Author: Ang T.

Vda. de Borromeo vs Pogoy (1983) The motion should still be dismissed because P.D. 1508
applies only when the parties are individual, or natural
Petition: Petition for Review of the Decision of the Court persons. Reyes, in representing the estate of Vito Borromeo
Petitioner: PETRA VDA. DE BORROMEO was in fact representing a juridical person and as such, P.D.
Respondent: HON. JULIAN B. POGOY, Municipality/City Trial Court of 1508 does not apply
Cebu City, and ATTY. RICARDO REYES
Ponencia: Escolin, J.
DISPOSITION: Petition denied. The decision of the RTC is affirmed.
DOCTRINE:
a. The prescription period of unlawful detainer is one year
b. P.D. 1508 requires parties to be individual persons, or in other
words, natural persons. An estate if a diseased person is a
juridical person and as such, P.D. 1508 cannot apply in the
present case.

FACTS:

1) Petitioner Petra Vda. De Borromeo was leasing the building of the

deceased Vito Borromeo.
2) Respondent Reyes was the administrator of the estate of Vito.
3) Reyes demanded from petitioner the unpaid rent for March to
September 1982. When petitioner denied, Reyes filed a case of
unlawful detainer against Borromeo with the RTC.
4) Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the case
should have been filed with the Barangay Court, pursuant to P.D.
1508 or the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.
5) Respondent claims that the P.D. 1508 allows unlawful detainer to be
filed directly with the RTC if prescription would result otherwise.
6) RTC ruled in favor of Respondent.

ISSUES:
a) W/N the case should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction

RULING + RATIO:
a) No.
Although Respondent’s claim is without basis, the motion to
dismiss should nevertheless be denied. Respondent in this
case filed the action for unlawful detainer within one month
of the demand. P.D. 1508 requires that cases filed with the
Barangay Court must be concluded within 60 days. As such,
Respondent would have a whole 9 months to file with the
RTC.
Digest Author: Ann Catherine Co RULING + RATIO:
WILMON AUTO SUPPLY v COURT OF APPEALS No. An ejectment suit cannot be suspended by an action filed in the RTC
based on tenant’s claim that his right of pre-emption was violated
(1992) • The action in the RTC did not involve physical or de facto possession
Petitioner: Wilmon Auto Supply Corp.; Iloilo Multi Parts Supply Corp., Virgilio and the case in the RTC was merely a ploy to delay disposition of the
Ang, Southern Sales Corp.; Chang Liang, Jr. ejectment proceedings, or that the issue presented in the former
Respondent: Court of Appeals; Star Group Resources And Development, could quite as easily be set up as defense in the ejectment action
Inc and there resolved.
Ponencia: Narvasa, C.J. • Cases wherein ownership is the issue does not bar or suspend
ejectment cases which tackle possession de facto
DOCTRINE: Cases wherein ownership is the issue does not bar or suspend
ejectment cases which tackle possession de facto DISPOSITION: Decision AFFIRMED

FACTS:
1. Petitioners were lessees of a commercial building and bodegas
standing on registered land in Iloilo City owned in common by Lucy
A. Solinap, Fr. Jerry R. Locsin, Lourdes C. Locsin, Manuel C. Locsin
and Ester L. Jarantilla.
2. The lease contract among others contained a "reservation of rights"
clause stating that LESSOR reserves the rights to sell, mortgage,
hypothecate or encumber the property so long as it requires the
purchase(r) or mortgage creditors to respect the terms of this lease
contract; provided further that LESSEE shall be duly informed about
LESSOR's plan to sell the property.
3. After the expiration of the period fixed in the lease agreements, the
lessors executed a public instrument entitled "Deed of Absolute
Sale," to Star Group Resources and Development Inc.
4. On November 22, 1989, the buyer, Star Group, brought separate
actions of unlawful detainer in the Municipal Trial Court In Cities of
Iloilo City against the lessees
5. The lessees refused to concede, and indeed impugned, Star Group's
right to eject them.
6. They argued that in so selling the properties and seeking their
ejectment therefrom, the lessors — and their buyer — had violated
their leasehold rights because (i) they (the lessees) were not
accorded the right of preemption, (b) the buyer was not required to
honor the leases, and (c) the lessees were denied the option to
renew their leases upon the expiration thereof.
7. The same propositions were also set out as causes of action in a
complaint filed in the RTC.

ISSUES: W/N an action for unlawful detainer filed in the MTC be suspended
by an action filed in RTC on the claim that he is entitled to right of preemption
Author: Marti
Semira vs. Court of Appeals(1994)
Petition: Petition for review
Petitioner: Miguel Semira
Respondent: Court of Appeals and Buenaventura An
Ponente: Bellosillo
DOCTRINE: (Scope and Limit of Forcible Entry)
Ultimately, a suit charging forcible entry is only a provisional remedy provided
for by law to prevent further deprivation of property where such deprivation
happens. Therefore, though a court may rule upon the question of ownership
to determine prior possession in a case of forcible entry, such is not
conclusive and the aggrieved party may file for an action to determine who
the rightful owner of a property is.
FACTS:
1. Juana Gutierrez was the owner of Lot 4221. She sold the land to
Buenaventura An in a “Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa” for a lump sum of
P850.
2. 4221 was indicated in the deed of sale as measuring approximately
822.5 square meters and boundaries were indicated. Without regard for
the size of the land, what Buenaventura An followed were the
boundaries.
3. Subsequently, Buenaventura An, bought from Pascual Hornilla, the son
of Juana Gutierrez, the land to the right of Lot 4221. This lot (Lot 4215
with area of 8,606 square meters) is the boundary of 4221 on the east.
Buenaventura also bought another land from Santiago Asi (11k sq. m.).
4. Buenaventura sold Lot 4221 to his nephew, Cipriano Ramirez, for a lump
sum of P2,500. It maintained the description it had in the previous deed
of sale of approx.822.5 sq. m. with similar boundaries except that instead
of Juana Gutierrez on the east, it was now bounded by his uncle,
Buenaventura An.
5. Cipriano sold the land to Miguel Semira for 20,000, although the area of
the land in the “Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa” was 2,200 sq. m., still with
the same boundaries. This change in the area indicated was due to the
cadastral survey in 1974.
6. On March 17, 1979, Semira entered the premises and began to construct
a rice-mill. However on April 18, 1979, a complaint for forcible entry was
filed against him by Buenaventura An, since An believed that the excess
of 2,200 sq. m. from the 822.5 sq. m. belonged to him. An claimed that
since An only sold 822.5 sq. m. to his nephew, then Cipriano could not
have sold the rest of the 2,200 sq. m. to Semira.
7. The MTC, after denying the petition at first for lack of jurisdiction since
the case involved the question of ownership, which used to be the
original jurisdiction of the RTC (BP Blg. 129 gave MTC the power to
decide on the ownership of the land ONLY FOR PURPOSES OF
DETERMINING PRIOR POSSESSION), ruled that Semira is the rightful
owner and possessor of such land and therefore cannot be ejected
therefrom.
8. RTC ruled otherwise by saying that since An has been in possession of
the land since 1964 and possession was disputed by Semira only on
1979, An therefore had prior possession. CA affirmed this ruling.
ISSUES:
1. WoN forcible entry case will prosper.
a. WoN Semira is the owner of the whole 2,200 sq. m.
i. WoN the whole lot was validly sold to him.
PROVISION:
• Art. 1542. Civil Code. In the sale of real estate, made for a lump sum
and not at the rate of a certain sum for a unit of measure or number,
there shall be no increase or decrease of the price although there be
greater or less area or number than that stated in a contract.
The same rule shall be applied when two or more immovable are sold
for a single price; but if, besides mentioning the boundaries, which is
indispensable in every conveyance of real estate, its area or number
should be designated in the contract, the vendor shall be bound to
deliver all that is included within said boundaries, even when it exceeds
the area or number specified in the contract; and, should he not be able
to do so, he shall suffer a reduction in the price, in proportion to what is
lacking in the area or number, unless the contract is rescinded because
vendee does not accede to the failure to deliver what has been
stipulated.
RULING + RATIO: (From the controlling sub-issue to the main one)
Author: Marti
1&2. Yes, the whole of Lot 4211 was sold to Cipriano and therefore
was validly transferred to Semira through a subsequent sale.
a. See Art. 1542 above.

