Bongalon vs People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 169533 March 20, 2013

Facts: The Prosecution showed that on May 11, 2002, Jayson Dela Cruz (Jayson) and Roldan, his older
brother, both minors, joined the evening procession for the Santo Niño at Oro Site in Legazpi City; that
when the procession passed in front of the petitioner’s house, the latter’s daughter Mary Ann Rose, also a
minor, threw stones at Jayson and called him “sissy”; that the petitioner confronted Jayson and Roldan and
called them names like “strangers” and “animals”; that the petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his
hand, and slapped Jayson on the face; that the petitioner then went to the brothers’ house and challenged
Rolando dela Cruz, their father, to a fight, but Rolando did not come out of the house to take on the
petitioner; that Rolando later brought Jayson to the Legazpi City Police Station and reported the incident;
that Jayson also underwent medical treatment at the Bicol Regional Training and Teaching Hospital; that
the doctors who examined Jayson issued two medical certificates attesting that Jayson suffered the following
contusions, to wit: (1) contusion .5 x 2.5 scapular area, left; and (2) +1×1 cm. contusion left zygomatic area
and contusion .5 x 2.33 cm. scapular area, left. On his part, the petitioner denied having physically abused
or maltreated Jayson. He explained that he only talked with Jayson and Roldan after Mary Ann Rose and
Cherrylyn, his minor daughters, had told him about Jayson and Roldan’s throwing stones at them and
about Jayson’s burning Cherrylyn’s hair. He denied shouting invectives at and challenging Rolando to a
fight, insisting that he only told Rolando to restrain his sons from harming his daughters. To corroborate
the petitioner’s testimony, Mary Ann Rose testified that her father did not hit or slap but only confronted
Jayson, asking why Jayson had called her daughters “Kimi” and why he had burned Cherrlyn’s hair. Mary
Ann Rose denied throwing stones at Jayson and calling him a “sissy.” She insisted that it was instead Jayson
who had pelted her with stones during the procession. She described the petitioner as a loving and
protective father.

Issues: Whether or not the proper remedy of the petitioner is via a petition for certiorari.

Whether or not petitioner is liable for child abuse.

Held: No. The special civil action for certiorari is intended for the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal office is only to keep the
inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. As observed in Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Court of Appeals, et al. “the special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of
errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The raison d’etre for the rule is when a court exercises its
jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprived it of the jurisdiction being exercised
when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction
and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. In such a scenario, the administration of justice
would not survive. Hence, where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the
decision–not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision–the same is beyond the province of a
special civil action for certiorari. The proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a decision of the Court of
Appeals is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and other Conditions Prejudicial to the
Child’s Development. – (a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or
exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child’s development including those
covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period. x x x x

Child abuse, the crime charged, is defined by Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610, as follows:
Section 3. Definition of terms. – x x x x (b) “Child Abuse” refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or
not, of the child which includes any of the following: (1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty,
sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment; (2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or
demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being; (3) Unreasonable deprivation of his
basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or (4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an
injured child resulting in serious impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity
or death.

The records did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that his laying of hands on Jayson had been intended
to debase the “intrinsic worth and dignity” of Jayson as a human being, or that he had thereby intended to
humiliate or embarrass Jayson. The records showed the laying of hands on Jayson to have been done at the
spur of the moment and in anger, indicative of his being then overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the
personal safety of his own minor daughters who had just suffered harm at the hands of Jayson and Roldan.
With the loss of his self-control, he lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic
worth and dignity of a child as a human being that was so essential in the crime of child abuse.

G.R. No. 169533, March 20, 2013

Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes the crime of child abuse under Section 10 (a)
of Republic Act No. 7610. Only when the laying of hands is shown beyond reasonable doubt to be intended
by the accused to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being
should it be punished as child abuse. Otherwise, it is punished under the Revised Penal Code.

FACTS: On May 11, 2002, Jayson Dela Cruz (Jayson) and Roldan, his older brother, both minors, joined
the evening procession for the Santo Niño at Oro Site in Legazpi City; that when the procession passed in
front of the petitioner’s house, the latter’s daughter Mary Ann Rose, also a minor, threw stones at Jayson
and called him “sissy”; that the petitioner confronted Jayson and Roldan and called them names like
“strangers” and “animals”; that the petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his hand, and slapped Jayson
on the face; that the petitioner then went to the brothers’ house and challenged Rolando dela Cruz, their
father, to a fight, but Rolando did not come out of the house to take on the petitioner; that Rolando later
brought Jayson to the Legazpi City Police Station and reported the incident; that Jayson also underwent
medical treatment at the Bicol Regional Training and Teaching Hospital; that the doctors who examined
Jayson issued two medical certificates attesting that Jayson suffered contusions.

Petitioner denied having physically abused or maltreated Jayson. He explained that he only talked with
Jayson and Roldan after his minor daughters had told him about Jayson and Roldan’s throwing stones at
them and about Jayson’s burning Cherrylyn’s hair. He denied shouting invectives at and challenging
Rolando to a fight, insisting that he only told Rolando to restrain his sons from harming his daughters.

Crime charged: child abuse, an act in violation of Section 10(a) of R.A. 7610

RTC: found and declared the petitioner guilty of child abuse as charged

CA: affirmed the conviction, but modified the penalty

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was guilty of the crime charged and that even assuming that he was
guilty, his liability should be mitigated because he had merely acted to protect her two minor daughters
(ONLY SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES; PENALTY IS MITIGATED)

HELD: Although the Court affirms the factual findings of fact by the RTC and the CA to the effect that the
petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his hand and slapped Jayson on the face, it disagrees with their
holding that his acts constituted child abuse within the purview of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610.
The records did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that his laying of hands on Jayson had been intended
to debase the “intrinsic worth and dignity” of Jayson as a human being, or that he had thereby intended to
humiliate or embarrass Jayson. The records showed the laying of hands on Jayson to have been done at the
spur of the moment and in anger, indicative of his being then overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the
personal safety of his own minor daughters who had just suffered harm at the hands of Jayson and Roldan.
With the loss of his selfcontrol, he lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic
worth and dignity of a child as a human being that was so essential in the crime of child abuse.

It is not trite to remind that under the well-recognized doctrine of pro reo, every doubt is resolved in favor
of the petitioner as the accused. Thus, the Court should consider all possible circumstances in his favor.
Considering that Jayson’s physical injury required five to seven days of medical attention, the petitioner
was liable for slight physical injuries under Article 266(1) of the Revised Penal Code.

The penalty for slight physical injuries is arresto menor, which ranges from one day to 30 days of
imprisonment. In imposing the correct penalty, however, the Court has to consider the mitigating
circumstance of passion or obfuscation under Article 13(6) of the Revised Penal Code, because the petitioner
lost his reason and self-control, thereby diminishing the exercise of his will power. It is relevant to mention,
too, that in passion or obfuscation, the offender suffers a diminution of intelligence and intent.

Arresto menor is prescribed in its minimum period in the absence of any aggravating circumstance that
offset the mitigating circumstance of passion. Accordingly, with the Indeterminate Sentence Law being
inapplicable due to the penalty imposed not exceeding one year, the petitioner shall suffer a straight penalty
of 10 days of arresto menor.

