CONFLICT OF LAW CASES by TMC

1. HENRY HILTON vs. GUSTAVE BERTIN GUYOT, ET AL., 159 US 113, June 3, 1895

Brief Fact Summary

Hilton (Plaintiff) and Libbey (Plaintiff) appealed from a federal district court holding that a French court judgment against them for amounts allegedly
owed to a French firm was enforceable without retrial on the merits.

Synopsis of Rule of Law

No law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of the sovereignty from which its authority is derived.

Facts
Hilton (Plaintiff) and Libbey (Plaintiff), New York citizens trading in Paris, were sued in France by Guyot (Defendant), the administrator of a French firm, for
sums allegedly owed to that firm. The Plaintiffs appeared and litigated the merits in the French proceeding. The French court rendered a judgment
against them that was affirmed by a higher court and became final. Defendant then sought to enforce that judgment in federal district court in New York.
That court held the judgment enforceable without retrial on the merits. The Plaintiffs then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Issue: Do laws have any effect, of their own force, beyond the limits of the sovereignty from which its authority is derived?

Held:
(Gray, J.) No. No law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of the sovereignty from which its authority is derived. No sovereign is bound,
unless by special compact, to execute within his dominions a judgment rendered by the tribunals of another state, and if execution be sought by suit
upon the judgment or otherwise, the tribunal in which the suit is brought, or from which execution is sought, is, on principle, at liberty to examine into
the merits of such judgment, and to give effect to it or not, as may be found just and equitable. However, the general comity, utility and convenience of
nations have established a usage among most civilized states, by which the final judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally
carried into execution, under certain regulations and restrictions, which differ in different countries. Additionally, judgments rendered in France, or in any
foreign country, by the laws of which our own judgments are reviewable upon the merits, are not entitled to full credit and conclusive effect when sued
upon in this country, but are prima facie evidence only of the justice of the plaintiffs’ claim. Reversed.

2. SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MILAGROS P. MORADA and HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 89,
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, 297 SCRA 469, G.R. No. 122191, October 8, 1998

Locus Actus
FACTS:

On January 21, 1988 defendant SAUDIA hired plaintiff as a Flight Attendant for its airlines based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia
.In 1990, while she and some co-workers were in a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, an Arab co-worker tried to rape her in a hotel room. Fortunately, a room
boy heard her cry for help and two of her Arab co-workers were arrested and detained in Indonesia. Later, Saudia Airlines re-assigned her to work in their
Manilao ffice. While working in Manila, Saudia Airlines advised her to meet with a Saudia Airlines officer in Saudi.She did but to her surprise, she was
brought to a Saudi court where she was interrogated and eventually sentenced to 5 months imprisonment and 289 lashes; she allegedly violated Muslim
customs by partying with males. The Prince of Makkah got wind of her conviction and the Prince determined that she was wrongfully convicted hence the
Prince absolved her and sent her back to the Philippines. Saudia Airlines later on dismissed Morada. Morada then sued Saudia Airlines for damages under
Article19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Saudia Airlines filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case because the
applicable law should be the law of Saudi Arabia. Saudia Airlines also prayed for other reliefs under the premises.

ISSUE: WON Saudi Airlines’ contention' was tenable?

HELD: No.
Firstly, the RTC has acquired jurisdiction over Saudia Airlines when the latter filed a motion to dismisswith petition for other reliefs. The asking for other
reliefs effectively asked the court to make adetermination of Saudi
a Airlines’s rights hence a submission to the court’s jurisdiction.

Secondly , the RTC has acquired jurisdiction over the case because as alleged in the complaint ofMorada, she is bringing the suit for damages under the
provisions of our Civil Law and not of the ArabianLaw.Morada then has the right to file it in the QC RTC because under the Rules of Court, a plaintiff may
elect whether to file an action in personam (case at bar) in the place where she resides or where thedefendant resides. Obviously, it is well within her
right to file the case here because if she’ll file it in Saudi Arabia, it will be very disadvantageous for her (and of course, again, Philippine Civil Law is the law
invoked).

Thirdly, one important test factor to determine where to file a case, if there is a foreign element involved, is the so called “locus actus” or where an act
has been done. In the case at bar, Morada was already working in Manila when she was summoned by her superior to go to Saudi Arabia to meet with a
Saudia Airlines officer. She was not informed that she was going to appear in a court trial. Clearly, she wasdefrauded into appearing before a court trial
which led to her wrongful conviction. The act of defrauding,which is tortuous, was committed in Manila and this led to her humiliation, misery, and
suffering. Andapplying the torts principle in a conflicts case, the SC finds that the Philippines could be said as a situs ofthe tort (the place where the
alleged tortious conduct took place).

3. HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION vs. JACK ROBERT SHERMAN, DEODATO RELOJ and THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, 176
SCRA 331, G.R. No. 72494, August 11, 1989
FACTS:
In 1981, Eastern Book Supply Service PTE, Ltd., (Eastern) a company incorporated in Singapore applied w/, & was granted by the Singapore branch of
HSBC an overdraft facility in the max amount of Singapore $200,000 (w/c amount was subsequently increased to Singapore $375,000) w/ interest at 3%
over HSBC prime rate, payable monthly, on amounts due under said overdraft facility. As a security for the repayment by Eastern of sums advanced by
HSBC to it through the aforesaid overdraft facility, in 1982, Jack Sherman, Dodato Reloj, and a Robin de Clive Lowe, all of whom were directors of Eastern
at such time, executed a Joint and Several Guarantee in favor of HSBC whereby Sherman, Reloj and Lowe agreed to pay, jointly and severally, on demand
all sums owed by Eastern to HSBC under the aforestated overdraft facility.

The Joint and Several Guarantee provides that: “This guarantee and all rights, obligations and liabilities arising hereunder shall be construed and
determined under and may be enforced in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Singapore. We hereby agree that the Courts of Singapore shall
have jurisdiction over all disputes arising under this guarantee.”

Eastern failed to pay its obligation. Thus, HSBC demanded payment of the obligation from Sherman & Reloj, conformably w/ the provisions of the Joint
and Several Guarantee. Inasmuch as Sherman & Reloj still failed to pay, HSBC filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money against them. Sherman &
Reloj filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that (1) the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint, and (2) the court has no
jurisdiction over the person of the defendants.

ISSUE: W/N Philippine courts should have jurisdiction over the suit?

RULING
YES. While it is true that "the transaction took place in Singaporean setting" and that the Joint and Several Guarantee contains a choice-of-forum clause,
the very essence of due process dictates that the stipulation that "this guarantee and all rights, obligations & liabilities arising hereunder shall be
construed & determined under & may be enforced in accordance w/ the laws of the Republic of Singapore. We hereby agree that the Courts in Singapore
shall have jurisdiction over all disputes arising under this guarantee" be liberally construed. One basic principle underlies all rules of jurisdiction in
International Law: a State does not have jurisdiction in the absence of some reasonable basis for exercising it, whether the proceedings are in rem quasi
in rem or in personam. To be reasonable, the jurisdiction must be based on some minimum contacts that will not offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice. Indeed, as pointed-out by HSBC at the outset, the instant case presents a very odd situation. In the ordinary habits of life, anyone
would be disinclined to litigate before a foreign tribunal, w/ more reason as a defendant. However, in this case, Sherman & Reloj are Philippine residents
(a fact which was not disputed by them) who would rather face a complaint against them before a foreign court and in the process incur considerable
expenses, not to mention inconvenience, than to have a Philippine court try and resolve the case. Their stance is hardly comprehensible, unless their
ultimate intent is to evade, or at least delay, the payment of a just obligation.