3.No, forcible entry case will not prosper.

a. Since Semira is the rightful owner of the whole lot, he cannot
be ejected therefrom.
2. However, the court noted here that though Semira was determined to
be the owner in the case of forcible entry for the purpose of
determining prior possession, An is not barred from instituting a
separate proceeding for determination of ownership of the land. This
is because any pronouncement as to the ownership of the real
property in a case of forcible entry is provisional.

DISPOSITION: Petition granted. Decision of CA and RTC reversed and

set aside. MTC decision is affirmed and reinstated.
 WONG VS CARPIO
Petitioners: IGNACIO WONG
Respondent: HON. LUCAS D. CARPIO
Ponencia: BIDIN, J
DOCTRINE: Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in
two different personalities except in the case of co-possession. Should a
question arise regarding the fact of possession, the present possessor shall
be preferred. If there are two possessions, the longer in possession if the
dates of possession are the same, the one who presents a title, If these
conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit pending
determination of its possession or ownership through the proper
proceedings.
FACTS:
1. On 1972 a deed of sale with right to repurchase was executed
between Manuel Mercado and William Giger over lot 3 for the price
of 3,500 peseos.
a. In 1973, William Giger again asked an additional amount of
2,500 from Manuel Mercado and so Mercado required Giger
to sign a new deed of Pacto de Retro sale.
2. In 1972, Manuel Mercado began harvesting coconut fruits and he
paid the taxes on the lands for Mr. Giger. His use of the land had the
following characteristics:
a. He only periodically went to the land to make copra
b. He did not place any person on the land to watch it
c. He did not reside on the land as he was a
businessman/storekeeper
d. He did not put any sign or hut to show that he is in actual
possession
e. He was aware that defendants’ laborers were on the land as
early as August 1976 and that they have a hut there but did
nothing to stop them.
i. He was in fact “happy that there were people and a
hut on the land.”
3. Before July 1976, Ignacio Wong went to the land to find out if there
were other people residing or claiming it besides the owner and he
found none.
a. As a result, Wong bought the land from William Giger and
asked for the delivery of the title to him.
b. He tried to register the sale but due to some technicalities it
could not be registered.
4. Wong then placed laborers on the land and built a small farm house
and placed signboards.
a. This was when Mercado visited the land to make copra and
the matter was brought to court.
5. MTC: Wong had prior actual and continuous physical possession
over the property.
6. CFI: Ruled in favor of Mercado
ISSUE:
Whether or not Wong is an intruder for purposes of a forcible entry.
RULING + RATIO: Yes
a. Definition of Possession: Possession is acquired by the
material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right, or by
the fact that it is subject to the action of our will, or by the
proper acts and legal formalities for acquiring such right; and
that the execution of a sale thru a public instrument shall be
equivalent to the delivery of the thing, unless there is
stipulation to the contrary. However, if the purchaser cannot
have the enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing and
make use of it herself, because such tenancy and enjoyment
are opposed by another, then delivery has not been effected.
b. It is clear that possession passed from William Giger to
Manuel Mercado by virtue of the first sale. The second sale
to Wong failed to pass the possession of the land because
there is an impediment – the possession exercised by
Mercado.
 i. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the
same time in two different personalities except in the
case of co-possession.
ii. Should a question arise regarding the fact of
possession, the present possessor shall be
preferred.

iii. If there are two possessions, the longer in

possession

iv. if the dates of possession are the same, the one

who presents a title,

v. If these conditions are equal, the thing shall be

placed in judicial deposit pending determination of its
possession or ownership through the proper
proceedings.

c. Was there FISTS present? Yes. The act of entering the

property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom
necessarily implies the exertion of force over the property
and this is all the is necessary.