G.R. No. 169533 March 20, 2013

GEORGE BONGALON, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes the crime of child abuse under Section 10 (a)
of Republic Act No. 7610.1 Only when the laying of hands is shown beyond reasonable doubt to be intended
by the accused to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being
should it be punished as child abuse. Otherwise, it is punished under the Revised Penal Code.
The Case

On June 22, 2005,2 the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction of the petitioner for the crime of child
abuse under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610.
Antecedents

On June 26, 2000, the Prosecutor’s Office of Legazpi City charged the petitioner in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Legazpi City with child abuse, an act in violation of Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610,
alleging as follows:
That on or about the 11th day of May 2000, in the City of Legazpi Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
commit on the person of JAYSON DELA CRUZ, a twelve year-old,
Grade VI pupil of MABA Institute, Legazpi City, acts of physical abuse and/or maltreatment by striking
said JAYSON DELA CRUZ with his palm hitting the latter at his back and by slapping said minor hitting
his left cheek and uttering derogatory remarks to the latter’s family to wit: "Mga hayop kamo, para dayo
kamo digdi, Iharap mo dito ama mo" (You all animals, you are all strangers here. Bring your father here),
which acts of the accused are prejudicial to the child’s development and which demean the intrinsic worth
and dignity of the said child as a human being.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The Prosecution showed that on May 11, 2002, Jayson Dela Cruz (Jayson) and Roldan, his older brother,
both minors, joined the evening procession for the Santo Niño at Oro Site in Legazpi City; that when the
procession passed in front of the petitioner’s house, the latter’s daughter Mary Ann Rose, also a minor,
threw stones at Jayson and called him "sissy"; that the petitioner confronted Jayson and Roldan and called
them names like "strangers" and "animals"; that the petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his hand,
and slapped Jayson on the face;4 that the petitioner then went to the brothers’ house and challenged
Rolando dela Cruz, their father, to a fight, but Rolando did not come out of the house to take on the
petitioner; that Rolando later brought Jayson to the Legazpi City Police Station and reported the incident;
that Jayson also underwent medical treatment at the Bicol Regional Training and Teaching Hospital;5 that
the doctors who examined Jayson issued two medical certificates attesting that Jayson suffered the following
contusions, to wit: (1) contusion .5 x 2.5 scapular area, left; and (2) +1x1 cm. contusion left zygomatic area
and contusion .5 x 2.33 cm. scapular area, left.6
On his part, the petitioner denied having physically abused or maltreated Jayson. He explained that he only
talked with Jayson and Roldan after Mary Ann Rose and Cherrylyn, his minor daughters, had told him
about Jayson and Roldan’s throwing stones at them and about Jayson’s burning Cherrylyn’s hair. He
denied shouting invectives at and challenging Rolando to a fight, insisting that he only told Rolando to
restrain his sons from harming his daughters.7
To corroborate the petitioner’s testimony, Mary Ann Rose testified that her father did not hit or slap but
only confronted Jayson, asking why Jayson had called her daughters "Kimi" and why he had burned
Cherrlyn’s hair. Mary Ann Rose denied throwing stones at Jayson and calling him a "sissy." She insisted
that it was instead Jayson who had pelted her with stones during the procession. She described the
petitioner as a loving and protective father.8
Ruling of the RTC

After trial, the RTC found and declared the petitioner guilty of child abuse as charged, to wit:9
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused
GEORGE BONGALON @ "GI" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Republic Act No. 7610,
and is hereby ordered to undergo imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years of prision
mayor in its minimum period.
SO ORDERED.
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the petitioner assailed the credibility of the Prosecution witnesses by citing their inconsistencies.
He contended that the RTC overlooked or disregarded material facts and circumstances in the records that
would have led to a favorable judgment for him. He attacked the lack of credibility of the witnesses
presented against him, citing the failure of the complaining brothers to react to the incident, which was
unnatural and contrary to human experience.
The CA affirmed the conviction, but modified the penalty,10 viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated October 20, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 9 of Legazpi City is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that accused-appellant George
Bongalon is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional, as minimum term, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and 1 day of prision mayor as the
maximum term.
Further, accused-appellant is ordered to pay the victim, Jayson de la Cruz the additional amount of ₱5,000
as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
Issues

The petitioner has come to the Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.11
The petitioner asserts that he was not guilty of the crime charged; and that even assuming that he was
guilty, his liability should be mitigated because he had merely acted to protect her two minor daughters.
Ruling of the Court
At the outset, we should observe that the petitioner has adopted the wrong remedy in assailing the CA’s
affirmance of his conviction. His proper recourse from the affirmance of his conviction was an appeal taken
in due course. Hence, he should have filed a petition for review on certiorari. Instead, he wrongly brought a
petition for certiorari. We explained why in People v. Court of Appeals:12
The special civil action for certiorari is intended for the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal office is only to keep the inferior
court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. As observed in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court
of Appeals, et al. "the special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The raison d’etre for the rule is when a court exercises its
jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprived it of the jurisdiction being exercised
when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction
and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. In such a scenario, the administration of justice
would not survive. Hence, where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the
decision–not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision–the same is beyond the province of a
special civil action for certiorari. The proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a decision of the Court of
Appeals is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
It is of no consequence that the petitioner alleges grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA in his
petition. The allegation of grave abuse of discretion no more warrants the granting of due course to the
petition as one for certiorari if appeal was available as a proper and adequate remedy. At any rate, a
reading of his presentation of the issues in his petition indicates that he thereby imputes to the CA errors of
judgment, not errors of jurisdiction. He mentions instances attendant during the commission of the crime
that he claims were really constitutive of justifying and mitigating circumstances; and specifies reasons why
he believes Republic Act No. 7610 favors his innocence rather than his guilt for the crime charged.13 The
errors he thereby underscores in the petition concerned only the CA’s appreciation and assessment of the
evidence on record, which really are errors of judgment, not of jurisdiction.
Even if we were to treat the petition as one brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, it would still be
defective due to its being filed beyond the period provided by law. Section 2 of Rule 45 requires the filing of
the petition within 15 days from the notice of judgment to be appealed. However, the petitioner received a
copy of the CA’s decision on July 15, 2005,14 but filed the petition only on September 12, 2005,15 or well
beyond the period prescribed by the Rules of Court.
The procedural transgressions of the petitioner notwithstanding, we opt to forego quickly dismissing the
petition, and instead set ourselves upon the task of resolving the issues posed by the petition on their merits.
We cannot fairly and justly ignore his plea about the sentence imposed on him not being commensurate to
the wrong he committed. His plea is worthy of another long and hard look. If, on the other hand, we were to
outrightly dismiss his plea because of the procedural lapses he has committed, the Court may be seen as an
unfeeling tribunal of last resort willing to sacrifice justice in order to give premium to the rigidity of its rules
of procedure. But the Rules of Court has not been intended to be rigidly enforced at all times. Rather, it has
been instituted first and foremost to ensure justice to every litigant. Indeed, its announced objective has
been to secure a "just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding."16 This objective
will be beyond realization here unless the Rules of Court be given liberal construction and application as the
noble ends of justice demand. Thereby, we give primacy to substance over form, which, to a temple of
justice and equity like the Court, now becomes the ideal ingredient in the dispensation of justice in the case
now awaiting our consideration.
The petitioner’s right to liberty is in jeopardy. He may be entirely deprived of such birthright without due
process of law unless we shunt aside the rigidity of the rules of procedure and review his case. Hence, we
treat this recourse as an appeal timely brought to the Court. Consonant with the basic rule in criminal
procedure that an appeal opens the whole case for review, we should deem it our duty to correct errors in
the appealed judgment, whether assigned or not.17
The law under which the petitioner was charged, tried and found guilty of violating is Section 10 (a), Article
VI of Republic Act No. 7610, which relevantly states:
Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and other Conditions Prejudicial to the
Child’s Development. –
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for
other conditions prejudicial to the child’s development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential
Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
xxxx
Child abuse, the crime charged, is defined by Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610, as follows:
Section 3. Definition of terms. –
xxxx
(b) "Child Abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any of
the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child
as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of his
growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.
xxxx
Although we affirm the factual findings of fact by the RTC and the CA to the effect that the petitioner
struck Jayson at the back with his hand and slapped Jayson on the face, we disagree with their holding that
his acts constituted child abuse within the purview of the above-quoted provisions. The records did not
establish beyond reasonable doubt that his laying of hands on Jayson had been intended to debase the
"intrinsic worth and dignity" of Jayson as a human being, or that he had thereby intended to humiliate or
embarrass Jayson. The records showed the laying of hands on Jayson to have been done at the spur of the
moment and in anger, indicative of his being then overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the personal
safety of his own minor daughters who had just suffered harm at the hands of Jayson and Roldan. With the
loss of his self-control, he lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and
dignity of a child as a human being that was so essential in the crime of child abuse.
It is not trite to remind that under the well-recognized doctrine of pro reo every doubt is resolved in favor of
the petitioner as the accused. Thus, the Court should consider all possible circumstances in his favor.18
What crime, then, did the petitioner commit?
Considering that Jayson’s physical injury required five to seven days of medical attention,19 the petitioner
was liable for slight physical injuries under Article 266 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
Article 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. — The crime of slight physical injuries shall be
punished:
1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall incapacitate the offended
party for labor from one to nine days, or shall require medical attendance during the same period.
xxxx
The penalty for slight physical injuries is arresto menor, which ranges from one day to 30 days of
imprisonment.20 In imposing the correct penalty, however, we have to consider the mitigating circumstance
of passion or obfuscation under Article 13 (6) of the Revised Penal Code,21 because the petitioner lost his
reason and self-control, thereby diminishing the exercise of his will power.22 Passion or obfuscation may
lawfully arise from causes existing only in the honest belief of the accused.23 It is relevant to mention, too,
that in passion or obfuscation, the offender suffers a diminution of intelligence and intent. With his having
acted under the belief that Jayson and Roldan had thrown stones at his two minor daughters, and that
Jayson had burned Cherrlyn’s hair, the petitioner was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion.
Arresto menor is prescribed in its minimum period (i.e., one day to 10 days) in the absence of any
aggravating circumstance that offset the mitigating circumstance of passion. Accordingly, with the
Indeterminate Sentence Law being inapplicable due to the penalty imposed not exceeding one year,24 the
petitioner shall suffer a straight penalty of 10 days of arresto menor.
The award of moral damages to Jayson is appropriate. Such damages are granted in criminal cases
resulting in physical injuries.25 The amount of ₱5,000.00 fixed by the lower courts as moral damages is
consistent with the current jurisprudence.26
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals; and ENTER a new judgment: (a)
finding petitioner George Bongalon GUlLTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of SLIGHT PHYSICAL
INJURIES under paragraph 1, Article 266, of the Revised Penal Code; (b) sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of 10 days of arresto menor; and (c) ordering him to pay Jayson Dela Cruz the amount of ₱5,000.00
as moral damages, plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMULO SAULO, AMELIA DE LA CRUZ, and
CLODUALDO DE LA CRUZ, accused.

