On Liberty is a philosophical work by the English philosopher John Stuart Mill,

originally intended as a short essay. The work, published in 1859, applies Mill's
ethical system of utilitarianism to society and the state.[1][2] Mill attempts to
establish standards for the relationship between authority and liberty. He
emphasizes the importance of individuality, which he conceived as a
prerequisite to the higher pleasures—the summum bonum of utilitarianism.
Furthermore, Mill criticizes the errors of past attempts to defend individuality
where, for example, democratic ideals resulted in the "tyranny of the majority".
Among the standards established in this work are Mill's three basic liberties of
individuals, his three legitimate objections to government intervention, and his
two maxims regarding the relationship of the individual to society.

On Liberty was a greatly influential and well received work, although it did not
go without criticism. Some attacked it for its apparent discontinuity with
Utilitarianism, while others criticized its vagueness. The ideas presented in On
Liberty have remained the basis of much liberal political thought. It has
remained in print continuously since its initial publication. To this day, a copy of
On Liberty is passed to the president of the British Liberal Democrats as a
symbol of office. A copy of the same book is also presented to and then held by
the president of the Liberal Party as a symbol of office.

Mill's marriage to his wife Harriet Taylor Mill greatly influenced the concepts in
On Liberty, which was largely finished prior to her death, and published shortly
after she died.

Introduction

John Stuart Mill opens his essay by discussing the historical "struggle between
authority and liberty," describing the tyranny of government, which, in his view,
needs to be controlled by the liberty of the citizens. He divides this control of
authority into two mechanisms: necessary rights belonging to citizens, and the
"establishment of constitutional checks by which the consent of the community,
or of a body of some sort, supposed to represent its interests, was made a
necessary condition to some of the more important acts of the governing power."
Because society was—in its early stages—subjected to such turbulent conditions
(i.e. small population and constant war), it was forced to accept rule "by a
master." However, as mankind progressed, it became conceivable for the people
to rule themselves. Mill admits that this new form of society seemed immune to
tyranny because "there was no fear of tyrannizing over self." Despite the high
hopes of the Enlightenment, Mill argues that the democratic ideals were not as
easily met as expected. First, even in democracy, the rulers were not always the
same sort of people as the ruled. Second, there is a risk of a "tyranny of the
majority" in which the many oppress the few who, according to democratic
ideals, have just as much a right to pursue their legitimate ends.
In Mill's view, tyranny of the majority is worse than tyranny of government
because it is not limited to a political function. Where one can be protected from
a tyrant, it is much harder to be protected "against the tyranny of the prevailing
opinion and feeling." The prevailing opinions within society will be the basis of
all rules of conduct within society; thus there can be no safeguard in law against
the tyranny of the majority. Mill's proof goes as follows: the majority opinion
may not be the correct opinion. The only justification for a person's preference
for a particular moral belief is that it is that person's preference. On a particular
issue, people will align themselves either for or against that issue; the side of
greatest volume will prevail, but is not necessarily correct. In conclusion to this
analysis of past governments, Mill proposes a single standard for which a
person's liberty may be restricted:

That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.
His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant ... Over
himself, over his body and mind, the individual is sovereign.

Mill clarifies that this standard is solely based on utility. Therefore, when it is
not useful, it may be ignored. For example, according to Mill, children and
"barbarian" nations are benefited by limited freedom. Just despots, such as
Charlemagne and Akbar the Great, were historically beneficial to people not yet
fit to rule themselves.

J. S. Mill concludes the Introduction by discussing what he claimed were the

three basic liberties in order of importance:

1. The freedom of thought and emotion. This includes the freedom to act on
such thought, i.e. freedom of speech
2. The freedom to pursue tastes (provided they do no harm to others), even if
they are deemed "immoral"
3. The freedom to unite so long as the involved members are of age, the
involved members are not forced, and no harm is done to others

While Mill admits that these freedoms could—in certain situations—be pushed
aside, he claims that in contemporary and civilised societies there is no
justification for their removal.

Of the liberty of thought and discussion

In the second chapter, J. S. Mill attempts to prove his claim from the first
chapter that opinions ought never to be suppressed. Looking to the consequences
of suppressing opinions, he concludes that opinions ought never to be
suppressed, stating, "Such prejudice, or oversight, when it [i.e. false belief]
occurs, is altogether an evil; but it is one from which we cannot hope to be
always exempt, and must be regarded as the price paid for an inestimable good."
He claims that there are three sorts of beliefs that can be had—wholly false,
partly true, and wholly true—all of which, according to Mill, benefit the
common good:

“ First, if any opinion is compelled to silence, that opinion may, for

aught we can certainly know, be true. To deny this is to assume our
own infallibility. Secondly, though the silenced opinion be an error, it
may, and very commonly does, contain a portion of truth; and since
the general or prevailing opinion on any subject is rarely or never the
whole truth, it is only by the collision of adverse opinions that the
remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied. Thirdly, even
if the received opinion be not only true, but the whole truth; unless it
is suffered to be, and actually is, vigorously and earnestly contested, it
will, by most of those who receive it, be held in the manner of a
prejudice, with little comprehension or feeling of its rational grounds.
And not only this, but, fourthly, the meaning of the doctrine itself will
be in danger of being lost, or enfeebled, and deprived of its vital effect
on the character and conduct: the dogma becoming a mere formal
profession, inefficacious for good, but cumbering the ground, and
preventing the growth of any real and heartfelt conviction, from
reason or personal experience. ”

Mill spends a large portion of the chapter discussing implications of and

objections to the policy of never suppressing opinions. In doing so, Mill explains
his opinion of Christian ethics, arguing that, while they are praiseworthy, they
are incomplete on their own. Therefore, Mill concludes that suppression of
opinion based on belief in infallible doctrine is dangerous. Among the other
objections Mill answers is the objection that the truth will necessarily survive
persecution and that society need only teach the grounds for truth, not the
objections to it. Near the end of Chapter 2, Mill states that "unmeasured
vituperation, enforced on the side of prevailing opinion, deters people from
expressing contrary opinion, and from listening to those who express them."

On individuality as one of the elements of well-being

In the third chapter, J. S. Mill points out the inherent value of individuality since
individuality is ex vi termini (i.e. by definition) the thriving of the human person
through the higher pleasures. He argues that a society ought to attempt to
promote individuality as it is a prerequisite for creativity and diversity. With this
in mind, Mill believes that conformity is dangerous. He states that he fears that
Western civilization approaches this well-intentioned conformity to
praiseworthy maxims characterized by the Chinese civilization. Therefore, Mill
concludes that actions in themselves do not matter. Rather, the person behind the
action and the action together are valuable. He writes:

“ It really is of importance, not only what men do, but also what
manner of men they are that do it. Among the works of man, which
human life is rightly employed in perfecting and beautifying, the first
in importance surely is man himself. Supposing it were possible to get
houses built, corn grown, battles fought, causes tried, and even
churches erected and prayers said, by machinery—by automatons in
human form—it would be a considerable loss to exchange for these
automatons even the men and women who at present inhabit the more
civilised parts of the world, and who assuredly are but starved
specimens of what nature can and will produce. Human nature is not a
machine to be built after a model, and set to do exactly the work
prescribed for it, but a tree, which requires to grow and develop itself
on all sides, according to the tendency of the inward forces which
make it a living thing. ”

On the limits to the authority of society over the individual

In the fourth chapter, J. S. Mill explains a system in which a person can discern
what aspects of life should be governed by the individual and which by society.
Generally, he holds that a person should be left as free to pursue his own
interests as long as this does not harm the interests of others. In such a situation,
"society has jurisdiction over [the person's conduct].” He rejects the idea that
this liberty is simply for the purpose of allowing selfish indifference. Rather, he
argues that this liberal system will bring people to the good more effectively
than physical or emotional coercion. This principle leads him to conclude that a
person may, without fear of just punishment, do harm to himself through vice.
Governments, he claims, should only punish a person for neglecting to fulfill a
duty to others (or causing harm to others), not the vice that brought about the
neglect.

J. S. Mill spends the rest of the chapter responding to objections to his maxim.
He notes the objection that he contradicts himself in granting societal
interference with youth because they are irrational but denying societal
interference with certain adults though they act irrationally. Mill first responds
by restating the claim that society ought to punish the harmful consequences of
the irrational conduct, but not the irrational conduct itself which is a personal
matter. Furthermore, he notes the societal obligation is not to ensure that each
individual is moral throughout adulthood. Rather, he states that, by educating
youth, society has the opportunity and duty to ensure that a generation, as a
whole, is generally moral.

Where some may object that there is justification for certain religious
prohibitions in a society dominated by that religion, he argues that members of
the majority ought make rules that they would accept should they have been the
minority. He states, "unless we are willing to adopt the logic of persecutors, and
say that we may persecute others because we are right, and that they must not
persecute us because they are wrong, we must beware of admitting a principle of
which we should resent as a gross injustice the application to ourselves." In
saying this, he references an earlier claim that morals and religion cannot be
treated in the same light as mathematics because morals and religion are vastly
more complex. Just as with living in a society which contains immoral people,
Mill points out that agents who find another's conduct depraved do not have to
socialise with the other, merely refrain from impeding their personal decisions.
While Mill generally opposes the religiously motivated societal interference, he
admits that it is conceivably permissible for religiously motivated laws to
prohibit the use of what no religion obligates. For example, a Muslim state could
feasibly prohibit pork. However, Mill still prefers a policy of society minding its
own business.

