Rule 65 Cases

Supreme Court of the Philippines
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 173861, July 14, 2014
JAY CANDELARIA AND ERIC BASIT, PETITIONERS, VS. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 42, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, (PAMPANGA) REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDING
JUDGE HON. MARIA AMIFAITH S. FIDER-REYES, OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL
PROSECUTOR, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA AND ALLIED DOMECQ
PHILIPPINES, INC., RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
In this Petition for Certiorari with Application for Preliminary Injunction[1] filed under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, petitioners Jay Candelaria and Eric Basit (petitioners) seek to nullify and
set aside two Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 42, City of San Fernando,
Pampanga, to wit: Order dated October 12, 2005[2] denying their Motion to Suppress/Exclude
Evidence[3] and Order dated July 14, 2006[4] denying their Motion for Reconsideration[5] thereto.
Factual Antecedents
During an alleged buy-bust operation conducted in the evening of June 22, 2001, petitioners
were arrested at the corner of Gueco St. and MacArthur Highway, Balibago, Angeles City for
delivering, with the intention to sell, five cases of counterfeit Fundador Brandy. On the strength
of the Joint Affidavit[6] of the police operatives, petitioners were formally charged in an
Information[7] dated July 6, 2004 with violation of Section 155 in relation to Section 170 of
Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines.
After they were arraigned and had pleaded not guilty to the charge on May 31, 2005,[8]
petitioners filed on June 17, 2005 a Motion to Suppress/Exclude Evidence[9] based on
inadmissibility of evidence. They contended that the evidence the prosecution intended to
present were obtained in violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures. This is considering that at the time the alleged counterfeit products were seized, they
were neither committing nor attempting to commit a crime in the presence of the arresting
officers as to justify the conduct of search and seizure following their unlawful arrest.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On October 12, 2005, the RTC issued the first assailed Order[10] denying the Motion to
Suppress/Exclude Evidence. Observing that the motion was anchored on petitioners’ alleged
illegal arrest, it cited jurisprudence[11] wherein it was held that any objection to an arrest must be
made before an accused enters his plea on arraignment. Having failed to move for the quashal of
the information before the arraignment, an accused is estopped from questioning the legality of
his arrest. Notwithstanding this reference, the RTC based its denial of the subject motion on its
examination of the Joint Affidavit of the arresting officers. According to the said court, since it
appears from the said affidavit that the search and seizure was incidental to a valid warrantless
arrest of the accused who were caught in flagrante delicto, any evidence obtained during such
search and seizure is admissible in evidence.
Not satisfied, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[12] which the RTC denied in its
assailed Order[13] of July 14, 2006.
Issue
Hence, the present recourse under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, anchored on the sole ground of:
WHETHER X X X THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 42 OF THE CITY OF SAN

FERNANDO, PAMPANGA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING THE MOTION OF
THE PETITIONERS TO SET THE CASE FOR SUPPRESSION HEARING.[14]
The Petition is bereft of merit.
Petitioners failed to allege that

there is no appeal nor any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.
It is to be stressed that in every special civil action under Rule 65, a party seeking the writ
whether for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, must be able to show that his or her resort to
such extraordinary remedy is justified by the absence of an appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. “[H]e must allege in his petition and establish
facts to show that any other existing remedy is not speedy or adequate x x x.”[15] As held in Visca
v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources:[16]
x x x [I]t is incumbent upon an applicant for a writ of certiorari to allege with certainty in his
verified petition facts showing that “there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law,” because this is an indispensable ingredient of a valid
petition for certiorari. “Being a special civil action, petitioner-appellant must allege and prove
that he has no other speedy and adequate remedy.” “Where the existence of a remedy by appeal
or some other plain, speedy and adequate remedy precludes the granting of the writ, the
petitioner must allege facts showing that any existing remedy is impossible or unavailing, or that
excuse petitioner for not having availed himself of such remedy. A petition for certiorari which
does not comply with the requirements of the rules may be dismissed.[17]
Pursuant to the foregoing, the instant Petition for Certiorari is dismissible for failure to allege
that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
as to justify resort to certiorari.
Assuming the assailed October 12, 2005

Order to be erroneous, the mistake is an
error in judgment which is beyond the
ambit of certiorari.
In Triplex Enterprises, Inc. v. PNB-Republic Bank,[18] the Court held that:
The writ of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower court
or quasi-judicial body is wholly void. Moreover, it is designed to correct errors of jurisdiction
and not errors in judgment. The rationale of this rule is that, when a court exercises its
jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being
exercised when the error is committed. Otherwise, every mistake made by a court will deprive it
of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment will be a void judgment.
When the court has jurisdiction over the case and person of the defendant, any mistake in the
application of the law and the appreciation of evidence committed by a court may be corrected
only by appeal. The determination made by the trial court regarding the admissibility of evidence
is but an exercise of its jurisdiction and whatever fault it may have perpetrated in making such a
determination is an error in judgment, not of jurisdiction. Hence, settled is the rule that rulings of
the trial court on procedural questions and on admissibility of evidence during the course of a
trial are interlocutory in nature and may not be the subject of a separate appeal or review on
certiorari. They must be assigned as errors and reviewed in the appeal properly taken from the
decision rendered by the trial court on the merits of the case.[19]
Here, it is undisputed that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case and the person of the
petitioners. As such, any perceived error in its interpretation of the law and its assessment of
evidence is correctible by appeal, not certiorari, as the same would only be considered an error
of judgment and not of jurisdiction. In particular, the RTC’s denial of the Motion to
Suppress/Exclude Evidence based on its assessment that the evidence sought to be
suppressed/excluded is admissible, was done in the proper exercise of its jurisdiction. Assuming
that the RTC’s determination is erroneous, the mistake is clearly not an error of jurisdiction but
of judgment which is not correctible by certiorari.
No grave abuse of discretion.
Even assuming that petitioners’ resort of certiorari is proper, the Petition must still be dismissed
for their failure to show that the RTC acted in grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack of
jurisdiction. “Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on
the part of the public officer concerned which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction.
The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty
or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility.”[20]
In this case, petitioners miserably failed to show how the RTC supposedly abused its discretion.
In fact, we note that the main issue raised by petitioners in their Petition is when is the proper
time to file a motion to suppress/exclude evidence.[21] They even conceded that this is a pure
question of law.[22]
In any case, our perusal of the records shows that the RTC did not abuse, much more, gravely
abuse its discretion. The RTC thoroughly considered the pleadings submitted by the parties, to
wit: Motion to Suppress/Exclude Evidence; Opposition (to the Motion to Suppress Evidence);
Reply; Rejoinder; and Sur-Rejoinder; as well as the Joint affidavit submitted by the arresting
officers. Only after a careful analysis of the submissions of the parties did the RTC render its
judgment.
Petitioners violated the principle

of hierarchy of courts.
It also did not escape our attention that from the RTC, petitioners made a direct recourse to this
Court. This is against the well-settled principle dictating that a petition for certiorari assailing
the interlocutory orders of the RTC should be filed with the Court of Appeals and not directly
with the Supreme Court. It was held in Rayos v. City of Manila[23] that:
Indeed, this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts exercise concurrent
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus
and injunction. However, such concurrence in jurisdiction does not give petitioners unbridled
freedom of choice of court forum. In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, citing People v.
Cuaresma, the Court held:
This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by
this Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of
jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an
absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be
directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue
of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that
petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (“inferior”) courts should be
filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A
direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be
allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to
prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to
those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the
Court’s docket.[24]
Clearly, a direct invocation of this Court’s original jurisdiction may only be allowed if there are
special and important reasons clearly and specifically set out in the petition which, however, are
not obtaining in this case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
*
Per Special Order No. 1712 dated June 23, 2014.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 3-21.
[2]
Records, Vol. 1, pp. 183-185; penned by Acting Judge Divina Luz P. Aquino-Simbulan.
[3]
Id. at 118-127.
[4]
Id. at 303-306; penned by Presiding Judge Maria Amifaith S. Fider-Reyes.
[5]
Id. at 239-247.
[6]
Id. at 35-36.
[7]
Id. at 1-2. The accusatory part reads:
That on or about the 22nd day of June, 2001, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually aiding [and] abetting one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously use in commerce, without the consent of Pedro Domecq, S.A., the owner of duly
registered FUNDADOR trademark, a reproduction, copy, counterfeit, or colorable imitation of
said FUNDADOR trademark in connection with [their] sale and/or offering for sale of the
following counterfeit FUNDADOR products: five (5) cases (each case containing 12 bottles) of
counterfeit Fundador Brandy worth P2,160.00 per case and which use is likely to cause
confusion or to cause mistake or deceive the consuming public, to the damage and prejudice of
PEDRO DOMECQ, S.A.
Contrary to law.
[8]
Id. at 108.
[9]
Id. at 118-127.
[10]
Id. at 183-185.
[11]
People v. Tampis, 455 Phil. 371, 382 (2003).
[12]
Records, Vol. 1, pp. 239-247.
[13]
Id. at 303-306.
[14]
Rollo, p. 10.
[15]
Lee v. People, 483 Phil. 684, 699 (2004).
[16]
255 Phil. 213 (1989).
[17]
Id. at 216-217; italics in the original; citations omitted.
[18]
527 Phil. 685 (2006).
[19]
Id. at 690-691.
[20]
Singian, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 195011-19, September 30, 2013. Citation omitted.
[21]
Rollo, p. 11.
[22]
Id.
[23]
G.R. No. 196063, December 14, 2011, 662 SCRA 684.
[24]
Id. at 689; emphasis and italics in the original; citations omitted.
Copyright 2016 - Batas.org
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 211356, September 29, 2014
CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO, PETITIONER, VS. MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY, AKLAN,

REPRESENTED BY HON. MAYOR JOHN P. YAP, SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MALAY,
AKLAN, REPRESENTED BY HON. EZEL FLORES, DANTE PASUGUIRON, ROWEN
AGUIRRE, WILBEC GELITO, JUPITER GALLENERO, OFFICE OF THE MUNICIPAL
ENGINEER, OFFICE OF THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER, BORACAY PNP CHIEF,
BORACAY FOUNDATION, INC., REPRESENTED BY NENETTE GRAF, MUNICIPAL
AUXILIARY POLICE, AND JOHN AND JANE DOES, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
VELASCO JR., J.:
Nature of the Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari challenging the Decision[1] and the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 120042 dated August 13, 2013 and
February 3, 2014, respectively. The assailed rulings denied Crisostomo Aquino’s Petition for
Certiorari for not being the proper remedy to question the issuance and implementation of
Executive Order No. 10, Series of 2011 (EO 10), ordering the demolition of his hotel
establishment.
The Facts
Petitioner is the president and chief executive officer of Boracay Island West Cove Management
Philippines, Inc. (Boracay West Cove). On January 7, 2010, the company applied for a zoning
compliance with the municipal government of Malay, Aklan.[2] While the company was already
operating a resort in the area, the application sought the issuance of a building permit covering
the construction of a three-storey hotel over a parcel of land measuring 998 sqm. located in Sitio
Diniwid, Barangay Balagab, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan, which is covered by a Forest Land
Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT) issued by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) in favor of Boracay West Cove.
Through a Decision on Zoning dated January 20, 2010, the Municipal Zoning Administrator
denied petitioner’s application on the ground that the proposed construction site was within the
“no build zone” demarcated in Municipal Ordinance 2000-131 (Ordinance).[3] As provided in the
Ordinance:
SECTION 2. – Definition of Terms. As used in this Ordinance, the following words, terms and
phrases shall mean as follows:
xxxx
(b) No Build Zone – the space twenty-five (25) meters from the edge of the mean high water
mark measured inland;
xxxx
SECTION 3. – No building or structure of any kind whether temporary or permanent shall be

allowed to be set up, erected or constructed on the beaches around the Island of Boracay and in
its offshore waters. During the conduct of special activities or special events, the Sangguniang
Bayan may, through a Resolution, authorize the Office of the Mayor to issue Special Permits for
construction of temporary structures on the beach for the duration of the special activity as
embodied in the Resolution.
In due time, petitioner appealed the denial action to the Office of the Mayor on February 1, 2010.
On May 13, 2010, petitioner followed up his appeal through a letter but no action was ever taken
by the respondent mayor. On April 5, 2011, however, a Notice of Assessment was sent to
petitioner asking for the settlement of Boracay West Cove’s unpaid taxes and other liabilities
under pain of a recommendation for closure in view of its continuous commercial operation since
2009 sans the necessary zoning clearance, building permit, and business and mayor’s permit. In
reply, petitioner expressed willingness to settle the company’s obligations, but the municipal
treasurer refused to accept the tendered payment. Meanwhile, petitioner continued with the
construction, expansion, and operation of the resort hotel.
Subsequently, on March 28, 2011, a Cease and Desist Order was issued by the municipal
government, enjoining the expansion of the resort, and on June 7, 2011, the Office of the Mayor
of Malay, Aklan issued the assailed EO 10, ordering the closure and demolition of Boracay West
Cove’s hotel.
EO 10 was partially implemented on June 10, 2011. Thereafter, two more instances followed
wherein respondents demolished the improvements introduced by Boracay West Cove, the most
recent of which was made in February 2014.
Alleging that the order was issued and executed with grave abuse of discretion, petitioner filed a
Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief with the CA. He argued that judicial
proceedings should first be conducted before the respondent mayor could order the demolition of
the company’s establishment; that Boracay West Cove was granted a FLAgT by the DENR,
which bestowed the company the right to construct permanent improvements on the area in
question; that since the area is a forestland, it is the DENR—and not the municipality of Malay,
or any other local government unit for that matter—that has primary jurisdiction over the area,
and that the Regional Executive Director of DENR-Region 6 had officially issued an opinion
regarding the legal issues involved in the present case; that the Ordinance admits of exceptions;
and lastly, that it is the mayor who should be blamed for not issuing the necessary clearances in
the company’s favor.
In rebuttal, respondents contended that the FLAgT does not excuse the company from complying
with the Ordinance and Presidential Decree No. 1096 (PD 1096), otherwise known as the
National Building Code of the Philippines. Respondents also argued that the demolition needed
no court order because the municipal mayor has the express power under the Local Government
Code (LGC) to order the removal of illegally constructed buildings.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its assailed Decision dated August 13, 2013, the CA dismissed the petition solely on
procedural ground, i.e., the special writ of certiorari can only be directed against a tribunal,
board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions and since the issuance of EO 10
was done in the exercise of executive functions, and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions,
certiorari will not lie. Instead, the proper remedy for the petitioner, according to the CA, is to file
a petition for declaratory relief with the Regional Trial Court.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but this was denied by the CA on February 3, 2014 through the
challenged Resolution. Hence, the instant petition raising arguments on both procedure and
substance.
The Issues
Stripped to the essentials, the pivotal issues in the extant case are as follows:
1. The propriety under the premises of the filing of a petition for certiorari instead of a
petition for declaratory relief;
a. Whether or not declaratory relief is still available to petitioner;

b. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the respondent mayor was performing
neither a judicial nor quasi-judicial function when he ordered the closure and
demolition of Boracay West Cove’s hotel;
2. Whether or not respondent mayor committed grave abuse of discretion when he

issued EO 10;
a. Whether or not petitioner’s right to due process was violated when the respondent
mayor ordered the closure and demolition of Boracay West Cove’s hotel without
first conducting judicial proceedings;
b. Whether or not the LGU’s refusal to issue petitioner the necessary building permit
and clearances was justified;
c. Whether or not petitioner’s rights under the FLAgT prevail over the municipal
ordinance providing for a no-build zone; and
d. Whether or not the DENR has primary jurisdiction over the controversy, not the
LGU.
The Court’s Ruling
We deny the petition.
Certiorari, not declaratory relief, is the proper remedy
a. Declaratory relief no longer viable
Resolving first the procedural aspect of the case, We find merit in petitioner’s contention that the
special writ of certiorari, and not declaratory relief, is the proper remedy for assailing EO 10. As
provided under Sec. 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court:
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring
an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or
validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder. x x x (emphasis added)
An action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the
instruments involved or of the rights arising thereunder. Since the purpose of an action for
declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the
parties under a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or
compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be
entertained before the breach or violation of the statute, deed or contract to which it refers. A
petition for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for ending controversies that have not
reached the state where another relief is immediately available; and supplies the need for a form
of action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation of obligations, an
invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs.[4]
In the case at bar, the petition for declaratory relief became unavailable by EO 10’s enforcement
and implementation. The closure and demolition of the hotel rendered futile any possible
guidelines that may be issued by the trial court for carrying out the directives in the challenged
EO 10. Indubitably, the CA erred when it ruled that declaratory relief is the proper remedy given
such a situation.
b. Petitioner correctly resorted to certiorari
On the propriety of filing a petition for certiorari, Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer,
and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. x x x
For certiorari to prosper, the petitioner must establish the concurrence of the following requisites,
namely:
1. The writ is directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions;
2. Such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
3. There is no appeal or any plain speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.[5]
Guilty of reiteration, the CA immediately dismissed the Petition for Certiorari upon determining
that the first element is wanting—that respondent mayor was allegedly not exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions when he issued EO 10.
We are not persuaded.
The CA fell into a trap when it ruled that a mayor, an officer from the executive department,
exercises an executive function whenever he issues an Executive Order. This is tad too
presumptive for it is the nature of the act to be performed, rather than of the office, board, or
body which performs it, that determines whether or not a particular act is a discharge of judicial
or quasi-judicial functions. The first requirement for certiorari is satisfied if the officers act
judicially in making their decision, whatever may be their public character.[6]
It is not essential that the challenged proceedings should be strictly and technically judicial, in
the sense in which that word is used when applied to courts of justice, but it is sufficient if they
are quasi-judicial.[7] To contrast, a party is said to be exercising a judicial function where he has
the power to determine what the law is and what legal rights of the parties are, and then
undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties, whereas
quasi-judicial function is “a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc., of public
administrative officers or bodies x x x required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of
facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to
exercise discretion of a judicial nature.”[8]
In the case at bench, the assailed EO 10 was issued upon the respondent mayor’s finding that
Boracay West Cove’s construction, expansion, and operation of its hotel in Malay, Aklan is
illegal. Such a finding of illegality required the respondent mayor’s exercise of quasi-judicial
functions, against which the special writ of certiorari may lie. Apropos hereto is Our ruling in
City Engineer of Baguio v. Baniqued:[9]
There is no gainsaying that a city mayor is an executive official nor is the matter of issuing
demolition notices or orders not a ministerial one. In determining whether or not a structure is
illegal or it should be demolished, property rights are involved thereby needing notices and
opportunity to be heard as provided for in the constitutionally guaranteed right of due
process. In pursuit of these functions, the city mayor has to exercise quasi-judicial powers.
With the foregoing discussion, the CA erred in ruling that the respondent mayor was merely
exercising his executive functions, for clearly, the first requisite for the special writ has been
satisfied.
Aside from the first requisite, We likewise hold that the third element, i.e., the unavailability of a
plain, speedy, or adequate remedy, is also present herein. While it may be argued that, under the
LGC, Executive Orders issued by mayors are subject to review by provincial governors,[10] this
cannot be considered as an adequate remedy given the exigencies of petitioner’s predicament.
In a litany of cases, We have held that it is inadequacy, not the mere absence of all other legal
remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must usually determine the
propriety of certiorari. A remedy is plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the
petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or
agency. It is understood, then, that a litigant need not mark time by resorting to the less speedy
remedy of appeal in order to have an order annulled and set aside for being patently void for
failure of the trial court to comply with the Rules of Court.[11]
Before applying this doctrine, it must first be borne in mind that respondents in this case have
already taken measures towards implementing EO 10. In fact, substantial segments of the hotel
have already been demolished pursuant to the mayor’s directive. It is then understandable why
petitioner prayed for the issuance of an injunctive writ––a provisional remedy that would
otherwise have been unavailable had he sought a reversal from the office of the provincial
governor of Aklan. Evidently, petitioner correctly saw the urgent need for judicial intervention
via certiorari.
In light of the foregoing, the CA should have proceeded to grab the bull by its horns and
determine the existence of the second element of certiorari––whether or not there was grave
abuse of discretion on the part of respondents.
Upon Our finding that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the appropriate remedy, We will
proceed to resolve the core issues in view of the urgency of the reliefs prayed for in the petition.
Respondents did not commit grave abuse of discretion
a. The hotel’s classification as a nuisance
Article 694 of the Civil Code defines “nuisance” as any act, omission, establishment, business,
condition or property, or anything else that (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of others;
(2) annoys or offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; (4)
obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of
water; or (5) hinders or impairs the use of property.[12]
In establishing a no build zone through local legislation, the LGU effectively made a
determination that constructions therein, without first securing exemptions from the local
council, qualify as nuisances for they pose a threat to public safety. No build zones are intended
for the protection of the public because the stability of the ground’s foundation is adversely
affected by the nearby body of water. The ever present threat of high rising storm surges also
justifies the ban on permanent constructions near the shoreline. Indeed, the area’s exposure to
potential geo-hazards cannot be ignored and ample protection to the residents of Malay, Aklan
should be afforded.
Challenging the validity of the public respondents’ actuations, petitioner posits that the hotel
cannot summarily be abated because it is not a nuisance per se, given the hundred million peso-
worth of capital infused in the venture. Citing Asilo, Jr. v. People,[13] petitioner also argues that
respondents should have first secured a court order before proceeding with the demolition.
Preliminarily, We agree with petitioner’s posture that the property involved cannot be classified
as a nuisance per se, but not for the reason he so offers. Property valuation, after all, is not the
litmus test for such a determination. More controlling is the property’s nature and conditions,
which should be evaluated to see if it qualifies as a nuisance as defined under the law.
As jurisprudence elucidates, nuisances are of two kinds: nuisance per se and nuisance per
accidens. The first is recognized as a nuisance under any and all circumstances, because it
constitutes a direct menace to public health or safety, and, for that reason, may be abated
summarily under the undefined law of necessity. The second is that which depends upon certain
conditions and circumstances, and its existence being a question of fact, it cannot be abated
without due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing does in law
constitute a nuisance.[14]
In the case at bar, the hotel, in itself, cannot be considered as a nuisance per se since this type of
nuisance is generally defined as an act, occupation, or structure, which is a nuisance at all
times and under any circumstances, regardless of location or surrounding.[15] Here, it is merely
the hotel’s particular incident––its location––and not its inherent qualities that rendered it a
nuisance. Otherwise stated, had it not been constructed in the no build zone, Boracay West Cove
could have secured the necessary permits without issue. As such, petitioner is correct that the
hotel is not a nuisance per se, but to Our mind, it is still a nuisance per accidens.
b. Respondent mayor has the power to order the demolition of illegal constructions
Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless such a thing is
a nuisance per se.[16] So it was held in AC Enterprises v. Frabelle Properties Corp:[17]
We agree with petitioner’s contention that, under Section 447(a)(3)(i) of R.A. No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Panglungsod is empowered
to enact ordinances declaring, preventing or abating noise and other forms of nuisance. It bears
stressing, however, that the Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a particular thing as a nuisance
per se and order its condemnation. It does not have the power to find, as a fact, that a
particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can it authorize
the extrajudicial condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance which in its nature,
situation or use is not such. Those things must be determined and resolved in the ordinary
courts of law. If a thing, be in fact, a nuisance due to the manner of its operation, that question
cannot be determined by a mere resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan. (emphasis supplied)
Despite the hotel’s classification as a nuisance per accidens, however, We still find in this case
that the LGU may nevertheless properly order the hotel’s demolition. This is because, in the
exercise of police power and the general welfare clause,[18] property rights of individuals may be
subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Otherwise
stated, the government may enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property,
lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare.[19]
One such piece of legislation is the LGC, which authorizes city and municipal governments,
acting through their local chief executives, to issue demolition orders. Under existing laws, the
office of the mayor is given powers not only relative to its function as the executive official of
the town; it has also been endowed with authority to hear issues involving property rights of
individuals and to come out with an effective order or resolution thereon.[20] Pertinent herein is
Sec. 444 (b)(3)(vi) of the LGC, which empowered the mayor to order the closure and removal of
illegally constructed establishments for failing to secure the necessary permits, to wit:
Section 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. –
xxxx
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general
welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the municipal
mayor shall:
xxxx
(3) Initiate and maximize the generation of resources and revenues, and apply the same to the
implementation of development plans, program objectives and priorities as provided for under
Section 18 of this Code, particularly those resources and revenues programmed for agro-
industrial development and country-wide growth and progress, and relative thereto, shall:
xxxx
(vi) Require owners of illegally constructed houses, buildings or other structures to obtain
the necessary permit, subject to such fines and penalties as may be imposed by law or
ordinance, or to make necessary changes in the construction of the same when said
construction violates any law or ordinance, or to order the demolition or removal of said
house, building or structure within the period prescribed by law or ordinance. (emphasis
supplied)
c. Requirements for the exercise of the power are present

i. Illegality of structures
In the case at bar, petitioner admittedly failed to secure the necessary permits, clearances, and
exemptions before the construction, expansion, and operation of Boracay Wet Cove’s hotel in
Malay, Aklan. To recall, petitioner declared that the application for zoning compliance was still
pending with the office of the mayor even though construction and operation were already
ongoing at the same time. As such, it could no longer be denied that petitioner openly violated
Municipal Ordinance 2000-131, which provides:
SECTION 9. – Permits and Clearances.
(a) No building or structure shall be allowed to start construction unless a Building

Permit therefore has been duly issued by the Office of the Municipal Engineer. Once
issued, the building owner or any person in charge of the construction shall display on the
lot or on the building undergoing construction a placard containing the Building Permit
Number and the date of its issue. The office of the Municipal Engineer shall not issue
any building permit unless:
1. The proposed construction has been duly issued a Zoning Clearance by the
Office of the Municipal Zoning Officer;
2. The proposed construction has been duly endorsed by the Sangguniang Bayan
through a Letter of Endorsement.
(b) Only buildings/structures which has complied with all the requirements for its construction
as verified to by the Building Inspector and the Sangguniang Bayan shall be issued a
Certificate of Occupancy by the Office of the Municipal Engineer.
(c) No Business or Mayor’s Permit shall be issued to businesses being undertaken on
buildings or structures which were not issued a certificate of Occupancy beginning
January 2001 and thereafter.
xxxx
SECTION 10. – Penalties.
xxxx
(e) Any building, structure, or contraption erected in any public place within the Municipality of
Malay such as but not limited to streets, thoroughfares, sidewalks, plazas, beaches or in any other
public place are hereby declared as nuisance and illegal structure. Such building structure or
contraption shall be demolished by the owner thereof or any of his authorized
representative within ten (10) days from receipt of the notice to demolish. Failure or refusal
on the part of the owner or any of his authorized representative to demolish the illegal
structure within the period herein above specified shall automatically authorize the
government of the Municipality of Malay to demolish the same, gather and keep the
construction materials of the demolished structure. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner cannot justify his position by passing the blame onto the respondent mayor and the
latter’s failure to act on his appeal for this does not, in any way, imply that petitioner can proceed
with his infrastructure projects. On the contrary, this only means that the decision of the
zoning administrator denying the application still stands and that petitioner acquired no
right to construct on the no build zone. The illegality of the construction cannot be cured by
merely tendering payment for the necessary fees and permits since the LGU’s refusal rests on
valid grounds.
Instead of taking the law into his own hands, petitioner could have filed, as an alternative, a
petition for mandamus to compel the respondent mayor to exercise discretion and resolve the
controversy pending before his office. There is indeed an exception to the rule that matters
involving judgment and discretion are beyond the reach of a writ of mandamus, for such writ
may be issued to compel action in those matters, when refused. Whether or not the decision
would be for or against petitioner would be for the respondent mayor to decide, for while
mandamus may be invoked to compel the exercise of discretion, it cannot compel such discretion
to be exercised in a particular way.[21] What would have been important was for the respondent
mayor to immediately resolve the case for petitioner to be able to go through the motions that the
zoning clearance application process entailed.
Alas, petitioner opted to defy the zoning administrator’s ruling. He consciously chose to violate
not only the Ordinance but also Sec. 301 of PD 1096, laying down the requirement of building
permits, which provides:
Section 301. Building Permits. No person, firm or corporation, including any agency or
instrumentality of the government shall erect, construct, alter, repair, move, convert or demolish
any building or structure or cause the same to be done without first obtaining a building permit
therefor from the Building Official assigned in the place where the subject building is located or
the building work is to be done.
This twin violation of law and ordinance warranted the LGU’s invocation of Sec. 444 (b)(3)(vi)
of the LGC, which power is separate and distinct from the power to summarily abate nuisances
per se. Under the law, insofar as illegal constructions are concerned, the mayor can, after
satisfying the requirement of due notice and hearing, order their closure and demolition.
ii. Observance of procedural due process rights
In the case at bench, the due process requirement is deemed to have been sufficiently complied
with. First, basic is the rule that public officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the
performance of their duties.[22] The burden is on the petitioner herein to prove that Boracay West
Cove was deprived of the opportunity to be heard before EO 10 was issued. Regrettably, copies
of the Cease and Desist Order issued by the LGU and of the assailed EO 10 itself were never
attached to the petition before this Court, which documents could have readily shed light on
whether or not petitioner has been accorded the 10-day grace period provided in Section 10 of
the Ordinance. In view of this fact, the presumption of regularity must be sustained. Second, as
quoted by petitioner in his petition before the CA, the assailed EO 10 states that petitioner
received notices from the municipality government on March 7 and 28, 2011, requiring Boracay
West Cove to comply with the zoning ordinance and yet it failed to do so.[23] If such was the
case, the grace period can be deemed observed and the establishment was already ripe for closure
and demolition by the time EO 10 was issued in June. Third, the observance of the 10-day
allowance for the owner to demolish the hotel was never questioned by petitioner so there is no
need to discuss the same. Verily, the only grounds invoked by petitioner in crying due process
violation are (1) the absence of a court order prior to demolition and (2) the municipal
government’s exercise of jurisdiction over the controversy instead of the DENR. Therefore, it
can no longer be belatedly argued that the 10-day grace period was not observed because to
entertain the same would result in the violation of the respondents’ own due process rights.
Given the presence of the requirements under Sec. 444 (b)(3)(vi) of the LGC, whether the
building constituted a nuisance per se or a nuisance per accidens becomes immaterial. The hotel
was demolished not exactly because it is a nuisance but because it failed to comply with the legal
requirements prior to construction. It just so happened that, in the case at bar, the hotel’s incident
that qualified it as a nuisance per accidens––its being constructed within the no build zone––
further resulted in the non-issuance of the necessary permits and clearances, which is a ground
for demolition under the LGC. Under the premises, a court order that is required under normal
circumstances is hereby dispensed with.
d. The FLAgT cannot prevail over the municipal ordinance and PD 1096
Petitioner next directs our attention to the following FLAgT provision:
VII. The SECOND PARTY may construct permanent and/or temporary improvements or
infrastructure in the FLAgT Area necessary and appropriate for its development for tourism
purposes pursuant to the approved SMP. “Permanent Improvements” refer to access roads, and
buildings or structures which adhere to the ground in a fixed and permanent manner. On the
other hand, “Temporary Improvements” include those which are detachable from the foundation
or the ground introduced by the SECOND PARTY in the FLAgT Area and which the SECOND
PARTY may remove or dismantle upon expiration or cancellation of this AGREEMENT x x
x.[24]
Taken in conjunction with the exceptions laid down in Sections 6 and 8 of the Ordinance,
petitioner argues that Boracay West Cove is exempted from securing permits from the LGU.
Said exceptions read:
SECTION 6. – No building or structure shall be allowed to be constructed on a slope Twenty

Five Percent (25%) or higher unless provided with soil erosion protective structures and
authorized by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
xxxx
SECTION 8. – No building or structure shall be allowed to be constructed on a swamp or other

water-clogged areas unless authorized by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources.
According to petitioner, the fact that it was issued a FLAgT constitutes sufficient authorization
from the DENR to proceed with the construction of the three-storey hotel.
The argument does not persuade.
The rights granted to petitioner under the FLAgT are not unbridled. Forestlands, although under
the management of the DENR, are not exempt from the territorial application of municipal laws,
for local government units legitimately exercise their powers of government over their defined
territorial jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the conditions set forth in the FLAgT and the limitations circumscribed in the
ordinance are not mutually exclusive and are, in fact, cumulative. As sourced from Sec. 447
(a)(5)(i) of the LGC:
Section 447. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. –
(a) The sangguniang bayan, as the legislative body of the municipality, shall enact ordinances,
approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the municipality and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate
powers of the municipality as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
xxxx
(5) Approve ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective delivery of the basic
services and facilities as provided for under Section 17 of this Code, and in addition to said
services and facilities, shall:
(i) Provide for the establishment, maintenance, protection, and conservation of communal
forests and watersheds, tree parks, greenbelts, mangroves, and other similar forest
development projects x x x. (emphasis added)
Thus, aside from complying with the provisions in the FLAgT granted by the DENR, it was
incumbent on petitioner to likewise comply with the no build zone restriction under Municipal
Ordinance 2000-131, which was already in force even before the FLAgT was entered into. On
this point, it is well to stress that Sections 6 and 8 of the Ordinance do not exempt petitioner from
complying with the restrictions since these provisions adverted to grant exemptions from the ban
on constructions on slopes and swamps, not on the no build zone.
Additionally, the FLAgT does not excuse petitioner from complying with PD 1096. As correctly
pointed out by respondents, the agreement cannot and will not amend or change the law because
a legislative act cannot be altered by mere contractual agreement. Hence, petitioner has no valid
reason for its failure to secure a building permit pursuant to Sec. 301 of the National Building
Code.
e. The DENR does not have primary jurisdiction over the controversy
Lastly, in ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent mayor, petitioner
argued that the hotel site is a forestland under the primary jurisdiction of the DENR. As such, the
merits of the case should have been passed upon by the agency and not by the LGU. In the
alternative, petitioner explains that even if jurisdiction over the matter has been devolved in
favor of the LGU, the DENR still has the power of review and supervision over the former’s
rulings. As cited by the petitioner, the LGC reads:
Section 17. Basic Services and Facilities. –
xxxx
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, the following:
xxxx
(2) For a Municipality:

xxxx
(ii) Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control and review of the DENR,
implementation of community-based forestry projects which include integrated social forestry
programs and similar projects; management and control of communal forests with an area not
exceeding fifty (50) square kilometers; establishment of tree parks, greenbelts, and similar forest
development projects. (emphasis added)
Petitioner has made much of the fact that in line with this provision, the DENR Region 6 had
issued an opinion favourable to petitioner.[25] To petitioner, the adverted opinion effectively
reversed the findings of the respondent mayor that the structure introduced was illegally
constructed.
We disagree.
In alleging that the case concerns the development and the proper use of the country’s
environment and natural resources, petitioner is skirting the principal issue, which is Boracay
West Cove’s non-compliance with the permit, clearance, and zoning requirements for building
constructions under national and municipal laws. He downplays Boracay West Cove’s omission
in a bid to justify ousting the LGU of jurisdiction over the case and transferring the same to the
DENR. He attempts to blow the issue out of proportion when it all boils down to whether or not
the construction of the three-storey hotel was supported by the necessary documentary
requirements.
Based on law and jurisprudence, the office of the mayor has quasi-judicial powers to order the
closing and demolition of establishments. This power granted by the LGC, as earlier explained,
We believe, is not the same power devolved in favor of the LGU under Sec. 17 (b)(2)(ii), as
above-quoted, which is subject to review by the DENR. The fact that the building to be
demolished is located within a forestland under the administration of the DENR is of no moment,
for what is involved herein, strictly speaking, is not an issue on environmental protection,
conservation of natural resources, and the maintenance of ecological balance, but the legality or
illegality of the structure. Rather than treating this as an environmental issue then, focus should
not be diverted from the root cause of this debacle––compliance.
Ultimately, the purported power of review by a regional office of the DENR over respondents’
actions exercised through an instrumentality of an ex-parte opinion, in this case, finds no
sufficient basis. At best, the legal opinion rendered, though perhaps informative, is not
conclusive on the courts and should be taken with a grain of salt.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The
Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 120042 dated August
13, 2013 and February 3, 2014, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Peralta, Villarama, Jr., Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
October 23, 2014
N O T I C E OF J U D G M E N T
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that on ___September 29, 2014___ a Decision, copy attached herewith, was
rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by
this Office on October 23, 2014 at 12:30 p.m.
Very truly yours,

(SGD)
WILFREDO V. LAPITAN
Division Clerk of Court
[1]
Rollo, pp. 49-60. Penned by Associate Justice Carmelita Salandanan-Manahan and concurred
in by Associate Justices Ramon Paul L. Hernando and Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla.
[2]
Id. at 65.
[3]
Id. at 196-198.
[4]
Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corporation v. Bonifacio, G.R. No. 167391, June 8,
2011, 631 SCRA 327, 350-351.
[5]
Yusay v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156684, April 6, 2011, 647 SCRA 269, 276-277.
[6]
The Municipal Council of Lemery, Batangas v. The Provincial Board of Batangas, 56 Phil.
260 (1931).
[7]
Id.
[8]
Galicto v. Aquino, G.R. No. 193978, February 28, 2012, 667 SCRA 150, 167.
[9]
G.R. No. 150270, November 26, 2008, 571 SCRA 617, 633.
[10]
Section 30. Review of Executive Orders. -
(a) Except as otherwise provided under the Constitution and special statutes, the governor shall
review all executive orders promulgated by the component city or municipal mayor within his
jurisdiction. The city or municipal mayor shall review all executive orders promulgated by the
punong barangay within his jurisdiction. Copies of such orders shall be forwarded to the
governor or the city or municipal mayor, as the case may be, within three (3) days from their
issuance. In all instances of review, the local chief executive concerned shall ensure that such
executive orders are within the powers granted by law and in conformity with provincial, city, or
municipal ordinances.
(b) If the governor or the city or municipal mayor fails to act on said executive orders within
thirty (30) days after their submission, the same shall be deemed consistent with law and
therefore valid.
[11]
Heirs of Spouses Teofilo M. Reterta and Elisa Reterta v. Spouses Lorenzo Mores and
Virginia Lopez, G.R. No. 159941, August 17, 2011, 655 SCRA 580, 594-595; citing Jaca v.
Davao Lumber Company, G.R. No. L-25771, March 29, 1982, 113 SCRA 107, 129,
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, Inc. v. National Wages and Productivity Commission,
G.R. No. 144322, February 6, 2007, 514 SCRA 346, and Lu Ym v. Nabua, G.R. No. 161309,
February 23, 2005, 452 SCRA 298, 311.
[12]
Gancayo v. City Government of Quezon, G.R. No. 177807, October 11, 2011, 658 SCRA
853, 867.
[13]
G.R. Nos. 159017-18, 159059, March 9, 2011, 645 SCRA 41.
[14]
Salao v. Santos, 67 Phil. 550 (1939).
[15]
2 J.C.S. Sangco, Torts and Damages 893 (1994).
[16]
AC Enterprises v. Frabelle Properties Corp., G.R. No. 166744, November 2, 2006, 506
SCRA 625, 660-661.
[17]
Id.
[18]
Section 16. General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise the powers
expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate,
or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the
promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local
government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment
of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology,
encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and
technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social
justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve
the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
[19]
Gancayo v. City Government of Quezon, supra note 12, at 864-865.
[20]
City Engineer of Baguio v. Baniqued, supra note 9, at 633.
[21]
Amante v. Hidalgo, 67 Phil. 338 (1939).
[22]
Rules of Court, Rule 131, Sec. 3(m).
[23]
Rollo, p. 88.
[24]
Id. at 191.
[25]
Id. at 144.

264 Phil. 947
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-47518, June 18, 1990
MANUEL CALAGUI, AND RODOLFO MAPAGU, PETITIONERS, VS. THE COURT OF

APPEALS, HON. BONIFACIO CACDAC, JR., AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF CAGAYAN, BRANCH V, VIRIATO MOLINA, JR., AS CLERK OF COURT OF
THE FIRST INSTANCE CAGAYAN, TITO M. DUPAYA, QUINTIN BALAO, INOCENCIO
BABARAN, EDUARDO QUINTO, JUAN TURINGAN, HILARION AQUINO, LEONCIO
MAPAGU, VICENTE LIMQUECO, JR., MATIAS STO. TOMAS, EPIFANIO PALATTAO,
FRUTO ELIZAGA, DOMINGO LIM, ANSELMO LIM, GODOFREDO AVENA, VALERIANO
QUIMPO, CALIXTO TAGAYUN, EDUARDO PAZZIUAGAN, FERMIN QUERUBIN, DAVID
HIPOLITO, JUAN LASAM, EXEQUIEL ADVIENTO, JOSEPH STOOPS, HILARIO TELAN,
MARIO ROSALES, FELICISIMO ZINGAPAN, CARLOS VALDEPENAS, GEORGE LIBAN,
ALEJANDRO NONATO, JOSE FROGOSO, AND ERNESTO BAUTISTA, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision, promulgated on 16 September 1977,
[1]
in CA-G.R. No. SP-06726-R, entitled “Manuel Calagui, et al. vs. Hon. Bonifacio Cacdac, Jr., as
Judge CFI of Cagayan, Branch V, et al.”, which dismissed the petitioners’ petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus.
The facts are as follows:
On 2 August 1976, private respondents filed before the Court of First Instance of Cagayan,
Branch V, in Civil Case No. 2433, an action for injunction with preliminary prohibitory
injunction and damages against petitioners herein, alleging that as owners of the Tuguegarao
cockpit in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, they had been issued a license to operate said cockpit in 1971
and yearly thereafter up to 1976. They further alleged that when P.D. No. 449, otherwise known
as the “Cockfighting Law of 1974”, was promulgated on 9 May 1974, they were already
operating the Tuguegarao Cockpit. The said law provides that only one (1) cockpit shall be
allowed in a city or municipality where the population is not more than 100,000. Tuguegarao, in
[2]
1976, had a population of less than 100,000. The same law likewise authorizes the city and
municipal mayors to issue licenses for the operation and maintenance of cockpits subject to the
approval of the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary or his authorized representative.
[3]
Sometime in 1976, petitioners were able to secure from the P.C. Zone Commander approval of
their request to operate a cockpit (Balzain cockpit) in Balzain, which is in Tuguegarao, and
petitioners announced to the public the holding of cockfights in the Balzain cockpit on 8 August
1976.
On 14 August 1976, in said Civil Case No. 2433, respondent judge issued a writ of preliminary
injunction against petitioners who were, however, given “for reasons of equity and fair play” in
the same order an opportunity to file an injunctive counterbond, which they did, and the writ of
preliminary injunction was stayed and dissolved until further orders from the court.
After trial, respondent judge rendered his decision dated 7 May 1977 in Civil Case No. 2433,
ordering, among other things, that the preliminary injunction granted by the court in its Order
dated 14 August 1976 be considered permanent, final and perpetual; the Municipal Mayor of
Tuguegarao to issue a license to the Tuguegarao Cockpit for the year 1977, if he had not yet
done so; the Chief of the Constabulary to approve the said license; and the defendants (herein
petitioners) together with their bondsman to jointly and severally pay the amount of P4,000.00 to
plaintiffs (private respondents) as damages.
Petitioners appealed from the said decision to the respondent Court of Appeals. However,
believing that their appeal was not adequate to promptly relieve them from the injurious effects
of the abovementioned decision, on 1 June 1977 petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition, and Mandamus before respondent Court of Appeals, with application for issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction against respondent judge and private respondents. As earlier
stated, the respondent appellate court rendered a decision on 16 September 1977, dismissing the
petition, “but without prejudice to the petitioners herein, presenting for consideration of the
Court which shall resolve the appeal of Civil Case No. 2433, the corresponding motion or
petition for the lifting of the writ of injunction directed against them to operate the Balzain
Cockpit in Tuguegarao, Cagayan.” [4]
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners have come to this Court raising
the following issues in their amended petition:
[5]
“1. Is there a legal impediment for the Court of Appeals to entertain and pass judgment on
the errors raised before it in a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, when the
injunction case from where the errors raised, emanated, is pending appeal?
2. In an injunction case seeking to prohibit and restrain the operation of a cockpit about to
operate by virtue of a license granted to the operator thereof to hold cockfights for the current
year, has the trial court trying the said injunction case, jurisdiction to restrain perpetually the
operation of said cockpit, more so if in the meanwhile that said case is pending, another license
is granted to the operator thereof to operate for the succeeding year, and the validity of the latter
license is not challenged in the injunction case?
3. Is the writ of execution issued by the trial court pending appeal with respect to the award
of damages in the injunction case, and which is deemed by the Court of Appeals as proper
subject for the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, had it not been enforced and
executed, rendered moot and academic?
4. Is the error of the trial court ordering the Municipal Mayor to issue a license and ordering
the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary to approve the same, when said public officers are not
parties to the injunction case, merely an error of judgment or procedure, and not a jurisdictional
error?”
Except for the first issue, the issues in the present petition are the same as those raised by
petitioners in their petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
We have reviewed the facts of this case and we fully agree with the respondent Court of Appeals
that the correctness of the decision rendered by the lower court in Civil Case No. 2433 should be
properly resolved in the appeal interposed by the petitioners and not by means of a petition for
certiorari to declare as null and void said decision or any part thereof. As correctly found by
respondent appellate court, the real issue raised in the petition for certiorari is the determination
of the legality or illegality of the existence of the respective cockpits of the petitioners and
private respondents. Said issue is within the jurisdiction of the lower court.
We note that in their petition before respondent appellate court, petitioners prayed for judgment
to declare:
“x x x that the Respondent Judge acted without, or in excess of, jurisdiction, and/or gravely
abused his discretion, in perpetually restraining the Petitioners from operating their Balzain
Cockpit; in immediately ordering the execution of the decision despite the appeal taken in Civil
Case No. 2433; in compelling the Municipal Mayor of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, and the Chief of
the Philippines Constabulary to issue and approve the 1977 license of the Private Respondents x
x x.”[6]
In effect, petitioners were seeking a reversal of the lower court’s decision, which should properly
be done in the appeal, not in a petition for certiorari.
In one case, the Court had occasion to distinguish the two (2) approaches; thus:
[7]
“An appeal brings up for review errors of judgment committed by a court with jurisdiction over
the subject of the suit and the persons of the parties or any such error committed by the court in
the exercise of its jurisdiction amounting to nothing more than an error of judgment. On the
other hand, the writ of certiorari issues for the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.”
By its nature, the extraordinary writ of certiorari offers a limited form of review, for its principal
function is to keep lower courts within their jurisdiction.[8]
We, therefore, do not find error in the dismissal of the petition for certiorari by the Court of
Appeals.
The present petition cannot prosper for an additional reason. In a Manifestation filed on 26
January 1983, private respondents alleged that the Court of Appeals already rendered a decision
[9]
affirming in toto the appealed decision in Civil Case No. 2433 and entry of judgment was made
on 17th November 1982. [10]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, there being no reversible error in the assailed
judgment of the respondent appellate court, and for being moot and academic. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Sarmiento, and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Penned by Associate Justice Nestor B. Alampay, and concurred in by Associate Justices

[1]
Pacifico P. de Castro and Jose G. Bautista.