ROMULO SAULO, accused-appellant.

[G.R. No. 125903. November 15, 2000]

FACTS:
Accused-appellant, together with Amelia de la Cruz and Clodualdo de la Cruz, were charged with
violation of Article 38 (b) of the Labor Code[1] illegal recruitment in large scale and the accused were also
charged with three counts of estafa.
During a meeting sometime in April or May, 1990, ROMULO SAULO told BENNY MALIGAYA
that she would be able to leave for Taiwan as a factory worker once she gave him the fees for the processing
of her documents. Sometime in May, 1990, Maligaya also met with AMELIA DE LA CRUZ and
CLODUALDO DE LA CRUZ at their house in Baesa, Quezon City and they assured her that they were
authorized by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) to recruit workers for Taiwan.
Maligaya paid accused-appellant and Amelia de la Cruz the amount of P35,000.00, which is evidenced by a
receipt signed by accused-appellant and Amelia de la Cruz. Seeing that he had reneged on his promise to
send her to Taiwan, Maligaya filed a complaint against accused-appellant with the POEA.
Meanwhile, ANGELES JAVIER was told by Ligaya, accused-appellants wife, to apply for work
abroad through accused-appellant. At a meeting in accused-appellants Quezon City residence, Javier was
told by accused-appellant that he could get her a job in Taiwan as a factory worker and that she should give
him P35,000.00 for purposes of preparing Javier’s passport. Javier gave an initial amount of P20,000.00 to
accused-appellant, but she did not ask for a receipt as she trusted him. As the overseas employment never
materialized, Javier was prompted to bring the matter before the POEA.
On April 19, 1990, LEODIGARIO MAULLON, upon the invitation of his neighbor Araceli
Sanchez, went to accused-appellants house in order to discuss his prospects for gaining employment abroad.
As in the case of Maligaya and Javier, accused-appellant assured Maullon that he could secure him a job as
a factory worker in Taiwan if he pays him for the processing of his papers. Maullon pay to accused-
appellants wife, who issued a receipt. Thereafter, Maullon paid an additional amount in the presence of
accused-appellant and Amelia de la Cruz, which payment is also evidenced by a receipt. Finally, Maullon
pay to a certain Loreta Tumalig, a friend of accused-appellant, as shown by a receipt. Again, accused-
appellant failed to deliver on the promised employment. Maullon thus filed a complaint with the POEA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not ROMULO SAULO is guilty of the act of Illegal Recruitment and estafa.
HELD:
Yes. The Court finds that the trial court was justified in holding that accused-appellant was
engaged in unlawful recruitment and placement activities. The prosecution clearly established that accused-
appellant promised the three complainants - Benny Maligaya, Angeles Javier and Leodigario Maullon
employment in Taiwan as factory workers and that he asked them for money in order to process their
papers and procure their passports. It is not disputed that accused-appellant is not authorized nor
licensedby the Department of Labor and Employment to engage in recruitment and placement activities.
The absence of the necessary license or authority renders all of accused-appellants recruitment activities
criminal.
It is also well established in jurisprudence that a person may be charged and convicted for both
illegal recruitment and estafa. The reason for this is that illegal recruitment is a malum prohibitum,
whereas estafa is malum in se, meaning that the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for
conviction in the former, but is required in the latter.
WHEREFORE, Decision of the Trial Court is AFFIRMED subject to MODIFICATIONS.

[1] Art. 38. Illegal recruitment. x x x (b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale
shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized in accordance with
Article 39 hereof.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more
persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal
transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed
committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group. Labor
Code.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 125903. November 15, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMULO SAULO, AMELIA DE LA CRUZ, and
CLODUALDO DE LA CRUZ, accused.
ROMULO SAULO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

Accused-appellant, together with Amelia de la Cruz and Clodualdo de la Cruz, were charged with violation
of Article 38 (b) of the Labor Code[1] for illegal recruitment in large scale in an information which states

CRIM. CASE NO. Q-91-21911

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses ROMULO SAULO, AMELIA DE LA CRUZ and
CLODUALDO DE LA CRUZ, of the crime of ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE (ART.
38(b) in relation to Art. 39(a) of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended by P.D. No. 2018, committed
as follows:

That on or about the period comprised from April 1990 to May 1990 in Quezon City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping one another, by falsely representing themselves to have the
capacity to contract, enlist and recruit workers for employment abroad, did, then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement abroad to
LEODEGARIO MAULLON, BENY MALIGAYA and ANGELES JAVIER, without first securing the
required license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment, in violation of said law.

That the crime described above is committed in large scale as the same was perpetrated against three (3)
persons individually or as [a] group penalized under Articles 38 and 39 as amended by PD 2018 of the
Labor Code (P.D. 442).

CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]

In addition, accused were charged with three counts of estafa (Criminal Case Nos. Q-91-21908, Q-91-21909
and Q-91-21910). Except for the names of the complainants, the dates of commission of the crime charged,
and the amounts involved, the informations[3] were identical in their allegations

CRIM. CASE NO. Q-91-21908

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses ROMULO SAULO, AMELIA DE LA CRUZ AND
CLODUALDO DE LA CRUZ of the crime of ESTAFA (Art. 315, par. 2 (a) RPC), committed as follows:

That on or about the period comprised from April 1990 to May 1990, in Quezon City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping one another, with intent of gain, by means of false pretenses and/or
fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, did, then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud one BENY MALIGAYA, in the following manner, to wit: on the
date and in the place aforementioned, accused falsely pretended to the offended party that they had
connection and capacity to deploy workers for overseas employment and that they could secure
employment/placement for said Beny Maligaya and believing said misrepresentations, the offended party
was later induced to give accused, as in fact she did give the total amount of P35,000.00, Philippine
Currency, and once in possession of the said amount and far from complying with their commitment and
despite repeated demands made upon them to return said amount, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously and with intent to defraud, misappropriate, misapply and convert the same to their own
personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said offended party in the aforementioned amount
and in such amount as may be awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to all the charges against him. Meanwhile accused
Amelia de la Cruz and Clodualdo de la Cruz have remained at large.

