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Database Contributed by Tom Cooper & Franz Vajda
Media Feb 20, 2008 at 10:34 AM
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In an addenda to the recently published book "Arab MiG19 and MiG21 Units in Combat", by Dr. David Nicolle and Tom Cooper, Franz
Vajda and Tom Cooper provide this indepth analysis of Arab air power on 5 June 1967.
Algeria
QJJ (alQuwwat alJawwiya alJaza’eriya)
Having gained its independence from France only in 1962, Algeria was a completely new appearance in the wars between the Arabs and
Israel. The true extension of its participation in specific phases of this conflict remains largely unknown until today.
In 1967 the QJJ was still a young service: the Algerian Air Force was formed only in November 1962 with Soviet and Egyptian help
around five MiG15s, 12 Gomhouriahs supplied from Egypt, and 12 Czech C.11s (Yak11). After purchasing additional light aircraft and
helicopters from the USA and France, in 1963 more combat aircraft were acquired from the USSR again, including 15 MiG15bis, few
MiG15UTIs, 20 MiG17Fs, and 12 Il28s. After a short war with Morocco, in 1963, in 1964 and 1965 even more aircraft were received,
including 20 MiG17Fs, 12 additional Il28s, and the first eight MiG19s and six MiG21F13s. By June 1967 the Algerians therefore had a
fullydeveloped regiment with three squadrons of MiG17s, one bomber regiment with two squadrons Il28s, a mixed fighter squadron
with MiG19s and MiG21s, one squadron of MiG15s and a transport regiment with a squadron each of An12s and Il14s.
Almost all the Algerian MiG17s and certainly all MiG21s were sent to Egypt during the war. Flying via Tunisia and Libya the aircraft –
formed into two “large” MiG17units, and one MiG21unit – they started arriving already on the afternoon of 5 June, although most
followed on the following day.
Egypt
UARAF
The Egyptian Air Force was definitely the most powerful Arab air arm in 1967. It boasted 560 aircraft and helicopters, plus a small
reserve, of which 431 were combat aircraft, including 278 modern MiG19s and MiG21s, Su7s, and Tu17s. combat and 200 support
aircraft and helicopters, staffed by 11.000 military and 5.000 civilian personnel. This large force saw a decade of fascinating
development since the last war in which it participated.
Although there were some negotiations with the USA immediately after the Suez Crisis, in late 1956 Egypt once again turned to the
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USSR for acquisition of new weapons needed to rebuild its battered military. The Soviets were swift to use the opportunity and promised
supplies of arms and equipment worth $150 million, in addition to already granted loans for the building of the Asswan dam. Already in
March 1957 three Soviet merchants arrived in Alexandria, with 15 MiG17, ten Il28, and radar equipment for the EAF. Meanwhile all the
aircraft evacuated to Saudi Arabia and Syria were returned to Egypt.
Additional deliveries from the USSR, as well as 650 Soviet, Polish, and Czechoslovak instructors enabled Egypt to completely rebuild and
reorganize its air force, but also standardise the equipment. By July 1957 the EAF boasted almost 100 MiG15s and MiG17s, and 40 Il
28s, and many of these aircraft were presented to the public during a large parade in Cairo on 23 of the same month. At the same time
a large number of Egyptian officers, pilots, and technicians were sent to the USSR, Poland, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia for training,
few even to the USA. Some of them were to spend up to four years on different courses outside Egypt in the following years, as the
investment in training and further development of the EAF was massive. In the course of the following years the Egyptians have
completely reorganized their air force. Many would say that the new structure was “according to the Soviet doctrine”: the Egyptians,
however, always stress that they were doing their things in their own way, taking some ides from the Soviets, but others also in the
West.
Indeed, the EAF was now formed into Air Brigades, each of which consisted of usually three units and was connected into a centralized
air defence system, controlled by the Supreme Command Council (SCC), itself under control of the General Headquarters. Some
brigades, or units within them were actually put under a direct control of the Army. On the other side of the chain of command air
brigades were local control centres, in turn integrated into a newlyestablished command and control system, supported by two dozens
of radar stations and numerous groups of ground observers. Most of the existing airfields were also enlargened, with additional hangars,
workshops, and depots being built.
When in 1958 Egypt, Yemen and Syria joined into the United Arab Republic, the EAF was correspondingly renamed into United Arab
Republic Air Force (UARAF), and its command structure enlargened to control also the Syrian and the Yemeni air forces. Despite intense
cooperation and unit exchange in the following years, however, the UARAF was eventually never to become a really „united“ air force.
The simple reason was that the Egyptian air force was well relatively developed, equipped, and trained, but also confronted with
completely different problems than the other two forces that made the UARAF. The Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF), for example, was
suffering from several subsequent coups in Damascus, each of which brought a new purge of commanding officers. The Yemeni Air
Force was existent only due to extensive Egyptian support. Besides, except Israel, all the three parts of the UARAF had also different
other enemies. Syria, for example was antagonized by Turkey and Iraq as much as by Israel, while Yemen had no border to Israel at
all.
Nevertheless, the establishment of the UAR made Egypt to the leading Arab nation, and acquisitions of additional aircraft developed the
Egyptian part of the UARAF into the most powerful air force in the Middle East. Even if the UAR was not to last very long (it fell apart
already in 1961, mainly because of a new regime that climbed to power in Damascus after another militarysupported coup), the
Egyptian air force kept its name and was therefore still designated UARAF.
By 1960 the Egyptian air force was larger than the whole IDF/AF. Most of the Egyptian fighters were also more advanced than the types
flown by the Israeli: the Egyptian part of the UARAF boasted no less but four regiments with a total of almost 150 MiG15s and MiG
17F/PFs, one regiment with some 60 Il28 bombers, and one transport regiment with Il14s and An12s. However, in the subsequent
years the Egyptian part of the UARAF was to be faced by considerable problems, most of which were connected with the simultaneous
acquisition of a large number of combat aircraft of an entirely new generation, but also due to Egypt’s involvement in the war in Yemen.