DISPOSITION: Decision of CA set affirmed

 JAVIER v. VERIDIANO There is identity of parties.
Doctrine: A judgment in a forcible entry or detainer case disposes of no other issue than It is evident that private respondent Reino Rosete is a successor in interest of Ben Babol by
possession and declares only who has the right of possession, but by no means constitutes title subsequent to the commencement and termination of the first action. Hence, there is
a bar to an action for determination of who has right or title of ownership. actual, if not substantial, identity of the parties between the two actions. What is required is
Facts: NOT absolute but only substantial identity of parties
• Petitioner Felicidad Javier filed on January 1963, a Miscellaneous Sales Application There is NO identity of causes of action.
for Lot No. 1641, of the Olongapo Townsite Subdivision, Lower Kalaklan, Olongapo 1. First case - complaint for forcible entry, where what is at issue is prior possession,
City, with the Bureau of Lands. Sometime in December 1970, she filed a complaint regardless of who has lawful title over the disputed property. The only issue in an action for
for forcible entry against a certain Ben Babol. forcible entry is the physical or material possession of real property, that is, possession de
factoand NOT possession de jure.
• Babol allegedly took possession with stealth and strategy the southwestern part of
- A judgment rendered in a case for recovery of possession is conclusive only on the question
land, with the assistance of hired helpers and started construction of riprap along
of possession and NOT on the ownership. It does NOT in any way bind the title or affect the
the Kalaklan River perimeter of said portion of land.
ownership of the land
• Said entry was further augmented by removing Javier’s chain link fence with
2. Second case - an action for "Quieting of Title and Recovery of Possession with Damages" is
galvanized iron posts embedded in concrete, and also destroying plants introduced
in reality an action to recover a parcel of land or an accion reivindicatoria
by Javier. By these actions, Babol started exercising illegal possession of said
- Accion reivindicatoria is an action whereby plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land
portion of land which contains an area of 200 sqm.
and seeks recovery of its full possession. It is different from accion interdictal or accion
• The trial court ruled in 1973 that the 200sqm contested area of the lot is NOT
publiciana where plaintiff merely alleges proof of a better right to possess WITHOUT claim of
within Lot 1641 applied by petitioner.In 1973, the sales application was granted
title
and an OCT was given covering Lot No. 1641.
3. In the first case, petitioner merely claimed a better right or prior
• Meanwhile, Ben Babol had sold the property he was occupying, including the
possession over the disputed area without asserting title thereto. She merely alleged that
portion of about 200 sqm in question, to private respondent Reino Rosete.
she was the “true and lawful possessor in actual and prior physical possession of the land”
Petitioner demanded the surrender of the same area in dispute from Reino Rosete
4. In the second case, she alleges ownership, praying that she be
who repeatedly refused to comply with the demand.
declared the rightful owner and given possession of the disputed
• In 1977, after 4 years since the dismissal of her earlier forcible entry complaint, she
portion. She asserts that is "the absolute owner in fee simple" of the
files an action for quieting of title and recovery of possession against Babol and parcel of land covered by an OCT
Rosete. Rosete moved for the dismissal of the case based on res judicata. In a judgment in forcible entry or detainer case disposes of no other
• Trial court ruled in favor of Rosete. Petitioner contends that res juricata cannot issue than possession and declares only who has the right of possession, but by no means
apply in the case since there is no identity of causes of action since the first case constitutes a bar to an action for determination of who has the right or title of ownership.
was for forcible entry, which is merely concerned with the possession of the Hence, res judicata does NOT apply since there is no identity in the causes of action
property, whereas the subsequent case was for quieting of title, which looks into
the ownership of the disputed land. Private respondent however submits that
there is identity of parties in the two cases since he is a successor in interest by title
of the defendant in the first case after the commencement of the first action.
Issue: Whether or not res juricata is applicable to the case?
Held: No. Res judicata is NOT applicable. Petition granted. Petitioner won.
Ratio:
For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action the following requisites must
concur:
(1) There must be a final judgment or order;
(2) The court rendering the judgment must have jurisdiction over the subject
matter;
(3) The former judgment is a judgment on the merits; and,
(4) There is between the first and second actions identity of parties, of subject
matter and of causes of action
The presence of the first three requirements and the identity of subject matter in the fourth
requirement are not disputed. Hence, the only issues remaining are whether there is identity
of parties and identity of causes of action in the forcible entry case and the action for
quieting of title & recovery of possession.
Digest Author: Kapunan
LIM KIEH TONG, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Petitioner: Lim Kieh Tong, Inc.
Respondent: Court of Appeals, Hon. Judge Rogelio M. Pizarro, Presiding
Judge of Branch 16 of Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, & Reginaldo Y. Lim
Ponencia: Gancayco, J.
DOCTRINE: Any person deprived of possession of any land/building or
part thereof, may file an action for forcible entry & detainer in the
proper inferior court against the person unlawfully depriving or
withholding possession from him. This relief is also available to a
lessee or tenant against whom the possession of any land or building,
or a part thereof, is unlawfully withheld, within one (1) year after such
unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner is a duly organized domestic corp. and owner of a building
located at 1231 Piedad Street corner Benavidez Street, Manila.
2. Lim Eng Piao, father of private respondent, occupied said premises as a
dwelling unit at the above address together with all the members of his
family. When he died, occupancy was continued by Reginaldo Lim.
3. Later, Reginaldo was able to acquire a house at No. 3 Igdalig St.,
Quezon. In spite of having transferred residence, he did not vacate
Room 301 of the building. Instead, he utilized the same as a place where
he keeps his important belongings, books, documents and appliances.
4. In September 1987, petitioner changed the lock of the common main
door of the building.
5. One morning, Reginaldo tried to go to Room 301 to fetch 3 of his law
books, which he needed to read for a case. He was surprised to find out
that the key given him could no longer fit the door lock which was then
already changed. So he had to buy 3 new books for which he incurred
expenses in the sum of P 1,253.
6. He demanded from petitioner's officer-in-charge, Rafael Lim, the delivery
of the appropriate keys to the common main door so that he could enter
and be restored to possession of said room. But his efforts proved futile.
7. With this, he instituted a Civil Case denominated as an action for
damages with injunction; but was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
8. Private respondent again instituted another action which reiterated the
same allegations. A temporary restraining order (TRO) was issued by
respondent judge pending trial on the merits, commanding petitioner to
deliver the appropriate keys to private respondent.
9. Petitioners instituted the instant petition.
10. Court ruled in favor of private appellee. It was held that force was used
by petitioner to deprive private respondent of the physical possession of
Room 301 when the lock of the main door was changed without his
knowledge and consent.
11. An appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals but was dismissed for lack
of merit. Hence, this petition for review the main thrust of which is that
the action being one for specific performance the jurisdiction thereof is
vested in the Regional Trial Court.
ISSUE: W/N the complaint filed is one for forcible entry and detainer or
one for specific performance?
PROVISION: Article 539 – Every possessor has a right to be respected in his
possession; and should he be disturbed therein he shall be protected in or
restored in or restored to said possession by the means established by laws
and the Rules of Court. A possessor deprived of his possession through the
forcible entry may within 10 days from the filing of the complaint present a
motion to secure from the competent court, in the action for forcible entry, a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore him in his possession.
RULING + RATIO:
The suit is one for forcible entry and detainer under Rule 70 of the Rules
of Court. Private respondent retained the possession of Room 301 of
petitioner's building which he claimed to have the right to use and enjoy, but
petitioner prevented him from enjoying his right by depriving him of the right
of egress and ingress through the main door of the building. Through
stealth, petitioner changed the key to the main door thus depriving
private respondent of the possession of his rented room.
The purpose of forcible entry is that regardless of the actual condition of the
title to property, the party in peaceable and quiet possession shall not be
turned out by strong hand, violence or terror. In affording this remedy,
breaches of the peace and criminal disorder would be minimized. A party out
of possession must respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what he
claims is his.
Any person deprived of possession of any land or building or part
thereof, may file an action for forcible entry and detainer in the proper
inferior court against the person unlawfully depriving or withholding
possession from him. This relief is not only available to a landlord,
vendor, or vendee, but also to a lessee or tenant or any other person
against whom the possession of any land or building, or a part thereof,
is unlawfully withheld, or is otherwise unlawfully deprived possession
thereof, within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession.
DISPOSITION: Petition is DENIED. No costs.
Author: Phimie Lim
PENAS v. COURT OF APPEALS
Petitioner: SPOUSES NAZARIO P. PENAS, JR. represented by ELPIDIO
R. VIERNES, ATTORNEY-IN-FACT
Respondent: COURT OF APPEALS and LUPO CALAYCAY
Ponencia: PADILLA, J.
Doctrine: A complaint for unlawful detainer can be filed should it be
counted from the last demand letter to vacate, the reason being that the
lessor has the right to waive his right of action based on previous
demands and let the lessee remain meanwhile in the premises.
FACTS:
1) Subject of this controversy are the premises identified as 24-B
Scout Santiago Street, Barangay Laging Handa, Quezon City, also
identified as 26-B South D Street, Quezon City.
2) It was the object of a written lease contract executed by the late
Nazario Penas in favor of Lupo Calaycay on June 26, 1964, at an
agreed monthly rental of P110.00 Pesos. The written lease contract
was on a month to month basis.
3) Nazario Penas, Sr. died and, thereafter, an extra-judicial settlement
of his estate was executed by his surviving heirs, one of whom is
his son, Nazario Penas, Jr. Likewise, after the death of plaintiff's
mother Concepcion P. Penas, her children including Nazario
Penas, Jr. executed an extra judicial settlement of her estate.
4) The monthly rental on the subject premises had been gradually
increased by the petitioners, the latest of which was P691.20.
5) In a letter of January 18, 1990, spouses Penas, through counsel
notified the respondent that effective March 1990, they were
terminating the lease contract and demanded from the latter to
vacate the premises on or before February 28, 1990.
6) Petitioners opted to allow the defendant to continue occupying the
leased premises provided he will agree to execute a new lease
contract for a period of 1 year at an increased monthly rental of
P2,500.00 plus 2 months deposit and gave the respondent up to
February 28, 1990 to decide, otherwise judicial action for unlawful
detainer shall ensue.
7) Petitioners later finally reduced the monthly rental to P2,000.00.
8) Respondent failed to abide by the demand of the petitioners. He
continued staying on the leased premises and effective March
1990, he deposited the monthly rentals in the subject premises with
the PNB in his name in trust for spouses Lucila and Nazario Penas,
Jr. under Account No. 688930.
9) Prior to such deposit, Respondent together with others, in a letter of
March 26, 1990, informed the petitioners, that since petitioners'
representative refused to accept the rentals, he will deposit the
same with a reputable bank and he will hold the same intact for the
petitioners. There was no instance that petitioners manifested any
desire to withdraw the same deposit in the bank.
10) On August 10, 1992, plaintiffs through counsel sent another letter to
the defendant to vacate the subject premises and to pay back rental
arrearages in the sum of P2,000.00, per month from March 1990 in
the total sum of P60,000.00 which defendant failed to satisfy.
11) On September 25, 1992, after the corresponding Certification to
File Action was issued by Barangay Laging Handa, Quezon City,
petitioners filed the present suit for unlawful detainer on the
grounds of termination of the lease contract and failure of the
defendant to execute a new lease agreement with increased
rentals.
12) The parties were required to submit their respective position papers
after which the Metropolitan Trial Court rendered a decision dated
16 March 1993 dismissing herein petitioners' complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. The trial court based its decision on the finding that the
complaint was filed more than 1 year after private respondent
began unlawfully occupying the premises.
13) On appeal to the Regional Trial Court, the trial court decision was
upheld, the RTC ruling that herein petitioners' remedy was
converted from an actio de mero hecho to an accion publiciana
since more than 1 year had elapsed from the demand upon
defendants to vacate. The Regional Trial Court concluded that
herein petitioners could initiate a proper complaint with the Regional
Trial Court.
14) Respondent Court of Appeals in a decision upheld the RTC. The
Court of Appeals ruled that since petitioners were not collecting the
rentals being deposited by private respondent, there no longer was
any lease contract between the parties for 2 years since the first
letter of petitioners to private respondent. The Court of Appeals
thus agreed that the proper remedy of the petitioners is to file an
action for recovery of possession in the Regional Trial Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case for unlawful detainer was filed in time.
RULING + RATIO:
YES. We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals, and hence
set it aside. Petitioners correctly cite our ruling in Sy Oh v. Garcia upholding
the established rule that the 1 year period provided for in section 1, Rule 70
of the Rules of Court within which a complaint for unlawful detainer can
be filed should be counted from the LAST letter of demand to vacate,
the reason being that the lessor has the right to waive his right of
Author: Phimie Lim
action based on previous demands and let the lessee remain Costs against private respondent.
meanwhile in the premises.
SO ORDERED.
In the present case, it is of note that the first demand letter addressed by
petitioners to private respondent gave the latter the option to either vacate
the premises on or before 28 February 1990 or agree to execute a new lease
contract for 1 year at an increased rental rate of P2,500 per month.