During trial, the prosecution sought to prove the following material facts and circumstances surrounding
the commission of the crimes:

Benny Maligaya, having learned from a relative of accused-appellant that the latter was recruiting workers
for Taiwan, went to accused-appellants house in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, together with
Angeles Javier and Amelia de la Cruz, in order to discuss her chances for overseas employment. During that
meeting which took place sometime in April or May, 1990, accused-appellant told Maligaya that she would
be able to leave for Taiwan as a factory worker once she gave accused-appellant the fees for the processing
of her documents. Sometime in May, 1990, Maligaya also met with Amelia de la Cruz and Clodualdo de la
Cruz at their house in Baesa, Quezon City and they assured her that they were authorized by the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) to recruit workers for Taiwan. Maligaya paid accused-
appellant and Amelia de la Cruz the amount of P35,000.00, which is evidenced by a receipt dated May 21,
1990 signed by accused-appellant and Amelia de la Cruz (Exhibit A in Crim. Case No. Q-91-21908). Seeing
that he had reneged on his promise to send her to Taiwan, Maligaya filed a complaint against accused-
appellant with the POEA.[4]

Angeles Javier, a widow and relative by affinity of accused-appellant, was told by Ligaya, accused-
appellants wife, to apply for work abroad through accused-appellant. At a meeting in accused-appellants
Quezon City residence, Javier was told by accused-appellant that he could get her a job in Taiwan as a
factory worker and that she should give him P35,000.00 for purposes of preparing Javiers passport. Javier
gave an initial amount of P20,000.00 to accused-appellant, but she did not ask for a receipt as she trusted
him. As the overseas employment never materialized, Javier was prompted to bring the matter before the
POEA.[5]

On April 19, 1990, Leodigario Maullon, upon the invitation of his neighbor Araceli Sanchez, went to
accused-appellants house in order to discuss his prospects for gaining employment abroad. As in the case of
Maligaya and Javier, accused-appellant assured Maullon that he could secure him a job as a factory worker
in Taiwan if he paid him P30,000.00 for the processing of his papers. Maullon paid P7,900.00 to accused-
appellants wife, who issued a receipt dated April 21, 1990 (Exhibit A in Crim. Case No. Q-91-21910).
Thereafter, Maullon paid an additional amount of P6,800.00 in the presence of accused-appellant and
Amelia de la Cruz, which payment is also evidenced by a receipt dated April 25, 1990 (Exhibit B in Crim.
Case No. Q-91-21910). Finally, Maullon paid P15,700.00 to a certain Loreta Tumalig, a friend of accused-
appellant, as shown by a receipt dated September 14, 1990 (Exhibit C in Crim. Case No. Q-91-21910).
Again, accused-appellant failed to deliver on the promised employment. Maullon thus filed a complaint with
the POEA.[6]

The prosecution also presented a certification dated July 26, 1994 issued by the POEA stating that accused
are not licensed to recruit workers for overseas employment (Exhibit A in Crim. Case No. Q-91-21911).[7]

In his defense, accused-appellant claimed that he was also applying with Amelia de la Cruz for overseas
employment. He asserts that it was for this reason that he met all three complainants as they all went
together to Amelia de la Cruz house in Novaliches, Quezon City sometime in May, 1990 in order to follow
up their applications. Accused-appellant flatly denied that he was an overseas employment recruiter or that
he was working as an agent for one. He also denied having received any money from any of the
complainants or having signed any of the receipts introduced by the prosecution in evidence. It is accused-
appellants contention that the complainants were prevailed upon by accused-appellants mother-in-law, with
whom he had a misunderstanding, to file the present cases against him.[8]

The trial court found accused-appellant guilty of three counts of estafa and of illegal recruitment in large
scale. It adjudged:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Romulo Saulo:

A. In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21908, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code as amended, without any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, and this Court hereby sentences the accused Romulo Saulo to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of three (3) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as
minimum to seven (7) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, and to indemnify the
complainant Beny Maligaya in the amount of P35,000.00, with interest thereon at 12% per annum until the
said amount is fully paid, with costs against the said accused.

B. In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21909, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code as amended, without any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, and this Court hereby sentences the accused Romulo Saulo to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as
minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant
Angeles Javier in the amount of P20,000.00 with interest thereon at 12% per annum until the said amount is
fully paid, with costs against said accused.

C. In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21910, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code as amended, without any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, and this Court hereby sentences the accused Romulo Saulo to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as
minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant
Leodigario Maullon in the amount of P30,400.00 with interest thereon at 12% per annum until the said
amount is fully paid, with costs against said accused.

D. In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21911, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale
as defined and punished under Article 38 (b) in relation to Article 39 (a) of the Labor Code of the
Philippines as amended, and this Court sentences the accused Romulo Saulo to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00).

Being a detention prisoner, the accused Romulo Saulo shall be entitled to the benefits of Article 29 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended.

SO ORDERED.[9]

The Court finds no merit in the instant appeal.

The essential elements of illegal recruitment in large scale, as defined in Art. 38 (b) of the Labor Code and
penalized under Art. 39 of the same Code, are as follows:

(1) the accused engages in the recruitment and placement of workers, as defined under Article 13 (b) or in
any prohibited activities under Article 34 of the Labor Code;

(2) accused has not complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment,
particularly with respect to the securing of a license or an authority to recruit and deploy workers, whether
locally or overseas; and

(3) accused commits the same against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group.[10]

Under Art. 13 (b) of the Labor Code, recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services,
promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not; Provided, That any
person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall
be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.

After a careful and circumspect review of the records, the Court finds that the trial court was justified in
holding that accused-appellant was engaged in unlawful recruitment and placement activities. The
prosecution clearly established that accused-appellant promised the three complainants - Benny Maligaya,
Angeles Javier and Leodigario Maullon employment in Taiwan as factory workers and that he asked them
for money in order to process their papers and procure their passports. Relying completely upon such
representations, complainants entrusted their hard-earned money to accused-appellant in exchange for
what they would later discover to be a vain hope of obtaining employment abroad. It is not disputed that
accused-appellant is not authorized[11] nor licensed[12] by the Department of Labor and Employment to
engage in recruitment and placement activities. The absence of the necessary license or authority renders all
of accused-appellants recruitment activities criminal.

Accused-appellant interposes a denial in his defense, claiming that he never received any money from the
complainants nor processed their papers. Instead, accused-appellant insists that he was merely a co-
applicant of the complainants and similarly deceived by the schemes of Amelia and Clodualdo de la Cruz.
He contends that the fact that Benny Maligaya and Angleles Javier went to the house of Amelia and
Clodualdo de la Cruz in Novaliches, Quezon City, to get back their money and to follow-up their application
proves that complainants knew that it was the de la Cruz who received the processing fees, and not accused-
appellant. Further, accused-appellant argues that complainants could not have honestly believed that he
could get them their passports since they did not give him any of the necessary documents, such as their
birth certificate, baptismal certificate, NBI clearance, and marriage contract.

Accused-appellants asseverations are self-serving and uncorroborated by clear and convincing evidence.
They cannot stand against the straightforward and explicit testimonies of the complainants, who have
identified accused-appellant as the person who enticed them to part with their money upon his
representation that he had the capability of obtaining employment for them abroad. In the absence of any
evidence that the prosecution witnesses were motivated by improper motives, the trial courts assessment of
the credibility of the witnesses shall not be interfered with by this Court.[13]

The fact that accused-appellant did not sign all the receipts issued to complainants does not weaken the case
of the prosecution. A person charged with illegal recruitment may be convicted on the strength of the
testimonies of the complainants, if found to be credible and convincing.[14] The absence of receipts to
evidence payment does not warrant an acquittal of the accused, and it is not necessarily fatal to the
prosecutions cause.[15]

Accused-appellant contends that he could not have committed the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale
since Nancy Avelino, a labor and employment officer at the POEA, testified that licenses for recruitment
and placement are issued only to corporations and not to natural persons. This argument is specious and
illogical. The Labor Code states that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.[16]
Corrolarily, a nonlicensee or nonholder of authority is any person, corporation or entity which has not been
issued a valid license or authority to engage in recruitment and placement by the Secretary of Labor, or
whose license or authority has been suspended, revoked, or canceled by the POEA or the Secretary.[17] It
also bears stressing that agents or representatives appointed by a licensee or a holder of authority but whose
appointments are not previously authorized by the POEA fall within the meaning of the term nonlicensee or
nonholder of authority.[18] Thus, any person, whether natural or juridical, that engages in recruitment
activities without the necessary license or authority shall be penalized under Art. 39 of the Labor Code.

It is well established in jurisprudence that a person may be charged and convicted for both illegal
recruitment and estafa. The reason for this is that illegal recruitment is a malum prohibitum, whereas estafa
is malum in se, meaning that the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction in the former,
but is required in the latter.[19]

The elements of estafa under Art. 315, paragraph 2 (a), of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that the accused
has defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by deceit, and (2) that damage or prejudice capable of
pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person.[20] The trial court was correct in
holding accused-appellant liable for estafa in the case at bench. Owing to accused-appellants false
assurances that he could provide them with work in another country, complainants parted with their
money, to their damage and prejudice, since the promised employment never materialized.

