SAFETY & FIRE FIGHTING

 Safety and Risks of LNG Transportation

All the dangers coming from the use of LNG shows that a
special precaution measures must be taken to avoid unwanted
results. At a design level in order to avoid cryogenic damage
the exposure of pipes and couplings must be reduced and an
effort must be done to eliminate risk for damage or injury in
case of small leakage.
Also the length of bunkering lines must be reduced to minimize
air emissions. Gas detection system must be installed in areas
with possible leakages such as re-liquefaction plant,
instrumentation and control. The system must be in working
condition during burning operations. Such system are flame
screens fitted in the supply line. Pressure levels in tanks must
be constantly monitored. All the supply lines must be purged
with inert gas before and during burning operations.
Ventilation must be installed and be in operation in re-
liquefaction plant space, machinery space and near un trunked
gas piping. The all systems of safety must be constantly
checked and maintained, and the crucial systems twice. All
piping must be checked for any leakages. Handling of safety
systems requires special education for the crew. All the
incidents, even trivial must be reported to responsible officer

 Safety level of LNG handling

The most severe accident that may realistically occur on a

loaded LNG tanker is the breach of one or more storage tanks,
with consequent discharge of liquefied natural gas outboard.
Fortunately, no accidents leading to loss of cargo have
occurred over the history of maritime liquefied natural gas
transportation. Even when a submarine emerged directly
under LNG carrier, no leakage occurred, although the bottom
was damaged.

According to more conservative review, LNG carriers are less

incident-prone than oil-carriers, and the incidents happened
with LNG carriers are rarely related to cargo. That's incredible
difference with LNG shore facilities where a great number of
accidents has occurred even with hundreds of dead. This fact
is owed to special design of LNG: double hull of LNG tanks and
separation between LNG tank and inner tank. This means that
a possible penetration has to overcome at least three barriers
before the LNG is released. Also LNG carriers are high-tech
ships, using special materials and designs to handle safely the
very cold LNG. Ships plans are carefully examined before final
approval, and these ships are inspected during construction
and are periodically inspected after completion.
LNG Incidents and LNG safety - LNG Incidents Started with
the first vessel load of LNG by marine vessels. The number of
LNG accidents is remarkably small.
It is Consequence of a “Culture of Safety.” Culture must
transfer to bunkering segment of the industry.

LNG safety: Bunkering operations considered LNG transfers. It

is not simply a fueling operation. SAFETY is of primary
importance & specialty business with a limited number of
participants and an impeccable safety record. Recent growth
has added a number of new participants with limited LNG
experience.

LNG as a marine fuel requires that all industry participants

adopt the LNG safety culture. To the media any incident is not
a bunker spill – “IT IS AN LNG ACCIDENT!!”

 Potential LNG Fuel Accidents

 Spills from
 Transfer piping
 Storage tank
  Vessel holding tanks
 LNG explosive vapor: visible or flameless
 Fire from spills: ranges beyond accident area
 Terrorism

 Fire detection
On ships, the only mandatory requirement for fire detection
equipment in the cargo area is the fusible elements specified in the
Gas Codes.
These have to be fitted in the vicinity of tank domes and at cargo
manifolds.
The fusible elements provide for the automatic cargo shut-down in
the event of fire. However, many modern ships have fire
detectors installed in motor rooms and compressor rooms.
In terminals, where storage tank and miscellaneous plant are
diversely located, fire detection equipment is extensively provided.
Typical locations are electrical control rooms, boil-off gas compressor
houses and at cargo pumps.
Cargo-related fires may be broadly categorised as follows:—
• Jet fires from leaks at pumps or pipelines
• Fires from confined liquid pools
• Fire, from unconfined spillages, and
• Fires in enclosed spaces, such as compressor rooms

• Types of LNG Fires:

 Flash Fire/Vapor Cloud Fire
 Jet
 Pool
 BLEVE
 Rapid Phase Transition?
• Pool Fire:
 Accumulated liquid from spill:
 Unlikely to occur on deck of ship.
 On shore, liquid can pool into large quantities.
 Contain the pool to preventspreading.
 If vapor is present, it may ignite and create a pool fire
• BLEVE:
Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion
Associated with storage of liquefied gas in pressurized containers (tanks)

