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India, China & NPT

Appendix to information paper Nuclear Power in India
(Updated December 2016)

Both India and China are rapidly increasing their energy, and particularly electricity, use.  They have well-
considered policies to increase dramatically their use of nuclear power to make that electricity.  Both see
nuclear power as an important ingredient of sustainable development.  However, for nearly four decades they
have had very different status internationally regarding nuclear non-proliferation, with China enjoying the
benefits of being party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and India excluded from those benefits,
despite its scrupulous conformity to its principles.

India background
Nuclear power for civil use is well established in India and has been a priority since independence in 1947. In
1948 the Atomic Energy Act was passed, and the Atomic energy Commission set up. Under it, the Department
of Atomic Energy was created in 1954, when the country's 3-stage plan for establishing nuclear power was first
outlined. This plan first employs Pressurised Heavy-Water Reactors (PHWR) fuelled by natural uranium to
generate electricity and produce plutonium as a by-product. Stage 2 plans to use fast breeder reactors burning
the plutonium to breed U-233 from thorium. Stage 3 is to develop this and produce a surplus of fissile material.

India's civil nuclear strategy has been directed towards complete independence in the nuclear fuel cycle,
necessary because it is excluded from the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) due to it acquiring
nuclear weapons capability after 1970. (Those five countries doing so before 1970 were accorded the status
of Nuclear Weapons States under the NPT.)

In May 1974 when India exploded its first nuclear device only 94 states had signed the NPT and fewer (79) had
ratified it. This compares with 190 ratifying states now. After 1974 India was denied nuclear technology by the
Western world. Post 1974, India has been considered a nuclear weapons-capable state – though its military
nuclear program proceeded slowly in the ensuing years and only came fully out of the closet in 1998 when
India conducted several nuclear explosive tests. The rationale for this isolation was largely coercive, to
encourage signature of the NPT by India and the other 80+ states that were non-signatories in 1974. However,
political support within India for its nuclear weapons program has been strong across the political spectrum,
due to distrust of its neighbours China and Pakistan in particular, and this precluded any move to sign the NPT
as a Non-Nuclear Weapons State – the only option open from NPT perspective.

The self-sufficiency engendered by this isolation extends from uranium exploration and mining through fuel
fabrication, heavy water production, reactor design and construction, to reprocessing used fuel ,and waste
management. It has a small fast breeder reactor and is commissioning a much larger one. It is also developing
technology to utilise its abundant resources of thorium as a nuclear fuel.

As of November 2016 India has 18 small and four larger nuclear power reactors in operation and capacity had
reached 6.2 GWe. Four large reactors were under construction, with more planned.  In 2015 nuclear power
contributed 34.6 TWh of electricity – 3.5% of total. Government policy is to have almost 15 GWe of nuclear
capacity operating by 2024, and 25% nuclear contribution is foreseen by 2050.
Led by the USA, India has set up an international agreement which now allows it to import nuclear power
plants and uranium fuel and to put itself more fully under the international safeguards regime without having to
abandon its nuclear weapons. In effect, the aim has been to put it on much the same basis as China with
safeguards and access to trade. In 2014 the Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement with IAEA came
into force.

China contrast
China started its nuclear power program in the 1970s and the industry then moved to a steady development
period. Since about 2005 China has been in a rapid nuclear power development phase, as electricity
consumption grows very rapidly and concerns about air pollution increase.

Most electricity produced in China is supplied by fossil fuels (about 73%, almost all coal) and hydro power
(about 1%). Nuclear power has an important role, especially in the coastal areas remote from the coalfields
and where the economy is developing rapidly.

China exploded its first weapon in 1964, and then in 1970 the NPT came into effect.  Under its terms, China
became recognised as one of the world's five 'weapons states', while India was excluded from such status.

See also: Nuclear power in China paper.

India and China vis a vis the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
India's nuclear weapons program is described by its government as a necessary minimum deterrent in the face
of regional nuclear threats that include a considerably larger Chinese nuclear arsenal as well as Pakistan's
nuclear arms.

While India and China are alike in having large aspirations to produce clean energy in the 21st century using
nuclear power, the two countries occupy quite different positions in relation to the NPT. The difference has
been reduced since 2008.

As mentioned, China exploded its first weapon in 1964, and India did so in 1974. Between those dates, in 1970
the NPT came into effect. Under its terms, China became recognised as one of the world's five 'weapon states',
and India was excluded from such status.

For its part, India was left with the choice of remaining outside the NPT or relinquishing any possibility of
maintaining even a minimal nuclear deterrent. In the light of perceived strategic challenges from both China
and Pakistan, India chose a nuclear deterrent. However, it has been scrupulous in ensuring that its weapons
material and technology are guarded against commercial or illicit export to other countries. Pakistan has been
conspicuously unscrupulous, and China has been sometimes unduly flexible.

Meanwhile, international efforts to build a stronger non-proliferation regime had the effect of penalising India
harshly.

The NPT itself requires only that internationally-traded nuclear material and technology be safeguarded - a
condition that India has continually made clear it is willing to accept, even though it declines to disarm and join
the NPT as a "non-weapon-state". However, in 1992, in an effort to induce expanded participation in the NPT,
the informal 'club' of nations called the Nuclear Suppliers Group decided – as a matter of policy, not law – to
prohibit all nuclear commerce with nations that have not agreed to full-scope safeguards. This precondition
effectively required countries to join the NPT as non-weapon-states if they were to participate in nuclear
commerce.

As a practical matter, this left India as a pariah in the world of nuclear commerce. India's response has been to
intensify its embrace of the ethos of self-reliance as it continued its dual policy of maintaining a small nuclear
deterrent while pursuing peaceful nuclear power on an ever-larger scale.