Under Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the crime of estafa is as follows:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if
the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds
the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one
year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed under the
provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.

xxx xxx xxx

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum shall
be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed for the offense. Since the penalty prescribed
by law for the estafa charge against accused-appellant is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor
minimum, the penalty next lower in degree is prision correccional minimum to medium. Thus, the minimum
term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere within six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4)
years and two (2) months.

In fixing the maximum term, the prescribed penalty of prision correccional maximum to prision mayor
minimum should be divided into three equal portions of time, each of which portion shall be deemed to form
one period, as follows

Minimum Period : From 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 5 years, 5 months and 10 days

Medium Period : From 5 years, 5 months and 11 days to 6 years, 8 months and 20 days

Maximum Period : From 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years

pursuant to Article 65, in relation to Article 64, of the Revised Penal Code.

When the amounts involved in the offense exceeds P22,000, the penalty prescribed in Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional
P10,000.00, although the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty (20) years.[21]

Accordingly, the following penalties shall be imposed upon accused-appellant:

In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21908 where accused-appellant defrauded Benny Maligaya in the amount of
P35,000.00, one year for the additional amount of P13,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 provided for in Article
315 shall be added to the maximum period of the prescribed penalty of prision correccional maximum to
prision mayor minimum. Thus, accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years,
and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as minimum to nine (9) years of prision mayor as
maximum.[22] Accused-appellant shall also pay Benny Maligaya P35,000.00 by way of actual damages.

In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21909 where accused-appellant defrauded Angeles Javier in the amount of
P20,000.00, accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight (8) months and
twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days
of prision correccional maximum. Accused-appellant shall also pay Angeles Javier P20,000.00 by way of
actual damages.

In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21910 where accused-appellant defrauded Leodigario Maullon in the amount of
P30,400.00, accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional medium, as minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum.[23] Accused-
appellant shall also pay Leodigario Maullon P30,400.00 by way of actual damages.

In addition, for the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale (Criminal Case No. Q-91-21911) and pursuant
to Article 39 (a) of the Labor Code, accused-appellant shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a
fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00).

WHEREFORE, the March 6, 1996 Decision of the trial court finding accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa is hereby AFFIRMED subject
to the following modifications:

In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21908 where accused-appellant defrauded Benny Maligaya in the amount of
P35,000.00, one year for the additional amount of P13,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 provided for in Article
315 shall be added to the maximum period of the prescribed penalty of prision correccional maximum to
prision mayor minimum. Thus, accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years,
and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as minimum to nine (9) years of prision mayor as
maximum. Accused-appellant shall also pay Benny Maligaya P35,000.00 by way of actual damages.

In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21909 where accused-appellant defrauded Angeles Javier in the amount of
P20,000.00, accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight (8) months and
twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days
of prision correccional maximum. Accused-appellant shall also pay Angeles Javier P20,000.00 by way of
actual damages.

In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21910 where accused-appellant defrauded Leodigario Maullon in the amount of
P30,400.00, accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional medium, as minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum. Accused-
appellant shall also pay Leodigario Maullon P30,400.00 by way of actual damages.

In addition, for the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale (Criminal Case No. Q-91-21911) and pursuant
to Article 39 (a) of the Labor Code, accused-appellant shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a
fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00).

Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

[1] Presidential Decree No. 442.

[2] Rollo, 368-369.

[3] Ibid., 366-368.

[4] TSN, May 26, 1994, 2-17.

[5] TSN, June 16, 1994, 2-13.

[6] TSN, April 21, 1994, 2-15.

[7] TSN, August 18, 1994, 3-4.

[8] TSN, December 2, 1994, 2-15; TSN, December 8, 1994, 2-9; TSN, December 14, 1994, 1-12.

[9] Rollo, 371-372.

[10] People v. Sadiosa, 290 SCRA 92 (1998); People v. Benedictus, 288 SCRA 319 (1998).

[11] Art. 13 of the Labor Code provides

(f) Authority means a document issued by the Department of Labor authorizing a person or association to
engage in recruitment and placement activities as a private recruitment entity.

[12] Art. 13 of the Labor Code provides

(d) License means a document issued by the Department of Labor authorizing a person or entity to operate
a private employment agency.

[13] People v. Cabiles, 284 SCRA 199 (1998); People v. Obello, 284 SCRA 79 (1998).

[14] People v. Saley, 291 SCRA 715 (1998); People v. Sanchez, 291 SCRA 333 (1998).

[15] People v. Juego, 298 SCRA 22 (1998); People v. Saley, id.

[16] Art. 13 (b).

[17] Abaca v. Court of Appeals, 290 SCRA 657 (1998), citing Sec. 1 (d) of the Rules Implementing P.D. 1920
promulgated on July 12, 1984.

[18] Id., citing Sec. 1, Rule V, Book II of the POEA Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment
promulgated on May 21, 1985.

[19] People v. Sanchez, supra; People v. Sadiosa, supra.

[20] People v. Saley, supra.

[21] Id.

[22] People vs. Menil, G. R. No. 115054-66, prom. September 12, 2000.

[23] Ibid.
[G.R. No. 128845. June 1, 2000]
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE), petitioner, vs. HON.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING in his capacity as the Secretary of Labor and Employment;
HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO in his capacity as the Acting Secretary of Labor and
Employment; DR. BRIAN MACCAULEY in his capacity as the Superintendent of International
School-Manila; and INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL, INC., respondents.