Between 1958 and 1965 Egypt purchased a total of 100 MiG19S fighters. Originally, the number of acquired airframes was much lower,
and only enough to organize two sizeable units, the 20th and 21st Fighter Squadrons. However, the aircraft proved to have several
serious flaws in construction, the most important one being that the piping of the hydraulic system was positioned too close to the engine
and thus suffered from overheating, causing a number of catastrophic accidents. The number of available aircraft fell so rapidly, that by
1964 the 20th and 21st Squadron had to be combined into one large unit. Other Arab air forces had even more significant problems
when operating MiG19s, however, so in 1964 a decision was taken the Egyptians to take over all the 30 remaining Syrian and ten Iraqi
examples. While the exIraqi MiG19s were flown to Egypt, a majority of Syrian MiG19s remained in Syria, but were given to two
Egyptian UARAF units permanently based there.
Meanwhile the Egyptians learned about the appearance of a new fighter jet, capable of flying at Mach 2, but relatively simple to fly: the
MiG21. Excellent flying characteristics, armament of two 30mm cannons and a useful ranging radar made the 21 exceptionally
interesting. When in 1961 it became known that Israel was about to order what was thought to would be 40 Mirage IIICs from France,
Egypt immediately ordered a similar number of MiG21Fs from the USSR, and the first group of Egyptian pilots was sent to the USSR for
training. The first 40 MiG21F13s arrived in Egypt already in June and July 1962, forming a single regiment of three squadrons. In 1963,
however, the UARAF learned that the total Israeli order was for 72 Mirages, and consequently a second order for MiG21F13s was
issued to increase the number of these fighters to 120, and equip a complete division with them. After the pilottraining proved more
complex than expected, in 1964 also 40 MiG21Us were acquired, while in the same year also the first 40 allweather MiG21PFs were
purchased, used to reequip three units that were previously flying MiG21F13s: this older version was then “cascaded” to other units,
previously flying MiG17s and MiG19s.
In 1962 the UARAF was further reinforced by 30 Tupolev Tu16 bombers, a number of which belonged to the Tu16K1116 version,
equipped with AS1 and AS5 guided airtoground missiles, and could target Israel from safe distances, without the need to risk being
intercepted by Israeli fighters. A single regiment with three squadrons of Tu16s was formed in 1964, but it was still in training in 1967.
In the meantime, the acquisition process of MiG21s was continued, as in 1966 the UARAF purchased also 75 improved MiG21PFM
fighters to establish four new squadrons. Actually, no new squadrons were established: four selected units converted to this variant,
cascading their own MiG21F13s and MiG21PFs to other – already existing – units. Many F13s and PFs were meanwhile lost in
accidents, while some were given to other air forces. Consequently, although purchasing no less but 235 MiG21s between 1961 and
1967, and – at least on the paper – having six interceptor and six fighterbomber squadrons equipped with them on 5 June 1967 the
UARAF effectively had only 108 MiG21s in service, which were enough for only nine units of 12 aircraft each!
Another very important delivery was 64 Su7BMK ground attack planes between July 66 and June 67. the Egyptian pilots disliked the
type, because of its short range, but also because of lots of defects and little fighting capability due to its small payload. But, the Soviets
insisted, and thus the first batch of 64 aircraft was ordered, followed by a second batch of 30. By June 1967 a total of 64 were delivered
and there were plans to organize a full division with two regiments and six squadrons with them. But, by June 1967 only the No. 55
Squadron, based at Fa’id, was about to complete the conversion, having 15 qualified pilots and 15 operational Su7BMKs.
It should be mentioned here, that in the early and mid1960s Egypt was also investing heavily into the manufacture of the Ha200 and
then the development of the Ha300 jet aircraft. The first was a trainer developed in Spain, 63 of which were built at the Aircraft Works
in Hulwan, as Ha200 alKahiras, but which suffered from unreliable engines. The Ha300 was a much more ambitious project for a light
weight, deltawinged, supersonic fighter, developed with German, Austrian, and Spanish help, and with Indian involvement. This highly
interesting and promising project, however, was cancelled after the war in 1967.
In total, by 1967 the Egyptian air force was a very modern air arm, wellequipped, but the quality of the training of its personnel was
different. The UARAF foremost lacked sufficient technicians to keep its aircraft operational. Out of some 700 qualified pilots and 150
navigators, only roughly 150 were rotated to Yemen where they gained combat experience, and barely more than 200 could have been
considered as experienced. Most of the others were still in the middle of the training of one sort or the other, and exactly this, together
with the fundamental weaknesses within the SCC as well as the General Headquarters, was to eventually prove as the main weakness of
the UARAF. Namely, the Egyptians lacked anything but a very general plan for the case of a war: despite having the only air force in
possession of dedicated light and medium bombers in the whole Middle East, the Egyptians were not expecting to deploy their air power
in offensive manner. In fact, most of the commanding officers in responsible positions simply did not know what to do in the case the
fighting would break out. Most were also not ready to act on their own, instead preferring to wait for orders from above: if these would
not arrive, their units would do nothing. The highly centralized command system was also slow to forward commands down to various
squadrons, and the cooperation between the UARAF, the Army and the Navy was therefore very poor. Although the Egyptian pilots and
officers were confident and their equipment modern, their experiences from Yemen as well as combat against tactical fighters as flown
by the Israeli were completely ignored, and the whole force was actually untested in combat. Brig. Gen. (ret.) Tamim Fahmi ‘Abd Allah
criticised the Soviet training concepts of the time (see Phoenix over the Nile, p:
I didn’t like the kind of training we were getting because it was very hypothetical. We were not unique, probably the Soviet Union and all
Soviet bloc countries trained the same way, but I will never forgive us for following this same path. We were in combat a lot in Yemen,
so we should have known better. But we got our equipment from the Soviets and we believed them, we didn’t believe ourselves. We
were flying all the time at high altitudes, high speeds – supersonic much of the time. Anyone who would fl low could get courtmartialled.
I was once in big trouble because I flew low. We did so in Yemen a lot, but after we came home it was forgotten.
Many Egyptian officers complained the Soviets were not training them any tactics at all. Brig.Gen. (ret.) Qadri alHamid concluded (ibid,
p.198):
We were lacking in the theory of air combat: the Russians had given us training but not good tactics. They trained us to fly at Mach 2 and
do highlevel intercepts and night fighting. All of this did not happen in the 1967 War with Israel – it was all fought on the deck. You train
for something, and if it doesn’t happen that way, you aren’t prepared.