In Vda. de Murga v. Chan we held that:

The notice giving the lessee the alternative either to pay the increased rental
or otherwise vacate the land is not the demand contemplated by the Rules of
Court in unlawful detainer cases. When after such notice, the lessee elects to
stay, he thereby merely assumes the new rental and cannot be ejected until
he defaults in said obligation and necessary demand is first made.

The facts of this case do not warrant a departure from said settled doctrine. It
should be noted that even if the private respondent was depositing rentals in
trust for the petitioners, what was being deposited were rentals at the old
rate, which petitioners were not bound to accept or withdraw. When private
respondent elected to remain in the premises after petitioners had sent him
the letter of 18 January 1990 giving him the option to vacate by 28 February
1990 or to sign a new lease contract for 1 year at an increased rental rate of
P2,500.00 (later reduced to P2,000.00) a month, he assumed the new rental
rate and could be ejected from the premises only upon default and by a
proper demand from the petitioners. The demand was made on 10 August
1992, followed by the action for unlawful detainer on 25 September 1992.
Hence it was filed within 1 year from the beginning of the unlawful
possession.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the decision of the

Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 31480 is hereby SET ASIDE and a new
decision rendered:

1. Ordering private respondent Lupo Calaycay to immediately vacate the

premises located at 24-B Scout Santiago Street, Barangay Laging Handa,
Quezon City.

2. Ordering private respondent Lupo Calaycay to pay back rentals in the

amount of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos per month from March 1990
until he finally vacates the leased premises.

3. Ordering private respondent to pay Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos as

attorney's fees.
Digest Author: Coco Navarro
FRANCEL REALTY CORP. V COURT OF APPEALS
Petitioner: Francel Realty
Respondent: CA; Francisco T. Sycip
Ponencia: Mendoza, J.
DOCTRINE: The MTC generally has exclusive jurisdiction over a
complaint for unlawful detainer. But when the complaint arises from
the failure of the buyer to pay installments for real property based on
the right to stop paying amortizations under PD 957, the determinative
question is exclusively cognizable by the HLURB (Housing and Land
Regulatory Board).
FACTS:
1. There was a contract to sell between Francel Realty and
Francisco Sycip for Lot 16, Bldg. 14 of the Francel Townhomes
in Bacoor Cavite. Failure to pay would amount to a rescission
and forfeiture of down-payments as earnest money. Sycip will
also have to vacate the building without judicial demand.
2. Upon failure of respondent to pay the monthly amortization since
October 1990 and despite demands, Francel Realty filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer with the MTC.
3. In his answer, Sycip alleged that he stopped paying
amortizations because the townhouse unit sold was defective
and that in fact, he filed a complaint for “unsound real estate
business practice” in the HLURB.
PROVISIONS:
1. PD 957 Sec 23 (not cited in case, please google nalang I
have limited internet and my eye is throbbing. thanks)
2. Rule 6 Sec 8 (in summary:) – a party may file a counterclaim
only if the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim; otherwise it
cannot be filed.
RULING + RATIO:
1. No. MTC correctly ruled that it does not have jurisdiction. Under PD
957, respondent did in fact have a right to stop paying amortizations
after giving notice to the owner or developer (Francel Realty) due to
petitioner’s failure to develop the subdivision/condominium project
according to approved plans and with compliance with time. The
case thus involves a determination of rights and obligations of parties
in a sale of real estate under PD 957. In short, this is not a simple
case for unlawful detainer arising from failure of lessee to pay rent.
There is a determinative question cognizable by the HLURB, the
question of right of petitioner must be determined by the petitioner.
2. No. MTC correctly ruled that it does not have jurisdiction over the
complaint; it follows that it has no jurisdiction to award counterclaim
for damages in pursuant to Rule 6 Sec 8.

4. MTC dismissed the complaint due to lack of jurisdiction but

awarded moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s
fees in the amount of 23,000.

5. Upon appeal, petitioner argued that since MTC has no

jurisdiction, it also does not have jurisdiction to award the
counterclaim for damages.

ISSUES:
WON MTC has jurisdiction
WON MTC can award damages by way of counterclaim
Digest Author: Czar Paguio
Sps. Esmaquel vs Coprada (2010)
Petitioner: SPOUSES MARCOS R. ESMAQUEL and VICTORIA
SORDEVILLA
Respondent: MARIA COPRADA
Ponencia: Peralta, J.
DOCTRINE: Article 546 which allows full reimbursement of useful
improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made,
apply only to a possessor in good faith, one who builds on land with the belief
that he is the owner thereof. Verily, persons whose occupation of is by sheer
tolerance of its owners are not possessors in good faith.
FACTS:
1. Spouses Marcos Esmaquel and Victoria Sordevilla filed an ejectment
case against respondent Maria V. Coprada, claiming that they are
the registered owners of a 253 sqm parcel of land in Laguna,
covered by a TCT.
2. Sps: In 1945, Coprada was able to persuade the spouses to allow
her and her family to occupy and construct a residential house (nipa
hut) on the land, under the condition that they will vacate the
premises should sps need to use the same.
3. Sps made no attempt to drive them away out of pity, since Coprada
and her eight children had no other place to live in. They occupied
the premises free of rent and payment of realty taxes.
4. However, when Coprada’s financial circumstances improved
(children are already working and she has acquired her own
residential house), spouses demanded that she vacate the land in
1996. Coprada ignored the demands.
6. MCTC held that laches had already set in which prevented
petitioners from questioning the validity of the purported sale. The
RTC reversed the judgment and ruled that respondent's occupation
was by virtue of petitioners' tolerance and permission. Hence,
respondent is bound by an implied promise that she will vacate the
property upon demand. Thus, her possession over the subject
property became unlawful after the petitioners demanded her to
vacate the property. CA reversed the decision; hence, this petition.
ISSUES: W/N petitioners have a valid ground to evict respondent from the
subject property
PROVISION: Art. 546
RULING + RATIO: YES. Respondent's occupation of the subject property
was by mere tolerance, she has no right to retain its possession under
Article 448 of the Civil Code. She is aware that her tolerated possession
may be terminated any time and she cannot be considered as builder in good
faith. Both Article 448 and Article 546 , which allow full reimbursement of
useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is
made, apply only to a possessor in good faith., one who builds on land with
the belief that he is the owner thereof. Verily, persons whose occupation of a
realty is by sheer tolerance of its owners are not possessors in good faith. At
the time respondent built the improvements on the premises in 1945, she
knew that her possession was by mere permission and tolerance of the
petitioners; hence, she cannot be said to be a person who builds on land with
the belief that she is the owner thereof.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

5. Coprada’s defense: Sps sold the lot to her for P2,000, which she
had fully paid. She has also been paying the realty taxes of the lot
and was able to build a semi-concrete house on the land. She also
claimed that the sps’ claim is barred by laches. Even granting,
without admitting, that her claim of ownership is improper because
sps are the registered owners thereof, she argued that she is a
builder in good faith, and thus entitled to be reimbursed the
necessary and useful expenses under Articles 546 and 548 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines. Without such reimbursement,
she has the right of retention over the property and she cannot
just be ejected from the premises.
Other shit na relevant but hindi kelangan sabihin:

First, there is no evidence of the sale. As against the unproven claim of an oral sale,
the Torrens title of the Sps. must prevail. Petitioners' title over the subject property is
evidence of their ownership and such certificate of title serves as evidence of an
indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose
name appears therein. The person who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to
possession thereof.