[2]
Section 5(b), P.D. No. 449.
[3]
Section 6, ibid.
[4]
Rollo, p. 53
[5]
Ibid., pp. 66-67
[6]
Rollo, p. 37
[7]
Silverio vs. Court of Appeals, L-39861, March 17, 1986, 141 SCRA 527
[8]
Enriquez vs. Rivera, L-48948, June 19, 1979, 90 SCRA 641
[9]
Rollo, p. 201
[10]
Ibid., p. 203
G.R. No. 145169

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 145169, May 13, 2004
SIENA REALTY CORPORATION, AS REPRESENTED BY LYDIA CO HAO AND LILIBETH

MANLUGON, PETITIONER, VS. HON. LOLITA GAL-LANG, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF
THE RTC OF MANILA, BRANCH 44; ANITA CO NG IN TRUST FOR ROCKEFELLER NG;
AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, SPECIAL 13TH DIVISION, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Challenged via petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Court is the September 13, 2000 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 59096,
Siena Realty Corporation, as represented by Lydia Co Hao and Lilibeth Manlugon v. Hon.
Lolita O. Gal- lang, as Presiding Judge of Br. 44 of the RTC of Manila, and Anita Co Ng in trust
for Rockefeller Ng.
Since the petition attributes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals in the
issuance of subject resolution, what should have been filed was one for certiorari under Rule 65.
On this score alone, the petition must be denied due course.
But even if technicality were set aside, just the same the petition fails.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals on June 7, 2000 or allegedly
on the 60th day from their receipt of the March 23, 2000 Order of Branch 44 of the Manila
Regional Trial Court denying their motion for Reconsideration of said court’s Order dismissing,
on motion of private respondent, their complaint.
The Court of Appeals, by Resolution[1] of June 20, 2000, dismissed petitioner’s petition for
certiorari, however, for being filed out of time, it holding that:
Per records, it appears that petitioners had only until May 29, 2000 within which
to file the Petition for Certiorari considering the following:
1. Petitioners received a copy of the October 20, 1999 Order denying their
[counsel’s] Notice of Withdrawal [and likewise denying petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order dismissing their complaint] on November 8, 1999;
2. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the October 20, 1999 Order on
November 17, 1999; and that
3. Petitioners received a copy of the March 23, 2000 Order denying their motion for
reconsideration on April 8, 2000.
The instant petition was filed on June 7, 2000 or nine (9) days late.
Thus, for being belatedly filed, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Petitioners thereupon filed (on July 10, 2000) a motion for reconsideration [2] of the above-said
June 20, 2000 Order of the appellate court.
In the meantime, this Court issued in A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC ( Reglamentary Period to File
Petitions for Certiorari and Petition for Review on Certiorari) a Resolution dated August 1,
2000 approving the amendment to the following provision of Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure:
SECTION 4. Where petition filed. The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days
from notice of the judgment, order, resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court
or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or
person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by
the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid
of its jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless
otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by
the Court of Appeals.
If the petitioner had filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration after notice of said
judgment, order or resolution, the period herein fixed shall be interrupted. If the motion is
denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but which
shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of such denial. No
extension of time shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to
exceed fifteen (15) days. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The amendment to Sec. 4, Rule 65, which took effect on September 1, 2000, reads:
SECTION 4. When and where petition filed. – The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60)
days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or
new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period
shall be counted from notice of the denial of the said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower
court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the
Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in the aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the
Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a
quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed
in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason and in no
case exceeding fifteen (15) days. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Court of Appeals, acting on petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration of its Order of June 20,
2000, denied, by Resolution of September 13, 2000, [3] said motion in this wise:
xxx
From the argument espoused by petitioners’ counsel, it appears that he overlooked the provision
of second paragraph of Sec. 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as amended per
Supreme Court Circular dated July 21, 1998, which provides as follows:
“If the petitioner had filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration after notice of said judgment,
order or resolution, the period herein fixed shall be interrupted. If the motion is denied, the
aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less
than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of such denial. No extension of time shall
be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.”
Verily, the sixty (60) day period within which to file a Petition for Certiorari is not counted from
the date of the receipt of the denial of Motion for Reconsideration, but from the date of the
receipt of the questioned order or decision, except that such 60-day period is interrupted upon the
filing of a Motion for Reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, for reason above-stated, the instant motion is DENIED. Consequently, the
present Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED with finality. (Underscoring supplied)
Hence, the petition at bar, petitioners challenging the September 13, 2000 Resolution of the
appellant court as having been
. . . ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AS IT WAS MADE WITHOUT
TAKING PRIOR JUDICIAL NOTICE OF SUPREME COURT A.M. NO. 00-2 - 03 SC
WHICH RESOLUTION TOOK EFFECT ON SEPTEMBER 1, 2000, AND WHICH
AMENDED THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 4, RULE 65 OF THE 1997 RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.[4] (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner’s argument is well-taken.
Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules on Evidence reads:
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. – A court shall take judicial notice, without
the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political
history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and
maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the
Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the
Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Even if petitioner did not raise or allege the amendment in their motion for reconsideration
before it, the Court of Appeals should have taken mandatory judicial notice of this Court’s
resolution in A.M. Matter No. 00-02-03 SC. The resolution did not have to specify that it had
retroactive effect as it pertains to a procedural matter. Contrary to private respondent’s allegation
that the matter was no longer pending and undetermined, the issue of whether the petition for
certiorari was timely filed was still pending reconsideration when the amendment took effect on
September 1, 2000, hence, covered by the its retroactive application.
The amendatory rule in their favor notwithstanding, petitioners’ petition fails as stated early on.
The order of the trial court granting private respondent’s Motion to Dismiss the complaint was a
final, not interlocutory, order and as such, it was subject to appeal,[5] not a petition for certiorari.
At the time petitioners filed before the appellate court their petition for certiorari on the 60th day
following their receipt of the October 20, 1999 Order of the trial court denying their Motion for
Reconsideration of its dismissal order, the said October 20, 1999 Order had become final and
executory after the 15th day following petitioners’ receipt thereof.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions, hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, JJ., concur.
[1]
Rollo at 39-40.
[2]
Id. at 105-107.
[3]
Id. at 37-38.
[4]
Id. at 22.
[5]
Sec. 1, Rule 41, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[5]
Sec. 1, Rule 41, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

G.R. No. 189028
EN BANC
G.R. No. 189028, July 16, 2013
NATIONAL ARTIST FOR LITERATURE VIRGILIO ALMARIO, NATIONAL ARTIST FOR

LITERATURE BIENVENIDO LUMBERA, NATIONAL ARTIST FOR VISUAL ARTS
(PAINTING) BENEDICTO CABRERA, NATIONAL ARTIST FOR VISUAL ARTS
(SCULPTURE) NAPOLEON ABUEVA, NATIONAL ARTIST FOR VISUAL ARTS (PAINTING
AND SCULPTURE) ARTURO LUZ, NATIONAL ARTIST FOR PRODUCTION DESIGN
SALVADOR BERNAL, UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR EMERITUS GEMINO ABAD, DEAN
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN (UP COLLEGE OF LAW), DEAN DANILO SILVESTRE (UP
COLLEGE OF ARCHITECTURE), DEAN ROLAND TOLENTINO (UP COLLEGE OF MASS
COMMUNICATION), PROF. JOSE DALISAY, DR. ANTON JUAN, DR. ALEXANDER
CORTEZ, DR. JOSE NEIL GARCIA, DR. PEDRO JUN CRUZ REYES, PROF. JOSE CLAUDIO
GUERRERO, PROF. MICHAEL M. COROZA, PROF. GERARD LICO, PROF. VERNE DE LA
PENA, PROF. MARIAN ABUAN, PROF. THEODORE O. TE, DR. CRISTINA PANTOJA-
HIDALGO, PROF. JOSE WENDELL CAPILI, PROF. SIR ANRIAL TIATCO, PROF. NICOLO
DEL CASTILLO, PROF. HORACIO DUMANLIG, PROF. DANTON REMOTO, PROF.
PRISCELINA PATAJO-LEGASTO, PROF. BELEN CALINGACION, PROF. AMIEL Y.
LEONARDIA, PROF. VIM NADERA, PROF. MARILYN CANTA, PROF. CECILIA DELA PAZ,
PROF. CHARLSON ONG, PROF. CLOD MARLON YAMBAO, PROF. KENNETH
JAMANDRE, PROF. JETHRO JOAQUIN, ATTY. F.D. NICOLAS B. PICHAY, ATTY. ROSE
BEATRIX ANGELES, MR. FERNANDO JOSEF, MS. SUSAN S. LARA, MR. ALFRED YUSON,
MS. JING PANGANIBAN-MENDOZA, MR. ROMULO BAQUIRAN, JR., MR. CARLJOE
JAVIER, MS. REBECCA T. ANONUEVO, MR. JP ANTHONY D. CUNADA, MS. LEAH
NAVARRO, MR. MARK MEILLY, MR. VERGEL O. SANTOS, MR. GIL OLEA MENDOZA,
MR. EDGAR C. SAMAR, MS. CHRISTINE BELLEN, MR. ANGELO R. LACUESTA, MS.
ANNA MARIA KATIGBAK-LACUESTA, MR. LEX LEDESMA, MS. KELLY PERIQUET, MS.
CARLA PACIS, MR. J. ALBERT GAMBOA, MR. CESAR EVANGELISTA BUENDIA, MR.
PAOLO ALCAZAREN, MR. ALWYN C. JAVIER, MR. RAYMOND MAGNO GARLITOS, MS.
GANG BADOY, MR. LESLIE BOCOBO, MS. FRANCES BRETANA, MS. JUDITH TORRES,
MS. JANNETTE PINZON, MS. JUNE POTICAR-DALISAY, MS. CAMILLE DE LA ROSA, MR.
JAMES LADIORAY, MR. RENATO CONSTANTINO, JR., AND CONCERNED ARTISTS OF
THE PHILIPPINES (CAP), PETITIONERS, VS. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, THE CULTURAL
CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CULTURE AND THE
ARTS, MS. CECILE GUIDOTE-ALVAREZ, MR. CARLO MAGNO JOSE CAPARAS,[1] MR.
JOSE MORENO, MR. FRANCISCO MAÑOSA, AND ALL PERSONS, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE,
ACTING UNDER THEIR INSTRUCTIONS, DIRECTION, CONTROL AND SUPERVISION IN
RELATION TO THE CONFERMENT OF THE ORDER OF THE NATIONAL ARTIST AND
THE RELEASE OF FUNDS IN RELATION TO THE CONFERMENT OF THE HONORS AND
PRIVILEGES OF THE ORDER OF NATIONAL ARTISTS ON RESPONDENTS GUIDOTE-
ALVAREZ, CAPARAS, MORENO AND MAÑOSA, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Art has traditionally been viewed as the expression of everything that is true, good and
beautiful. As such, it is perceived to evoke and produce a spirit of harmony. Art is also
considered as a civilizing force, a catalyst of nation-building. The notion of art and artists as
privileged expressions of national culture helped shape the grand narratives of the nation and
shared symbols of the people. The artist does not simply express his/her own individual
inspiration but articulates the deeper aspirations of history and the soul of the people.[2] The law
recognizes this role and views art as something that “reflects and shapes values, beliefs,
aspirations, thereby defining a people’s national identity.”[3] If unduly politicized, however, art
and artists could stir controversy and may even cause discord, as what happened in this case.
The Antecedents
History of the Order of National Artists
On April 27, 1972, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1001[4] and,
upon recommendation of the Board of Trustees of the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP),
created the category of Award and Decoration of National Artist to be awarded to Filipinos who
have made distinct contributions to arts and letters. In the same issuance, Fernando Amorsolo
was declared as the first National Artist.
On May 15, 1973, Proclamation No. 1144[5] was issued. It amended Proclamation No. 1001 “by
creating a National Artists Awards Committee” that would “administer the conferment of the
category of National Artist” upon deserving Filipino artists. The Committee, composed of
members of the Board of Trustees of the CCP, was tasked to “draft the rules to guide its
deliberations in the choice of National Artists, to the end that those who have created a body of
work in the arts and letters capable of withstanding the test of time will be so recognized.”
The authority of the National Artists Awards Committee to administer the conferment of the
National Artist Award was again reiterated in Presidential Decree No. 208[6] issued on June 7,
1973.
On April 3, 1992, Republic Act No. 7356, otherwise known as the Law Creating the National
Commission for Culture and the Arts, was signed into law. It established the National
Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA) and gave it an extensive mandate over the
development, promotion and preservation of the Filipino national culture and arts and the
Filipino cultural heritage. The NCCA was tasked with the following:
Sec. 8. The Commission. – A National Commission for Culture and Arts is hereby created to
formulate policies for the development of culture and arts; implement these policies in
coordination with affiliated cultural agencies; coordinate the implementation of programs of
these affiliated agencies; administer the National Endowment Fund for Culture and Arts
(NEFCA); encourage artistic creation within a climate of artistic freedom; develop and promote
the Filipino national culture and arts; and preserve Filipino cultural heritage. The Commission
shall be an independent agency. It shall render an annual report of its activities and achievements
to the President and to Congress.
Among the specific mandates of the NCCA under Republic Act No. 7356 is to “extend
recognition of artistic achievement through awards, grants and services to artists and cultural
groups which contribute significantly to the Filipino’s cultural legacy.”[7] In connection with this
mandate, the NCCA is vested with the power to “advise the President on matters pertaining to
culture and the arts, including the creation of a special decoration or award, for persons who have
significantly contributed to the development and promotion of Philippine culture and arts.”[8]
As both the CCP Board of Trustees and the NCCA have been mandated by law to promote,
develop and protect the Philippine national culture and the arts, and authorized to give awards to
deserving Filipino artists, the two bodies decided to team up and jointly administer the National
Artists Award.[9] Thereafter, they reviewed the guidelines for the nomination, selection and
administration of the National Artists Award. Pursuant to their respective powers to draft and
promulgate rules, regulations and measures to guide them in their deliberations in the choice of
National Artists, the CCP and NCCA adopted the following revised guidelines in September
2007[10]:
4.ADMINISTRATION OF THE AWARD
4.1. The National Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA) shall plan, organize and
implement the Order of National Artists in coordination with the Cultural Center of
the Philippines (CCP).
4.2. It shall enlist the support and cooperation of private sector experts from the various fields
of art to ensure that the awards are implemented in a successful and impartial manner.
4.3. The National Artist Award Secretariat shall commission art experts to form a Special
Research Group who shall verify information submitted on nominees and provide
essential data. They shall be selected for their specialization and familiarity with the
works and accomplishments of nominated artists.
4.4. The Special Research Group shall be composed of ten (10) to twenty (20) members who
have expertise in one or more fields or disciplines.
4.5. The National Artist Award Council of Experts shall be created before or during the
nomination period. It is tasked to screen nominees and recommend to the NCCA and CCP
Boards the candidates for the Order of National Artists. It shall be composed of highly
regarded peers, scholars, (including cultural philosophers and historians), academicians,
researchers, art critics, and other knowledgeable individuals. A wider age-range of experts
who would have first-hand knowledge of achievements of nominees shall be considered.
4.6. The selection of the members of the National Artist Award Council of Experts shall be
based on the following criteria:
(a) should have achieved authority, credibility and track record in his field(s) of
expertise;
(b) should have extensive knowledge in his field(s) and his views on Philippine art and
culture must be national in perspective;
(c) should be a recognized authority in the study or research of Philippine art and
culture;
(d) must be willing to devote sufficient time and effort to the work of the Council;
(e) must be willing to sign a non-disclosure statement in order to safeguard the
confidentiality of the deliberations;
(f) must not have been convicted with finality of any crime by a court of justice or
dismissed for cause by any organization, whether public or private.
4.7. The National Artist Award Council of Experts shall be composed of a maximum of seven
(7) members each of the seven (7) areas/disciplines. The living National Artists will
automatically become members in addition to the forty-nine (49) selected members.
These members will constitute the first deliberation panel and will be invited to evaluate
the nominations and materials submitted by the Special Research Group.
4.8. Any member of the Council of Experts who is nominated or related to a nominee up to the
fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity shall inhibit himself/herself from the
deliberation process. Likewise, any member may decline to participate in the deliberation
for any reason or may be removed for just cause upon recommendation to the NCCA
Board by at least two thirds (2/3) of the members; in which case, the National Artist
Award Secretariat shall again select the replacements for those who decline or resigned
until the first deliberation panel is completed.
4.9. The list of nominated members of the National Artist Award Council of Experts shall be
reviewed by the National Artist Award Secretariat as needed, for purposes of adding new
members or replacements.
4.10.The members of the National Artist Award Council of Experts shall serve for a fixed term
of three (3) years.
5.CRITERIA FOR SELECTION
The Order of National Artists shall be given to:
5.1 Living artists who are Filipino citizens at the time of nomination, as well as those who
died after the establishment of the award in 1972 but were Filipino citizens at the time of
their death.
5.2 Artists who through the content and form of their works have contributed in building a
Filipino sense of nationhood.
5.3. Artists who have pioneered in a mode of creative expression or style, thus, earning
distinction and making an impact on succeeding generations of artists.
5.4. Artists who have created a substantial and significant body of works and/or consistently
displayed excellence in the practice of their art form thus enriching artistic expression or
style.
5.5 Artists who enjoy broad acceptance through:
5.5.1.prestigious national and/or international recognition, such as the Gawad CCP Para sa
Sining, CCP Thirteen Artists Award and NCCA Alab ng Haraya
5.5.2.critical acclaim and/or reviews of their works
5.5.3.respect and esteem from peers.
6.NOMINATION PROCEDURE
6.1. The National Artist Award Secretariat shall announce the opening of nominations through
media releases and letters to qualified organizations.
6.2. Candidates may be nominated under one or more of the following categories:
6.2.1.Dance – choreography, direction and/or performance.
6.2.2.Music – composition, direction, and/or performance.
6.2.3.Theater – direction, performance and/or production design.
6.2.4.Visual Arts – painting, sculpture, printmaking, photography, installation art, mixed
media works, illustration, comics/komiks, graphic arts, performance art and/or
imaging.
6.2.5.Literature – poetry, fiction (short story, novel and play); non-fiction (essay,
journalism, literary criticism and historical literature).
6.2.6.Film and Broadcast Arts – direction, writing, production design, cinematography,
editing, camera work, and/or performance.
6.2.7.Architecture, Design and Allied Arts – architecture design, interior design, industrial
arts design, landscape architecture and fashion design.
6.3. Nominations for the Order of National Artists may be submitted by government and non-
government cultural organizations and educational institutions, as well as private
foundations and councils.
6.4. Members of the Special Research Group, as well as agencies attached to the NCCA and
CCP shall not submit nominations.
6.5. NCCA and CCP Board members and consultants and NCCA and CCP officers and
staff are automatically disqualified from being nominated.
6.6. Nominations shall be accepted only when these are submitted in writing and with proper
supporting documentation, as follows:
6.6.1.A cover letter signed by the head or designated representative of the nominating
organization.
The cover letter shall be accompanied by a Board Resolution approving the nominee
concerned with the said resolution signed by the organization President and duly
certified by the Board Secretary.
6.6.2.A duly accomplished nomination form;
6.6.3.A detailed curriculum vitae of the nominee;
6.6.4.A list of the nominee’s significant works categorized according to the criteria;
6.6.5.The latest photograph (color or black and white) of the nominee, either 5[”] x 7” or
8[”] x 11”;
6.6.6.Pertinent information materials on the nominee’s significant works (on CDs, VCDs
and DVDs);
6.6.7.Copies of published reviews;
6.6.8.Any other document that may be required.
6.7. Nominations received beyond the announced deadline for the submission of nominations
shall not be considered.
6.8. The National Artist Award Secretariat shall announce the opening of nominations through
media releases.
6.9. All inquiries and nominations shall be submitted to
The NATIONAL ARTIST AWARD SECRETARIAT
Office of the Artistic Director
Cultural Center of the Philippines
Roxas Boulevard, 1300 Pasay City
or
The NATIONAL ARTIST AWARD SECRETARIAT

Office of the Deputy Executive Director
National Commission for Culture and the Arts
633 General Luna Street, Intramuros, Manila
7.SCREENING AND SELECTION PROCESS
7.1. The National Artist Award Secretariat shall pre-screen the nominees based on technical
guideline items 5.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6. The pre-screening shall not be based on the
accomplishments and merits of the nominee.
7.2. The Special Research Group shall accomplish its task within six (6) months. The main
objective is to verify the validity of the data, and evaluate the quality, true value and
significance of works according to the criteria. It shall come up with the updated and
comprehensive profiles of nominees reflecting their most outstanding achievements.
7.3. The National Artist Award Secretariat will meet to review the list of nominees for
oversights. Consequently, deserving nominees shall be added to the list.
7.4. The first deliberation panel (Council of Experts) shall be intra-disciplinary. The panelists
shall be grouped according to their respective fields of expertise or disciplines to shortlist
the nominees in their disciplines or categories for presentation to the second deliberation
panel.
7.5. The second deliberation panel shall be composed of a different set of experts from the first
deliberation panel [three (3) experts each of the seven (7) areas/discipline] and may
include members from varying backgrounds such as critics and academicians. The
achievements of each shortlisted nominee shall be presented by one designated member of
Council of Experts. Then panel deliberates and ranks the shortlisted nominees according
to the order of precedence following the set criteria of the Order of National Artists. In
extreme cases, the Second Deliberation may add new names to the lists.
7.6. The second deliberation panel may recommend not to give award in any category if no
nominee is found deserving. The number of awardees shall also depend on the availability
of funds. All decisions and recommendations shall be in writing.
7.7. The recommendations from the Second Deliberation Panel of the National Artist Award
Council of Experts shall then be presented to the joint boards of NCCA and CCP for final
selection. The presentors shall prepare their presentation in writing together with an
audio-visual presentation or powerpoint presentation. Written interpellations/opinions will
be accepted from selected critics. The review shall be based on the ranking done by the
Second Deliberation. The voting shall be across disciplines. The National Artists will be
given the option whether to vote on all categories or on his/her particular discipline.
7.8. Proxy votes will not be allowed in the Selection Process. Designation of permanent
representatives of agencies should be made at the outset to make them regular Board
members of NCCA and thus, may be allowed to cast votes.
7.9. The list of awardees shall be submitted to the President of the Republic of the
Philippines for confirmation, proclamation and conferral.
8.PRESENTATION OF THE AWARDS
8.1. The Order of National Artists shall not be conferred more frequently than every three (3)
years.
8.2. The Order of National Artists shall be conferred by the President of the Philippines on
June 11 or any appropriate date in fitting ceremonies to be organized by the National
Artist Secretariat.
8.3. The medallion of the Order of National Artists and citation shall be given to the honoree
during the conferment ceremony. The cash award of P100,000.00 in cheque shall be given
immediately after the ceremony or at another time and place as requested by the honoree.
8.4. A posthumous conferral consisting of the medallion and citation shall be given to the
family or legal heir/s of the honoree. The cash award of P75,000.00 in cheque shall be
given to the honoree’s legal heir/s or a representative designated by the family
immediately after the ceremony or at another time and place as requested by the family.
(Emphases supplied.)
In 1996, the NCCA and the CCP created a National Artist Award Secretariat composed of the
NCCA Executive Director as Chairperson, the CCP President as Vice-Chairperson, and the
NCCA Deputy Executive Director, the CCP Vice-President/Artistic Director, the NCCA
National Artist Award Officer and the CCP National Artist Award Officer as members. They
also centralized with the NCCA all financial resources and management for the administration of
the National Artists Award. They added another layer to the selection process to involve and
allow the participation of more members of the arts and culture sector of the Philippines in the
selection of who may be proclaimed a National Artist.
On September 19, 2003, Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003, entitled Establishing the Honors
Code of the Philippines to Create an Order of Precedence of Honors Conferred and for Other
Purposes, was issued. The National Artists Award was renamed the Order of National Artists
and raised to the level of a Cultural Order, fourth in precedence among the orders and
decorations that comprise the Honors of the Philippines.[11] Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003,
recognizes the vital role of the NCCA and the CCP in identifying Filipinos who have made
distinct contributions to arts and letters and states that the National Artist recognition is conferred
“upon the recommendation of the Cultural Center of the Philippines and the National
Commission for Culture and the Arts.”[12] Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003, further created a
Committee on Honors to “assist the President in evaluating nominations for recipients of
Honors,”[13] including the Order of National Artists, and presidential awards. The Committee on
Honors has been allowed to “authorize relevant department or government agencies to maintain
Honors and/or Awards Committees to process nominations for Honors and/or Presidential
Awards.”[14] In this connection, Section 2.4(A) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations[15] of
Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003, states:
2.4: Awards Committees
There shall be two types of awards committees: the Committee on Honors and the various
awards committees in the various units of the government service.
A. The Committee on Honors
The Committee on Honors serves as a National Awards Committee. It is composed of the

following:
The Executive Secretary, Chairman
The Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Vice-Chairman
Head, Presidential Management Staff, member
Presidential Assistant for Historical Affairs, member
Chief of Presidential Protocol, member
Chief of Protocol, DFA, member
All nominations from the various awards committees must be submitted to the Committee on
Honors via the Chancellery of Philippine Orders and State Decorations. The Chancellery shall
process nominations for the consideration of the Committee on Honors. The Committee on
Honors shall screen and recommend these nominations to the President.
The Committee on Honors shall, as a general rule, serve as a screening committee to ensure
that nominations received from the various awards committees meet two tests: that there
has not been an abuse of discretion in making the nomination, and that the nominee is in
good standing. Should a nomination meet these criteria, a recommendation to the President
for conferment shall be made.
The President of the Philippines takes the recommendations of the Committee on Honors in the
highest consideration when making the final decision on the conferment of awards. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Executive Order No. 435, s. 2005, entitled Amending Section 5(IV) of Executive Order No. 236
Entitled “Establishing the Honors Code of the Philippines to Create an Order of Precedence of
Honors Conferred and for Other Purposes” was subsequently issued on June 8, 2005. It
amended the wording of Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003, on the Order of National Artists and
clarified that the NCCA and the CCP “shall advise the President on the conferment of the Order
of National Artists.”
Controversy Surrounding the 2009

Order of National Artists
Petitioners alleged that on January 30, 2007, a joint meeting of the NCCA Board of
Commissioners and the CCP Board of Trustees was held to discuss, among others, the evaluation
of the 2009 Order of National Artists and the convening of the National Artist Award
Secretariat. The nomination period was set for September 2007 to December 31, 2007, which
was later extended to February 28, 2008. The pre-screening of nominations was held from
January to March 2008.[16]
On April 3, 2009, the First Deliberation Panel met.[17] A total of 87 nominees[18] were
considered during the deliberation and a preliminary shortlist[19] of 32 names was compiled.
On April 23, 2009, the Second Deliberation Panel purportedly composed of an entirely new set
of Council of Experts met and shortlisted 13 out of the 32 names in the preliminary
shortlist.[20] On May 6, 2009, the final deliberation was conducted by the 30-member Final
Deliberation Panel comprised of the CCP Board of Trustees and the NCCA Board of
Commissioners and the living National Artists.[21] From the 13 names in the second shortlist, a
final list of four names was agreed upon.[22] The final list, according to rank, follows:
Name Art Field/Category Number of Votes

Manuel Conde (+) Film and Broadcast Arts (Film) 26
Ramon Santos Music 19
Lazaro Francisco (+) Literature 15
Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz Visual Arts 15
On May 6, 2009, a letter, signed jointly by the Chairperson of the NCCA, Undersecretary Vilma
Labrador, and the President and Artistic Director of the CCP, Mr. Nestor Jardin, was sent to the
President.[23] The letter stated, thus:
May 6, 2009
Her Excellency GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

President of the Philippines
Malacañan Palace, Manila
Subject: 2009 Order of National Artist Awardees
Dear President Arroyo:
We are respectfully submitting a recommendation of the NCCA Board of Trustees and CCP
Board of Trustees for the Proclamation of the following as 2009 Order of National Artists:
1. Mr. MANUEL CONDE+ (Posthumous) – Film and Broadcast Arts

2. Dr. RAMON SANTOS – Music
3. Mr. LAZARO FRANCISCO+ (Posthumous) – Literature
4. Mr. FEDERICO AGUILAR-ALCUAZ – Visual Arts
The above persons were identified by experts in the various fields of arts and culture, including
living National Artists. An intensive selection process was observed following established
practice. In the past, awards were presented by the President at a Ceremony held at the
Malacañan Palace followed by a program called “Parangal” at the Cultural Center of the
Philippines. We also propose to continue with past practice of celebrating the life and works of
the four (4) Order of National Artists through an exhibit that will open and a commemorative
publication that will be released on the day of the proclamation.
We respectfully suggest, subject to Her Excellency’s availability, that the Proclamation be on

June 11, 2009, if possible at the Malacañan Palace.
Thank you for your kind attention.
Very respectfully yours,
(Sgd.)
VILMA L. LABRADOR
Chairman
National Commission for Culture and the Arts
(Sgd.)
NESTOR O. JARDIN
President and Artistic Director
Cultural Center of the Philippines[24]
According to respondents, the aforementioned letter was referred by the Office of the President
to the Committee on Honors. Meanwhile, the Office of the President allegedly received
nominations from various sectors, cultural groups and individuals strongly endorsing private
respondents Cecile Guidote-Alvarez, Carlo Magno Jose Caparas, Francisco Mañosa and Jose
Moreno. The Committee on Honors purportedly processed these nominations and invited
resource persons to validate the qualifications and credentials of the nominees.[25]
The Committee on Honors thereafter submitted a memorandum to then President Gloria

Macapagal-Arroyo recommending the conferment of the Order of National Artists on the four
recommendees of the NCCA and the CCP Boards, as well as on private respondents Guidote-
Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno. Acting on this recommendation, Proclamation No. 1823
declaring Manuel Conde a National Artist was issued on June 30, 2009. Subsequently, on July 6,
2009, Proclamation Nos. 1824 to 1829 were issued declaring Lazaro Francisco, Federico
Aguilar-Alcuaz and private respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno,
respectively, as National Artists. This was subsequently announced to the public by then
Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita on July 29, 2009.[26]
Convinced that, by law, it is the exclusive province of the NCCA Board of Commissioners and
the CCP Board of Trustees to select those who will be conferred the Order of National Artists
and to set the standard for entry into that select group, petitioners instituted this petition for
prohibition, certiorari and injunction (with prayer for restraining order) praying that the Order of
National Artists be conferred on Dr. Santos and that the conferment of the Order of National
Artists on respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno be enjoined and declared
to have been rendered in grave abuse of discretion.[27]
In a Resolution[28] dated August 25, 2009, the Court issued a status quo order[29] enjoining
“public respondents” “from conferring the rank and title of the Order of National Artists on
private respondents; from releasing the cash awards that accompany such conferment and
recognition; and from holding the acknowledgment ceremonies for recognition of the private
respondents as National Artists.”
What is the nature and scope of the power of the President to confer the Order of the National
Artists and how should it be exercised? This is the essential issue presented in this case. It will
determine whether the proclamation of respondents as National Artists is valid. Preliminary
procedural issues on the standing of the petitioners and the propriety of the remedies taken,[30]
however, call for resolution as a prerequisite to the discussion of the main question.
Contention of the Parties
A perusal of the pleadings submitted by the petitioners reveals that they are an aggrupation of at
least three groups, the National Artists, cultural workers and academics, and the Concerned
Artists of the Philippines (CAP). The National Artists assert an “actual as well as legal interest in
maintaining the reputation of the Order of National Artists.”[31] In particular, they invoke their
right to due process not to have the honor they have been conferred with diminished by the
irregular and questionable conferment of the award on respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas,
Mañosa and Moreno. For petitioners, this would adversely affect their right to live a meaningful
life as it detracts not only from their right to enjoy their honor as a fruit of their lifelong labor but
also from the respect of their peers.[32]
The cultural workers, academics and CAP claim to be Filipinos who are deeply concerned with
the preservation of the country’s rich cultural and artistic heritage. As taxpayers, they are
concerned about the use of public monies for illegal appointments or spurious acts of
discretion.[33]
All of the petitioners claim that former President Macapagal-Arroyo gravely abused her
discretion in disregarding the results of the rigorous screening and selection process for the Order
of National Artists and in substituting her own choice for those of the Deliberation
Panels. According to petitioners, the President’s discretion to name National Artists is not
absolute but limited. In particular, her discretion on the matter cannot be exercised in the
absence of or against the recommendation of the NCCA and the CCP. In adding the names of
respondents Caparas, Guidote-Alvarez, Mañosa and Moreno while dropping Dr. Santos from the
list of conferees, the President’s own choices constituted the majority of the awardees in utter
disregard of the choices of the NCCA and the CCP and the arts and culture community which
were arrived at after a long and rigorous process of screening and deliberation. Moreover, the
name of Dr. Santos as National Artist for Music was deleted from the final list submitted by the
NCCA and the CCP Boards without clearly indicating the basis thereof. For petitioners, the
President’s discretion to name National Artists cannot be exercised to defeat the
recommendations made by the CCP and NCCA Boards after a long and rigorous screening
process and with the benefit of expertise and experience. The addition of four names to the final
list submitted by the Boards of the CCP and the NCCA and the deletion of one name from the
said list constituted a substitution of judgment by the President and a unilateral reconsideration
without clear justification of the decision of the First, Second and Final Deliberation Panels
composed of experts.[34]
Petitioners further argue that the choice of respondent Guidote-Alvarez was illegal and unethical
because, as the then Executive Director of the NCCA and presidential adviser on culture and
arts, she was disqualified from even being nominated.[35] Moreover, such action on the part of
the former President constituted grave abuse of discretion as it gave preferential treatment to
respondent Guidote-Alvarez by naming the latter a National Artist despite her not having been
nominated and, thus, not subjected to the screening process provided by the rules for selection to
the Order of National Artists. Her inclusion in the list by the President represented a clear and
manifest favor given by the President in that she was exempted from the process that all other
artists have to undergo. According to petitioners, it may be said that the President used a
different procedure to qualify respondent Guidote-Alvarez. This was clearly grave abuse of
discretion for being manifest and undue bias violative of the equal protection clause.[36]
Respondent Caparas refutes the contention of the petitioning National Artists and insists that
there could be no prejudice to the latter. They remain to be National Artists and continue to
receive the emoluments, benefits and other privileges pertaining to them by virtue of that
honor. On the other hand, all the other petitioners failed to show any material and personal
injury or harm caused to them by the conferment of the Order of National Artists on respondents
Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno. The rule on standing may not be relaxed in
favor of the petitioners as no question of constitutionality has been raised and no issue of
transcendental importance is involved.[37]
Respondent Caparas further argues that the remedies of prohibition and injunction are improper
as the act sought to be enjoined – the declaration of respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas,
Mañosa and Moreno as National Artists – had already been consummated. In particular,
respondent Caparas was already proclaimed National Artist through Proclamation No. 1827
issued on July 6, 2009.[38]
On the merits, respondent Caparas contends that no grave abuse of discretion attended his
proclamation as National Artist. The former President considered the respective
recommendations of the NCCA and the CCP Boards and of the Committee on Honors in
eventually declaring him (Caparas) as National Artist. The function of the NCCA and the CCP
Boards is simply to advise the President. The award of the Order of National Artists is the
exclusive prerogative of the President who is not bound in any way by the recommendation of
the NCCA and the CCP Boards. The implementing rules and regulations or guidelines of the
NCCA cannot restrict or limit the exclusive power of the President to select the recipients of the
Order of National Artists.[39]
For her part, in a letter[40] dated March 11, 2010, respondent Guidote-Alvarez manifested that she
was waiving her right to file her comment on the petition and submitted herself to the Court’s
discretion and wisdom.
Respondent Mañosa manifested that his creations speak for themselves as his contribution to
Filipino cultural heritage and his worthiness to receive the award. Nonetheless, he expressed his
conviction that the Order of National Artists is not a right but a privilege that he would willingly
relinquish should he be found not worthy of it.[41]
Respondent Moreno did not file any pleading despite being given several opportunities to do
so. Hence, the Court dispensed with his pleadings.[42]
In a Resolution dated July 12, 2011, this Court gave due course to the petition and required the
parties to file their respective memoranda.[43] Respondent Caparas filed his memorandum on
September 8, 2011,[44] the CCP filed its memorandum on September 19, 2011,[45] respondent
Mañosa on September 20, 2011,[46] and the Office of the Solicitor General filed a manifestation
stating that it is adopting its comment as its memorandum on September 21,
2011.[47] Respondent Moreno failed to file a Memorandum, hence, the Court resolved to
dispense with the same.[48] Petitioners filed their Memorandum on May 14, 2012.[49]
On the other hand, the original position of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was similar
to that of respondent Caparas.[50] In a subsequent manifestation,[51] however, the OSG stated that
the current Board of Commissioners of the NCCA agree with the petitioners that the President
cannot honor as a National Artist one who was not recommended by the joint Boards of the
NCCA and the CCP. The implementing rules and regulations of Executive Order No. 236, s.
2003, recognized the binding character of the recommendation of the NCCA and the CCP
Boards and limited the authority of the Committee on Honors to the determination that (1) there
has been no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NCCA and the CCP Boards in making
the nomination, and (2) the nominee is in good standing. Where a nomination meets the said two
criteria, a recommendation to the President to confer the award shall be made.[52]
The OSG further argued that, while the President exercises control over the NCCA and the CCP,
the President has the duty to faithfully execute the laws, including the NCCA-CCP guidelines for
selection of National Artists and the implementing rules of Executive Order No. 236, s.
2003. Moreover, the laws recognize the expertise of the NCCA and the CCP in the arts and
tasked them to screen and select the artists to be conferred the Order of National Artists. Their
mandate is clear and exclusive as no other agency possesses such expertise.[53]
The OSG also assailed the former President’s choice of respondent Guidote-Alvarez for being
contrary to Republic Act No. 7356.[54] Section 11 of the said law provides:
Sec. 11. Membership Restrictions. – During his/her term as member of the Commission, a
Commissioner shall not be eligible for any grant, or such other financial aid from the
Commission as an individual: Provided, however, That he/she may compete for grants and
awards on the same level as other artists one (1) year after his/her term shall have expired.
The omission of the word “award” in the first portion of the above provision appears to be
unintentional as shown by the proviso which states that a member may compete for grants and
awards only one year after his or her term shall have expired. As such, respondent Guidote-
Alvarez is restricted and disqualified from being conferred the 2009 Order of National Artists.[55]
Standing of the Petitioners
Standing is the determination of whether a specific person is the proper party to bring a matter to
the court for adjudication.[56] The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.[57]
The parties who assail the constitutionality or legality of a statute or an official act must have a
direct and personal interest. They must show not only that the law or any governmental act is
invalid, but also that they sustained or are in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury
as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that they suffer thereby in some indefinite
way. They must show that they have been or are about to be denied some right or privilege to
which they are lawfully entitled or that they are about to be subjected to some burdens or
penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.[58]
In this case, we find that the petitioning National Artists will be denied some right or privilege to
which they are entitled as members of the Order of National Artists as a result of the conferment
of the award on respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno. In particular, they
will be denied the privilege of exclusive membership in the Order of National Artists.
In accordance with Section 2(a)[59] of Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003, the Order of National
Artists is “an exclusive association of honored individuals.” To ensure the exclusivity of the
membership in the Order, a rigid nomination and screening process has been established with
different sets of renowned artists and respected art critics invited to sit as the Council of Experts
for the First and Second Deliberation Panels. Moreover, all living National Artists are given a
voice on who should be included in their exclusive club as they automatically become members
of the Final Deliberation Panel that will vote on who should be included in the final list to be
submitted to the President for conferment of the Order of National Artists. To allow the
untrammeled discretion and authority of the President to confer the Order of National Artists
without regard to the stringent screening and rigorous selection process established by the NCCA
and the CCP will diminish, if not negate, the exclusive nature of the said Order. It will unduly
subject the selection and conferment of the Order of National Artists to politics rather than to
principles and procedures. It will subvert the transparent and rigorous process and allow entry to
the exclusive Order of National Artists through a secret backdoor of lobbying, back channeling
and political accommodation.
Among the other petitioners, Prof. Gemino Abad presents a unique valid personal and substantial
interest. Like respondents Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno, he was among the 87 nominees for the
2009 Order of National Artists. Like respondent Moreno, he made it to the preliminary
shortlist. As he did not make it to the second shortlist, he was not considered by the Final
Deliberation Panel, more so by the former President.
It should be recalled too that respondent Guidote-Alvarez was disqualified to be nominated for
being the Executive Director of the NCCA at that time while respondents Mañosa and Caparas
did not make it to the preliminary shortlist and respondent Moreno was not included in the
second shortlist. Yet, the four of them were treated differently and considered favorably when
they were exempted from the rigorous screening process of the NCCA and the CCP and
conferred the Order of National Artists. The Committee on Honors and the former President
effectively treated respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno as a preferred
class. The special treatment accorded to respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and
Moreno fails to pass rational scrutiny.[60] No real and substantial distinction between
respondents and petitioner Abad has been shown that would justify deviating from the laws,
guidelines and established procedures, and placing respondents in an exceptional position. The
undue classification was not germane to the purpose of the law. Instead, it contradicted the law
and well-established guidelines, rules and regulations meant to carry the law into effect. While
petitioner Abad cannot claim entitlement to the Order of National Artists,[61] he is entitled to be
given an equal opportunity to vie for that honor. In view of the foregoing, there was a violation
of petitioner Abad’s right to equal protection, an interest that is substantial enough to confer him
standing in this case.
As regards the other concerned artists and academics as well as the CAP, their claim of deep
concern for the preservation of the country’s rich cultural and artistic heritage, while laudable,
falls short of the injury in fact requirement of standing. Their assertion constitutes a generalized
grievance shared in a substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens.[62] Nor can
they take refuge in their status as taxpayers as the case does not involve any illegal appropriation
or taxation. A taxpayer’s suit is proper only when there is an exercise of the spending or taxing
power of the Congress.[63]
Nonetheless, as a reading of the petition shows that it has advanced an issue which deserves the
attention of this Court in view of its seriousness, novelty and weight as precedent, it behooves
the Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issue presented before it.[64] Moreover,
this issue is of paramount interest,[65] which further justifies a liberal stance on standing.
Propriety of the Remedies
The present action is a petition for prohibition, certiorari, injunction, restraining order and all
other legal, just and equitable reliefs.
It has been held that the remedies of prohibition and injunction are preventive and, as such,
cannot be availed of to restrain an act that is already fait accompli.[66] Where the act sought to be
prohibited or enjoined has already been accomplished or consummated, prohibition or injunction
becomes moot.[67]
Nevertheless, even if the principal issue is already moot, this Court may still resolve its merits
for the future guidance of both bench and bar. Courts will decide a question otherwise moot and
academic if it is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.”[68]
It is an opportune time for the Court to assert its role as republican schoolmaster,[69] a teacher in
a vital national seminar.[70] There are times when the controversy is of such character that, to
prevent its recurrence and to assure respect for constitutional limitations, this Court must pass on
the merits of a case.[71] This is one such case. More than being a teaching moment, this is not the
first time that the Order of National Artists was conferred in the manner that is being assailed in
this case.[72] If not addressed here and now, there is great probability that the central question
involved in this case will haunt us again in the future. Every President may invoke absolute
presidential prerogative and thrust upon us National Artists after his or her own heart, in total
disregard of the advise of the CCP and the NCCA and the voice of the community of artists,
resulting to repeated episodes of indignation and uproar from the artists and the public.
Furthermore, if not corrected, such an act would give rise to mischief and dangerous precedent
whereby those in the corridors of power could avoid judicial intervention and review by merely
speedily and stealthily completing the commission of an illegality.[73]
In any event, the present petition is also for certiorari and there is no procedural bar for the
Court to pass upon the question of whether the proclamations of respondents Guidote-Alvarez,
Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno as National Artists were attended by grave abuse of presidential
discretion.
Limits of the President’s Discretion
The respective powers of the CCP Board of Trustees and of the NCCA Board of Commissioners
with respect to the conferment of the Order of National Artists are clear. They jointly administer
the said award and, upon their recommendation or advice, the President confers the Order of
National Artists.
To “recommend” and to “advise” are synonymous. To “recommend” is “to advise or

counsel.”[74] To “advise” is “to give an opinion or counsel, or recommend a plan or course of
action; also to give notice. To encourage, inform or acquaint.”[75] “Advise” imports that it is
discretionary or optional with the person addressed whether he will act on such advice or
not.[76] This has been clearly explained in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Atty. Palma[77]:
The “power to recommend” includes the power to give “advice, exhortation or indorsement,
which is essentially persuasive in character, not binding upon the party to whom it is
made.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, in the matter of the conferment of the Order of National Artists, the President may or may
not adopt the recommendation or advice of the NCCA and the CCP Boards. In other words, the
advice of the NCCA and the CCP is subject to the President’s discretion.
Nevertheless, the President’s discretion on the matter is not totally unfettered, nor the role of the
NCCA and the CCP Boards meaningless.
Discretion is not a free-spirited stallion that runs and roams wherever it pleases but is reined in to
keep it from straying. In its classic formulation, “discretion is not unconfined and vagrant” but
“canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing.”[78]
The President’s power must be exercised in accordance with existing laws. Section 17, Article
VII of the Constitution prescribes faithful execution of the laws by the President:
Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices.
He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied.)
The President’s discretion in the conferment of the Order of National Artists should be exercised
in accordance with the duty to faithfully execute the relevant laws. The faithful execution clause
is best construed as an obligation imposed on the President, not a separate grant of power.[79] It
simply underscores the rule of law and, corollarily, the cardinal principle that the President is not
above the laws but is obliged to obey and execute them.[80] This is precisely why the law
provides that “[a]dministrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when
they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.”[81]
In this connection, the powers granted to the NCCA and the CCP Boards in connection with the
conferment of the Order of National Artists by executive issuances were institutionalized by two
laws, namely, Presidential Decree No. 208 dated June 7, 1973 and Republic Act No. 7356. In
particular, Proclamation No. 1144 dated May 15, 1973 constituted the CCP Board as the
National Artists Awards Committee and tasked it to “administer the conferment of the category
of National Artist” upon deserving Filipino artists with the mandate to “draft the rules to guide
its deliberations in the choice of National Artists”:
Proclamation No. 1001 dated April 27, 1972, creating the Award and Decoration of National
Artist, is hereby amended by creating a National Artists Awards Committee, hereinafter to
administer the conferment of the category of National Artist upon those deserving thereof.
The Committee, which shall be composed of members of the Board of Trustees of the Cultural
Center of the Philippines, shall organize itself immediately and shall draft the rules to guide its
deliberations in the choice of National Artists, to the end that those who have created a body
of work in the arts and in letters capable of withstanding the test of time will be so recognized.
(Emphases supplied.)
The authority of the CCP Board of Trustees as National Artists Awards Committee was
reiterated in Presidential Decree No. 208 dated June 7, 1973.
The function of the CCP Board of Trustees as National Artists Awards Committee has been
recognized under Republic Act No. 7356:
Sec. 18. The National Cultural Agencies. – The [NCCA] shall coordinate with the national
cultural agencies including but not limited to the Cultural Center of the Philippines, the Institute
of Philippine Languages, the National Historical Institute, the National Library, the National
Museum, the Records Management and Archives Office. However, they shall continue
operating under their respective charters or as provided by law where provisions therein
are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. They shall serve as the national repository
and/or showcase, as the case may be, of the best of Philippine culture and arts. For this purpose,
these agencies shall submit periodic reports, including recommendations to the [NCCA].
(Emphasis supplied.)
On the other hand, the NCCA has been given the following mandate in connection with the
conferment of cultural or arts awards:
Sec. 12. Mandate. – The Commission is hereby mandated to formulate and implement policies
and plans in accordance with the principles stated in Title 1 of this Act.
(a) To encourage the continuing and balanced development of a pluralistic culture by the people
themselves, it shall:
xxxx
(4) extend recognition of artistic achievement through awards, grants and services to
artists and cultural groups which contribute significantly to the Filipino’s cultural legacy;
xxxx
Sec. 13. Powers and Functions. – To carry out its mandate, the Commission shall exercise the
following powers and functions:
xxxx
(j) advise the President on matters pertaining to culture and the arts, including the
creation of a special decoration or award, for persons who have significantly contributed to
the development and promotion of Philippine culture and arts;
(k) promulgate rules, regulations and undertake any and all measures as may be necessary
to implement this Act[.] (Emphases supplied.)
By virtue of their respective statutory mandates in connection with the conferment of the
National Artist Award, the NCCA and the CCP decided to work together and jointly administer
the National Artist Award. They reviewed the guidelines for the nomination, selection and
administration of the National Artist Award, created a National Artist Award Secretariat,
centralized all financial resources and management for the administration of the National Artist
Award, and added another layer to the selection process so that more members of the arts and
culture sector of the Philippines may be involved and participate in the selection of National
Artists.
We have held that an administrative regulation adopted pursuant to law has the force and effect
of law.[82] Thus, the rules, guidelines and policies regarding the Order of National Artists jointly
issued by the CCP Board of Trustees and the NCCA pursuant to their respective statutory
mandates have the force and effect of law. Until set aside, they are binding upon executive and
administrative agencies,[83] including the President himself/herself as chief executor of laws. In
this connection, Section 2.5(A) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations[84] of Executive
Order No. 236, s. 2003 provides:
2.5: General Guidelines for Awards Committees
A. National Orders of Cultural and Scientific Merit
The existing modalities of the NCCA for selecting recipients for the Order of National
Artists, and the Gawad sa Manlilikha ng Bayan, and of the NAST for selecting recipients of the
Order of National Scientists, shall remain in force. (Emphases supplied.)
Section 2.4(A) of the same implementing rules further states:
2.4: Awards Committees
There shall be two types of awards committees: the Committee on Honors and the various
awards committees in the various units of the government service.
A. The Committee on Honors
The Committee on Honors serves as a National Awards Committee. It is composed of the

following:
The Executive Secretary, Chairman
The Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Vice-Chairman
Head, Presidential Management Staff, member
Presidential Assistant for Historical Affairs, member
Chief of Presidential Protocol, member
Chief of Protocol, DFA, member
All nominations from the various awards committees must be submitted to the Committee on
Honors via the Chancellery of Philippine Orders and State Decorations. The Chancellery shall
process nominations for the consideration of the Committee on Honors. The Committee on
Honors shall screen and recommend these nominations to the President.
The Committee on Honors shall, as a general rule, serve as a screening committee to ensure
that nominations received from the various awards committees meet two tests: that there
has not been an abuse of discretion in making the nomination, and that the nominee is in
good standing. Should a nomination meet these criteria, a recommendation to the President
for conferment shall be made.
The President of the Philippines takes the recommendations of the Committee on Honors in the
highest consideration when making the final decision on the conferment of awards. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Pursuant to the above provision of the implementing rules of Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003,
the authority of the Committee on Honors is limited to determining whether the nominations
submitted by a particular awards committee, in this case, the joint NCCA and CCP Boards, have
been tainted by abuse of discretion, and whether the nominees are in good standing. Should the
nominations meet these two criteria, the Committee on Honors shall make a recommendation to
the President for conferment of the Order of National Artists.
In view of the various stages of deliberation in the selection process and as a consequence of
his/her duty to faithfully enforce the relevant laws, the discretion of the President in the matter of
the Order of National Artists is confined to the names submitted to him/her by the NCCA and the
CCP Boards. This means that the President could not have considered conferment of the Order
of National Artists on any person not considered and recommended by the NCCA and the CCP
Boards. That is the proper import of the provision of Executive Order No. 435, s. 2005, that the
NCCA and the CCP “shall advise the President on the conferment of the Order of National
Artists.” Applying this to the instant case, the former President could not have properly
considered respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno, as their names were not
recommended by the NCCA and the CCP Boards. Otherwise, not only will the stringent
selection and meticulous screening process be rendered futile, the respective mandates of the
NCCA and the CCP Board of Trustees under relevant laws to administer the conferment of
Order of National Artists, draft the rules and regulations to guide its deliberations, formulate and
implement policies and plans, and undertake any and all necessary measures in that regard will
also become meaningless.
Furthermore, with respect to respondent Guidote-Alvarez who was the Executive Director of the
NCCA at that time, the Guidelines expressly provides:
6.5 NCCA and CCP Board members and consultants and NCCA and CCP officers and staff are
automatically disqualified from being nominated.[85]
Respondent Guidote-Alvarez could not have even been nominated, hence, she was not qualified
to be considered and conferred the Order of National Artists at that time. The President’s
discretion on the matter does not extend to removing a legal impediment or overriding a legal
restriction.
From the foregoing, the advice or recommendation of the NCCA and the CCP Boards as to the
conferment of the Order of National Artists on Conde, Dr. Santos, Francisco and Alcuaz was not
binding on the former President but only discretionary or optional for her whether or not to act
on such advice or recommendation. Also, by virtue of the power of control, the President had
the authority to alter or modify or nullify or set aside such recommendation or advice. It was
well within the President’s power and discretion to proclaim all, or some or even none of the
recommendees of the CCP and the NCCA Boards, without having to justify his or her
action. Thus, the exclusion of Santos did not constitute grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the former President.
The conferment of the Order of National Artists on respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas,

Mañosa and Moreno was an entirely different matter.
There is grave abuse of discretion when an act is (1) done contrary to the Constitution, the law or
jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or
personal bias.[86]
There was a violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution[87] when the former
President gave preferential treatment to respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and
Moreno. The former President’s constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws and observe
the rules, guidelines and policies of the NCCA and the CCP as to the selection of the nominees
for conferment of the Order of National Artists proscribed her from having a free and uninhibited
hand in the conferment of the said award. The manifest disregard of the rules, guidelines and
processes of the NCCA and the CCP was an arbitrary act that unduly favored respondents
Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno. The conferment of the Order of National
Artists on said respondents was therefore made with grave abuse of discretion and should be set
aside.
While the Court invalidates today the proclamation of respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas,
Mañosa and Moreno as National Artists, such action should not be taken as a pronouncement on
whether they are worthy to be conferred that honor. Only the President, upon the advise of the
NCCA and the CCP Boards, may determine that. The Court simply declares that, as the former
President committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing Proclamation Nos. 1826 to 1829 dated
July 6, 2009, the said proclamations are invalid. However, nothing in this Decision should be
read as a disqualification on the part of respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and
Moreno to be considered for the honor of National Artist in the future, subject to compliance
with the laws, rules and regulations governing said award.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED in PART. Proclamation Nos. 1826 to 1829
dated July 6, 2009 proclaiming respondents Cecile Guidote-Alvarez, Carlo Magno Jose Caparas,
Francisco Mañosa, and Jose Moreno, respectively, as National Artists are declared INVALID
and SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Bersamin, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza,
Reyes, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Brion, J., on leave.
Del Castillo, and Leonen, J., no part.
[1]
Also referred to as “Carlos Caparas” and “Carlo Caparas” in some parts of the records.
[2]
Arts and Creative Industries: A Historical Overview and an Australian Conversation, p. 51,
Australia Council for the Arts.
[3]
Republic Act No. 7356, Section 3 or the Law Creating the National Commission for Culture
and the Arts.
[4]
Entitled Declaring Fernando Amorsolo a National Artist.
[5]
Entitled Declaring Francisca Reyes Aquino, Carlos V. Francisco, Amado V. Hernandez,
Antonio J. Molina, Juan F. Nakpil, Guillermo E. Tolentino and Jose Garcia Villa National
Artists; and Amending Proclamation No. 1001 dated April 27, 1972, by Creating a National
Artists Awards Committee, Hereinafter to Administer the Conferment of the Award/Decoration
of National Artist.
[6]
Entitled Granting Certain Privileges and Honors to National Artists and Creating a Special
Fund for the Purpose.
[7]
Republic Act No. 7356, Section 12(4).
[8]
Id., Section 13(j).
[9]
Rollo, p. 82. This effort on coordination is consistent with the powers of the NCCA to “set up
a system of networking and coordination with and among all existing government cultural
agencies for the effective implementation of programs and activities” under Section 13(c) of
Republic Act No. 7356. Section 18 in connection with Section 23(b) of the same law further
provides that the NCCA “shall coordinate with the national cultural agencies including but not
limited to the Cultural Center of the Philippines” with the NCCA as “over all policy-making and
coordinating body.”
[10]
Id. at 138-144.
[11]
Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003, Sections 3 and 5.
[12]
Id., Section 5.
[13]
Id., Section 9.
[14]
Id.
[15]
Approved under Memorandum Order No. 128 dated December 23, 2003.
[16]
Rollo, p. 17.
[17]
Id. at 18.
[18]
Id. at 39-40. These nominees were as follows:
Art Field Name Number

Dance 1. Belmonte, Paz Cielo 8
2. Elejar, Eddie
3. Fabella, Antonio
4. Iñigo, Corazon
5. Locsin, Carmen
6. Pil, Teresita Veloso
7. Radaic, Felicitas
8. Reyes, Alice
Music 1. Asensio, Fides Cuyugan 16
2. Buenaventura, Alfredo
3. Canseco, George+
4. Cayabyab, Ryan
5. Cenizal, Josefino
6. Cruz, Emiliano
7. De Guzman, Constancio+
8. Hontiveros, S.J., Fr. Eduardo+
9. Lozada, Carmencita+
10. Kabayao, Gilopez
11. Mijares, Emil+
12. Pajaro, Eliseo+
13. Romero, Redentor+
14. Santos, Ramon
15. Sunico, Raul
16. Zamora, Ricardo “Dick”
Theater 1. Amador, Zeneida+ 6
2. Bonifacio, Amelia Lapeña
3. Carpio, Rustica4. Mabesa, Antonio
5. Rogers, Naty Crame
6. Santos, Isabel
Visual Arts 1. Alcala, Larry+ 22
2. Alcuaz, Federico Aguilar
3. Bitanga, Rosario
4. Caparas, Carlo
5. Carlos, Romeo
6. Carmelo, Alfredo+
7. Castrillo, Eduardo
8. Coching, Francisco+
9. Fajardo, Brenda
10. Isidro, Raul
11. Lorenzo, Diosdado+
12. Marcelo, Nonoy+
13. Miranda, Jr., Nemesio
14. Olmedo, Luis “Onib”+
15. Orlina, Ramon
16. Pacheco, Rafael
17. Rodriguez, Sr., Manuel
18. Santos, Mauro Malang
19. Santos, Paz Singson Abad
20. Tabuena, Romeo
21. Velasquez, Tony+
22. Vitug, Honesto
Literature 1. Abad, Gemino 14
2. Bautista, Cirilo
3. Bragado, Jose
4. Cristobal, Sr., Adrian+
5. Chua, Kee (Sy Yinchow)
6. Dimalanta, Ophelia Alcantara
7. Fernandez, Doreen+
8. Fernando, Gilda Cordero
9. Francisco, Lazaro+
10. Hidalgo, Juan, S.P.
11. Jalandoni, Magdalena+
12. Matute, Genoveva Edroza
13. Uranza, Azucena Grajo
14. Villanueva, Renato “Rene”+
Film and Broadcast 1. Aunor, Nora (Film) 10
Arts 2. Castillo, Celso Ad (Film)
3. Conde, Manuel+ (Film)
4. De Leon, Mike (Film)5. Dolphy (Film)
6. Lazaro, Cecilia “Cheche” (Broadcast Arts)
7. Magpayo, Fidela “Dely” (Broadcast Arts)
8. Muñoz, Tita+ (Film)
9. Trinidad, Francisco+ (Broadcast Arts)
10. Vela, Helen+ (Broadcast Arts)
Architecture, Design 1. Alonzo, Aureo (Fashion Design) 11
and Allied Arts 2. Arguelles, Carlos+ (Architecture)
3. Calma, Lor (Architecture)
4. Concio, Cesar (Architecture)
5. Farrales, Ben (Fashion Design)
6. Formoso, Gabriel (Architecture)
7. Higgins, Salvacion Lim+ (Fashion Design)
8. Mañosa, Francisco “Bobby” (Architecture)
9. Mendoza, Felipe+ (Architecture)
10. Moreno, Jose “Pitoy” (Fashion Design)
11. Salazar, Joe+ (Fashion Design)
[19]
Id. at 41. Those included in the preliminary shortlist were as follows:
Art Field Name (In Alphabetical Order)

