R A Y T H E O N I N T E R N A T I O N A L V . S T O C K T O N W . R O U Z I E , J R . , G . R . N O .

P
PA162894, (FEBRUARY 26, 2008),546 SCRA 555
RAYTHON INTERNATIONAL V. STOCKTON W. ROUZIE

FACTS:

Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a corporation duly organized & existing under the laws of
Connecticut, &Stockton Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered into a contract. BMSI hired Rouzie
as its representative to negotiate the sale of services in several government projects in thePhilippines
for an agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts.Rouzie secured a service contract w/ the
Rep. of Phil. on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of rivers affected by the Mt.Pinatubo eruption &
mudflows.Rouzie filed before the NLRC a suit against BMSI and Rust International (Rust) for alleged
nonpayment of commissions, illegal termination, & breach of employment contract.The Labor Arbiter
ordered BMSI & Rust to pay Rouzie’s money claims.Upon appeal, the NLRC reversed & dismissed
Rouzie’s complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Rouzie filed an action for damages before the RTC of La Union (where he was a resident) against
RaytheonInternational. He reiterated that he was not paid the commissions due him from the
Pinatubo dredging project which hesecured on behalf of BMSI. The complaint also averred that BMSI,
RUST and Raytheon had combined &functioned asone company. Raytheon sought the dismissal of
the complaint on the grounds of failure to state a cause of action and forum convenience and prayed
for damages by way of compulsory counterclaim. The Regional Trail Court denied Raytheon’s motion.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. Raytheon’s contention: The written contract between Rouzie& BMSI
included a valid choice of law clause, that is, that the contract shall be governed by the laws of the
State of Connecticut. It also mentions the presence of foreign elements in the dispute, namely that
the parties & witnesses involved are American corporations & citizens &the evidence to be presented
is located outside the Philippines that renders our local courts inconvenient forums. The foreign
elements of the dispute necessitate the immediate application of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the complaint should be dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens.

RULING:

YES.On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is filed in a
Philippine court andwhere the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties and the rest, it
may or can proceed to try thecase even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the
parties point to a foreign forum. This is anexercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where the
case is filed.Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the
Constitution and the law & by thematerial allegations in the complaint, irrespective of whether or not
the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claimsor reliefs sought therein. The case file was
an action for damages arising from an alleged breach of contract.Undoubtedly, the nature of the
action and the amount of damages prayed are within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over Rouzieupon the filing
of the complaint.On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of Raytheon was acquired by its
voluntary appearance in court. That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be
governed by the laws of the state of Connecticut does not suggest that the Philippine courts,
or any other foreign tribunal for that matter, are precluded from hearing the civil action.

Jurisdiction & choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause
a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a
substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. the choice of law
stipulation will become relevant only when the substantive issues of the instant case develop, that is,
after hearing on the merits proceeds before the trial court.On the other hand the complaint should not
be dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens. Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a
court, in conflicts-of-laws cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most
“convenient” or available forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.
Raytheon’s averments of the foreign elements are not sufficient to oust the Regional Trial Court of its
jurisdiction over the case and the parties involved. Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case
based on the principle of forum non conveniens requires a factual determination; hence, it is more
properly considered as a matter of defense. While it is with the discretion of the trial court to abstain
from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are establishedto
determine whether special circumstances require the court’s desistance.
 WORLDWIDE VOLKSWAEGEN CORP. VS WOODSON 444 US. 286 (1980)

FACTS:

Spouses Harry and Kay Robinson, residents of New York, who had purchased a car from Seaway
Volkswagen, a retailer in New York,brought a suit against the retailer and its wholesale distributor,
in the District Court for Creek county, Oklahoma. The Robinsonsclaimed that the injuries which they
suffered in a car accident in Oklahoma were caused by the defective design and placement of their
automobile’s gas tank and fuel system. Seaway Volkswagen and Worldwide Volkswagen both
incorporated and doing businessin New York, asserted that Oklahoma’s exercise of jurisdiction over
them would violate the limitations on state jurisdiction imposedby the due process clause. Seaway
and Worldwide Volkswagen sought a writ of prohibition in the Supreme Court of Oklahoma toprevent
the trial judge from exercising in personam jurisdiction over them. The writ was denied on the ground
that personaljurisdiction was authorized by Oklahoma’s “longarm” statute allowing an Oklahoma
court’s exercise of in personam jurisdiction over a tort feasor who causes injury in Oklahoma by an
act or omission outside Oklahoma “if he regularly does or solicits business orengages in any other
persistent course of conduct, or derivessubstantial revenue from goods used or consumed or
servicesrendered” in Oklahoma.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Oklahoma has jurisdiction over the controversy?

RULING:

No, As has long been settled, and as we reaffirm today, a state court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendantonly as long as there exist “minimum contacts” between
the defendant and the forum state. The concept of minimum contacts, in turn, can be seen to perform
two related, but distinguishable, functions. It protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating
ina distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the States, through their courts, do
not reach out beyond the limitsimposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal
system.The protection against inconvenient litigation is typically described in terms of
“reasonableness” or “fairness.” We have said that thedefendant’s contacts with the forum State must
be suchthat maintenance of the suit “does not offend traditional notions of fairplay and substantial
justice.”Thus, the Due Process Clause “does not contemplate that a state may make binding a
judgement in personam against an individualor corporate defendant with which the state has
no contacts, ties, or relations”. Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or noinconvenience from
being forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State; even if the forum State has a strong
interest inapplying its law to the controversy; even if the forum state is the most convenient location
for litigation, the Due Process Clause,acting as an instrument of interstate federalism,
may sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid judgement.Apply these principles
to the case at hand, we find in the record before us a total absence of those affiliating circumstances
that area necessary predicate to any exercise of state-court jurisdiction. Petitioners carry on no
activity whatsoever in Oklahoma. They closeno sales and perform no services there. They avail
themselves of none of the privileges either through salespersons or throughadvertising reasonably
calculated to reach the State. Nor does the record show that they regularly sell cars at wholesale or
retail toOklahoma customers or residents or that they indirectly, through others, serve or seek to
serve the Oklahoma market. In short,respondents seek to base jurisdiction on one, isolated
occurrence and whatever inferences can be drawn therefrom: the fortuitouscircumstance that a single
Audi automobile, sold in New York to New York residents, happened to suffer an accident while
passingthrough Oklahoma. It is argued, however that because an automobile is mobile by its
very design and purpose itwas “foreseeable” that the Robinsons’Audi would cause injury in
Oklahoma. Yet “foreseeability” alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for personal
jurisdictionunder the Due Process Clause.Because we find that petitioners have no “contacts, ties
orrelations” with the State of Oklahoma the judgement of the Supreme

21. RUSH VS. SAUCHUK, 444 US 320 (1980)

 KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA and NIPPON ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS CO., LTD., vs MINORU
KITAMURA

FACTS:

Nippon Engineering Consultants (Nippon), a Japanese consultancy firm providingtechnical and

management support in the infrastructure projects national permanently residing in thePhilippines.
The agreement provides that Kitamaru was to extend professional services to Nipponfor a year.
Nippon assignedKitamaru to work as the project manager of the
SouthernTagalog Access Road (STAR) project. When the STAR project was near completion, DPWH
engaged theconsultancy services of Nippon, this time for the detailed engineering & construction
supervision ofthe Bongabon-Baler Road Improvement (BBRI) Project. Kitamaru was named as the
projectmanager in the contract.Hasegawa, Nippon‘s general manager for its International Division,
informed Kitamaru that thecompany had no more intention of automatically renewing his ICA. His
services would be engagedby the company only up to the substantial completion of the STAR
Project.Kitamaru demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI project. Nippon insisted that
Kitamaru‘scontract was for a fixed term that had expired. Kitamaru then filed for specific performance
&damages w/ the RTC of Lipa City. Nippon filed a Motion to dismiss.Nippon‘s contention is that, The
ICA had been perfected in Japan & executed by & between Japanesenationals. Thus, the RTC of
Lipa City has no jurisdiction. The claim for improper pre-termination ofKitamaru‘s ICA could only be
heard & ventilated in the proper courts of Japan following theprinciples of lex
locicelebrationis&lexcontractus. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals
ruled that the principle of lexloci celebrationis wasnot applicable to the case, because nowhere in the
pleadings was the validity of the writtenagreement put in issue. It held that the Regional Trial Court
was correct in applying the principle of lex locisolutionis.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in civil cases
for specificperformance & damages involving contracts executed outside the country by foreign
nationals maybe assailed on the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lexcontractus, ―the state of the
most significantrelationship rule, or forum non conveniens.