Second, the validity of petitioners' certificate of title cannot be attacked by respondent

in this case for ejectment. The issue of the validity of the title of the petitioners can
only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. Whether or not the
respondent has the right to claim ownership over the property is beyond the power of
the trial court to determine in an action for unlawful detainer.

Third, laches isn’t applicable here. As the registered owners, petitioners' right to eject
any person illegally occupying their property is not barred by laches. This right is
imprescriptible and can never be barred by laches.
Digest Author: Billy Alcid cultivation, and to a part of the net harvest, both in proportion to the time of
Azarcon and Adobo v. Eusebio (1991) the possession.
Petitioner/s: Leonardo Azarcon, Manuel Azarcon and Esteban Adobo
Respondent: Victor Eusebio RULING + RATIO:
Ponencia: Labrador, J. 1. Yes
• Under the law a person who is in possession and who is being
DOCTRINE: Under the law a person who is in possession and who is being ordered to leave a parcel of land while products thereon are pending
ordered to leave a parcel of land while products thereon are pending harvest, harvest, has the right to a part of the net harvest, as expressly
has the right to a part of the net harvest, as expressly provided by Article 545 provided by Article 545 of the Civil Code.
of the Civil Code. • As the order of execution did not expressly prohibit the defendants-
appellants from gathering the pending fruits, which fruits were the
FACTS: result of their possession and cultivation of the land, it cannot be said
1. Victor Eusebio had filed a lease application, for a parcel of land that the defendants-appellants committed an act which is clear
containing an area of about 349 hectares. violation of the courts' order.
2. A portion thereof was occupied by petitioners herein, Leonardo L. • A person who has been ordered to leave certain premises is
Azarcon and his companions, under a homestead application. ordinarily not prohibited from taking with him his own effects and
3. Before the dispute could be settled, Eusebio filed a complaint in the possession, unless there is an express prohibition to this effect. No
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija praying that the petitioners such, prohibition was contained in the order for the defendants to
Azarcon be ordered to vacate the said portion of land and pay leave the land.
damages. The lower court eventually declared the petitioners in
default ordering them to vacate the land. The petitioners appealed to DISPOSITION: The finding of the CA regarding contempt of court is set
the CA. aside, and the petitioners are acquitted of the charge against them.
4. Pending the appeal, a writ of execution of the judgment of the
lower court was issued.
5. In order to stay the writ of execution, the petitioners deposited a
supersedeas bond of Php 1,000 (November 1955) hence the lower
court suspended the execution. However the certificate showing that
the petitioners deposited such bond was issued late (December
1955) and the Court of Appeals was not notified of such. Therefore
the Court of Appeals had the belief that the petitioners did not post
such bond which is why such court denied the staying of the
execution.
6. In spite of the receipt by the petitioners of the notice of the writ
of execution commanding them to remove from the land and
that the respondent have restitution of the same, the former
nevertheless entered the land to gather palay which was then
pending harvest. Such rice was planted by the petitioners.
7. Hence the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision finding the
parties guilty of contempt of court.
ISSUES:
1. WON the gathering of palay by the petitioners was proper.

PROVISION
Art. 545. If at the time the good faith ceases, there should be any natural or
industrial fruits, the possessor shall have a right to a part of the expenses of
Digest Author: Bugsy Mangaser a homesteader except that it be made within 5 years from date of
conveyance.
CALAGAN v. CFI of DAVAO (1980) • The Court then resorted to Article 1616 which provides that the
vendor a retro cannot avail himself of the right of repurchase without
Petitioner: Mangulon Calagan, Fernando, Calagan, Asuncion Calagan, Mirasol returning to the vendee the price of the sale, the expenses of the
Calagan, Arsenia Calagan, Paula Calagan, Cristituto Calagan, Candelaria Calagan contract and other legitimate payments, and the necessary and
and Crispina Calagan useful expenses made on the thing sold.
Respondent: Hon. Court of First Instance of Davao (Brand II) and Petra Sandoval o The house which PETRA constructed is useful expense (that
Ponencia: Panganiban, J.
which increases the value or augments the income of the
party, as contrary to a necessary expense which is incurred
DOCTRINE:
for the preservation of the thing)
A homesteader who exercises his right to repurchase within 5 years from
• However, Article 1616 should be construed in conjunction with Article
conveyance of the homestead should do so in accordance with Article 1616.
546 and 547 of the Civil Code prescribing the rules on refund of
However, if he chooses not to pay the useful improvements, as the contrary
necessary and useful expense inasmuch as a vendee a retro is
would grant the vendee the right of retention over the property (Article 546),
considered in good faith.
the vendee may resort to remedies afforded by Article 547 which is to
o An option available to the homesteader to is to pay for the
remove the useful improvements, provided no substantial damage or injury is
useful improvements with right of retention. However, to
made.
allow the vendee of a homestead the right of retention until
full payment would render nugatory the right of repurchase
FACTS:
granted by law to homesteader. All a vendee would do to
1. MANGULON Calagan and wife, TAKURA, were granted a
prevent repurchase is to build something on the homestead
Homestead Patent over a 5.2905 hectare-land in Dawis, Digos,
BEYOND the capacity of the homesteader to pay.
Davao
o Therefore, most viable option is for the homesteader to
2. TAKURA died a year after and was survived by her husband and
require the vendee a retro to remove the useful
children
improvements. It being obvious that CALAGANS are not
3. 1961: MANGULON and daughter, PAULA, sold a portion of their
exercising the option to refund, vendee may remove her
homestead (9,230 square meters) to PETRA Sandoval for P2,340.
house since this can be done without damaging the principal
The latter borrowed the title of the land to have the sale annotated
thing.
thereon
4. 1963: MANGULON offered to repurchase the portion sold to PETRA,
DISPOSITION: Judgment appealed from is MODIFIED. (Portion ordering
but she refused. The CALAGANS (petitioners) made subsequent
CALAGANS to pay value of the house is eliminated. PETRA is given the right
offers but PETRA was adamant. She later on maintained that she
to remove her house without damage to the land.)
was willing to comply provided she was reimbursed the value of the
house that she constructed on the subject of the land.
5. The trial Court ruled for the CALAGANS, however ordered them to
return the P 2,340 and pay P 3,000 for the value of the house
constructed thereon.

ISSUES:
• WoN the CALAGANS may be ordered to pay the value of the house

PROVISION: Public Land Act, Article 1616, 546 and 547 (Civil Code)