Receiving salaries less than their counterparts hired abroad, the local-hires of private respondent
School, mostly Filipinos, cry discrimination. We agree. That the local-hires are paid more than their
colleagues in other schools is, of course, beside the point. The point is that employees should be given
equal pay for work of equal value. That is a principle long honored in this jurisdiction. That is a principle
that rests on fundamental notions of justice. That is the principle we uphold today.
Private respondent International School, Inc. (the School, for short), pursuant to Presidential Decree
732, is a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic
personnel and other temporary residents.[1] To enable the School to continue carrying out its
educational program and improve its standard of instruction, Section 2(c) of the same decree authorizes
the School to
employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or
abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from
otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their employment, except laws that
have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees.
Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the
same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. The School employs four tests to determine
whether a faculty member should be classified as a foreign-hire or a local hire:
a.....What is one's domicile?
b.....Where is one's home economy?
c.....To which country does one owe economic allegiance?
d.....Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in the School and was the School
responsible for bringing that individual to the Philippines?[2]
Should the answer to any of these queries point to the Philippines, the faculty member is classified as a
local hire; otherwise, he or she is deemed a foreign-hire.
The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. These include housing,
transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires are also paid a
salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires. The School justifies the difference on two
"significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure, namely: (a) the "dislocation factor"
and (b) limited tenure. The School explains:
A foreign-hire would necessarily have to uproot himself from his home country, leave his
family and friends, and take the risk of deviating from a promising career path-all for the
purpose of pursuing his profession as an educator, but this time in a foreign land. The new
foreign hire is faced with economic realities: decent abode for oneself and/or for one's
family, effective means of transportation, allowance for the education of one's children,
adequate insurance against illness and death, and of course the primary benefit of a basic
salary/retirement compensation.
Because of a limited tenure, the foreign hire is confronted again with the same economic
reality after his term: that he will eventually and inevitably return to his home country
where he will have to confront the uncertainty of obtaining suitable employment after a
long period in a foreign land.
The compensation scheme is simply the School's adaptive measure to remain competitive
on an international level in terms of attracting competent professionals in the field of
international education.[3]
When negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement were held on June 1995, petitioner
International School Alliance of Educators, "a legitimate labor union and the collective bargaining
representative of all faculty members"[4] of the School, contested the difference in salary rates between
foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of whether foreign-hires should be included in
the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock between the parties.
On September 7, 1995, petitioner filed a notice of strike. The failure of the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board to bring the parties to a compromise prompted the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) to assume jurisdiction over the dispute. On June 10, 1996, the DOLE Acting
Secretary, Crescenciano B. Trajano, issued an Order resolving the parity and representation issues in
favor of the School. Then DOLE Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing subsequently denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration in an Order dated March 19, 1997. Petitioner now seeks relief in this Court.
Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory to Filipinos
and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.
The School disputes these claims and gives a breakdown of its faculty members, numbering 38 in all,
with nationalities other than Filipino, who have been hired locally and classified as local hires. [5]The
Acting Secretary of Labor found that these non-Filipino local-hires received the same benefits as the
Filipino local-hires:
The compensation package given to local-hires has been shown to apply to all, regardless of race. Truth
to tell, there are foreigners who have been hired locally and who are paid equally as Filipino local
hires.[6]
The Acting Secretary upheld the point-of-hire classification for the distinction in salary rates:
The principle "equal pay for equal work" does not find application in the present case. The
international character of the School requires the hiring of foreign personnel to deal with
different nationalities and different cultures, among the student population.
We also take cognizance of the existence of a system of salaries and benefits accorded to
foreign hired personnel which system is universally recognized. We agree that certain
amenities have to be provided to these people in order to entice them to render their
services in the Philippines and in the process remain competitive in the international
market.
Furthermore, we took note of the fact that foreign hires have limited contract of
employment unlike the local hires who enjoy security of tenure. To apply parity therefore,
in wages and other benefits would also require parity in other terms and conditions of
employment which include the employment contract.
A perusal of the parties' 1992-1995 CBA points us to the conditions and provisions for
salary and professional compensation wherein the parties agree as follows:
All members of the bargaining unit shall be compensated only in accordance
with Appendix C hereof provided that the Superintendent of the School has
the discretion to recruit and hire expatriate teachers from abroad, under
terms and conditions that are consistent with accepted international practice.
Appendix C of said CBA further provides:
The new salary schedule is deemed at equity with the Overseas Recruited
Staff (OSRS) salary schedule. The 25% differential is reflective of the agreed
value of system displacement and contracted status of the OSRS as
differentiated from the tenured status of Locally Recruited Staff (LRS).
To our mind, these provisions demonstrate the parties' recognition of the difference in the
status of two types of employees, hence, the difference in their salaries.
The Union cannot also invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of parity. It is
an established principle of constitutional law that the guarantee of equal protection of the
laws is not violated by legislation or private covenants based on reasonable classification.
A classification is reasonable if it is based on substantial distinctions and apply to all
 members of the same class. Verily, there is a substantial distinction between foreign hires
and local hires, the former enjoying only a limited tenure, having no amenities of their
own in the Philippines and have to be given a good compensation package in order to
attract them to join the teaching faculty of the School.[7]
We cannot agree.
That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution and laws
reflect the policy against these evils. The Constitution[8] in the Article on Social Justice and Human
Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and
enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities."
The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith."
International law, which springs from general principles of law,[9] likewise proscribes discrimination.
General principles of law include principles of equity,[10] i.e., the general principles of fairness and
justice, based on the test of what is reasonable.[11] The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,[12] the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,[13] the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,[14] the Convention against Discrimination in
Education,[15] the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and
Occupation[16] - all embody the general principle against discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness
and justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its
national laws.
In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of capital,
inequality and discrimination by the employer are all the more reprehensible.
The Constitution[17] specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of work." These
conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace - the factory, the office or the field - but include
as well the manner by which employers treat their employees.
The Constitution[18] also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all."
Similarly, the Labor Code[19] provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless of
sex, race or creed." It would be an affront to both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State, in
spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal employment opportunities, closes its eyes
to unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of employment.[20]
Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 135, for
example, prohibits and penalizes[21]the payment of lesser compensation to a female employee as
against a male employee for work of equal value. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an
employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization.
Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra, in Article 7 thereof,
provides:
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the
enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work, which ensure, in particular:
a.....Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:
i.....Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without
distinction of any kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions of
work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work;
x x x.
The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of
"equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and
responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries.[22] This rule applies to the School,
its "international character" notwithstanding.
The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local-hires perform work equal to
that of foreign-hires.[23] The Court finds this argument a little cavalier. If an employer accords
employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees perform equal work.
This presumption is borne by logic and human experience. If the employer pays one employee less than
the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others receive more.
That would be adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated against that employee; it is for
the employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly.
The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence here that foreign-
hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have similar functions
and responsibilities, which they perform under similar working conditions.
The School cannot invoke the need to entice foreign-hires to leave their domicile to rationalize the
distinction in salary rates without violating the principle of equal work for equal pay.
"Salary" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed.) as "a reward or recompense for services
performed." Similarly, the Philippine Legal Encyclopedia states that "salary" is the "[c]onsideration paid
at regular intervals for the rendering of services." In Songco v. National Labor Relations
Commission,[24] we said that:
"salary" means a recompense or consideration made to a person for his pains or industry
in another man's business. Whether it be derived from "salarium," or more fancifully from
"sal," the pay of the Roman soldier, it carries with it the fundamental idea of
compensation for services rendered. (Emphasis supplied.)
While we recognize the need of the School to attract foreign-hires, salaries should not be used as an
enticement to the prejudice of local-hires. The local-hires perform the same services as foreign-hires
and they ought to be paid the same salaries as the latter. For the same reason, the "dislocation factor"
and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates.
The dislocation factor and limited tenure affecting foreign-hires are adequately compensated by certain
benefits accorded them which are not enjoyed by local-hires, such as housing, transportation, shipping
costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances.
The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare," [25] "to
afford labor full protection."[26] The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations
between labor and capital.[27] These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with
public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the
common good.[28] Should such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to public policy, courts
will not hesitate to strike down these stipulations.
In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the
distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no
reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice of
the School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy and, certainly, does not
deserve the sympathy of this Court.
We agree, however, that foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires.
A bargaining unit is "a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the
entire body of employees, consistent with equity to the employer indicate to be the best suited to serve
the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the
law."[29] The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of the
employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees' interest, such as substantial
similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual
Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status. [30] The
basic test of an asserted bargaining unit's acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the
combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.[31]
It does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped together with local-
hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the School also shows
that these groups were always treated separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure; local-hires enjoy
security of tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar functions under the same working conditions
as the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not granted to local-hires. These benefits,
such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance, are reasonably
related to their status as foreign-hires, and justify the exclusion of the former from the latter. To include
foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with local-hires would not assure either group the exercise of their
respective collective bargaining rights.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The
Orders of the Secretary of Labor and Employment dated June 10, 1996 and March 19, 1997, are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as they uphold the practice of respondent School of according
foreign-hires higher salaries than local-hires.
SO ORDERED.

FACTS: International School Alliance of Educators (the School) hires both foreign and local teachers as
members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.

In which, the School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires including housing,
transportation, shipping costs, taxes, home leave travel allowance and a salary rate 25% more than
local hires based on “significant economic disadvantages”

The labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members of the School,
contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires.

The Union claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory to
Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Union can invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of parity.

RULING: Yes. The Labor Code’s and the Constitution’s provisions impregnably institutionalize in this
jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with
substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid
similar salaries.

If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees
perform equal work. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to
explain why he receives less or why the others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury.

The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence here that foreign-
hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have similar functions
and responsibilities, which they perform under similar working conditions.

Hence, the Court finds the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the
distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no
reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires.

PART III
Article 6

1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right to work, which includes the right of
everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely chooses or accepts, and will take
appropriate steps to safeguard this right.

2. The steps to be taken by a State Party to the present Covenant to achieve the full realization of this
right shall include technical and vocational guidance and training programmes, policies and techniques
to achieve steady economic, social and cultural development and full and productive employment under
conditions safeguarding fundamental political and economic freedoms to the individual.

Article 7

The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and
favourable conditions of work which ensure, in particular:

(a) Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:

(i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in
particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal
pay for equal work;

(ii) A decent living for themselves and their families in accordance with the provisions of the present
Covenant;

(b) Safe and healthy working conditions;

(c) Equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted in his employment to an appropriate higher level,
subject to no considerations other than those of seniority and competence;

(d ) Rest, leisure and reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay, as well as
remuneration for public holidays

Article 8

1. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure:

(a) The right of everyone to form trade unions and join the trade union of his choice, subject only to the
rules of the organization concerned, for the promotion and protection of his economic and social
interests. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those prescribed by law
and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public order or
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others;

(b) The right of trade unions to establish national federations or confederations and the right of the
latter to form or join international trade-union organizations;

(c) The right of trade unions to function freely subject to no limitations other than those prescribed by
law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public order
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others;

(d) The right to strike, provided that it is exercised in conformity with the laws of the particular country.
2. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by
members of the armed forces or of the police or of the administration of the State.
3. Nothing in this article shall authorize States Parties to the International Labour Organisation
Convention of 1948 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize to take
legislative measures which would prejudice, or apply the law in such a manner as would prejudice, the
guarantees provided for in that Convention.