Dance 1. Belmonte, Paz Cielo
2. Iñigo, Corazon
Music 1. Asensio, Fides Cuyugan
2. Buenaventura, Alfredo
3. Santos, Ramon
4. Sunico, Raul
Theater 1. Bonifacio, Amelia Lapeña
2. Mabesa, Antonio
3. Rogers, Naty Crame
Visual Arts 1. Alcala, Larry+
2. Alcuaz, Federico Aguilar
3. Castrillo, Eduardo
4. Coching, Francisco+
5. Lorenzo, Diosdado+
6. Rodriguez, Sr., Manuel
Literature 1. Abad, Gemino
2. Bautista, Cirilo
3. Fernando, Gilda Cordero
4. Francisco, Lazaro+
5. Jalandoni, Magdalena+
6. Villanueva, Renato+
Film and Broadcast Arts 1. Castillo, Celso Ad (Film)
2. Conde, Manuel+ (Film)
3. Dolphy (Film)
4. Lazaro, Cecilia “Cheche” (Broadcast Arts)
5. Trinidad, Francisco+ (Broadcast Arts)
Architecture, Design and 1. Arguelles, Carlos+ (Architecture)
Allied Arts 2. Formoso, Gabriel (Architecture)
3. Higgins, Salvacion Lim+ (Fashion Design)
4. Mendoza, Felipe+ (Architecture)
5. Moreno, Jose “Pitoy” (Fashion Design)
6. Salazar, Joe+ (Fashion Design)
[20]
Id. at 42. Those included in the second shortlist were as follows:
Art Field Name

Dance Belmonte, Paz Cielo
Iñigo, Corazon
Music Santos, Ramon
Theater Bonifacio, Amelia Lapeña
Mabesa, Antonio
Visual Arts Alcuaz, Federico Aguilar
Castrillo, Eduardo
Literature Francisco, Lazaro+
Jalandoni, Magdalena+
Film and Broadcast Arts Conde, Manuel+ (Film)
Trinidad, Francisco+ (Broadcast Arts)
Architecture, Design and Arguelles, Carlos+ (Architecture)
Allied Arts Salazar, Joe+ (Fashion Design)
[21]
Id. at 22.
[22]
Id. at 43.
[23]
Id. at 22.
[24]
Id. at 44.
[25]
Id. at 160-161.
[26]
Id.
[27]
Id. at 34-35.
[28]
Id. at 49-50.
[29]
Id. at 51-55.
[30]
Other procedural issues (such as violation of the hierarchy of courts and lack of verification
by some of the petitioners) have been raised by the public respondents and respondent Caparas.
In view of the purely legal question, substantial merit and paramount public interest involved in
this case, however, the said procedural infirmities have been brushed aside and strict
technicalities relaxed. (Relevant to the relaxation of the rule on the hierachy of courts, see
Archbishop Capalla v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 201112, June 13, 2012, 673 SCRA 1,
47-48; United Claimants Association of NEA (UNICAN) v. National Electrification
Administration, G.R. No. 187107, January 31, 2012, 664 SCRA 483, 489-490; Chua v. Ang,
G.R. No. 156164, September 4, 2009, 598 SCRA 229, 239; Garcia v. Miro, G.R. No. 167409,
March 20, 2009, 582 SCRA 127, 133. In connection with the liberality on the verification
requirement, see Altres v. Empleo, G.R. No. 180986, December 10, 2008, 573 SCRA 583; De
Guzman, Jr. v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 169292, April 13, 2011, 648 SCRA 677, 682-683; Torres-
Gomez v. Codilla, Jr., G.R. No. 195191, March 20, 2012, 668 SCRA 600, 611; and Pagadora v.
Ilao, G.R. No. 165769, December 12, 2011, 662 SCRA 14, 25.)
[31]
Rollo, p. 682.
[32]
Id.
[33]
Id. at 682-683.
[34]
Id. at 671-677.
[35]
Id. at 673.
[36]
Id. at 678-680.
[37]
Id. at 508-513.
[38]
Id.
[39]
Id. at 514-519.
[40]
Id. at 409.
[41]
Id. at 366-379, Entry of Appearance with Show Cause and Comment dated March 12, 2010;
rollo, pp. 578-585, Memorandum dated September 20, 2011.
[42]
Id. at 489-491 and 637B-637C, Resolutions dated July 12, 2011 and January 17, 2012.
[43]
Id.
[44]
Id. at 499-527.
[45]
Id. at 535-576.
[46]
Id. at 578-585.
[47]
Id. at 586-590.
[48]
Id. at 637B-637C.
[49]
Id. at 659-686.
[50]
Id. at 146-198 and 304-312, Comment and Supplemental Comment of public respondents
filed by the OSG.
[51]
Id. at 697-746.
[52]
Id.
[53]
Id.
[54]
Id.
[55]
Id.
[56]
Chemerinsky, Erwin, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies (3rd Edition), p. 60.
[57]
Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 893 (2003).
[58]
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No.
178552, October 5, 2010, 632 SCRA 146, 167, citing Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v.
Executive Secretary Ermita, 558 Phil. 338, 351 (2007).
[59]
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. - The following terms, as used in this Executive Order,
shall be defined as follows:
a. Order. An Order is an award that grants membership in an exclusive association of

honored individuals, and which by tradition carries with it distinctive insignia to be worn by
recipients. (Emphasis supplied.)
[60]
The rational basis scrutiny is one of three tests used by the Court to test compliance with the
equal protection clause. It is the minimal level of scrutiny which requires that the challenged
classification is rationally related to serving a legitimate State interest. It is used when the
government action is a type of discrimination that does not warrant the intermediate and strict
levels of scrutiny. The intermediate or middle-tier test requires the government to show that (1)
the challenged classification serves an important State interest, and (2) the classification is at
least substantially related to serving that interest. It is applied to suspect classifications like
gender or illegitimacy. The most demanding is the strict scrutiny test which requires the
government to show that (1) the challenged classification serves a compelling State interest, and
(2) the classification is necessary to serve that interest. It is used in classifications based on race,
national origin, religion alienage, denial of the right to vote, access to courts and other rights
recognized as fundamental. (Bernas, Joaquin S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines: A Commentary [2009 edition], pp. 139-140).
[61]
This is not to say that petitioner Abad is unworthy of the honor. It only means that the Court
is in no position to make that determination.
[62]
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); see also David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 522 Phil.
705, 762 (2006).
[63]
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, supra note 58 at
174-175; Automotive Industry Workers Alliance v. Romulo, 489 Phil. 710, 719 (2005); Gonzales
v. Narvasa, 392 Phil. 518, 525 (2000).
[64]
Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, supra note 57 at 897-898.
[65]
A congressional inquiry was conducted in connection with the 2009 National Artists
controversy. The general public, not only the arts and culture community, also weighed in on the
issue especially in connection with the conferment of the Order of National Artists on the late
Fernando Poe, Jr. and the clamor for the late Rodolfo “Dolphy” V. Quizon to be conferred the
said Order.
[66]
Guerrero v. Domingo, G.R. No. 156142, March 23, 2011, 646 SCRA 175, 179. See also
Montes v. Court of Appeals, 523 Phil. 98, 110 (2006).
[67]
See Caneland Sugar Corporation v. Alon, 559 Phil. 462, 466-467 (2007); Bernardez v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190382, March 9, 2010, 614 SCRA 810, 820.
[68]
Caneland Sugar Corporation v. Alon, id.
[69]
Lerner, Ralph, The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, 1967 Sup. Ct. Rev. 127.
[70]
Rostow, Eugene, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1952).
[71]
Rufino v. Endriga, 528 Phil. 473, 489 (2006).
[72]
Both petitioners and respondents admit in their pleadings that the Order of National Artists
was confered by former Presidents Fidel V. Ramos and Joseph Ejercito Estrada on artists who
had not been recommended by the NCCA and CCP Boards. (See p. 14 of Memorandum of
petitioners, rollo, p. 672 and pp. 11-13 of Comment of public respondents, rollo, pp. 156-158.)
[73]
See Tan v. Commission on Elections, 226 Phil. 624, 638 (1986).
Black’s Law Dictionary (6th edition), p. 1272, citing Kirby v. Nolte, 351 Mo. 525, 173 S.W.2d
[74]
391.
[75]
Id. at 54.
[76]
Id.
[77]
501 Phil. 1, 10 (2005).
[78]
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935), Cardozo, J., dissenting.
[79]
Tribe, Lawrence, American Constitutional Law, Vol. I (2000 edition), p. 713.
[80]
Justice Dante O. Tinga made a similar point in his dissenting opinion in Rufino v. Endriga,
supra note 71 at 530.
[81]
CIVIL CODE, Article 17.
[82]
Spouses Almeda v. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 309, 321 (1996).
[83]
Agpalo, Ruben, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND
ELECTION LAW (2005 edition), p. 72.
[84]
Approved under MEMORANDUM ORDER NO. 128 dated December 23, 2003.
[85]
Rollo, p. 142.
[86]
Doromal v. Biron, G.R. No. 181809, February 17, 2010, 613 SCRA 160, 172; St. Mary of the
Woods School, Inc. v. Office of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City, G.R. No. 174290, January
20, 2009, 576 SCRA 713, 727; Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v.
Commission on Elections, 464 Phil. 173 (2004).
[87]
Sec. 1, Art. III of the Constitution provides that “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be deprived the equal protection of
the laws.”
263 Phil. 821
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 69592, May 08, 1990
FRANCISCO P. TESORERO, ANTONIO G. DIAZ, JESUS G. DUREZA, PETITIONERS, VS.

PONCIANO G. A. MATHAY, JAIME S. MEJIA, BOARD OF ENERGY AND DAVAO LIGHT &
POWER COMPANY, INC., RESPONDENTS. DAVAO CITY, REPRESENTED BY
HONORABLE CITY MAYOR, ELIAS B. LOPEZ, INTERVENOR.
DECISION
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari, with a prayer for a restraining order, seeking the
annulment of the December 6, 1983 decision of the Board of Energy in BOE Case No. 82-684
approving the amount of P282,024,877.40 as the fair and reasonable value of the properties,
assets and equipment in service as of October 9, 1981 of the Davao Light and Power Co., Inc.
Herein petitioners are residents of Davao City and consumers of electricity of herein private
respondent Davao Light and Power Co., Inc. (DALIGHT, in short), the authorized operator of
electric light, heat and power service in the City of Davao, as well as in the municipalities of
Panabo, Sto. Tomas and Carmen, all in the province of Davao del Norte. Petitioners, in their
own behalf and on behalf of the more or less 70,000 consumers of Davao City and its environs,
opposed the inclusion by herein public respondent Board of Energy (BOE) of some properties of
DALIGHT for reappraisals because they will have a direct bearing on the rates that respondent
DALIGHT charges its customers to the effect that the higher the appraisal of the properties, the
higher will be the base of the 12% allowable return; or otherwise stated, the higher the rates the
consumers will have to pay.
As gathered from the records, the facts of this case are as follows:
On December 3, 1980, respondent DALIGHT filed with public respondent BOE an application
for the approval of the sound value appraisal of its properties and equipment in service as of
December 31, 1979 in the amount of P339,311,139.00. The appraisal was made by the
Technical and Management Service (Phil.), Inc. (TAMSPHIL). Respondent BOE, after
hearings, in an order dated March 13, 1981, constituted an inspection team to conduct ocular
inspection/verification of the physical existence and ownership of all the properties and
equipment of DALIGHT as listed the TAMSPHIL Appraisal Report. Thereafter, respondent
BOE, in an order dated June 19, 1981, based on the submission of the inspection team,
disapproved TAMSPHIL appraisal because: (1) TAMSPHIL was disqualified from making the
appraisal, its President-Chairman being then a technical and engineering consultant of applicant
DALIGHT; and (2) there were deficiencies and discrepancies in the appraisal report of such
serious proportion as to affect the over-all integrity and reliability of the said report.
On June 24, 1982, DALIGHT again filed an application for the approval of the appraisal of its
properties and equipment in service as of October 9, 1981 in the amount of P302,109,000.00
(Rollo, pp. 23-24). This time, the appraisal was conducted by Asian Appraisal Co., Inc. Said
application was opposed by the petitioners (Rollo, pp. 27-33).
BOE constituted a team to conduct ocular examination/verification of DALIGHT’s properties

and equipment, including its books of accounts and other papers relative to the Appraisal Report
of Asian Appraisal Co., Inc. The inspection team submitted its report on June 28, 1983.
Respondent BOE, in a decision dated December 6, 1983, approved the amount of

P282,024,877.40 as the fair and reasonable value of DALIGHT’s properties, assets and
equipment in the service as of October 9, 1981 (Ibid., pp. 86-97). Petitioners received the same
on December 19, 1983.
On January 19, 1984, or seventeen (17) days after receipt of the said decision, petitioners filed a
Motion for Reconsideration (Ibid., pp. 98-112), but the same was denied in an order dated June
25, 1984 (Ibid., p. 128). Apparently not having received the said order of June 25, 1984,
petitioners in their motion of October 11, 1984 prayed that a hearing be conducted and/or a
resolution be issued on their motion for reconsideration (Ibid., pp. 125-126). Accordingly,
respondent BOE issued an order dated October 31, 1984, informing petitioners that the motion
had long been denied, furnishing them copies of the June 25, 1984 order (Ibid., p. 128).
Hence, the instant petition.
On September 9, 1985, Davao City filed its Petition in Intervention (Ibid., pp. 219-223). After
all the required pleadings were filed, the First Division of this Court, in a resolution dated
January 20, 1986, resolved to give due course to the petition and the petition for intervention
(Ibid., p. 354).
Thereafter, petitioners filed their memorandum, instead of a brief, on July 22, 1987 (Ibid., pp.
403-429); while respondent DALIGHT and public respondent BOE filed a manifestation that
they be allowed to adopt their respective comments as their respective briefs.
The issues raised by petitioners are:
1. Whether or not certiorari is the proper remedy in this case.

2. Whether or not the properties included in the appraisal should be excluded.
The instant petition is impressed with merit.
There is no question that certiorari is not the proper remedy in this case as PD No. 1206 creating
BOE provides for an appeal to the Office of the President within seven (7) days from receipt of
notice of its decision or orders. Thereafter, under the Interim Rules Implementing Sec. 9 of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, final decisions, orders, awards or resolutions of all quasi-
judicial bodies other than those specifically excepted are reviewable by the Intermediate
Appellate Court.
It will be noted that after receipt of the questioned decision of December 6, 1983 on December
19, 1983, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration thereof only on January 5, 1984, or
seventeen (17) days from receipt of the said decision, which therefore had already become final
and executory. They received a copy of the order of June 25, 1984 and of October 31, 1984
informing them of said denial on December 3, 1984.
But while it is evident that there was error in the remedy resorted to, this Court in the broader
interests of justice has in a number of cases given due course to a petition for certiorari, although
the proper remedy is appeal especially where the equities warrant such recourse and considering
that dismissals on technicalities are viewed with disapproval (Marahay v. Melicon etc. et al.,
G.R. L-44980, Feb. 6, 1990 citing Perlas v. Concepcion, 3 Phil. 559 [1916]; Alfonso v. Yatco 80
Phil. 407 [1948]).
Furthermore, it is well settled that litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on their
merits and not on technicalities (Galdo v. Rosete, 84 SCRA 239, 242-243 [1978]); that every
party-litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of
his case, free from unacceptable plea of technicalities (Heirs of Ceferino Morales v. Court of
Appeals, 67 SCRA 304, 310 [1975]); that this Court, in the exercise of equity jurisdiction,
decided to disregard technicalities in order to resolve the case on its merits based on evidence
(St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc., et al. v. Cleofas, 121 SCRA 287 [1983]; Helmuth, Jr. v. People of
the Philippines, 112 SCRA 573 [1982]).
A careful review of the records show that this case will not only affect herein petitioners who on
some points have a good cause of action but also the more or less 70,000 consumers in Davao
City and its environs. Hence, it appears more appropriate to consider the petition on its merits
rather than to dismiss it on technicalities.
II
There appears to be no dispute on the generally accepted principle that in order to comply with
the legal mandate that electric utilities must render safe, reliable and efficient service to the
general public which in the process would require tremendous expenditure of working funds, a
revaluation of assets to a more realistic level must be allowed to enable said utilities to
accumulate funds with which to replace their obsolescent assets (Rollo, p. 96).
Petitioners take exceptions, however, to the fact that the assailed decision approved appraisals
consisting of:
(1) Properties of respondent DALIGHT which by legal mandate cannot be replaced anymore;
(2) Properties which have no bearing on the production/distribution of power to consumers;
(3) Properties that are not owned by DALIGHT;
(4) Properties which by their nature are not subject to appraisal. (Rollo, p. 11)
Verily, it is well settled that this Court cannot substitute its judgment or discretion for that of the
BOE whose decisions and determinations particularly on matters of facts are entitled to great
weight and respect.
But it is equally accepted that exhaustion of administrative remedies before resort to judicial
bodies is not an absolute rule. It admits of exception, among which is that where the question
litigated upon is a purely legal one, the rule does not apply. (Bagatsing v. Ramirez 74 SCRA
307 [1976]; Malabanan v. Ramento 129 SCRA 359 [1984]; Limorco v. Board of
Administrations, PVAO, 133 SCRA 43 [1984]; National Housing Authority v. C.A. 121 SCRA
777 [1983]). It is likewise true that while administrative determination on questions of law is
persuasive on courts and carries with it a strong presumption of correctness, nonetheless, the
interpretation and application of laws is the courts’ prerogative. (Cadwallader et al. v. Abedela,
98 SCRA 123 [1980]; Philex Mining Corp. v. Zaldiva, 43 SCRA 479 [1972]).
Equally important is the fact that the rule may and should be relaxed when its application may
cause great and irreparable damage (Bagatsing v. Ramirez, supra).
As earlier pointed out, the assailed decision may affect more or less 70,000 consumers in Davao
City and its environs.
A careful scrutiny of the records shows that the bone of contention in this case is not the factual
determination of the appraisals of the properties involved and the rates fixed by reason thereof,
but the legal determination of the properties covered by the reappraisal under laws pertinent
thereto.
1. Under Presidential Decree No. 40 it is expressly provided that the setting up of transmission
lines grids and the construction of associated generation facilities shall be the responsibility of
the National Power Corporation as the authorized implementing agency of the State. In the same
manner plant additions necessary to meet the increase in power demand in the area covered
thereby shall be constructed and owned by the NPC.
Accordingly, there is no dispute that DALIGHT is no longer allowed to replace its generators. In
fact, the obligation to pay for four (4) generators was assumed by NPC and they were just leased
to DALIGHT.
On the other hand, the claim of DALIGHT that it was advised by NPC to retain its generators as
standby units, appears to be a mere temporary measure when there was only one line connecting
the Agus Grid in Iligan City to Davao City passing through dangerous rebel infested territories,
then in constant danger of sabotage. Presently, however, there are two more lines passing safe
areas which precluded the danger of Davao City from being cut off from the Agno Grid thru
sabotage (Rollo, pp. 75-77).
As DALIGHT is precluded by PD No. 40 from replacing these assets said generators with an
approved sound value of P153,504,500.00 should have been excluded from the appraisal.
Even granting that said generators are still being used and as such subject to repairs and
maintenance costs, still they are operating expenses deductible from current income and have
nothing to do with appraisals (Rollo, p. 413).
2. Properties objected to as having no bearing to the production/distribution of power to

consumers are: the administration building appraised at P3,383,110.00 and an airplane with a
sound value of P75,000.00.
It was found among other things that aside from the fact that a portion of the administration
building is being rented to others, it had been substantially torn apart leaving only the foundation
and the main posts and completely rebuilt with a very different design. Thereafter, the new costs
of construction were added to the appraisal of the old building, thereby inflating the value of the
same beyond reasonable valuations (Rollo, p. 420).
In like manner, the regular use of the airplane allegedly to observe watersheds which cover vast
stretches of forest was not established. Instead the BOE Special Investigation Team found the
airplane in Cebu City which has no connection to power generation and the only licensed pilot of
Davao Light is its president who is not expected to conduct dangerous reconnaisance flights
himself (Rollo, pp. 420-421).
Accordingly, 40% of the valuation of the building which is devoted to lease and not to the
operation of electricity should be deducted from the total valuation, that is, P3,383,110.00 -
1,353,244.00 (representing 40% of total valuation) = P2,029,866.00, the sound value appraisal of
DALIGHT’s property including the construction cost in remodelling the same.
On the other hand, the appraised value of the airplane which is not being used in the operation of
electricity should be excluded in the appraisal.
3. Properties allegedly not owned by respondent DALIGHT are: (a) improvements constructed
on the Talomo Hydro Power System which is leased from NPC and (b) improvements
constructed under the Digos and Parrigan Projects Agreement, all of which are permanent
improvements which cannot be removed even after the expiration of the lease without violation
of the lease agreement (Rollo, pp. 422-423).
In the same manner, the sound value of these improvements should have been excluded from the
appraisal of DALIGHT’s properties.
4. Properties which allegedly by their nature are not subject to appraisal are motor vehicles
which fall under the “Employees Car Plan”. While the employer retains the registration of the
same in its name, it is only a form of alien against said vehicle should the employee opt to
abscond before the vehicle is fully paid. That the vehicle has been sold to the employees even
though conditionally and for only one half of the purchase price conclusively proves that the
vehicles are no longer owned by the employer.
Still further, should the employment of the employees concerned be terminated before all
installments are fully paid, the vehicles will be taken by the employer and all installments paid
shall be considered rentals per agreement. In that eventuality, said vehicle will neither qualify
for appraisal because the same have been used to earn rentals and not for power generation nor
distribution.
In resume, the amounts to be deducted from the approved amount of P282,024,877.40 which is
the appraised sound value of DALIGHT’s properties, assets and equipment, are as follows:
Amount Approved by BOE . . . . . . . . . P282,024,877.40

Deductions:
(a) For Power Plants - P153,504,500.00
(b) 40% value of Adm. Building - 1,353,244.00
(c) Value of Airplane - 75,000.00
(d) Value of Permanent Improvements:
Digos and Parrigan Project - 2,455,900.00
Talomo Hydropower System - 2,128,500.00
(e) Vehicles purchased under Car Plan - 332,300.00
Total Deductions 159,849,444.00
Balance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . P122,175,433.40
==========
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the December 6, 1983 decision of the Board of Energy is hereby
MODIFIED by approving only the sum of P122,175,433.40 as the fair and reasonable value of
the properties, assets and equipment in service as of October 9, 1981 of DALIGHT.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Padilla, Sarmiento, and Regalado, JJ., concur.
271 Phil. 932
EN BANC
G.R. No. 92649, February 14, 1991
SPOUSES LEONOR AND ROSA BADUA, PETITIONERS, VS. CORDILLERA BODONG

ADMINISTRATION, CORDILLERA PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY, MANUEL TAO-IL,
AMOGAO-EN KISSIP, DALALO ILLIQUES, JUANITO GAYYED, PEDRO CABANTO,
VICENTE DAYEM AND DAVID QUEMA, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
GRINO-AQUINO, J.:
Whether a tribal court of the Cordillera Bodong Administration can render a valid and executory
decision in a land dispute is the legal issue presented by this petition.
The petitioners, spouses Leonor and Rosa Badua, allegedly own a farm land in Lucaga, Lumaba,
Villaviciosa, Abra. In July 1989, they were forcibly ejected from the land by virtue of a
"decision" of the Cordillera Bodong Administration in Case No. 0, entitled "David Quema vs.
Leonor Badua."
The factual background of the case, as recited in the undated "decision" (Annex A, translation is
Annex A-1) is as follows:
In 1966, Quema, as the owner of two parcels of land in Lucaga, Lumaba, Villaviciosa, Abra,
evidenced by Tax Declarations Nos. 4997 and 4998 mortgaged said parcels of land for P6,000 to
Dra. Erotida Valera. He was able to redeem the land twenty-two (22) years later, on August 14,
1988, long after the mortgagee had already died. He allegedly paid the redemption price of
P10,000 to the mortgagee's heir, Jessie Macaraeg.
On the other hand, Rosa Badua alleged that the land was sold to her by Dra. Erotida Valera when
she was still alive. However, Rosa could not produce the deed of sale because it is allegedly in
the possession of Vice-Governor Benesa.
As Quema was prevented by Rosa Badua from cultivating the land, he filed a case before the
Barangay Council, but it failed to settle the dispute, A certain Judge Cacho advised Quema to file
his complaint in the provincial level courts. Instead, Quema filed it in the tribal court of the
Maeng Tribe. The tribal court conducted a trial on February 19, 1989 and rendered the following
decision:
“9. The Maeng Tribal Court, therefore, decides to give the land to DAVID QUEMA and ROSA
BADUA and her husband must pay the persons to whom they mortgaged the said land. The
Maeng Tribal Court also decides that ROSA BADUA and her husband must reimburse the
expenses of DAVID QUEMA in following-up the land case amounting to P2,000.00. The
Maeng Tribal Court further decides to penalize ROSA BADUA and her husband in the amount
of P5,000.00 for telling the lie that they bought this land from the late DRA. EROTIDA
VALERA; for misleading the Maeng Tribal Court which handled the continuation of this case
here in Bangued, CBA Provincial Office where they failed to make an appearance: and their
illegal acquisition of the said parcel of land. This decision is based on the 'PAGTA.' " (pp. 16--
17, Rollo.)
When Leonor and Rosa Badua did not immediately vacate the land, they received on June 30,
1989 a "warning order" from Ka Blantie, Zone Commander, Abra Zone-1 of the Cordillera
People's Liberation Army, thus:
"WARNING ORDER"
"Mr. & MRS. LEONOR BADUA
"A last warning from the armed CPLA of the CBA reiterates the order that you not to interfere
any longer with the parcels of land decided in favor of DAVID QUEMA as per 'Court Order' of
the Maeng Tribal Court. You are also to pay back the expenses he incurred for the case
amounting to P2,000.00 and your fine of P5,000.00.
"Non-compliance of the said decision of the Court and any attempt to bring this case to another
Court will force the CPLA to settle the matter, in which case, you will have no one to blame
since the case has been settled." (p. 20, Rollo.)
Fearful for his life, Leonor Badua went into hiding. In September 1989, his wife, Rosa, was
arrested by the Cordillera People's Liberation Army and detained for two days.
On April 2, 1990, the Baduas filed this petition "for Special and Extraordinary Reliefs" (which
may be treated as a petition for certiorari and prohibition) praying that:
1. a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to stop the respondents from enforcing the decision
of the Cordillera Bodong Administration, during the pendency of this case;
2. the respondents be prohibited from usurping judicial power and hearing cases; and
3. the legal personality of the Cordillera Bodong Administration and Cordillera People's
Liberation Army be clarified.
Petitioners allege that the decision of the Cordillera Bodong Administration is null and void
because:
1. petitioners were denied due process or formal hearing; and
2. the Cordillera Bodong Administration has no judicial power nor jurisdiction over the
petitioners nor over the private respondent as neither of them are members of the Maeng Tribe.
Upon receipt of the petition, the Court on April 5, 1990 required the respondents to comment,
but, unable to serve said resolution on the respondents, the court requested the Philippine
Constabulary Commander of the Cordillera Region to do it.
Respondents through counsel, Atty. Demetrio V. Pre, filed their comment on October 26,
1990. They alleged that: the Maeng Tribe is a cultural minority group of Tingguians inhabiting
the interior mountain town of Villaviciosa, Abra. The tribe is a part of the Cordillera Bodong
Association or Administration whose military arm is the Cordillera People's Liberation
Army. The tribal court, or council of elders, is composed of prominent and respected residents
in the locality. It decides and settles all kinds of disputes more speedily than the regular courts,
without the intervention of lawyers.
Respondents further allege that the proceedings and decisions of the tribal courts are respected
and obeyed by the parties, the municipal and barangay officials, and the people in the locality,
ostracism being the penalty for, disobedience of, or non-compliance with, the decisions of the
council of elders in the areas where tribal courts operate.
Respondents contend that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over the tribal courts because
they are not a part of the judicial system.
Respondents concede that if the petitioners "want to test the wisdom of the decision of the
council of elders,” the petitioners should file the necessary suit, not in the Supreme Court, but in
the trial courts, where evidence can be presented. Respondents pray that the decision of the
tribal court be maintained and the petition for certiorari and prohibition be dismissed.
After deliberating on the petition and the comment thereon of the respondents, which the Court
decided to treat as the latter's answer, the Court finds the petition to be meritorious, hence,
resolved to grant the same.
In "Cordillera Regional Assembly Member Alexander P. Ordillo, et al., vs. The Commission on
Elections, et al., " G.R. No. 93054, December 4, 1990, the Court en banc, found that in the
plebiscite that was held on January 23, 1990 pursuant to Republic Act 6766, the creation of the
Cordillera Autonomous Region was rejected by all the provinces and city[*] of the Cordillera
region, except Ifugao province, hence, the Cordillera Autonomous Region did not come to be.
"Resolution No. 2259 of the Commission on Elections, insofar as it upholds the creation of an
autonomous region, the February 14, 1990 memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, the
February 5, 1990 memorandum of the Executive Secretary, Administrative Order No. 160, and
Republic Act No. 6861 are declared null and void while Executive Order No. 220 is declared to
be still in force and effect until properly repealed or amended."
As a logical consequence of that judicial declaration, the Cordillera Bodong Administration
created Under Section 13 of Executive Order No. 220, the indigenous and special courts for the
indigenous cultural communities of the Cordillera region (Sec. 1, Art. VII, Rep. Act 6766), and
the Cordillera People's Liberation Army, as a regional police force or a regional command of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (Secs. 2 and 4, Article XVIII of R.A. 6766), do not legally
exist.
Since the Cordillera Autonomous Region did not come into legal existence, the Maeng Tribal
Court was not constituted into an indigenous or special court under R.A. No. 6766. Hence, the
Maeng Tribal Court is an ordinary tribal court existing under the customs and traditions of an
indigenous cultural community.
Such tribal courts are not a part of the Philippine judicial system which consists of the Supreme
Court and the lower courts which have been established by law (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987
Constitution). They do not possess judicial power. Like the pangkats or conciliation panels
created by P.D. No. 1508 in the barangays, they are advisory and conciliatory bodies whose
principal objective to bring together the parties to a dispute and persuade them to make peace
settle, and compromise.
An amicable settlement, compromise, and arbitration award rendered by a pangkat, if not

seasonably repudiated, has the force and effect of a final judgment of a court (Sec. 11, P.D.
1508), but it can be enforced only through the local city or municipal court to which the secretary
of the Lupon transmits the compromise settlement or arbitration award upon expiration of the
period to annul or repudiate it (Sec. 14, P.D. 1508). Similarly, the decisions of a tribal court
based on compromise or arbitration, as provided in P.D. 1508, may been enforced or set aside, in
and through the regular courts only.
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is hereby GRANTED. The
decision rendered on February 18, 1989 by the Maeng Tribal Court in Case No. 0, entitled
"David Quema vs. Leonor Badua," is hereby annulled for lack of jurisdiction. The respondents
Cordillera Bodong Administration, Cordillera People's Liberation Army, Manuel Tao-il,
Amogao-en Kissip, Dalalo Illiques, Juanito Gayyed, Pedro Cabanto, Vicente Dayem and David
Quema, are hereby ordered to cease and desist from implementing said decision without
prejudice to the filing of an appropriate action by the parties in the proper competent courts of
the land as provided by law. Costs against the respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Medialdea, and Regalado, JJ., concur.
[*]
Benguet, Mountain Province, Abra, Kalinga-Apayao and City of Baguio.
574 Phil. 20
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 155806, April 08, 2008
TIBLE & TIBLE COMPANY, INC., HEIRS OF EMILIO G. TIBLE, JR., NAMELY:
ALMABELLA MENLA VDA. DE TIBLE, EMILIO M. TIBLE IV, MA. MYLENE TIBLE,
VICTOR M. TIBLE, ERIC M. TIBLE, ALLAN M. TIBLE, NORMAN M. TIBLE AND JOHANN
EMIL M. TIBLE, PETITIONERS, VS. ROYAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION (NOW
ASSIGNED TO COMSAVINGS BANK) AND GODOFREDO E. QUILING, DEPUTY
PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF CALAMBA, LAGUNA, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:

THE remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or
successive. Certiorari being an extraordinary remedy, the party which seeks to avail of it must
observe the Rules strictly.
This is a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari of the Resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) which dismissed a Rule 65 petition for certiorari on procedural flaws.
The Facts
The facts, as reflected in the petition and its annexes, are as follows:
Sometime in June 1997, petitioners Tible & Tible Company, Inc. (TTCI) and Emilio G. Tible, Jr.
(now deceased), jointly and severally, obtained a loan and/or credit accommodation from
respondent Royal Savings and Loan Association (RSLA) in the total amount of one million five
hundred thousand and eighty pesos (P1,500,080.00). The loan amount was released to petitioner
TTCI in four instalments, as follows:
Date Released Amount Due Date

June 6, 1977 P750,000.00 June 6, 1980
July 30, 1977 250,040.00 June 30, 1980
September 21, 1977 250,040.00 September 9, 1980
February 21, 1978 250,000.00 February 21, 1980
TOTAL P1,500,080.00
Securing the loan were the following mortgages:
(a) Chattel Mortgage executed on June 2, 1977 over 64 units/pieces of logging, heavy, and
sawmill equipment, their accessions and accessories, all valued at P3,123,035.00; and
(b) Chattel Mortgage on 2,243 pieces of logs, with total volume of 683,818 board feet.
The loan was intended to finance the logging and lumber business of petitioner
TTCI. Unfortunately, between 1977 to 1980, TTCI did not come up to its projected capacity of
12,000 board feet per 8-hour operation due to mechanical and design deficiencies. Despite
remedial measures undertaken, it was unsuccessful in its efforts to rehabilitate the
sawmill. TTCI was thus able to pay only P418,317.40 through dacion en pago by delivery of its
lumber products.
In a Decision dated February 4, 1980 in Civil Case No. 2893, then Judge Luis L. Victor of the
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cavite, Branch 2, approved the compromise agreement between
respondent RSLA, as then plaintiff on the one hand, and petitioners TTCI and Emilio Tible, Jr.,
as then defendants, on the other. TTCI expressly admitted to be indebted to RSLA in the sum of
P2,428,290.20, inclusive of interests, attorney's fees service charges, stamps collection costs and
expenses of suit, to be restructured for 18 months commencing January 12, 1980.[2]
Also stipulated in said compromise agreement is the mode of payment, to wit:
2. That defendants, after having fully examined and verified the said sum of P2,428,290.20 to be
correct and/or untainted by any illegality or any imperfection in law and in fact, do hereby
expressly propose to pay the said sum of P2,428,290.20 strictly according to the fallowing
schedule:
a. P156,176.58 - on or before March 30, 1980;

b. P156,176.58 - on or before April 30, 1980 and every 30th day of the
immediately succeeding months thereafter until the account is paid in full,
it being expressly understood that all unpaid instalments shall bear
fourteen per cent (14%) interest per annum from their respective dates of
default until full payment.[3]
The compromise agreement further stated that "failure on the part of the defendants to pay any
one of the installments as and when the same is due and payable, shall make the whole obligation
immediately due and payable and shall entitle the plaintiff to immediately execute without
further verbal or written notice to the defendants x x x."[4]
After TTCI defaulted in its monthly payments, RSLA moved for immediate execution of the
February 4, 1980 Decision based on the compromise in Civil Case No. N-2893, without
furnishing TTCI any copy of such motion. CFI granted the motion and issued the order dated
July 16, 1980 stating as follows:
For failure of the defendants to comply with the decision rendered by the Court on February 4,
1980, the omnibus ex parte motion for appointment of special sheriff to enforce the same, dated
July 1, 1980, filed by the plaintiff is granted.
WHEREFORE, in view thereof, let a writ of execution be issued in this case and the same be
implemented by the City Sheriff of Naga City.
SO ORDERED.[5]
In its manifestation with ex parte motion dated August 17, 1981 in the said civil case, RSLA
sought the issuance of an alias writ of execution, which was again granted by the CFI, as
follows:
Considering the manifestation with ex parte motion, dated August 17, 1981, filed by counsel for
the plaintiff, to be well-taken, the motion is granted and an alias writ of execution is hereby
issued in this case and to implement the same, Deputy Provincial Sheriff of Laguna Godofredo
Quiling is hereby appointed as a special sheriff for the purpose.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Accordingly, an alias writ of execution[7] was issued.
In a public auction sale conducted on December 12, 1983 by Godofredo E. Quiling, then Deputy
Sheriff of the Province of Laguna, twenty-three (23) parcels of land[8] were awarded to RSLA as
highest bidder for the total bid price of P950,000.00.
On November 5, 1993, almost ten years after the supposed public auction sale, Quiling, now
Sheriff IV of Calamba, Laguna, issued the final deed of sale[9] in favor of RSLA (now
Comsavings Bank).
Upon another ex parte motion by now respondent Comsavings Bank, the former CFI of Cavite,
now Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 16, in Cavite City, issued an Order[10] for: (a) the
Register of Deeds of Naga City to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 9061; (b) the
Register of Deeds of Camarines Sur to cancel seven original and transfer certificates of title; (c)
the Provincial Assessor of Camarines Sur to cancel eight tax declarations; and (d) the City
Assessor of Naga City to cancel two tax declarations and (e) all of them to issue in lieu thereof
new certificates of title and tax declarations in the name of respondent Comsavings Bank, upon
payment of corresponding fees and subject to subsisting encumbrances.
Aggrieved by these developments, petitioners filed an action for "Annulment of Execution Sale,
and TCT Nos. 27994, 24002, 24003, 24004, 24005 and other related Documents, and/or
Reconveyance of Real Property with prayer to Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order
with Damages" initially with the RTC, Branch 24, Naga City which was docketed as Civil Case
No. RTC-96-3626, considering that the subject matter in litigation are located within the
territorial jurisdiction of the said court.
In an Order[11] dated October 13, 1997, however, RTC, Branch 24, in Naga City dismissed the
complaint for want of jurisdiction and suggested that the complaint be filed in Cavite City
instead. It cited Philippine National Bank v. Javelana[12] which held that the rule which prohibits
a judge from interfering with the actuations of the judge of another branch of the same court is
not infringed when the judge who modifies or annuls the order issued by the other judge acts in
the same case and belongs to the same court.[13]
Opting against elevating the said order of dismissal to the appellate court, petitioners filed the
same complaint, which is now the case involved in the present petition, with the RTC in Cavite
City as suggested by the RTC in Naga City. This was considered as a new case, docketed as
Civil Case No. N-6619, raffled to the same RTC, Branch 16 in which Civil Case No. N-2893
was docketed.
Instead of filing an answer, respondent Comsavings bank filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that petitioners' claim or demand has been waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished.
RTC and CA Dispositions
On February 6, 2002, the RTC dismissed the complaint in Civil Case No. N-6619 for want of
proof. The RTC likewise dismissed the counterclaim. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of
said dismissal was also denied by the RTC in its Order dated March 26, 2002, stating that:
Acting on the motion for reconsideration dated February 22, 2002 and finding no new and
cogent reason which would warrant a reversal of the decision dated February 6, 2002 considering
that the issues raised have already been passed upon and dealt with adequately, the same is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[14]
Petitioners elevated the case to the CA on May 15, 2002 via petition for review under Rule
42. On May 20, 2002, after allegedly realizing that the decision of RTC, Branch 16, Cavite City
was not rendered in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, petitioners filed a motion to withdraw
petition for review. The CA granted the motion to withdraw.
On May 23, 2002, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.
On July 11, 2002, the CA dismissed outright the petition for certiorari on procedural grounds,
viz.:
(1) the "Verification Affidavit of Non-Forum Shopping" was signed by one Almabella Menla
Vda. de Tible, but there is no Special Power of Attorney, Board Resolution nor Secretary's
Certificate was attached thereto authorizing said signatory to sign the Verification
and Affidavit of Non-Forum Shopping in behalf of the other petitioners; (Sec. 3, Rule 46
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as amended)
(2) there is no written explanation to justify service by mail in lieu of the required personal
service of copies of the petition upon the respondents was made (Section 11, Rule 13, Id.;
Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. vs. Hon. Ricafort, et al., 293 SCRA 661).
Further, even a perfunctory reading of the petition reveals that the same is seriously infirmed in
that it is not the proper remedy from the assailed decision dismissing petitioners' complaint for
"Annulment of Execution Sale and T.C.T. Nos. 27994, 24002, 24003, 24005 and other related
documents, and/or Reconveyance of Real Property with prayer for Preliminary Injunction and
Restraining Order with Damages" in Civil Case No. N-6619 before the Regional Trial Court of
Cavite City, Branch 16, but ordinary appeal therefrom under Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.[15]
On August 5, 2002, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and motion to admit
petitioners' special power of attorney and board resolution. In a Resolution dated October 29,
2002, the CA denied petitioners' plea for reconsideration.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
Issues
The two main issues are both procedural in nature:
1. Is petitioners' proper remedy an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 or a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65?
2. May the CA relax the application of the rules requiring verification and certification of non-
forum shopping under Section 3, Rule 46, as well as compliance with the rule regarding
priorities in modes of service and filing of pleadings under Section 11, Rule 13?
Our Ruling
The CA aptly dismissed the petition

for certiorari for being an improper
remedy.
In the assailed Resolution of July 11, 2002, the CA dismissed petitioners' certiorari petition for
being the wrong remedy or mode of review of the decision dated February 6, 2002 of RTC,
Branch 16, in Cavite City.
The RTC decision is a judgment from which an appeal may be taken in accordance with Section
1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, which states:
SECTION 1. Subject of appeal. - An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to
be appealable.
The CA was, therefore, correct when it dismissed outright the petition for certiorari. This Court
has invariably upheld dismissals of certiorari petitions erroneously filed, appeal being the
correct remedy. It is a very basic rule in our jurisprudence that certiorari cannot be availed of
when the party has adequate remedy such as an appeal.
Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rule of Civil Procedure explicitly states when a petition for
certiorari may be availed of, to wit:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment
be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and
granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. (Emphasis supplied)
The Court has exhaustively enumerated and painstakingly discussed the differences between
these two remedies in Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation,[16] viz.:
Appeal and Certiorari Distinguished
Between an appeal and a petition for certiorari, there are substantial distinctions which shall be
explained below.
As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction,
not errors of judgment. In Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC, we explained the simple reason for
the rule in this light:
"When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it
of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed
by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void
judgment. This cannot be allowed. The administration of justice would not survive such a
rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction is not correctable through the original civil action of certiorari."
The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of certiorari cannot be
exercised for the purpose of reviewing the intrinsic correctness of a judgment of the lower court -
on the basis either of the law or the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal soundness of the
decision. Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the
case, such correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error is not one
of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact - a mistake of judgment - appeal is the remedy.
As to the Manner of Filing. Over an appeal, the CA exercises its appellate jurisdiction and
power of review. Over a certiorari, the higher court uses its original jurisdiction in accordance
with its power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts. An appeal is thus
a continuation of the original suit, while a petition for certiorari is an original and independent
action that was not part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order
complained of. The parties to an appeal are the original parties to the action. In contrast, the
parties to a petition for certiorari are the aggrieved party (who thereby becomes the petitioner)
against the lower court or quasi-judicial agency, and the prevailing parties (the public and the
private respondents, respectively).
As to the Subject Matter. Only judgments or final orders and those that the Rules of Court so
declare are appealable. Since the issue is jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari may be
directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an appeal from the judgment; or
where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate remedy.
As to the Period of Filing. Ordinary appeals should be filed within fifteen days from the notice
of judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant
must file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty days from the said notice of
judgment or final order. A petition for review should be filed and served within fifteen days
from the notice of denial of the decision, or of the petitioner's timely filed motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration. In an appeal by certiorari, the petition should be filed also within
fifteen days from the notice of judgment or final order, or of the denial of the petitioner's motion
for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
On the other hand, a petition for certiorari should be filed not later than sixty days from the
notice of judgment, order, or resolution. If a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration
was timely filed, the period shall be counted from the denial of the motion.
As to the Need for a Motion for Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration is generally
required prior to the filing of a petition for certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an
opportunity to correct the alleged errors. Note also that this motion is a plain and adequate
remedy expressly available under the law. Such motion is not required before appealing a
judgment or final order.[17]
With these distinctions, it is plainly discernible why a party is precluded from filing a petition for
certiorari when appeal is available, or why the two remedies of appeal and certiorari are
mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.[18] Where appeal is available, certiorari
will not prosper, even if the ground availed of is grave abuse of discretion.[19]
More than that, We find no grave abuse of discretion here. Applying the settled jurisprudence on
the matter, appeal would have been an adequate remedy, especially since the dismissal by the
RTC was mainly based on factual considerations.
After a thorough review of all the arguments of petitioners, We are unconvinced that the alleged
errors referred to are acts of "grave abuse of discretion" that would fall under the definition of
this phrase. As We explained in Pilipino Telephone Corporation v. Pilipino Telephone
Employees Association:[20]
For a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to prosper, the tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions must be proven to have acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. "Grave abuse of discretion" has been defined as "a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not
enough, it must be so grave as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law."[21]
It should be stressed that it is not sufficient that a tribunal, in the exercise of its power, abused its
discretion; such abuse must be grave.[22]
Non-compliance with the rules is

fatal to a petition for certiorari.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the petition for certiorari filed with the CA is the correct remedy,
still, petitioners' defective verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping as required by
Section 3, Rule 46, as well as the absence of any written explanation to justify service by mail in
lieu of personal service, as required by Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rule of Civil Procedure,
are fatal to their cause.
In Athena Computers, Inc. v. Reyes,[23] the Court stressed that "certiorari, being an extraordinary
remedy, the party who seeks to avail of the same must strictly observe the rules laid down by the
law." The Court further explained in Athena:
The acceptance of a petition for certiorari as well as the grant of due course thereto is, in
general, addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Although the court has absolute
discretion to reject and dismiss a petition for certiorari, it does so only (1) when the petition fails
to demonstrate grave abuse of discretion by any court, agency, or branch of the government; or
(2) when there are procedural errors, like violations of the Rules of Court or Supreme Court
Circulars. Clearly petitioners in their petition before the Court of Appeals committed procedural
errors.
The verification of the petition and certification of non-forum shopping before the Court of
Appeals were signed only by Jimenez. There is no showing that he was authorized to sign the
same by Athena, his co-petitioner.
Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules states that a pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has
read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his knowledge and
belief. Consequently, the verification should have been signed not only by Jimenez but also by
Athena's duly authorized representative.
In Docena v. Lapesura, we ruled that the certificate of non-forum shopping should be signed by
all the petitioners or plaintiffs in a case, and that the signing by only one of them is
insufficient. The attestation on non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the party
executing the same, and the lone signing petitioner cannot be presumed to have personal
knowledge of the filing or non-filing by his co-petitioners of any action or claim the same as
similar to the current petition.[24]
As noted by the CA in its Resolution of July 11, 2002, petitioner Almabella Menla Vda. de
Tible's signature in the verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping of the petition for
certiorari was not ratified by any special power of attorney, board resolution nor secretary's
certificate executed by her co-petitioners authorizing her to sign for and in their behalf. The CA
used this as one of its basis to dismiss the petition.
The CA refused to reverse its earlier dismissal upon petitioners' motion for reconsideration
despite subsequent compliance by submitting the required special power of attorney,[25]
secretary's certificate,[26] and board resolution.[27]
In Digital Microwave Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[28] the Court affirmed the CA dismissal
of a petition on the same ground, noting -
x x x That petitioner did not in the first instance comply with the requirement of Revised
Circular No. 2-91 by having the certification against forum shopping signed by one of its
officers, as it did after its petition before the Court of Appeals had been dismissed, is beyond
our comprehension.[29] (Emphasis supplied)
At any rate, it must be noted that subsequent compliance does not ipso facto entitle a party to a
reconsideration of the dismissal order. As the Court aptly observed in Batoy v. Regional Trial
Court, Br. 50, Loay, Bohol:[30]
x x x the requirement under Administrative Circular No. 04-94 for a certificate of non-forum
shopping is mandatory. The subsequent compliance with said requirement does not excuse a
party's failure to comply therewith in the first instance. In those cases where this Court
excused the non-compliance with the requirement of the submission of a certificate of non-forum
shopping, it found special circumstances or compelling reasons which made the strict
application of said Circular clearly unjustified or inequitable. x x x[31] (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, petitioners failed to include any written explanation to justify service by mail in lieu
of the required personal service of copies of the petition upon respondents. Section 11, Rule 13
of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. - Whenever practicable, the service and filing
of pleadings and other papers shall be done personally. Except with respect to papers emanating
from the court, a resort to other modes must be accompanied by a written explanation why the
service or filing was not done personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the
paper as not filed. (Emphasis supplied)
In Solar Team Entertainment v. Ricafort,[32] the Court has unequivocally stated that "for the
guidance of the Bench and the Bar, strictest compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 is mandated
x x x."[33] The Court finds no cogent reason not to apply the same strict standard to petitioners.
The doctrine of liberal application of

Procedural rules applies when there
is justifiable cause for non-
compliance or compelling reason to
relax it.
Much reliance is placed on the rule that "Courts are not slaves or robots of technical rules, shorn
of judicial discretion. In rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought to be,
conscientiously guided by the norm that on balance, technicalities take a backseat against
substantive rights, and not the other way around."[34] This rule must always be used in the right
context, lest injustice, rather than justice would be its end result.
It must never be forgotten that, generally, the application of the rules must be upheld, and the
suspension or even mere relaxation of its application, is the exception. This Court previously
explained:
The Court is not impervious to the frustration that litigants and lawyers alike would at times
encounter in procedural bureaucracy but imperative justice requires correct observance of
indispensable technicalities precisely designed to ensure its proper dispensation. It has long
been recognized that strict compliance with the Rules of Court is indispensable for the
prevention of needless delays and for the orderly and expeditious dispatch of judicial business.
Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities that may be ignored at will to
suit the convenience of a party. Adjective law is important in ensuring the effective
enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and speedy administration of
justice. These rules are not intended to hamper litigants or complicate litigation but, indeed to
provide for a system under which a suitor may be heard in the correct form and manner and at
the prescribed time in a peaceful confrontation before a judge whose authority they
acknowledge.
It cannot be overemphasized that procedural rules have their own wholesome rationale in the
orderly administration of justice. Justice has to be administered according to the Rules in
order to obviate arbitrariness, caprice, or whimsicality. We have been cautioned and reminded
in Limpot vs. CA, et al., that:
"Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration of justice and the
protection of substantive rights in judicial and extrajudicial proceedings. It is a mistake to
propose that substantive law and adjective law are contradictory to each other or, as often
suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules should never be permitted if it will result in
prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants. This is not exactly true; the concept is much
misunderstood. As a matter of fact, the policy of the courts is to give both kinds of law, as
complementing each other, in the just and speedy resolution of the dispute between the
parties. Observance of both substantive rights is equally guaranteed by due process, whatever
the source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court.
xxxx
"x x x (T)hey are required to be followed except only when for the most persuasive of reasons
them may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed. x x x While it is true that a
litigation is not a game of technicalities, this does not mean that the Rules of Court may be
ignored at will and at random to the prejudice of the orderly presentation and assessment of the
issues and their just resolution. Justice eschews anarchy."[35]
For the exception to come into play, first and foremost should be the party litigant's plausible
explanation for non-compliance with the rules he proposes to be exempted from. Absent any
acceptable explanation, the party's plain violation of the rules will not be countenanced.
Thus, in Suzuki v. De Guzman,[36] the Court held:

As a general rule, these requirements are mandatory, meaning, non-compliance therewith is a
sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. While the Court is not unmindful of
exceptional cases where this Court has set aside procedural defects to correct a patent injustice,
concomitant to a liberal application of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of
the party invoking liberality to at least explain his failure to comply with the rules. There must
be at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the Rules. Utter disregard of the Rules
cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.[37] (Emphasis
supplied)
In Ortiz v. Court of Appeals,[38] the CA dismissed the petition for review outright for failure of
petitioners to sign the certification of non-forum shopping. The certification was signed only by
their lawyer. In affirming the dismissal of the petition, the Court said:
Regrettably, we find substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict
observance as provided for in Circular No. 28-91. The attestation contained in the certification
on non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the same. To
merit the Court's consideration, petitioner here must show reasonable cause for failure to
personally sign the certification. The petitioners must convince the court that the outright
dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration of justice. However, the petitioner did
not give any explanation to warrant their exemption from the strict application of the rule. Utter
disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal
construction.[39] (Emphasis supplied)
Too, the party litigant must convince the Court that the outright dismissal of the petition would
defeat the administration of justice.[40] The Court's pronouncements in Pet Plans, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals[41] are illustrative:
x x x In Loquias vs. Office of the Ombudsman (338 SCRA 62, 68 [2000]), we held that failure of
one of the petitioners to sign the verification and certificate against forum shopping constitutes a
defect in the petition, which is a ground for dismissing the same. While we have held in rulings
subsequent to Loquias that this rule may be relaxed, petitioners must comply with two
conditions: first, petitioners must show justifiable cause for their failure to personally sign the
certification, and; second, they must also be able to prove that the outright dismissal of the
petition would seriously impair the orderly administration of justice. x x x[42]
Recapitulating, the two pre-requisites for the relaxation of the rules are: (a) justifiable cause or
plausible reason for non-compliance; and (b) compelling reason to convince the court that
outright dismissal of the petition would seriously impair the orderly administration of justice.
Perusing the records, We find neither justifiable cause nor compelling reason to relax the rules in
petitioners' favor.
Petitioners do not have any plausible reason for non-compliance. In their motion for
reconsideration[43] of the CA dismissal, petitioners claimed that co-petitioners of Almabella Vda.
de Tible, who signed the verification in their behalf, had executed a Special Power of Attorney
(SPA) way back in November 22, 1997, but offered no acceptable explanation why they did
not attach a copy of said SPA to their petition for certiorari. The same is true with the lack of a
board resolution. Supposed "oversight and/or inadvertence committed by petitioners' counsel"
which may easily be alleged, do not per se constitute an acceptable explanation for non-
compliance.
Also, the Court finds nothing on record which constitutes compelling reason for a liberal
application of procedural rules.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez, (Acting Chairperson), Tinga, Chico-Nazario, and Nachura, JJ., concur.
* Vice Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, who is on official leave per
Special Order No. 497 dated March 14, 2008.
** Designated as additional member per Special Order No. 497 dated March 14, 2008.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 45-46. Dated July 11, 2002. Penned by Associate Justice B.A. Adefuin-dela Cruz
(now retired), with Associate Justices Eliezer R. de los Santos (now deceased) and Regalado E.
Maambong, concurring.
[2]
Id. at 80.
[3]
Id.
[4]
Id. at 81. (Emphasis supplied)
[5]
Id. at 82.
[6]
Id. at 84.
[7]
Id. at 85.
[8]
Ten (10) parcels of land were covered only by tax declarations, while thirteen parcels of land
were covered by eight (8) transfer certificates of titles.
[9]
Rollo, pp. 86-94.
[10]
Id. at 95-96. Dated February 16, 1995 in Civil Case No. N-2893.
[11]
Id. at 128-130.
[12]
92 Phil. 525 (1953).
[13]
Rollo, p. 130. Cited in RTC Order dated October 13, 1997.
[14]
Id. at 25.
[15]
Id. at 45-46.
[16]
G.R. No. 156067, August 11, 2004, 436 SCRA 123.
[17]
Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation, id. at 134-136.
[18]
Tomas Claudio Memorial College v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152568, February 16, 2004,
423 SCRA 122.
[19]
Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation, supra note 16, at 136-137.
[20]
G.R. No. 160058, June 22, 2007, 525 SCRA 361.
[21]
Pilipino Telephone Corporation v. Pilipino Telephone Employees Association, id. at 376-377,
citing Salinguin v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 166046, March 23, 2006, 485 SCRA 219.
[22]
Benito v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 134913, January 19, 2001, 349 SCRA 705, 714.
[23]
G.R. No. 156905, September 5, 2007, 532 SCRA 343.
[24]
Athena Computers, Inc. v. Reyes, id. at 348.
[25]
Rollo, p. 55.
[26]
Id. at 57.
[27]
Id. at 58.
[28]
G.R. No. 128550, March 16, 2000, 328 SCRA 286.
[29]
Digital Microwave Corporation v. Court of Appeals, id. at 290.
[30]
G.R. No. 126833, February 17, 2003, 397 SCRA 506.
[31]
Batoy v. Regional Trial Court, Br. 50, Loay, Bohol, id. at 510.
[32]
G.R. No. 132007, August 5, 1998, 293 SCRA 661.
[33]
Solar Team Entertainment v. Ricafort, id. at 670.
[34]
Grand Placement Services Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142358, January 31,
2006, 481 SCRA 189, 199.
[35]
Republic v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 117209, February 9, 1996, 253 SCRA 509, 529-531.
[36]
G.R. No. 146979, July 27, 2006, 496 SCRA 651.
[37]
Suzuki v. De Guzman, id. at 662.
[38]
G.R. No. 127393, December 4, 1998, 299 SCRA 708.
[39]
Ortiz v. Court of Appeals, id. at 711-712.
[40]
United Paragon Mining Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150959, August 4, 2006,
497 SCRA 638, 648.
[41]
G.R. No. 148287, November 23, 2004, 443 SCRA 510.
[42]
Pet Plans, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, id. at 520.
[43]
Rollo, p. 69.
643 Phil. 283
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 159275, August 25, 2010
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN

(SECOND DIVISION), RICARDO C. SILVERIO, FERDINAND E. MARCOS (NOW
SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS), IMELDA R. MARCOS AND PABLO P. CARLOS, JR. (NOW
SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS), RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This petition for certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the June 9, 2003 Resolution[1] of public
respondent Sandiganbayan (Second Division) which denied the motion to reopen for
presentation of plaintiff's additional evidence filed by the Republic of the Philippines.
The factual antecedents:
On July 22, 1987, petitioner through the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), instituted SB Civil Case No. 0011 for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution
and damages, entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos,
Ricardo C. Silverio and Pablo P. Carlos, Jr." Petitioner seeks to recover ill-gotten wealth
acquired or accumulated by the said respondents either singly or collectively, and includes
charges of misappropriation and theft of public funds; plunder of the nation's wealth; extortion;
blackmail; bribery; embezzlement and other acts of corruption; betrayal of public trust; and
abuse of power, to the grave and irreparable damage of petitioner.
Private respondents Silverio and Carlos, Jr. were specifically charged with the following acts:
a) gave to above Defendant spouses improper payments such as kickbacks and/or commissions
in hundreds of thousands of US dollars in exchange for an award to Defendant Ricardo C.
Silverio of Kawasaki Scrap Loaders and Toyota Rear Dump Trucks, respectively;
b) received annually, for three consecutive years, special accommodations, privileges and
exemptions by the Central Bank in the form of (i) increased dollar import quota allocation for the
importation of Toyota vehicles for Delta Motors[,] Inc., and airconditioning and refrigerating
equipment in excess of the limits prescribed under applicable Central Bank Rules and
Regulations, and (ii) a more liberal mode of payment (i.e., documents against acceptance (D/A)
vs. letter of credit (L/C) arrangement) contrary to Central Bank Rules and Regulations and to the
manifest disadvantage of Plaintiff and the Filipino people;
c) obtained huge amounts in loans, guarantees and other types of credit accommodations under
favored and very liberal terms of credit from government financial institution, such as the
Philippine National Bank, to finance the establishment, operation and working capital
requirements of his various business/financial ventures, more particularly, the Delta Motors
Corporation, to the serious detriment of Plaintiff and the Filipino people;
d) was extended preferential status and treatment in the implementation of the Government's
Progressive Car Manufacturing Program (PCMP) resulting in (i) unfair advantage to Defendant
Ricardo C. Silverio, (ii) unjust and improper discrimination against the other participants in the
PCMP, and (iii) the ultimate demise of PCMP, to the grave damage and prejudice of Plaintiff and
the Filipino people;
e) obtained from the Central Bank multi-million peso emergency loans as additional capital
infusion to Filipinas Bank, a commercial banking institution owned and/or controlled by
Defendant Ricardo C. Silverio;
f) acted as dummy, nominee or agent of Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos
in several corporations where said Defendants have substantial interests such as the Meralco
Securities and the First Philippine Holdings Corporation and, with the active collaboration,
knowledge and willing participation of Fe Roa Gimenez and Hector Rivera who served as
conduit for the receipt of funds from said corporations. Defendants Fe Roa Gimenez and Hector
Rivera are subjects of separate suits.[2]
After the presentation of its witnesses Godofredo dela Paz (Bank Officer III, Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas) and Ma. Lourdes O. Magno (PCGG Librarian), petitioner rested its case. In its Formal
Offer of Evidence dated October 18, 2001, petitioner submitted only the following documents:
EXH. A - Resolution of the Supreme Court promulgated on October 26, 1987, in G.R. No. 77645
entitled "Ricardo Silverio, petitioner, versus Presidential Commission on Good Government,
respondent."
Purpose: To show that there is a prima facie case against the defendant Ricardo Silverio, i.e.,
defendant has acquired assets and properties manifestly out of proportion to his usual and normal
income.
EXH. B - Memorandum dated April 27, 1987, of Godofredo dela Paz, re: Import Quota
Allocations Granted to Delta Motors Corporation (DMC)
EXH. B-1 - Signature of Godofredo dela Paz appearing on page 3 of Exh. B.
Purpose: To show that Delta Motors Corporation, a corporation 96% owned by defendant
Ricardo Silverio, was granted exemptions by the Central Bank in the matter of importing motor
vehicles and air conditioning and refrigeration equipment because of said defendant's close
association with former President Ferdinand Marcos.
EXH. C - A certification dated August 25, 1967, signed by defendant Ricardo Silverio whereby
defendant committed himself to pay $499,500.00 to someone, in consideration of his
arrangements for making possible the award to defendant of 1,000 units of Toyota rear dump
trucks.
EXH. C-1 - Signature of defendant Ricardo Silverio appearing at the bottom of Exh. C-1.
Purpose: To show that defendant Ricardo Silverio gave to former President Marcos improper
payments in exchange for an award to defendant of Toyota rear dump trucks.
EXH. D - A certification dated August 25, 1967, signed by defendant Ricardo Silverio whereby
defendant committed himself to pay $290,000.00 to someone, in consideration of his
arrangements for making possible the award to defendant of 200 units Kawasaki Scoop loaders.
EXH. D-1 - Signature of defendant Ricardo Silverio appearing at the bottom of Exh. D.
Purpose: To show that defendant Ricardo Silverio gave to former President Marcos improper
payments in exchange for an award to defendant of Kawasaki Scoop loaders.
EXH. E - Letter dated May 10, 1980, of Ricardo Silverio addressed to President Ferdinand E.
Marcos.
Purpose: To show that the enterprises ostensibly owned by Ricardo Silverio, e.g. Filipinas Bank
and Delta Motors Corp., are beneficially owned and controlled by former President Ferdinand
Marcos.[3]
Acting on the formal offer of evidence by the petitioner, as well as the comments/oppositions
respectively filed by respondents Silverio, Carlos, Jr. and Marcos, public respondent issued a
Resolution[4] on January 10, 2002 admitting only Exhibit "A" and denying admission of Exhibits
"B" to "E" for being mere photocopies and irrelevant to the purpose for which they were offered,
and failure to prove the due execution and authenticity of private writings. Nonetheless, the
documents not admitted were allowed to remain on the records.
On February 4, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion for
Reconsideration,[5] expressing its intention to file a Consolidated Motion for Reconsideration
with Motion to File Supplement to Formal Offer of Evidence.
On February 26, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Admit Herein Motion for Reconsideration
with Supplement to Formal Offer of Evidence[6] setting forth the following arguments: (a)
Technical rules should be set aside when necessary to achieve the purposes behind PCGG's
creation; (b) The best evidence rule does not apply since the contents of the writings are not in
issue; (c) Assuming arguendo that the best evidence rule applies, then secondary evidence may
be availed of when the original writing itself is unavailable and cannot be produced in court; and
(d) Exhibits "B" and "B-1" are admissible because they are relevant in establishing the fact that
defendant Silverio was granted accommodations by reason of his close association with former
President Marcos.[7]
In a Resolution[8] dated May 21, 2002, public respondent denied petitioner's Motion to Admit
Herein Motion for Reconsideration with Supplement to Formal Offer of Evidence. It held that
the petitioner was unable to establish the loss or destruction of the original documents and hence
it cannot be permitted to present secondary evidence as required under Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. That the best evidence rule applies in this case is demonstrated by petitioner's own
purpose in offering the rejected documentary exhibits for how then can it intend to prove the
defendants' close business/personal relationship with defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos without
inquiring into the contents thereof. Moreover, citing Section 19 of Rule 132, public respondent
declared that the mere fact that the subject documents "form part of the public records of private
documents in the possession of PCGG, [which were] required by law to be entered therein," does
not necessarily make them public documents; none of the exhibits offered by the petitioner is
required by any law to be entered in a public record. As to Exhibits "B" and "B-1", even if
properly identified by Godofredo dela Paz, the one (1) who executed the same, still the court
rejected these evidence on the ground that the same were mere photocopy and the offeror failed
to lay the basis for the introduction of secondary evidence, again in violation of the best evidence
rule.[9]
On September 25, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Reopen Plaintiff's Presentation of

Evidence[10] stating thus:
7. That on July 11, 2002, while preparing the files of PCGG documentary evidence for computer
scanning, PCGG Librarian Ma. Lourdes Magno discovered the original copies of certain
documentary evidence relevant to this case misfiled in a different case folder, thus, their
availability now for presentation. The affidavit of Ma. Lourdes Magno dated September 23, 2002
is hereto attached as Annex "A". Considering the voluminous records and documents involved
in the numerous ill-gotten wealth cases initiated by the PCGG, such incident should
understandably be unavoidable. It bears emphasis that these documents were among those
enumerated in the Pre-Trial Brief.
Attached herewith are certified true copies of the said documents, the originals of which will be
presented in the course of the proceedings, to wit:
(a) Memorandum of Godofredo dela Paz dated 27 April 1987 (Annex "B" hereof) which was
marked as plaintiff's Exhibit "B" in its Formal Offer of Evidence;
(b) Delta Motor[s] Corporation stock certificate for 10,000 shares issued to defendant Silverio;
(Annex "C" hereof) which was marked as plaintiff's Exhibit "J" in its Pre-Trial Brief;
(c) Philippine American Investments Corporation stock certificate for 10,000 shares issued to
Jose P. Madrigal (Annex "D" hereof) which was marked as plaintiff's Exhibit "I" in its Pre-Trial
Brief;
(d) Lepanto Consolidated Mining stock certificate for 3,183,750 shares issued to Fairmont Real
Estate[,] Inc. (Annex "E" hereof) which was marked as plaintiff's Exhibit "H" in its Pre-Trial
Brief;
(e) Meralco stock certificate for 1,566 shares issued to defendant Silverio (Annex "F" hereof)
which was marked as plaintiff's Exhibit "C" in its Pre-Trial Brief;
(f) Meralco stock certificate for 1,175 shares issued to defendant Silverio (Annex "G" hereof)
which was marked as plaintiff's Exhibit "D" in its Pre-Trial Brief;
(g) Meralco stock certificate for 1,175 shares issued to defendant Silverio (Annex "H" hereof)
which was marked as plaintiff's Exhibit "C" in its Pre-Trial Brief; and
(h) letter of Silverio to former President Ferdinand E. Marcos dated 10 May 1980 (Annex "I"
hereof) which was marked as plaintiff's Exhibit "E" in its Formal Offer of Evidence.
Attached also as Annexes are certified photocopies of Silverio's Letter dated 2 January 1974
(Annex "J") and an Insular Minerals Exploration Hinobaan Copper Project Timetable (Annex
"K" hereof).
Plaintiff intends to recall Ma. Lourdes O. Magno as its witness to testify on the existence of
the foregoing documents.
8. Further to prove its case against defendants, plaintiff also intends to present as additional
evidence the relevant contents of the transcript of defendant Silverio's direct testimony in
the case of US v. Imelda Marcos and Adnan Kashoggi, before the US District Court,
Southern District of New York (SSS87, Cr 0598 [JFK]), particularly on the following facts:
a. The personal help given by Ferdinand Marcos to defendant Silverio regarding the approval of
an SSS loan;
b. The corresponding transfer of shares of Delta Motors Corporation from defendant Silverio to
Ferdinand Marcos then valued at $900,000;
c. Defendant Silverio's receipt and endorsement in blank of shares of Meralco Securities and
First Philippine Holdings Corp. which were then given to a certain Mr. Fontanilla, one of the
secretaries of Mr. Roberto Benedicto, and which were then delivered to Mr. Marcos;
d. Delivery of cash dividends to Fe Roa Gimenez in Malacañang Palace; and,
e. The 15% commission of Mr. Marcos out of the $6,000,000 from the Reparations Commission,
among others.
Plaintiff intends to make the necessary request for admission of such additional vital evidence,
since the purpose of the rule governing requests for admissions of facts and genuineness of
documents is to expedite trial and to relieve parties of the costs of proving facts which will not be
disputed on trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry.
Attached herewith as Annex "L" is the letter dated August 27, 2002 of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government addressed to Monger, Tolles and Olsen, its counsel in
the aforementioned case, requesting for authenticated and certified true copy of the
transcript of stenographic notes in the said case.
On the basis of the foregoing, plaintiff respectfully seeks to reopen the case for the presentation
of its additional evidence.[11] (Emphasis supplied.)
Respondent Silverio filed his Opposition[12] asserting that the grounds cited by petitioner do not
warrant a reopening of the presentation of evidence. Assuming that petitioner identified the
"misfiled" documents in its pre-trial brief, still petitioner's failure to present the same was due to
gross and inexcusable negligence. He further pointed out that Atty. Edgardo L. Kilayko of the
PCGG categorically declared at the September 18, 2001 hearing that petitioner had no other
evidence apart from those already marked. He claimed that the timing of the discovery of the
"misfiled" documents is highly suspect, after the court rejected these "certain documents" and
only after fourteen (14) years since the case was filed when petitioner should have already
gathered, prepared and presented its evidence.
In its Reply[13] to Opposition, petitioner argued that the paramount interest of justice, the
recovery of ill-gotten wealth declared as an overriding policy of State under Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, requires that petitioner Republic be granted the opportunity to present the
originals of the exhibits it earlier presented, in compliance with the court's lawful order when it
denied admission of mere photocopies of the same when they were first formally
offered. Petitioner also stressed that respondent Silverio's right to speedy trial was not violated
as there was no unreasonable request for postponement of the trial but a supplication for the
reopening of the case to present additional evidence to protect the State's interest, the additional
evidence sought to be offered being relevant and material to petitioner's case. Aside from the
originals of the exhibits earlier formally offered, as well as documents listed in the Pre-Trial
Brief, petitioner seeks to present in evidence respondent Silverio's own testimony in the case of
US v. Imelda Marcos and Adnan Kashoggi wherein he testified to matters referred to in
petitioner's Motion to Reopen the presentation of evidence in this case; these are very material as
they contain statements given by respondent Silverio under oath in a US District Court referring
to acts and documents concerning the very allegations sought to be established by petitioner in
this case. There can be no cries of surprise on the part of respondent Silverio since everything
sought to be introduced are of public records, and as for aforementioned testimony, based on his
own personal knowledge.
On June 9, 2003, public respondent issued the assailed Resolution[14] denying the Motion to
Reopen Plaintiff's Presentation of Evidence, as follows:
WE view the motion more of the nature of a plea to reconsider our resolution denying the
admission of Exhibits "B" to "E". Thus, the prayer is to allow to present additional witness
and/or to recall witness to establish the existence and execution of the original copies of Exhibits
"B" to "E". If we afford affirmative relief to the motion, it will render completely ineffective and
totally at naught our Resolution denying the admission of these exhibits with all the grounds
redoubtable as they are, spelled out in our Resolution. Our Resolution admitting only Exhibits
"B" to "E" (sic) has long become final and executory and the issues in connection thereto has
long been laid to rest. WE cannot allow it to be revived on the pretext of another motion
captioned differently without doing violence to the settled rule of finality of orders or decision.
Worse everything would be an endless rigmarole without any end of the proceedings on sight.
Moreover, the documents and proofs alleged in the plaintiffs motion have been existing all along,
some in fact as early as fourteen (14) years ago, and after these years of hearing, the Court
cannot just simply brush aside what had been taken up, and on the mere claim that those
documents were "misfiled" and are now ready to be presented, reopen again the proceedings
with all the adverse consequences to the time honored orderly presentation of evidence and the
universally acclaimed expeditious, speedy and inexpensive disposition of all action[s] and
proceedings.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, plaintiff's Motion to Reopen Plaintiff's Presentation of

Evidence is denied.
SO ORDERED.[15] (Italics supplied.)
Hence, this recourse via certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion in the denial of petitioner's
motion to reopen presentation of plaintiff's evidence.
On November 10, 2003, we granted petitioner's urgent motion for issuance of a temporary
restraining order and directed public respondent to refrain from acting on and/or taking
cognizance of the Motion to Dismiss by way of Demurrer to Evidence (Motion to Dismiss) filed
by respondent Silverio, and from enforcing its June 9, 2003 Resolution denying petitioner's
motion to reopen for presentation of additional evidence and its Order given in open court on
August 1, 2003 submitting SB Civil Case No. 0011 for resolution, until further orders from this
Court.[16]
Petitioner submits that contrary to the ruling of public respondent, resolutions denying
admissibility to petitioner's documentary exhibits, as well as the subject resolution denying the
motion to present additional evidence, were not final orders which may no longer be
disturbed. Citing the case of Looyuko v. Court of Appeals,[17] petitioner points out that before
judgment is rendered and for good cause shown, the court may still allow the introduction of
additional evidence, and that is still within a liberal interpretation of the period for trial. Since no
judgment has yet been rendered in SB Civil Case No. 0011, the presentation of additional
evidence may still be resolved by public respondent and integrated in the judgment disposing of
all the claims in the said case.[18]
As to the length of time for the trial of the case, petitioner maintains that it is not fair to attribute
delay solely to it; presentation of plaintiff's evidence was only terminated in 2002 when
petitioner filed its formal offer of evidence, which public respondent denied. The presentation of
additional evidence will not cause substantial injustice to respondent Silverio as these documents
and the witnesses to be recalled were all declared in petitioner's Pre-Trial Brief, while the
testimony in a foreign court is none other than that of respondent Silverio, confirming material
facts, which are the subject of SB Civil Case No. 0011. On the other hand, disallowing the
presentation of additional evidence would cause undue prejudice to petitioner's case.[19]
Respondent Silverio reiterates that public respondent did not gravely abuse its discretion in
denying petitioner's motion which it claims will enable it to present the originals of the exhibits
earlier offered for admission but only two (2) actually relates to the exhibits it had already
offered in evidence. Public respondent court had denied admission to these two (2) exhibits not
only because they violated the Best Evidence Rule but also because they are irrelevant and not
properly authenticated. It is argued that the policy of relaxing the technical rules of procedure in
cases of recovery of ill-gotten wealth is not a license to disregard the fundamental Rules of
Evidence. As to the testimony given by respondent Silverio, petitioner had said that the same
was given wayback in 1990 or twelve (12) years ago. Hence, it was available to the Republic
long before it drafted its Pre-trial Brief and before it commenced presentation of evidence.
Petitioner's failure to present the alleged testimony of respondent Silverio is gross and
inexcusable negligence and therefore cannot be a ground to reopen the case. Petitioner's
asseveration that to reopen the proceedings to allow it to present additional evidence would not
cause substantial injustice to respondent Silverio cannot be serious. If twenty (20) years of long
litigation is not harassment and injustice, respondent Silverio does not know what
is. Respondent Silverio also points out that the Republic's pre-trial brief dated September 1990
was superseded by the February 23, 1996 Pre-Trial Brief wherein petitioner makes no reference
to any of the "misfiled" documents, and hence petitioner is now precluded from presenting such
"misfiled" documents.[20]
We grant the petition.
First, on petitioner's immediate resort to this Court without filing a motion for reconsideration
with the public respondent of the assailed resolution denying its motion to reopen for
presentation of additional evidence.
As a rule, the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, lies only when the lower court has been given the opportunity to correct
the error imputed to it through a motion for reconsideration of the assailed order or resolution.[21]
This rule, though, has certain exceptions: (1) when the issue raised is purely of law, (2) when
public interest is involved, or (3) in cases of urgency. As a fourth exception, the Court has also
ruled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration before availment of the remedy of certiorari
is not a sine qua non, when the questions raised are the same as those that have already been
squarely argued and exhaustively passed upon by the lower court.[22]
Aside from the public interest involved in the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth by the
Government, it was shown that the issue herein raised by petitioner had already been squarely
argued by it and amply discussed by public respondent in its assailed resolution. Hence, the
requirement of prior filing of a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with.
Contrary to public respondent's posture, its order denying admission to petitioner's documentary
exhibits, as well as the denial of the motion to reopen for presentation of additional evidence for
plaintiff, was merely interlocutory. An order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does
not end the Court's task of adjudicating the parties' contentions and determining their rights and
liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by
the Court, is interlocutory.[23]
Certiorari is an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order (1) when the tribunal issued
such order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; and (2) when
the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous, and the remedy of appeal would not afford
adequate and expeditious relief.[24] Recourse to a petition for certiorari to assail an interlocutory
order is now expressly recognized in the ultimate paragraph of Section 1, Rule 41 of the Revised
Rules of Court on the subject of appeal, which states:[25]
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved
party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
Public respondent seriously erred in denying the motion to reopen for presentation of additional
evidence on the basis of the supposed "final and executory" ruling which denied admission of
Exhibits "B" to "E" in the Formal Offer of Evidence filed by the petitioner. Admission of
additional evidence is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Indeed, in the
furtherance of justice, the court may grant the parties the opportunity to adduce additional
evidence bearing upon the main issue in question.[26] The remedy of reopening a case for
presenting further proofs was meant to prevent a miscarriage of justice.[27]
While it is true that the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, prescribed an order of trial
(Section 5, Rule 30), relaxation of the rule is permitted in sound discretion of the
court. According to Justice Jose Y. Feria in his annotations on civil procedure:
After the parties have produced their respective direct proofs, they are allowed to offer rebutting
evidence only, but, it has been held, the court, for good reasons in the furtherance of justice, may
permit them to offer evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed in the
appellate court where no abuse of discretion appears. So, generally, additional evidence is
allowed when it is newly discovered, or where it has been omitted through inadvertence or
mistake, or where the purpose of the evidence is to correct evidence previously offered.[28]
Considering that petitioner, in requesting to reopen the presentation of additional evidence after
it has rested its case, sought to present documentary exhibits consisting of certified copies which
had earlier been denied admission for being photocopies, additional documents previously
mentioned in its pre-trial brief and new additional evidence material in establishing the main
issue of ill-gotten wealth allegedly amassed by the private respondents, singly or collectively,
public respondent should have, in the exercise of sound discretion, properly allowed such
presentation of additional evidence. Bearing in mind that even if the originals of the
documentary exhibits offered as additional evidence have been in the custody of the PCGG since
the filing of the complaint or at least at the time of the preparation of its original pre-trial brief in
September 1990, public respondent should have duly considered the explanation given by PCGG
Commissioner Ruben C. Carranza and PCGG Librarian Ma. Lourdes O. Magno in their
respective affidavits[29] attached to the motion, as to the belated discovery of the original
documentary evidence which had long been in the possession of PCGG. Given the voluminous
documents and papers involved in ill-gotten wealth cases, it was indeed unavoidable that in the
course of trial certain documentary exhibits were omitted or unavailable by inadvertence, as what
had happened in this case where the subject original documentary evidence were found misfiled
in a different case folder.
Lamentably, public respondent peremptorily denied petitioner's plea for a chance to present
additional evidence vital to its case, saying that it cannot "just simply brush aside what had been
taken up [after these years of hearing]," and even alluding to the supposed "adverse
consequences to the time honored orderly presentation of evidence and the universally acclaimed
expeditious, speedy and inexpensive disposition of all action[s] and proceedings." On the other
hand, respondent Silverio contended that allowing the motion to reopen would only cause him to
suffer further "harassment and injustice." However, perusal of the records plainly reveals that
petitioner was not responsible for the delay in the prosecution of this case. The protracted
litigation was due to the numerous pleadings, postponements and various motions filed by
respondents Marcoses. Clearly, public respondent's rigid application of the rule on order of trial
was arbitrary, improper and in utter disregard of the demands of substantial justice.
Executive Order No. 14, series of 1986, issued by former President Corazon C. Aquino, provided
that technical rules of procedure and evidence shall not be strictly applied to cases involving ill-
gotten wealth. Apropos is our pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan (Third Division):[30]
In all cases involving alleged ill-gotten wealth brought by or against the Presidential
Commission on Good Government, it is the policy of this Court to set aside technicalities
and formalities that serve merely to delay or impede their judicious resolution. This Court
prefers to have such cases resolved on the merits before the Sandiganbayan. Substantial justice
to all parties, not mere legalisms or perfection of form, should now be relentlessly
pursued. Eleven years have passed since the government started its search for and reversion of
such alleged ill-gotten wealth. The definitive resolution of such cases on the merits is thus long
overdue. If there is adequate proof of illegal acquisition, accumulation, misappropriation, fraud
or illicit conduct, let it be brought out now. Let the titles over these properties be finally
determined and quieted down with all reasonable speed, free of delaying technicalities and
annoying procedural sidetracks. (Emphasis supplied.)
It was incumbent upon the public respondent to adopt a liberal stance in the matter of procedural
technicalities. More so in the instant case where the showing of a prima facie case of ill-gotten
wealth was sustained by this Court in Silverio v. Presidential Commission on Good Government
in No. L-77645 under the Resolution dated October 26, 1987.[31] Petitioner should be given the
opportunity to fully present its evidence and prove that the various business interests of
respondent Silverio "have enjoyed considerable privileges obtained from [respondent] former
President Marcos during [the latter's] tenure as Chief Executive in violation of existing laws;
privileges which could not have been so obtained were it not for the close association of
[Silverio] with the former President."[32] No element of surprise could have been intended in the
motion to reopen considering that these documentary exhibits were either certified copies of the
originals in the custody of the PCGG, properly identified by the witness who prepared the same
(Godofredo dela Paz) and statements under oath from a testimony given before the US District
Court by respondent Silverio himself.
The term "grave abuse of discretion" connotes capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as
is equivalent to excess, or a lack of jurisdiction. The abuse must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or
to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or hostility.[33]
Public respondent gravely abused its discretion in disallowing the presentation of additional
evidence by the petitioner after the latter made a formal offer of documentary evidence, at the
time the respondents had not even commenced the presentation of their evidence. Such arbitrary
denial of petitioner's motion to reopen for presentation of additional evidence would result in
serious miscarriage of justice as it deprives the Republic of the chance to fully prove its case
against the respondents and recover what could be "illegally-gotten" wealth.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE and the writ prayed for
accordingly GRANTED. The Resolution dated June 9, 2003 of the Sandiganbayan (Second
Division) in SB Civil Case No. 0011 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Said court is
hereby DIRECTED to ALLOW the Republic of the Philippines to present additional evidence
and recall witnesses as prayed for in its Motion to Reopen Plaintiff's Presentation of Evidence
with utmost dispatch.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on November 10, 2003 is hereby
LIFTED and SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio Morales, (Chairperson), Brion, Bersamin, and Sereno, JJ., concur.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 32-35. Penned by Associate Justice Edilberto G. Sandoval and concurred in by
Associate Justices Godofredo L. Legaspi and Raoul V. Victorino.
[2]
Sandiganbayan records, Vol. I, pp. 11-14.
[3]
Rollo, pp. 51-52.
[4]
Id. at 56-62.
[5]
Id. at 63-65.
[6]
Id. at 66-75.
[7]
Id. at 66-67.
[8]
Id. at 77-83. Penned by Associate Justice Godofredo L. Legaspi and concurred in by
Associate Justices Edilberto G. Sandoval and Raoul V. Victorino.
[9]
Id. at 80-82.
[10]
Id. at 84-101.
[11]
Id. at 89-92.
[12]
Id. at 365-375.
[13]
Id. at 376-382.
[14]
Id. at 32-35.
[15]
Id. at 34-35.
[16]
Id. at 160-161.
[17]
G.R. Nos. 102696, 102716, 108257 & 120954, July 12, 2001, 361 SCRA 150.
[18]
Rollo, p. 24.
[19]
Id. at 25.
[20]
Id. at 505-506, 520, 527.
[21]
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 141796 & 141804, June 15, 2005, 460 SCRA 146,
158, citing Yau v. Manila Banking Corporation, G.R. Nos. 126731 & 128623, July 11, 2002,
384 SCRA 340, 348.
[22]
Government of the United States of America v. Purganan, G.R. No.148571, September 24,
2002, 389 SCRA 623, 650, citing Phil. Air Lines Employees Association v. Phil. Air Lines, Inc.,
No. L-31396, January 30, 1982, 111 SCRA 215, 219 and Progressive Development Corporation,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123555, January 22, 1999, 301 SCRA 637, 647.
[23]
Investments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, No. L-60036, January 27, 1987, 147 SCRA 334, 340,
cited in United Overseas Bank (formerly Westmont Bank) v. Ros, G.R. No. 171532, August 7,
2007, 529 SCRA 334, 344.
[24]
Santos v. People, G.R. No. 173176, August 26, 2008, 563 SCRA 341, 361-362, citing Casil
v. CA, 349 Phil. 187, 196-197 (1998).
[25]
Id. at 362.
[26]
Valencia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 165996, October 17, 2005, 473 SCRA 279, 290,
citing United States v. Gallegos, 37 Phil. 289, 293-294 (1917). See also People v. Tee, G.R.
Nos. 140546-47, January 20, 2003, 395 SCRA 419, 444.
[27]
See Cabarles v. Maceda, G.R. No. 161330, February 20, 2007, 516 SCRA 303, 315,
citing II F. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium 551 (10th ed., 2004).
[28]
Jose Y. Feria and Maria Concepcion S. Noche, Civil Procedure Annotated, 2001 Edition,
Vol. I, p. 574, citing Lopez v. Liboro, 81 Phil. 429, 434 (1948). See also Rivera v. Palattao, G.R.
No. 157824, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 623, 635.
[29]
Rollo, pp. 339-343.
[30]
G.R. No. 113420, March 7, 1997, 269 SCRA 316, 334-335.
[31]
155 SCRA 60.
[32]
Id. at 65-66.
[33]
Republic v. Sandiganbayan (Second Division), G.R. No. 129406, March 6, 2006, 484 SCRA
119, 127, citing Litton Mills, Inc. v. Galleon Trader, Inc., No. L-40867, July 26, 1988, 163
SCRA 489, 494 and Duero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131282, January 4, 2002, 373 SCRA
11, 17.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 163999, July 09, 2014
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. MILLARD R.

OCAMPO, CIPRIANO REY R. HIPOLITO, ERIC F. MERJILLA AND JOSE R. CARANDANG,
RESPONDENTS,
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A special civil action for certiorari is an extraordinary remedy; thus, a party who seeks to avail
of it must strictly observe the rules laid down by law.[1]
This Petition for Review on Certiorari[2] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the
Decision[3] dated February 18, 2004 and the Resolution[4] dated June 11, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 74990.
Factual Antecedents
In February 1996, petitioner Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT), through its
Quality Control Investigation Division (QCID), conducted an investigation on the alleged illegal
International Simple Resale (ISR) activities in Makati City.[5] ISR is a method of routing and
completing an international long distance call using lines, cables, antennas, and/or airwave or
frequency that directly connect to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the country of
destination of the call.[6] Likened to a jumper,[7] the unauthorized routing of international long
distance calls by-passes petitioner’s International Gateway Facilities (IGF) with the use of ISR
access numbers, making international long distance calls appear as local calls, and thereby,
depriving petitioner of substantial revenues.[8]
After confirming that some PLDT subscribers were indeed operating ISR businesses in Makati
City, under the business names INFILNET and Emergency Monitoring System[9] (EMS),
petitioner requested the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to apprehend
the said subscribers.[10] Acting on said request, Atty. Oscar L. Embido (Embido), the supervising
agent assigned to the Anti-Organized Crime Division of the NBI, conducted surveillance on the
offices of INFILNET and EMS.[11] To verify his findings, he went to San Francisco, USA, and
made international calls to the Philippines using a borrowed subscriber’s card.[12] Petitioner
monitored the calls and discovered that these calls by-passed its IGF.[13] Atty. Embido then
returned to the Philippines and applied for search warrants with Branch 23[14] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.[15]
On September 17, 1996, the Manila RTC issued two search warrants: (a) Search Warrant No. 96-
651 directed at the office of INFILNET; and (b) Search Warrant No. 96-652 directed at the
office of EMS, both located in Makati City.[16]
On the same day, NBI agents conducted simultaneous raids during which electronic gadgets,
documents, assorted office supplies, several pieces of computer equipment, and some personal
belongings of the employees of INFILNET and EMS were seized.[17]
On September 19, 1996, an Information for the crime of simple theft was filed before the RTC of
Makati City, Branch 60, docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-1590, against respondents Millard R.
Ocampo, Cipriano Rey R. Hipolito, Eric F. Merjilla, and Jose R. Carandang.[18] Respondents
posted bail the following day.[19]
On October 4, 1996, respondents filed before the Makati RTC a Motion to Suppress or Exclude
or Return Inadmissible Evidence Unlawfully Obtained,[20] assailing the validity of the Search
Warrants on the ground that the searches conducted were not in accordance with the established
constitutional rules and statutory guidelines.[21]
On February 21, 1997, the Makati RTC denied the Motion ruling that it is the issuing court, in
this case, the Manila RTC, which has the jurisdiction to rule on the validity of the Search
Warrants.[22] Respondents moved for reconsideration but the same was unavailing,[23] prompting
them to file with the CA a Petition for Certiorari,[24] docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 47265.[25]
On July 13, 1998, the CA rendered a Decision[26] dismissing the Petition as it found no fault on
the part of the Makati RTC in refusing to rule on the Motion to Suppress Evidence under the
Principle of Non-Interference of a co-equal court.[27] However, in order to avoid any conflict, the
CA ordered the search warrant cases consolidated with the criminal case for theft.[28] Thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered:

(1) The instant special civil action for certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit; and
(2) The [RTC] of Manila, Branch 23, is hereby ORDERED to forward the records of the case to
the [RTC] of Makati Branch 60, for proper consolidation thereof.
SO ORDERED.[29]
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court of

Makati City
On May 24, 2002, respondents applied for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum against
certain persons allegedly in possession of documents relating to PAMTEL, a foreign
telecommunications company with tie-ups to INFILNET and EMS.[30]
Finding the documents irrelevant and immaterial to the resolution of the case, the RTC issued an
Order[31] dated July 11, 2002, denying the application for subpoena duces tecum.[32] Respondents
sought reconsideration[33] but the RTC denied the same in its Order[34] dated October 10, 2002.
Respondents were notified of the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration on October 18,
2002.[35]
On November 29, 2002, the RTC proceeded to hear the Motion to Suppress, which was revived
pursuant to the CA’s Decision dated July 13, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 47265.[36] But since
respondents failed to appear and present evidence to substantiate their Motion, the RTC denied
the Motion in open court and issued the corresponding Order[37] to that effect.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Aggrieved, respondents elevated the case to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari,[38] docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 74990, assailing the Orders dated July 11, 2002, October 10, 2002, and
November 29, 2002.
On February 18, 2004, the CA rendered a Decision[39] finding grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the RTC in issuing the assailed Orders.[40] In reversing the denial of the Motion to
Suppress, the CA explained that contrary to the findings of the RTC, there was no intention on
the part of respondents to delay the resolution of the Motion.[41] In fact, the delays were not
solely attributable to them considering that both parties were trying to arrive at a compromise
agreement.[42] As to the application for subpoena duces tecum, the CA said that the RTC should
have granted it because respondents needed the documents to support their Motion to
Suppress.[43] Thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is given due course. The assailed
Orders dated November 29, 2002 and July 11, 2002 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Public respondent Presiding Judge is hereby ordered to grant [respondents’] application for
subpoena duces tecum and to continue with the hearing on [respondents’] Motion to Suppress
and Exclude Inadmissible Evidence Seized by the reception of evidence from both parties in
support of or in opposition to said motion.
SO ORDERED.[44]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration[45] but the CA denied the same in its Resolution[46] dated
June 11, 2004.
Issues
Hence, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following errors:
A. THE [CA] GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING THE FIRST AND SECOND RTC
ORDERS, WHICH DENIED RESPONDENTS’ APPLICATION FOR SUBPOENA
CONSIDERING THAT:
1. SAID ORDERS HAVE LONG BEEN FINAL AND EXECUTORY AND THE PERIOD
FOR FILING A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ASSAILING THESE ORDERS HAS
ALREADY LAPSED. THUS, THE [CA] SHOULD NOT HAVE DISTURBED THE FIRST
AND SECOND RTC ORDERS.
2. THE RTC-MAKATI PROPERLY DENIED THE APPLICATION FOR SUBPOENA AS

THERE WAS NO PROPER GROUND FOR GRANTING THE SAME.
B. THE [CA] GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING THE THIRD RTC ORDER, WHICH
DENIED THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS, CONSIDERING THAT:
1. RESPONDENTS FAILED TO FILE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE

THIRD RTC ORDER WITHOUT CITING ANY JUSTIFIABLE REASON BEFORE FILING
A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI QUESTIONING SAID ORDER.
2. DESPITE SEVERAL OPPORTUNITIES GRANTED TO THEM BY, AND REPEATED

WARNINGS FROM, THE RTC-MAKATI, RESPONDENTS FAILED TO SUBSTANTIATE
THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS.
3. THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS ARE THE SAME ISSUES IN A
MOTION TO QUASH WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN RULED UPON BY THE RTC-
MANILA, A COURT OF COORDINATE JURISDICTION.
4. IN ANY CASE, THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS HAS NO MERIT AND WAS PROPERLY
DENIED BY THE RTC-MAKATI.[47]
Stripped of the non-essentials, the core issue is whether the CA erred in giving due course to the
Petition for Certiorari, and in subsequently granting the same despite evident procedural lapses.
Petitioner’s Arguments
Petitioner assails the propriety of the CA’s reversal of the Orders of the RTC, positing that in
filing the Petition for Certiorari, respondents failed to observe procedural rules. First, no motion
for reconsideration of the Order dated November 29, 2002, denying respondents’ Motion to
Suppress, was filed prior to the filing of the Petition for Certiorari.[48] Second, more than 60-
days had lapsed from the time respondents were notified of the denial of their Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order dated July 11, 2002, which denied their application for subpoena
duces tecum.[49] Third, respondents failed to indicate the date they received the Orders dated July
11, 2002 and October 10, 2002.[50] Given the foregoing procedural infirmities, petitioner
contends the CA should not have entertained the Petition for Certiorari much more granted
affirmative relief.
Respondents’ Arguments
Respondents, on the other hand, insist that their failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the
Order dated November 29, 2002 is not fatal as the rule is subject to exceptions.[51] In this case,
respondents no longer filed a motion for reconsideration as they already moved in open court for
a reconsideration of the denial of their Motion to Suppress but the RTC flatly denied the same.[52]
As to the alleged non-compliance with the 60-day period, respondents brush aside the issue
arguing that technical rules cannot prevent the CA from giving due course to a Petition for
Certiorari, which it considers to be meritorious.[53]
Our Ruling
The Petition has merit.
Assailed in the Petition for Certiorari filed before the CA are three Orders, to wit:
1) The Order dated July 11, 2002, denying respondents’ application for subpoena duces tecum;
2) The Order dated October 10, 2002, denying respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration of the
Order dated July 11, 2002; and
3) The Order dated November 29, 2002, denying respondents’ Motion to Suppress.
We shall first discuss the Orders dated July 11, 2002 and October 10, 2002.
The Petition for Certiorari should have

been filed within 60 days from notice of the
denial of the Motion for Reconsideration of
the assailed Order.
Section 4,[54] Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that a special civil action for certiorari
should be instituted within 60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution, or from the
notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the judgment, order, or resolution being
assailed. The 60-day period, however, is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay, which
would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their cases.[55] Thus,
strict compliance of this rule is mandatory and imperative. [56] But like all rules, the 60-day
limitation may be relaxed “for the most persuasive of reasons,” which must be sufficiently
shown by the party invoking liberality. [57]
In this case, respondents were notified of the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration of the
Order dated July 11, 2002, denying their application for subpoena duces tecum, on October 18,
2002.[58] Accordingly, they had until December 17, 2002 within which to file a Petition for
Certiorari with the CA. Records, however, show that it was only on January 20, 2003 that
respondents filed their Petition for Certiorari to assail the Orders dated July 11, 2002 and
October 10, 2002.[59] Instead of admitting that more than 60 days had lapsed, respondents kept
silent about it in their Petition for Certiorari. When petitioner brought up the issue, respondents’
reply[60] was unresponsive. In fact, they did not even confirm or deny the alleged lapse of the 60-
day period. Siding with respondent, the CA opted not to discuss the issue and resolved to reverse
the Order dated July 11, 2002 on the ground that the granting of the subpoena duces tecum was
necessary in order for respondents to substantiate their Motion to Suppress.
The CA’s reasoning, however, even if true, does not excuse respondents from complying with
the 60-day period rule, especially since they have not offered any plausible justification for their
non-compliance. In fact, their adamant refusal to admit the obvious truth as well as their
deliberate attempt to hide this procedural lapse cannot be ignored. Leniency is given only to
those deserving of it. In this case, respondents are not entitled to any because they intentionally
omitted to indicate in their Petition for Certiorari the date they were notified of the Order dated
October 10, 2002 in order to mislead the CA. Besides, relaxing the rule would not only be unfair
and unjust but would also be prejudicial to petitioner, who had every right to believe that the
Orders dated July 11, 2002 and October 10, 2002 had attained finality and may no longer be
altered, modified, or reversed. As we have said, the 60-day limitation may be relaxed only for the
most persuasive reasons and only in meritorious cases, which must be sufficiently shown by the
party invoking liberality. Such is not the situation in this case.
In view of the foregoing, we find that the CA erred in giving due course to the Petition and in
reversing the Orders dated July 11, 2002 and October 10, 2002, as they may no longer be
disturbed, after having attained finality.
In the absence of a motion for

reconsideration, the Petition for
Certiorari should have been dismissed.
Jurisprudence consistently holds that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite to
the institution of a petition for certiorari.[61] Although this rule is subject to certain exceptions,[62]
none of which is present in this case.
Respondents admit that they failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated
November 29, 2002 prior to filing the Petition for Certiorari. As an excuse, they alleged that
their counsel verbally moved for a reconsideration of the denial of their Motion to Suppress,
which the RTC flatly denied in open court. Such allegation, however, as aptly pointed out by
petitioner,[63] is not supported by the evidence as the Order dated November 29, 2002 made no
mention of such fact.[64] It is also unlikely for respondents’ counsel to have moved for a
reconsideration of the said Order considering that, as stated in the Order, he appeared only after
the hearings were over.[65] Besides, the lower court should first be informed of its supposed error
and be allowed to correct or rectify the same through a re-examination of the legal and factual
aspects of the case, which could only be done by filing a motion for reconsideration of the
assailed order.[66] This respondents failed to do. Thus, in the absence of a motion for
reconsideration, the CA erred in giving due course to the Petition and in reversing the Order
dated November 29, 2002.
In closing, we must emphasize that while litigation is not a game of technicalities, this does not
mean that procedural rules may be ignored at will or that their non-observance may be dismissed
simply because it may prejudice a party’s substantial rights.[67] Mere invocations of substantial
justice and liberality are not enough for the court to suspend procedural rules.[68] Again, except
only for the most compelling or persuasive reasons, procedural rules must be followed to
facilitate the orderly administration of justice.[69]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated February 18, 2004 and
the Resolution dated June 11, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74990 are hereby
SET ASIDE. The Orders dated July 11, 2002, October 10, 2002 and November 29, 2002 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 60, in Criminal Case No. 96-1590, are hereby
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
[1]
Batugan v. Judge Balindong, 600 Phil. 518, 527 (2009).
[2]
Rollo, pp. 20-66.
[3]
CA rollo, pp. 429-436; penned by Associate Justice Sergio L. Pestaño and concurred in by
Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Aurora S. Lagman.
[4]
Id. at 475-476; penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon and concurred in by Associate
Justices Eloy R. Bello, Jr. and Aurora S. Lagman.
[5]
Id. at 429-430.
[6]
Rollo, p. 27.
[7]
Id.
[8]
CA rollo, p. 430.
[9]
Referred to as Emergency Monitoring Services in petitioner’s pleadings.
[10]
CA rollo, p. 430.
[11]
Id.
[12]
Id.
[13]
Rollo, p. 28.
[14]
Then presided by Executive Judge William M. Bayhon; CA rollo, p. 430.
[15]
Id.
[16]
Id.
[17]
Id.
[18]
Id.
[19]
Id.
[20]
Rollo, pp. 103-119.
[21]
CA rollo, p. 430.
[22]
Id. at 431 and rollo, pp. 120-121; Order dated February 21, 1997; penned by Judge Pedro N.
Laggui.
[23]
Id. at 431 and id. at 126-132; Order dated December 2, 1997; penned by Judge Pedro N.
Laggui.
[24]
Rollo, pp. 133-155.
[25]
CA rollo, p. 431.
[26]
Rollo, pp. 156-166; penned by Associate Justice Ramon A. Barcelona and concurred in by
Associate Justices Jorge S. Imperial and Demetrio G. Demetria.
[27]
Id. at 164.
[28]
Id. at 165.
[29]
Id.
[30]
CA rollo, p. 431.
[31]
Rollo, pp. 187-188; penned by Judge Marissa Macaraig-Guillen.
[32]
CA rollo, p. 431.
[33]
Rollo, pp. 190-198.
[34]
Id. at 213; penned by Judge Marissa Macaraig-Guillen.
[35]
See Order dated October 18, 2002; penned by Judge Marissa Macaraig-Guillen, id. at 215-
216.
[36]
CA rollo, p. 431.
[37]
Rollo, pp. 217-218; penned by Judge Marissa Macaraig-Guillen.
[38]
CA rollo, pp. 2-24.
[39]
Id. at 429-436.
[40]
Id. at 435.
[41]
Id. at 433-434.
[42]
Id.
[43]
Id. at 434-435.
[44]
Id. at 435.
[45]
Rollo, pp. 373-390.
[46]
CA rollo, pp. 475-476.
[47]
Rollo, pp. 33-34.
[48]
Id. at 615-617.
[49]
Id. at 605-606.
[50]
Id. at 606-608.
[51]
Id. at 578-579.
[52]
Id.
[53]
Id. at 577-578.
[54]
Section 4. When and where to file the petition. — The petition shall be filed not later than
sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for
reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the petition
shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days counted from the notice of the denial of the motion.
xxxx
[55]
Mallari v. Government Service Insurance System, G.R. No. 157659, 611 SCRA 32, 43,
January 25, 2010.
[56]
Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 480 Phil. 134,140 (2004).
[57]
Id.
[58]
See Order dated October 18, 2002, rollo, pp. 215-216.
[59]
CA rollo, p. 2.
[60]
Id. at 326-335.
[61]
Novateknika Land Corporation v. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 194104, March 13,
2013, 693 SCRA 423, 432.
[62]
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon
by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay
would prejudice the interests of the government or the petitioner or the subject matter of the
action is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such
relief by the trial court is improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
(h) where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object;
and
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved. (Id.)
[63]
Rollo, pp. 615-617.
[64]
Id. at 217-218.
[65]
Id. at 218.
[66]
Novateknika Land Corporation v. Philippine National Bank, supra note 61 at 433.
[67]
Sea Power Shipping Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 412 Phil. 603, 611 (2001).
[68]
Lazaro v. Court of Appeals, 386 Phil. 412, 414 and 417 (2000) and Pinakamasarap
Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 534 Phil. 222, 232 (2006).
[69]
Barcenas v. Sps. Anastacio Tomas, 494 Phil. 565, 575 (2005).
603 Phil. 18
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. NO. 135703, April 15, 2009
PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS,