The defense of Sherman & Reloj that the complaint should have been filed in Singapore is based merely on technicality. They did not even claim, much
less prove, that the filing of the action here will cause them any unnecessary trouble, damage, or expense. On the other hand, there is no showing that
petitioner BANK filed the action here just to harass Sherman & Reloj.

The parties did not thereby stipulate that only the courts of Singapore, to the exclusion of all the rest, has jurisdiction. Neither did the clause in question
operate to divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction. In International Law, jurisdiction is often defined as the light of a State to exercise authority over
persons and things w/in its boundaries subject to certain exceptions. Thus, a State does not assume jurisdiction over travelling sovereigns, ambassadors
and diplomatic representatives of other States, and foreign military units stationed in or marching through State territory w/ the permission of the latter's
authorities. This authority, which finds its source in the concept of sovereignty, is exclusive w/in and throughout the domain of the State. A State is
competent to take hold of any judicial matter it sees fit by making its courts and agencies assume jurisdiction over all kinds of cases brought before them.

4. IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF CHEONG BOO, deceased, MORA ADONG vs. CHEONG SENG GEE, 43 Phil. 43, G.R. No. 18081, March 3, 1922

5. CAYETANO LIM and MARCIANO LIM vs. THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, 36 Phil. 472, G.R. No. L-11759, March 16, 1917

6. KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA and NIPPON ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS CO., LTD. vs. MINORU KITAMURA, 538 SCRA 26, G.R. No. 149177, November 23, 2007

FACTS:
Nippon Engineering Consultants (Nippon), a Japanese consultancy firm providing technical and management support in the infrastructure projects
national permanently residing in the Philippines. The agreement provides that Kitamaru was to extend professional services to Nippon for a year. Nippon
assigned Kitamaru to work as the project manager of the Southern Tagalog Access Road (STAR) project. When the STAR project was near completion,
DPWH engaged the consultancy services of Nippon, this time for the detailed engineering & construction supervision of the Bongabon-Baler Road
Improvement (BBRI) Project. Kitamaru was named as the project manger in the contract.

Hasegawa, Nippon’s general manager for its International Division, informed Kitamaru that the company had no more intention of automatically
renewing his ICA. His services would be engaged by the company only up to the substantial completion of the STAR Project.

Kitamaru demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI project. Nippon insisted that Kitamaru’s contract was for a fixed term that had expired. Kitamaru
then filed for specific performance & damages w/ the RTC of Lipa City. Nippon filed a MTD.

Nippon’s contention: The ICA had been perfected in Japan & executed by & between Japanese nationals. Thus, the RTC of Lipa City has no jurisdiction.
The claim for improper pre-termination of Kitamaru’s ICA could only be heard & ventilated in the proper courts of Japan following the principles of lex loci
celebrationis & lex contractus.

The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. The CA ruled hat the principle of lex loci celebrationis was not applicable to the case, because nowhere in the
pleadings was the validity of the written agreement put in issue. It held that the RTC was correct in applying the principle of lex loci solutionis.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in civil cases for specific performance & damages involving contracts executed
outside the country by foreign nationals may be assailed on the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex contractus, “the state of the most significant
relationship rule,” or forum non conveniens.

HELD: NO. In the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, 3 consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement
of judgments. Jurisdiction & choice of law are 2 distinct concepts.Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state;
choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law w/c will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The
power to exercise jurisdiction does notautomatically give a state constitutional authority to apply forum law. While jurisdiction and the choice of the lex
foriwill often coincide, the “minimum contacts” for one do not always provide the necessary “significant contacts” for the other. The question of whether
the law of a state can be applied to a transaction is different from the question of whether the courts of that state have jurisdiction to enter a judgment.

In this case, only the 1st phase is at issue—jurisdiction. Jurisdiction, however, has various aspects. For a court to validly exercise its power to adjudicate a
controversy, it must have jurisdiction over the plaintiff/petitioner, over the defendant/respondent, over the subject matter, over the issues of the case
and, in cases involving property, over the res or the thing w/c is the subject of the litigation.In assailing the trial court's jurisdiction herein, Nippon is
actually referring to subject matter jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority w/c establishes and organizes the court. It is given only
by law and in the manner prescribed by law. It is further determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to
all or some of the claims asserted therein. To succeed in its motion for the dismissal of an action for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
claim, the movant must show that the court or tribunal cannot act on the matter submitted to it because no lawgrants it the power to adjudicate the
claims.

In the instant case, Nippon, in its MTD, does not claim that the RTC is not properly vested by law w/ jurisdiction to hear the subject controversy for a civil
case for specific performance & damages is one not capable of pecuniary estimation & is properly cognizable by the RTC of Lipa City.What they rather
raise as grounds to question subject matter jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus, and the “state of the most significant
relationship rule.” The Court finds the invocation of these grounds unsound.

Lex loci celebrationis relates to the “law of the place of the ceremony” or the law of the place where a contract is made. The doctrine of lex contractus or
lex loci contractusmeans the “law of the place where a contract is executed or to be performed.” It controls the nature, construction, and validity of the
contract and it may pertain to the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law intended by them either expressly or implicitly. Under the “state
of the most significant relationship rule,” to ascertain what state law to apply to a dispute, the court should determine which state has the most
substantial connection to the occurrence and the parties. In a case involving a contract, the court should consider where the contract was made, was
negotiated, was to be performed, and the domicile, place of business, or place of incorporation of the parties.This rule takes into account several contacts
and evaluates them according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue to be resolved.

Since these 3 principles in conflict of laws make reference to the law applicable to a dispute, they are rules proper for the 2nd phase, the choice of law.
They determine which state's law is to be applied in resolving the substantive issues of a conflicts problem. Necessarily, as the only issue in this case is
that of jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not only inapplicable but also not yet called for.

Further, Nippon’s premature invocation of choice-of-law rules is exposed by the fact that they have not yet pointed out any conflict between the laws of
Japan and ours. Before determining which law should apply, 1st there should exist a conflict of laws situation requiring theapplication of the conflict of
laws rules. Also, when the law of a foreign country is invoked to provide the proper rules for the solution of a case, the existence of such law must be
pleaded and proved.

It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a foreign element, is brought before a court or administrative agency, there are 3 alternatives
open to the latter in disposing of it: (1) dismiss the case, either because of lack of jurisdiction or refusal to assume jurisdiction over the case; (2) assume
jurisdiction over the case and apply the internal law of the forum; or (3) assume jurisdiction over the case and take into account or apply the law of some
other State or States. The court’s power to hear cases and controversies is derived from the Constitution and the laws. While it may choose to recognize
laws of foreign nations, the court is not limited by foreign sovereign law short of treaties or other formalagreements, even in matters regarding rights
provided by foreign sovereigns.

Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens, be used to deprive the RTC of its jurisdiction. 1st, it is not a proper basis for a motion to
dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include it as a ground. 2nd, whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis
of the said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the RTC. In this case, the RTC
decided to assume jurisdiction. 3rd, the propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual determination; hence, this conflicts
principle is more properly considered a matter of defense.