Article 9

The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to social security, including
social insurance.

Article 10

The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that:

1. The widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the family, which is the natural
and fundamental group unit of society, particularly for its establishment and while it is responsible for
the care and education of dependent children. Marriage must be entered into with the free consent of
the intending spouses.

2. Special protection should be accorded to mothers during a reasonable period before and after
childbirth. During such period working mothers should be accorded paid leave or leave with adequate
social security benefits.

3. Special measures of protection and assistance should be taken on behalf of all children and young
persons without any discrimination for reasons of parentage or other conditions. Children and young
persons should be protected from economic and social exploitation. Their employment in work harmful
to their morals or health or dangerous to life or likely to hamper their normal development should be
punishable by law. States should also set age limits below which the paid employment of child labour
should be prohibited and punishable by law.

Article 11

1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard
of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous
improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization
of this right, recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international co-operation based on
free consent.

2. The States Parties to the present Covenant, recognizing the fundamental right of everyone to be free
from hunger, shall take, individually and through international co-operation, the measures, including
specific programmes, which are needed:

(a) To improve methods of production, conservation and distribution of food by making full use of
technical and scientific knowledge, by disseminating knowledge of the principles of nutrition and by
developing or reforming agrarian systems in such a way as to achieve the most efficient development
and utilization of natural resources;
(b) Taking into account the problems of both food-importing and food-exporting countries, to ensure an
equitable distribution of world food supplies in relation to need.

Landmark Case: RH BILL CASE -- Imbong vs Ochoa et.al. G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014 ( Digested
Case)
This a Landmark Case not only citing the validity of the RH Bill but also the classic scenario where of the
Catholic Church vs the Government. It is no secret that the Catholic Church plays political power in the
Philippines for many years. This displays ow the separation of the State and the Church paves it way.

Digested Case: Imbong v Ochoa, et al. (G.R. Nos. 204819, 204934, 204957, 205003, 205138, 204988,
205043, 205478, 205491, 205720, 206355, 207111, 207172, 207563)

FACTS:
Concerned citizens and the Catholic Church had petitioned for the constitutionality of the Reproductive
Health Bill.

ISSUES:
A. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the:
1. Right to life
2. Right to health
3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech
a.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom since it mandates the State-sponsored
procurement of contraceptives, which contravene the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners
b.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by compelling medical health
practitioners, hospitals, and health care providers, under pain of penalty, to refer patients to other
institutions despite their conscientious objections
c.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by requiring would-be spouses, as a
condition for the issuance of a marriage license, to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning,
breastfeeding and infant nutrition
4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom
6. Due process clause
7. Equal protection clause
8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude
B. WON the delegation of authority to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to determine WON a
supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List is valid
C. WON the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to Local Governments and the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
* HELD:
A.
1. NO.
2. NO.
3.
a.) NO.
b.) YES.
c.) NO.
4. YES.
5. NO.
6. NO.
7. NO.
8. NO.
B. NO.
C. NO.
* RATIO:
1.) Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a scientific and
medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. However,
they agreed that individual Members could express their own views on this matter.
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the
life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.”
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional meaning of
“conception” according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization.
Medical sources also support the view that conception begins at fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to refer to the moment of
“fertilization” and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did not
intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized
ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and female
ovum, and those that similarly take action before fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus
constitutionally permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to prevent
the Legislature from passing a measure to prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise.
The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the word “or” in defining
abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation
but also those that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb. The
RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded duty to
protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of
abortifacient by using the term “primarily”. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that “primarily
induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or the prevention of the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb” (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way
for the approval of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason, the
definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term “primarily”, must be
struck down.
2.) Petitioners claim that the right to health is violated by the RH Law because it requires the inclusion
of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and
effective family planning products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary and in the regular
purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all national hospitals (Section 9 of the RH Law). They
cite risks of getting diseases gained by using e.g. oral contraceptive pills.
Some petitioners do not question contraception and contraceptives per se. Rather, they pray that the
status quo under RA 4729 and 5921 be maintained. These laws prohibit the sale and distribution of
contraceptives without the prescription of a duly-licensed physician.
The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court believes
adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available to the public. In
fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA
4729: the contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical
company and that the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following
a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered “mandatory” only after
these devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot
determine that contraceptives are “safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective”.
3.) The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation in support of
modern RH measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to one’s
dogma or belief. However, the Court has the authority to determine whether or not the RH Law
contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.
3a.) The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the policies of
any one religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate Article
III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a
particular religion, and thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population
control program through the RH Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the
religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.
3b.) Sections 7, 23, and 24 of the RH Law obliges a hospital or medical practitioner to immediately refer
a person seeking health care and services under the law to another accessible healthcare provider
despite their conscientious objections based on religious or ethical beliefs. These provisions violate the
religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. They are contrary to Section 29(2), Article VI
of the Constitution or the Free Exercise Clause, whose basis is the respect for the inviolability of the
human conscience.
The provisions in the RH Law compelling non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and
operated by a religious group and health care service providers to refer patients to other providers and
penalizing them if they fail to do so (Sections 7 and 23(a)(3)) as well as compelling them to disseminate
information and perform RH procedures under pain of penalty (Sections 23(a)(1) and (a)(2) in relation
to Section 24) also violate (and inhibit) the freedom of religion. While penalties may be imposed by law
to ensure compliance to it, a constitutionally-protected right must prevail over the effective
implementation of the law.
Excluding public health officers from being conscientious objectors (under Sec. 5.24 of the IRR) also
violates the equal protection clause. There is no perceptible distinction between public health officers
and their private counterparts. In addition, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the
protection of this freedom remains even if he/she is employed in the government.
Using the compelling state interest test, there is no compelling state interest to limit the free exercise of
conscientious objectors. There is no immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the
perceived scenario of the above-quoted provisions. In addition, the limits do not pertain to life-
threatening cases.
The respondents also failed to show that these provisions are least intrusive means to achieve a
legitimate state objective. The Legislature has already taken other secular steps to ensure that the right
to health is protected, such as RA 4729, RA 6365 (The Population Act of the Philippines) and RA 9710
(The Magna Carta of Women).
3c.) Section 15 of the RH Law, which requires would-be spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood,
family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license,
is a reasonable exercise of police power by the government. The law does not even mandate the type
of family planning methods to be included in the seminar. Those who attend the seminar are free to
accept or reject information they receive and they retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life
without the intervention of the State.
4.) Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the consent of the
spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial privacy and
autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic social institution.
Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of
spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible
parenthood and (b) the right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and
implementation of policies and programs that affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual
decision-making, and endanger the institutions of marriage and the family.
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or
has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12 of
the Constitution, which states: “The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the
youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.” In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads “in the case of minors, the
written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising parental authority
or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures” is invalid as it denies the right of
parental authority in cases where what is involved is “non-surgical procedures.”
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning services.
Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this situation and
may assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received. In addition, an
exception may be made in life-threatening procedures.
5.) The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which mandates the
State to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education. Although educators
might raise their objection to their participation in the RH education program, the Court reserves its
judgment should an actual case be filed before it.
Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education has not yet
formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in the
development of their children with the use of the term “primary”. The right of parents in upbringing
their youth is superior to that of the State.
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement (rather
than supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other interest groups in
developing the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that the program will be in line with
the religious beliefs of the petitioners.
6.) The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the definitions of several
terms as observed by the petitioners are not vague.
The definition of “private health care service provider” must be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of the
RH Law which defines a “public health service provider”. The “private health care institution” cited under
Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to “private health care service provider.
The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include providing of information and
rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from
rendering RH service and modern family planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law)
as well as from giving RH information and procedures.
The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the
terms “incorrect” and “knowingly” connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent
the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health.
7.) To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s RH program is not a violation
of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which
states that the State shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and
children and that it shall endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of the RH
Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have
children. In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and
does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to
provide priority to the poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program under
Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational
institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the
teaching of reproductive health education.
8.) The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health care service
providers to render 48 hours of pro bono RH services does not amount to involuntary servitude, for two
reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both the
power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public
welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-government RH service providers to
render pro bono service. Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do
otherwise.
However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious beliefs do not allow
them to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise (See Part 3b of this digest.)
B. The delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether or not a supply or product
is to be included in the Essential Drugs List is valid, as the FDA not only has the power but also the
competency to evaluate, register and cover health services and methods (under RA 3720 as amended
by RA 9711 or the FDA Act of 2009).
C. The RH Law does not infringe upon the autonomy of local governments. Paragraph (c) of Section 17
provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and
services. Unless a local government unit (LGU) is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it
has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the national government under
the annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within
the jurisdiction of the LGU.
In addition, LGUs are merely encouraged to provide RH services. Provision of these services are not
mandatory. Therefore, the RH Law does not amount to an undue encroachment by the national
government upon the autonomy enjoyed by LGUs.
Article III, Sections 6, 10, and 11 of RA 9054 or the Organic Act of the ARMM merely delineates the
powers that may be exercised by the regional government. These provisions cannot be seen as an
abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation that would benefit the general welfare.