Maj.Gen. Abdel Nasr, former ChiefofStaff of the UARAF commented (Wings over Suez, p.366):
When the Russians came they emphasised training to make us staff and general officers. They didn’t teach us tactics but they succeeded
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in teaching us to think in a proper and organized manner... When I was in the Soviet Union I had many relations with the training
department because of my job. I was discussing with them how to train our troops. I discovered that they gave us a course in
elementary training but they didn’t teach us tactics. They had their own tactics but they wouldn’t be good for us because they depended
upon massing and he use of large numbers that were not available to us.
Contrary to the Israeli Air Force, were the aggressiveness and initiative were some of the main predispositions for all officers and pilots,
the Egyptians were not permitted to operate aggressively, as Col. (ret.) Tahsin Zaki recalled (PON, p.192):
I was commander of the 2nd Air Wing of MiG17s during 1965, which included a squadron of MiG17s stationed permanently at alArish.
Our orders were not to fly near the EgyptianIsraeli border, but the Israelis often penetrated our airspace, flying very low, even right
over alArish airport. This made my pilots feel very bad because of the restrictions the high command had put against penetrating the
Israeli border. To boost the morale of my pilots, I allowed them, at times, to penetrate at low level until Beersheba.
Consequently, while impressive on the paper, the UARAF had some serious limitations. Tahsin Zaki commented in summary:
We held exercises to test the efficiency of our air defence against lowflying aircraft. The air defences failed completely to spot any
aircraft flying below 400 meters because of the outmoded Russian radars that were incapable of detecting any aircraft flying low. A
meeting was held attended by the supreme commander of the Air Force. This meeting ended after one of the Russian advisors said that
the air defence system of the UAR was sound but needed some minor modifications of the SAM sites north of the Canal Zone – which
surprised me a lot!
Finally, the UARAF was also not trained for operations at high tempo. Its technicians were not trained to match as short turnaround
times of aircraft like the Israelis were, and the Egyptians could sedum maintain more than between 60 and 65% of their aircraft in
operational condition. Even if this was a readiness rate comparable with such air forces like the US or Soviet at the time, it was
insufficient against Israel. Perhaps for this reason the SCC turned down requests from local commanders to fly permanent combat air
patrols along the Suez Canal and the most important air bases, explaining there was no money for that. Quite on the contrary, even in
the final days before the war the UARAF interceptor units were flying only patrols in the early morning: after 0800hrs all the aircraft
would be on the ground, rearming, refuelling and with their crews getting breakfast. In the light of the fact that not only officers within
the UARAF, but also some higherranking officers have warned of the way the Israelis would attack Egypt, it is completely unclear why
was the Egyptian high command ignoring the lessons from the war in Yemen or suggestions from its own experienced officers and pilots;
why were the aircraft not dispersed and air bases readied to survive a surprising Israeli strike.
UARAF: Order of Battle on 5 June 1967
The organizational structure of the UARAF on 5 June 1967 was extremely complex, then in the weeks since it was mobilized (on 13 May
1967) most of the units were moved around a great deal in an attempt to confuse the Israeli intelligence. Additionally, many units were
prepared to operate from several different bases – in addition to their main base, and had their aircraft dispersed on up to three
different airfields. To increase the problems in tracking down the Egyptian units, it must also be said that in 1965 the UARAF was
completely reorganized, receiving new squadron numbers in separate blocks, while most of the designations for units 1 thru 29 were
kept too. In the face of tight security measures introduced after the Six Day War, many former pilots and modernday observers are
therefore still confused about the exact designation and dislocation of numerous units until today. The order of battle offered bellow is
the best available in the moment.
It should be added, that in June 1967 the UARAF had a total of 431 combat aircraft, including 124 MiG15/17s, 80 MiG19s, 108 MiG21s,
60 Su7BMKs, 29 Il28s, and 30 Tu16s, as well as a large number of support and transport aircraft, and helicopters.
1 AB
(this brigade was scheduled for conversion to Su7BMK, which were to equip three squadrons, but by 5 June 1967 only one unit became
operational)
55 Sqn, 15 Su7BMK, Fayid; Egyptian Su7s were also left in „bare metal“ overall, and wore small black serials on the forward
fuselage: 7664
Unknown Sqn, in formation
Unknown Sqn, in formation
2 AB elArish
(this Brigade was scheduled for conversion to Su7BMK, which were to equip three squadrons, but this could not be done before 5 June
1967)
24 Sqn, MiG15bis, Jebel Libni
31 Sqn, MiG15bis, Kibrit
Unknown Sqn, formation on Su7BMK planned
3 or 4 (?) AB
43 Sqn, MiG21F13, status and base unknown (probably only nominally existent)
46 Sqn, MiG21F13, status and base unknown (probably only nominally existent)
47 Sqn, MiG21F13, status and base unknown (probably only nominally existent)
5 AB
10 Sqn, 20 MiG21F13 & 1 MiG15UTI, Bi’r Jifjafah/alMulayz
22 Sqn, MiG21PFM, Kibrit
26 Sqn, MiG21PFM, Kibrit
As delivered to the UARAF, all the MiG21F13s were in bare metal overall. The original batch of 40 wore small black serials
on the forward fuselage in the range 5001 thru (probably) 5040. The second batch of 80 MiG21F13s were left in the same
colours and with the same form of serials, probably in range from 5801 thru 5919. With these aircraft the original 5th, 7th,
and 9th Air Brigades were formed, in 1964.
7 AB
41 Sqn, MiG21F13, Cairo International
42 Sqn, MiG21F13, Abu Sawayr
45 Sqn, MiG21F13, Abu Sawayr
Each UARAF squadron had a handful of MiG21Us. These were left in bare metal overall and wore small black serials on the forward
fuselage, in the range 5601 thru 5640.
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9 AB
40 Sqn, MiG21PF, Fa’id
44 Sqn, MiG21PF, Inshas & Bi’r Jifjafah/alMulayz
49 Sqn, MiG21PFM, Inshas
The Egyptian MiG21PFs were also left in bare metal overall and they wore small black serials on the forward fuselage in the range 5401
thru 5440. The more advanced MiG21PFMs were left in bare metal overall as well, but some were observed having small black “anti
glare” panels in front of the cockpit. Their serials were in the range 5201 thru 5240.