7. PHILSEC INVESTMENT CORPORATION, BPI-INTERNATIONAL FINANCE LIMITED, and ATHONA HOLDINGS, N.V. vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
1488, INC., DRAGO DAIC, VENTURA O. DUCAT, PRECIOSO R. PERLAS, and WILLIAM H. CRAIG, 274 SCRA 102, G.R. No. 103493, June 19, 1997

FACTS:
Private respondent Ducat obtained separate loans from petitioners Ayala International Finance Limited (AYALA) and Philsec Investment Corp (PHILSEC),
secured by shares of stock owned by Ducat.
In order to facilitate the payment of the loans, private respondent 1488, Inc., through its president, private respondent Daic, assumed Ducat’s obligation
under an Agreement, whereby 1488, Inc. executed a Warranty Deed with Vendor’s Lien by which it sold to petitioner Athona Holdings, N.V. (ATHONA) a
parcel of land in Texas, U.S.A., while PHILSEC and AYALA extended a loan to ATHONA as initial payment of the purchase price. The balance was to be paid
by means of a promissory note executed by ATHONA in favor of 1488, Inc. Subsequently, upon their receipt of the money from 1488, Inc., PHILSEC and
AYALA released Ducat from his indebtedness and delivered to 1488, Inc. all the shares of stock in their possession belonging to Ducat.
As ATHONA failed to pay the interest on the balance, the entire amount covered by the note became due and demandable. Accordingly, private
respondent 1488, Inc. sued petitioners PHILSEC, AYALA, and ATHONA in the United States for payment of the balance and for damages for breach of
contract and for fraud allegedly perpetrated by petitioners in misrepresenting the marketability of the shares of stock delivered to 1488, Inc. under the
Agreement.
While the Civil Case was pending in the United States, petitioners filed a complaint “For Sum of Money with Damages and Writ of Preliminary
Attachment” against private respondents in the RTC Makati. The complaint reiterated the allegation of petitioners in their respective counterclaims in the
Civil Action in the United States District Court of Southern Texas that private respondents committed fraud by selling the property at a price 400 percent
more than its true value.
Ducat moved to dismiss the Civil Case in the RTC-Makati on the grounds of (1) litis pendentia, vis-a-vis the Civil Action in the U.S., (2) forum non
conveniens, and (3) failure of petitioners PHILSEC and BPI-IFL to state a cause of action.
The trial court granted Ducat’s MTD, stating that “the evidentiary requirements of the controversy may be more suitably tried before the forum of the litis
pendentia in the U.S., under the principle in private international law of forum non conveniens,” even as it noted that Ducat was not a party in the U.S.
case.
Petitioners appealed to the CA, arguing that the trial court erred in applying the principle of litis pendentia and forum non conveniens.
The CA affirmed the dismissal of Civil Case against Ducat, 1488, Inc., and Daic on the ground of litis pendentia.
ISSUE: is the Civil Case in the RTC-Makati barred by the judgment of the U.S. court?
HELD:CA reversed. Case remanded to RTC-Makati
NO. While this Court has given the effect of res judicata to foreign judgments in several cases, it was after the parties opposed to the judgment had been
given ample opportunity to repel them on grounds allowed under the law. This is because in this jurisdiction, with respect to actions in personam, as
distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is
subject to proof to the contrary. Rule 39, §50 provides:
Sec. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. — The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as
follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by
a subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.
In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners were given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the U.S. court as basis for declaring it res
judicata or conclusive of the rights of private respondents. The proceedings in the trial court were summary. Neither the trial court nor the appellate
court was even furnished copies of the pleadings in the U.S. court or apprised of the evidence presented thereat, to assure a proper determination of
whether the issues then being litigated in the U.S. court were exactly the issues raised in this case such that the judgment that might be rendered would
constitute res judicata.
Second. Nor is the trial court’s refusal to take cognizance of the case justifiable under the principle of forum non conveniens:
First, a MTD is limited to the grounds under Rule 16, sec.1, which does not include forum non conveniens. The propriety of dismissing a case based on
this principle requires a factual determination, hence, it is more properly considered a matter of defense.

Second, while it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after “vital facts are
established, to determine whether special circumstances” require the court’s desistance.

8. PIONEER CONCRETE PHILIPPINES, INC., PIONEER PHILIPPINES HOLDINGS, and PHILIP J. KLEPZIG vs. ANTONIO D. TODARO, 524 SCRA 153, G.R. No.
154830, June 8, 2007

FACTS
Antonio D. Todaro (Todaro) filed with the RTC of Makati City, a complaint for Sum of Money and Damages with Preliminary Attachment against Pioneer
International Limited (PIL), Pioneer Concrete Philippines, Inc. (PCPI), Pioneer Philippines Holdings, Inc. (PPHI), John G. McDonald (McDonald) and Philip J.
Klepzig (Klepzig).

Todaro alleged that PIL is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of Australia and is principally engaged in the ready-mix concrete and
concrete aggregates business; PPHI is the company established by PIL to own and hold the stocks of its operating company in the Philippines; PCPI is the
company established by PIL to undertake its business of ready-mix concrete, concrete aggregates and quarrying operations in the Philippines; McDonald
is the Chief Executive of the Hongkong office of PIL; and, Klepzig is the President and Managing Director of PPHI and PCPI; Todaro has been the managing
director of Betonval Readyconcrete, Inc. (Betonval), a company engaged in pre-mixed concrete and concrete aggregate production; he resigned from
Betonval in February 1996; in May 1996, PIL contacted Todaro and asked him if he was available to join them in connection with their intention to
establish a ready-mix concrete plant and other related operations in the Philippines; Todaro informed PIL of his availability and interest to join them;
subsequently, PIL and Todaro came to an agreement wherein the former consented to engage the services of the latter as a consultant for two to three
months, after which, he would be employed as the manager of PIL's ready-mix concrete operations should the company decide to invest in the
Philippines; subsequently, PIL started its operations in the Philippines; however, it refused to comply with its undertaking to employ Todaro on a
permanent basis. Instead of filing an Answer, PPHI, PCPI and Klepzig separately moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the complaint states
no cause of action, that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint, as the same is within the jurisdiction of the NLRC, and that
the complaint should be dismissed on the basis of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. RTC dismissed the MTD which was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE
W/N the RTC should have dismissed the case on the basis of forum non conveniens due to a presence of a foreign element

RULING
NO. Whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. In the case of Communication Materials and Design, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held that
"xxx [a] Philippine Court may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so; provided, that the following requisites are met: (1) that the
Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to
the law and the facts; and, (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision."

The doctrine of forum non conveniens should not be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not
include said doctrine as a ground. This Court further ruled that while it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on
this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances require the court’s desistance; and that the
propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle of forum non conveniens requires a factual determination, hence it is more properly considered a
matter of defense.

Note: the case was also being dismissed on the ground that there was no cause of action but SC held that there was cause of action, to sustain a motion
to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist, rather than that a claim has been defectively
stated, or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain. And it was also argued in this case that jurisdiction is with the NLRC and not with the RTC. SC held it was
with RTC, SC has consistently held that where no employer-employee relationship exists between the parties and no issue is involved which may be
resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes or any collective bargaining agreement, it is the RTC that has jurisdiction.