REPRESENTED BY ORLANDO L. SALVADOR, PETITIONER, VS. OMBUDSMAN ANIANO
A. DESIERTO, PANFILO O. DOMINGO, CONRADO S. REYES, ZOSIMO C. MALABANAN,
JOSE R. TENGCO, JR., PLACIDO L. MAPA, JR., VERDEN C. DANGILAN, ARMANDO T.
ROMUALDEZ, VILMA S. ROMUALDEZ, JUAN L. SYQUIAN AND ALFREDO T.
ROMUALDEZ. RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On challenge by the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans, represented
by Orlando L. Salvador (petitioner), is the Resolution of then Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto
(Ombudsman) dated August 19, 1998 in OMB-0-97-1911 dismissing its complaint against
Panfilo O. Domingo, Conrado S. Reyes, Zosimo C. Malabanan, Jose R. Tengco, Jr., Placido L.
Mapa, Jr., Verden C. Dangilan, Armando T. Romualdez, Vilma S. Romualdez, Juan L. Syquian,
and Alfredo T. Romualdez, for violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
On October 8, 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating
the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Committee) which was
tasked to conduct an inventory of all behest loans, determine the parties involved, and
recommend the appropriate action to be pursued. The Committee was composed of the Chairman
of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) as Chairman, the Solicitor
General, representatives from the Office of the Executive Secretary, the Department of Finance,
the Department of Justice, the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), the Philippine
National Bank, the Asset Privatization Trust, the Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee
Corporation, and the Government Corporate Counsel, as members.[1]
The Committee's functions were later expanded by President Ramos via Memorandum Order
No. 61 dated November 9, 1992 to include the inventory and review of all non-performing loans,
whether behest or non-behest. For this purpose, the following criteria were established as a frame
of reference in determining a behest loan:
a. It is undercollateralized;
b. The borrower corporation is under-capitalized;

c. Direct or indirect endorsement by high government officials like presence
of marginal notes;
d. Stockholders, officers or agents of the borrower corporation are identified

as cronies;
e. Deviation of use of loan proceeds from the purpose intended;
f. Use of corporate layering;
g. Non-feasibility of the project for which financing is being sought; [and]
(a) Extra-ordinary speed in which the loan release was made.[2]
Among the accounts referred to the Committee for investigation were those of Golden Country
Farms, Inc. (GCFI), which involved loans from the National Investment Development
Corporation (NIDC) and DBP.
After its investigation, the Committee concluded that GCFI's loan transactions with NIDC and
DBP bore badges of a behest loan, particularly the following: (1) the loans were
undercollateralized; (2) the GCFI was undercapitalized; (3) stockholders, officers, or agents of
GCFI were identified as cronies; (4) direct or indirect endorsement by high government officials
like the presence of marginal notes; and (5) extraordinary speed in which the proceeds of the
loan were released.
Atty. Orlando L. Salvador (Atty. Salvador), PCGG consultant of the Committee, thereupon filed
a sworn complaint[3] with the Ombudsman alleging that GCFI's loan transactions were behest
loans that violated R.A. No. 3019, specifically Section 3(e) and (g) thereof:
Sec. 3. Corrupt Practice of Public Officers. -- In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful.
Xxx xxx xxx
e. Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government or giving any private party
any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative
or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
Xxx xxx xxx

(a) Entering on behalf of the Government into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
Atty. Salvador identified ten individuals who could be held liable. Six of them - Panfilo O.
Domingo, Conrado S. Reyes, Zosimo C. Malabanan, Jose R. Tengco, Jr., Placido L. Mapa, Jr.,
and Verden C. Dangilan - were officers and members of the board of directors of NIDC and
DBP. The remaining four - Armando T. Romualdez, Vilma S. Romualdez, Juan L. Syquian, and
Alfredo T. Romualdez - were stockholders and officers of GCFI.
In his accompanying sworn statement,[4] Atty. Salvador detailed the Committee's findings as
follows:
GCFI applied for a credit facility of $5.7 million (P43 million at the then prevailing exchange
rate) and a letter of guarantee in the amount of $7.6 million (P57 million), or a total of $13.3
million (P100 million). Panfilo O. Domingo endorsed the loan on October 17, 1975 to the NIDC
board of directors and the latter approved a credit facility of $5.7 million (P43 million) in favor
of GCFI on October 22, 1975. The documents pertinent to GCFI's application for a letter of
guarantee for $7.6 million (P57 million) were thereafter forwarded to DBP and approved on May
5, 1976.
At the time the NIDC loan of P43 million was approved, GCFI had a paid-up capital of only P3.5
million; whereas at the time the DBP loan of P57 million was approved, it had a paid-up capital
of only P10 million. The loans were also undercollateralized, the appraised value of GCFI's
collateral having amounted to only P50,540,301 as of April 29, 1977, while the loan releases
then had already totaled P72 million.
GCFI loan proponents Armando T. Romualdez, Vilma S. Romualdez, and Alfredo T. Romualdez
are related to then First Lady Imelda R. Marcos. On five occasions, then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos gave instructions to DBP regarding the management of GCFI's loan and disposition of its
assets, viz:
1. On December 7, 1978, President Marcos instructed Chairman Placido

Mapa to grant the request for the restructuring of the maturity period of
the loans and condonation of interest. (Annex 9, Evidence 21)
2. On June 26, 1980, President Marcos gave instructions to Chairman Rafael

Sison to release the balance of P18.9 million and restructure the entire
loan. (Annex 10, Evidence 22)
3. On July 15, 1980, President Marcos approved the takeover by DBP and
NIDC of GCFI for its rehabilitation. (Annex 11, Evidence 23)
4. On March 4, 1981, President Marcos instructed Chairman Rafael Sison to
approve the request for tax exemption. (Annex 12, Evidence 24)
(a) On January 11, 1983, President Marcos gave clearance to Chairman

Cesar Zalamea on the proposed disposition of the assets of GCFI. (Annex
13, Evidence 25)[5]
GCFI had an outstanding balance of P211,950,520.76 owing to NIDC as of June 30, 1986, and
of P302,685,193.31 to DBP as of December 31, 1986.
Only Armando T. Romualdez and Vilma S. Romualdez (spouses Romualdez) complied with the
Ombudsman's order to file a counter-affidavit.
In their Joint Counter-Affidavit dated August 17, 1998, spouses Romualdez alleged, among other
things, that the offenses charged had prescribed and not all the elements of a behest loan were
present; and that GCFI had infused an additional capital of P100 million, as well as caused the
installation of NIDC and DBP comptrollers at GCFI as signatories to all its disbursements.[6]
By Resolution of August 19, 1998,[7] the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint, finding that there
was insufficient evidence to warrant the indictment of the persons charged, and that the alleged
offenses had prescribed. The Ombudsman explained:
To hold herein respondents for violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019, it is but significant to
establish the injury suffered by the offended party or the unwarranted benefit afforded to any
party and the means employed to accomplish the object of the questioned act or deed. For such
purpose, concrete and convincing evidence pointing to such facts are necessary.
A cursory look at the records at hand discloses that there was absence of a clear proof showing
that the government has suffered damage by reason of the questioned financial transaction.
On record is the fact that even prior to the issuance of the Sequestration Order, dated July 27,
1987, by the herein complainant, former President Marcos or per the allegation of the
complainant had already approved the take-over by DBP and NIDC of the GCFI's management
and operation. This was likewise the response of the GCFI's Corporate Secretary in a letter, dated
September 2, 1997, to the Sequestration Order issued by the complainant. The said letter tacitly
disclosed that GCFI's management and operation had been taken over by DBP, PNB and NFA,
its major creditors, since August of 1980.
X x x Absent such indispensable element of the act complained of, the respondents cannot be
held liable herefore.
Moreover, prescription has already intervened in the prosecution of the offenses charged.
Xxxx
x x x [T]he reckoning period for purposes of prescription shall begin to run from the time the
public instruments came into existence.
In the case at bar, the subject financial accommodations were entered into by virtue of public
documents during the period of 1975 to 1976 and for purposes of computing the prescriptive
period, the aforementioned principles in the Dinsay, Villalon and Sandiganbayan cases will
apply. Records show that the complaint was referred and filed with this Office on October 1,
1997 or after the lapse of more than twenty (20) years from the violation of the law. Deducibly
therefore, the offenses charged have already prescribed or forever barred by the Statute of
Limitations.
It must be pointed out that the acts complained of were committed before the issuance of BP 195
on March 2, 1982. Hence, the prescriptive period in the instant case is ten (10) years as provided
in Section 11 of R.A. 3019, as originally enacted.[8] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.[9]
The Court initially referred the case to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action by Resolution
dated November 25, 1998.[10] On the Ombudsman's motion for reconsideration, however, the
Court recalled the November 25, 1998 Resolution and required respondents to comment on the
petition within ten days from notice.[11]
The Committee argued that the Ombudsman erred in holding that the Government did not suffer
any damage as its takeover of GCFI's management and operation was actually prompted by the
losses it had incurred;[12] that the right of the State to recover behest loans as ill-gotten wealth is
imprescriptible under Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution;[13] and that assuming that
the period to file criminal charges herefore is subject to prescription, the prescriptive period
should be counted from the time of discovery of the behest loans or sometime in 1992 when the
Committee was constituted.[14]
The Ombudsman, in his Comment,[15] countered that his finding of insufficiency of evidence to
warrant an indictment must be accorded full faith and credit; that the offenses charged had
prescribed, more than ten years having elapsed from the time of their commission; and that
absent any showing of jurisdictional error, his dismissal of the complaint must be upheld.
Alfredo T. Romualdez, for his part, contended that the proper remedy to challenge the
Ombudsman's findings is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and not a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 thereof; that the Committee's failure to move for
reconsideration with the Ombudsman warrants the outright dismissal of its petition; that the
courts should not interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of his constitutional power to
determine the sufficiency of a complaint to merit an indictment; and that the State had lost its
right to prosecute the alleged offenses by prescription.[16]
In their Comment,[17] spouses Romualdez averred that the Ombudsman has ample discretion to
determine whether to prosecute or dismiss a complaint, and that the Committee has no legal right
to question his findings. They also posited that Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution
applies only to civil cases and not to criminal cases involving supposedly ill-gotten wealth,
hence, the Committee's action has prescribed, the complaint having been filed only in 1997 or
more than ten years from the approval of the loans in 1975 and 1976. They added that the same
is true even if the prescriptive period of ten years is counted from the time the Marcoses left the
country and the Aquino administration took over in 1986.
Jose R. Tengco, Jr., on the other hand, filed a Comment[18] and a Manifestation in further support
thereof,[19] wherein he maintained that the Ombudsman's findings are supported by the records
and should not be disturbed; that the Court has articulated a policy of non-interference with the
Ombudsman's exercise of discretion in the discharge of his investigatory power; and that the
Court had previously upheld the Ombudsman's dismissal of the Committee's complaints in other
behest loans cases.
Verden C. Dangilan stated in his Comment[20] that no evidence had been presented to
substantiate the alleged violations of R.A. No. 3019; and that the subject loans are not behest
loans since no short-cuts were taken in the approval thereof.
Panfilo O. Domingo asseverated that the sworn statement of Atty. Salvador and its attachments
failed to establish probable cause; that the Government had not quantified its actual injury; and
that the action had prescribed.[21]
Placido L. Mapa, Jr. pleaded transactional immunity from all PCGG-initiated civil cases and
criminal proceedings or investigations, pursuant to an Agreement with the Government affirmed
by this Court in Mapa, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan.[22] And he argued that the offenses charged had
prescribed since the discovery thereof should be reckoned, at the latest, from the time GCFI was
sequestered by the PCGG on July 27, 1987, which was more than ten years before the filing of
the complaint with the Ombudsman (the date of filing, as determined by the Ombudsman, is
October 1, 1997); and that at any rate, the DBP loan actually released was only P29 million and
the same was secured by collateral worth P116,754,760 more or less.[23]
With respect to the other respondents, the Court, by Resolution of February 20, 2002,[24]
considered Zosimo C. Malabanan and Juan L. Syquian to have waived the filing of a Comment,
they having failed to do so. The same should also apply to Conrado S. Reyes who similarly
failed to heed the Court's directive to file a Comment.
The Court shall first deal with procedural issues.
Indeed, the remedy from an adverse resolution of the Ombudsman is a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65,[25] but what was filed with the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45. Nevertheless, the Court will treat this petition as one filed under Rule 65 since a reading
of its contents shows that the Committee imputes grave abuse of discretion to the Ombudsman
for dismissing the complaint.[26]
Respecting the Committee's failure to file a motion for reconsideration with the Ombudsman, the
general rule is that before filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the petitioner is mandated
to comply with a condition precedent: the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the assailed
order, which motion is denied. The rule, however, is subject to the following recognized
exceptions:
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the
questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower
court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an
urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the
interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where
petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a
criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial
court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due
process; (h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to
object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved.[27]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
As will be shown later, the challenged Resolution of the Ombudsman dismissing the complaint
on the grounds of prescription and insufficiency of evidence was issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and thus a nullity. At all events, the case
involves public interest warranting a relaxation of the rule.
In the matter of prescription, the computation of the prescriptive period for offenses involving
the acquisition of behest loans has been laid to rest in Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest
Loans v. Hon. Desierto:[28]
[I]t was well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known the violations of
R.A. No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made because, as alleged, the public
officials concerned connived or conspired with the "beneficiaries of the loans." Thus, we agree
with the COMMITTEE that the prescriptive period for the offenses with which the
respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should be computed from the discovery of the
commission thereof and not from the day of such commission.[29] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The ruling was reiterated and explained in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans v. Ombudsman Desierto:[30]
In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to the February 1986 EDSA
Revolution that ousted President Ferdinand E. Marcos, we ruled that the government as the
aggrieved party could not have known of the violations at the time the questioned transactions
were made. Moreover, no person would have dared to question the legality of those transactions.
Thus, the counting of the prescriptive period commenced from the date of discovery of the
offense in 1992 after an exhaustive investigation by the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on
Behest Loans.[31] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Applying the foregoing settled rule, the counting of the prescriptive period commenced from the
discovery of the offenses in 1992 after an exhaustive investigation by the Committee. When the
complaint was filed in 1997 or after about five years, prescription had not set in.[32]
On the merits. Ordinarily, the Court will not interfere with the Ombudsman's determination as to
the existence or non-existence of probable cause. The rule, however, does not apply if there is
grave abuse of discretion.[33]
After a considered review of the records and the respective positions of the parties, the Court
finds that the case calls for the exercise of its power of supervision over the Ombudsman.
Private respondents are charged with violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019.
The elements of the offense in Section 3(e) are: (1) that the accused are public officers or private
persons charged in conspiracy with them; (2) that said public officers commit the prohibited acts
during the performance of their official duties or in relation to their public positions; (3) that they
cause undue injury to any party, whether the Government or a private party; (4) that such injury
is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and (5) that
the public officers have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence.
On the other hand, the elements of the offense in Section 3(g), are: (1) that the accused is a
public officer; (2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the Government; and
(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
Government.
There are two phases that demarcate the questioned acts, the demarcation line pertaining to the
legal relationship that evolved between GCFI on the one hand, and NIDC and DBP on the other.
The first phase encompasses GCFI's application for a loan and its approval by NIDC and DBP.
This phase covers the period prior to the takeover of GCFI by NIDC and DBP, when GCFI's
identity and interests were clearly distinct from those of NIDC and DBP. The second phase
commenced when NIDC and DBP assumed ownership over GCFI, thereby incorporating the
latter's assets and obligations into theirs. At that point, the interest of NIDC and DBP in GCFI
was no longer confined to ensuring that the latter pay its loan obligations, but rather, expanded to
making it a profitable venture.
Applying the earlier stated elements, it is apparent that in theory there can be liability for
violating Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019 with respect to the pre-takeover transactions, but
there can be liability for violating only Section 3(g) with respect to post-takeover transactions.[34]
A Section 3(e) violation requires that there be injury caused by giving unwarranted benefits,
advantages or preferences to private parties who conspire with public officers. This element no
longer exists after the takeover since the stockholders in their private capacity had already been
effectively excluded from the management of the corporation they previously controlled. In
contrast, Section 3(g) does not require the giving of unwarranted benefits, advantages or
preferences to private parties, the core element being the engagement in a transaction or contract
that is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the Government.
These distinctions were totally lost in the Ombudsman's challenged Resolution, which seemingly
regarded the takeover as a magic formula that had cured lock, stock and barrel all alleged
violations of R.A. No. 3019.
The Ombudsman in fact failed to properly resolve the issues raised by the parties, he having
predicated his finding of insufficiency of evidence solely on the alleged lack of injury suffered
by the Government in view of, again, the takeover. The Court finds that, on the contrary, that the
loan had remained unpaid at the time of the takeover should have been enough basis for a finding
of injury to the Government.
AT ALL EVENTS, as reflected earlier, injury to the Government is only required to support a
charge under Section 3(e), but not under Section 3(g), of R.A. No. 3019; and there can still be a
violation of Section 3(g) insofar as the post-takeover transactions are concerned.
The duty of the Ombudsman in the conduct of a preliminary investigation is to establish whether
there exists probable cause to file an information in court against the accused. Considering the
quantum of evidence needed to support a finding of probable cause, the Court holds that the
Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion when he found such to be lacking here.
Preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties'
evidence. It is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-founded belief
that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. The validity
and merits of a party's accusation or defense, as well as admissibility of testimonies and
evidence, are better ventilated during the trial proper.[35]
In the proceedings before the Ombudsman, the Committee and spouses Romualdez presented
conflicting accounts on whether GCFI was undercapitalized and the subject loans
undercollateralized. While the Committee found that GCFI's capital was way below the amounts
of the loan at the time of their approval, spouses Romualdez countered that GCFI had infused an
additional capital of P100 million. Moreover, while the Committee averred that the appraised
value of GCFI's collateral fell inadequate as of April 29, 1977, spouses Romualdez contended
that GCFI furnished additional security by causing NIDC and DBP comptrollers to be installed at
GCFI as signatories to all disbursements made by the latter. Clearly, these conflicting claims of
the parties should be resolved in a full-blown trial.[36]
It behooves the Ombudsman, while he asks the Court to respect his findings, to also accord a
proper modicum of respect towards the expertise of the Committee, which was formed precisely
to determine the existence of behest loans. Considering the membership of the Committee -
representatives from the Department of Finance, the Philippine National Bank, the Asset
Privatization Trust, the Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation and even
DBP itself - its recommendation should be given great weight. No doubt, the members of the
Committee are experts in the field of banking. On account of their special knowledge and
expertise, they are in a better position to determine whether standard banking practices are
followed in the approval of a loan or what would generally constitute as adequate security for a
given loan.[37] Absent a substantial showing that their findings were made from an erroneous
estimation of the evidence presented, they are conclusive and, in the interest of stability of the
governmental structure, should not be disturbed.[38]
It bears stressing that a finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that
more likely than not, a crime was committed and was committed by the suspects.[39] By this
standard, the Court finds probable cause to bind over private respondents to stand trial for the
offenses charged, except for Placido L. Mapa, Jr. whom the Government had committed to
exclude as party defendant or respondent in all PCGG-initiated civil cases and criminal
proceedings or investigations in exchange for his having provided information relating to the
prosecution of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act cases against the
Marcoses in New York.[40]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Ombudsman's Resolution dated August 19,
1998 in OMB-0-97-1911 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Ombudsman is ORDERED to
file in the proper court the necessary information against Panfilo O. Domingo, Conrado S. Reyes,
Zosimo C. Malabanan, Jose R. Tengco, Jr., Verden C. Dangilan, Armando T. Romualdez, Vilma
S. Romualdez, Juan L. Syquian, and Alfredo T. Romualdez.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio Morales*, J., Acting Chairperson

Tinga, Chico-Nazario**, Velasco, Jr., and Peralta***, JJ., concur.
*
In lieu of Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing who took no part.
**
Additional member in lieu of Justice Quisumbing.
***
Additional member in lieu of the leave of absence due to sickness of Justice Arturo D. Brion.
[1]
[2]
Ibid.
[3]
Id. at 46-51.
[4]
Id at 47-49.
[5]
Id. at 49.
[6]
Id. at 38-39.
[7]
Id. at 35-44.
[8]
Id. at 41-42.
[9]
Id. at 8-34.
[10]
Rollo, p. 10.
[11]
Id. at 20.
[12]
[13]
Sec. 15. The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or
employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription,
laches, or estoppel.
[14]
[15]
Rollo, pp. 81-93.
[16]
Vide Comment filed by Alfredo T. Romualdez dated August 18, 1999; rollo, pp. 58-76.
[17]
Rollo, pp. 27-45.
[18]
Id. at 168-177.
[19]
Id. at 277-284.
[20]
Id. at 182-192.
[21]
Vide Comment filed by Panfilo O. Domingo dated March 20, 2001; Rollo, pp. 205-216.
[22]
G.R. No. 100295, April 26, 1994, 231 SCRA 783; Rollo, pp. 243-245.
[23]
Rollo, pp. 245-250.
[24]
Id. at 304-305.
[25]
Cabrera v. Lapid, G.R. No. 129098, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 55, 64.
[26]
Vide Salvador v. Mapa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 135080, November 28, 2007, 539 SCRA 34, 44.
[27]
Vide Nisce v. Equitable PCI Bank, Inc., G.R. No. 167434, February 19, 2007, 516 SCRA
231, 251.
[28]
375 Phil. 697 (1999).
[29]
Id. at 724.
[30]
415 Phil. 723 (2001).
[31]
Id. at 729-730.
[32]
This is true whether the prescriptive period is ten or fifteen years. In People v. Pacificador,
G.R. No. 139405, March 13, 2001, 354 SCRA 310, 318, the Court explained:
Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended by B.P. Blg. 195, provides that the offenses committed
under the said statute shall prescribe in fifteen (15) years. It appears however, that prior to the
amendment of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 by B.P. Blg. 195 which was approved on March 16,
1982, the prescriptive period for offenses punishable under the said statute was only ten (10)
years. The longer prescriptive period of fifteen (15) years, as provided in Section 11 of R.A. No.
3019 as amended by B.P. Blg. 195, does not apply in this case for the reason that the
amendment, not being favorable to the accused (herein private respondent), cannot be given
retroactive effect. Hence the crime prescribed on January 6, 1986 or ten (10) years from January
6, 1976.
[33]
Tetangco v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 156427, January 20, 2006, 479 SCRA 249, 253.
[34]
Vide Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, et al., G.R.
No. 147723, August 22, 2008, 563 SCRA 1.
[35]
Drilon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115825, July 5, 1996, 258 SCRA 280, 286.
[36]
Vide Presidential Ad-Hoc Fact-Finding Committee On Behest Loans v. Desierto, et al., G.R.
No. 136225, April 23, 2008, 552 SCRA 513, 526.
[37]
Id. at 527.
[38]
Vide Juan v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 166639, April 24, 2007, 522 SCRA 119,
129.
[39]
Webb v. De Leon, G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995, 247 SCRA 652, 675.
[40]
Vide Mapa, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 22 at 803.
379 Phil. 92
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 129846, January 18, 2000
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND TRADERS

ROYAL BANK, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the resolution,[1] dated March 17, 1997, of the
Court of Appeals dismissing petitioner’s appeal from an order of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 19, Manila, which dismissed petitioner’s complaint. The appellate court threw out
petitioner’s appeal on the ground that its notice of appeal had been filed out of time. Petitioner
urges a relaxation of the rules in applying the period for filing appeals. But even its appeal to this
Court from the resolution of the appellate court is late. Hence, the dismissal of the present
petition is called for.
The procedural antecedents are as follows:
On two occasions in January 1986, the Office of the President issued four type "B" Treasury
Warrants drawn against the Bureau of Treasury in the aggregate amount of P151,645,000.00.
The treasury warrants were deposited in private respondent Traders Royal Bank for collection.
On January 7, 1986, private respondent presented the warrants to the Bureau of Treasury for
clearing. The warrants were cleared and private respondent credited the amounts to the
designated payees’ accounts.[2] Petitioner subsequently discovered on April 3, 1986 that the
payees’ indorsements on the warrants had been forged. It demanded reimbursement from private
respondent of the amounts paid on the warrants but the latter refused to pay.
On October 13, 1987, petitioner, through the Bureau of Treasury, filed Civil Case No. 87-42752
for collection against private respondent before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Manila.
Trial then ensued. After petitioner had rested its case, private respondent, with prior leave of
court, filed a Demurrer to Evidence on January 12, 1994. Among others, it was contended:
. . . The plaintiff does not claim nor alleged that because of the alleged forgery of the
indorsements of the payees, it (the plaintiff) had to replace the treasury warrants in question and
thus pay the payees all over again. Does not the cause of action or right to relief, then, if any,
properly pertain to the payees whose endorsements were allegedly forged? And is not such a
cause of action or right to relief properly against the forger/s or perpetrator of the forgery?
In an order dated September 30, 1994, the trial court denied the demurrer to evidence. However,
on motion of private respondent, the trial court, on January 30, 1995, reconsidered its order and
dismissed petitioner’s complaint. Petitioner received the order of dismissal on February 7, 1995.
Hence, it had up to February 22, 1995 within which to appeal.
On February 20, 1995, two days before the last day to file an appeal, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order of dismissal which interrupted the running of the period of appeal.
On May 23, 1995, the trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. The order was
received by petitioner on June 2, 1995, so that it had until June 4, 1995 within which to file the
notice of appeal. However, petitioner filed its notice of appeal only on June 16, 1995, 12 days
beyond the 15-day reglementary period. As a consequence, the dismissal became final. For some
reason, this fact was not immediately noticed, so that the records of the case were elevated to the
Court of Appeals and petitioner was required to file its appellant’s brief. When it came to its turn
to file its brief as an appellee, private respondent asked for an extension of time. Its motion was
granted, but instead of filing its brief, private respondent asked the appellate court to dismiss
petitioner’s appeal on the ground that it was filed out of time. Its motion was granted and
petitioner’s appeal was dismissed. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but its motion
was denied. Petitioner received the appellate court’s resolution denying its motion on June 5,
1997, so that it had until June 20, 1997 within which to appeal to this Court by filing a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Instead, petitioner filed on August 4, 1997, 45 days after
the last day to file an appeal, the present petition for certiorari under Rule 65, contending that the
Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in dismissing its appeal from the order of the RTC
which dismissed its complaint against private respondent.
As earlier stated, this petition should be dismissed.

First. Petitioner’s remedy was to appeal to this Court from the resolutions, dated March 17, 1997
and May 20, 1997, of the appellate court by filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45. Instead, it filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 only on August 4, 1997. Apparently,
petitioner resorted to this special civil action because it had failed to take an appeal within the
15-day reglementary period which expired on June 20, 1997. This, of course, cannot be done.
The special civil action of certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal which petitioner
has lost. Nor can it be contended that the only question raised in this case is a jurisdictional
question. Certiorari lies only where there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. There is no reason why the question being raised by
petitioner, i.e., whether the appellate court committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
petitions, could not have been raised by it on appeal.
In Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals,[3] we dismissed a Rule 65 petition on the ground that the
proper remedy for petitioner therein should have been an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, viz.:
At the outset, this Court notes that the proper remedy of Petitioner Bernardo should have been an
appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. We have time and again reminded members of the
bench and bar that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when "there is no
appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." Certiorari can not
be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that
remedy, certiorari not being a substitute for lost appeal. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are
mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. . . .[4]
Admittedly, this Court, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in
the interest of justice, has the discretion to treat a petition for certiorari as having been filed
under Rule 45, especially if filed within the reglementary period for filing a petition for review.[5]
In this case, however, we find no reason to justify a liberal application of the rules. The petition
was filed well beyond the reglementary period for filing a petition for review without any reason
therefor.
Second. Even on the grounds invoked by petitioner, we think the present petition should be
dismissed. Time and again, we have emphasized that the perfection of appeals in the manner and
within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and that the failure to
perfect an appeal renders the decision of the trial court final and executory.[6] This rule is
founded upon the principle that the right to appeal is not part of due process of law but is a mere
statutory privilege to be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of
the law.[7] In this case, we find no reason to depart from this rule.
Petitioner invokes the judicial policy of allowing appeals, although filed late, when the interest of
justice so requires. Citing Bank of America, NT & SA v. Gerochi, Jr.,[8] it contends that this
Court, in meritorious instances, has allowed the rules on the periods for perfecting appeals to be
relaxed.[9] Unfortunately for petitioner, even a cursory reading of the very case upon which it
relies for support shows that the policy invoked is qualified by the requirement that there must be
exceptional circumstances to justify the relaxation of the rules. The case cited, which involved an
appeal made five days late, illustrates how questions of this nature have been resolved by this
Court:
True, in few highly exceptional instances, we have allowed the relaxing of the rules on the
application of the reglementary periods of appeal. We cite a few typical examples: In Ramos vs.
Bagasao, 96 SCRA 395, we excused the delay of four days in the filing of a notice of appeal
because the questioned decision of the trial court was served upon appellant Ramos at a time
when her counsel of record was already dead. Her new counsel could only file the appeal four
days after the prescribed reglementary period was over. In Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 83
SCRA 453, we allowed the perfection of an appeal by the Republic despite the delay of six days
to prevent a gross miscarriage of justice since the Republic stands to lose hundreds of hectares of
land already titled in its name and had since then been devoted for educational purposes. In
Olacao vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 177 SCRA 38, 41, we accepted a tardy appeal
considering that the subject matter in issue had theretofore been judicially settled, with finality, in
another case. The dismissal of the appeal would have had the effect of the appellant being
ordered twice to make the same reparation to the appellee.
The case at bench, given its own settings, can not come close to those extraordinary
circumstances that have indeed justified a deviation from an otherwise stringent rule. Let it not
be overlooked that the timeliness of an appeal is a jurisdictional caveat that not even this Court
can trifle with.[10]
As in Bank of America, there is no showing in this case of a factual setting which approximates
any of the extraordinary circumstances which may justify a deviation from the rule on timely
filing of appeals. Anyone seeking exemption from the application of this rule has the burden of
proving that exceptionally meritorious instances exist which warrant such departure. In this case,
petitioner failed to discharge this burden. It offered no explanation at all for the 12-day delay in
filing its notice of appeal. What was said in Videogram Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals[11]
applies with equal force to this case, as petitioner is likewise represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General, viz.:
And, while we understand the OSG’s predicament, its oft-repeated excuse of being saddled with
a huge caseload, which is resorted to almost everytime it applies for extension of time for appeal
and filing of comments/replies/briefs, has already lost its flavor, if not gone stale entirely.
Certainly, by this time the OSG must have already developed a system for keeping track of all its
deadlines and monitoring the progress of work being done on the cases it is handling. After all,
government service really entails hard work and perennial unceasing pressure to meet deadlines.
Most assuredly, this is not a ground for the liberal interpretation of the rules. Only in
exceptionally meritorious cases should the rules be relaxed. Such has not been shown to be the
situation in this case.
After its case was dismissed by the trial court, all that the OSG had to do was to file a notice of
appeal, which is just a brief statement of petitioner’s intention to appeal from the court’s
decision. There is no reason why the OSG could not have done this in two days. Unlike a record
on appeal, a notice of appeal does not require the extractions of pleadings and documents from
the records pertinent to the subject of the appeal. In the absence of any satisfactory explanation,
the OSG’s failure to file a timely notice of appeal simply cannot be excused without defeating
private respondent’s right, as a party-litigant, to benefit from a decision that has become final
and executory.
Nor can petitioner invoke the doctrine that rules of technicality must yield to the broader interest
of substantial justice.[12] While every litigant must be given the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities,[13] the
failure to perfect an appeal within the reglementary period is not a mere technicality. It raises a
jurisdictional problem as it deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction over the appeal.[14] The
failure to file the notice of appeal within the reglementary period is akin to the failure to pay the
appeal fee within the prescribed period. In both cases, the appeal is not perfected in due time. As
we held in Pedrosa v. Hill,[15] the requirement of an appeal fee is by no means a mere
technicality of law or procedure, but an essential requirement without which the decision
appealed from would become final and executory.[16] The same can be said about the late filing
of a notice of appeal.
The fact is that petitioner did not only fail to appeal from the main order of the trial court
dismissing its complaint. It did not only fail to appeal on time from the order denying
reconsideration. Petitioner likewise failed to make a timely appeal to this Court from the
resolution of the appellate court dismissing its appeal.
Nonetheless, it is contended that petitioner has a meritorious claim against private respondent
and that it stands to lose P151,645,000.00 if it cannot appeal from the trial court’s order
dismissing its complaint against private respondent. The finality of the trial court’s order as a
consequence of petitioner’s failure to appeal on time, first to the Court of Appeals and, later to
this Court, unfortunately, bars further consideration of its case. There is simply no explanation
offered for such lapses.
Third. There is another reason why review of the trial court’s order cannot be made. Petitioner
does not dispute the fact that, as observed by the Court of Appeals, its notice of appeal referred
only to the order of the trial court denying its Motion for Reconsideration and not the order of
dismissal of its complaint as well.[17] Such failure is fatal. Rule 37, §9 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that an order denying a motion for reconsideration is not appealable, the
remedy being an appeal from the judgment or final order. On the other hand, Rule 41, §1(a) of
the same rules also provides that no appeal may be taken from an order denying a motion for
reconsideration. It is true the present Rules of Civil Procedure took effect only on July 1, 1997
whereas this case involves an appeal taken in February 1995. But Rule 37, §9 and Rule 41, §1(a)
simply codified the rulings in several cases to the effect that an order denying a motion for
reconsideration is interlocutory in nature[18] and, therefore, is not appealable.[19] These rules,
therefore, are not really new.
The outcome of this petition maybe a bitter lesson for petitioner, but one mainly of its own
doing. Not only did it file its notice of appeal well beyond the reglementary period, it actually
failed to appeal from the order dismissing its case against private respondent. The inevitable
consequence of such grave inadvertence is to render the trial court’s decision dismissing its case
final and executory. The Court of Appeals thus acted properly in dismissing petitioner’s appeal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1]
Per Justice Romeo A. Brawner and concurred in by Justices Emeterio C. Cui and Lourdes K.
Tayao-Jaguros.
[2]
The particulars of the warrants are as follows:
TW No. Payee Date Amount

B05529511 Leonila Sioson 1-6-86 P33,044,000.00
B05529512 Leonila Sioson 1-6-86 P17,800,250.00
B05529515 Nancy Concepcion 1-11-86 P39,900,250.00
B05529526 Nancy Concepcion 1-11-86 P40,900,500.00
[3]
275 SCRA 423 (1997)
[4]
Id., at p. 426.
[5]
Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 597 (1997)
[6]
Bank of America, NT & SA v. Gerochi, Jr., 230 SCRA 9 (1994) citing Alto Sales Corp. v.
IAC, 197 SCRA 618 (1991), Falcon Mfg. v. NLRC, 199 SCRA 814 (1991), Kabushi Kaisha
Isetan v. IAC, 203 SCRA 583 (1991)
[7]
Bello v. Fernando, 4 SCRA 135 (1962); Borre v. Court of Appeals, 158 SCRA 660 (1988);
Pedrosa v. Hill, 257 SCRA 373 (1996); People v. Esparas, 260 SCRA 539 (1996)
[8]
230 SCRA 9 (1994)
[9]
Petition, p. 10; Rollo, p. 11.
[10]
230 SCRA at 15-16 (Emphasis added)
[11]
265 SCRA 50, 60 (1996)
[12]
Petition, p. 12; Rollo, p. 13.
[13]
De la Rosa v. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 444 (1997), citing Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals,
68 SCRA 262 (1975)
[14]
Bank of America, NT & SA v. Gerochi, 230 SCRA 9 (1994)
[15]
257 SCRA 373 (1996)
[16]
Id., at 379.
[17]
Rollo, p. 29.
[18]
Artuyo v. Gonzalves, 137 Phil. 803 (1969)
[19]
Pagtakhan v. Court of Industrial Relations, 39 SCRA 455 (1971), citing the former Section 2,
Rule 41, Rules of Court; People v. Doriques, 24 SCRA 167 (1968); Ramos v. Ardant Trading
Corporation, 23 SCRA 947 (1968); Sy v. Dalman, 22 SCRA 834 (1968); Chuatoco v. Aragon, 22
SCRA 346 (1968); People v. Macandog, 7 SCRA 195 (1963); Bautista v. De la Cruz, 9 SCRA
725 (1963); Harrison Foundry & Machinery v. Harrison Foundry Workers Association, 8 SCRA
430 (1963); Phil. Refining Co., Inc. v. Ponce, 99 Phil. 269 (1956); PLDT Employees Union v.
PLDT Co. Free Tel. Workers Union, 97 Phil. 424 (1955); Sitchon v. Sheriff of Occidental
Negros, 80 Phil. 397 (1948)
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 190253, June 11, 2014
JUAN TRAJANO A.K.A. JOHNNY TRAJANO, PETITIONER, VS. UNIWIDE SALES

WAREHOUSE CLUB, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari,[1] filed by petitioner Juan Trajano, to challenge
the July 29, 2009 decision[2] and the October 28, 2009 resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 101815.
The Factual Antecedents
This petition originated from Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club, Inc.’s (Uniwide’s) complaint
against Golden Sea Overseas Sales Corp. (Golden Sea) and Trajano for a sum of money and
damages with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary
injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque.[4]
Uniwide alleged that it entered into a sales arrangement with Golden Sea and Trajano for the
importation of goods from China in 2001. Under this arrangement, Uniwide ordered merchandise
from Golden Sea, which delivered the goods to Uniwide. Since Uniwide was under corporate
rehabilitation at that time, Trajano allegedly “guarantee[d] the payment”[5] of the goods to
Golden Sea. In turn, Uniwide delivered to Trajano and a certain Vicente Kua post-dated checks
payable to “Golden Universal/Cash” or “Golden Sea/Cash” whose face value represented the
goods’ purchase price plus a monetary interest rate of 36% per annum.[6]
From January 2002 until the filing of the complaint, Golden Sea delivered P178,199,054.60
worth of unsaleable, defective and/or damaged goods as well as merchandise that Uniwide did
not agree to purchase. Thus, Golden Sea allegedly agreed to credit in Uniwide’s account the
price of these goods, upon which Uniwide requested for credit amounting to P163,199,054.60 in
its favor. However, Golden Sea did not heed Uniwide’s request; instead, Golden Sea and Trajano
encashed all the post-dated checks Uniwide issued (except those maturing from July 2005 to
September 2006), which totaled to P86,284.028.00.[7] Aggrieved, Uniwide filed the complaint to
get the refund of the total value of misdelivered, unsaleable, defective and/or damaged goods,
and to enjoin Golden Sea and Trajano from encashing the remaining post-dated checks in their
possession.[8]
The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 05-0265, was raffled to RTC of Parañaque – Branch
274, which was presided by Judge Fortunito Madrona.[9] On August 11, 2005, the RTC issued a
writ of preliminary injunction prohibiting Golden Sea and Trajano from encashing the post-dated
checks.[10] Trajano moved to reconsider the issuance of the writ for lack of factual basis.[11]
Subsequently, Trajano filed a motion to post counterbond to lift the writ of preliminary
injunction.[12] Uniwide opposed this,[13] and filed a motion for ocular inspection of the goods
to support its opposition to the motion to post counterbond.[14]
On December 22, 2005, the RTC issued an order: (1) sustaining the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction; (2) granting Uniwide’s motion for ocular inspection; and (3)
deferring the resolution of Trajano’s motion to post counterbond pending the ocular
inspection of the subject goods.[15]
On January 11, 2006, Trajano sought a partial reconsideration of the December 22, 2005
order insofar as the RTC held that his motion to post counterbond would only be resolved
after the ocular inspection. Trajano claimed that Uniwide entered into a contract of sale with
Golden Sea for the importation of merchandise. On the other hand, Uniwide entered into a
contract of loan with Trajano for the payment of these imported goods. Consequently, the
determination of whether Golden Sea should credit in Uniwide’s account the total value of
misdelivered, unsaleable, defective and/or damaged goods was a separate matter from Uniwide’s
contractual obligation to pay Trajano the matured loan. The condition of the purchased goods
was irrelevant with respect to Uniwide’s obligation to pay him the overdue loan. Trajano thus
prayed that he be allowed to post a counterbond and to encash the post-dated checks.[16] On the
same date, Golden Sea and Trajano also separately moved for the voluntary inhibition of
Judge Madrona for his alleged bias towards Uniwide.[17]
On January 12, 2006, Trajano filed a supplemental motion to his motion for partial
reconsideration dated January 11, 2006. In his supplemental motion, Trajano called the trial
court’s attention to the statement of Uniwide’s counsel during the August 5, 2005 hearing that
the agreement for the credit of misdelivered, unsaleable, defective and/or damaged goods only
involved Uniwide and Golden Sea.[18]
On February 15, 2006, Judge Madrona recused himself from the case,[19] but Uniwide
moved to reconsider his voluntary inhibition. Thereafter, the case was re-raffled to the RTC
of Parañaque – Branch 195, which was presided by Judge Aida Estrella Macapagal.
Uniwide contested the re-raffling of the case due to its pending motion for reconsideration of
Judge Madrona’s voluntary inhibition. On June 30, 2006, Judge Madrona denied Uniwide’s
motion for reconsideration and the records of the case were subsequently transferred to Branch
195.[20]
On March 17, 2006, Trajano filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
93492 before the CA. In his petition, Trajano sought to dissolve the writ enjoining him from
encashing the post-dated checks.[21] On January 22, 2008, the CA dissolved the writ of
preliminary injunction with respect to Trajano for lack of factual basis.[22] The CA held
that Uniwide failed to prove that it had a clear and unmistakable right to be protected that
warrants the issuance of the writ.[23] This decision eventually became final and entry of
judgment was made on February 27, 2008.[24]
Meanwhile, on March 29, 2006, Trajano filed before the RTC motions to resolve his motion to
post counterbond and for partial reconsideration dated January 11, 2006.[25] Trajano reiterated his
motion to resolve on May 22, 2007.[26]
On August 28, 2006, Uniwide assailed Judge Madrona’s inhibition from the case[27] in a
petition for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 95885 before the CA.[28] Uniwide argued
that Judge Madrona’s perceived bias in its favor was unfounded, and that the preservation of the
parties’ trust and confidence was an insufficient ground for Judge Madrona’s inhibition.[29]
The RTC Ruling
Due to the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 95885, the RTC issued an order dated June 19,
2007 deferring the resolution of Trajano’s motions to post counterbond and for partial
reconsideration dated January 11, 2006. The RTC held that the issue of whether Judge
Madrona should hear Civil Case No. 05-0265 presented a jurisdictional question that prevented
Branch 195 from resolving Trajano’s pending motions.[30]
After the RTC denied[31] Trajano’s motion for reconsideration[32] in an order dated October 15,
2007, he filed a petition for certiorari assailing the June 19 and October 15, 2007 orders
before the CA.[33] The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101815.
The CA Ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 101815
In a decision dated July 29, 2009, the CA upheld the RTC rulings deferring the resolution of
Trajano’s motions and suspending the proceedings in Civil Case No. 05-0265 during the
pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 95885. Citing Eternal Gardens Memorial Park v. Court of
Appeals[34], the CA ruled that judicial courtesy prompted the RTC to await the final
determination of CA-G.R. SP No. 95885 before taking cognizance of Trajano’s motions and
continuing with the proceedings in Civil Case No. 05-0265.[35]
Trajano filed the present petition[36] after the CA denied[37] its motion for reconsideration.[38]
The Petition
In the present petition, Trajano insists that the RTC should decide on his pending motions since
the propriety of a judge’s inhibition does not determine the RTC’s jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case. He points out that jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in its branch or in the
judge presiding the case. Trajano also opines that whether Judge Madrona correctly recused
himself from the case merely involves the exercise of jurisdiction, not of jurisdiction itself.
Trajano further asserts that the CA incorrectly applied the principle of judicial courtesy since the
disposition of his motions before the RTC would not render the propriety of Judge Madrona’s
voluntary inhibition moot.[39]
The Respondent’s Position

In its Comment,[40] Uniwide claims that Trajano’s petition is in fact an appeal from the June 19
and October 15, 2007 orders of the RTC since he did not raise the issue of “whether the CA
correctly found that Judge Macapagal did not commit grave abuse of discretion” in deferring the
resolution of Trajano’s pending motions. Thus, Trajano incorrectly availed of a Rule 45 petition
in assailing the RTC’s interlocutory orders. Uniwide also points out that Trajano failed to show
that Judge Macapagal gravely abused his discretion in issuing the June 19 and October 15, 2007
orders. Lastly, Uniwide prays for the outright denial of the petition because it lacks competent
evidence of Trajano’s identity in its verification page.
Proceedings in CA-G.R. SP No. 95885 and G.R. No. 193972
In a decision dated May 5, 2010, the CA ruled that the events that had transpired before Branch
274 of the Parañaque RTC provoked the parties’ suspicions that Judge Madrona prejudged the
case, which warranted his inhibition.[41] The CA also denied Uniwide’s motion for
reconsideration,[42] prompting Uniwide to elevate the case before the Supreme Court in Uniwide
Sales Warehouse Club, Inc. v. Golden Sea Overseas Sales Corp., docketed as G.R. No. 193972,
before the Court’s First Division.[43]
The Issues
This case presents to us the following issues:

(1) Whether the petition should be denied outright for procedural infirmities; in particular:
(a) Whether the petition lacks proper verification; and
(b) Whether the petition availed of the proper remedy in appealing the CA decision dated
January 3, 2008 and resolution dated October 28, 2009;
(2) Whether the resolution of Trajano’s motion to post counterbond,[44] motion for partial
reconsideration,[45] and supplemental motion to the motion for partial reconsideration[46] is
already moot and academic; and
(3) Whether the CA erred in not finding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in
suspending the proceedings in Civil Case No. 05-0265.
We find the petition partly meritorious.
I. The petition is not procedurally infirm
A. The petition contains proper verification

Contrary to Uniwide’s claim, the records of the case show that the petition’s verification page
contains Trajano’s competent evidence of identity, specifically, Passport No. XX041470.[47]
Trajano’s failure to furnish Uniwide a copy of the petition containing his competent evidence of
identity is a minor error that this Court may and chooses to brush aside in the interest of
substantial justice. This Court has, in proper instances, relaxed the application of the Rules of
Procedure when the party has shown substantial compliance with it.[48] In these cases, we have
held that the rules of procedure should not be applied in a very technical sense when it defeats
the purpose for which it had been enacted, i.e., to ensure the orderly, just and speedy
dispensation of cases.[49] We maintain this ruling in this procedural aspect of this case.
B. Trajano properly availed of a Rule 45 petition in assailing the January 3, 2008 decision and
the October 28, 2009 resolution of the Court of Appeals
We also see no merit in Uniwide’s claim that Trajano improperly availed of the present petition
for review on certiorari in assailing the RTC orders dated June 19 and October 15, 2007. The
body of the petition clearly and unequivocably challenges the CA decision dated January 3, 2008
and resolution dated October 28, 2009. A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court invokes the Court’s appellate jurisdiction over questions of law that has been
decided by the lower courts with finality. The CA decision assailed by the present petition
involves its final order regarding the alleged grave abuse of discretion involved in the RTC’s
interlocutory orders.
This CA decision should not be confused with the RTC’s interlocutory orders that had been
disputed before the CA, which was correctly contested by Trajano through a petition for
certiorari. In J.L. Bernardo Construction v. Court of Appeals,[50] we stated that a petition for
certiorari is an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order: (1) when the tribunal issued
such order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and (2) when the
assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford
adequate and expeditious relief.
Thus, Trajano correctly filed a petition for certiorari before the CA in order to strike down the
RTC’s interlocutory orders that he claims to have been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
In the same vein, Trajano’s present petition for review on certiorari is also the proper remedy, as
it questions the CA’s final order regarding the RTC’s interlocutory orders.
II. The issue of whether the CA erred in finding no jurisdictional error in the June 19 and
October 15, 2007 orders of the RTC is already moot and academic
Amidst the myriad of procedures that the parties had taken before the lower courts and this
Court, the main focus of the controversy — i.e., whether the CA erred in not finding a
jurisdictional error on the June 19 and October 15, 2007 orders of the RTC — no longer presents
a justiciable controversy. The CA and the parties have overlooked the crucial fact that the
CA, in CA-G.R. SP No. 93492, had already dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction
that enjoined Trajano from encashing the subject post-dated checks. Moreover, the dissolution
of the writ had long become final and executory on February 27, 2008.
In its June 19 and October 15, 2007 orders, the RTC deferred the resolution of Trajano’s motions
to post counterbond and for partial reconsideration dated January 11, 2006. These motions were
filed to lift the writ of preliminary injunction. In addition, the motion for partial
reconsideration questioned the RTC’s suspension of its ruling on the motion to post
counterbond pending its ocular inspection of the subject goods. In turn, the order
commanding the examination of the goods stemmed from Uniwide’s motion for ocular
inspection in support of its opposition to Trajano’s motion to post counterbond.
In other words, the gist of the controversy in CA-G.R. SP No. 101815 that are now the subject
of the present petition pertains to the posting of counterbond to dissolve the writ of preliminary
injunction, which had already been lifted with respect to Trajano in CA-G.R. SP No. 93492.
Thus, Trajano is no longer entitled to any substantial relief on his pending motions before the
RTC as the writ of preliminary injunction itself had already been dissolved with finality.
We also note that Trajano himself admitted that the subject post-dated checks had already
become stale.[51] A stale check is one which has not been presented for payment within a
reasonable time after its issue; it is valueless and, therefore, should not be paid.[52] For these
reasons, we hold that this issue has been rendered moot and academic.
III. The RTC should continue with the proceedings in Civil Case No. 05-0265 during the
pendency of G.R. No. 193972
Trajano alleges in his petition that the RTC did not set the case for trial[53] due to the pendency of
CA-G.R. SP No. 95885 and subsequently, G.R. No. 193972. The mere pendency of a special
civil action for certiorari commenced in relation to a case pending before a lower court does not
automatically interrupt the proceedings in the lower court. A petition for certiorari does not
divest the lower courts of jurisdiction validly acquired over the case pending before them. A
petition for certiorari, unlike an appeal, is an original action; it is not a continuation of the
proceedings in the lower court. It is designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction, including
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[54]
Under Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the higher court should issue against the public
respondent a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction in order to interrupt
the course of the principal case.[55] The petitioner in a Rule 65 petition has the burden of proof to
show that there is a meritorious ground for the issuance of an injunctive writ or order to suspend
the proceedings before the public respondent. He should show the existence of an urgent
necessity for the writ or order, so that serious damage may be prevented. Nonetheless, even if an
injunctive writ or order is issued, the lower court retains jurisdiction over the principal case.[56]
Indeed, we introduced in Eternal Gardens Memorial Park v. Court of Appeals[57] the principle
of judicial courtesy to justify the suspension of the proceedings before the lower court even
without an injunctive writ or order from the higher court. In that case, we pronounced that
“[d]ue respect for the Supreme Court and practical and ethical considerations should have
prompted the appellate court to wait for the final determination of the petition [for
certiorari] before taking cognizance of the case and trying to render moot exactly what was
before this [C]ourt.”[58] We subsequently reiterated the concept of judicial courtesy in Joy Mart
Consolidated Corp. v. Court of Appeals.[59]
We, however, have qualified and limited the application of judicial courtesy in Go v. Abrogar[60]
and Republic v. Sandiganbayan.[61] In these cases, we expressly delimited the application of
judicial courtesy to maintain the efficacy of Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and held
that the principle of judicial courtesy applies only “if there is a strong probability that the
issues before the higher court would be rendered moot and moribund as a result of the
continuation of the proceedings in the lower court.” Through these cases, we clarified that the
principle of judicial courtesy remains to be the exception rather than the rule.[62]
From these perspectives, the appellate court erroneously applied the principle of judicial courtesy
in the current case. There is no strong probability that the issue of the propriety of Judge
Madrona’s voluntary inhibition in CA-G.R. SP No. 95885 would be rendered moot and academic
by the continuation of the proceedings in the trial court.
Furthermore, whether Judge Madrona properly inhibited himself from the case does not pose any
jurisdictional problem in resolving the issues in Civil Case No. 05-0265. We agree with Trajano
that jurisdiction vests in the trial court, not in the judges. We also point out in this respect that the
various branches of the RTC of Parañaque are coordinate and co-equal courts whose totality
constitutes only one RTC. Each of the RTC’s branches is not a court separate and distinct from
the other branches. When a complaint is filed before one branch or judge, jurisdiction does not
attach to this branch or judge alone, to the exclusion of the others. Trial may be had or
proceedings may continue by and before another branch or judge. The different branches in the
RTC of Parañaque do not possess jurisdictions independent of and incompatible with each
other.[63]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we PARTLY GRANT the petition. The resolution of

petitioner Juan Trajano’s motion to post counterbond dated September 9, 2005, motion for
partial reconsideration of the order allowing ocular inspection dated January 11, 2006, and
supplemental motion to the motion for partial reconsideration dated January 12, 2006 is hereby
declared MOOT AND ACADEMIC. The Regional Trial Court of Parañaque – Branch 195 is
hereby ordered to CONTINUE with the proceedings in Civil Case No. 05-0265.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