12 AB (The main base of this unit was Kibrit, and its main task was closesupport for the Army. For that purpose parts of its squadrons
were put directly under the Army Command.)
25 Sqn, MiG17F, Kibrit, elArish & Bi’r alThamadah
31 OCU, MiG17PF, Kibrit & Luxor
15 AB
20/21 Combined Sqn, MiG19, Hurghada/alGhardagah
? Sqn, MiG17s & MiG19s in Damascus, Syria
20 AB
5 Sqn, MiG17F, elArish
18 Sqn, MiG15 & MiG17F, elArish & Jabel Libni; aluminium overall, redwhite chequered rudder
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61 AB
2 Sqn, MiG17, Bi’f alThamadah
8 Light Bomber Squadron, Il28, Abu Sawayr; bare metal overall, black serial on the forward fuselage: 1733
9 Light Bomber Squadron, Il28, Cairo West & Ras Banas
? Light Bomber Squadron, Il28, Cairo West
65 AB
? Medium Bomber Squadron, Tu16, Cairo West;
? Medium Bomber Squadron, Tu16, Bani Suwayf;
95 Medium Bomber Flight, Tu16K1116, Cairo West; aircraft were left „bare metal“ overall, but had large black serials in Persian
characters on the rear fuselage: 4374, 4384
Other units
7 Helicopter Squadron, 6 Mi6; Cairo West
11 Transport Squadron, DC3/C47/Dakota; Cairo West & elMansourah
12 Helicopter Squadron, Mi4, Bi’r Jifjafah
? Transport Squadron, Il14, Cairo West & Bilbeis
16 Transport Squadron, An12B, Cairo West, Aswan
40 Sqn, Mi8, Bi’r Jifjafah & Hurghada/alGhardagah &
The detailed losses of the UARAF during the Six Day war were as follows:
89 MiG15/17s (including 9 in airtoair combat)
29 MiG19 (including 16 in airtoair combat)
98 MiG21s (including 29 in airtoair combat)
27 Su7BMK (including four in airtoair combat)
29 Il28 (including two shot down in air combats)
29 Tu16s
24 Il14s (including one shot down by the Israeli fighters)
8 An12s (including one shot down by the Israeli fighters)
1 Mi4
10 Mi6
4 other support aircraft were lost as well
This was an obvious and veritable catastrophe, especially that by the time hardly a handful of Egyptian MiG21s – mere ten – survived
the war, except for the few supplied by Algeria from 5 June onwards, at least one, but most probably three, of which ended in Israeli
hands, when they were sent to elArish airfield, which was already captured by the enemy. Certainly, it is known that out of some 40
MiG17s and MiG21s sent by Algeria to Egypt, only between six and eight were returned in 1968. Nevertheless, immediately after the
war a massive resupply was started. The Czechs have sent 30 MiG21F13s (serialled from 5701 upwards) and started a delivery or 122
modern L29 trainers. 75 MiG21PFM from the USSR were supplied by the end of 1967 as well (serialled 8001 upwards). Much more
problematic was replacement of some 100 fully qualified pilots killed during the war. In order to bolster the training the UARAF
consequently purchased 24 additional MiG21US as well (serialled 5641 upwards).
Iraq
IrAF
Meanwhile, the Iraqis followed a completely different politics in regards to the equipment of their air force. Essentially, the RIrAF of the
1950s was completely Britishtrained and –equipped. The RIrAF was already operating 12 Vampire FB.Mk.52s, six Vampire T.Mk.55s, as
well as 19 Venom FB.Mk.1s and FB.Mk.50s since the mid1950s. In 1956 also the first 15 Hunter F.Mk.6 were ordered: they were
supplied – with US financial help – in two batches, the first of which consisted of five aircraft delivered in April 1957, and the second of
ten aircraft delivered in December 1957, all from RAF Middle East stocks. In 1958 the USA supplied also five F86F Sabres to Iraq. The
Hunters entered service with the No. 1 Squadron, based at Tahmouz/Habbaniyah AB. The Sabres, however, were not to enter service:
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they were parked in a hangar at alRaschid AB, and were left there for some tiime before being returned to the USA, in the early 1960s.
The situation in Iraq changed completely after the bloody coup that seept the young King Feisal from power, in 1958, after which the
new regime allied with the USSR. The fighting in the aftermath of the coup saw the first combat use of Hunters, when F.Mk.6s of the No.1
Sqn (together with Fury F.Mk.1s of the No. 4 Sqn) were used to rocket and straffe royalist strongholds in southern Iraq.
Once again the Soviets were very swift to react to the Iraqi requests for arms supplies, and already n 1958 the first MiG15s and MiG
17s were delivered to Iraq, entering service with the No.5 Squadron, replacing Vampires. In 1962 Iraq then acquired 40 MiG19 from
the USSR, followed by the first 12 MiG21F13s. The Iraqis experienced exactly the same problems with their MiG19s like the Egyptians,
and this fact hampered the furter orders from the USSR for a number of years to come, while most of the MiG19s were sold to Egypt, in
1965.
Meanwhile, after two other changes of different regeimes in Baghdad, by 1964 Iraq was purchasing new fighters only from the UK, so
that between 1964 and 1966 between 42 and 45 additional examples were acquired. These were supplied in two large batches,
designated F.Mk.59 (24 exBelgian examples, brought to the FGA.9 standard before deliverey), and FGA.59A (18 exDutch examples,
also brought to FGA.9 standard before delivery), all of which had their flaps cutout to enable the carriage of large external tanks.
Finally, five F.Mk.59Bs were added, all of which were compatible with threecamera noses for photo reconnaissance. New Hunters were
used to reinforce the No.4 and No.7 Squadrons.
In general, most of training and traditions of the Iraqi Air Force at the time were of British origins, and RAFrelated. In the 1950s future
Iraqi Hunterpilots were trained at RAF Chivenor, and their training syllabus was almost completely based on that of the RAF Hunter
units. Iraqi pilots of the time flew between 170 and 200 hours annually, with several main exercises each year, especially in airto
ground and airtoair gunnery. The appearance of the Soviets in Iraq, starting with 1958, changed almost nothing: the Iraqis saw the
USSR only as a weaponssupplier, and wanted no Soviet political influence in their country. Consequently, even the pilots flying MiGs
continued using the tactical methods they inherited from the British.