 Jet fires
Small leaks from pump glands, pipe flanges or from vent risers will
initially produce vapour. This vapour will not ignite spontaneously but,
if the escape is large, there may be a risk of the vapour cloud
spreading to a source of ignition. Should a gas cloud
occur, ignition should be prevented by closing all openings to
hazardous areas.
Furthermore, the vapour cloud should be directed or dispersed away
from ignition sources by means of fixed or mobile water sprays (see
10.3.2). If ignition does occur, it will almost certainly flash back to the
leak. Leaks from pipelines are likely to be under pressure and, if
ignited, will give rise to a jet flame. Emergency shut-down of pumping
systems and closure of ESD valves should have already occurred
but, even so,
pressure may persist in a closed pipeline until the liquid trapped
within has been expelled through the leak. In such a case the best
course of action is often to allow the fire to burn out. The alternative
of extinguishing the fire has a high risk of further vapour cloud
production and flash-back causing re-ignition. While the fire is being
allowed to burn itself out, the surroundings should be protected with
cooling water.
Dry powder :
Dry powder is provided both in large fixed installations and
portable extinguishers. Any part of the deck can be reached
by at least two hoses from the fixed installations.

Water extinguishing :
Water is not a suitable medium for fighting an LNG fire directly
as it will cause a massive expansion of the fire, through an
increase in the rate of vaporisation of the liquid to gaseous
state. Water is however essential as a cooling medium for the
area surrounding an LNG fire and to protect personnel who
may need to approach the site. Water is also essential for
protecting steel work from the effects of extreme cold in the
event of a liquid spill.

CO2 :
A CO2 extinguisher system is available for cargo compressor
rooms, electric motor rooms, inert gas dryer room and on
some ships cargo control room. Ships plans should be
consulted for what is applicable to the concerned vessel.

How to tackle LNG fire ?

The rapid vaporisation of any exposed LNG prevents any
ignition of the liquid itself and an LNG fire is thus a cold vapour
fire.
Ignition of a flammable mixture of natural gas vapour requires
a spark of similar ignition energy as would ignite other
hydrocarbon vapours. The auto-ignition temperature of
methane in air (650°C) is higher than other hydrocarbons.
Electrostatic ignition of LNG is not a hazard during normal
operations. This is because the permanent, positive pressure in
LNG tanks maintained by gas boil-off prevents air entering
these spaces to form flammable mixtures in tanks or lines.

The velocity of propagation of a flame is lower in methane than

nearly all other hydrocarbons. Unless ignition occurs during the
initial rapid vaporisation period, it is most unlikely that any
flash will accompany an ignition. The term ‘lazy flame’ has
been aptly used to describe the spreading characteristics of an
LNG fire.
 Alarm procedures
Each gas ship and terminal should have fire-fighting plans and
muster lists prominently displayed. These should be carefully read
and understood by all personnel. As a general guide, when a liquid
gas fire occurs, the correct procedure to adopt is as
follows:—
• Raise the alarm
• Assess the fire’s source and extent, and if personnel are at risk
• Implement the emergency plan
• Stop the spread of the fire by isolating the source of fuel
• Cool surfaces under radiation or flame impingement with water, and
• Extinguish the fire with appropriate equipment or, if this is not
possible or desirable, control the spread of the fire as above
 The emergency plan
An emergency can occur at any time and in any situation. Effective
action is only possible if pre-planned and practical procedures have
been developed and are frequently
exercised. When cargo is being transferred, the ship and shore
become a combined operational unit and it is during this operation
that the greatest overall risk arises. In this respect,
the cargo connection is probably the most vulnerable area.
The objective of an emergency plan to cover cargo transfer
operations should be to make maximum use of the resources of the
ship, the terminal and local authority services. The plan should be
directed at achieving the following aims:—
• Rescuing and treating casualties
• Safeguarding others
• Minimising damage to property and the environment, and
• Bringing the incident under control
Attention is drawn to References 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7 where these
aspects are discussed
fully from both the ship and terminal perspectives.
 Incident plans
In developing plans for dealing with incidents, the following scenarios
should be considered:
• Checks for missing or trapped personnel
• Collision
• Grounding
• Water leakage into a hold or inter barrier space
• Cargo containment leakage
• Cargo connection rupture, pipeline fracture or cargo spillage
• Lifting of a cargo system relief valve
• Fire in non-cargo areas
• Fire following leakage of cargo
• Fire in a compressor or motor room