HELD: NO. In the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, three consecutive phases
are involved:jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments. Jurisdiction &
choice oflaw are 2 distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to
travel tothis state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law
w/c will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The power to exercise
jurisdiction doesnot automatically give a state constitutional authority to apply forum law. While
jurisdiction and thechoice of thelexfori will often coincide, the ―minimum contacts for one do
not always provide thenecessary significant contacts for the other. The question of whether the law of
a state can beapplied to a transaction is different from the question of whether the courts of that state
havejurisdiction to enter a judgment.In this case, only the 1st phase is at issue. Jurisdiction, however,
has various aspects.For a court to validly exercise its power to adjudicate acontroversy, it must have
jurisdiction overthe plaintiff, over the defendant, over the subject matter, over the issues ofthe case
and, in cases involving property, over theres or the thing w/c is the subject of thelitigation.In assailing
the trial court's jurisdiction herein, Nippon is actually referring to subjectmatter
jurisdiction. Jurisdictionover the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign
authority which establishes and organizes the court. It is given only by law and in the manner
prescribed by law. It isfurther determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether
the plaintiff is entitledto all or some of the claims asserted therein. To succeed in its motion for the
dismissal of an actionfor lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim, the movant must
show that the court ortribunal cannot act on the matter submitted to it because no law grants it the
power to adjudicate theclaims.In the instant case, Nippon, in its MTD, does not claim that the
Regional trial court is not properly vested by law which jurisdiction to hear the subject controversy for
a civil case for specific performance & damages isone not capable of pecuniary estimation & is
properly cognizable by the RTC of Lipa City.Whatthey rather raise as grounds to question subject
matter jurisdiction are the principles oflexlocicelebrationis andlexcontractus ,and the ―state of the
most significant relationship rule. The Court findsthe invocation of these grounds unsound. Under the
state of the most significant relationship rule, toascertain what state law to apply to a dispute, the
court should determine which state has the mostsubstantial connection to the occurrence and the
parties. In a case involving a contract, the courtshould consider where the contract was made, was
negotiated, was to be performed, and thedomicile, place of business, or place of incorporation of the
parties.This rule takes into account several contacts and evaluates them according to their relative
importance with respect to theparticular issue to be resolved.Since these 3 principles in conflict of
laws make reference to the law applicable to a dispute, they arerules proper for the 2nd phase, the
choice of law. They determine which state's law is to be applied inresolving the substantive issues of
a conflicts problem. Necessarily, as the only issue in this case isthat of jurisdiction, choice-of-law
rules are not only inapplicable but also not yet called for.