In fact, it was not before 1966 that the Iraqis realized that the British would not sell them their Lightning interceptors and therefore felt
compelled to contact Moscow again, with an order for no less but 60 MiG21PFs. These fighters, however, were not to reach Iraq before
the Six Day War, and therefore in early June 1967 the IrAF was organized as follows:
No. 1 Sqn/Flight A, Hunter F.Mk.6 H3/alWallid & Tahmouz/Habbaniyah;
The first batch of IrAF Hunters was painted Extra Dark Sea Grey and Dark Green in standard RAF pattern over, Silver undersides. These
aircraft wore black serials on the rear fuselage: 394, 396, 401, 403, 575, 579 and others.
The 16 F.Mk.6s supplied in 1957 were all from RAF stocks, and their British serials were:
XJ677
XJ678
XJ679
XJ681
XJ682
XK143
XK144
XK145
XK146
XK147
XK152
XK153
XK154
XK155
XK156
Two of these aircraft were seen with serials 570 and 578 in service with the IrAF.
No. 1 Sqn/Flight B operated the five FR.Mk.10s Iraq acquired in 1966. All were actually supplied under the designation F.Mk.59B, and
were exDutch aircraft, converted to FGA.9 standard, albeit compatible with threecamera recce noses. The Iraqi FR.Mk.10s had their
noses and/or fins painted in red, like this was the case with Jordanian reconnaisance Hunters as well. The exact significance of these
markings are unknown. Their former Dutch serials were:
N205
N221
N259
N263
No. 2 Bomber Squadron, Il28, Moascar alRashid;
Iraqi Il28s were left in bare metal overall and had black serials applied on the forward fuselage, repeated on the fin. Known serials are:
423 (Il28U), 426, 428 (Il28U).
No. 3 Transport Squadron, A Flight, Freighter, Il14, An12BP;
For details about Iraqi Bristol Freighters see article “Iraqi Air Force since 1948”, in the “Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf” database.
Iraq received at least six An12s by 1967. The first three were painted Grey overall, cockpit roof in white, title „I.A.F“ in black in Arabic
characters underneath the cockpit, repeated in Persian characters on the rear fuselage: 501, 502, 505, 506, 636, 805, 806.
The only known photograph of an Iraqi Il14 is in black and white, and shows the aircraft in camouflage colours probably consisting of
Dark Green and Sand over, and “Russian Light Blue” underneath, without any serials, but with a larger Iraqi flash on the fin.
No. 3 Transport Squadron, B Flight, Mi1 & Mi4, Moascar alRashid;
No. 3 Transport Squadron, C Flight 12 Wessex Mk.52 and ? Dragonfly, Moascar alRashid;
Both types were camouflaged in Dark Earth/Light Brown over, Azure Blue underneath. Only one serial for a Dragonfly is known, applied
in Black on the boom: 332.
No. 4 Fighter Squadron, Hunter F.Mk.59A, H3/alWallid & Habbaniyah;
Extra Dark Sea Grey and Dark Green in standard RAF pattern over, Silver undersides; white serials on the rear fuselage; known are
629633, 657661, and 665677. This unit mainly flew F.Mk.59As supplied between 1963 and 1965, most of which were exBelgian and
exDutch F.Mk.6s, brought to the FGA.9standard. Their former serials were:
IF6
IF10
IF11
IF14
IF20
IF21
IF24
IF27
IF28
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IF32
IF48
IF75
IF79
IF80
IF88
IF94
IF107
IF114
IF122
IF126
IF140
IF142
N234
N247
No. 5 Fighter Squadron, MiG17F, Kirkuk;
Iraqi MiG17s were left in bare metal overall, and wore black serials on the front fuselage, probably repeated on the top of the fin.
Known examples are: 343 and 452.
No. 6 Fighter Squadron, Venom F.Mk.1 & FB.Mk.52 (replaced by MiG21PFs in 1968), Habbaniyah;
For details see article “Iraqi Air Force since 1948”, in the “Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf” database.
No. 7 OCU (Operational element designated No. 702 Squadron), Hunter F.Mk.59/F.Mk.59A & T.Mk.66, Habbaniyah:
Extra Dark Sea Grey and Dark Green in standard RAF pattern over, Silver undersides; white serials on the rear fuselage. This unit
foremost operated twoseat Hunters, including the original three that came into existence through conversion of exBelgian F.Mk.6s IF
68, IF84, and IF143, and were serialled 567, 568 and 569 in IrAF, after delivery in 1962. However, two additional serials of Iraqi
T.Mk.66s are known, 626 and 627, which should have arrived in 1965 from an unknown source. Iraq has lost a total of five Hunters on
the ground during the Six Day War, and one or two in airtoair combats. The main equipment It is unclear if it was this unit for which
also the third series of Hunters was acquired in the UK. Namely, already while the first 24 F.Mk.59s were in production, the Iraqis
ordered 18 additional aircraft. Hawker used 16 former Belgian and two Dutch F.Mk.6s to build a series designated F.Mk.59A in Iraqi
service. All of these aircraft were delivered by May of 1967, their original serials being:
IF8
IF9
IF22
IF25
IF29
IF31
IF54
IF59
IF71
IF72
IF74
IF87
IF93
IF99
IF135
IF138
N253
N255
No. 8 Bomber Squadron, Tu16, alRashid;
Iraq received a total of eight Tu16s between 1962 and 1966, of which six were intact and four operational on 5 June. The aircraft were
left in bare metal overall, and wore thick serials applied in Black on the rear fuselage. Known original serials were: 499, 500, 503, and
504.
Unknown COIN Squadron, Jet Provost T.Mk.52, base unknown;
All Iraqi Strikemasters were left in bare metal overall. Several examples were photographed wearing large panels in DayGlo Orange on
the rear fuselage. Serials were 600 thru 619, and worn on the rear fuselage in Black.
No. 11 Fighter Squadron, MiG19S, alRashid; This unit was still in the process of conversion to MiG21PF after all of its MiG19s were
given to Egypt, in 1965. Original MiG19s of the Iraqi Air Force should have either been left in bare metal overall, or painted light grey
overall. It is known also that most if not all of them also wore names of different Iraqi cities, applied in Arabic, in white, underneath
the cockpits. This practice was kept by the Egyptians when the aircraft came in their possession. The MiG19 shown bellow wears the
name of "Basrah".