9. MENANDRO B. LAUREANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED, 324 SCRA 414, G.R. No. 114776, February 2, 2000
FACTS:
• In 1978 plaintiff Menandro B. Laureano applied for employment with the defendant company Singapore Airlines Ltd.
• On January 20, 1979, plaintiff commenced working for the defendant after accepting a contract of employment for an original period of two
(2) year.
• On July 21, 1979, dependant ordered plaintiff an extension of his two-year contract to five (5) years effective January 21, 1979 to January 20,
1984.
• In 1982, defendant, hit by recession, decided to terminate its excess personnel including the plaintiff.
• On October 5, 1982, defendant informed plaintiff of his termination effective November 1, 1982 and he will be paid three (3) month-salary in
lieu of three-month notice. Due to the request of plaintiff, private respondent gave two (2) months notice and one (1) month salary.
• On June 29, 1983, plaintiff filed a case for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter which was later withdrawn.
• On February 11, 1987, alleging lack of jurisdiction of the court over the matter, private respondent filed a motion to dismiss, which was later
denied by the court.
• On April 10, 1991, trial court decided in favor of the plaintiff, ordering the private respondent to pay him his unearned compensation,
consequential, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
• On October 29, 1993, the Court of Appeals set aside and reversed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUES
1. Whether the Singapore Law was applicable to the case at hand
2. Whether the Philippine court had jurisdiction over the case

HELD
1. The court cannot determination the applicability of Singapore Laws due to the defendant’s failure
to show which specific laws of Singapore that apply to the case at hand; thus, Philippine law
should be applied.

2. Respondent Court of Appeals had acquired jurisdiction when the defendant filed its appeal before
the said court; hence, the former was correct it barred the latter from raising the issue of
jurisdiction.

Hence, the court dismissed the petition, affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals.

10. WILDVALLEY SHIPPING CO., LTD. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE PRESIDENT LINES INC., 342 SCRA 213, G.R. No. 119602, October 6, 2000

“PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION DOCTRINE”

FACTS:
The Philippine Roxas, a vessel owned by Philippine President Lines, Inc., private respondent herein, arrived in Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, to load iron ore.
Upon the completion of the loading and when the vessel was ready to leave port, an official pilot of Venezuela, was designated by the harbour authorities
in Puerto Ordaz to navigate the Philippine Roxas through the Orinoco River. The Philippine Roxas experienced some vibrations when it entered the San
Roque Channel. The vessel proceeded on its way, with the pilot assuring the watch officer that the vibration was a result of the shallowness of the
channel. The master (captain) checked the position of the vessel and verified that it was in the centre of the channel. The Philippine Roxas ran around in
the Orinoco River, thus obstructing the ingress and egress of vessels. As a result of the blockage, the Malandrinon, a vessel owned by herein petitioner
Wild valley Shipping Company, Ltd., was unable to sail out of Puerto Ordaz on that day. Subsequently, Wild valley Shipping Company, Ltd. filed a suit with
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch III against Philippine President Lines, Inc. and Pioneer Insurance Company (the underwriter/insurer of
Philippine Roxas) for damages in the form of unearned profits, and interest thereon amounting to US $400,000.00plus attorney's fees, costs, and
expenses of litigation.

ISSUE: Whether or not Venezuelan law is applicable to the case at bar?

RULING:
It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any
other fact, they must be alleged and proved. For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following requisites are mandatory:

(1) It must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or by his deputy; (2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consular or consular agent or foreign service officer, and with the seal of his office.

The latter requirement is not a mere technicality but is intended to justify the giving of full faith and credit to the genuineness of a document in a foreign
country. With respect to proof of written laws, parol proof is objectionable, for the written law itself is the best evidence. According to the weight of
authority, when a foreign statute is involved, the best evidence rule requires that it be proved by a duly authenticated copy of the statute. At this
juncture, we have to point out that the Venezuelan law was not pleaded before the lower court.

A foreign law is considered to be pleaded if there is an allegation in the pleading about the existence of the foreign law, its import and legal consequence
on the event or transaction in issue.

A review of the Complaint revealed that it was never alleged or invoked despite the fact that the grounding of the M/V Philippine Roxas occurred within
the territorial jurisdiction of Venezuela. We reiterate that under the rules of private international law, a foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved
as a fact. In the absence of pleading and proof, the laws of a foreign country, or state, will be presumed to be the same as our own local or domestic law
and this is known as Processual Presumption.
11. AUGUSTO BENEDICTO SANTOS III, represented by his father and legal guardian, Augusto Benedicto Santos vs. NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES and
COURT OF APPEALS, 210 SCRA 256, G.R. No. 101538, June 23, 1992

12. INTERNATIONAL SHOE COMPANY vs. STATE OF WASHINGTON, OFFICE OF UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION & PLACEMENT, ET AL., 326 US 310,
December 3, 1945

FACTS:
Augusto Benedicto Santos III is a minor represented by his dad. In October 1986, he bought a round trip ticket from Northwest Orient Airlines (NOA) in
San Francisco. His flight would be from San Francisco to Manila via Tokyo and back to San Francisco. His scheduled flight was in December. A day before
his departure he checked with NOA and NOA said he made no reservation and that he bought no ticket. The next year, due to the incident, he sued NOA
for damages. He sued NOA in Manila. NOA argued that Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to Article 28(1) of theWarsaw
Convention, which provides that complaints against international carriers can only be instituted in:

1. the court of the domicile of the carrier (NOA’s domicile is in the USA);

2. the court of its principal place of business (which is San Francisco, USA);

3. the court where it has a place of business through which the contract had been made (ticket was purchased in San Francisco so that’s where
the contract was made);

4. the court of the place of destination (Santos bought a round trip ticket which final destination is San Francisco).

The lower court ruled in favor of NOA. Santos III averred that Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the case and he questioned the constitutionality of
Article 28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention.

ISSUE: Whether or not Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the matter to conduct judicial review.

HELD: No.The Supreme Court ruled that they cannot rule over the matter for the SC is bound by the provisions of the Warsaw Convention which was
ratified by the Senate. Until & unless there would be amendment to the Warsaw Convention, the only remedy for Santos III is to sue in any of the place
indicated in the Convention such as in San Francisco, USA.

The SC cannot rule upon the constitutionality of Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention.In the first place, it is a treaty which was a joint act by the
legislative and the executive.The presumption is that it was first carefully studied and determined to be constitutional before it was adopted and given the
force of law in this country. In this case, Santos was not able to offer any compelling argument to overcome the presumption.

13. EL BANCO ESPA-OL-FILIPINO vs. VICENTE PALANCA, administrator of the estate of Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng, 37 Phil. 921, G.R. No. L-11390, March
26, 1918

Constitutional Law| Procedural Due Process| Presumption of Regularity

FACTS:
Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged his parcels of real property to El Banco Espanol-Filipino as security for his debt to the bank.
Engracio however failed to settle his payments. Furthermore, he returned to China, his native country and never returned to the Philippines until his
death in 1910. The bank proceeded to foreclose the mortgage. As Engracio was a nonresident, it was necessary for the bank to give notice by publication
their summons and complaints by virtue of the order of the court directed to the defendant’s last place of residence in the city of Amoy, China.