JAMES M. IMBONG AND LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor children,
LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT
CENTER, INC., Petitioners,

vs.

HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., EXECUTIVE Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Education,
Culture and Sports and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.

G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014

FACTS:

Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise
known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), challengers from
various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that
strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may
produce, the Court now faces the controversy, as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2)
petitions-in-intervention.

The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional.

ISSUES:
After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has synthesized and
refined them to the following principal issues:

PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
Power of Judicial Review
Actual Case or Controversy
Facial Challenge
Locus Standi
Declaratory Relief
One Subject/One Title Rule
2. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:

Right to Life
Right to Health
Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
The Family
Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
Due Process
Equal Protection
Involuntary Servitude
Delegation of Authority to the FDA
Autonomy of Local Governments / ARMM
RULING:

Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules, it behooves the Court
to resolve some procedural impediments.
The petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of
the judiciary to settle the dispute. “The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to
adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. Once a controversy as
to the application or interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the
instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide. In
the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, “judicial review is
essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers
among the three great departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the
boundaries of authority and control between them.” To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the only,
medium of participation – or instrument of intervention – of the judiciary in that balancing operation.
Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled authority to
rule on just any and every claim of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that
the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case
or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must
be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the
case.
Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty. In this
case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for
judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken
effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the
subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. When an action of the legislative branch is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to
settle the dispute.
The Court is not persuaded. In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a
First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only
protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment. These include religious freedom,
freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom
of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one’s freedom of
expression, as they are modes which one’s thoughts are externalized. In this jurisdiction, the application
of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with some modifications.
While this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it has
expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious
freedom, and other fundamental rights. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive
Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
The transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the
technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues
raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation,
specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in
accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed
to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial
justice, must always be eschewed. Considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn
which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before taking action.
Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider
them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.
The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. It is well-settled that the “one title-one
subject” rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such
precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule
is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which
the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature,
scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably
adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule “so as not to cripple or impede
legislation.” In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both
“reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” are interrelated and germane to the overriding
objective to control the population growth.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
The Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at implantation.
According to him, “fertilization and conception are two distinct and successive stages in the reproductive
process. They are not identical and synonymous.” Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that medical
authorities confirm that the implantation of the fertilized ovum is the commencement of conception and
it is only after implantation that pregnancy can be medically detected. This theory of implantation as the
beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It does not pertain to the beginning of life
but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object – it is a living
human being complete with DNA and 46 chromosomes. Implantation has been conceptualized only for
convenience by those who had population control in mind. To adopt it would constitute textual infidelity
not only to the RH Law but also to the Constitution. It is the Court’s position that life begins at
fertilization, not at implantation. When a fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine wall, its viability is
sustained but that instance of implantation is not the point of beginning of life.
A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is
replete with provisions protecting and promoting the right to health. These provisions are self-
executing. Unless the provisions clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should
be considered self-executory. There is no need for legislation to implement these self-executing
provisions. In Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, it was stated:
x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature
would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be
cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that –… in case of doubt, the
Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing. . . .
Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-
executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they
shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which
could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.
It is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of contraceptives or one’s
participation in the support of modem reproductive health measures is moral from a religious standpoint
or whether the same is right or wrong according to one’s dogma or belief. For the Court has declared
that matters dealing with “faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule
of a church … are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil
courts.” The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. Whatever
pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench should be understood only in this realm where it
has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical
matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine whether the RH Law
contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom. Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their
supposition that the State cannot enhance its population control program through the RH Law simply
because the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not
precluded to pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by the policies of any
one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The
demarcation line between Church and State demands that one render unto Caesar the things that are
Caesar’s and unto God the things that are God’s. The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer
imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the
medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on modem reproductive health
products, services, procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been
compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner
Bernas) has written, “at the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the
human conscience.
The Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of health providers, whether public or private,
should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance
with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and
conviction, it would be violative of “the principle of non-coercion” enshrined in the constitutional right to
free exercise of religion.
The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and
operated by a religious group and health care service providers. Considering that Section 24 of the RH
Law penalizes such institutions should they fail or refuse to comply with their duty to refer under
Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must be struck down for being violative of the
freedom of religion.
The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24, considering that in the
dissemination of information regarding programs and services and in the performance of reproductive
health procedures, the religious freedom of health care service providers should be respected. The
punishment of a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient to another, or
who declines to perform reproductive health procedure on a patient because incompatible religious
beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the Court cannot allow.
The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the care and
custody of a minor child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a
compelling state interest can justify a state substitution of their parental authority.
Any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature because the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health
education. One can only speculate on the content, manner and medium of instruction that will be used
to educate the adolescents and whether they will contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners and
validate their apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of this particular issue, the Court
declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its application. It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle. Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a statute are vague, words must not only
be taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in relation to other parts of the statute.
It is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, that is,
every part of it must be construed together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general
intent of the whole enactment.
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s reproductive health care program
is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the
Constitution which recognizes the distinct necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged by
providing that they be given priority in addressing the health development of the people. Thus: Section
11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall
endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at
affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled,
women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers. It should be
noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from
fertility issues and desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH
Law only seeks to target the poor to reduce their number. While the RH Law admits the use of
contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above, sanction abortion. As Section 3(1) explains, the
“promotion and/or stabilization of the population growth rate is incidental to the advancement of
reproductive health.”
The notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force, threats, intimidation or other similar
means of coercion and compulsion. A reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals that it only
encourages private and non- government reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro bono
service. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they choose to do
otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty
to choose which kind of health service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or
whether to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render
pro bono service against their will. While the rendering of such service was made a prerequisite to
accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same to be an unreasonable burden, but
rather, a necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate state
interest. Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized that
conscientious objectors are exempt from this provision as long as their religious beliefs and convictions
do not allow them to render reproductive health service, pro bona or otherwise.
The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the power but also the
competency to evaluate, register and cover health services and methods. It is the only government
entity empowered to render such services and highly proficient to do so. It should be understood that
health services and methods fall under the gamut of terms that are associated with what is ordinarily
understood as “health products.” Being the country’s premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety
of food and medicines available to the public, the FDA was equipped with the necessary powers and
functions to make it effective. Pursuant to the principle of necessary implication, the mandate by
Congress to the FDA to ensure public health and safety by permitting only food and medicines that are
safe includes “service” and “methods.” From the declared policy of the RH Law, it is clear that Congress
intended that the public be given only those medicines that are proven medically safe, legal, non-
abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research
standards. The philosophy behind the permitted delegation was explained in Echagaray v. Secretary of
Justice, as follows:
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the growing inability of the
legislature to cope directly with the many problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has
ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be
expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many
of the problems attendant upon present day undertakings, the legislature may not have the
competence, let alone the interest and the time, to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to
say specific solutions.
A reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the establishment of health care
facilities, the hiring of skilled health professionals, or the training of barangay health workers, it will be
the national government that will provide for the funding of its implementation. Local autonomy is not
absolute. The national government still has the say when it comes to national priority programs which
the local government is called upon to implement like the RH Law.