Applications

This last chapter applies the principles laid out in the previous sections. He
begins by summarising these principles:

“ The maxims are, first, that the individual is not accountable to society
for his actions, in so far as these concern the interests of no person but
himself. Advice, instruction, persuasion, and avoidance by other
people if thought necessary by them for their own good, are the only
measures by which society can justifiably express its dislike or
disapprobation of his conduct. Secondly, that for such actions as are
prejudicial to the interests of others, the individual is accountable, and
may be subjected either to social or to legal punishment, if society is
of opinion that the one or the other is requisite for its protection. ”

Economy

Mill first applies these principles to the economy. He concludes that free
markets are preferable to those controlled by governments. While it may seem,
because "trade is a social act," that the government ought intervene in the
economy, Mill argues that economies function best when left to their own
devices. Therefore, government intervention, though theoretically permissible,
would be counterproductive. Later, he attacks government-run economies as
"despotic." He believes that if the government ran the economy, then all people
would aspire to be part of a bureaucracy that had no incentive to further the
interests of any but itself.

Preventing harm

Next Mill investigates in what ways a person may try to prevent harm. He first
admits that a person should not wait for injury to happen, but ought try to
prevent it. Second, he states that agents must consider whether that which can
cause injury can cause injury exclusively. He gives the example of selling
poison. Poison can cause harm. However, he points out that poison can also be
used for good. Therefore, selling poison is permissible. Yet, due to the risk
entailed in selling poison or like products (e.g. alcohol), he sees no danger to
liberty to require warning labels on the product. Again, Mill applies his
principle. He considers the right course of action when an agent sees a person
about to cross a condemned bridge without being aware of the risk. Mill states
that because the agent presumably has interest in not crossing a dangerous
bridge (i.e. if he knew the facts concerned with crossing the bridge, he would
not desire to cross the bridge), it is permissible to forcibly stop the person from
crossing the bridge. He qualifies the assertion stating that, if the means are
available, it is better to warn the unaware person.

With regard to taxing to deter agents from buying dangerous products, he makes
a distinction. He states that to tax solely to deter purchases is impermissible
because prohibiting personal actions is impermissible and "[e]very increase of
cost is a prohibition, to those whose means do not come up to the augmented
price." However, because a government must tax to some extent in order to
survive, it may choose to take its taxes from what it deems most dangerous.

Repeat offences to public through private action

Mill expands upon his principle of punishing the consequences rather than the
personal action. He argues that a person who is empirically prone to act
violently (i.e. harm society) from drunkenness (i.e. a personal act) should be
uniquely restricted from the drinking. He further stipulates that repeat offenders
should be punished more than first time offenders.

Encouraging vice

On the subject of fornication and gambling, Mill has no conclusive answer,

stating, "[t]here are arguments on both sides." He suggests that while the actions
might be "tolerated" in private, promoting the actions (i.e. being a pimp or
keeping a gambling house) "should not be permitted." He reaches a similar
conclusion with acts of indecency, concluding that public indecency is
condemnable.

Suicide and divorce

Mill continues by addressing the question of social interference in suicide. He

states that the purpose of liberty is to allow a person to pursue their interest.
Therefore, when a person intends to terminate their ability to have interests it is
permissible for society to step in. In other words, a person does not have the
freedom to surrender their freedom. To the question of divorce, Mill argues that
marriages are one of the most important structures within society; however, if a
couple mutually agrees to terminate their marriage, they are permitted to do so
because society has no grounds to intervene in such a deeply personal contract.

Education

Mill believes that government run education is an evil because it would destroy
diversity of opinion for all people to be taught the curriculum developed by a
few. The less evil version of state run schooling, according to Mill, is that which
competes against other privately run schools. In contrast, Mill believes that
governments ought to require and fund private education. He states that they
should enforce mandatory education through minor fines and annual
standardised testing that tested only uncontroversial fact. He goes on to
emphasise the importance of a diverse education that teaches opposing views
(e.g. Kant and Locke). He concludes by stating that it is legitimate for states to
forbid marriages unless the couple can prove that they have "means of
supporting a family" through education and other basic necessities.

Conclusion

J. S. Mill concludes by stating three general reasons to object to governmental

interference:

1. if agents do the action better than the government.

2. if it benefits agents to do the action though the government may be more
qualified to do so.
3. if the action would add so greatly to the government power that it would
become over-reaching or individual ambition would be turned into
dependency on government.

He summarises his thesis, stating:

The worth of a State, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals composing
it; and a State which postpones the interests of their mental expansion and
elevation to a little more of administrative skill, or of that semblance of it which
practice gives, in the details of business; a State which dwarfs its men, in order
that they may be more docile instruments in its hands even for beneficial
purposes—will find that with small men no great thing can really be
accomplished; and that the perfection of machinery to which it has sacrificed
everything will in the end avail it nothing, for want of the vital power which, in
order that the machine might work more smoothly, it has preferred to banish.