Further, Nippon‘s premature invocation of choice-of-law rules is exposed by the fact that they havenot
yet pointed out any conflict between the laws of Japan and ours. Before determining which lawshould
apply, 1st there should exist a conflict of laws situation requiring the application of theconflict of laws
rules. Also, when the law of a foreign country is invoked to provide the proper rulesfor the solution of
a case, the existence of such law must be pleaded and proved.It should be noted that when a
conflicts case, one involving a foreign element, is brought before acourt or administrative agency,
there are 3 alternatives open to the latter in disposing of it: (1)dismiss the case, either because of lack
of jurisdiction or refusal to assume jurisdiction over the case;(2) assume jurisdiction over the case and
apply the internal law of the forum; or (3) assumejurisdiction over the case and take into account or
apply the law of some other State or States. Thecourt‘s power to hear cases and controversies is
derived from the Constitution and the laws. While itmay choose to recognize laws of foreign nations,
the court is not limited by foreign sovereign lawshort of treaties or other formal agreements, even in
matters regarding rights provided by foreignsovereigns.Neither can the other ground
raised, forum non conveniens , be used to deprive the Regional trial court of itsjurisdiction. First, it is
not a proper basis for a motion to dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rulesof Court does not
include it as a ground. Second, whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed onthe basis of the
said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressedto the sound
discretion of the Regional trial court. In this case, the Regional trial court decided to assume
jurisdiction. Third, thepropriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual
determination; hence, thisconflicts principle is more properly considered a matter of defense.
 THE MANILA HOTEL CORP. AND MANILA HOTEL INTL. LTD. vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 120077 October 13, 2000

FACTS:

During his employment with the Mazoon Printing Press in the Sultanate of Oman,respondent
Marcelo Santos received a letter dated May 2, 1988 from Mr. Gerhard R. Shmidt,General Manager,
Palace Hotel, Beijing, China informing Santos that he was recommended by oneNestor Buenio, a
friend of his. Mr. Shmidt offered Santos the same position as printer, but with ahigher monthly salary
and increased benefits. Santos was deemed resigned from the MazoonPrinting Press, on June
30,1988 and started to work at the Palace Hotel on November 5, 1988.Subsequently, Santos signed
an amended "employment agreement" with the Palace Hotel, effectiveNovember 5, 1988. The Vice
President (Operations and Development) of petitioner MHICL MiguelD. Cergueda signed the
employment agreement under the word "noted". However, due to businessreverses brought about by
the political upheaval in China, the Palace Hotel terminated theemployment of respondent. On
February 20, 1990, respondent Santos filed a complaint for illegaldismissal with theArbitration
Branch, National Capital Region, National Labor RelationsCommission(NLRC).

ISSUE:

Whether or not the NLRC is a convenient forum to hear the case.

RULING:

Under the rule of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court or agency may assumejurisdiction over
the case if it chooses to do so provided: (1) that the Philippine court is one to which the parties may
conveniently resort to;(2) that the Philippine court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to
the law and thefacts; and (3) that the Philippine court has or is likely to have power to enforce its
decision. Theconditions are unavailing in the case at bar. The NLRC was a seriously inconvenient
forum giventhat all the incidents of the case from the time of recruitment, to employment to
dismissaloccurred outside the Philippines. The inconvenience is compounded by the fact that the
properdefendants, the Palace Hotel and MHICL are not nationals of the Philippines. Neither are
they"doing business in the Philippines." Likewise, the main witnesses, Mr. Shmidt and Mr. Henkare
non-residents of the Philippines.
 PIONER CONCRETE PHILIPPINES V. TODARO
524 SCRA 153 (2007)
7. PIONEER CONCRETE PHILIPPINES V. TODARO,
524 SCRA 153 (2007)
FACTS:

Antonio D. Todaro (Todaro) filed with the RTC a complaint for Sum of Money and Damages with Prel
iminary Attachment against Pioneer International Limited (PIL), Pioneer Concrete Philippines,
Inc. (PCPI), Pioneer PhilippinesHoldings, Inc. (PPHI), John G. McDonald (McDonald) and Philip J.
Klepzig (Klepzig).Todaro alleged that PIL is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws
of Australia and is principallyengaged in the ready-mix concrete and concrete aggregates business;
PPHI is the company established by PIL toown and hold the stocks of its operating company in the
Philippines; PCPI is the company established by PIL toundertake its business of ready-mix concrete,
concrete aggregates and quarrying operations in the Philippines;McDonald is the Chief Executive of
the Hongkong office of PIL; and, Klepzig is the President and Managing Director of PPHI and
PCPI;Todaro has been the managing director of BetonvalReadyconcrete, Inc. (Betonval), a company
engaged in pre-mixedconcrete and concrete aggregate production. He resigned from Betonval in
February 1996, in May 1996, PIL contacted Todaro and asked him if he was available to join them in
connection with their intention toestablish a ready-mix concrete plant and other related operations in
the Philippines;Todaro informed PIL of his availability and interest to join them; subsequently, PIL and
Todaro came to an agreementwherein the former consented to engage the services of the latter as a
consultant for two to three months, after which,he would be employed as the manager of PIL's ready-
mix concrete operations should the company decide to invest inthe Philippines; subsequently, PIL
started its operations in the Philippines; however, it refused to comply with itsundertaking to employ
Todaro on a permanent basis. Instead of filing an Answer, PPHI, PCPI and Klepzig separatelymoved
to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of
action,thattheRTChasno jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint, as the same is within th
e jurisdiction of the NLRC, and that thecomplaint should be dismissed on the basis of the doctrine of
forum non conveniens. RTC dismissed the MTD whichwas affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC should have dismissed the case on the basis of forum non conveniens due
to a presence of aforeign element

RULING:

NO. Whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of said doctrine depends largely
upon thefacts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. In the
case of Communication Materials and Design, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held that "xxx [a]
Philippine Court mayassume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so; provided, that the
following requisites are met: (1) that thePhilippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently
resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a positionto make an intelligent decision as to the law and
the facts; and, (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to havepower to enforce its decision.The
doctrine of forum non conveniens should not be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss because
Sec. 1,Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include said doctrine as a ground. This Court further
ruled that while it iswithin the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this
ground, it should do so onlyafter vital facts are established, to determine whether special
circumstances require the court’s desistance; andthat the propriety of dismissing a case based on this
principle of forum non conveniens requires a factualdetermination, hence it is more properly
considered a matter of defense.
 ASIAVEST LIMITED VS COURT OF APPEALS
295 SCRA 469

FACTS:

In 1984, a Hong Kong court ordered Antonio Heras to payUS$1.8 million or its equivalent, with
interest, to Asiavest Ltd. Apparently, Heras guaranteed a certain loan in Hong Kong andthe debtor in
said loan defaulted hence, the creditor, Asiavest,ran after Heras. But before said judgment was
issued and evenduring trial, Heras already left for good Hong Kong and hereturned to the Philippines.
So when in 1987, when Asiavestfiled a complaint in court seeking to enforce the foreign judgment
against Heras, the latter claim that he never receivedany summons, not in Hong Kong and not in the
Philippines. Healso claimed that he never received a copy of the
foreign judgment. Asiavest howevercontends that Heras was actuallygiven service of summons when
a messenger from the SycipSalazar Law Firm served said summons by leaving a copy toone Dionisio
Lopez who was Heras’ son in law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the foreign judgment can be enforcedagainst Heras in the Philippines.

HELD:

No. Although the foreign judgment was duly authenticated(Asiavest was able to adduce evidence in
support thereto) andHeras was never able to overcome the validity of it, it cannotbe enforced against
Heras here in the Philippines because Heras was not properly served summons. Hence, as far
asPhilippine law is concerned, the Hong Kong court has neveracquired jurisdiction over Heras. This
means then thatPhilippine courts cannot act to enforce the said foreign judgment.The action against
Heras is an action in personam and as faras Hong Kong is concerned, Heras is a nonresident. He is
anon resident because prior to the judgment, he already abandoned Hong Kong. The Hong Kong law
on service ofsummons in in personam cases against nonresidents wasnever presented in court
hence processual presumption isapplied where it is now presumed that Hong Kong law in as faras
this case is concerned is the same as Philippine laws.
Andunder our laws, in an action in personam wherein thedefendant is a non-resident who
does not voluntarily submithimself to the authority of the court, personal service ofsummons within the
state is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over her person. This method of service is possibleif
such defendant is physically present in the country. If he isnot found therein, the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction over hisperson and therefore cannot validly try and decide the caseagainst him. Without a
personal service of summons, the HongKong court never acquired jurisdiction. Needless to say,
thesummons tendered to Lopez was an invalid service becausethe same does not satisfy the
requirement of personal service.
 OMANFIL INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER DEVELOPMENTCORPORATION VS NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONSCOMMISSION

FACTS:

In February 1993, Hyundai Engineering and Construction Co.,Ltd., through its local agent, Omanfil
International ManpowerDevelopment Corporation, engaged Eduardo Felipe to work asa rigger in
Malaysia. In June 1993, the ferry boat in whichEduardo was assigned met an accident. His body was
neverfound. A provision in the Malaysia labor law provides:Where death has resulted from the injury,
a lump sum equalto forty five months earnings or fourteen thousand fourhundred ringgit [RM],
whichever is the less;A local labor office in Malaysia then wrote a letter to Hyundaiadvising the latter
of the computation it arrived at, to wit;45 months x US $620.04 (monthly salary of Eduardo) =
US$27,902.02.RM14,400 which is equivalent to US $5,393.29 is less than US$27,902.02, hence,
Hyundai deposited the lesser amount withthe said labor office.The wife of Eduardo, Lora Felipe, does
not agree that Hyundaiis liable for the lesser amount hence she filed a labor case
against Hyundai’s agent, Omanfil. The labor arbiter orderedOmanfil to pay $27,902.02 to Lora. This
was affirmed by theNational Labor Relations Commission. It was ruled that theMalaysian labor law is
susceptible to two interpretationsbecause it is vague; that in case of doubt of labor laws, it mustbe
construed in favor of the laborer.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the National Labor Relations is correct.

HELD:

No. The Malaysian Law in question is not vague. Clearly whatis due to Lora as death benefit (for her
dead husband) is14,400 Malaysian Ringgit since that amount is less than US$27,902.02. Further, it
appears that the Director General ofLabor of Malaysia certified that Eduardo is only entitled to
amaximum of RM14,000.00 pursuant to the labor law inquestion. This certification is duly
authenticated by Mr. BayaniV. Mangibin, our Consul General in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.Such
authentication of the said Certification, which provides aninterpretation of said foreign labor law by
none other than theDirector of Labor of Malaysia is proof of the foreign law.Further still, this was
never contested by Lora.
 LLORENTE VS CA
G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000

FACTS:

Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner Paula Llorente were married in 1937 in the Philippines. Lorenzo was
an enlisted serviceman of the US Navy. Soon after, he left for the US where through naturalization,
he became a US Citizen. Upon his visitation of his wife, he discovered that she was living with his
brother and a child was born. The child was registered as legitimate but the name of the father was
left blank. Llorente filed a divorce in California, which later on became final. He married Alicia and
they lived together for 25 years bringing 3 children. He made his last will and testament stating that all
his properties will be given to his second marriage. He filed a petition of probate that made or
appointed Alicia his special administrator of his estate. Before the
proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo died. Paula filed a letter of administration over Llorente’s
estate. The trial granted the letter and denied the motion for reconsideration. An appeal was made to
the Court of Appeals, which affirmed and modified the judgment of the Trial Court that she be
declared co-owner of whatever properties, she and the deceased, may have acquired during their 25
years of cohabitation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the National Law shall apply.

RULING:

Lorenzo Llorente was already an American citizen when he divorced Paula. Such was also the
situation when he married Alicia and executed his will. As stated in Article 15 of the civil code, aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, provided that they are validly required in their National Law. Thus the
divorce obtained by Llorente is valid because the law that governs him is not Philippine Law but his
National Law since the divorce was contracted after he became an American citizen. Furthermore, his
National Law allowed divorce.
The case was remanded to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo
Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’ successional rights allowing proof of foreign law.