No. 17 Sqn, MiG21F13, H3/alWallid & Habbaniyah;
Iraqi MiG21F13s were all left bare metal overal. Small black serials were usually applied on the front fuselage. Known examples are:
534 (flown to Israel in August 1966), 609, 628 (the last survived to become a gateguard at asShoibiyah AB, in the 1990s).
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Unknown Unit, Vampire T.Mk.55, probably alGayyar AB/Mosul, or alHurriyah AB/Kirkuk;
For details see article “Iraqi Air Force since 1948”, in the “Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf” database.
Jordan
RJAF (Royal Jordanian Air Force)
The Royal Jordanian Air Force came into existence only in the early 1950s, and was heavily dependent on foreign help in its early years.
Yet, contrary to the situation in Egypt, the young King Hussein took a great care not to let his military become involved in politics.
Besides, the Jordanian military was cooperating very closely with the British: all RJAF pilots were trained in the UK and RAFinstructors
were almost permanently assigned to the RJAF. Consequently, the local officers, pilots, technicians and other ranks were trained in a
highly professional manner, and even if there were comparatively few of them, they were probably the best of all the Arab airmen of
the time, even if their equipment was not as advanced as that of Egypt or even Syria.
The first jet aircraft of the RJAF were nine Vampire FB.Mk.9s and two Vampire T.Mk.11s, supplied from the UK in 1954. Two years later
also seven exEAF Vampire FB.Mk.52s were donated by Egypt.
In the aftermath of their “show of support” for the King Hussein – i.e. the British intervention in 1958 (see the separate article in this
database) – the British supplied 12 Hunter F.Mk.6 as well. These were used to equip the No. 1 Squadron, while the Vampires were
“cascaded down” to the No. 2 Squadron. When the British instructors noticed that the lessexperienced Jordanian pilots had some
problems with converting from slow pistonengined training aircraft to fighter jets also 12 Harvard T.Mk.2Bs were supplied. By 1964
additional 23 Hunter F.Mk.73s and FGA.9s were supplied to RJAF, and by 1967 the Jordanians planned to reequipp the No.2 Squadron
with them as well. This decision was in part based on the fact that from 1965 the USA started supplying arms to Jordan. Initially, some
200 M47 and M48 tanks, a similar number of M113 armoured personnel carriers, and M109 selfpropelled howitzers were delivered,
but in 1967 the RJAF was also about to start acquiring F104 Starfighters. In fact, when the Six Day War was about to break out two F
104As and two TF104As were already at Amman IAP where they were used to familiarise RJAF personnel with them.
Jordanian aircraft were all left in colours as delivered. Hunters and Vampires wore the standard RAF camouflage patterns in Extra Dark
Sea Grey & Dar Green over, and Silver underneath. National markings were applied in six positions.
No 1 Sqn, Hunter F.Mk.6 & FR.Mk.6, Mafraq AB; most of the 12 Hunters originally delivered to the No. 1 Sqn RJAF have had the insignia
of their unit applied on the forward fuselage. This consisted of a wolfhead on a white field, outlined in black, on a redwhite checkered
arrow; white codes were applied on the top of the fin and serials in white on rear fuselage. All aircraft were essentially equipped to the
same standard as Indian F.Mk.66s. By the Six Day War the RJAF still had eleven of them in service. Originally delivered F.Mk.6s were:
WW597 (RJAF 711/?)
XE543 (RJAF 707/?)
XE551 (RJAF 700/A)
XE558 (RJAF 701/B)
XE379 (RJAF 709/K)
XF373 (RJAF 703/D)
XF380 (RJAF 710/?)
XF381 (RJAF 702/C)
XF444 (RJAF 705/F)
XF452 (RJAF 708/?)
XF496 (RJAF 706/?)
XF498 (RJAF 704/E)
In 19601961 also two FR.Mk.10s were supplied from RAF stock, and these two might have been the only Jordanian Hunters to survive
the Six Day War; they were:
XF426 (delivered as FR.Mk.10 from RAF stock, becoming 853/? with RJAF: this plane was probably the only of all the Jordanian Hunters
that survived the Six Day War)
XG262 (originally F.Mk.6, modified with a threecamera nose, becoming 852 with RJAF)
At some point also the Hunter FR.Mk.10 of unknown origin was delivered, serialled 712/N in RJAF service. This aircraft should have seen
action in 1967, but its fate is unknown.
In RJAF service the aircraft mentioned above or seen on photographs were serialled as follows:
700/A, F.Mk.6,
701/B, F.Mk.6
702/C, F.Mk.6, flown by Flt.Lt. SaifulAzam (PAF), on 5 June 1967, it probably had full No. 1 Sqn RJAF markings in the early 1960, when
it survived a crashlanding, but was destroyed on 5 June 1967
703/D, F.Mk.6, fate unknown, probably destroyed on 5 June 1967
704/E, (ex XF498) fate unknown, probably destroyed on 5 June 1967
705/C, F.Mk.6, destroyed on 5 June 1967
705/F, fate unknown (perhaps one of aircraft supplied after 1967)
707/H, F.Mk.6, destroyed on 5 June 1967
709/K (ex XF379)
710/L, F.Mk.6, destroyed on 5 June 1967
712/L, FR.Mk.6/10,
752, reported destroyed at Mafraq on 5 June 1967; possibly an IrAF example forced to land there after morning raids against Israel.
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No 2 Sqn, Vampire FB.Mk.59 & T.Mk.55, Mafraq & Amman; the Vampires of this unit have also carried the unit insignia – a black eagle
on a white circle outlined in black, with an arrow chequered in red and white (or in black and yellow, according to other sources) on the
forward fuselage; in addition the national insignia, carried on six positions, was also winged by fields chequered either in red and white
or black and yellow. Two T.Mk.55 twoseaters were supplied from the RAF in the early 1950s, one of which was serialled 209 in RJAF.
Nine or ten Vampire FB.Mk.59s were donated from the RAF in 1955, their original RAF serials being in the range between WX200 and
WX260; their RJAF serials were F600 thru F609. The serials of seven Vampire FB.Mk.52s donated from Egypt in 1955 remain unknown.