[1]
Dated January 4, 2010 and filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; rollo, pp. 25-48.
[2]
Id. at 9-20; penned by Associate Justice Antonio L. Villamor, and concurred in by Associate
Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and Celia C. Librea-Leagogo.
[3]
Id. at 21-23.
[4]
Id. at 62-79.
[5]
Id. at 64.
[6]
Id. at 63-72.
[7]
Id. at 80.
[8]
Id. at 63-72.
[9]
Id. at 10.
[10]
Id. at 80.
[11]
Id. at 81-136.
[12]
Id. at 137-139.
[13]
Id. at 30.
[14]
Id. at 140-145.
[15]
Id. at 146-148.
[16]
Id. at 157-160.
[17]
Id. at 149-156; rollo in G.R. No. 193972, Annex “A.”
[18]
Rollo, pp. 161-163.
[19]
Id. at 164-167.
[20]
Id. at 11-12; and 78-279.
[21]
Id. at 168-236; Trajano assailed the RTC orders dated August 6 and December 22, 2005 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 93492.
[22]
Id. at 237-249.
[23]
Id. at 247.
[24]
Id. at 250.
[25]
Id. at 251-253.
[26]
Id. at 334-336.
[27]
Uniwide assailed the RTC orders dated February 15, 2006 and June 30, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 95885.
[28]
Id. at 280-333.
[29]
Rollo in G.R. No. 193972, pp. 9-23.
[30]
Rollo, p. 337.
[31]
Id. at 349.
[32]
Id. at 338-348.
[33]
Id. at 350-373.
[34]
247 Phil. 387-398 (1988).
[35]
Supra note 2.
[36]
Supra note 1.
[37]
Supra note 3.
[38]
Rollo, pp. 437-454.
[39]
Supra note 1.
[40]
Id. at 466-472.
[41]
Rollo in G.R. No. 193972, pp. 27-40.
[42]
Id. at 41-42.
[43]
Id. at 9-23.
[44]
Dated September 9, 2005.
[45]
Dated January 11, 2006.
[46]
Dated January 12, 2006
[47]
Rollo, p.49; The passport was issued on January 23, 2010 in Manila.
[48]
Alcantara v. Philippine Commercial and International Bank, 634 SCRA 48, 59-60, G.R. No.
151349, October 20, 2010; and Security Bank Corp. v. Indiana Aerospace University, G.R. No.
146197, 500 Phil. 51, 58 (2005).
[49]
Serrano v. Galant Maritime Services, Inc., 455 Phil. 993, 998-999 (2003).
[50]
G.R. No. 105827, January 31, 2000, 324 SCRA 24, 34.
[51]
Rollo, pp. 43-46.
[52]
The International Corporate Bank v. Spouses Gueco, 404 Phil. 356, 366 (2001).
[53]
Rollo, p. 26.
[54]
Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holding Corp., 479 Phil. 769-771, 778-782 (2004).
[55]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, Section 7.
[56]
Herrera, Remedial Law III, 2006 Ed., p. 363.
[57]
Supra note 34.
[58]
Id. at 387-388, 394.
[59]
G.R. No. 88705, June 11, 1992, 209 SCRA, 746.
[60]
446 Phil. 228-229, 238 (2003).
[61]
525 Phil. 806, 810 (2006).
[62]
See also Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, 532 Phil. 340, 350 (2006).
[63]
Bacalso v. Ramolete, G.R. No. L-22488, October 26, 1967, 21 SCRA 519, 524; Maloles II v.
Phillips, 381 Phil. 193-194 (2000); People v. Gorospe, G.R. No. L-51513, May 15, 1984; and
Municipality of Daet v. Court of Appeals, 182 Phil. 84, 104 (1979).
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 200538, August 13, 2014
CITY OF DAVAO, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND BENJAMIN C. DE

GUZMAN, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify and set
aside the August 5, 2011 Resolution[1] and December 6, 2011 Resolution[2] of the Court of
Appeals (CA). in CA-G.R. SP No. 03951-MIN. The first resolution granted the motion for partial
reconsideration of private respondent Benjamin C. De Guzman (De Guzman), praying for the
imposition of treble costs against petitioner City of Davao (Davao City). The second resolution
denied the motion for reconsideration of Davao City.
The Factual and Procedural Antecedents
Davao City was the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Daliao, Toril, Davao City,
covered by TCT No. T-29856. Claiming that this same parcel of land was earlier donated by the
late Engracia Tagalplace (Tagalplace) and Juan dela Cruz (dela Cruz), to be used as a public
market but was not used as such, their heirs wrote De Guzman, then Davao City Mayor, seeking
reconveyance of the said land.[3]
Subsequently, the Sangguniang Panlungsod issued Resolution No. 2398-01 granting De Guzman
the authority to sign for, and on behalf of, Davao City a deed of reconveyance in favor of the
said heirs.[4]
A few months later, under its new mayor, Mayor Rodrigo R. Duterte (Mayor Duterte), it was
discovered that the subject property was sold, not donated, to Davao City, based on the
annotation found at the back of TCT No. 1417.
From the documents discovered, it appeared that TCT No. T-9856 was a portion of a bigger
parcel of land covered by TCT No. 1417; that on December 29, 1936, TCT No. 1417 was
cancelled, caused by the execution of a deed of sale transferring the rights over Lot 134-A-2-B in
favor of then Municipality of Davao (now Davao City); that in lieu of TCT No. 1417, two (2)
titles were issued by the Register of Deeds; TCT No. 1588, issued in the name of the
Municipality of Davao, covering Lot 134-A-2-B-1, with an area of 10,009 square meters, and
TCT 1589, issued in the name of Tagalplace and dela Cruz, covering Lot 134-A-2-B-2,
comprising 93,126 square meters; and that on February 1971, TCT No. 1588 was further
cancelled when the Municipality of Davao purchased it from Tagalplace and dela Cruz, resulting
in the issuance of TCT No. 29856.
Based on this documented discovery, Davao City, through Mayor Duterte, filed a complaint to
annul the reconveyance, impleading not only the heirs of Tagalplace and dela Cruz (the Heirs)
but also De Guzman.[5] The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 28,908-2002 and was raffled to
Regional Trial Court, Branch 17 Davao City (RTC-Br. 17), presided by Judge Renato A. Fuentes
(Judge Fuentes,).
Claiming that he was not a real party-in-interest, De Guzman filed a motion to dismiss. Judge
Fuentes denied the motion. Upon denial of his motion for reconsideration, De Guzman filed a
petition for certiorari before the CA, docketed as G.R. No. 75168 (De Guzman's Motion to
Dismiss).
Meanwhile, there being no injunction issued by the CA, Judge Fuentes proceeded with Civil
Case No. 28,908-02 and eventually rendered a summary judgment voiding the reconveyance and
ordering the said parcel of land restored to Davao City.[6] As can be gleaned from the decretal
portion of the RTC-Br. 17 Decision, De Guzman was included in the judgment. Said portion
reads:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the evidence of parties through counsels, as a result of their
admissions and stipulations submitted through the filing of their respective memorandum (sic),
except the heirs of the late Juan dela Cruz and Engracia Tagalplace, whose submission of their
memorandum was delayed but nonetheless admitted, finding the evidence of plaintiff through
counsel, sufficient by preponderance, to support and uphold the cause of action of plaintiff
against defendant, Decision is rendered in favor of plaintiff City of Davao, represented by its
City Mayor Hon. Rodrigo R. Duterte, and against defendants Benjamin C. de Guzman, and
Heirs of the late Juan dela Cruz and Engracia Tagalplace, declaring the Deed of Reconveyance
dated May 11, 2001, covered by TCT No. T-29856, containing an area of Ten Thousand
(10,000) square meters more or less, in favor of the Heirs of Juan dela Cruz and Engracia
Tagalplace executed by then City Mayor Davao City Benjamin C. de Guzman, null and void and
without legal effect, restoring and reconveying full and complete ownership over said above
mentioned property, back to the City of Davao, with cost de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
[Emphasis supplied]
The Heirs and De Guzman filed an appeal to the CA, docketed as CA G.R. CV No. 00108
(Appeal on the Merits Case). The CA (22nd Division), in its Decision, elated June 5, 2008,
expressed the view that the application of the rules on summary procedure was not proper
because there were genuine issues which necessitated the presentation of evidence. For said
reason, it set aside the RTC-Br. 17 decision and ordered the remand of the case to the said court
for further proceedings.
On January 31, 2008, the CA (Special 21st Division), in G.R. No. 75168 (De Guzman's Motion
to Dismiss), dismissed De Guzman's petition for being (i) an improper remedy in questioning an
interlocutory order: and (ii) moot because of the RTC-Br. 17 decision on the merits of the main
case.[7]
When the case was returned to RTC-Br. 17, the Heirs and De Guzman moved for the inhibition
of Judge Fuentes, who granted the motion. The case was thereafter re-raffled to RTC-Branch 11
presided by Judge Virginia Hofilenia-Europa (Judge Hofilenia-Europa). As the records would
show, Davao City asked for the inhibition of Judge Hotilenia-Europa, as her son was the lawyer
of De Guzman. Eventually, the case was finally re-raffled to RTC-Br. 14 presided by Judge
George Omelio[8] (Judge Omelio).
During the proceedings, De Guzman reiterated his pos1t1on that he should not be impleaded
because he merely signed the reconveyance in his official capacity as then mayor of Davao City.
This led to an exchange or oral arguments between the opposing parties. Thereafter, Judge
Omelio ordered in open court that De Guzman be dropped as co-defendant.[9] The RTC-Br. 14
Order,[10] dated October 11, 2010, reads:
ORDER
The Court is allowed to drop a party on its own initiative and this is granted under Section 11,
Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Accordingly, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby Denied.
Set the next hearing of this case on November 10, 2010 at 8:30 in the morning.
SO ORDERED.
[Emphasis supplied]
This prompted Davao City to move for the inhibition of Judge Omelio, alleging bias and
partiality as there was no motion filed by De Guzman. Judge Omelio, however, denied the
motion.
The matter of exclusion of De Guzman as a party was elevated to the CA by Davao City, through
a petition for certiorari, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Omelio for
dropping him as co-defendant despite the absence of a motion to that effect. The case was
docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 03951-MIN. This time, the CA (Special 23rd Division) upheld
Judge Omelio by dismissing Davao City's petition.[11] The CA found no abuse of discretion on
the part of Judge Omelia because the assailed order was well within the authority of the Court
pursuant to Section 11, Rule 3[12] of the Rules of Court. The CA stated that De Guzman could
neither benefit nor be injured by the affirmation or annulment of the deed or
reconveyance. Thus, the CA dismissed Davao City's petition for being "patently without
merit.''[13]
While the petition was dismissed in his favor, De Guzman still filed a motion for partial
reconsideration asking for the imposition of treble costs and, award of attorney's fees.[14]
On August 5, 2011, the CA (Special 23rd Division) issued the first assailed Resolution.
WHEREFORE, finding merit to the motion for partial reconsideration, the same is hereby
GRANTED. Consequently, our April 15, 2011 Resolution is MAINTAINED with modification
such that petitioner and its counsel are hereby DIRECTED within ten (10) days from notice to
pay solidarily private respondent the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as treble
costs. conformably with Section 8, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.[15]
[Emphasis supplied]
Davao City moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in its second assailed
Resolution, elated December 6, 2011.
Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS HAS ACTED

WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN ISSUING RESOLUTIONS DATED 05 AUGUST 2011 AND 06
DECEMBER 2011, DIRECTING PETITIONER AND ITS COUNSEL TO PAY
SOLIDARILY PRIVATE RESPONDENT BENJAMIN C. DE GUZMAN TREBLE
COSTS IN THE AMOUNT OF FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00)[16]
Davao City charges that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the August 5,
2011 Resolution directing it and its counsel to pay solidarily De Guzman the amount of
P5,000.00 as treble costs. It argues that it was entirely improper and had no factual and legal
basis. Davao City claims that it filed the said petition based on "a firm and honest belief,
primarily anchored on no less than the honorable respondent Court's dismissal of De Guzman's
petition for certiorari seeking for the dropping of his name as party defendant, that de Guzman
was a real party in-interest in the case below and that Judge Omelio's act of dropping him as
such, contrary to the honorable respondent Court's decision of not dropping him as party
defendant in its Decision dated 27 August 2008. Without the slightest iota of doubt, it constitutes
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.''[17] It stresses that it
submitted pieces of evidence to prove their position. In praying for the deletion of the award of
treble costs, Davao City explains the following reasons:[18]
1] There is no showing that Davao City was guilty of bad faith in filing the petition. No amount
of evidence is in sight to that effect. lt did not even opt to file a motion for reconsideration of the
resolution dismissing its petition.
2] The petition cannot even be said to be dilatory considering that it was Davao City who was the
plaintiff in the case below, and it would be absurd for it to cause the delay of the prosecution of
its own case.
3] Had it filed the said petition maliciously and in bad faith, the CA would have seen that and
would have included in its judgment the award of treble cost in its earlier decision.
4] Davao City also believed and was of the strong conviction that De Guzman was a real party-
in-interest. This is so because without his signature, the deed of reconveyance, dated May 11,
2011, could not have been made as basis of the transfer of the title over TCT No. 1417 in the
name of the Heirs.
5] Judge Omelia could not just conveniently give a flimsy reason that De Guzman was just
acting in his official capacity as City Mayor and under the color of authority by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Davao City (Sanggunian) when he signed the Deed of Reconveyance. The
annotation at the back of the title bearing number TCT No. 1417 stated that the City of Davao
acquired the same by way of a deed of sale, and not by way of donation. For said reason, De
Guzman could have aptly refused to sign the deed of reconveyance notwithstanding his authority
to reconvey the subject parcel of land to the Heirs.
6] De Guzman could have exercised his veto powers under the Local Government Code in
striking down the ordinance authorizing him to sign the reconveyance to forestall the suffering
by Davao City of a great proprietary loss. Yet, De Guzman utterly and deliberately failed to veto
such an ultra vires act. Or, in the alternative, he could just have refused to use the authority
conferred upon him by the Sanggunian because mere authority, as opposed to a command, does
not necessarily mean that its execution is compulsory. Such deliberate failure on the part of De
Guzman makes him liable for civil damages. That is why Davao City, in good faith and in honest
belief strongly argued that De Guzman was a proper party-defendant and should not have been
dropped as such from the case.
7] This firm and honest belief of Davao City, entertained in good faith, is bolstered by the fact
that the motion to dismiss of De Guzman was earlier denied by Judge Fuentes and his motion for
reconsideration of the order denying his motion to dismiss was likewise denied.
8] That on January 3 I, 2008, the CA, in G.R. No. 75168, dismissed the petition for certiorari
tiled by De Guzman questioning the denial of his motion to dismiss. It likewise denied his
motion for reconsideration for being bereft of merit.
Davao City then goes on to cite examples of cases, wherein treble costs were awarded, to show
why it should not be sanctioned. It also reiterated the reasons why it impleaded De Guzman as a
co-defendant in the case for annulment of reconveyance and the reasons why Judge Omelio erred
in dropping him from the case even as there was no motion filed praying therefor.[19]
De Guzman counters that the assailed resolutions of April 15, 2011 and August 5, 2011 had
become final and, therefore, immutable, when it failed to appeal therefrom within the
reglementary period. He further asserts that the CA was well within its sound discretion and
jurisdiction because the assailed resolutions were sanctioned by Section 8 of Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court and the application of the said rule and the basis therefor had been properly
explained in the said resolution, from which no appeal was taken.[20]
Davao City replies that it could not have properly filed a petition for review on certiorari via
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court because it was not appealing from the decision on the merits of the
case but questioning the validity of the grant of treble costs in both the April 15, 2011 and
August 5, 2011 Resolutions. Thus, it claims that it correctly resorted to a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court as the proper remedy.
Arguing that, by their nature, the questioned resolutions were mere interlocutory orders in that
they were dwelt mainly on the validity of the award of treble costs and not on the merits of the
main case, Davao City could not have properly assailed the questioned resolution through a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Davao City avers that the tenor of the said
orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and
the only legal way to question them was by way of petition for certiorori under Rule 65.
Davao City also points out that De Guzman in his comment did not specifically deny the
allegations contained in the petition and so he is deemed to have admitted all its material
averments and is estopped from further offering any counterarguments.
The Court's Ruling
The Court resolves to grant the petition.
In this disposition, the Court will not delve on the merits of Davao City's petition for certiorari
before the CA questioning the directive of Judge Omelio dropping De Guzman as co-defendant.
It is not the issue here. The issue here is the imposition by the CA of P5,000.00 as treble costs
against Davao City in its resolution of the motion for reconsideration filed by De
Guzman. While the decision on the merits became final, the Court has residual powers to
resolve the issue on such an interlocutory matter. Moreover, if the strict application of the rules
will tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, it is always within the Court's power to suspend
the rules, or except a particular case from its operation.[21]
The pertinent rule in this regard is Section 8 of Rule 65, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC,
which reads:
SEC. 8. Proceedings after comment is filed. After the comment or other pleadings required by
the court are filed, or the time for the filing thereof has expired, the court may hear the case or
require the parties to submit memoranda. If, after such hearing or filing of memoranda or upon
the expiration of the period for filing, the court finds that the allegations of the petition are true, it
shall render judgment for such relief to which the petitioner is entitled.
However, the court may dismiss the petition if it finds the same patently without merit or
prosecuted manifestly for delay, or if the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to
require consideration. In such event, the court may award in favor of the respondent treble
costs solidarily against the petitioner and counsel, in addition to subjecting counsel to
administrative sanctions under Rule 139 and 139-B of the Rules of Court.
The Court may impose motu proprio, based on res ipsa loquitur, other disciplinary sanctions or
measures on erring lawyers for patently dilatory and unmeritorious petitions for certiorari.
[Emphases and underscoring supplied]
The use of the word "may" in the last sentence of the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 65,
indicates that the assessment of treble costs is not automatic or mandatory. It merely gives the
court the discretion and latitude to impose further S8nctions where a petition is dismissed for
being ''patently without merit," ''prosecuted manifestly for delay," or upon finding that the
questions raised in the petition for certiorari were "too unsubstantial to require consideration.''
Although the court is afforded judicial discretion in imposing treble costs, there remains a need
to show that it is sound and with basis - that is "taking all the pertinent circumstances into due
consideration."[22] In the assailed CA Resolution, dated August 5, 2011, granting De Guzman's
motion for partial reconsideration, the CA merely wrote:
Indeed, we have ruled that the petition was filed patently without merit. While petitioner claims
that it was not filed "maliciously" and "in bad faith," we however ruled that 'it is mind boggling
why petitioner would exert every effort to implead him as co-defendant when records clearly
show that he was merely acting in his official capacity.' Records further show that private
respondent has indeed participated in the case since 2002 and ever since had been insisting that
he was not the real party-in-interest.[23]
The foundation for considering the case against De Guzman to be ''patently without merit" was
never clearly laid out in the assailed August 5, 2011 Resolution. The CA considered it mind
boggling for Davao City to continue to persecute its former mayor since 2002. It has not been
Davao City's fault that the case dragged on. The CA had once dismissed De Guzman's petition
questioning his implication in the case.[24] Although, RTC-Br. 17 had rendered a summary
judgment earlier, the CA vacated the same and remanded the case to the court of origin for
further proceedings.[25] To date, this Court has not received information that the main case has
been resolved.
The Court cannot see why the petition questioning the dropping of De Guzman as co-defendant
was patently without merit. Davao City was of the firm and sincere belief that he had a hand in
the reconveyance of the subject property to the Heirs. Although this matter is still to be decided
by RTC-Br. 14, Davao City believed that he should be impleaded in the case precisely because
from the annotations on TCT No. 1417 covering the subject property, it clearly appears that the
said parcel of land was not donated to the local government unit, but sold to it. Despite the
annotations, De Guzman still executed the deed of reconveyance.
To be considered in favor of Davao City was the fact that initially the motion to dismiss of De
Guzman was denied by Judge Fuentes and upheld by the CA in its January 31, 2008 Decision.
His submission that he was wrongfully impleaded as a party-defendant was not even passed upon
by the CA, which merely ruled that his remedy was not certiorari, among others. Had there been
merit in De Guzman's claim that he was wrongfully impleaded, the CA could have ordered that
he be dropped as co-defendant as early as 2008, as it ordered the remand of the case to RTC-Br.
17 for a full blown trial. The CA, however, did not make such an order.
Despite the undisputed fact that there was no motion to that effect, however, Judge Omelio
ordered that he be dropped as a party defendant. Clearly, the order was made not after a full
blown hearing on the merits. For said reason, Davao City has a valid cause to elevate the matter
to the CA. The case was definitely not "patently without merit."
In most recent cases where the Court awarded treble costs, the reasons therefor were clearly
explained. Treble costs were imposed in cases where the parties and their counsels resort to
deplorable dilatory tactics to frustrate the fruition of justice. In Central Surety And Insurance
Compony v. Planters Products, Inc.,[26] the Court awarded treble costs when the losing litigant
repeatedly frustrated the execution of a final and executory decision. In the said case, the
execution was delayed for more than five years because of his dilatory tactics. When the winning
party sought the execution by motion beyond the period, he still opposed it despite the fact that
the period was suspended because of reasons attributable to him. In Spouses Manuel A. Aguilar
and Yolanda C. Aguilar v. The Manila Banking Corporation,[27] treble costs were again awarded
because of the deplorable course resorted to by the losing litigants in the hope of evading
manifest obligations. The Court stated that it viewed with disfavor the unjustified delay in the
enforcement of the final decision and orders in the said case. Once a judgment becomes final
and executory, the prevailing party should not be denied the fruits of his victory by some
subterfuge devised by the losing party. Unjustified delay in the enforcement of a judgment sets
at naught the role of courts in disposing justiciable controversies with finality.
In some cases, treble costs were imposed because the parties took the law into their own hands or
resorted to a wrong remedy. In Ernesto Ramos Uypitching And Ramas Uypitching Sons, Inc., v.
Ernesto Quiamco,[28] instead of bringing the proper civil action necessary to acquire legal
possession of a motorcycle, the petitioner took the law into his own hands and seized it without a
search warrant or court order. Worse, in the course of the illegal seizure or the motorcycle, the
petitioner even mouthed a slanderous statement. By doing so, he transgressed the proper norms
of human relations. Treble costs were imposed by the Court. In Saturnino Salera, Jr., Sarah
Salera, Samuel Salera, and Susan Salera v. A-1 Investors, Inc.,[29] a party claimed that he was
denied due process when the court adjudged a case against him even if he was not served the
summons. He then resorted to filing a complaint for injunction to stop the execution of the final
judgment. The Court said that he should have resorted to an action for annulment under Rule 47
and so awarded treble costs against him.
In the case at bench, the imposition of treble costs was not explained at all. The CA imposed the
amount of P5,000.00 but it did not give any reason for such imposition. As the CA never
justified it, the imposition should be stricken off.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The August 5, 2011 and December 6, 2011
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03951-MIN are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, the imposition of P5,000.00 as treble costs is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Villarama, Jr.,* and Leonen, JJ., concur.
August 28, 2014

N O T I C E OF J U D G M E N T
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that on ___August 13, 2014___ a Decision, copy attached herewith, was
rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by
this Office on August 28, 2014 at 3:30 p.m.
Very truly yours,

(SGD)
WILFREDO V. LAPITAN
Division Clerk of Court
*
Designated Acting Member in view of the vacancy in the Third Division, per Special Order No.
1691 dated May 22, 2014.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 49: penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim. Jr., with Associate Justices
Edgardo T. Lloren and Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles. concurring.
[2]
Id. at 52-53; penned by Associate Justice Edgardo T. Lloren, with Associate Justices Melchor
Quirino C. Sadang and Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles, concurring.
[3]
Id. at 30.
[4]
Id.
[5]
Id. at 131.
[6]
Id. at 86-98.
[7]
Id. at 100-102
[8]
Judge George Omelio has been DISMISSED from the service for ignorance of the law and
gross misconduct in A.M. No. RTJ-11-2259. October 22, 2013 (Peralta v. Judge George E.
Omelio). Earlier in A.M. No. RTJ-12-2321. October 3, 2012 (Spouses Jesus G. Crisologo And
Nannette B. Crisologo v. Judge George E. Omelio), he was FINED P40,000.00 for gross
ignorance of the law; and in A.M. No. MTJ-08-1701 (A.M No. RTJ-11-2273), July 28, 2008
(Milagros Villa Abrille v. Judge George Omelio), he was found administratively liable for
violation of a Supreme Court Circular for which he was FINED in the amount or P10,000.00.
[9]
Rollo, pp. 19 and 132.
[10]
Id. at 85.
[11]
CA Resolution dated 15 April 2011; id. at 129.
[12]
"SEC. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. — Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of
parties is ground for dismissal or an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the
court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage or the action and on such terms
as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately."
(underscoring ours).
[13]
Rollo, pp. 135-136.
[14]
Id. at 140 and 144.
[15]
Id. at 49.
[16]
Id. at 52.
[17]
Id. at 30.
[18]
Id. at 25-42.
[19]
Id.
[20]
Id. at 184-185.
[21]
Valerosos v. Court of Appeals, 614 Phil. 236 (2009).
[22]
Diaz v. People, G.R. No. 180677, February 18, 2013, 691 SCRA 139.
[23]
Rollo, p. 50.
[24]
Id. at 131.
[25]
Id. at 132.
[26]
56 Phil. 479 (2007).
[27]
56 Phil. 645 (2006).
[28]
539 Phil. 227 (2006).
[29]
427 Phil. 440 (2002).
335 Phil. 82
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 122156, February 03, 1997
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, PETITIONER, VS. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE

SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION AND
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos,[1] is invoked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the shares
of the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing,
respondents maintain that the provision is not self-executing but requires an implementing
legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether the 51% shares form part of the
national economy and patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the Constitution.
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant
to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8
December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and
outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual “strategic partner,”
is to provide management expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and
financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.[2] In a close
bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince
Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000
shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel
operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the
bid of petitioner.
Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by respondent GSIS state -
I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH GSIS/MHC -
1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below by October 23, 1995
(reset to November 3, 1995) or the Highest Bidder will lose the right to purchase the Block of
Shares and GSIS will instead offer the Block of Shares to the other Qualified Bidders:
a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with the GSIS/MHC the Management
Contract, International Marketing/Reservation System Contract or other type of contract
specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for the Manila Hotel x x x x
b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement with GSIS x x x x
K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER -
The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner after the following
conditions are met:
a. Execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later than October 23, 1995 (reset to
November 3, 1995); and
b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP (Committee on Privatization)/ OGCC
(Office of the Government Corporate Counsel) are obtained.”[3]
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the
execution of the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28
September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad.[4] In a
subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent a manager’s check issued by Philtrust
Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos (P33,000,000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of the
Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad x x x x[5] which respondent GSIS refused to accept.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of
the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and
consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus.
On 18 October 1995 the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from
perfecting and consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.
On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the Court En Banc after it was referred
to it by the First Division. The case was then set for oral arguments with former Chief Justice
Enrique M. Fernando and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as amici curiae.
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and
submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically
become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It
is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness
of independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To
all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony.[6] Petitioner also argues
that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel
which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel
business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the
national economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is
clearly covered by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987
Constitution, applies.[7]
It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its
business also unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner should be preferred after it
has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if for any
reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the
other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders
are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share.[8]
Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing
provision and requires implementing legislation(s) x x x x Thus, for the said provision to operate,
there must be existing laws “to lay down conditions under which business may be done.”[9]
Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under the term
national patrimony which only refers to lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna and all marine wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as
cited in the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. According to
respondents, while petitioner speaks of the guests who have slept in the hotel and the events that
have transpired therein which make the hotel historic, these alone do not make the hotel fall
under the patrimony of the nation. What is more, the mandate of the Constitution is addressed to
the State, not to respondent GSIS which possesses a personality of its own separate and distinct
from the Philippines as a State.
Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the constitutional
provision invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding
shares of the corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands.
Certainly, 51% of the equity of the MHC cannot be considered part of the national patrimony.
Moreover, if the disposition of the shares of the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution,
petitioner should have questioned it right from the beginning and not after it had lost in the
bidding.
Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1., of the bidding rules which provides
that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may
offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these
Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share, is misplaced.
Respondents postulate that the privilege of submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen since it
only takes place if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares.
Thus the submission by petitioner of a matching bid is premature since Renong Berhad could
still very well be awarded the block of shares and the condition giving rise to the exercise of the
privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet taken place.
Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of discretion should fail since
respondent GSIS did not exercise its discretion in a capricious, whimsical manner, and if ever it
did abuse its discretion it was not so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition for mandamus
should fail as petitioner has no clear legal right to what it demands and respondents do not have
an imperative duty to perform the act required of them by petitioner.
We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and
administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the
authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of
the nation.[10] It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the
different departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles
on which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a
supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private
rights must be determined and all public authority administered.[11] Under the doctrine of
constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or
contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by
private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus,
since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed
written in every statute and contract.
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their
provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who
merely establish an outline of government providing for the different departments of the
governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens.[12]
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and
becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which
supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-
executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right
conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be
determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating
that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.[13]
As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a
different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate
directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of
constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence,
unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the
legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the
fundamental law.[14] This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always
been, that -
x x x x in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-
self-executing x x x x Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution
should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to
determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to
the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing
to pass the needed implementing statute.[15]
Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is clearly not self-
executing, as they quote from discussions on the floor of the 1986 Constitutional Commission -
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, I am asking this question as the Chairman of the Committee
on Style. If the wording of “PREFERENCE” is given to QUALIFIED FILIPINOS,” can it be
understood as a preference to qualified Filipinos vis-a-vis Filipinos who are not qualified. So,
why do we not make it clear? To qualified Filipinos as against aliens?
THE PRESIDENT. What is the question of Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove the word
“QUALIFIED?”
MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely “TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS” as against whom?
As against aliens or over aliens ?
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is understood. We use the word “QUALIFIED”
because the existing laws or prospective laws will always lay down conditions under which
business may be done. For example, qualifications on capital, qualifications on the setting up of
other financial structures, et cetera (underscoring supplied by respondents).
MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.

MR. NOLLEDO. Yes.[16]
Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it
appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature
is not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the
contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature
without impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate
the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a
provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for
the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards
around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or
prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render
such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution
of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an
indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision
of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any
legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right
and make it more available.[17] Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that
the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.
Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is
implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly
are not self-executing.[18] The argument is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-
executing because Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the formation and operation
of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs
legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national
jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can
only be self-executing as it does not by its language require any legislation in order to give
preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part
and non-self-executing in another.[19]
Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain constitutional provisions are merely
statements of principles and policies, which are basically not self-executing and only placed in
the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights - are
simply not in point. Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation[20] speaks of
constitutional provisions on personal dignity,[21] the sanctity of family life,[22] the vital role of the
youth in nation-building,[23] the promotion of social justice,[24] and the values of education.[25]
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance[26] refers to constitutional provisions on social justice and
human rights[27] and on education.[28] Lastly, Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato[29] cites provisions on the
promotion of general welfare,[30] the sanctity of family life,[31] the vital role of the youth in
nation-building[32] and the promotion of total human liberation and development.[33] A reading of
these provisions indeed clearly shows that they are not judicially enforceable constitutional rights
but merely guidelines for legislation. The very terms of the provisions manifest that they are only
principles upon which legislations must be based. Res ipsa loquitur.
On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory,
positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not
require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our
Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national
economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that -
qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in
certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute
especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own
inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where
there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission[34] explains
-
The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and developed refers not only to our rich
natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of our race. It also refers to our intelligence in
arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we should develop not only our lands, forests, mines and
other natural resources but also the mental ability or faculty of our people.
We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage.[35] When
the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to
the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
Manila Hotel has become a landmark - a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was
restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly
Filipino. Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various
significant events which have shaped Philippine history. It was called the Cultural Center of the
1930’s. It was the site of the festivities during the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth.
Dubbed as the Official Guest House of the Philippine Government it plays host to dignitaries and
official visitors who are accorded the traditional Philippine hospitality.[36]
The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The Manila Hotel: The Heart and
Memory of a City.[37] During World War II the hotel was converted by the Japanese Military
Administration into a military headquarters. When the American forces returned to recapture
Manila the hotel was selected by the Japanese together with Intramuros as the two (2) places for
their final stand. Thereafter, in the 1950’s and 1960’s, the hotel became the center of political
activities, playing host to almost every political convention. In 1970 the hotel reopened after a
renovation and reaped numerous international recognitions, an acknowledgment of the Filipino
talent and ingenuity. In 1986 the hotel was the site of a failed coup d’ etat where an aspirant for
vice-president was “proclaimed” President of the Philippine Republic.
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures,
loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own
historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily,
Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the
equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the
majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual
control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated
from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain
respondents’ claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable since what is being
sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land
upon which the building stands.[38]
The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as used in our Constitution also
includes corporations at least 60% of which is owned by Filipinos. This is very clear from the
proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission -
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. I would like to introduce an amendment to the Nolledo amendment. And the
amendment would consist in substituting the words “QUALIFIED FILIPINOS” with the
following: “CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES OR CORPORATIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS
WHOSE CAPITAL OR CONTROLLING STOCK IS WHOLLY OWNED BY SUCH
CITIZENS.”
xxxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, apparently the proponent is agreeable, but we have to raise a
question. Suppose it is a corporation that is 80-percent Filipino, do we not give it preference?
MR. DAVIDE. The Nolledo amendment would refer to an individual Filipino. What about a
corporation wholly owned by Filipino citizens?
MR. MONSOD. At least 60 percent, Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE. Is that the intention?

MR. MONSOD. Yes, because, in fact, we would be limiting it if we say that the preference
should only be 100-percent Filipino.
MR. DAVIDE. I want to get that meaning clear because “QUALIFIED FILIPINOS” may refer
only to individuals and not to juridical personalities or entities.
MR. MONSOD. We agree, Madam President.[39]
xxxx
MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote, may I request that the amendment be read again.
MR. NOLLEDO. The amendment will read: “IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES
AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE
STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS.” And the word
“Filipinos” here, as intended by the proponents, will include not only individual Filipinos but
also Filipino-controlled entities or entities fully-controlled by Filipinos.[40]
The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained thus -
MR. FOZ. Madam President, I would like to request Commissioner Nolledo to please restate his
amendment so that I can ask a question.
MR. NOLLEDO. “IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS

COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE
PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS.”
MR. FOZ. In connection with that amendment, if a foreign enterprise is qualified and a Filipino
enterprise is also qualified, will the Filipino enterprise still be given a preference?
MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.
MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects than the Filipino enterprise, will the
Filipino still be preferred?
MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is “yes.”
MR. FOZ. Thank you.[41]
Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision Commissioner Nolledo continues –
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, Madam President. Instead of “MUST,” it will be “SHALL - THE STATE
SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS.” This embodies the so-called
“Filipino First” policy. That means that Filipinos should be given preference in the grant of
concessions, privileges and rights covering the national patrimony.[42]
The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional Commission regarding the subject
provision was still further clarified by Commissioner Nolledo[43]
Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the “Pro-Filipino” bias in all economic concerns.
It is better known as the FILIPINO FIRST Policy x x x x This provision was never found in
previous Constitutions x x x x
The term “qualified Filipinos” simply means that preference shall be given to those citizens who
can make a viable contribution to the common good, because of credible competence and
efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and preferential treatment to Filipino
citizens or organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since such an indiscriminate
preference would be counterproductive and inimical to the common good.
In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to be made
between a “qualified foreigner” and a “qualified Filipino,” the latter shall be chosen over the
former.”
Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so considered by respondent GSIS
and selected as one of the qualified bidders. It was pre-qualified by respondent GSIS in
accordance with its own guidelines so that the sole inference here is that petitioner has been
found to be possessed of proven management expertise in the hotel industry, or it has significant
equity ownership in another hotel company, or it has an overall management and marketing
proficiency to successfully operate the Manila Hotel.[44]
The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the Constitution by arguing that the subject
provision is not self-executory and requires implementing legislation is quite disturbing. The
attempt to violate a clear constitutional provision - by the government itself - is only too
distressing. To adopt such a line of reasoning is to renounce the duty to ensure faithfulness to the
Constitution. For, even some of the provisions of the Constitution which evidently need
implementing legislation have juridical life of their own and can be the source of a judicial
remedy. We cannot simply afford the government a defense that arises out of the failure to enact
further enabling, implementing or guiding legislation. In fine, the discourse of Fr. Joaquin G.
Bernas, S.J., on constitutional government is apt -
The executive department has a constitutional duty to implement laws, including the
Constitution, even before Congress acts - provided that there are discoverable legal standards for
executive action. When the executive acts, it must be guided by its own understanding of the
constitutional command and of applicable laws. The responsibility for reading and understanding
the Constitution and the laws is not the sole prerogative of Congress. If it were, the executive
would have to ask Congress, or perhaps the Court, for an interpretation every time the executive
is confronted by a constitutional command. That is not how constitutional government
operates.[45]
Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is addressed to the State, not to
respondent GSIS which by itself possesses a separate and distinct personality. This argument
again is at best specious. It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried
out with the prior approval of the State acting through respondent Committee on Privatization.
As correctly pointed out by Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this fact alone makes the sale of the
assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a “state action.” In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of
persons distinct from the government are considered “state action” covered by the Constitution
(1) when the activity it engages in is a “public function;” (2) when the government is so
significantly involved with the private actor as to make the government responsible for his
action; and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized the action. It is evident that the
act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the second
and third categories of “state action.” Without doubt therefore the transaction, although entered
into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to the
constitutional command.[46]
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the
government as elements of the State. After all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of
power - legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the
State is correspondingly directed to the three (3) branches of government. It is undeniable that in
this case the subject constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the Executive
Department and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its authority from the
State.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning
bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the
winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the
requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows
preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the
highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to
make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For
in choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987
Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other
interested parties.
Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is, as it
should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding
rules be nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional
law that all laws and contracts must conform with the fundamental law of the land. Those which
violate the Constitution lose their reason for being.
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason the Highest Bidder cannot
be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly
submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in
terms of price per share.[47] Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to
award the block of shares immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a
higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the
constitutional injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning
the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony,
thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be
allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign
firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the
Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly
stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply
disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign investors.
But the Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to be always open to public
scrutiny. These are given factors which investors must consider when venturing into business in
a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any
of its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and obligations under the
Constitution and the laws of the forum.
The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from questioning the sale to Renong
Berhad since petitioner was well aware from the beginning that a foreigner could participate in
the bidding is meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike were invited to the bidding.
But foreigners may be awarded the sale only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino
fails to match the highest bid tendered by the foreign entity. In the case before us, while
petitioner was already preferred at the inception of the bidding because of the constitutional
mandate, petitioner had not yet matched the bid offered by Renong Berhad. Thus it did not have
the right or personality then to compel respondent GSIS to accept its earlier bid. Rightly, only
after it had matched the bid of the foreign firm and the apparent disregard by respondent GSIS of
petitioner’s matching bid did the latter have a cause of action.
Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional safeguard unless perhaps the
award has been finally made. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a
Filipino group willing to match the bid of the foreign group is to insist that government be
treated as any other ordinary market player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of
judgment, regardless of the consequences to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the
Constitution is regrettable. Thus we would rather remedy the indiscretion while there is still an
opportunity to do so than let the government develop the habit of forgetting that the Constitution
lays down the basic conditions and parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the
bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of
shares of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in
accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as
well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as
provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied in the 1987
Constitution not merely to be used as a guideline for future legislation but primarily to be
enforced; so must it be enforced. This Court as the ultimate guardian of the Constitution will
never shun, under any reasonable circumstance, the duty of upholding the majesty of the
Constitution which it is tasked to defend. It is worth emphasizing that it is not the intention of
this Court to impede and diminish, much less undermine, the influx of foreign investments. Far
from it, the Court encourages and welcomes more business opportunities but avowedly sanctions
the preference for Filipinos whenever such preference is ordained by the Constitution. The
position of the Court on this matter could have not been more appropriately articulated by Chief
Justice Narvasa -
As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not its function to substitute its judgment for
that of the legislature or the executive about the wisdom and feasibility of legislation economic
in nature, the Supreme Court has not been spared criticism for decisions perceived as obstacles to
economic progress and development x x x x in connection with a temporary injunction issued by
the Court’s First Division against the sale of the Manila Hotel to a Malaysian Firm and its
partner, certain statements were published in a major daily to the effect that that injunction
“again demonstrates that the Philippine legal system can be a major obstacle to doing business
here.”
Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is no business of the Court to intervene in
contracts of the kind referred to or set itself up as the judge of whether they are viable or
attainable, it is its bounden duty to make sure that they do not violate the Constitution or the
laws, or are not adopted or implemented with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. It will never shirk that duty, no matter how buffeted by winds of unfair
and ill-informed criticism.[48]
Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its business viability and preventing
further losses, regardless of the character of the asset, should not take precedence over non-
material values. A commercial, nay even a budgetary, objective should not be pursued at the
expense of national pride and dignity. For the Constitution enshrines higher and nobler non-
material values. Indeed, the Court will always defer to the Constitution in the proper governance
of a free society; after all, there is nothing so sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw itself
beyond judicial review when the Constitution is involved.[49]
Nationalism is inherent in the very concept of the Philippines being a democratic and republican
state, with sovereignty residing in the Filipino people and from whom all government authority
emanates. In nationalism, the happiness and welfare of the people must be the goal. The nation-
state can have no higher purpose. Any interpretation of any constitutional provision must adhere
to such basic concept. Protection of foreign investments, while laudible, is merely a policy. It
cannot override the demands of nationalism.[50]
The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to
the highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. We are not talking about an ordinary piece
of property in a commercial district. We are talking about a historic relic that has hosted many of
the most important events in the short history of the Philippines as a nation. We are talking about
a hotel where heads of states would prefer to be housed as a strong manifestation of their desire
to cloak the dignity of the highest state function to their official visits to the Philippines. Thus the
Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant role as an authentic repository of
twentieth century Philippine history and culture. In this sense, it has become truly a reflection of
the Filipino soul - a place with a history of grandeur; a most historical setting that has played a
part in the shaping of a country.[51]
This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined efforts of respondents to sell the
historical landmark - this Grand Old Dame of hotels in Asia - to a total stranger. For, indeed, the
conveyance of this epic exponent of the Filipino psyche to alien hands cannot be less than
mephistophelian for it is, in whatever manner viewed, a veritable alienation of a nation’s soul for
some pieces of foreign silver. And so we ask: What advantage, which cannot be equally drawn
from a qualified Filipino, can be gained by the Filipinos if Manila Hotel - and all that it stands
for - is sold to a non-Filipino? How much of national pride will vanish if the nation’s cultural
heritage is entrusted to a foreign entity? On the other hand, how much dignity will be preserved
and realized if the national patrimony is safekept in the hands of a qualified, zealous and well-
meaning Filipino? This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of
the Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and
accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and
protect the sanctity of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA

HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling
51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the
matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject
51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute
the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and
to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Kapunan, Francisco, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ, concur.Narvasa,
C.J., (Chairman), and Melo, J., joins J. Puno in his dissent.
Padilla, J., see concurring opinion.
Vitug, J., see separate concurring opinion
Mendoza, J.,see concurring opinion
Torres, J., with separate opinion
Puno, J., see dissent.
Panganiban J., with separate dissenting opinion.
[1]
See Sec. 10, par. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution.
[2]
Par. I. Introduction and Highlights, Guidelines and Procedures: Second Prequalifications and
Public Bidding of the MHC Privatization; Annex “A”, Consolidated Reply to Comments of
Respondents; Rollo, p.142.
[3]
Par. V. Guidelines for the Public Bidding, Id., pp. 153-154.
Annex “A”, Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with Temporary Restraining Order; Rollo,
[4]
pp.13-14.
[5]
Annex “B,” Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with Temporary Restraining Order; Id.,
p.15.
[6]
Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with Temporary Restraining Order, pp. 5-6; Id., pp.6-
7.
[7]
Consolidated Reply to Comments of Respondents, p. 17; Id., p.133.
[8]
Par. V. J. 1,Guidelines for Public Bidding, Guidelines and Procedures: Second
Prequalifications and Public Bidding of the MHC Privatization, Annex “A,” Consolidated Reply
to Comments of Respondents; Id., p. 154.
Respondents’ Joint Comment with Urgent Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order, p.9;
[9]
Rollo, p. 44.
[10]
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 138 (1803).
[11]
11 Am Jur. 606.
[12]
16 Am Jur. 2d 281.
[13]
Id., p. 282.
[14]
See Note 12.
[15]
Cruz, Isagani A., Constitutional Law, 1993 ed., pp. 8-10.
[16]
Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 3, 22 August 1986, p. 608.
[17]
16 Am Jur 2d 283-284.
[18]
Sec. 10, first par., reads: The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and
planning agency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens,
or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments. The Congress
shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital
is wholly owned by Filipinos.
Sec. 10, third par., reads: The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments
within its national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities.
[19]
State ex rel. Miller v. O’Malley, 342 Mo 641, 117 SW2d 319.
[20]
G.R. No. 91649, 14 May 1991, 197 SCRA 52.
[21]
Sec. 11, Art. II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies), provides that [t]he State values
the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.
[22]
Sec. 12, Art. II, provides that [t]he State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect
the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right
and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral
character shall receive the support of the government.
[23]
Sec. 13, Art. II, provides that [t]he State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-
building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social
well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their
involvement in public and civic affairs.
[24]
Sec. 1, Art. XIII (Social Justice and Human Rights), provides that [t]he Congress shall give
highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people
to human dignity, reduce social, economic and political inequalities, and remove cultural
inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of property
and its increments.
Sec. 2, Art. XIII, provides that [t]he promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to
create economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance.
[25]
Sec. 2, Art. XIV (Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture, and Sports), provides
that [t]he State shall:
(1) Establish, maintain, and support a complete, adequate, and integrated system of education
relevant to the needs of the people and society;
(2) Establish and maintain a system of free public education in the elementary and high school
levels. Without limiting the natural right of parents to rear their children, elementary education is
compulsory for all children of school age;
(3) Establish and maintain a system of scholarship grants, student loan programs, subsidies, and
other incentives which shall be available to deserving students in both public and private schools,
especially to the underprivileged;
(4) Encourage non-formal, informal, and indigenous learning, independent, and out-of-school
study programs particularly those that respond to community needs; and
(5) Provide adult citizens, the disabled, and out-of-school youth with training in civics,
vocational efficiency, and other skills.
[26]
G.R. No. 115455, 25 August 1994, 235 SCRA 630.
[27]
See Note 25.
[28]
Sec. 1, Art. XIV, provides that [t]he State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to
quality education at all levels of education and shall take appropriate steps to make such
education accessible to all.
[29]
G.R. No. 118910, 17 July 1995.
[30]
Sec. 5, Art. II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies), provides that [t]he maintenance
of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general
welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.
[31]
See Note 23.
[32]
See Note 24.
[33]
Sec. 17, Art. II, provides that [t]he State shall give priority to education, science and
technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social
progress, and promote total human liberation and development.
[34]
Nolledo, Jose N., The New Constitution of the Philippines Annotated, 1990 ed., p. 72.
[35]
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, 1986 ed., p. 1656.
[36]
The guest list of the Manila Hotel includes Gen. Douglas MacArthur, the Duke of Windsor,
President Richard Nixon of U.S.A., Emperor Akihito of Japan, President Dwight Eisenhower of
U.S.A, President Nguyen Van Thieu of Vietnam, President Park Chung Hee of Korea, Prime
Minister Richard Holt of Australia, Prime Minister Keith Holyoake of New Zealand, President
Lyndon Johnson of U.S.A., President Jose Lopez Portillo of Mexico, Princess Margaret of
England, Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser of Australia, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone of
Japan, Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau of Canada, President Raul Alfonsin of Argentina,
President Felipe Gonzalez of Spain, Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita of Japan, Prime Minister
Hussain Muhammad Ershad of Bangladesh, Prime Minister Bob Hawke of Australia, Prime
Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone of Japan, Premier Li Peng of China, Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah of
Brunei, President Ramaswami Venkataraman of India, Prime Minister Go Chok Tong of
Singapore, Prime Minister Enrique Silva Cimma of Chile, Princess Chulaborn and Mahacharri
Sirindhorn of Thailand, Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama of Japan, Sultan Azlan Shah and
Raja Permaisuri Agong of Malaysia, President Kim Young Sam of Korea, Princess Infanta Elena
of Spain, President William Clinton of U.S.A., Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia,
King Juan Carlos I and Queen Sofia of Spain, President Carlos Saul Menem of Argentina, Prime
Ministers Chatichai Choonhavan and Prem Tinsulanonda of Thailand, Prime Minister Benazir
Bhutto of Pakistan, President Vaclav Havel of Czech Republic, Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf of
U.S.A., President Ernesto Perez Balladares of Panama, Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius of
Lithuania, President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani of Iran, President Askar Akayev of Kyrgyztan,
President Ong Teng Cheong of Singapore, President Frei Ruiz Tagle of Chile, President Le Duc
Anh of Vietnam, and Prime Minister Julius Chan of Papua New Guinea, see Memorandum for
Petitioner, pp. 16-19.
[37]
Authored by Beth Day Romulo.
[38]
See Note 9, pp.15-16; Rollo, pp. 50-51.
[39]
Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 3, 22 August 1986, p. 607.
[40]
Id., p. 612.
[41]
Id., p. 616.
[42]
Id., p. 606.
[43]
Nolledo, J.N., The New Constitution of the Philippines Annotated, 1990 ed., pp.930-931.
[44]
Bidders were required to have at least one of the these qualifications to be able to participate
in the bidding process; see Note 2.
[45]
Memorandum of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., p.6.
[46]
Id., pp. 3-4.
[47]
See Note 8.
[48]
Keynote Address at the ASEAN Regional Symposium on Enforcement of Industrial Property
Rights held 23 October 1995 at New World Hotel, Makati City.
[49]
Speech of Senior Associate Justice Teodoro R. Padilla at the Induction of Officers and
Directors of the PHILCONSA for 1996 held 16 January 1996 at the Sky-Top, Hotel
Intercontinental, Makati City.
[50]
Memorandum of Authorities submitted by former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, p.5.
[51]
8 March 1996 issue of Philippine Daily Inquirer, p. B13.
Separate Concurring Opinion
MENDOZA, J.:
I take the view that in the context of the present controversy the only way to enforce the
constitutional mandate that “[i]n the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the
national patrimony the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos”[1] is to allow petitioner
Philippine corporation to equal the bid of the Mlaysian firm Renong Berhad for the purchase of
the controlling shares of stocks in the Manila Hotel Corporation. Indeed, it is the only way a
qualified Filipino or Philippine corporation can be given preference in the enjoyment of a right,
privilege or concession given by the State, by favoring it over a foreign national or corporation.
Under the rules on public bidding of the government Service and Insurance System, if petitioner
and the Malaysian firm had offered the same price per share, “priority [would be given] to the
bidder seeking the larger ownership interest in MHC,“[2] so that if petitioner bid for more
shares, it would be preferred to the Malaysian corporation for that reason and not because it is a
Philippine corporation. Consequently, it is only in cases like the present one, where an alien
corporation is the highest bidder, that preferential treatment of the Philippine corporation is
mandated not by declaring it winner but by allowing it “to match the highest bid in terms of price
per share” before it is awarded the share of stocks.[3]That, to me, is what “preference to qualified
Filipinos” means in the context of this case – by favoring Filipinos whenever they are at a
disadvantage vis-avis foreigners.
This was the meaning given in Co Chiong v. Cuaderno[4] to a 1947 statute giving “preference to
Filipino citizens in the lease of public market stalls.”[5] This Court upheld the cancellation of
existing leases covering market stalls occupied by persons who were not Filipinos and the award
thereafter of the stalls to qualified Filipino vendors as ordered by the Department of Finance.
Similarly, in Vda. de Salgado v. De la Fuente,[6] this Court sustained the validity of a municipal
ordinance passed pursuant to the statute (R.A. No. 37), terminating existing leases of public
market stalls and granting preference to Filipino citizens in the issuance of new licences for the
occupancy of the stalls. In Chua Lao v. Raymundo,[7] the preference granted under the statute
was held to apply to cases in which Filipino vendors sought the same stalls occupied by alien
vendors in the public markets even it there were available other stalls as good as those occupied
by aliens. “The law, apparently, is applicable whenever there is a conflict of interest between
Filipino applicants and aliens for lease of stalls in public markets, in which situation the right to
preference immediately arises.”[8]
Our legislation on the matter thus antedated by a quarter of a century efforts began only in the
1970s in America to realize the promise of equality, through affirmative action and reverse
discrimination programs designed to remedy past discrimination against colored people in such
areas as employment, contracting and licensing.[9] Indeed, in vital areas of our national economy,
there are situations in which the only way to place Filipinos in control of the national economy
as contemplated in the Constitution[10] is to give them preferential treatment where they can at
least stand on equal footing with aliens.
There need be no fear that thus preferring Filipinos would either invite foreign retaliation or
deprive the country of the benefit of foreign capital on know-how. We are dealing here not with
common trades or common means of livelihood which are open to aliens in our midst,[11] but
with the sale of government property, which is like the grant of government largess or benefits.
In the words of Art. XII, §10, we are dealing here with “rights, privileges, and concessions
covering the national economy” and therefore no one should begrudge us if we give preferential
treatment to our citizens. That at any rate is the command of the Constitution. For the Manila
Hotel is a business owned by the Government. It is being privatized. Privatization should result
in the relinquishment of the business in favor of private individuals and groups who are Filipino
citizens, not in favor of aliens.
Nor should there be any doubt that by awarding the shares of stocks to petitioner we would be
trading competence and capability for nationalism. Both petitioner and the Malaysian firm are
qualified, having hurdled the prequalification process.[12] It is only the result of the public
bidding that is sought to be modified by enabling petitioner to up its bid to equal the highest bid.
Nor, finally, is there any basis for the suggestion that allow a Filipino bidder to match the highest
bid of an alien could encourage speculation, since all that a Filipino entity would then do would
be not to make a bid or make only a token one and, after it is known that a foreign bidder has
submitted the highest bid, make an offer matching that of the foreign firm. This is not possible
under the rules on public bidding of the GSIS. Under these rules there is a minimum bid required
(P36.67 per share for a range of 9 to 15 million shares).[13] Bids below the minimum will not be
considered. On the other hand, if the Filipino entity, after passing the prequalification process,
does not submit a bid, he will not be allowed to match the highest bid of the foreign firm because
this is a privilege allowed only to those who have “validly submitted bids.”[14] The suggestion
is, to say the least, fanciful and has no basis in fact.
For the foregoing reasons, I vote to grant the petition.
[1]
Art, XII, §10, second paragraph.
[2]
GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES: SECOND PREQUALIFICATION AND PUBLIC
BIDDING OF THE MHC PRIVATIZATION (hereafter referred to as GUIDELINES), Part V,
par. H(4).
[3]
Id.
[4]
83 Phil. 242 (1949).
[5]
R.A. No. 37, §1.
[6]
87 Phil. 343 (1950).
[7]
104 Phil. 302 (1958).
[8]
Id., at 309.
[9]
For an excellent analysis of American cases on reverse discrimination in these areas, see
GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 780-819 (1991).
[10]
Art. II, §19: “The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos.” (Emphasis added)
[11]
See Villegas v. Hiu Chiung Tsai Pao Ho, 86 SCRA 270 (1978) (invalidating an ordinance
imposing a flat fee of P500 on aliens for the privilege of earning a livelihood)
[12]
Petitioner passed the criteria set forth in the GUIDELINES, Part IV, par. F(4), of the GSIS,
relating to the following:
a. Business management expertise, track record, and experience