In October 2002 – while India was hosting a major conference of signatories to the International Framework
Convention on Climate Change – the Indian Prime Minister called for a rational review of global non-
proliferation policy. Specifically, he asked the international community to:

• Focus on clandestine and illegal development and transfer of missile and nuclear technology;
 • Recognise that India's indigenous nuclear weapons program provides nothing more than a "minimum
credible deterrent" that is necessary for its regional security and that India has not contributed to
nuclear proliferation beyond its borders;
• Note the global environmental importance of India's civil nuclear power program and co-operate with it,
using safeguards to ensure that all traded material is used for peaceful purposes; and
• End its hypocrisy in relation to the Kyoto Protocol on climate change. ("It is truly ironic that we are
lectured on our moral obligations to clamp down on emissions while being denied international
technology co-operation.")

US initiatives and international moves to affirm India

In March 2006 India and the USA signed an agreement designed to put India on the same basis as China in
relation to international trade in nuclear technology and materials. The agreement was finalised in July 2007,
opening the way for India's participation in international commerce in nuclear fuel and equipment and requiring
India to put most of the country's nuclear power reactors under IAEA safeguards and close down the CIRUS
research reactor by 2010. It would allow India to reprocess US-origin and other foreign-sourced nuclear fuel at
a new national plant under IAEA safeguards. This would be for used fuel arising from those 14 reactors
designated as unambiguously civilian and under full IAEA safeguards.

The IAEA Director General welcomed the agreement in 2006 as "an important step towards satisfying India's
growing need for energy, including nuclear technology and fuel, as an engine for development." At the same
time "It would also bring India closer as an important partner in the non-proliferation regime," he said. "It would
also be a step towards the universalization of the of the international safeguards regime" and "timely for
ongoing efforts to consolidate the non-proliferation regime, combat nuclear terrorism and strengthen nuclear
safety."

After much delay in India's parliament, it then set up a new and comprehensive safeguards agreement with the
IAEA, plus an Additional Protocol. The IAEA board approved this in July 2008, after the agreement had
threatened to bring down the Indian government. The agreement is similar to those between IAEA and non
nuclear weapons states, notably Infcirc-66, the IAEA's information circular that lays out procedures for
applying facility-specific safeguards, hence much more restrictive than many in India's parliament wanted.

The next step in bringing India into the fold was the consensus resolution of the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG) in September 2008 to exempt India from its rule of prohibiting trade with non-members of the
NPT. A bilateral trade agreement then went to US Congress for final approval. Similar agreements will apply
with Russia and France. The ultimate objective is to put India on the same footing as China in respect to
responsibilities and trade opportunities, though it has had to accept much tighter international controls than
other nuclear-armed countries.

The introduction to India's safeguards agreement says that India's access to assured supplies of fresh fuel is
an "essential basis" for New Delhi's acceptance of IAEA safeguards on some of its reactors and that India has
a right to take "corrective measures to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the
event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies." But the introduction also says that India will "provide assurance
against withdrawal of safeguarded nuclear material from civilian use at any time." In the course of NSG
deliberations India also gave assurances regarding weapons testing.

In October 2008 US Congress passed the bill allowing civil nuclear trade with India, and a nuclear trade
agreement was signed with France. The 2008 agreements ended 34 years of trade isolation on nuclear
materials and technology.

India's safeguards agreement was signed early in 2009, though the timeframe for bringing the extra reactors
(Kakrapar 1&2 and Narora 1&2, beyond Tarapur 1&2, Rawatbhata 1-6 and Kudankulam 1&2) under safeguards
still had to be finalised. The Additional Protocol to the safeguards agreement was agreed by the IAEA Board in
March 2009, and signed by India in May 2009. The decision to ratify was announced under the new
government in June 2014, with 20 facilities listed, including six at the Nuclear Fuel Complex, Hyderabad and
two stores at Tarapur, plus 12 reactors. Narora 1&2 were not listed by then, being due to come under
safeguards at the end of 2014. The Additional Protocol came into force on 25 July 2014, giving the IAEA
enhanced access to India’s civil power facilities.
When the 2006 agreement was reached, India had 15 operating nuclear power reactors plus eight more under
construction, one of them a fast-breeder reactor. It also then had five operating research reactors – two very
large ones – apparently run as military plutonium producers, and one a 40 MWt fast-breeder. The large CIRUS
research reactor was closed and decommissioned at the end of 2010. The two fast-breeder units would be
excluded from safeguards, but future "civil" fast breeders would be included. Of the 2006 current reactors and
those under construction, 14 would be covered by safeguards. At present 12 units are under safeguards,
including two foreign-supplied ones under arrangements predating the NPT.

Pakistan has indicated a desire for a similar agreement, with China if not the USA, but both the Nuclear
Suppliers Group and the USA said that they would not relax trade rules for Pakistan in the light of its track
record. India's record of avoiding any export of nuclear material or technology is consistent with Article 1 of the
NPT, and stands in sharp contrast to Pakistan's role as a wholesale proliferator contributing to the failure of
Iran, Libya and North Korea to abide by their NPT commitments.

The US initiative with IAEA support and accepted by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, has the practical effect of
making India a sixth nuclear weapons state alongside, if not eventually within, the NPT system. This will
involve both benefits and responsibilities.

Sources:
Dr A.Kakodkar, paper at WNA Symposium 2002.
A B Vajpayee in India Express 31/10/02.
A.Gopalakrishnan, 2002, Evolution of the Indian Nuclear Power Program, Ann Review Energy Environment
27:369-395.

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