RULING + RATIO:
No.
• There is no provision in the PUBLIC LAND ACT which provides for
the terms and conditions under which repurchase may be effected by
Digest Author: George Filasol
Cruz v. Pahati (1956)
Petitioner/s: Jose R. Cruz
Respondent/s: Reynaldo Pahati, et.al
Ponencia: Bautista Angelo, J.
DOCTRINE: A person illegally deprived of any movable may recover it from
the person in possession of the same and the only defense the latter may
have is if he has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, in which case the
owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid for.
FACTS:
1. The automobile in question was originally owned by Northern Motors,
Inc. which later sold it to a Chinaman.
a. The Chinaman sold it to Belizo (dealer in 2nd hand cars)
b. Belizo later on sold it to Cruz
2. One year thereafter, Belizo offered the plaintiff to sell the automobile
for him claiming to have a buyer for it.
3. At that time, plaintiff’s certificate of registration was missing and,
upon the suggestion of Belizo, plaintiff wrote a letter addressed to
the Motor Section of Public Works fro the issuance of a new
registration certificate alleging as reason the loss of the one
previously issued to him and stating that he was intending to sell his
car.
4. But the said letter was falsified and converted into an authorized
deed of sale in favor of Belizo.
5. With this deed of sale, Belizo succeeded in obtaining a certificate of
registration in his name.
6. Subsequently, he sold the car to Bulahan.
a. Bulahan then sold it to Pahati.
7. Hence, this action for Replevin instituted by Cruz against Pahati and
Bulahan.
8. Bulahan claims that he acquired the automobile from Belizo for value
and without having any knowledge of any defect in the title of the
latter.
a. He claims that Cruz delivered the possession of the
automobile to Belizo for resale and to facilitate it, Cruz gave
Belizo a letter of authority to secure a new certificate of
registration Cruz’ name.
b. By having clothed Belizo with an apparent ownership or
authority to sell the automobile, plaintiff is now stopped to
deny such ownership or authority.
ISSUES:
1. WON Cruz or Bulahan has the better right to the car
PROVISION: Art. 559. The possession of movable property acquired in
good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any
movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the
person in possession of the same.
If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been
unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner
cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefore.
RULING + RATIO:
1. Cruz has the better right of possession
• Both (Cruz and Bulahan) were found by the lower court to be
innocent and to have acted in good faith
• BUT Cruz has a better right to the car in question than Bulahan
for it cannot be disputed that Cruz had been illegally deprived
thereof because of the ingenious scheme utilized by Belizo to
enable him to dispose of it as if he were the owner thereof.
o Cruz, therefore, can still recover the possession of the
car even if Bulahan had acted in good faith in purchasing
it from Belizo.
o The maxim that “no man can transfer to another a better
title than he has himself” obtain in the civil as well as in
common law.
• The common law principle that “where one of two innocent
parties must suffer by a fraud perpetrated by another, the law
imposes the loss upon the party who, by his misplaced
confidence, has enabled the fraud to be committed” cannot be
applied to this case which is covered by an express provision of
the New Civil Code.
DISPOSITION: Petition appealed from is reversed. No cost.
Author: Cham Mercado
AZNAR V. YAPDIANGCO (1965)
Petitioner: Jose Aznar
Respondent: Rafael Yapdiangco
Ponencia: Regala, J.
DOCTRINE: If the owner has lost a thing, or if he has been unlawfully
deprived of it, he has a right to recover it, not only from the finder, thief or
robber, but also from third persons who may have acquired it in good faith
from such finder, thief, or robber.
In these cases, the possessor cannot retain the thing as against the
owner, who may recover it without paying indemnity, except when the
possessor acquired it in a public sale.
FACTS:
1. Teodoro Santos advertised in 2 metropolitan newspapers the sale of
his Ford Fairlane 500.
2. A certain L. De Dios went to the Santos residence to answer the ad.
Because Teodoro was out, De Dios talked with the Teodoro’s son,
Irineo Santos, and told him that his uncle, Vicente Marella was
interested in buying the car.
3. The following day, as instructed by his father, Ireneo went to the
address of Vicente Marella in Sampaloc, Manila.
a. At this meeting, Marella agreed to buy the car at P14,700
provided that the price would be paid only after the car had
been registered in his name.
4. Thereafter, Ireneo, with his father, and De Dios went to the office of a
certain Atty. Padolina to execute the deed of sale for the car. Then,
they went to the Motor Vehicles Office in Quezon City where the car
was registered in Marella’s name.
5. Teodoro returned to his house, but gave the registration papers and
copy of the deed of sale to his son, Irineo, and instructed him not to
part with them until Marella gives full payment for the car.
6. When Irineo went to Marella and demanded payment, Marella said
that he was short by P2000. The latter begged to be allowed to
secure the shortage from a sister living in Azcarraga, Manila.
7. Marella ordered De Dios and Irineo Santos to go said sister. He also
requested the registration papers and deed of sale from Irineo
claiming that he would like to show them to his lawyer. Irineo handed
the papers over to Marella and proceeded to the said sister.
8. At a place in Azcarraga, Irineo and De Dios alighted from the car and
entered a house, while their unidentified companion remained in the
car.
9. Once inside, De Dios asked Irineo to wait at the sala, while he went
inside a room.
a. That was the last time Irineo saw him.
10. After some time, Irineo found out that the car and their unidentified
companion were gone.
11. When Irineo went back to Marella’s house, it was closed and Marella
was gone.
a. The matter was reported to his father and the police.
12. On the same day, in the afternoon, Marcella sold the car to petitioner
Jose Aznar for P15,000.
13. While the car was in Aznar’s possession and while he was attending
to its registration in his name, the agents of Phil. Constabulary,
headed by respondent Yapdiangco, seized the car based on
Teodoro Santos’ report that said car was unlawfully taken from him.
14. Aznar filed a complaint for replevin against Yapdiangco.
15. Lower court rendered a decision awarding the car to intervenor
Teodoro Santos.
ISSUE:
Who has the better the right to the possession of the car, Teodoro Santos or
Jose Aznar?
PROVISION: Art.559, Civil Code
“The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is
equivalent to title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been
unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in possession of
the same.
If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been
unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner
cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor.”
RULING + RATIO:
Teodoro Santos has a better right to the car.
• The rule is that if the owner has lost a thing, or if he has been
unlawfully deprived of it, he has a right to recover it, not only from the
finder, thief or robber, but also from third persons who may have
acquired it in good faith from such finder, thief, or robber.
o In these cases, the possessor cannot retain the thing as
against the owner, who may recover it without paying
indemnity, except when the possessor acquired it in a public
sale.
• In this case, Teodoro had been unlawfully deprived of his car by
Marella. Therefore, he can still recover possession of his car even if
it is in the possession of a third party who had acquired it in good
faith.
DISPOSITION: Appeal dismissed.
Author: De Claro, Kimmi
De Garcia v. Court of Appeals
Petition: Replevin
Petitioners: Consuelo de Garcia and Anastacio Garcia
Respondents: Angelina Guevara and Juan Guevara
Ponente: Fernando, J
DOCTRINE:
Article 559 in fact assumes that possessor is not yet the owner. It is
only a presumptive title sufficient to serve as a basis for acquisitive
prescription, that the clause immediately following provides that `one
who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof,
may recover it from the person in possession of the same.
FACTS:
1. October 11, 1953 Angelina Guevara while talking to Consuelo
de Garcia, owner of La Bulakeña restaurant recognized her
ring in the finger of Mrs. Garcia and inquired where she bought
it, which the Consuelo told her that she bought it from her
comadre.
2. Angelina explained that that ring was stolen from her house in
February, 1952. Consuelo handed the ring to Angelina and it
fitted the latter’s finger. (lady's diamond ring 18 cts. white gold
mounting, with a 2.05 cts. diamond-solitaire, and four brills
0.10 cts.)
3. Two or three days later, Angelina and her husband Lt. Col.
Juan Guevara along with Consuelo de Garcia and her
attorney, proceeded to the store of Mr. Rebullida to whom they
showed the ring in question.
4. Mr. Rebullida a examined the ring with the aid of high power
lens and concluded that it was the indeed the ring that
Angelina bought from him in 1947. The ring was returned to
Consuelo, who failed to return the ring to Angelina despite a
written request.
5. Later on when the sheriff tried to serve the writ of seizure
(replevin), Consuelo refused to deliver the ring which had been
examined by Mr. Rebullida, claiming it was lost.
6. Consuelo also claims that the ring she bought could be similar
to, but not the same ring Angelina purchased from Mr.
Rebullida which was stolen; that according to a pawn-shop
owner, Consuelo’s diamond was found to weigh 2.57 cts.
7. It was established that the ring possessed by Consuelo was
the same ring as the one stolen from Angelina.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Consuelo’s possession in good faith constitutes title
over the ring.
PROVISIONS:
Article 559 - The possession of movable property acquired in good
faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any
movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from
the person in possession of the same. If the possessor of a movable
lost of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it
in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return
without reimbursing the price paid therefor.
RATIO + RULING:
NO. Consuelo’s possession in good faith is not equivalent to
title and did not defeat Angelina’s title over the ring.
Angelina Guevara, having been unlawfully deprived of the
diamond ring in question, was entitled to recover it from petitioner
Consuelo de Garcia who was found in possession of the same.
Article 559 in fact assumes that possessor is not yet the
owner. The title established by the first clause of Art. 559 is only a
presumptive title sufficient to serve as a basis for acquisitive
prescription, that the clause immediately following provides that `one
Author: De Claro, Kimmi
who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof,
may recover it from the person in possession of the same.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of