b. Financial capability
c. Feasibility and acceptability of the proposed strategic plan for The Manila Hotel
[13]
GUIDELINES, Part V par. C (1)(3), in relation to Part I.
[14]
Id., Part V, par. V (1).
CONCURRING OPINION
PADILLA, J.:
I concur with the ponencia of Mr. Justice Bellosillo. At the same time, I would like to expound a
bit more on the concept of national patrimony as including with in its scope and meaning
institutions such as the Manila Hotel.
It is argued by petitioner that the Manila Hotel comes under “national patrimony” over which
qualified Filipinos have the preference, in ownership and operation. The Constitutional provision
on point states:
“x x x xxx xxx
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony,
the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.”[1]
Petitioners argument, I believe, is well taken. Under the 1987 Constitution, “national patrimony”
consists of the natural resources provided by almighty God (Preamble) in our territory (Article 1)
consisting of land, sea, and air.[2] A study of the 1935 Constitution, where the concept of
“national patrimony” originated, would show that its framers decided to adopt the even more
comprehensive expression “Patrimony of the Nation” in the belief that the phrase encircles a
concept embracing not only the natural resources of the country but practically everything that
belongs to the Filipino people, the tangible and the material as well as the intangible and the
spiritual assets and possessions of the people. It is to be noted that the framers did not stop with
conservation. They knew that conservation alone does not spell progress; and that this may be
achieved only through development as a correlative factor to assure to the people not only the
exclusive ownership, but also the exclusive benefits of their national patrimony.[3]
Moreover, the concept of national patrimony has been viewed as referring not only to our rich
natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of our race.[4]
There is no doubt in my mind that the Manila Hotel is very much a part of our national
patrimony and, as such, deserves constitutional protection as to who shall own it and benefit
from its operation. This institution has played an important role in our nation’s history, having
been the venue of many a historical event, and serving as it did, and as it does, as the Philippine
Guest House for visiting foreign heads of state, dignitaries, celebrities, and others.[5]
It is therefore our duty to protect and preserve it for future generations of Filipinos. As President
Manuel L. Quezon once said, we must exploit the natural resources of our country, but we
should do so with an eye to the welfare of the future generations. In other words, the leaders of
today are the trustees of the patrimony of our race. To preserve our national patrimony and
reserve it for Filipinos was the intent of the distinguished gentlemen who first framed our
Constitution. Thus, in debating the need for nationalization of our lands and natural resources,
one expounded that we should “put more teeth into our laws, and; not make the nationalization
of our lands and natural resources a subject of ordinary legislation but of constitutional
enactment”.[6] To quote further: “Let not our children be mere tenants and trespassers in their
own country. Let us preserve and bequeath to them what is rightfully theirs, free from all foreign
liens and encumbrances”.[7]
Now a word on preference. In my view “preference to qualified Filipinos”, to be meaningful,

must refer not only to things that are peripheral, collateral, or tangential. It must touch and affect
the very “heart of the existing order.” In the field of public bidding in the acquisition of things
that pertain to the national patrimony, preference to qualified Filipinos must allow a qualified
Filipino to match or equal the higher bid of a non-Filipino; the preference shall not operate only
when the bids of the qualified Filipino and the non-Filipino are equal in which case, the award
should undisputedly be made to the qualified Filipino. The Constitutional preference should give
the qualified Filipino an opportunity to match or equal the higher bid of the non-Filipino bidder
if the preference of the qualified Filipino bidder is to be significant at all.
It is true that in this present age of globalization of attitude towards foreign investments in our
country, stress is on the elimination of barriers to foreign trade and investments in the country.
While government agencies, including the courts should re-condition their thinking to such a
trend, and make it easy and even attractive for foreign investors to come to our shores, yet we
should not preclude ourselves from reserving to us Filipinos certain areas where our national
identity, culture and heritage are involved. In the hotel industry, for instance, foreign investors
have established themselves creditably, such as in the Shangri-La, the Nikko, the Peninsula, and
Mandarin Hotels. This should not stop us from retaining 51% of the capital stock of the Manila
Hotel Corporation in the hands of Filipinos. This would be in keeping with the intent of the
Filipino people to preserve our national patrimony, including our historical and cultural heritage
in the hands of Filipinos.
[1]
Article XII, Section 10, par. 2, 1987 Constitution.
[2]
Padilla, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Volume III, p. 89.
[3]
Sinco, Philippine Political Law, 11th ed., p.112.
[4]
Nolledo, The New Constitution of the Philippines, Annotated, 1990 ed, p. 72.
[5]
Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 1.
[6]
Laurel, Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional Convention (1934-1935), p. 507.
[7]
Id., p. 562.
Separate Dissenting Opinion
PANGANIBAN, J.:
I regret I cannot join the majority. To the incisive Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S.
Puno, may I just add:
1. The majority contends the Constitution should be interpreted to mean that, after a bidding
process is concluded, the losing Filipino bidder should be given the right to equal the highest
foreign bid, and thus to win. However, the Constitution [Sec. 10 (2), Art. XII] simply states that
“in the grant of rights x x x covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos.” The majority concedes that there is no law defining the extent
or degree of such preference. Specifically, no statute empowers a losing Filipino bidder to
increase his bid and equal that of the winning foreigner. In the absence of such empowering law,
the majority’s strained interpretation, I respectfully submit, constitutes unadulterated judicial
legislation, which makes bidding a ridiculous sham where no Filipino can lose and where no
foreigner can win. Only in the Philippines!
2. Aside from being prohibited by the Constitution, such judicial legislation is short-sighted and,
viewed properly, gravely prejudicial to long-term Filipino interest. It encourages other countries
– in the guise of reverse comity or worse, unabashed retaliation – to discriminate against us in
their own jurisdictions by authorizing their own nationals to similarly equal and defeat the higher
bids of Filipino enterprises solely, while on the other hand, allowing similar bids of other
foreigners to remain unchallenged by their nationals. The majority’s thesis will thus marginalize
Filipinos as pariahs in the global marketplace with absolutely no chance of winning any bidding
outside our country. Even authoritarian regimes and hermits kingdoms have long ago found out
that unfairness, greed and isolation are self-defeating and in the long-term self-destructing.
The moral lesson here is simple: Do to do unto others what you do not want others to do unto
you.
3. In the absence of a law specifying the degree or extent of the “Filipino First” policy of the
Constitution, the constitutional preference for the “qualified Filipinos” may be allowed only
where all the bids are equal. In this manner, we put the Filipino ahead without self-destructing
him and without being unfair to the foreigner.
In short, the Constitution mandates a victory for the qualified Filipino only when the scores are
tied. But not when the ballgame is over and the foreigner clearly posted the highest score.
Separate Dissenting Opinion
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for prohibition and mandamus filed by the Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a
domestic corporation, to stop the government Service Insurance System (GSIS) from selling the
controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to a foreign corporation. Allegedly, the sale
violates the second paragraph of section 10, Article XII of the Constitution.
Respondent GSIS is a government-owned and controlled corporation. It is the sole owner of the
Manila Hotel which it operates through its subsidiary, the Manila Hotel Corporation. Manila
Hotel was included in the privatization program of the government. In 1995, GSIS proposed to
sell to interested buyers 30% to 51% of its shares, ranging from 9,000,000 to 15,300,000 shares,
in the Manila Hotel Corporation. After the absence of bids at the first public bidding, the block
of shares offered for sale was increased from a maximum of 30% to 51%. Also, the winning
bidder, or the eventual “strategic partner” of the GSIS was required to “provide management
expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to
strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.”[1] The proposal was approved
by respondent Committee on Privatization.
In July 1995, a conference was held where prequalification documents and the bidding rules
were furnished interested parties. Petitioner Manila Prince Hotel, a domestic corporation, and
Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm with ITT Sheraton as operator, prequalified.[2]
The bidding rules and procedures entitled “Guidelines and Procedures: Second Prequalification
and Public Bidding of the MHC Privatization” provide:
“I INTRODUCTION AND HIGHLIGHTS
DETERMINING THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER
The party that accomplishes the steps set forth below will be declared the Winning
Bidder/Strategic Partner and will be awarded the Block of Shares:
First -- Pass the prequalification process;
Second -- Submit the highest bid on a price per share basis for the Block of Shares;
Third -- Negotiate and execute the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later than October
23, 1995.
x x x
IV GUIDELINES FOR PREQUALIFICATION
A. PARTIES WHO MAY APPLY FOR PREQUALIFICATION
The Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner will be expected to provide management expertise and/or
an international marketing reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the
profitability and performance of The Manila Hotel. In this context, the GSIS is inviting to the
prequalification process any local and/or foreign corporation, consortium/joint venture or
juridical entity with at least one of the following qualifications:
a. Proven management expertise in the hotel industry; or
b. Significant equity ownership (i.e. board representation) in another hotel company; or
c. Overall management and marketing expertise to successfully operate the Manila Hotel.
Parties interested in bidding for MHC should be able to provide access to the requisite
management expertise and/or international marketing/reservation system for The Manila Hotel.
x x x.
D. PREQUALIFICATION DOCUMENTS
x x x.
E. APPLICATION PROCEDURE
1. DOCUMENTS AVAILABLE AT THE REGISTRATION OFFICE
The prequalification documents can be secured at the Registration Office between 9:00 AM to
4:00 PM during working days within the period specified in Section III. Each set of documents
consists of the following:
a. Guidelines and Procedures: Second Prequalification and Public Bidding of the MHC
Privatization
b. Confidential Information Memorandum: The Manila Hotel Corporation
c. Letter of Invitation to the Prequalification and Bidding Conference
x x x
4. PREQUALIFICATION AND BIDDING CONFERENCE
A prequalification and bidding conference will be held at the Manila Hotel on the date specified
in Section III to allow the Applicant to seek clarifications and further information regarding the
guidelines and procedures. Only those who purchased the prequalification documents will be
allowed in this conference. Attendance to this conference is strongly advised, although the
Applicant will not be penalized if it does not attend.
5. SUBMISSION OF PREQUALIFICATION DOCUMENTS
The Applicant should submit 5 sets of the prequalification documents (1 original set plus 4
copies) at the Registration Office between 9:00 AM to 4:00 PM during working days within the
period specified in Section III.
F. PREQUALIFICATION PROCESS
1. The Applicant will be evaluated by the PBAC with the assistance of the TEC based on the
Information Package and other information available to the PBAC.
2. If the Applicant is a Consortium/Joint Venture, the evaluation will consider the overall
qualifications of the group, taking into account the contribution of each member to the venture.
3. The decision of the PBAC with respect to the results of the PBAC evaluation will be final.
4. The Applicant shall be evaluated according to the criteria set forth below:
a. Business management expertise, track record, and experience
b. Financial capability
c. Feasibility and acceptability of the proposed strategic plan for the Manila Hotel
5. The PBAC will shortlist such number of Applicants as it may deem appropriate.
6. The parties that prequalified in the first MHC public bidding – ITT Sheraton, Marriot
International Inc., Renaissance Hotel International Inc., consortium of RCBC Capital/Ritz
Carlton – may participate in the Public Bidding without having to undergo the prequalification
process again.
G. SHORTLIST OF QUALIFIED BIDDERS
1. A notice of prequalification results containing the shortlist of Qualified Bidders will be posted
at the Registration Office at the date specified in Section III.
2. In the case of a Consortium/Joint Venture, the withdrawal by a member whose qualification

was a material consideration for being included in the shortlist is a ground for disqualification of
the Applicant.
V. GUIDELINES FOR THE PUBLIC BIDDING
A. PARTIES WHO MAY PARTICIPATE IN THE PUBLIC BIDDING
All parties in the shortlist of Qualified Bidders will be eligible to participate in the Public
Bidding.
B. BLOCK OF SHARES
A range of Nine Million (9,000,000) to Fifteen Million Three Hundred Thousand (15,300,000)
shares of stock, representing Thirty Percent to Fifty-One Percent (30%-51%) of the issued and
outstanding shares of MHC, will be offered in the Public Bidding by the GSIS. The Qualified
Bidders will have the option of determining the number of shares within the range to bid for. The
range is intended to attract bidders with different preferences and objectives for the operation and
management of The Manila Hotel.
C. MINIMUM BID REQUIRED ON A PRICE PER SHARE BASIS
1. Bids will be evaluated on a price per share basis. The minimum bid required on a price per
share basis for the Block of shares is Thirty-Six Pesos and Sixty-Seven Centavos (P36.67).
2. Bids should be in the Philippine currency payable to the GSIS.
3. Bids submitted with an equivalent price per share below the minimum required will not
considered.
D. TRANSFER COSTS
x x x
E. OFFICIAL BID FORM
1. Bids must be contained in the prescribed Official Bid Form, a copy of which is attached as
Annex IV. The Official Bid Form must be properly accomplished in all details; improper
accomplishment may be a sufficient basis for disqualification.
2. During the Public Bidding, the Qualified Bidders will submit the Official bid Form, which
will indicate the offered purchase price, in a sealed envelope marked “OFFICIAL BID.”
F. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
During the Public Bidding, the following documents should be submitted along with the bid in a
separate envelop marked “SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS”:
1. WRITTEN AUTHORITY TO BID (UNDER OATH)
If the Qualified Bidder is a corporation, the representative of the Qualified Bidder should submit
a Board resolution which adequately authorizes such representative to bid for and in behalf of the
corporation with full authority to perform such acts necessary or requisite to bind the Qualified
Bidder.
If the Qualified Bidder is a Consortium/Joint Venture, each member of the Consortium/Joint

Venture should submit a Board Resolution authorizing one of its members and such member’s
representative to make the bid on behalf of the group with full authority to perform such acts
necessary or requisite to bind the Qualified Bidder.
2. BID SECURITY
a. The Qualified Bidder should deposit Thirty-Three Million Pesos (P33,000,000), in the
Philippine currency as Bid Security in the form of:
i. Manager’s cheque or unconditional demand draft payable to the “Government Service

Insurance System” and issued by a reputable banking institution duly licensed to do business in
the Philippines and acceptable to GSIS; or
ii. Stand-by letter of credit issued by a reputable banking institution acceptable to the GSIS.
b. The GSIS will reject a bid if:
i. The bid does not have a Bid Security; or
ii. The Bid Security accompanying the bid is for less than the required amount.
c. If the Bid Security is in the form of a manager’s check or unconditional demand draft, the
interest earned on the Bid Security will be for the account of GSIS.
d. If the Qualified Bidder becomes the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner, the Bid Security will
be applied as the downpayment on the Qualified Bidder’s offered purchase price.
e. The Bid Security of the Qualified Bidder will be returned immediately after the Public
Bidding if the Qualified bidder is not declared the Highest Bidder.
f. The Bid Security will be returned by October 23, 1995 if the Highest Bidder is unable to
negotiate and execute with GSIS/MHC the Management Contract, International
Marketing/Reservation System Contract or other types of contract specified by the Highest
Bidder in its strategic plan for The Manila Hotel.
g. The Bid Security of the highest Bidder will be forfeited in favor of GSIS if the Highest
Bidder, after negotiating and executing the Management Contract, International
Marketing/Reservation System Contact or other types of contract specified by the Highest Bidder
in its strategic plan for The Manila Hotel, fails or refuses to:
i. Execute the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement with GSIS not later than October 23,
1995; or
ii. Pay the full amount of the offered purchase price not later than October 23, 1995; or
iii. Consummate the sale of the Block of Shares for any other reason.
G. SUBMISSION OF BIDS
1. The Public Bidding will be held on September 7, 1995 at the following location:
New GSIS Headquarters Building
Financial Center, Reclamation Area

Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City, Metro Manila
2. The Secretariat of the PBAC will be stationed at the Public Bidding to accept any and all bids
and supporting requirements. Representatives from the Commission on Audit and COP will be
invited to witness the proceedings.
3. The Qualified Bidder should submit its bid using the Official Bid Form. The accomplished
Official Bid Form should be submitted in a sealed envelope marked “OFFICIAL BID.”
4. The Qualified Bidder should submit the following documents in another sealed envelope
marked “SUPPORTING BID DOCUMENTS”
a. Written Authority Bid
b. Bid Security
5. The two sealed envelopes marked “OFFICIAL BID” and “SUPPORTING BID
DOCUMENTS must be submitted simultaneously to the Secretariat between 9:00 AM and 2:00
PM, Philippine Standard Time, on the date of the Public Bidding. No bid shall be accepted after
the closing time. Opened or tampered bids shall not be accepted.
6. The Secretariat will log and record the actual time of submission of the two sealed envelopes.
The actual time of submission will also be indicated by the Secretariat on the face of the two
envelopes.
7. After Step No. 6, the two sealed envelopes will be dropped in the corresponding bid boxes
provided for the purpose. These boxes will be in full view of the invited public.
H. OPENING AND READING OF BIDS
1. After the closing time of 2:00 PM on the date of the Public Bidding , the PBAC will open all
sealed envelopes marked “SUPPORTING BID DOCUMENTS” for screening, evaluation and
acceptance. Those who submitted incomplete/insufficient documents or document/s which is/are
not substantially in the form required by PBAC will be disqualified. The envelope containing
their Official Bid Form will be immediately returned to the disqualified bidders.
2. The sealed envelopes marked “OFFICIAL BID” will be opened at 3:00 PM. The name of the
bidder and the amount of its bid price will be read publicly as the envelopes are opened.
3. Immediately following the reading of the bids, the PBAC will formally announce the highest
bid and the Highest Bidder.
4. The highest bid will be determined on a price per share basis. In the event of a tie wherein
two or more bids have the same equivalent price per share, priority will be given to the bidder
seeking the larger ownership interest in MHC.
5. The Public Bidding will be declared a failed bidding in case:
a. No single bid is submitted within the prescribed period; or
b. There is only one (1) bid that is submitted and acceptable to the PABC.
I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH GSIS/MHC
1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below by October 23, 1995 or
the Highest Bidder will lose the right to purchase the Block of Shares and GSIS will instead offer
the Block of Shares to the other Qualified Bidders:
a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with GSIS/MHC the Management Contract,
International Marketing/Reservation system Contract or other type of contract specified by the
Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for The Manila Hotel. If the Highest Bidder is intending to
provide only financial support to The Manila Hotel, a separate institution may enter into the
aforementioned contract/s with GSIS/MHC.
b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement with GSIS, a copy
of which will be distributed to each of the Qualified Bidder after the prequalification process is
completed.
2. In the event that the Highest Bidder chooses a Management Contract for The Manila Hotel,
the maximum levels for the management fee structure that GSIS/MHC are prepared to accept in
the Management Contract are as follows:
a. Basic management fee: Maximum of 2.5% of gross revenues. (1)
b. Incentive fee: Maximum of 8.0% of gross operating profit (1) after deducting undistributed
overhead expenses and the basic management fee.
c. Fixed component of the international marketing/reservation system fee: Maximum of 2.0% of

gross room revenues. (1) The Applicant should indicate in its Information Package if it is wishes
to charge fee.
Note (1): As defined in the uniform system of account for hotels.
The GSIS/MHC have indicated above the acceptable parameters for the hotel management fees
to facilitate the negotiations with the Highest Bidder for the Management Contract after the
Public Bidding.
A Qualified Bidder envisioning a Management Contract for The Manila Hotel should determine
whether or not the management fee structure above is acceptable before submitting their
prequalification documents to GSIS.
J. BLOCK SALE TO THE OTHER QUALIFIED BIDDERS
1. If for any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer
this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified
are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share.
2. The order of priority among the interested Qualified Bidders will be in accordance with the
equivalent price per share of their respective bids in the Public Bidding, i.e. first and second
priority will be given to the Qualified Bidders that submitted the second and third highest bids on
the price per share basis, respectively, and so on.
K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER
The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner after the following
conditions are met:
a. Execution of the necessary contract with GSIS/MHC not later than October 23, 1995; and
b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP/OGCC are obtained.
I. FULL PAYMENT FOR THE BLOCK OF SHARES
1. Upon execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC, the Winning Bidder/Strategic
Partner must fully pay, not later than October 23, 1995, the offered purchase price for the Block
of Shares after deducting the Bid Security applied as downpayment.
2. All payments should be made in the form of a Manager’s Cheque or unconditional Demand
Draft, payable to the “Government Service Insurance System,” issued by a reputable banking
institution licensed to do business in the Philippines and acceptable to GSIS.
M. GENERAL CONDITIONS
1. The GSIS unconditionally reserves the right to reject any or all applications, waive any
formality therein, or accept such application as may be considered most advantageous to the
GSIS. The GSIS similarly reserves the right to require the submission of any additional
information from the Applicant as the PBAC may deem necessary.
2. The GSIS further reserves the right to call off the Public Bidding prior to acceptance of the
bids and call for a new public bidding under amended rules, and without any liability whatsoever
to any or all the Qualified Bidders, except the obligation to return the Bid Security.
3. The GSIS reserves the right to reset the date of the prequalification/bidding conference, the
deadline for the submission of the prequalification documents, the date of the Public Bidding or
other pertinent activities at least three (3) calendar days prior to the respective deadlines/target
dates.
4. The GSIS sells only whatever rights, interest and participation it has on the Block of Shares.
5. All documents and materials submitted by the Qualified Bidders, except the Bid Security,
may be returned upon request.
6. The decision of the PBAC/GSIS on the results of the Public Bidding is final. The Qualified
Bidders, by participating in the Public Bidding, are deemed to have agreed to accept and abide
by these results.
7. The GSIS will be held free and harmless from any liability, suit or allegation arising out of
the Public Bidding by the Qualified Bidders who have participated in the Public Bidding.”[3]
The second public bidding was held on September 18, 1995. Petitioner bidded P41.00 per share
for 15,300,000 shares and Renong Berhad bidded P44.00 per share also for 15,300,000 shares.
The GSIS declared Renong Berhad the highest bidder and immediately returned petitioner’s bid
security.
On September 28, 1995, ten days after the bidding, petitioner wrote to GSIS offering to match
the bid price of Renong Berhad. It requested that the award be made to itself citing the second
paragraph of Section 10, Article XII of the Constitution. It sent a manager's check for thirty-three
million pesos (P33,000,000.00) as bid security.
Respondent GSIS, then in the process of negotiating with Renong Berhad the terms and
conditions of the contract and technical agreements in the operation of the Hotel, refused to
entertain petitioner’s request.
Hence, petitioner filed the present petition. We issued a temporary restraining order on October
18, 1995.
Petitioner anchors its plea on the second paragraph of Article XII, Section 10 of the
Constitution[4] on the “National Economy and Patrimony” which provides:
“x x x
the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
x x x.”
The vital issues can be summed up as follows:
(1) Whether section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution is a self-executing
provision and does not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect;
(2) Assuming section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII is self-executing, whether the controlling
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation;
(3) Whether GSIS is included in the term “State,” hence, mandated to implement section 10,
paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution;
(4) Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it failed to give preference to petitioner, a
qualified Filipino corporation, over and above Renong Berhad, a foreign corporation, in the sale
of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation;
(5) Whether petitioner is estopped from questioning the sale of the shares to Renong Berhad, a
foreign corporation.
Anent the first issue, it is now familiar learning that a Constitution provides the guiding policies
and principles upon which is built the substantial foundation and general framework of the law
and government.[5] As a rule, its provisions are deemed self-executing and can be enforced
without further legislative action.[6] Some of its provisions, however, can be implemented only
through appropriate laws enacted by the Legislature, hence not self-executing.
To determine whether a particular provision of a Constitution is self-executing is a hard row to

hoe. The key lies on the intent of the framers of the fundamental law oftentimes submerged in its
language. A searching inquiry should be made to find out if the provision is intended as a present
enactment, complete in itself as a definitive law, or if it needs future legislation for completion
and enforcement.[7] The inquiry demands a micro-analysis of the text and the context of the
provision in question.[8]
Courts as a rule consider the provisions of the Constitution as self-executing,[9] rather than as
requiring future legislation for their enforcement.[10] The reason is not difficult to discern. For if
they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law ratified by the
sovereign people can be easily ignored and nullified by Congress.[11] Suffused with wisdom of
the ages is the unyielding rule that legislative actions may give breath to constitutional rights but
congressional inaction should not suffocate them.[12]
Thus, we have treated as self-executing the provisions in the Bill of Rights on arrests, searches
and seizures,[13] the rights of a person under custodial investigation,[14] the rights of an
accused,[15] and the privilege against self-incrimination.[16] It is recognized that legislation is
unnecessary to enable courts to effectuate constitutional provisions guaranteeing the fundamental
rights of life, liberty and the protection of property.[17] The same treatment is accorded to
constitutional provisions forbidding the taking or damaging of property for public use without
just compensation.[18]
Contrariwise, case law lays down the rule that a constitutional provision is not self-executing
where it merely announces a policy and its language empowers the Legislature to prescribe the
means by which the policy shall be carried into effect.[19] Accordingly, we have held that the
provisions in Article II of our Constitution entitled “Declaration of Principles and State Policies”
should generally be construed as mere statements of principles of the State.[20]We have also ruled
that some provisions of Article XIII of “Social Justice and Human Rights, “[21] and Article XIV
on “Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture and Sports”[22] cannot be the basis of
judicially enforceable rights. Their enforcement is addressed to the discretion of Congress
though they provide the framework of legislation[23] to effectuate their policy content.[24]
Guided by this map of settled jurisprudence, we now consider whether Section 10, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution is self-executing or not. It reads:
“Sec. 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency,
when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher
percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact
measures that will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly
owned by Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national
jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities.”
The first paragraph directs Congress to reserve certain areas of investments in the country[25] to
Filipino citizens or to corporations sixty per cent[26] of whose capital stock is owned by
Filipinos. It further commands Congress to enact laws that will encourage the formation and
operation of one hundred percent Filipino-owned enterprises. In checkered contrast, the second
paragraph orders the entire State to give preference to qualified Filipinos in grant of rights and
privileges covering the national economy and patrimony. The third paragraph also directs the
State to regulate foreign investments in line with our national goals and well-set priorities.
The first paragraph of Section 10 is not self-executing. By its express text, there is a categorical
command for Congress to enact laws restricting foreign ownership in certain areas of
investments in the country and to encourage the formation and operation of wholly-owned
Filipino enterprises. The right granted by the provision is clearly still in ease. Congress has to
breath life to the right by means of legislation. Parenthetically, this paragraph was plucked from
section 3, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution.[27] The provision in the 1973 Constitution
affirmed our ruling in the landmark case of Lao Ichong v. Hernandez,[28] where we upheld the
discretionary authority of Congress of Filipinize certain areas of investments.[29] By reenacting
the 1973 provision, the first paragraph of section 10 affirmed the power of Congress to
nationalize certain areas of investments in favor of Filipinos.
The second and third paragraphs of Section 10 are different. They are directed to the State and
not to Congress alone which is but one of the three great branches of our government. Their
coverage is also broader for they cover “the national economy and patrimony” and “foreign
investments within [the] national jurisdiction” and not merely “certain areas of investments.”
Beyond debate, they cannot be read as granting Congress the exclusive power to implement by
law the policy of giving preference to qualified Filipinos in the conferral of rights and privileges
covering our national economy and patrimony. Their language does not suggest that any of the
State agency or instrumentality has the privilege to hedge or to refuse its implementation for any
reason whatsoever. Their duty to implement is unconditional and it is now. The second and the
third paragraphs of Section 10, Article XII are thus self-executing.
This submission is strengthened by Article II of the Constitution entitled “Declaration of

Principles and State Policies.” Its Section 19 provides that “[T]he State shall develop a self-
reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.” It engrafts the all-
important Filipino First Policy in our fundamental law and by the use of the mandatory word
“shall,” directs its enforcement by the whole State without any pause or a half-pause in time.
The second issue is whether the sale of a majority of the stocks of the Manila Hotel Corporation
involves the disposition of part of our national patrimony. The records of the Constitutional
Commission show that the Commissioners entertained the same view as to its meaning.
According to Commissioner Nolledo, “patrimony” refers not only to our rich natural resources
but also to the cultural heritage of our race.[30] By this yardstick, the sale of Manila Hotel falls
within the coverage of the constitutional provision giving preferential treatment to qualified
Filipinos in the grant of rights involving our national patrimony. The unique value to the Manila
Hotel to our history and culture cannot be viewed with a myopic eye. The value to hotel goes
beyond pesos and centavos. As chronicled by Beth Day Romulo,[31] the hotel first opened on July
4, 1912 as a first-class Hotel built by the American Insular Government for Americans living in,
or passing through, Manila while travelling to the Orient. Indigenous materials and Filipino
craftsmanship were utilized in its construction. For sometime, it was exclusively used by
American and Caucasian travelers and served as the “official guesthouse” of the American
Insular Government for visiting foreign dignitaries. Filipinos began coming to the Hotel as
guests during the Commonwealth period. When the Japanese occupied Manila, it served as
military headquarters and lodging fo the highest-ranking officers from Tokyo. It was at the Hotel
and the Intramuros that the Japanese made their last stand during the Liberation of Manila. After
the war, the Hotel again served foreign guests and Filipinos alike. Presidents and kings, premiers
and potentates, as well as glamorous international film and sports celebrities were house in the
Hotel. It was also the situs of international conventions and conferences. In the local scene, it
was the venue of historic meetings, parties and conventions of political parties. The Hotel has
reaped and continues reaping numerous recognitions and awards from international hotel and
travel award-giving bodies, a fitting acknowledgment of Filipino talent and ingenuity. These are
judicially cognizable facts which cannot be bent by a biased mind.
The Hotel may not, as yet, have been declared a national cultural treasure pursuant to Republic
Act No. 4846 but that does not exclude it from our national patrimony. Republic Act. No. 4846,
“The Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection Acts,” merely provides a procedure
whereby a particular cultural property may be classified a “national cultural treasure” or an
“important cultural property.”[32] Approved on June 18, 1966 and amended by P.D. 374 in 1974,
the law is limited in its reach and cannot be read as the exclusive law implementing section 10,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. to be sure, the law does not equate cultural treasure and
cultural property as synonymous to the phrase “patrimony of the nation.”
The third issue is whether the constitutional command to the State includes the respondent GSIS.
A look at its charter will reveal that GSIS is a government-owned and controlled corporation that
administers funds that come from the monthly contributions of government employees and the
government.[33] The funds are held in trust for a distinct purpose which cannot be disposed of
indifferently.[34] They are to be used to finance the retirement, disability and life insurance
benefits of the employees and the administrative and operational expenses of the GSIS. [35]
Excess funds, however, are allowed to be invested in business and other ventures for the benefit
of the employees.[36] It is thus contended that the GSIS’ investment in the Manila Hotel
Corporation is a simple business venture, hence, an act beyond the contemplation of section 10,
paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution.
The submission is unimpressive. The GSIS in not a pure private corporation. It is essentially a
public corporation created by Congress and granted an original charter to serve a public purpose.
It is subject to the jurisdictions of the Civil Service Commission.[37] and the Commission on
Audit.[38] As a state-owned and controllecorporation, it is skin-bound to adhere to the policies
spelled out in the Constitution especially those designed to promote the general welfare of the
people. One of these policies is the Filipino First policy which the people elevated as a
constitutional command.
The fourth issue demands that we look at the content of the phrase “qualified Filipinos” and their
“preferential right.” The Constitution desisted from defining their contents. This is as it ought to
be for a Constitution only lays down flexible policies and principles which can be bent to meet
today’s manifest needs and tomorrow’s unmanifested demands. Only a constitution strung with
elasticity can grow as a living constitution.
Thus, during the deliberation in the Constitutional Commission, Commissioner Nolledo brushed
aside a suggestion to define the phrase “qualified Filipinos.” He explained that present and
prospective “laws” will take care of the problem of its interpretation, viz:
“x x x
THE PRESIDENT. What is the suggestion of Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove the

word “QUALIFIED?”
MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely “TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS” as against whom?
As against aliens over aliens?
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is understood. We use the word
“QUALIFIED” because the existing laws or the prospective laws will always lay down
conditions under which business may be done. For example, qualifications on capital,
qualifications on the setting up of other financial structures, et cetera.
MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes.
MR. RODRIGO. If we say, “PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS,” it can be

understood as giving preference to qualified Filipinos as against Filipinos who are not qualified.
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, that was the intention of the proponents. The committee
has accepted the amendment.
x x x.”
As previously discussed, the constitutional command to enforce the Filipino First policy is
addressed to the State and not to Congress alone. Hence, the word “laws” should not be
understood as limited to legislations but all state actions which include applicable rules and
regulations adopted by agencies and instrumentalities of the State in the exercise of their rule-
making power. In the case at bar, the bidding rules and regulations set forth the standards to
measure the qualifications of bidders Filipinos and foreigners alike. It is not seriously disputed
that petitioner qualified to bid as did Renong Berhad.[39]
Thus, we come to the critical issue of the degree preference which GSIS should have accorded
petitioner, qualified Filipino, over Renong Berhad, a foreigner, in the purchase of the controlling
shares of the Manila Hotel. Petitioner claims that after losing the bid, this right of preference
gives it a second chance to match the highest bid or Renong Berhad.
With due respect, I cannot sustain petitioner’s submission. I prescind from the premise that the
second paragraph of section 10, Article XII of the Constitution is pro-Filipino but not anti-Alien.
It is pro-Filipino for it gives preference to Filipinos. It is not, however, anti-alien per se for it
does not absolutely bar aliens in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony. Indeed, in the absence of qualified Filipinos, the State is not
prohibited from granting these rights, privileges and concessions to foreigners if the act will
promote the wealth of the nation.
In implementing the policy articulated in section 10, Article XII of the Constitution, the stellar
task of our State policy-makers is to maintain a creative tension between two desiderata - - first,
the need to develop our economy and patrimony with the help of foreigners it necessary, and,
second, the need to keep our economy controlled by Filipinos. Rightfully, the framers of the
Constitution did not define the degree of the right of preference to be given to qualified Filipinos.
They knew that for the right to serve the general welfare, it must have a malleable content that
can be adjusted by our policy-makers to meet the changing needs of our people. In fine, the right
of preference of qualified Filipinos is to be determined by degree as time dictates and
circumstances warrant. The lesser the need for alien assistance, the greater the degree of the right
of preference can be given to Filipinos and vice versa.
Again, it should be stressed that the right and the duty to determine the degree of this privilege at
any given time is addressed to the entire State. While under our constitutional scheme, the right
primarily belongs to Congress as the lawmaking department of our government, other branches
of government, and all their agencies and instrumentalities, share the power to enforce this state
policy. Within the limits of their authority, they can act or promulgate rules and regulations
defining the degree of this right of preference in cases where they have to make grants involving
the national economy and judicial duty. On the other hand, our duty is to strike down acts of the
State that violate the policy.
To date, Congress has not enacted a law defining the degree of the preferential right.
Consequently, we must turn to the rules and regulations of respondents Committee on
Privatization and GSIS to determine the degree of preference that petitioner in entitled to a
qualified Filipino in the subject sale. A tearless look at the rules and regulations will show that
they are silent on the degree of preferential right to be accorded a qualified Filipino bidder.
Despite their silence, however, they cannot be read to mean that they do not grant any degree of
preference to petitioner for paragraph 2, section 10, Article XII of the Constitution is deemed
part of said rules and regulations. Pursuant to legal hermeneutics which demand that we interpret
rules to save them from unconstitutionality, I submit that the right of preference of petitioner
arises only if it tied the bid of Renong Berhad. In that instance, all things stand equal, and
petitioner, as a qualified Filipino bidder, should be preferred.
It is with deep regret that I cannot subscribe to the view that petitioner has a right to match the
bid of Renong Berhad. Petitioner’s submission must be supported by the rules but even if we
examine the rules inside-out a thousand times, they can not justify the claimed right. Under the
rules, the right to match the highest bid arises only “if the for any reason, the highest bidder
cannot be awarded the block of shares x x x.” No reason has arisen that will prevent the award to
Renong Berhad. It qualified as a bidder. It complied with the procedure of bidding. It tendered
the highest bid. It was declared as the highest bidder by the GSIS and the rules say this decision
is final. It deserves the award as a matter of right for the rules clearly did not give to the
petitioner as a qualified Filipino the privilege to match the higher bid of a foreigner. What the
rules did not grant, petitioner cannot demand. Our sympathies may be with petitioner but the
court has no power to extend the latitude and longtitude of the right of preference as defined by
the rules. The parameters of the right of preference depend on a galaxy of facts and factors
whose determination belongs to the province of the policy-making branches and agencies of the
State. We are duty-bound to respect that determination even if we differ with the wisdom of their
judgment. The right they grant may be little but we must uphold the grant for as long as the right
of preference is not denied. It is only when the State action amounts to a denial of the right that
the Court can come in and strike down the denial as unconstitutional.
Finally, I submit that petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad.
Petitioner was aware of the rules and regulations of the bidding. It knew that the rules and
regulations do not provide that a qualified Filipino bidder can match the winning bid after
submitting an inferior bid. It knew that the bid was open to foreigners and that foreigners
qualified even during the first bidding. Petitioner cannot be allowed to repudiate the rules which
it agreed to respect. It cannot be allowed to obey the rules when it wins and disregard them when
it loses. If sustained, petitioners’ stance will wreak havoc of the essence of bidding. Our laws,
rules and regulations require highest bidding to raise as much funds as possible for the
government to maximize its capacity to deliver essential services to our people. This is a duty
that must be discharged by Filipinos and foreigners participating in a bidding contest and the
rules are carefully written to attain this objective. Among others, bidders are prequalified to
insure their financial capability. The bidding is secret and the bids are sealed to prevent collusion
among the parties. This objective will be undermined if we grant petitioner the privilege to know
the winning bid and a chance to match it. For plainly, a second chance to bid will encourage a
bidder not to strive to give a highest bid in the first bidding.
We support the Filipino First policy without any reservation. The visionary nationalist Don Claro
M. Recto has warned us that the greatest tragedy that can befall a Filipino is to be an alien in his
own land. The Constitution has embodied Recto’s counsel as a state policy and our decision
should be in sync with this policy. But while the Filipino First policy requires that we incline to a
Filipino, it does not demand that we wrong an alien. Our policy makers can write laws and rules
giving favored treatment to the Filipino but we are not free to be unfair to a foreigner after
writing the laws and the rules. After the laws are written, they must be obeyed as written, by
Filipinos and foreigners alike. The equal protection clause of the Constitution protects all against
unfairness. We ca be pro-Filipino without unfairness to foreigners.
I vote to dismiss the petition.

[1]
Introduction and Highlights, Guidelines and Procedures: Second Prequalification and Public
Bidding of the MHC Pivatization, Annex “A” to Petitioner’s Consolidated Reply to Comments
of Respondents, Rollo, p.142.
[2]
The four bidders who previously prequalified for the first bidding, namely, ITT Sheraton ,
Marriot International, Inc., Renaissance Hotel International, Inc., and the consortium of RCBC
and the Ritz Carlton, were deemed prequalified for the second bidding.
[3]
Annex “A” to the Consolidated Reply to Comments of Respondents, Rollo, pp.140-155.
[4]
Former Chief Justice Enrique Fernando and Commissioner Joaquin Bernas were invited by the
Court as amicus curiae to shed light on its meaning.
[5]
Lopez v. de los Reyes, 55 Phil. 170, 190 [1930].
[6]
16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law, Sec. 139 p. 510 [1979 ed.]; 6 R.C.L. Sec. 52, p. 57 [1915];
see also Willis v. St. Paul Sanitation Co., 48 Minn. 140, 50 N.W. 1110, 31 A.J.R. 626, 16 L.R.A.
281 [1892]; State ex. Rel. Schneider v. Kennedy, 587 P. 2d 844, 225 Kan 13 [1978].
[7]
Willis v. St. Paul Sanitation, supra, at 1110-1111; see also Cooley, A Treatise on
Constitutional Limitations 167, vol. 1 [1927].
[8]
16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, Sec. 48, p. 100.
[9]
Cooley, supra, at 171; 6 R.C.L. Sec. 53, pp.57-58; Brice v. McDow, 116 S.C. 324, 108 S.E.
84, 87 [1921]; See also Gonzales, Philippine Constitutional Law p.26 [1969].
[10]
16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, Sec. 48, p.101.
[11]
Way v. Barney, 116 Minn. 285, 133 N.W. 801, 804 38 L.R.A. (N.S.) 648, Ann. Cas. 1913 A,
719 [1911]; Brice v. McDow, supra, at 87; Morgan v. Board of Supervisors, 67 Ariz. 133, 192 P.
2d 236, 241 [1948]; Gonzales, supra.
[12]
Ninth Decennial Digest Part I, Constitutional Law, (Key No. 28), p. 1638.
[13]
Article III, Section 2; See Webb v. de Leon, 247 SCRA 652 [1995]; People v. Saycon, 236
SCRA 325 [1994]; Allado v. Diokno, 232 SCRA 192 [1994]; Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133
SCRA 800 [1984]; Yee Sue Kuy v. Almeda, 70 Phil. 141 [1940]; Pasion Vda. de Garcia v.
Locsin, 65 Phil. 689 [1938]; and a host of other cases.
[14]
Article III, Section 12, pars. 1 to 3; People v. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293 [1995]; People v.
Bandula, 232 SCRA 566 [1994]; People v. Nito, 288 SCRA 442 [1993]; People v. Duero, 104
SCRA 379 [1981]; People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 465 [1985]; and a host of other cases.
[15]
Article III, Section 14; People v. Digno, 250 SCRA 237 [1995]; People v. Godoy, 250 SCRA
676 [1995]; People v. Colcol, 219 SCRA [1993]; Borja v. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422 [1977];
People v. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 59 [1971]; and a host of other cases.
[16]
Galman v. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 274 [1985]; Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663
[1968]; People v. Otadura , 86 Phil. 244 [1950]; Bermudez v. Castillo, 64 Phil. 485 [1937]; and a
host of other cases.
[17]
Harley v. Schuylkill County, 476 F. Supp. 191, 195-196 [1979]; Erdman v. Mitchell, 207 Pa.
St. 79, 56 Atl. 327, 99 A.S.R. 783, 63 L.R.A. 534 [1903]; see Ninth Decennial Digest Part I,
Constitutional Law, (Key No. 28), pp.1638-1639.
[18]
City of Chicago v. George F. Harding Collection, 217 N.E. 2d 381, 383, 70 Ill. App. 2d 254
[1966]; People v. Buellton Dev. Co., 136 P. 2d 793, 796 58 Cal. App. 2d 178 [1943]; Bordy v.
State, 7 N.W. 2d 632, 635, 142 Neb. 714 [1943]; Cohen v. City of Chicago, 36 N.E.2d 220, 224,
377 Ill. 221 [1941].
[19]
16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law, Sec. 143, p. 514; 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law, Sec. 48, p.
100; 6 R.C.L. Sec. 54, p. 59; se also State ex rel. Noe v. Knop La. App. 190 So. 135, 142 [1939];
State ex rel. Walker v. Board of Commr’s. for Educational Lands and Funds, 3 N.W. 2d 196,
200, 141 Neb. 172 [1942]; Maddox v. Hunt, 83 P. 2d 553, 556, 83 Okl. 465 [1938].
[20]
Article II, Sections 11, 12 and 13 (Basco v. Phil. Amusements and Gaming Corporation, 197
SCRA 52, 68 [1991]); Sections 5, 12, 13 and 17 (Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, 246 SCRA 540,
564 [1995]).
[21]
Article XIII, Section 13 (Basco, supra).
[22]
Article XIV, Section 2 (Basco, supra).
[23]
Kilosbayan v. Morato, supra, at 564.
[24]
Basco v. Phil. Amusements and Gaming Corporation, supra, at 68.
[25]
Congress had previously passed the Retail Trade Act (R.A. 1180); the Private Security
Agency Act (R.A. 5487; the law on engaging in the rice and corn industry (R.A. 3018, P.D. 194),
etc.
[26]
Or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe.
[27]
Article XIV, section 3 of the 1973 Constitution reads:
“Sec. 3. The Batasang Pambansa shall, upon recommendation to the National Economic and
Development Authority, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or association
wholly owned by such citizens, certain traditional areas of investments when the national interest
so dictates.”
[28]
101 Phil. 1155 [1957].
[29]
See Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines 450, vol. II [1988]. The Lao
Ichong case upheld the Filipinization of the retail trade and implied that particular areas of
business may be Filipinized without doing violence to the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
[30]
Nolledo, The New Constitution of the Philippines, Annotated, 1990 ed., p. 72. The word
“patrimony” first appeared in the preamble of the 1935 Constitution and was understood to cover
everything that belongs to the Filipino people, the tangible and the spiritual assets and
possessions of the nation (Sinco, Philippine Political Law, Principles and Concepts [1962 ed.], p.
112; Speech of Delegate Condrado Benitez defending the draft preamble of the 1935
Constitution in Laurel, Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, vol. III, p. 325 [1966]).
[31]
Commissioned by the Manila Hotel Corporation for the Diamond Jubilee celebration of the
Hotel in 1987; see The Manila Hotel: The Heart and Memory of a City.
[32]
Section 7 R.A. 4846 provides:
Sec. 7. In the designation of a particular cultural property as a “national cultural treasure,” the
following procedure shall be observed:
(a) Before the actual designation, the owner, if the property is privately owned, shall be
notified at least fifteen days prior to the intended designation, and he shall be invited to attend
the deliberation and given a chance to be heard. Failure on the part of the owner to attend the
deliberation shall not bar the panel to render its decision. Decision shall be given by the panel
within a week after its deliberation. In the event that the owner desires to seek reconsideration of
the designation made by the panel, he may do so within thirty days from the date that the
decision has been rendered. If no request for reconsideration is filed after this period, the
designation is then considered final and executory. Any request for reconsideration files within
thirty days and subsequently again denied by the panel, may be further appealed to another panel
chairmanned by the Secretary of Education with two experts as members appointed by the
Secretary of Education. Their decision shall final and binding.
(b) Within each kind or class of objects, only the rare and unique objects may be designated
as “National Cultural Treasures.” The reimainder, if any, shall be treated as cultural property.
x x x.”
P.D. 1146, Sec. 5; P.D. 1146, known as “The Revised Government Service Insurance Act of
[33]
1977” amended Commonwealth Act No. 186, the “Government Service Insurance Act” of 1936.
[34]
Beronilla v. Government Service Insurance System, 36 SCRA 44, 53 [1970]; Social Security
System Employees Association v. Soriano, 7 SCRA 1016, 1023 [1963].
[35]
Id., secs. 28 and 29.
[36]
Id., sec. 30.
[37]
Constitution, Article IX (B), section 2 (1).
[38]
Constitution, Article IX (D), section 2 (1)
[39]
It is meet to note that our laws do not debar foreigners from engaging in the hotel business.
Republic Act No. 7042, entitled the “Foreign Investments Acts of 1991” was enacted by
Congress to “attract, promote and welcome x x x foreign investments x x x in activities which
significantly contribute to national industrialization and socio-economic development to the
extent that foreign investment is allowed by the Constitution and Relevant laws.” The law
contains a list, called the Negative List, specifying areas of economic activity where foreign
participation is limited or prohibited. Areas of economic activity not included in the Negative
List are open to foreign participation up to one hundred per cent (Secs. 6 and 7). Foreigners now
own and run a great number of our five-star hotels.
TORRES, JR., J.:
Constancy in law is not an attribute of judicious mind. I say this as we are confronted in the case
at bar with legal and constitutional issues – and yet I am driven so to speak, on the side of
history. The reason perhaps is due to the belief that, in the words of Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., a “page of history is worth a volume of logic.”
I will, however, attempt to share my thoughts on whether the Manila Hotel has a historical and
cultural aspect within the meaning of the constitution and thus, forming part of the “patrimony of
the nation”.
Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
xxx
“In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony,
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national goals
and priorities.”
The foregoing provisions should be read in conjunction with Article II of the same Constitution
pertaining to “Declaration of Principles and State Policies” which ordain –
“The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled
by Filipinos.” (Sec. 19).
Interestingly, the matter of giving preference to “qualified Filipinos” was one of the highlights in
the 1987 Constitution Commission proceedings, thus:
xxx
“MR. NOLLEDO. The Amendment will read: “IN THE GRANT OF THE RIGHTS,
PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY
PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS”.
And the word “Filipinos” here, as intended by the proponents, will include not only individual
Filipinos but also Filipino-Controlled entities fully controlled by Filipinos (Vol. III, Records of
the Constitutional Commission, p. 608).
MR. MONSOD. We also wanted to add, as Commissioner Villegas said, this committee and this
body already approved what is known as the Filipino First policy which was suggested by
Commissioner de Castro. So that it is now in our Constitution (Vol. IV, Records of the
Constitutional Commission, p. 225).
Commissioner Jose Nolledo explaining the provision adverted to above, said:
“MR NOLLEDO. In the grant of rights, privileges and concession covering the national
economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
MR. FOZ. In connection with that amendment, if a foreign enterprise is qualified and the
Filipinos enterprise is also qualified, will the Filipino enterprise still be given a preference?
MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.
MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspect than the Filipino enterprise, will the
Filipino still be preferred?
MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is “yes”. (Vol. III, p. 616, Records of the Constitutional
Commission).
The nationalistic provisions of the 1987 Constitution reflect the history and spirit of the Malolos
Constitution of 1898, the 1935 Constitution and the 1973 Constitutions. That we have not
reneged on this nationalist policy is articulated in one of the earliest cases, this Court said –
“The ‘nationalistic tendency is manifested in various provisions of the Constitution. x x x It

cannot therefore be said that a law imbued with the same purpose and spirit underlying many of
the provisions of the Constitution is unreasonable, invalid or unconstitutional (Ichong, et al. vs.
Hernandez, et al., 101 Phil. 1155).’”
I subscribe to the view that history, culture, heritage, and tradition are not legislated and is the
product of events, customs, usages and practices. It is actually a product of growth and
acceptance by the collective mores of a race. It is the spirit and soul of a people.
The Manila Hotel is part of our history, culture and heritage. Every inch of the Manila Hotel is
witness to historic events (too numerous to mention) which shaped our history for almost 84
years.
As I intimated earlier, it is not my position in this opinion, to examine the single instances of the
legal largesse which have given rise to this controversy, as I believe that has been exhaustively
discussed in the ponencia. Suffice it to say at this point, that the history of the Manila Hotel
should not be placed in the auction block of a purely business transaction, where profits subverts
the cherished historical values of our people.
As a historical landmark in this “Pearl of the Orient Seas”, it has its enviable tradition which, in
the words of the philosopher Salvador de Madarriaga, (tradition) is “more of a river than a stone,
it keeps flowing, and one must view the flowing, and one must view the flow in both directions.
If you look towards the hill from which the river flows, you see tradition in the form of forceful
currents that push the river or people towards the future; and if you look the other way, you
progress.”
Indeed, tradition and progress are the same, for progress depends on the kind of tradition. Let us
not jettison the tradition of the Manila Hotel and thereby repeat our colonial history.
I grant, of course, that men of the law can see the same subject in different lights.
I remember, however, a Spanish proverb which says – “He is always right who suspects that he
makes mistakes”. On this note, I say that if I have to make a mistake, I would rather err
upholding the belief that the Filipino be first under his Constitution and in his own land.
I vote to GRANT the petition.