In 1908, the court ordered the sale of the property. After 7 years, Vicente Palanca emerged, as the administrator of the estate of Engracio Palanca and
petitioned to nullify the decision of the court in 1908 on the ground that they have not received a notice of letter from the court that resulted to their
default.

ISSUE: Whether the proceedings were conducted in such manner as to constitute due process of law.

HELD: SC ruled in favor of El Banco Espanol.

Yes. Due process is satisfied in the following conditions, namely;

1. There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it;
2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceeding;
3. The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and
4. Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
In the Code of Civil Procedure it is declared that there is a presumption “that official duty has been regularly performed” and a presumption
“that the ordinary course of business has been followed.”

The presumption that the clerk performed his duty and that the court made its decree with the knowledge that the requirements of law had been
complied with appear to be amply sufficient to support the conclusion that the notice was sent by the clerk as required by the order.
14. WILLIAM F. GEMPERLE vs. HELEN SCHENKER and PAUL SCHENKER as her husband, 19 SCRA 45, G.R. No. L-18164, January 23, 1967

FACTS:

Appeal, taken by plaintiff, William F. Gemperle, from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing this case for lack of jurisdiction over the
person of defendant Paul Schenker and for want of cause of action against his wife and co-defendant, Helen Schenker, said Paul Schenker "being in no
position to be joined with her as party defendant, because he is beyond the reach of the magistracy of the Philippine courts."

The record shows that sometime in 1952, Paul Schenker hereinafter referred to as Schenker acting through his wife and attorney-in-fact, Helen Schenker
hereinafter referred to as Mrs. Schenker filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, a complaint which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-2796 thereof
against herein plaintiff William F. Gemperle, for the enforcement of Schenker's allegedly initial subscription to the shares of stock of the Philippine-Swiss
Trading Co., Inc. and the exercise of his alleged pre-emptive rights to the then unissued original capital stock of said corporation and the increase thereof,
as well as for an accounting and damages. Alleging that, in connection with said complaint, Mrs. Schenker had caused to be published some allegations
thereof and other matters, which were impertinent, irrelevant and immaterial to said case No. Q-2796, aside from being false and derogatory to the
reputation, good name and credit of Gemperle, "with the only purpose of attacking" his "honesty, integrity and reputation" and of bringing him "into
public hatred, discredit, disrepute and contempt as a man and a businessman", Gemperle commenced the present action against the Schenkers for the
recovery of P300,000 as damages, P30,000 as attorney's fees, and costs, in addition to praying for a judgment ordering Mrs. Schenker "to retract in
writing the said defamatory expressions". In due course, thereafter, the lower court rendered the decision above referred to. A reconsideration thereof
having been denied, Gemperle interposed the present appeal.

Summons was personally served to Helen Schenker but not to Paul Schenker. Helen then filed an answer with a counterclaim, but Paul Schenker filed a
motion to dismiss arguing that the court never acquired jurisdiction over his person since admittedly, he is a Swiss citizen, residing in Zurich, Switzerland,
and has not been actually served with summons in the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of Paul Schenker.

RULING: Yes, although as a rule, when the defendant is a non-resident and in an accion in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can be
acquired only through voluntary appearance or personal service of summons. But this case is an exception to the said rule. The Supreme ratiocinated:

“We hold that the lower court had acquired jurisdiction over said defendant, through service of the summons addressed to him upon Mrs. Schenker, it
appearing from said answer that she is the representative and attorney-in-fact of her husband aforementioned civil case No. Q-2796, which apparently
was filed at her behest, in her aforementioned representative capacity. In other words, Mrs. Schenker had authority to sue, and had actually sued on
behalf of her husband, so that she was, also, empowered to represent him in suits filed against him, particularly in a case, like the of the one at bar, which
is consequence of the action brought by her on his behalf.”

Briefly, in an accion in personam where the defendant is a non-resident, substituted service of summons does not apply. However, by way of exception,
substituted service of summons may be effected, if the following requisites are present:

1. The summons is served to the spouse of the defendant

2.The spouse must be residing in the Philippines
3. The spouse is appointed as attorney-in-fact of the spouse defendant in a previous case involving the non-resident spouse.

15. VICTORIA REGNER vs. CYNTHIA R. LOGARTA, TERESA R. TORMIS and CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, Inc., 537 SCRA 277, G.R. No. 168747, October 19, 2007

Personal Action – Real Action – Extraterritorial Service

Facts:
Cynthia Logarta and Teresa Tormis were the daughters of Luis Regner in his first marriage with Anicita Regner. Victoria Regner is the second wife of Luis.

In 1999, Victoria alleged that Cynthia and Teresa with the help of another sibling defrauded Luis, who was then very ill and was unable to write, into
placing his thumbmark into a Deed of Donation. In said Deed, Luis purportedly donated a Proprietary Ownership Certificate pertaining to membership
shares in the Cebu Country Club. Victoria alleged that said Deed is void because the placing of thumbmark by Luis was done without the latter’s free will
and voluntariness considering his physical state; that it was done without Luis’s lawyer; that the ratification made by Luis before he died is likewise void
because of similar circumstances.

In the same year, Victoria filed a complaint to annul said deed with the RTC of Cebu. The sheriff could not deliver the summonses against Cynthia and
Teresa because apparently, although they are Filipinos, they are not residing here; they are residing in California. It was only in the year 2000 that one of
the summonses was served to one of the sisters, Teresa, when she came back to the Philippines.

Teresa immediately filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Victoria failed to prosecute her case for an unreasonable length of time. Naturally,
Victoria opposed the MTD. Teresa, in her rejoinder, alleged that the case should be dismissed because Cynthia, who is an indispensable party, was not
issued any summons, hence, since an indispensable party is not served with summons, without her who has such an interest in the controversy or subject
matter there can be no proper determination of the case. The trial court ruled in favor of Teresa; this was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of Victoria’s complaint is correct.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court agreed with the arguments presented by Teresa. The Supreme Court also emphasized:
There are generally two types of actions: actions in rem and actions in personam. An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his
personal liability, while an action in rem is an action against the thing itself, instead of against the person.
The certificate, subject of the donation, is a personal property. The action filed by Victoria is therefore a personal action. So in order for the court to
acquire jurisdiction over the respondents, summons must be served upon them. Further, the certificate is indivisible, Cynthia’s and Teresa’s interests
thereto can only be determined if both are summoned in court.

In personal actions, if the respondents are residents of the Philippines, they may be served summons in the following order:
1. Personal Service;
2. If (1) is not possible, Substituted Service;
3. If respondent can’t be found because he is abroad but still a resident of the Philippines, by publication with leave of court.

In personal actions still, if the respondents are non-residents, they may be served summons in the following manner:
1. Personal service through the Philippine embassy;
2. By publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the
summons and order of the court should be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant; or
3. in any other manner which the court may deem sufficient.

The above must be with leave of court.

In the case at bar, Cynthia was never served any summons in any of the manners authorized by the Rules of Court. The summons served to Teresa cannot
bind Cynthia. It is incumbent upon Victoria to compel the court to authorize the extraterritorial service of summons against Cynthia. Her failure to do so
for a long period of time constitutes a failure to prosecute on her part.