On Liberty was enormously popular in the years following its

publication.Thomas Hardy recalled later in life that undergraduates in the 1860s
knew the book almost by heart. Criticisms of the book in the 19th century came
chiefly from thinkers who felt that Mill's concept of liberty left the door open for
barbarism, such as James Fitzjames Stephen and Matthew Arnold.

In more recent times, although On Liberty garnered adverse criticism, it has

been largely received as an important classic of political thought for its ideas
and accessibly lucid style. Denise Evans and Mary L. Onorato summarise the
modern reception of On Liberty, stating: "[c]ritics regard his essay On Liberty as
a seminal work in the development of British liberalism. Enhanced by his
powerful, lucid, and accessible prose style, Mill's writings on government,
economics, and logic suggest a model for society that remains compelling and
relevant." As one sign of the book's importance, a copy of On Liberty is the
symbol of office for the president of the Liberal Democrat Party in England.

Contradiction to utilitarianism

Mill makes it clear throughout On Liberty that he "regard[s] utility as the

ultimate appeal on all ethical questions", a standard he inherited from his father,
a follower of Jeremy Bentham. Though J. S. Mill claims that all of his principles
on liberty appeal to the ultimate authority of utilitarianism, according to Nigel
Warburton, much of the essay can seem divorced from his supposed final court
of appeals. Mill seems to idealize liberty and rights at the cost of utility. For
instance, Mill writes:

“ If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person
were of contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in
silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be
justified in silencing mankind. ”

This claim seems to go against the principle of utilitarianism, that it is

permissible that one should be harmed so that the majority could benefit.
Warburton argues that Mill is too optimistic about the outcome of free speech.
Warburton suggests that there are situations in which it would cause more
happiness to suppress truth than to permit it. For example, if a scientist
discovered a comet about to kill the planet in a matter of weeks, it may cause
more happiness to suppress the truth than to allow society to discover the
impending danger.

While David Brink concedes that Mill's apparently categorical appeal to rights
seems to contradict utilitarianism, he points out that Mill does not believe rights
are truly categorical because Mill opposes unrestrained liberty (e.g. offensive
public exposure).

Furthermore, David Brink tries to reconcile Mill's system of rights with

utilitarianism in three ways:

1. Rights are secondary principles to the Greatest Happiness Principle

2. Rights are incomparable goods, justifying their categorical enforcement
3. Liberty is a good. Thus, those who suppress it are worthy of punishment.
Rights deal with the value of punishing/protecting others' interference
with liberty, not the actual protection of liberty

Narrow focus

Some thinkers have criticised Mill's writing for its apparent narrow or unclear
focus in several areas. Mill makes clear that he only considers adults in his
writing, failing to account for how irrational members of society, such as
children, ought to be treated. Yet Mill's theory relies upon the proper upbringing
of children. Plank has asserted that Mill fails to account for physical harm,
solely concerning himself with spiritual wellbeing. He also argues that, while
much of Mill's theory depends upon a distinction between private and public
harm, Mill seems not to have provided a clear focus on or distinction between
the private and public realms.

Religious criticism

Nigel Warburton states that though Mill encourages religious tolerance, because
he does not speak from the perspective of a specific religion, some claim that he
does not account for what certain religious beliefs would entail when governing
a society. Some religions believe that they have a God given duty to enforce
religious norms. For them, it seems impossible for their religious beliefs to be
wrong, i.e. the beliefs are infallible. Therefore, according to Warburton, Mill's
principle of total freedom of speech may not apply.
Conception of harm

The harm principle is central to the principles in On Liberty. Nigel Warburton

says that Mill appears unclear about what constitutes harm. Early in the book, he
claims that simply being offensive does not constitute harm. Later, he writes that
certain acts which are permissible and harmless in private are worthy of being
prohibited in public. This seems to contradict his earlier claim that merely
offensive acts do not warrant prohibition because, presumably, the only harm
done by a public act which is harmless in private is that it is offensive.

Warburton notes that some people argue that morality is the basis of society, and
that society is the basis of individual happiness. Therefore, if morality is
undermined, so is individual happiness. Hence, since Mill claims that
governments ought to protect the individual's ability to seek happiness,
governments ought to intervene in the private realm to enforce moral codes.

Charges of racism and colonialism

Mill is clear that his concern for liberty does not extend to all individuals and all
societies. He states that "Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in
dealing with barbarians". Contemporary philosophers Domenico Losurdoand
David Theo Goldberg have strongly criticised Mill as a racist and an apologist
for colonialism. However, during his term as a Member of Parliament, he
chaired the extraparliamentary Jamaica Committee, which for two years
unsuccessfully sought the prosecution of Governor Eyre and his subordinates for
military violence against Jamaican Blacks.