No. 3 Transport Squadron; Dove, Whirlwind, Amman
No. 4 Helicopter Squadron; Alouette III, Amman
No. 6 OCU; Hunter F.Mk.73 & FGA.9 – not much is known about this unit or ist insignia at the time of the Six Day War, except that it
was equipped with Hunter F.Mk.73s all of which belonged to the second batch supplied to Jordan. Originally, these aircraft were actually
intended to equip the No. 2 Squadron:
XF415 (RJAF 802)
XF417 (RJAF 810)
XF423 (RJAF 803)
XF518 (RJAF 809)
XG132 (RJAF 804)
XG137 (RJAF 813)
XG159 (RJAF 717)
XG171 (RJAF 808)
XG187 (RJAF 811)
XG257 (RJAF 812)
XG267 (RJAF 805)
XG268 (RJAF 806)
XG269 (RJAF 807)
The only Hunter from this batch which serial is believed to be known should be 809/K. Its fate is unknown, but it was most likely
destroyed on 5 June 1967.
The RJAF also received the following Hunter T.Mk.66B twoseaters (one newlybuilt, periodically leased, and two exKlu examples):
GAPUX spent a year with No. 6 OCU as 800/P (carrying full RJAF markings), before being returned to HawkerSiddeley
exN249, probably coded "714/B“ in RJAF, this aircraft survived the Six Day War and was later donated to Oman
N283, probably "716/?", later donated to Oman.
All but four of Jordanian Hunters were destroyed in Israeli strikes on 5 June 1967: these four survivors were then sent to Iraq.
Immediately after the war 12 new aircraft were purchased from the UK and some more temporarily loaned from Iraq before additional
aircraft readied to Jordanian specifications followed in 19681971. To complete the story of Jordanian Hunters here also details about the
examples supplied after the Six Day War.
Hunter F.Mk.6s and FGA.9s transferred from RAF and RSAF in 1967 and 1968:
XF454 (RJAF 816)
XF514 (RJAF 718)
XG298 (RJAF 826)
YK150 (RJAF 821/Q)
Hunter F.Mk.73 (all former F.Mk.6s, rebuilt to Jordanian standard and basically similar to FGA.9, they were used to reestablish the No.
2 Squadron RJAF in 1968):
XE603 (RJAF 832)
XE645 (RJAF 827)
XE655 (RJAF 817)
XF520 (RJAF 814)
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XG137
XG159
XG231
XG255 (RJAF 825, seen at Malta, in July 1972)
XK150 (RJAF 815)
Hunter F.Mk.74A (all newlybuilt, originally as F.Mk.6, upgraded to the same standard as F.Mk.73s and delivered in 1969):
XF389 (RJAF 829)
XG234 (RJAF 830)
XG237 (RJAF 828/I, arrived in Jordan in July 1969)
XJ645 (RJAF 831)
Hunter F.Mk.74A (additional batch of former F.Mk.4s, rebuilt into F.Mk.74As, supplied in 1971):
WV325 (RJAF 846)
WV408 (RJAF 845)
XF364 (RJAF 843)
XF936 (RJAF 844)
XF952 (RJAF 848)
XF968 (RJAF 847)
XF987
N268 (exKLu)
Hunter F.Mk.73B (former F.Mk.4s, upgraded to F.Mk.73 standard):
WV401 (RJAF 849)
XF979 (RJAF 850)
N264 (exKLu, RJAF 840)
N279 (exKLu, RJAF 841)
Hunter T.Mk.7:
XL605 (RJAF 836)
XL620 (RJAF 835)
No. 9 Sqn, F104A & TF104A – in organization; Jordanian Starfighters were left in bare metall overall, with the usual antiglare pannel
in Dark Green in front of the nose, and the radome in white; black serials were applied on the front fuselage, and a black code on the
top of the fin.
Lebanon
FAL (Force Aérienne Libanaise)
The Lebanese have got their first six exRAF Hunter F.Mk.6s already in 1958, the aircraft being paid for by the USA, and supplied in the
aftermath of the US intervention in the country, which came in response to viollent protests against the government in Beirut.
In 1964 three twoseat trainers readied to the Indian T.Mk.66 standard – and correspondingly designated T.Mk.66Cs – were ordered as
well as four examples built to FGA.9 standard, but designated F.Mk.70 for export. All these aircraft were former Belgian fighters, and
they were painted in the Extra Dark Sea Grey/Dark Green over, Silver underneath, with national markings in six positions and codes
and serials in black on the rear fuselage (code was applied in Latin characters, and serial numbers in Persian characters):
? Sqn; Hunter F.Mk.6 (former XE534, XE598, XF377, XF461, XF495, and XG167; FAL serials L170 thru L175), F.Mk.70s (former IF86,
IF96, IF101, and IF129; FAL serials L176 thru L179), and T.Mk.66C (former F.Mk.6s IF34, IF60, and IF112; FAL serials L280, L
281, and L282), based at Rayak.
? Sqn; Vampire FB.Mk.52; aluminium overall, black codes in Arabic and Persian characters on the boom, behind the national markings:
L155
? Sqn; SA.316C Alouette III, Rayak
Syria
SyAAF
The Syrian Arab Air Force was potentially the second most important Israeli opponent in 1967. In practice, this was not entirely the
case: instead the SyAAF, partially disorganized and poorly led, was thrown out of the battle without having sustained as heavy losses as
Jordan or Egypt, and there is still no clear explanation for this forthcomming from Damascus.
In the timeframe between 1956 and 1967 the SyAAF was developing very differently. In 1956 the SyAAF had only two operational
units, one equipped with Meteor F.Mk.4s, and another with survivors of some 20 Spitfire F.Mk.22s supplied from the UK in the early
1950s. Out of 20 MiG15s and six MiG15UTIs that were delivered for Syria to Egypt shortly before the Suez Crisis, only four survived
the AngloFrench onslaught. By the end of 1956 a program of intensive modernization of the Air Force was started and a total of 60 MiG
17Fs, together with ten Yak11s, ten Yak18s, six Il14s, and ten Mi4s. The first 12 MiG17s arrived in January 1957. Simultaneously, a
group of 20 Syrian pilots was sent to the USSR and 18 to Poland for conversion training. Additional pilots were trained in Syria by Soviet
instructors. The remaining aircraft were delivered by the end of the same year, however, the SyAAF was short of pilots for them all, and
a whole squadron was therefore manned by the Egyptians. As the number of qualified pilots increased, in 1958 a total of three MiG17
units became operational, and the fourth unit – a nightfighter squadron – was then formed and equipped with newlydelivered MiG
17PFs. By the end of the same year an Air College and the Aeronautical Technical Institute – the future Air Academy – were founded at
Minakh AB, near Hallab (Aleppo), where up to 30 new pilots and a similar number of technicians were trained annually, starting on Yak
18s, via Yak11s, to MiG15UTIs, and from 1965 on the first of over 80 L29s eventually acquired by the SyAAF over the next few years.