16. EUROPEAN RESOURCES AND TECHNOLOGIES, INC. and DELFIN J. WENCESLAO vs. INGENIEUBURO BIRKHAHN + NOLTE, Ingeniurgesellschaft mbh and
HEERS & BROCKSTEDT GMBH & CO., 435 SCRA 246, G.R. No. 159586, July 26, 2004

17. ERIE RAILROAD COMPANY vs. HARRY J. TOMPKINS, 304 US 64, April 25, 1938

Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins

FACTS:
Plaintiff, a Pennsylvania citizen, was walking along the railroad tracks of the Erie Railroad in Pennsylvania when a train passed and an open door on a car
struck him resulting in injury. He sued the railroad, a New York corporation, in federal district court in New York. Under Pennsylvania law, plaintiff was a
trespasser and the railroad was therefore only liable for wanton negligence. The judge, relying on Swift v. Tyson, instructed the jury according to “general
law” under which the railroad was liable even for ordinary negligence. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff, which was upheld by the Second Circuit.

ISSUE: Is a federal district court exercising diversity jurisdiction over a state law-based cause of action required to apply the common law of the state?

RULING:

(Brandeis) Yes. Reversed and remanded. Federal district courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction must apply both statutory and judge-man common law of
the states where it does not conflict with federal law.

The Court overruled Swift v. Tyson, which held that federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction over a state law action were under no obligation to
apply the non-statutory or judge-made law of that state, but instead had the power to apply federal common law or “general law.” The Swift doctrine
encouraged forum shopping by litigants to have different substantive law applied. It actually prevented uniformity and caused discrimination by non-
citizens against citizens, as non-citizens had the privilege of deciding whether to have the case heard in state or federal court and thus whether federal
common law would apply. Moreover, except in matters of federal law, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state, and it is irrelevant whether
that law is declared by the state’s legislature or high court. There is no federal general common law that exists outside of any particular state, yet is
applicable to the states unless changed by statute. Neither Congress nor federal courts have authority to declare substantive rules of common law
applicable to the states, which interferes with the rights reserved to the states by the Constitution.

Reed concurred in the judgment, stating that Swift should be overturned not because of the unconstitutionality of the federal common law approach, but
because that case misinterpreted the term “the laws” in the Rules of Decision Act as excluding state court decisions.

Butler (joined by McReynolds) dissented, arguing that the constitutional validity of the Swift doctrine was not raised by the parties nor necessary to
resolving the case and should not have been considered.

18. K.K. SHELL SEKIYU OSAKA HATSUBAISHO and FU HING OIL CO., LTD. vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ATLANTIC VENUS CO., S.A., and THE
VESSEL M/V "ESTELLA", G.R. Nos. 90306-06, July 30, 1990

Facts:

On January 7,1987, Kumagai Kaiun Kaisha, Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Kumagai), a corporation formed and existing under the laws of Japan, filed a
complaint for the collection of asum of money with preliminary attachment against Atlantic Venus Co., S.A. (hereinafter referredto as "Atlantic"), a
corporation registered in Panama, the vessel MV Estella and CrestamonteS hipping Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "Crestamonte"), a
Philippine corporation. Atlantic is the owner of the MV Estella. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 8738930 ofthe Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV,
Manila alleged that Crestamonte, as bare boat charterer and operator of the MV Estella, appointed N.S. Shipping Corporation (hereinafter referred to
as"NSS"), a Japanese corporation, as its general agent in Japan. The appointment was formalized in an Agency Agreement. NSS in turn appointed Kumagai
as its local agent in Osaka, Japan. Kumagai supplied the MV Estella with supplies and services but despite repeated demands Crestamonte failed to pay
the amounts due.NSS and Keihin Narasaki Corporation (hereinafter referred to a Keihin filed complaints-in-intervention.

On May 19,1987, petitioner Fu Hing Oil Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Fu Hing"), a corporation organized in Hong Kong and not doing business in the
Philippines, filed a motion for leave to intervene with an attached complaint-in-intervention, alleging that Fu Hing supplied marine diesel oil/fuel to the
MV Estella and incurred barge expenses for the total sum of One Hundred Fifty-two Thousand Four Hundred Twelve Dollars and Fifty-Six
Cents(US$152,412.56) but such has remained unpaid despite demand and that the claim constitutes a maritime lien. The issuance of a writ of attachment
was also prayed for. On July 16, 1987, petitioner K.K. Shell Sekiyu Osaka Hatsubaisho (hereinafter referred to as K.K. Shell"), a corporation organized in
Japan and not doing business in the Philippines, likewise filed a motion to intervene with an attached complaint-in-intervention, alleging that upon
request of NSS, Crestamonte's general agent in Japan, K.K. Shell provided and supplied marine diesel oil/fuel to the W Estella at the ports of Tokyo and
Mutsure in Japan and that despite previous demands Crestamonte has failed to pay the amounts of Sixteen Thousand Nine Hundred Ninety-Six Dollars
and Ninety- Six Cents (US$16,996.96) and One Million Yen(Y1,000,000.00) and that K.K. Shell's claim constitutes a maritime lien on the MV Estella. The
complaint-in-intervention sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.

ISSUE: Whether the court has acquired jurisdiction?

RULING: Private respondents have anticipated the possibility that the courts will not find that K.K.

Shell is expressly bound by the Agency Agreement, and thus they fall back on the argument that even if this were so, the doctrine of forum non
conveniens would be a valid ground to cause the dismissal of K.K. Shell's complaint-in-intervention.

K.K. Shell counters this argument by invoking its right as maritime lienholder. It citesPresidential Decree No. 1521, the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978,
which provides:

SEC. 21. Maritime Lien for Necessaries; person entitled to such lien-Any personfurnishing repairs, supplies, to wage, use of dry
dock or marine railway, or othernecessaries, to any vessel, whether foreign or domestic, upon the order of the owner ofsuch vessel, or of a
person authorized by the owner, shall have a maritime lien on thevessel, which may be enforced by suit in rem, and it shall be necessary to allege
or provethat credit was given to the vessel.

Private respondents on the other hand argue that even if P.D. No. 1521 is applicable, K.K. Shell cannot rely on the maritime lien because the fuel was
provided not exclusively for thebenefit of the MV Estella, but for the benefit of Crestamonte in general. Under the law it must beestablished that the
credit was extended to the vessel itself. Now, this is a defense that calls precisely for a factual determination by the trial court of who benefitted from the
delivery of thefuel. Hence, again, the necessity for the reception of evidence before the trial court.

In other words, considering the dearth of evidence due to the fact that the private respondents have yet to file their answer in the proceedings below
and trial on the merits is still to be conducted, whether or not petitioners are indeed maritime lien holders and as such may enforce the lien against the
MV Estella are matters that still have to be established.

Neither are we ready to rule on the private respondents' invocation of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, as the exact nature of the relationship of
the parties is still to reestablished. We leave this matter to the sound discretion of the trial court judge who is in the best position, after some vital facts
are established, to determine whether special circumstances require that his court desist from assuming jurisdiction over the suit.

19. HENRY HEINE vs. NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, 45 F2d 426, Dec. 1, 1930

FACTS:
The New York Life Insurance Company and the Guardian Insurance Company ("the insurance companies") were corporations created in New York, USA. As
conditions to be allowed to conduct business in Germany, they were made to agree to be supervised by German authorities, to invest the proceeds of
policies in German securities, and to establish a local agency to whom summons may be served. The insurance companies were later sued before courts
in both the US and Germany for the recovery on some 240 life insurance policies issued in Germany to German nationals, payable in German currency.