Appeals is hereby affirmed. With costs.
Digest Author: Marielle Corpin 
DIZON v SUNTAY
Petitioner: Dominador Dizon, doing business under the firm name
“Pawnshop of Dominador Dizon”
Respondent: Lourdes G. Suntay
Ponencia: Fernando, J.
DOCTRINE:
Owner unlawfully deprived of movable property may recover
possession of same from third party.
FACTS:
1. Plaintiff Suntay is the owner of the diamond ring valued at -
P- 5,000.00.
2. Plaintiff Suntay and Clarita Sison entered into a transaction
where Suntay’s ring was delivered to Clarita for sale on
commission. Suntay knew Clarita as latter is the close friend
of former’s cousin and frequently met each other.
3. 3 days after the ring was received by Clarita, said ring was
pledged by Melia Sison, niece of the husband of Clarita,
evidently in connivance with the latter, with petitioner Dizon’s
pawnshop for -P- 2,600.00.
4. After the lapse of a considerable time, Suntay demanded the
return of the ring. Clarita delivered to Suntay the pawnshop
ticket. Thereafter, Suntay filed a case of estafa against
Clarita.
5. Subsequently, Suntay wrote a letter to Dizon for the delivery
of the ring pledged. But the latter refused to return the ring.
6. Suntay successfully took possession of her ring through the
remedy of replevin which was granted by the court.
ISSUE:
WON Suntay can recover possession of her ring from Dizon who is
in good faith
PROVISION:
• Art. 559 CC
The possession of movable property acquired in good
faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has
lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived
thereof may recover it from the person in possession of
the same. If the possessor of a movable lost of which
the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it
in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain
its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor.
RULING + RATIO:
YES!
• Suntay can recover the possession of the diamond ring from
a pawnshop where Clarita had pledged it without authority to
do so.
• Article 559 applies and the defense that the pawnshop
acquired possession of the ring without notice of any defect
in the title of the pledgor is unavailing
• The common law principle that were one of two innocent
persons must suffer by a fraud perpetrated by another, the
law imposes the loss upon the party who, by his misplaced
confidence, has enabled the fraud to be committed, cannot
be applied in a case which is covered by an express
provision of the new Civil Code, specifically Article 559.
Between a common law principle and a statutory provision,
the latter must prevail in this jurisdiction.
• Also, it was mentioned in the case that the owner of movable
unlawfully pledged by another is not estopped from
recovering possession.
• Teehankee’s separate concurring opinion:
- “Unlawfully deprived” is used in the general sense, not
used in the specific sense such as “stolen” in the French
Code. It extends to all cases where there has been no
valid transmission of ownership, including depositary or
lessee.
- Conviction of embezzler not essential to recovery of
movable by owner from third party.
DISPOSITION: Decision of CA affirmed. Costs against petitioner.
Digest Author: Alyssa Rodriguez
EDCA Publishing v Santos (1990)
Petitioner: EDCA PUBLISHING & DISTRIBUTING CORP
Respondent: THE SPOUSES LEONOR and GERARDO SANTOS, doing
business under the name and style of "SANTOS BOOKSTORE," and THE
COURT OF APPEALS
Ponencia: Cruz, J.
DOCTRINE: The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is
equivalent to a title. This dispenses the need of further proof like sales
invoices.
FACTS:
1. A person identifying himself as Professor Jose Cruz placed an order
by telephone with EDCA (petitioner) for 406 books, payable on
delivery.
2. EDCA prepared the corresponding invoice and delivered the books
as ordered. Cruz issued a personal check covering the purchase
price of P8,995.65.
3. Cruz then sold 120 of the books to Gerardo and Leonor Santos of
the SANTOS BOOKSTORE (respondents) who, after verifying the
seller's ownership from the invoice shown, paid Cruz P1,700.00
4. Then after, Cruz made a second order with EDCA even before the
clearing of his first check. This made EDCA suspicious.
5. As such, EDCA made inquiries with the De la Salle College where
Cruz had claimed to be a dean and was informed that there was no
such person in its employ. EDCA also found out that Cruz had no
more account or deposit with the Philippine Amanah Bank, the bank
against which he had drawn the payment check.
6. With this, EDCA then went to the police, which set a trap and
arrested Cruz (real name Tomas de la Peña). EDCA then found out
about his sale of 120 of the books to the Spouses Santos.
7. That very same night Cruz was arrested, EDCA sought the
assistance of the police and they forced their way into the SANTOS
BOOKSTORE with prosecution for buying stolen property. They
seized the 120 books without warrant, loading them in a van
belonging to EDCA, and thereafter turned them over to the petitioner.
8. Spouses Santos sued for recovery of the books after demand for
their return was rejected by EDCA. A writ of preliminary attachment
was issued and EDCA, after initial refusal, finally surrendered the
books to the private respondents.
ISSUES: W/N EDCA may seize the books from Santos on the ground that it
has been unlawfully deprived of the books
PROVISIONS:
Art. 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is
equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has
been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in
possession of the same.
If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been unlawfully
deprived has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot
obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor.
Art. 1477. The ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee
upon the actual or constructive delivery thereof.
Art. 1478. The parties may stipulate that ownership in the thing shall not pass
to the purchaser until he has fully paid the price.
RULING + RATIO:
No.
• EDCA assails that the Spouses Santos have not established their
ownership of the disputed books because they have not even
produced a receipt to prove they had bought the stock. This is
unacceptable. Precisely, the first sentence of Article 559
provides that "the possession of movable property acquired in
good faith is equivalent to a title," thus dispensing with further
proof.
• Moreover, the general rule is that: Ownership shall pass from the
vendor to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery of the
thing sold even if the purchase price has not yet been paid.
• The exception would be that: Ownership in the thing sold shall not
pass to the buyer until full payment of the purchase only if there is a
stipulation to that effect. Absent the stipulation above noted, delivery
of the thing sold will effectively transfer ownership to the buyer who
can in turn transfer it to another.
• Appyling these to the case at bar, although the title of Cruz was
presumed under Article 559 by his mere possession of the books,
these being movable property, Leonor Santos nevertheless
demanded more proof from Cruz by requesting for the EDCA invoice
before deciding to buy them. This was extra caution on the Spouses
Santos’ part and it would certainly be unfair now to make them bear
the prejudice sustained by EDCA, which should have been more
vigilant in dealing with Cruz.
DISPOSITION: Petition dismissed.
 LEDESMA v CA (1992)
Petition: Appeal from CA, reversing CFI-Rizal in replevin case
Petitioner: Jaime Ledesma
Respondent: Court of Appeals, Citiwide Motors, Inc.
Ponencia: DAVIDE, Jr., J.:
DOCTRINE:
... ownership in the thing sold shall not pass to the buyer until full payment of the
purchase only if there is a stipulation to that effect. Otherwise, the rule is that such
ownership shall pass from the vendor to the vendee upon the actual or constructive
delivery of the thing sold even if the purchase price has not yet been paid.
Non-payment only creates a right to demand payment or to rescind the contract, or
to criminal prosecution in the case of bouncing checks. But absent the stipulation
above noted, delivery of the thing sold will effectively transfer ownership to the
buyer who can in turn transfer it to another. (EDCA Publishing and Distributing
Corp. v. Santos)
FACTS:
1. On Sept. 27, 1977, Citiwide sold to a certain Jojo Consuji, two cars (1977 Isuzu
Gemini, PhP42.2k, and 1977 Holden Premiere, PhP58.8k), ostensibly on behalf
of his daddy, Rustico T. Consuji. For this, Jojo was to pay with a Phil. Comm. and
Indust. Bank Managers Check for PhP101,000.00.
2. The next day, Citiwide delivered the cars to Jojo, and Jojo turned over the
Manager’s Check (dated Sept. 28) to Citiwide.
3. When Citiwide took the check to PCIB, IT WAS DISHONORED. PCIB found that
the check was tampered with to make the correct amount of “PhP101.00” look
like “PhP101,000.00” (material alteration).
4. Citiwide reported this to the Constabulary, which found that “Jojo” was in fact
Armando Suarez, and this check-altering is his favored modus operandi.
5. The Premiere was later found abandoned in QC. It’s the Gemini that’s the
problem: it’s now in the possession of Jaime Ledesma. Citiwide filed for
replevin.
6. Ledesma’s defense: he purchased the vehicle in good faith from its registered
owner, Pedro Neyra.
7. In case it’s asked: was Citiwide able to recover the vehicle during the case? YES.
Had to post double the car’s value as bond.
8. CFI-Rizal ruled IN FAVOR OF LEDESMA, awarding the return of the car, plus
damages (PhP35k actual, and PhP10k wrongful issue of writ of seizure)
9. Citiwide appealed, saying: ART. 559. Citiwide was unlawfully deprived of vehicle
by Jojo/Suarez. Ledesma’s good faith does not bar recovery. And the Court of
Appeals agreed, ruling in Citywide’s favor.
10. Could be important if asked: Ledesma’s motion for reconsideration argued that
Jojo/Suarez’ title to the car was “voidable” at least, and was not declared void
by a competent court at the time of transfer to Ledesma, for purposes of
applying Art. 1506. But the CA denied the reconsideration.
ISSUE: W/N Citiwide is entitled to recover the Gemini, by virtue of Art. 559.
(Conversely: Whether Ledesma is entitled to the car by virtue of Art. 1506)
PROVISIONS:
Civil Code Art. 559: The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is
equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been
unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in possession of the
same.
If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been unlawfully
deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its
return without reimbursing the price paid therefor.
Civil Code Art. 1506: Where the seller of goods has a voidable title thereto, but his
title has not been avoided at the time of the sale, the buyer acquires a good title to
the goods, provided he buys them in good faith, for value, and without notice of the
seller’s defect of title.
Civil Code Arts. 1477 and 1478: The ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred
to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery thereof. // The parties may
stipulate that ownership in the thing shall not pass to the purchaser until he has
fully paid the price.
HELD/RATIO:
CITIWIDE IS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVERY OF THE CAR. The short version is, “It is
EDCA Publishing and Distributing Corp. v. Santos all over again.” The Supreme Court
even explicitly says so. Long version, though:
1. As per Art. 1477 and 1478, unless the parties stipulate that ownership does
not pass to buyer until full payment of purchase price, then it is the act of
delivery that transfers ownership to the buyer. Citiwide did not stipulate
this when it delivered the car to Jojo/Suarez. Therefore, ownership did
validly pass to Jojo/Suarez, due to an unconditional contract of sale, but
voidable due to Suarez’s fraud.
 2. Therefore, the CA was wrong when it said that Citiwide was illegally
deprived of the car due to Suarez’s fraud. It was not. Even if it was due to
fraud, ownership was lawfully transferred by delivery, and all fraud can do
is vitiate consent, making the contract voidable—but not void ab initio.
Law on Sales!
3. When Ledesma bought the car from Neyra, that contract of sale with
Jojo/Suarez had not even been declared void yet by a competent court.
Citing the case of Chua Hai v. Hon. Kapunan, the SC noted that Ledesma’s
claim to the Gemini remains valid, and must be respected by the courts.
4. So the CA was also wrong to rule that Citiwide could repossess the vehicle.
Ledesma paid for the vehicle in good faith. The transfers of ownership
down to him remain uncontested in court.