In 1958 Syria started receiving 40 MiG19S supersonic fighters, and the year later 30 additional MiG15s and the first two Il28 bombers.
Consequently, by May 1961 the SyAAF boasted an inventory of 75 MiG15bis/MiG17F aircraft in six squadrons. However, this number
was soon to decrease considerably: by January 1964 the number of MiG15s and MiG17s fell to only 50, just for example, then there
were numerous accidents while other aircraft were unserviceable for lack of spares or maintenance problems. The fact was, namely,
that on one side the SyAAF lacked sufficient trained personnel, and on the other that a good part of SyAAF officers were rather
interested in the politics than in flying. Frequent purges of officers considered “disloyal” to each new regime caused additional problems,
and the Syrians were therefore very slow to train a new generation of fighter pilots, especially as these were also not trained as
aggressively as their Israeli counterparts.
Nevertheless, by 1962 four additional Il28 bombers were delivered, and a Light Bomber Squadron established. Meanwhile also a
Transport Squadron was in operation, having six each of C47 and Il14 aircraft. By now it became clear that the introduction of the MiG
19 in SyAAF service failed, and confronted with technical difficulties, the Syrians eventually transfered the 30 surviving MiG19s to
Egypt, in 1965, even if the aircraft remained in Syria until October 1975.
The first out of eventual 34 MiG21F13s reached Syria actually before any were delivered to Egypt, and were soon in service with two
units. Due to subsequent political unrests in the country, however, the overal condition of the SyAAF was not to improve: by 1965 the
Syrians had only a total of 30 MiG15s and MiG17s left, only four Il28s and 30 MiG21s, and the readiness of the air force was so low,
that despite all the aircraft barely three squadrons could be considered operational, two of which were flying MiG15s and MiG17s.
Therefore, it was still ultimately important for the air defence of Syria to have two Egyptian MiG19 units based at Dmeyr AB, even if
new orders for 39 MiG21PFs, issued in 1966, were to considerably reinforce the SyAAF.
Soviet, Czech, and East German advisors were present in Syria time and again in the 1960s. One of the Soviet instructors was Grigory
Neljubov. Member of the Soviet cosmonautteam, together with Gagarin and Titov, Neljubov was distanced from the project after
appearing at his base in drunken condition and picking a fight with a guard: due to his refusal to apologise the affair was made official
and public, and Neljubov sent to work as advisor in Syria, before he committed a suicide, in 1966. The influence of foreign instructors
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changed as the regimes in Damascus changed, however, only Egyptians remaining almost permanently influential. Several of their
officers were instrumental in organizing and training Syrian interceptor units. Their impact on the operational capabilities of Syrian MiG
21 units remains unclar, but it is certain that they were often working especially with MiG17units.
Exact details about the camouflage colours, serials and markings of Syrian aircraft in 1967 are very scarce. What is known is given
bellow, but it seems that the SyAAF was somewhat more conscious about camouflaging their aircraft, then at least few Syrian fighters –
foremost the Egyptianflown MiG19s – should have been camouflaged already at the time.
In June 1967 the SyAAF boasted the strength of 35 MiG15s and MiG17s in three squadrons, 60 MiG21F13s and MiG21PFs in four
squadrons, and only two Il28s in a sole light bomber unit.
No. 1 Fighter Squadron, MiG21F13, Tsaikal, Marj Real; bare metal overall, black serial on the forward fuselage: 1073, 2540 etc.
The exact look of this early Syrian MiG21F13 remains unconfirmed, but it supposedly was seen in the national markings
shown here, known to have been used by SyAAF aircraft from 1961 until 1963. Subsequently, red replaced the green fields on
the national colours, while the stars became green instead of red.
No. 3 Night Fighter Squadron, MiG17PF
No. 7 Sqn, MiG21PF (formerly MiG19s), Tsaikal, T.4
No. 8 Fighter Squadron, MiG17F; bare metal overall, black serial in three digits on the top of the fin, the last two repeated large on the
forward fuselage: 939/39, 982/82 etc.
No. 10 Fighter Squadron, MiG17F and MiG21, Dmeyr; in the process of conversion to MiG21
No. 12 Fighter Squadron, MiG15bis and MiG21, Dmeyr; in the process of conversion to MiG21
No. 22 Transport Squadron, Il14, C47, Damascus, Almezzeh;
No. 54 Fighter Squadron, MiG21PF, base unknown, in the process of establishment
No. 77 Fighter Squadron, MiG19S; base unknown;
This was the second Syrian unit known to have operated MiG19s. By 1967 all the Syrian MiG19s should have been under Egyptian
control. Nevertheless, there are reports about actions of SyAAF MiG19pilots during the Six Day War, consequently the exact status of
this unit remains unknown. Syrian MiG19s might have been the first Arab supersonic fighters to have been camouflaged, the only
pictorial evidence from the times around the Six Day War indicating that they were painted Dark Olive and Dark Sand or Light Earth on
upper surfaces, and Light Blue under. Serials were applied in black on the forward fuselage, possibly also in black on the top of the fin:
1103, 1118, 1138
No. ?? Light Bomber Squadron, 2 Il28, T.4 AB
No. ?? Helicopter Squadron, Mi4, Damascus, Almezzeh
The SyAAF losses during the Six Day War were heavy, but – measured on the total number of available aircraft – not as heavy as those
of the Egyptian or Jordanian air forces. Known to have been lost are:
33 MiG21s (including 8 in airtoair combat)
23 MiG17s and MiG15s (3 in airtoair combat)
an unknown number of MiG19s (none in airtoair combat)
2 Il28s
3 Mi4s
Total: 61 aircraft
Last Updated ( Nov 11, 2010 at 09:11 PM )
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