Arguments for the Plaintif

As the US courts have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, they have no choice but to try the case.

Issue: Whether or not the US courts may dismiss the case on the ground of forum non conveniens.

Held Yes. Under the circumstances, the case may be more suitably tried before German courts.

Ratio Decidendi
The courts in both jurisdictions are competent to try the case and summons may be served upon the insurance companies in both jurisdictions. Requiring
the insurance companies to defend their interests in the US would subject them to great and unnecessary inconvenience and expenses, including the
possibility of having to bring documentary evidence all the way from their office in Germany. Moreover, trying the case in the US additionally burden the
courts in that jurisdiction, to the detriment of other litigants. The assumption of jurisdiction over a case the cause of action of which arose from another
jurisdiction and wherein both parties are non-residents is discretionary upon the court.

20. In the matter Estate of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased, A.W. FLUEMER vs. ANNIE COUSHING HIX, 54 Phil. 610, G.R. No. L-32636, March 17, 1930

FACTS:
The petitioner is a special administrator of the estate of Edward Hix. He alleged that the latter’s will was executed in Elkins, West Virginia on November 3,
1925 by Hix who had his residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of that state govern. To this end, the petitioner submitted a copy of Section 3868
of Acts 1882, c.84 as found in West Virginia Code, annotated by Hogg, Charles E., vol.2 1914, p. 1690 and as certified to by the Director of National
Library. The Judge of the First Instance however denied the probate of the will on the grounds that Sec 300 and301 of the Code of Civil Procedure were
not complied with. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether it is necessary to prove in this jurisdiction the existence of such law in West Virginia as a prerequisite to the allowance and recording of
said will.

RULING: Yes. The laws of the foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. The courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take
judicial notice of the laws of the various states of the American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. Here the requirements of the law were not
met. There was no showing that the book from which an extract was taken was printed or published under the authority of the state of West Virginia, as
provided in Sec 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the extract from the law attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the original,
under the seal of the State of West Virginia as provided in Sec 301. No evidence was introduced showing that the extract from the laws of West Virginia
was in force at the time alleged will was executed. The court therefore did not err in denying the probate of the will. The existence of such law in West
Virginia must be proved.

21. TESTATE ESTATE OF C. O. BOHANAN, deceased. PHILIPPINE TRUST CO. vs. MAGDALENA C. BOHANAN, EDWARD C. BOHANAN, and MARY LYDIA
BOHANAN, 106 Phil. 997, G.R. No. L-12105, January 30, 1960
FACTS:

On April 24, 1950, admitting to probate C. O. Bohanan’s last will and testament, executed on April23, 1944 in Manila, CFI found that the testator
was born in Nebraska and a citizen of California, but temporarily stayed in the Philippines for a long period of time. At the time of his death, he was a
citizen of the United States and of testate of Nevada, and his will was executed in accordance with the laws of the state of Nevada. Out of his total
estate of P211,639.33 in cash, the testator gave his grandson P90,819.67 and ½ of all shares of stock of several mining companies and to his brother and
sister the same amount. To his children, he gave a legacy of only P6,000 each. Magdalena, his wife, and her 2 children opposed the validity of
the testamentary provisions contending that the will deprived them of their legitime. Magdalena alleged that the trial court erred in
recognizing the Reno divorce secured by the testator from his Filipino wife Magdalena, and that divorce should be declared a nullity in this jurisdiction.
According to the laws of the State of Nevada, no right to share in the inheritance in favor of a divorced wife. The divorce was granted to the testator on
May20, 1922.

ISSUE: Whether Philippine laws or the law of theState of Nevada should apply.

HELD: The testator died in 1944, thus, the old Civil Code governs. The old Civil Code provides that successional rights to personal property are to
be earned by the national law of the person whose succession is in question. The foreign law, specifically Section 9905, compiled Nevada Laws,
was introduced as evidence. That law can be taken judicial notice by the Court, without proof of such law having been offered at the hearing of the
project of partition. According to Article 10 of the Old Civil Code, the validity of testamentary dispositions are governed by the national law of the
testator, and it has been decided without dispute that the national law of the testator is that of the State of Nevada, which allows a testator to dispose
of all his property according to his will.

22. PRISCILLA C. MIJARES, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, HILDA B. NARCISO, SR. MARIANI DIMARANAN, SFIC, and JOEL C. LAMANGAN in their behalf and on
behalf of the Class Plaintiffs in Class Action No. MDL 840, United States District Court of Hawaii vs. HON. SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of Branch 137, Regional Trial Court, Makati City, and the ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS, through its court appointed legal
representatives in Class Action MDL 840, United States District Court of Hawaii, namely: Imelda R. Marcos and Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., G.R. No. 139325,
April 12, 2005

FACTS:

On 9 May 1991, a complaint was filed with the United States District Court, District of Hawaii, against the Estate of former Philippine President Ferdinand
E. Marcos (Marcos Estate) by ten Filipino citizens who each alleged having suffered human rights. The presiding judge rendered a Final Judgment
awarding the plaintiff class a total of One Billion Nine Hundred Sixty Four Million Five Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty Nine Dollars and Ninety Cents
($1,964,005,859.90) which was eventually affirmed by the US Court of Appeals. On 20 May 1997, the present petitioners filed Complaint with the
Regional Trial Court, City of Makati (Makati RTC) for the enforcement of the Final Judgment .

On 5 February 1998, the Marcos Estate filed a motion to dismiss, raising, among others, the non-payment of the correct filing fees. On 9 September 1998,
respondent Judge Santiago Javier Ranada of the Makati RTC issued the subject Order dismissing the complaint without prejudice. Respondent judge
opined that the subject matter of the complaint was indeed capable of pecuniary estimation, as it involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court
ordering the payment of definite sums of money. RTC estimated the proper amount of filing fees was approximately Four Hundred Seventy Two Million
Pesos, which obviously had not been paid.

ISSUE: What provision should apply in determining the filing fees for an action to enforce a foreign judgment?

RULING:
Absent perhaps a statutory grant of jurisdiction to a quasi-judicial body, the claim for enforcement of judgment must be brought before the regular
courts. Thus, we are comfortable in asserting the obvious, that the complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary
estimation. But at the same time, it is also an action based on judgment against an estate. We find that it is covered by Section 7(b)(3) of Rule 141,
involving as it does, "other actions not involving property." As crafted, Rule 141 of the Rules of Civil Procedure avoids unreasonableness, as it recognizes
that the subject matter of an action for enforcement of a foreign judgment is the foreign judgment itself, and not the right-duty correlatives that resulted
in the foreign judgment. In this particular circumstance, given that the complaint is lodged against an estate and is based on the US District Court's

Final Judgment, this foreign judgment may, for purposes of classification under the governing procedural rule, be deemed as subsumed under Section
7(b)(3) of Rule 141, i.e., within the class of "all other actions not involving property." Thus, only the blanket filing fee of minimal amount is required.