DISPOSITION: CA ruling SET ASIDE. CFI-Rizal (now RTC-level) REINSTATED. COSTS to

Citiwide. Ledesma GETS THE CAR BACK.

ADDITIONAL POTENTIALLY USEFUL DISCUSSION (especially if tested further during

recitation with hypotheticals)

Remember? Sales contract does not transfer ownership (title); it is merely mode. It
is delivery that transfers title. But the importance of sales contracts is that it creates
the obligation to transfer ownership of the reciprocal prestations, which can
therefore be enforced through specific performance.

But could Citiwide have recovered the Gemini, had it first had the sale to Suarez
declared void (rescinded, causing the prestations to be returned)? Consider that
when the car reached either Neyra (unless it’s another of Suarez’ aliases) or
Ledesma, that person became a third party who would be impinged by any legal
development affecting the original sales contract between Citiwide and Jojo.

Plus, of course, one would assume that Citiwide would have to find Suarez first to
pin him down with the rescission case.
Digest Author: Joachim Dompor
(CHUA HAI vs KAPUNAN and ONG SHU)
Petitioner: Chua Hai
Respondent: Hon. Ruperto Kapunan (Judge of CFI Manila) and Ong Shu
Ponencia: JBL Reyes
DOCTRINE:
A third party in possession of goods purchased in good faith from a person c
harged with estafa cannot be divested of possession by the lawful owner whil
e estafa has yet to be proven by a final decision in a criminal case
FACTS:
1. Roberto Soto purchased 700 corrugated galvanized iron sheets and
249 round iron bars for P6,137 from Youngstown Hardware, which
was owned by Ong Shu
2. Soto issued a Security Bank check for P7,000 as payment but didn't
inform Ong Shu that he had no sufficient funds. The che k was
subsequently dishonored.
3. Soto sold 165 sheets in Pangasinan and 535 of them in Mindoro. Of
those sold in Pangasinan, 100 were sold to Chua Hai
4. Ong Shu filed a case against Soto for estafa. He also filed a petition
asking thatthe700 iron sheets be returned to him (at the meantime,
they were deposited in the Manila Police Department)
5. Chua Hai opposed the petition, but the court still granted the return
of the sheets to Ong Shu
6. Chua Hai presented amotion for reconsideration alleging: the court's
order of return violated the contract of deposit with the Manila Police
Department, that the return amounted to deprivation of his property
without due process of law, and that Article 105 of the RPC
(restitution of items subject of theft/estafa) can only be invoked after
termination of the criminal case, not while it is pending.
7. The trial court still did not heed Chua Hai's protest, hence this
appeal.
ISSUES:
W/N goods purchased by an accused, for which he paid with a rubber check,
can be seized from a 3rd party who bought the same in good faith and for va
luable consideration before the offender is tried and convicted
PROVISION: Article 559 of the Civil Code (Articles 103-105 of the RPC
RULING + RATIO:
NO
• To deprive the possessor in good faith of the chattels possessed
violatesthe rule in Article 559
• As presumptive owner, Chua Hai is entitled to hold and enjoy the
thing
• It had yet to be proven that estafa was actually committed
• Civil liability to make restitution under Article 105 arises only when
criminal liability is finally declared
• Last paragraph of Artcile 105 provides that restution cannot be
effected if the thing has been acquired im such a manner that
recovery is now barred
ο Purchasesmade in a merchant's store/fairs/markets (Article 1505
CC)
• Even arguing that the purchase was not made in accordance with
Article 1505, failure of a buyer to make goos the price does not
revest title in the seller unleas the sale is first rescinded
• Assuming also that the sale was obtained through fraud and deceit,
the contract was made merely voidable
• Article1506 CC provides that a buyer in good faith wherein the
seller has a voidable title thereto acquires a good title to the thing
if the title has not been avoided at the time of sale
• Queations of ownership and possession being civil in nature, they
should not be settled by exclusive reference to the RPC
• Proper remedy lies in a civil suit and attachment
DISPOSITION: Petition granted. Order of the court revoked and set aside. G
alvanized Iron Sheets returned to Chua Hai.
Justice Felix, concurrin: Agrees with majority decision but basis of his vote is
that the Article105of the RPC which was relied upon by the court cannot be i
nvoked and applied in the case at bar
 Where the ownership of the effects of the crime has been transferred to
an innocent third party, restitution in Article 105 is limited to cases where
the offended party was illegally deprived of the thing (theft, robbery) but
not to cases where the offended party has been deprived of his property
which he delivered to the purchaser with the expectatiom of receiving
consideration for the sale
Justice Labrador, dissenting: It is paragraph 2 of Article 559 which shpuld be
controlling in this case
 The only way Chua Hai could vae been protected by the law was if he
purchased the sheets in a public sale as per paragraph 2 of Article 559
 Even if Chua Hai has possessed the thing in good faith, Ong Shu still
has a better right over the thing