23. SYLVESTER PENNOYER vs. MARCUS NEFF, 95 US 714, May 13, 1878

FACTS:
Marcus Neff ("Neff"), a resident of California, hired John H. Mitchell ("Mitchell"), an Oregon lawyer. Mitchell subsequently sued Neff before a state court
in Oregon to collect $300.00 in unpaid attorney's fees. Summons were served upon Neff by publication in an Oregon newspaper. Neff failed to appear in
court to defend his interests. Consequently, the court rendered a default judgment against Neff. At the time the judgment was rendered, Neff did not own
any property in Oregon. However, he was eventually granted a landholding in the said state. To satisfy the judgment, the court ordered the seizure and
auction of the landholding owned by Neff. Sylvester Pennoyer won in the auction. Neff then instituted an action to recover his property before a federal
court in Oregon on the ground that the state court did not acquire jurisdiction over him.

ISSUE:Whether or not the state court acquired jurisdiction over Neff.

HELD:No. Since the suit is one in personam, the service of summons upon the defendant through publication is not enough for the state court to acquire
jurisdiction over him. Moreover, the defendant's property must have been brought under court custody at the commencement of the suit.

Ratio Decidendi:
In rem and in personam suits distinguished; Substituted service by publication ineffective in actions in personam. Substituted service by publication is
valid only in suits which are in rem in character, or those actions in which the jurisdiction pertains to the property. However, in suits which are in
personam, or those actions which seek to determine only the personal rights and obligations of the defendant, substituted service by publication is
ineffectual for any purpose. Legal processes within one state cannot be effective in another state. Neither service by publication within the state nor
extra-territorial service will cure this.

Jurisdiction over a non-resident dependent on the presence of his or her property within the forum state. A state does not have jurisdiction over a non-
resident who does not have any property within its territorial jurisdiction since the court's jurisdiction over the defendant is only incidental to its
jurisdiction over the property. Hence, for a suit against a non-resident to prosper, he or she must have property within the forum state which must
brought under the control of the court at the beginning of the suit. Otherwise, the judgment is void and cannot be rendered valid thought the
subsequent acquisition of property within the forum state by the defendant. Furthermore, if the n0n-resident's property is not immediately seized, the
defendant could easily frustrate the suit by disposing of the said property.
24. MULLANE, SPECIAL GUARDIAN vs. CENTRAL HANOVER BANK & TRUST CO., TRUSTEE, et al., 399 US 306, April 24, 1950

25. R. F. SHAFFER, et al. vs. ARNOLD HEITNER, 433 US 186, June 24, 1977

FACTS:
Heitner, a nonresident of Delaware, owns one share of stock in Greyhound Corp, which has its principal place of business in Phoenix. Heitner files
shareholder’s derivative suit in Delaware against Greyhound Lines Inc., and Greyhound Corp, and 28 present or former officers or directors of one or the
other corporations. He files order of sequestration of Delaware property of individual defendants. Defendants are non-residents, but H sues for stock,
rights, debts, or credits due or accrued. 82,000 shares were seized as a result, by placing “stop transfers.” All 28 notified by certified mail.

Court of Chancery rejected defendant’s arguments. Court argues that sequestration is used to compel personal appearance of a nonresident defendant.
If the defendant enters a general appearance, sequested property is released.

Delaware Supreme Court affirms.

ISSUE: Can a plaintiff assert quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over a D’s property that is unrelated to the suit and causes violates “traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.”
HOLDING: No. Now apply International Shoe Test.

“Traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” that govern a state’s power to adjudicate in personam should also govern its power to adjudicate
personal rights to property located in the state. Property cannot be subjected to a court’s judgment unless reasonable and appropriate efforts have been
made to give the property owners actual notice of the action. “In order to justify an exercise of jurisdiction in rem, the basis for jurisdiction must be
sufficient to justify exercising “jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a thing.” The standard for determining whether an exercise of jurisdiction over
the interests of persons is consistent with the Due Process clause is the minimum-contacts standard elucidated in International Shoe.

Delaware defendants’ property is not the subject of litigation, nor the underlying cause of action related to the property. Therefore, the contacts are not
sufficient to support jurisdiction.
26. IDONAH SLADE PERKINS vs. MAMERTO ROXAS, ET AL., 72 Phil. 514, G.R. No. 47517, June 27, 1941

FACTS:
July 5, 1938, respondent Eugene Perkins filed a complaint in the CFI- Manila against the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company for the recovery of a sum
consisting of dividends which have been declared and made payable on shares of stock registered in his name, payment of which was being withheld by
the company, and for the recognition of his right to the control and disposal of said shares to the exclusion of all others. The company alleged, by way of
defense that the withholding of plaintiff’s right to the disposal and control of the shares was due to certain demands made with respect to said shares by
the petitioner Idonah Perkins, and by one Engelhard.

Eugene Perkins included in his modified complaint as parties defendants petitioner, Idonah Perkins, and Engelhard. Eugene Perkins prayed that petitioner
Idonah Perkins and H. Engelhard be adjudged without interest in the shares of stock in question and excluded from any claim they assert thereon.
Summons by publication were served upon the nonresident defendants Idonah Perkins and Engelhard. Engelhard filed his answer. Petitioner filed her
answer with a crosscomplaint in which she sets up a judgment allegedly obtained by her against respondent Eugene Perkins, from the SC of the State of
New York, wherein it is declared that she is the sole legal owner and entitled to the possession and control of the shares of stock in question with all the
cash dividends declared thereon by the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company.

Idonah Perkins filed a demurrer thereto on the ground that “the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the action,” because the alleged judgment of
the SC of the State of New York is res judicata. Petitioner’s demurrer was overruled, thus this petition.

ISSUE:
WON in view of the alleged judgment entered in favor of the petitioner by the SC of New York and which is claimed by her to be res judicata on all
questions raised by the respondent, Eugene Perkins, the local court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.

RULING:
By jurisdiction over the subject matter is meant the nature of the cause of action and of the relief sought, and this is conferred by the sovereign authority
which organizes the court, and is to be sought for in general nature of its powers, or in authority specially conferred. In the present case, the amended
complaint filed by the respondent, Eugene Perkins alleged calls for the adjudication of title to certain shares of stock of the Benguet Consolidated Mining
Company and the granting of affirmative reliefs, which fall within the general jurisdiction of the CFI- Manila. Similarly CFI- Manila is empowered to
adjudicate the several demands contained in petitioner’s crosscomplaint.

Idonah Perkins in her crosscomplaint brought suit against Eugene Perkins and the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company upon the alleged judgment of
the SC of the State of New York and asked the court below to render judgment enforcing that New York judgment, and to issue execution thereon. This is
a form of action recognized by section 309 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now section 47, Rule 39, Rules of Court) and which falls within the general
jurisdiction of the CFI- Manila, to adjudicate, settle and determine.

The petitioner expresses the fear that the respondent judge may render judgment “annulling the final, subsisting, valid judgment rendered and entered in
this petitioner’s favor by the courts of the State of New York, which decision is res judicata on all the questions constituting the subject matter of civil
case” and argues on the assumption that the respondent judge is without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the cause. Whether or not the respondent
judge in the course of the proceedings will give validity and efficacy to the New York judgment set up by the petitioner in her cross-complaint is a
question that goes to the merits of the controversy and relates to the rights of the parties as between each other, and not to the jurisdiction or power of
the court. The test of jurisdiction is whether or not the tribunal has power to enter upon the inquiry, not whether its conclusion in the course of it is right
or wrong. If its decision is erroneous, its judgment can be reversed on appeal; but its determination of the question, which the petitioner here anticipates
and seeks to prevent, is the exercise by that court and the rightful exercise of its jurisdiction.

Petition denied.