VITUG, J.:
I agree with Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo on his clear-cut statements, shared by Mr. Justice
Reynato S. Puno in a well written separate (dissenting) opinion, that:
First, the provision in our fundamental law which provides that “(i)n the grants of rights,
priveleges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos”[1] is self-executory. The provision verily does not need,
although it can obviously be amplified or regulated by, an enabling law or a set of rules.
Second, the term “patrimony” does not merely refer to the country’s natural resources but also to
its cultural heritage. A “historical landmark,” to use the words of Mr. Justice Justo P. Torres, Jr.,
Manila Hotel has now indeed become part of Philippine Heritage.
Third, the act of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), a government entity which
derives its authorirty from the State, in selling 51% of its share in MHC should be considered an
act of the State subject to the Constitutional mandate.
On the pivotal issue of the degree of “preference to qualified Filipinos,” I find it somewhat
difficult to take the same path traversed by the forceful reasoning of Justice Puno. In the
particular case before us, the only meaningful preference, it seems, would really be to allow the
qualified Filipino to match the foreign bid for, as practical matter, I cannot see any bid that
literally calls for millions of dollars to be at par (to the last cent) with another. The magnitude of
the bids is such that it becomes hardly possible for the competing bids to stand exactly “equal”
which alone, under the dissenting view, could trigger the right of preference.
It is most unfortunate that Renong Berhad has not been spared this great disappointment, a
letdown that it did not deserve, by a simple and timely advise of the proper rules of bidding
along with the peculiar constitutional implications of the proposed transaction. It is also
regrettable that the Court at times is seen to, instead, be the refuge for bureaucratic inadequacies
which create the perception that it even takes on non-justiciable controversies.
All told, I am constrained to vote for granting the petition.
[1]
Second par. Section 10, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution.
537 Phil. 391
EN BANC
G.R. NO. 166501, November 16, 2006
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., PETITIONER, VS. HON. BAYANI F. FERNANDO, IN HIS

CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY, AND METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
Petitioner Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. ("petitioner"), as member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and taxpayer, filed this original action for the issuance of the writs of Prohibition and
Mandamus. Petitioner prays for the Prohibition writ to enjoin respondents Bayani F. Fernando,
Chairman of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) and the MMDA
("respondents") from further implementing its "wet flag scheme" ("Flag Scheme").[1] The
Mandamus writ is to compel respondents to "respect and uphold the x x x rights of pedestrians to
due process x x x and equal protection of the laws x x x."
Petitioner contends that the Flag Scheme: (1) has no legal basis because the MMDA's governing
body, the Metro Manila Council, did not authorize it; (2) violates the Due Process Clause
because it is a summary punishment for jaywalking; (3) disregards the Constitutional protection
against cruel, degrading, and inhuman punishment; and (4) violates "pedestrian rights" as it
exposes pedestrians to various potential hazards.[2]
In their Comment, respondents sought the dismissal of the petition for petitioner's lack of
standing to litigate and for violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Alternatively,
respondents contended that the Flag Scheme is a valid preventive measure against jaywalking.
Petitioner filed a Reply, claiming that the Court should take cognizance of the case as it raises
issues of "paramount and transcendental importance." Petitioner also contended that he filed this
petition directly with the Court because the issues raised in the petition deserve the "direct x x x
intervention of the x x x [C]ourt x x x."
We dismiss the petition.
A citizen can raise a constitutional question only when (1) he can show that he has personally
suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) a favorable action
will likely redress the injury.[3] On the other hand, a party suing as a taxpayer must specifically
show that he has a sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned
statute.[4] Petitioner meets none of the requirements under either category.
Nor is there merit to petitioner's claim that the Court should relax the standing requirement
because of the "transcendental importance" of the issues the petition raises. As an exception to
the standing requirement, the transcendental importance of the issues raised relates to the merits
of the petition.[5] Thus, the party invoking it must show, among others, the presence of a clear
disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition.[6] Petitioner has not shown such clear
constitutional or statutory violation.
On the Flag Scheme's alleged lack of legal basis, we note that all the cities and municipalities
within the MMDA's jurisdiction,[7] except Valenzuela City, have each enacted anti-jaywalking
ordinances or traffic management codes with provisions for pedestrian regulation. Such fact
serves as sufficient basis for respondents' implementation of schemes, or ways and means, to
enforce the anti-jaywalking ordinances and similar regulations. After all, the MMDA is an
administrative agency tasked with the implementation of rules and regulations enacted by proper
authorities.[8] The absence of an anti-jaywalking ordinance in Valenzuela City does not detract
from this conclusion absent any proof that respondents implemented the Flag Scheme in that
city.
Further, the petition ultimately calls for a factual determination of whether the Flag Scheme is a
reasonable enforcement of anti-jaywalking ordinances and similar enactments. This Court is not
a trier of facts.[9] The petition proffers mere surmises and speculations on the potential hazards of
the Flag Scheme. This Court cannot determine the reasonableness of the Flag Scheme based on
mere surmises and speculations.
Lastly, petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts when he filed this petition directly
with us. This Court's jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus, while concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of
Appeals, does not give litigants unrestrained freedom of choice of forum from which to seek
such relief.[10] We relax this rule only in exceptional and compelling circumstances.[11] This is
not the case here.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez,

Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia, and Velasco, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
[1]
As first implemented on 17 January 2005, respondents describe the Flag Scheme as follows:
"[F]ifteen mobile units bearing wet white flags, measuring seven (7) by five (5) feet with the
words "MAGLAKAD AT MAG-ABANG SA BANGKETA," were deployed along major Metro
Manila thoroughfares. Specifically, the wet flags are hung on the right side of the MMDA
mobile units, perpendicular to the sidewalks and in full view of pedestrians and commuters
awaiting for a ride, which move slowly along the street." (Rollo, pp. 74-75)
[2]
Petitioner listed the following as the hazards likely to result from the Flag Scheme's
implementation (rollo, pp. 34-35):
a) Pedestrians walking ahead of a [sic] MMDA moving vehicle with their backs towards the
latter are likely to be hit by the wet flag even before they will come to know that the wet flag is
behind them;
b) The scheme is likely to cause accident and injuries in case of a sudden scampering of
pedestrians to avoid getting hit by the wet flag;
c) Employees going to work are likely to miss a day's work or be late for work because either
they have to change clothes or wait for the clothes they are wearing to dry;
d) Students going to school are likely to miss school or be late for school because either they
have to change clothes or wait for their wet clothes to dry;
e) Women are subjected to indignities because if drenched, sensitive parts of their bodies may be
exposed, or they might end up using just any place wherein to change clothes or to dry their
clothes;
f) As a matter of fact, anyone hit by the wet flag or wet [sic] or drenched with water is likely to
get sick if he or she does not change clothes;
g) Employees coming back from strenuous work are likely to have health problems if hit by the
wet flag or wet or drenched with water;
h) Old men and women and children are most likely to be hit and drenched by the wet flag
because they do not have the speed and agility to avoid the wet flag on board a moving MMDA
vehicle;
i) As observed, the manner of throwing water into the wet flag is so crude and primitive that
other pedestrians and bystanders on the sidewalk are likely to get wet by spilled water as water is
being thrown by a [sic] MMDA personnel into the wet flag; and,
j) Likewise, as observed, the wet flag itself is already so dirty after just a day or two of use that
using it to wet or drench pedestrians is so unsanitary and exposes pedestrians to possible health
problems.
[3]
Telecommunications & Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. COMELEC, 352 Phil.
153 (1998).
[4]
Id.
[5]
Id.
[6]
Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, 20 April 2006.
[7]
MMDA has jurisdiction over the cities of Caloocan, Las Piñas, Makati, Malabon,
Mandaluyong, Manila, Marikina, Muntinlupa, Parañaque, Pasay, Pasig, Quezon, San Juan,
Taguig, and Valenzuela and the municipalities of Navotas and Pateros.
[8]
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, 385 Phil. 586
(2000); Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin, G.R. No. 130230, 15 April 2005,
456 SCRA 176.
[9]
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, 433 Phil. 506 (2002).
[10]
People v. Cuaresma, G.R. No. 67787, 18 April 1989, 172 SCRA 415.
[11]
Santiago v. Vasquez, G.R. Nos. 99289-90, 27 January 1993, 217 SCRA 633.

197 Phil. 203
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-31396, January 30, 1982
PHILIPPINE AIR LINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT

FORTUNATO F. BIANGCO, PETITIONERS, VS. PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC. AND COURT
OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This is an original action for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Prohibitory and
Mandatory Injunction filed on December 26, 1969 by the Philippine Air Lines Employees
Association (PALEA) against the Philippine Air Lines, Inc. (PAL) and the Court of Industrial
Relations (CIR).
This case originated from a labor dispute certified to the Court of Industrial Relations by the
President of the Philippines (Case No. 43-IPA, entitled Philippine Air Lines Employees
Association (PALEA) and Philippine Air Lines Supervisors' Association (PALSA) vs.
Philippines Air Lines, Inc., which was then pending with respondent Court of Industrial
Relations). In said case, respondent Court issued a Return to Work Order on September 6, 1963,
which, besides ordering the employees to return to work, ordered PAL not to dismiss any regular
employee without prior authority from respondent Court.
PALEA alleged that, without prior authority from respondent Court, PAL dismissed 49
employees in the Maintenance and Engineering Department during the months of July and
August 1969. It also sent individual notices of termination, effective at the close of office hours
on September 30, 1969, to 125 regular employees in the same department for lack of work
caused by the non-renewal of its maintenance and servicing contract with the U.S. Air Force.
Upon complaint of the dismissed employees and those whose services were about to be
terminated, all of whom are members of PALEA, the latter, on August 7, 1969, filed with
respondent Court in Case No. 43-IPA, an Urgent Petition for Injunction, with prayer for the
issuance of a Restraining Order and Mandatory Injunction to restrain PAL from dismissing the
employees mentioned therein and to reinstate those dismissed on July 25 and 31, 1969.[1] The
Petition was not acted upon by respondent Court.
PALEA filed on August 18, 1969, an urgent Motion addressed to the Court of Industrial
Relations en banc praying that the "trial Court" be ordered to hear and dispose of its Petition for
Injunction dated August 7, 1969. The Court of Industrial Relations en banc also failed to act on
the same.
A few other incidents, including a recourse to this Court (L-31002), which ultimately became
moot and academic, transpired in the interim.
On September 29, 1969, respondent Court, through Judge Joaquin M. Salvador, issued an Order
directing PAL to maintain the status quo and to desist from terminating the services of 141
employees named in the Motion.[2]
PAL filed, on October 7, 1969, its Answer and Opposition to the Application for Injunction with
Counterclaim.[3] It also moved to lift the status quo Order of September 29, 1969 and to be
authorized to discharge from the service the 128 (125) employees listed in its Manifestation of
October 1, 1969.[4] PALEA opposed the said Motion.[5]
On December 6, 1969, respondent Court, through Judge Joaquin M. Salvador, lifted the
Restraining Order of September 29, 1969, upon PAL's posting of a bond of P300,000.00 (Annex
"R", pp. 102-104, Rollo).
On December 8, 1969, PALEA moved to lift the Order of December 6, 1969[6] and for
reconsideration of the same.[7]
On December 10, 1969, PAL wrote PALEA stating that it was now in a legal position to effect
the termination of the personnel involved, but in view of the Yuletide season, it had decided to
suspend the effectivity of the lay-off until January 1, 1970.[8]
Its Motion to set aside the Order of December 6, 1969 and to reconsider the same not having
been acted upon by respondent Court, PALEA filed with this Court, on December 26, 1969, the
present Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, praying for the immediate issuance of
a Restraining Order. That Restraining Order was issued by this Court on the same day enjoining
the implementation of the Court of Industrial Relations Order of December 6, 1969.
The issues in this case, as posed by petitioner, are:
“(1) Whether or not the instant petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is proper and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court; and
“(2) Whether or not the respondent Court has acted with grave abuse of discretion which is
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction when it neglected the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins and in either or both cases there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."[9]
PALEA contends that this Court has jurisdiction over the instant Petition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court and Section 17 of the Judiciary Act, and that the refusal of respondent Court to
act on its Petition of August 7, 1969 for Injunction and of August 18, 1969 addressed to the
Court of Industrial Relations en banc, and on its Motion to lift Order of December 6, 1969,
constitute neglect of duty which warrants the issuance of a Writ of Mandamus.
PAL, on the other hand, avers that the Petition to set aside the Order of December 6, 1969 is
improper, premature, and, therefore, outside the jurisdiction of this Court as PALEA's Motion to
lift said Order and Motion to reconsider the same are still pending resolution before respondent
Court. PAL further alleges that the case involves purely questions of fact which are disputed by
the parties, and that the pendency of Case No. 43-IPA before respondent Court and the efficacy
of the September 6, 1963 Order of respondent Court do not constitute a bar to its legal right to
lay off the employees in question.
As a general rule, Certiorari will not lie unless an inferior Court has, through a Motion for
Reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors imputed to him. This, however, admits of
exceptions, namely: (1) when the issue raised is one purely of law; (2) where public interest is
involved; and (3) in case of urgency.[10]
In this case, the projected dismissal of the employees concerned was to take effect on January 1,
1970. As of December 26, 1969, when this Petition was filed, respondent Court had not acted on
PALEA's Motion to set aside the Order of December 6, 1969 nor on its Motion to reconsider the
same. In the meantime, it was faced with the imminent dismissal of the affected employees.
Plainly, urgency prompted recourse to this Court and the adequate and speedy remedy open to
PALEA in the ordinary course of law was the present Petition to protect the rights of its
members.
Respondent Court should have resolved PALEA's pending Motions promptly considering the
urgency of the matter involved. PALEA was entitled to be seasonably apprised of whatever
action respondent Court would take so that it could avail itself of the proper remedy in case of
denial.
But while Certiorari is a proper procedural remedy, this Court cannot compel respondent Court
to lift its Order of December 6, 1969 or to reconsider the same, for this involves the exercise of
judgment and discretion. It can only compel respondent Court to act on the pending Motions one
way or the other. It is an established principle that the Writ of Mandamus may not be issued to
control the discretion of a Judge or to compel him to decide a case or motion in a particular way -
the Writ being available only to compel him to exercise his discretion or jurisdiction.[11] The law
concedes to Judges and Courts the right to decide questions according to their own judgment and
understanding of the law.[12]
The propriety of the dismissal of the employees involved and the intended lay-off of the others
during the pendency of Case No. 43-IPA and during the efficacy of the Order of September 6,
1963, are questions of fact that have yet to be determined by respondent Court. It should be
recalled that this case is a mere offshoot of the main case, which was then pending before
respondent Court.
Pursuant to Article 300 of the New Labor Code (PD 442), all cases pending before the Court of
Industrial Relations on the date of the Code's effectivity (May 1, 1974) shall be transferred to and
processed by the corresponding labor relations division having cognizance of the same in
accordance with the procedure prescribed and the Implementing Rules and Regulations issued.
It may be that the necessity for further action by an inferior tribunal or agency no longer exists.
However, considering the span of time that this case has been pending, and in order to avoid the
additional delay that will ensue from a verification of the status of the principal case from the
parties, it is best to write a finish to this Petition now.
WHEREFORE, the corresponding Labor Relations Division and/or proper labor agency, is
hereby ordered to act on petitioner's Motion to Set Aside Order of December 6, 1969 as well as
its Motion to reconsider the same, if the necessity for resolution still subsists. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero, and Plana, JJ., concur. Teehankee, (Chairman), J., in the result.
[1]
Annex "E", pp. 47-51, Rollo.
[2]
Annex "M", pp. 80-81, ibid.
[3]
Annex "O", pp. 84-93, ibid.
[4]
Annex "P", pp. 94-98, ibid.
[5]
Annex "Q", pp. 99-101, ibid.
[6]
Annex "T", pp. 106-107, ibid.
[7]
Annex "U", p. 108, ibid.
[8]
Annex "W", p. 110, ibid.
[9]
p. 192, ibid.
[10]
Central Bank vs. Cloribel, 44 SCRA 307 (1972).
[11]
Pio vs. Marcos, 56 SCRA 726 (1974).
[12]
Santiago Labor Union vs. Tabigne, 17 SCRA 286 (1966).
260 Phil. 301
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 76422, January 22, 1990
UNITED HOUSING CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ABELARDO M. DAYRIT,

SPOUSES JOSE M. TAPIA, JR. AND LYDIA C. TAPIA, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
FERNAN, C.J.:
Petitioner United Housing Corporation seeks by this petition for certiorari and prohibition: (1)
to annul the Order dated October 27, 1986 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
XXXIX, denying petitioner's motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 37432 and (2) to restrain
respondent judge from proceeding with the hearing of aforesaid case. Petitioner likewise prays
for a preliminary injunction and/or restraining order to preserve the status quo.
The undisputed facts of this case are as follows:
Jose M. Tapia, Jr. bought Lot 19, Block 28 from United Housing Corporation, owner and
developer of UPS-5A Subdivision, under a Novated Contract to Sell a Parcel of Land dated July
27, 1974. Tapia has long fully paid the purchase price of said lot but petitioner corporation has
not executed the Absolute Deed of Sale nor transferred the title in favor of Tapia despite repeated
demands.[1]
Tapia filed a complaint (docketed as HSRC Case No. REM-830184-1947) against petitioner
corporation before the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission (now Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board).[2] A compromise agreement was arrived at later by the parties wherein
petitioner corporation promised among others, to deliver the title of the subject lot within two (2)
months from the date of the compromise agreement (April 25, 1984).[3] A judgment upon
compromise was rendered on May 30, 1984.[4]
Petitioner corporation, however, failed to honor its commitment under said compromise
agreement to secure the release of subject title and to deliver the same to the private respondents.
Respondent Tapia moved for the execution of the judgment but was opposed by petitioner
corporation. Instead of acting on the motion, the then Regulatory Commission forwarded the
records of HSRC Case No. REM-030184-1947 entitled "Jose M. Tapia, Jr. v. United Housing
Corporation" to Senior State Prosecutor Melquiades Gabriel for violation by herein petitioner of
Section 25 of P.D. 957, consisting in its failure to deliver the subject title to private respondent
and to comply with the Compromise Agreement submitted by the parties and approved by the
Commission. As a result, the corresponding information for violation of P.D. 957 was filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXV, in Criminal Case No. 84-31256 against
the petitioner corporation's president and general manager.[5]
Having failed to effect the execution of the judgment upon compromise, private respondents
Spouses Jose M. Tapia, Jr. and Lydia C. Tapia filed a complaint for specific performance with
damages dated August 23, 1986 (docketed as Civil Case No. 86-37432) before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila. In their complaint, they prayed for, inter alia, the execution of a deed of
absolute sale over Lot 19, Block 28, United Paranaque Subdivision V, purchased by them from
the United Housing Corporation (petitioner herein), and for the transfer and delivery of the title
thereto.
On October 7, 1986, petitioner-corporation moved for the dismissal of the aforesaid complaint
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction by virtue of PD 1344, as amended by EO 648 (Charter of
the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission).
The Honorable Abelardo M. Dayrit, then presiding judge of Branch XXXIX of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, to whom said complaint was assigned, and after having considered the
allegations set forth in petitioner's dismissal motion and those in respondent's opposition thereto,
issued an Order dated October 27, 1986 denying the motion, hereunder quoted, as follows:
"Finding the Motion to Dismiss filed by the defendant to be not studiedly in order and taking into
consideration the opposition to said motion, the motion to dismiss is therefore denied."[6]
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner's motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order received by this Court on
December 12, 1986, was denied.[7]
The main issue in this petition is whether or not a case of specific performance decided by the
Human Settlement Regulatory Commission whose decision has already become final, may be
relitigated in the Regional Trial Court on the same issue and between the same parties.
In this petition, it is petitioner's position, as it was in its motion to dismiss in the court below, that
an action for specific performance instituted by buyers of subdivision lots against the owner or
developer thereof falls under section 1 of PD 1344, as amended by EO 648.
Petitioner further argues that private respondents' having filed at some previous time a similar
complaint (sans damages) before the HSRC (docketed as HSRC Case No. REM-030184-1947)
which is an explicit recognition of the Commission's jurisdiction[8] brings into play the principle
of estoppel. In addition, petitioner insists that private respondents cannot even bring their
complaint to any tribunal because the judgment upon compromise has the effect of res
judicata.[9]
On the other hand, citing the case of De Jesus vs. Hon. Garcia, 19 SCRA 554, private
respondents maintain that jurisdiction resides in the RTC, the subject action being that of specific
performance coupled with the fact that in actions of such nature, the subject of litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation. Private respondents, for the foregoing purpose, invoke the
provisions of the following laws:
"A. Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 —
xxxxxxxxx
"Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
"(1) In all other cases in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
xxxxxxxxx
"(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest and costs or the value of the
property in controversy, amounts to more than twenty thousand pesos (P20, 000.00)."
"B. Presidential Decree No. 957 —
"Sec. 41. Other remedies. — The rights and remedies provided in this Decree shall be in addition
to any and all other rights and remedies that may be available under existing laws."
xxxxxxxxx
Private respondents, while admitting that they had previously filed a complaint with the HSRC,
where a compromise agreement was eventually arrived at between them and petitioner and upon
which agreement a judgment was based, contend that it is petitioner's failure to honor its
commitment under the said agreement to secure the release of the subject title and deliver the
same to private respondents that prompted them to seek judicial relief.
It is also private respondents' averment that the motion for execution that they had filed before
the HSRC, as opposed by petitioner, was never resolved; that instead, the Commission decided
to forward to Senior Prosecutor Melquiades Gabriel the records of HSRC Case No. REM-
030184-1947 entitled "Jose M. Tapia, Jr. vs. UHC" for petitioner's (respondent therein) failure to
comply with the aforesaid agreement, in violation of Section 25 of PD 957; that as a result of
said indorsement, the corresponding information was filed before the RTC of Manila, Br. XXV
in Criminal Case No. 84-31256 against petitioner's President and General Manager.[10]
In short, it is on this seeming "helplessness of the Commission in enforcing its orders and
decisions for lacking the necessary machinery"[11] that private respondents decided to resort to
the courts for relief.
There is merit in this petition.
As explicitly provided by law, jurisdiction over actions for specific performance of contractual
and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the
owner or developer, is vested exclusively in the HSRC. Section 1 of PD 1344, in no uncertain
terms, provides:
"Section 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate real estate trade and business and in
addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing
Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:
"A. Unsound real estate business practices;
"B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit
buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
"C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by
buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker
or salesman." (Underscoring Ours)
This is reinforced by section 8 of EO 648 (otherwise known as the Charter of the Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission) which took effect on February 7, 1981, thus:
"Section 8. Transfer of Functions. — The Regulatory functions of the National Housing

Authority pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 957, 1216, 1344 and other related laws are hereby
transferred to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission. x x x Among the regulatory
functions are: x x x (11) Hear and decide cases of unsound real estate business practices; claims
involving refund filed against project owners, developers, dealers, brokers, or salesmen and cases
of specific performance." (Underscoring Ours).
Private respondents' reliance, therefore, on sections 1 and 8 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1980 is untenable. Thus, as correctly pointed out by petitioner, section 19, paragraph 6 of said
law is material to the issue of where jurisdiction lies, and We quote:
"Section 19. x x x
"(6) In all other cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, persons or body
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions."
xxxxxxxxx
Neither can We accede to private respondents' claim that resort to the courts is justified under
section 41 of PD 957 specifically under the phrase "legal remedies that may be available to
aggrieved subdivision lot buyers".[12]
There is no question that a statute may vest exclusive original jurisdiction in an administrative
agency over certain disputes and controversies falling within the agency's special expertise. The
constitutionality of such grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the National Housing Authority (now
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board) over cases involving the sale of lots in commercial
subdivisions was upheld in Tropical Homes Inc. v. National Housing Authority (152 SCRA 540
[1987]) and again sustained in a later decision in Antipolo Realty Corporation v. National
Housing Authority (153 SCRA 399 [1987]) where We restated that the National Housing
Authority (now HLURB) shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and
business in accordance with the terms of PD No. 957 which defines the quantum of judicial or
quasi judicial powers of said agency.
Moreover, We should not be oblivious to the stark fact that the parties herein had arrived at a
compromise agreement, hereinbelow reproduced as:
"Compromise Agreement
xxxxxxxxx
"1. Respondent acknowledges that it has not yet delivered the title over a parcel of land
particularly described as lot 19, Block 28 of United Paranaque Subdivision V, to the
complainant;
"2. That respondent acknowledges that the complainant has already paid in full all the amount
due on the subject parcel of land;
"3. That the title over the said parcel of land cannot, as yet, be delivered to the complainant
because the SIHI is unable to release the same due to the fact that it is now under
receivership;
"4. That respondent undertakes to secure the release of the subject title from the SIHI, free
from all liens, and encumbrances, within a two (2) month period from date herein.".[13]
and that in fact, upon the aforestated agreement, a judgment was rendered dated May 30,
1984.[14]
No one can dispute that the "essence of compromises being mutual concessions by the parties, is
to avoid or end litigation. It is therefore a well-settled rule that a compromise, once approved by
final orders of the court has the force of res judicata[*] between the parties and should not be
disturbed except for vices of consent or forgery".[15]
In a string of decisions, this Court has repeatedly held that a judgment upon compromise which
is a judgment embodying a compromise agreement entered into by the parties in which they
make reciprocal concessions in order to terminate a litigation already instituted[16] is not
appealable, is immediately executory[17] and has the effect of res judicata.[18]
A judgment rendered upon a compromise agreement, not contrary to law or public policy or
public order has all the force and effect of any other judgment, it being a judgment on the merits,
hence, conclusive upon the parties and their privies.[19] As such, it can be enforced by a writ of
execution.[20]
In the matter of execution of decisions of the HSRC, PD 1344 cannot be any less categorical,
where it is stated:
"Whereas, under PD 957, the National Housing Authority is vested with the exclusive
jurisdiction over the real estate trade and business;
"Whereas, the Decree did not expressly provide the means to enforce its decisions in favor of the
prevailing party, thereby rendering such decisions inutile;
"Whereas, many subdivision lot buyers have been appalled by the inability of the National
Housing Authority to enforce decisions rendered in their favor, thereby giving rise to
disillusionment and skepticism about the noble objectives of PD No. 957; and
"Whereas, it has become necessary to strengthen the powers of the NHA to enable it to enforce
and execute its decisions." (Underscoring Ours)
Thus, under Section 3 of said P.D. it is specifically provided that: "As soon as the decision has
become final and executory, the National Housing Authority" (now Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board), "shall on motion of the interested party, issue a writ of execution,
enforceable in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court of the Philippines".
Upon failure then of the HSRC to act on their motion for execution of the judgment dated May
30, 1984, private respondents should have instituted mandamus proceedings to compel the
HSRC to perform its purely ministerial duty of enforcing its final and executory decision. For the
reasons hereinabove discussed, a new complaint in court for specific performance was untenable.
Be that as it may, we cannot rest easy with the iniquitous situation that the granting of this
petition would help perpetuate. It is not seriously denied by petitioner that private respondents'
resort to the courts was made necessary primarily by petitioner's continued refusal to abide by its
commitment embodied in the Compromise Agreement and approved by the HSRC; and
secondarily only by the HSRC's failure to take proper action on private respondents' motion for
execution. It is unfortunate that the latter agency is not a party to this case and therefore beyond
our jurisdiction.
Petitioner, however, is before us. Considering that it is actually petitioner's omission that has
spawned this needless complication, it cannot be deemed to have come to us with clean hands.
To accord petitioner the relief sought and thereby aid and abet it in its obstinate failure to abide
by the Compromise Agreement is to allow it to profit by its own wrongdoing. That, indeed
would be the height of injustice.
The undeniable fact is that the Compromise Agreement has long become final and executory. Its
terms can no longer be changed and petitioner cannot seek to defer its execution indefinitely. The
day of reckoning must come soon if justice is acquire real meaning. To require private
respondents to plead anew before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board for the execution
of the Compromise Agreement would be circuitous and time-consuming. The fairest and most
equitable course to take under the circumstances is to write finis to the controversy between the
parties, who are both within the jurisdiction of the court, by ordering petitioner to perform its
obligation under the long final and executory Compromise Agreement.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Order of October 27, 1986 is
annulled and set aside. Civil Case No. 37432 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
XXXIX is ordered dismissed. Petitioner United Housing Corporation is however ordered to
deliver to private respondents Spouses Jose M. Tapia, Jr. and Lydia C. Tapia the title to Lot 19,
Block 28 of United Parañaque Subdivision within thirty (30) days from the finality of this
decision. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin, and Cortez, JJ., concur.

[1]
Rollo, pp. 10-11.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 29-30.
[3]
Rollo, pp. 33-34.
[4]
Rollo, pp. 35-36.
[5]
Rollo, pp. 30-32.
[6]
p. 21, Rollo.
[7]
p. 26, Rollo.
[8]
Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 65, Rollo.
[9]
Rollo, p. 47.
[10]
Comment, pp. 31-32, Rollo.
[11]
p. 32, Rollo.
[12]
supra.
[13]
Annex "A", Comment, p. 33, Rollo.
[14]
Annex "B", Comment, p. 35, Rollo.
[*]
Case is considered closed by approval of compromise agreement. GO v. TROCINO, 114
SCRA 443.
[15]
Binamira v. Ogan-Occena, 148 SCRA 677 (1987).
[16]
Article 2037, New Civil Code of the Philippines.
[17]
De los Reyes v. Ugarte, 75 Phil. 505; Enriquez v. Padilla, 77 Phil. 373; Samonte v. Samonte,
64 SCRA 524)
[18]
Binamira v. Ogan-Occena, supra.
[19]
Ramos v. Pangasinan Trans., Co., Inc. and Romeo Ferrer, 79 SCRA 170.
[20]
Paredes v. CA, 132 SCRA 501 (1984); Canonizado v. Benitez, 127 SCRA 610 (1984).
G.R. No. 101428
EN BANC
G.R. No. 101428, August 05, 1992
DR. ISABELITA VITAL-GOZON, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS MEDICAL CENTER

CHIEF OF THE NATIONAL CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, PETITIONER, VS. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND DR. ALEJANDRO S. DE LA FUENTE,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
NARVASA, C.J.:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction, in a special civil action of mandamus
against a public officer, to take cognizance of the matter of damages sought to be recovered from
the defendant officer, is the chief issue raised in the certiorari action at bar. Also put at issue is
whether or not the Solicitor General may represent the defendant public officer in the mandamus
suit, in so far as the claim for damages is concerned, in light of this Court's rulings in Urbano, et
al. v. Chavez, et al., and Co v. Regional Trial Court of Pasig, et al.[1]
There is no dispute about the facts from which these issues arise.
In the early months of 1987 -- and pursuant to Executive Order No. 119 issued on January 30,
1987 by President Corazon C. Aquino -- reorganization of the various offices of the Ministry of
Health commenced; existing offices were abolished, transfers of personnel effected.
At the time of the reorganization, Dr. Alejandro S. de la Fuente was the Chief of Clinics of the
National Children's Hospital, having been appointed to that position on December 20, 1978.
Prior thereto, he occupied the post of Medical Specialist II, a position to which he was promoted
in 1977 after serving as Medicial Specialist I of the same hospital for six (6) years (since 1971).
On February 4, 1988 Dr. de la Fuente received notice from the Department of Health that he
would be re-appointed "Medical Specialist II." Considering this to be a demotion by no less than
two ranks from his post as Chief of Clinics, Dr. de la Fuente filed a protest with the DOH
Reorganization Board. When his protest was ignored, he brought his case to the Civil Service
Commission where it was docketed as CSC Case No. 4. In the meantime "the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the position of Chief of Clinics were turned over to and were
allowed to be exercised by Dr. Jose D. Merencilla, Jr." [2]
Dr. de la Fuente's case was decided by the Civil Service Commission in a Resolution dated
August 9, 1988. In that Resolution, the Commission made the following conclusion and
disposition, to wit:
" ** (The Commission) declares the demotion/transfer of appellant dela Fuente, Jr. from Chief of
Clinics to Medical Specialist II as null and void: hence, illegal. Considering further that since the
National Children's Hospital was not abolished and the positions therein remained intact
although the title or the position of Chief of Clinics was changed to Chief of Medical
Professional Staff’ with substantially the same functions and responsibilities, the Commission
hereby orders that:
1. Appellant dela Fuente, Jr. be retained or considered as never having relinquished his position
of Chief of Clinics (now Chief of Medical Professional Staff) without loss of seniority rights;
and
2. He be paid back salaries, transportation, representation and housing allowances and such
other benefits withheld from him from the date of his illegal demotion/transfer."
No motion for reconsideration of this Resolution was ever submitted nor appeal therefrom
essayed to the Supreme Court, within the thirty-day period prescribed therefor by the
Constitution. Consequently, the resolution became final, on September 21, 1988.
[3]
De la Fuente thereupon sent two (2) letters to Dr. Vital-Gozon, the Medical Center Chief of the
National Children's Hospital, demanding implementation of the Commission's decision. Dr.
[4]
Vital-Gozon referred "de la Fuente's claims to the Department of Health Assistant Secretary for
Legal Affairs for appropriate advice and/or action * * (She did this allegedly because, according
to the Solicitor General, she was) unaware when and how a CSC Resolution becomes final and
executory, whether such Resolution had in fact become final and executory and whether the
DOH Legal Department would officially assail the mentioned Resolution." But she did not
[5]
answer Dr. de la Fuente's letters, not even to inform him of the referral thereof to the Assistant
Secretary. She chose simply to await "legal guidance from the DOH Legal Department." On the
other hand, no one in the DOH Legal Department bothered to reply to Dr. de la Fuente, or to take
steps to comply or otherwise advise compliance, with the final and executory Resolution of the
Civil Service Commission. In fact, de la Fuente claims that Vital-Gozon had "actually threatened
to stop paying ** (his) salary and allowances on the pretext that he has as yet no 'approved'
appointment even as 'Medical Specialist II' **." [6]
Three months having elapsed without any word from Vital-Gozon or anyone in her behalf, or
any indication whatever that the CSC Resolution of August 9, 1988 would be obeyed, and
apprehensive that the funds to cover the salaries and allowances otherwise due him would revert
to the General Fund, Dr. de la Fuente repaired to the Civil Service Commission and asked it to
enforce its judgment. He was however "told to file in court a petition for mandamus because of
the belief that the Commission had no coercive powers -- unlike a court -- to enforce its final
decisions/resolutions."[7]
So he instituted in the Court of Appeals on December 28, 1988 an action of "mandamus and
damages with preliminary injunction" to compel Vital-Gozon, and the Administrative Officer,
Budget Officer and Cashier of the NCH to comply with the final and executory resolution of the
Civil Service Commission. He prayed for the following specific reliefs:
"(1) (That) ** a temporary restraining order be issued immediately, ordering the principal and
other respondents to revert the funds of the NCH corresponding to the amounts necessary to
implement the final resolution of the CSC in CSC Case No. 4 in favor of herein petitioner, Dr.
Alejandro S. de la Fuente, Jr., and to pay such sums which have accrued and due and payable as
of the date of said order;
(2) After hearing on the prayer for preliminary injunction, that the restraining order be converted
to a writ of preliminary injunction; and that a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction be issued
ordering principal respondent and the other respondents to implement in full the said final
resolution; and
(3) That, after hearing on the merits of the petition, that judgment be rendered seeking (sic)
permanent writs issued and that principal respondent be ordered and commanded to comply with
and implement the said final resolution without further delay; and, furthermore, that the principal
respondent be ordered to pay to the petitioner the sums of P100,000.00 and P20,000.00 as moral
and exemplary damages, and P10,000.00 for litigation expenses and attorney's fees.
* * * * * .”
The Court of Appeals required the respondents to answer. It also issued a temporary restraining
order as prayed for, and required the respondents to show cause why it should not be converted
to a writ of preliminary injunction. The record shows that the respondents prayed for and were
granted an extension of fifteen (15) days to file their answer "through counsel, who," as the
Court of Appeals was later to point out, "did not bother to indicate his address, thus notice was
[8]
sent to him through the individual respondents. * * (However, no) answer was filed; neither was
there any show cause (sic) against a writ of preliminary injunction." It was a certain Atty. Jose
Fabia who appeared in Vital-Gozon's behalf. [9]
About a month afterwards, de la Fuente filed with the same Court a "Supplemental/Amended
Petition" dated February 2, 1989. The second petition described as one for "quo warranto" aside
from "mandamus," added three respondents including Dr. Jose Merencilla, Jr.; and alleged inter
alia that he (de la Fuente) had "clear title" to the position in question in virtue of the final and
executory judgment of the Civil Service Commission; that even after the Commission's judgment
had become final and executory and been communicated to Vital-Gozon, the latter allowed "Dr.
Merencilla, Jr. as 'OIC Professional Service' to further usurp, intrude into and unlawfully hold
and exercise the public office/position of petitioner (under a duly approved permanent
appointment as 'Chief of Clinics' since 1978). De la Fuente thus prayed, additionally, for
judgment:
"(a) Declaring that principal respondent Dr. Jose D. Merencilla, Jr. is not legally entitled to the
office of 'Chief of Clinics' (now retitled/known as 'Chief of Medical Professional Staff,' NCH),
ousting him therefrom and ordering said respondent to immediately cease and desist from further
performing as 'OIC Professional Service' any and all duties and responsibilities of the said office;
(and)
(b) Declaring that the petitioner, Dr. Alejandro S. de la Fuente, Jr., is the lawful or de jure Chief
of Clinics (now known as 'Chief of the Medical Professional Staff') and placing him in the
possession of said office/position, without the need of reappointment or new appointment as held
by the Civil Service Commission in its resolution of August 9, 1988, in CSC Case No. 4.
* * * * * ."
Copy of the "Supplemental/Amended Petition" was sent to "Atty. Jose A. Fabia, Counsel for
Respondents c/o Dr. Ma. Isabelita Vital-Gozon, etc., National Children's Hospital, E. Rodriguez
Ave., Quezon City (Atty. Fabia's address not being indicated or mentioned in his motion for
Extension of Time)." [10]
Again the Court of Appeals required answer of the respondents. Again, none was filed. The
petitions were consequently "resolved on the basis of their allegations and the annexes." The
Appellate Court promulgated its judgment on June 9, 1989. It held that --
[11]
"The question of whether petitioner may be divested of his position as Chief of Clinics by the
expedient of having him appointed to another, lower position is no longer an issue. It ceased to
be such when the resolution in CSC Case No. 4 became final. The said resolution is explicit in its
mandate; petitioner was declared the lawful and de jure Chief of Clinics (Chief of the Medical
Professional Staff) of the National Children's Hospital, and by this token, respondent Dr. Jose D.
Merencilla, Jr. is not legally entitled to the office. Respondents, particularly Dr. Isabelita Vital-
Gozon, had no discretion or choice on the matter; the resolution had to be complied with. It was
ill-advised of principal respondent, and violative of the rule of law, that the resolution has not
been obeyed or implemented.",
and accordingly ordered –
" * * respondents, particularly Dr. Isabelita Vital-Gozon, * * to forthwith comply with, obey and
implement the resolution in CSC Case No. 4 (and) * * Dr. Jose D. Merencilla, Jr., who is not
entitled to the office, * * to immediately cease and desist from further performing and acting as
OIC Professional Service."
But de la Fuente's prayer for damages -- founded essentially on the refusal of Gozon, et al. to
obey the final and executory judgment of the Civil Service Commission, which thus compelled
him to litigate anew in a different forum -- was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground
that the "petitions (for mandamus) are not the vehicle nor is the Court the forum for ** (said)
claim of damages."
Gozon acknowledged in writing that she received a copy of the Appellate Tribunal's Decision of
June 9, 1989 on June 15, 1989. Respondent de la Fuente acknowledged receipt of his own copy
[12]
on June 15, 1989. Neither Vital-Gozon nor her co-party, Dr. Merencilla, Jr., moved for
[13]
reconsideration of, or attempted to appeal the decision.
It was de la Fuente who sought reconsideration of the judgment, by motion filed through new
counsel, Atty. Ceferino Gaddi. He insisted that the Appellate Court had competence to award
[14]
damages in a mandamus action. He argued that while such a claim for damages might not have
been proper in a mandamus proceeding in the Appellate Court "before the enactment of B.P. Blg.
129 because the Court of Appeals had authority to issue such writs only ‘in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction,’" the situation was changed by said BP 129 in virtue of which three levels of courts
-- the Supreme Court, the Regional Trial Court, and the Court of Appeals -- were conferred
concurrent original jurisdiction to issue said writs, and the Court of Appeals was given power to
conduct hearings and receive evidence to resolve factual issues. To require him to separately
litigate the matter of damages, he continued, would lead to that multiplicity of suits which is
abhorred by the law.
While his motion for reconsideration was pending, de la Fuente sought to enforce the judgment
of the Court of Appeals of June 9, 1989 -- directing his reinstatement pursuant to the Civil
Service Commission's Resolution of August 9, 1988, supra. He filed on July 4, 1989 a "Motion
for Execution," alleging that the judgment of June 9, 1989 had become final and executory for
failure of Gozon, et al. -- served with notice thereof on June 16, 1989 -- to move for its
reconsideration or elevate the same to the Supreme Court. His motion was granted by the Court
[15]
of Appeals in a Resolution dated July 7, 1989, reading as follows:

[16]
"The decision of June 9, 1989 having become final and executory, as played for, let the writ of
execution issue forthwith."
The corresponding writ of execution issued on July 13, 1989, on the invoked authority of
[17]
Section 9, Rule 39. The writ quoted the dispositive portion of the judgment of June 9, 1989,
[18]
including, as the Solicitor General's Office points out, the second paragraph to the effect that the
petitions "are not the vehicle nor is the Court the forum for the claim of damages; (hence,) the
prayer therefor is denied."
The writ of execution notwithstanding, compliance with the June 9, 1989 judgment was not
effected. Consequently, de la Fuente filed, on July 20, 1989, an "Urgent Ex Parte Manifestation
with Prayer to Cite Respondents for Contempt," complaining that although Gozon and her co-
parties had been served with the writ of execution on July 14, they had not complied therewith.
By Resolution dated July 26, 1989, the Court required Gozon and Merencilla to appear before it
on August 3, 1989 to answer the charge and show cause "why they should not be adjudged in
contempt for disobeying and/or resisting the judgment." [19]
At the hearing Gozon and Merencilla duly presented themselves, accompanied by their
individual private lawyers – one for Gozon (Felipe Hidalgo, Jr.), two for Merencilla (Bernardo S.
Nera and Moises S. Rimando). One other lawyer appeared in their behalf, from the Health
Deptartment, Artemio Manalo, who stated that he was there "in behalf of Jose A. Fabia." They[20]
explained that they had no intention to defy the Court, they had simply referred the matter to
their superiors in good faith; and they were perfectly willing to comply with the judgment,
undertaking to do so "even in the afternoon" of that same day. The Court consequently ordered
them "to comply with their undertaking ** without any further delay," and report the action
taken towards this end, within five (5) days.
On August 9, 1989, Gozon, as "Medical Center Chief," sent a letter to Associate Justice Pedro A.
Ramirez, advising that under Hospital Special Order No. 31 dated August 3, 1989, de la Fuente
had been directed to assume the position of Chief of the Medical Professional Staff, and that a
voucher for the payment of his allowances had been prepared and was being processed. [21]
More than a month later, or more precisely on September 27 1989, the Court of Appeals
promulgated another Resolution, this time resolving de la Fuente's motion for reconsideration of
June 29, 1989. It modified the Decision of June 9, 1989 by (a) deleting its last paragraph
[22]
(disallowing the claim of damages, supra), (b) consequently describing and treating it as a
"PARTIAL DECISION," and (c) scheduling "further proceedings for the purpose of receiving
evidence (of damages)," since said question "cannot be resolved by mere reference to the
pleadings." This was done in reliance on Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, invoked by
[23]
de la Fuente, which reads as follows: [24]
"SEC. 3. Mandamus. -- When any tribunal, corporation, board, or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust,
or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to
which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to
protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason
of the wrongful acts of the defendant."
At about this time, yet another lawyer, Atty. Pedro F. Martinez entered his appearance for
Isabelita Gozon. At his instance, the Court gave him an "opportunity to ** file a motion for
[25]
reconsideration" of the Resolution of September 27, 1989. That motion he filed by registered
[26]
mail on November, 10, 1989. His basic contentions were (a) that the decision of June 9, 1989
[27]
could no longer be altered, having become final and executory and having in fact been executed,
and (b) that under BP 129, the Appellate Court had no jurisdiction over the question of damages
in a mandamus action.
The Office of the Solicitor General also put in an appearance in Gozon's behalf at this juncture,
saying that the case had been referred to it only on November 14, 1989. It, too, sought
reconsideration of the Resolution of September 27, 1989. It filed on November 16, 1989 an
"Omnibus Motion: I. For Reconsideration Of Resolution dated September 27, 1989; and II. To
defer hearing on petitioner's claims for damages." [28]
Both motions were denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated January 11, 1991. In
that Resolution, the Court –
1) Declared that the amended decision had already become final and could no longer be re-
opened because, although "a copy of the amendatory resolution was received by counsel who
was representing Gozon on October 3, 1989," the first motion for reconsideration was not mailed
until November 10, 1989 and the Solicitor General's "Omnibus Motion" was not filed until
November 16,1989; and
2) Prohibited the Solicitor General from representing Gozon "in connection with ** (de la
Fuente's) claim for damages," on the authority of this Court's ruling promulgated on March 19,
1990 in G.R. No. 87977 (Urbano, et al. v. Chavez, et al.) and G.R. No. 88578 (Co v. Regional
Trial Court of Pasig). [29]
Notice of this Resolution of January 11, 1991 was served on the Solicitor General's Office on
January 18, 1991. Again the Solicitor General sought reconsideration, by motion dated January
[30]
25, 1991 and filed on January 30, 1991. Again it was rebuffed. In a Resolution rendered on
[31]
August 7, 1991, served on the Solicitor General's Office on August 20, 1991, the Court of
[32] [33]
Appeals denied the motion. It ruled that the "question of the authority of the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for respondent Gozon ** (had already) been extensively discussed," and that
its "jurisdiction ** to hear and determine issues on damages proceeds from Sec. 9, Batas
Pambansa 129 as amended."
In an attempt to nullify the adverse dispositions of the Court of Appeals -- and obtain "the
ultimate and corollary relief of dismissing respondent de la Fuente's claim for damages" -- the
Solicitor General's Office has instituted the special civil action of certiorari at bar. It contends
that the Court of Appeals is not legally competent to take cognizance of and decide the question
of damages in a mandamus suit. It argues that -
1) B.P. Blg. 129 does not confer jurisdiction upon the Court of Appeals to hear, as a trial court,
claims for moral and exemplary damages;
2) assuming that the Court of Appeals does have jurisdiction over the claims for damages, it
lost the power to take cognizance thereof after the Decision of June 9, 1989 had, by its
own pronouncement, become final and executory; and
3) the Urbano and Co doctrines cited by the Appellate Tribunal do not disqualify the
Solicitor General's Office from representing government officials sued in their official
capacities and in damage claims not arising from a felony.
It is in light of these facts, just narrated, that this Court will now proceed to deal with the legal
issues raised in this action. But first, a few brief observations respecting the proceedings in the
Civil Service Commission.
The record demonstrates that Vital-Gozon was fully aware of the following acts and events: [34]
1) the proceedings commenced by de la Fuente in the Civil Service Commission in protest

against his demotion;
2) the Commission's Resolution of August 9, 1988 as well, particularly, as the direction

therein that de la Fuente be reinstated and paid all his back salaries and other monetary
benefits otherwise due him, this being couched in fairly simple language obviously
understandable to persons of ordinary or normal intelligence;
3) no less than two (2) written demands of de la Fuente for implementation of the CSC's
aforesaid Resolution of August 9, 1988;
4) the petition filed by de la Fuente in the Court of Appeals for enforcement of the CSC
Resolution of August 9, 1988;
5) the extension granted by said Court of Appeals within which to file answer, notice thereof
having been sent directly to her and her co-respondents since the attorney who sought
the extension in their behalf (Atty. Fabia) did not set out his address in his motion for
extension;
6) the "supplemental/amended petition" subsequently presented by de la Fuente, copy of

which was sent to Atty. Fabia, c/o Dr. Vital-Gozon; and
7) the Decision and Amendatory Decision sent to her counsel on October 3,1989.
To all these, her reaction, and that of the officials of the Department of Health concerned, was a
regrettably cavalier one, to say the least. Neither she nor the Health officials concerned accorded
said acts and events any importance. She never bothered to find out what was being done to
contest or negate de la Fuente's petitions and actions, notwithstanding that as time went by, de la
Fuente's efforts were being met with success.
Nothing in the record even remotely suggests that Vital-Gozon merits relief from the final and
executory Resolution of the Civil Service Commission. This Court will not disturb that
Resolution. It is satisfied that no procedural or substantive errors taint that Resolution, or its
becoming final and executory.
II
Now, final and executory judgments are enforced by writ of execution and not by another,
separate action, whether of mandamus or otherwise. Hence, execution of the Civil Service
Commission's decision of August 9, 1988 should have been ordered and effected by the
Commission itself, when de la Fuente filed a motion therefor. It declined to do so, however, on
the alleged ground, as de la Fuente claims he was told, that it "had no coercive powers -- unlike a
court -- to enforce its final decisions/resolutions." That proposition, communicated to de la
[35]
Fuente, of the Commission's supposed lack of coercive power to enforce its final judgments, is
incorrect. It is inconsistent with previous acts of the Commission of actually directing execution
of its decisons and resolutions, which this Court has sanctioned in several cases; and it is not in
[36]
truth a correct assessment of its powers under the Constitution and the relevant laws.
In an En Banc Decision promulgated on October 15, 1991 in G.R. No. 96938 entitled
"Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) versus Civil Service Commission, et al.," this [37]
Court declared that in light of the pertinent provisions of the Constitution and relevant statutes -
" ** it would appear absurd to deny to the Civil Service Commission the power or authority to
enforce or order execution of its decisions, resolutions or orders which, it should be stressed, it
has been exercising through the years. It would seem quite obvious that the authority to decide
cases is inutile unless accompanied by the authority to see that what has been decided is carried
out. Hence, the grant to a tribunal or agency of adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear and
adjudge cases, should normally and logically be deemed to include be grant of authority to
enforce or execute the judgments it thus renders, unless the law otherwise provides.
In any event, the Commission's exercise of that power of execution has been sanctioned by this
Court in several cases."
Be this as it may, the fact is that by reason of the Commission's mistaken refusal to execute its
final and executory Resolution of August 9, 1988, extended proceedings have taken place in the
Court of Appeals and certain issues have been expressly raised in relation thereto, supra. Those
issues appear to the Court to be important enough to deserve serious treatment and resolution,
instead of simply being given short shrift by a terse ruling that the proceedings in the Court of
Appeals were totally unnecessary because the Civil Service Commission actually had the power
to execute its final and executory Resolution.
III
The first such issue is whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the matter of damages in a special civil action of mandamus. The Solicitor General's Office
argues that since jurisdiction is conferred only by law, not by agreement of the parties, or
acquiescence of the court, and since the law conferring jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals,
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, makes no reference to "actions for moral and exemplary damages, as
those claimed by ** (de la Fuente)," it follows that the Court of Appeals has no competence to
act on said claim of damages. And Section 3 of Rule 65, which authorizes the petitioner in a
mandamus suit to pray for judgment commanding the defendant inter alia "to pay the damages
sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant," is "nothing more
than a procedural rule allowing joinder of causes of action, i.e., mandamus and damages," and
such an award of damages is allowable only in actions commenced in Regional Trial Courts but
not in the Court of Appeals or this Court.
The argument is specious. It cannot be sustained.
The Solicitor General's Office correctly identifies Section 9, B.P. 129 as the legal provision
specifying the original and appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. The section pertinently
declares that the "Intermediate Appellate Court (now the Court of Appeals) shall exercise . . ,"
among others:
" ** Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and
quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction
** ." [38]
The Solicitor General's Office evidently searched said Section 9 for an explicit and specific
statement regarding "actions for moral and exemplary damages," and finding none, concluded
that the Court of Appeals had not been granted competence to assume cognizance of claims for
such damages. The conclusion is incorrect. Section 19, governing the exclusive original
jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts in civil cases, contains no reference whatever to claims "for
moral and exemplary damages," and indeed does not use the word "damages" at all; yet it is
indisputable that said courts have power to try and decide claims for moral, exemplary and other
classes of damages accompanying any of the types or kinds of cases falling within their specified
jurisdiction. The Solicitor General's theory that the rule in question is a mere procedural one
allowing joinder of an action of mandamus and another for damages, is untenable, for it implies
that a claim for damages arising from the omission or failure to do an act subject of a mandamus
suit may be litigated separately from the latter, the matter of damages not being inextricably
linked to the cause of action for mandamus, which is certainly not the case.
Now, at the time of the enactment of B.P. 129, the issuance of the extraordinary writs above
mentioned was controlled by the Rules of Court of 1964, as they continue to date to be so
controlled. More particularly, the principal writs of mandamus, prohibition and certiorari were
(and continue to be) governed by Rule 65; the writ of habeas corpus, by Rule 102; and the writ
of quo warranto, by Rule 66. The so-called auxiliary writs were (and continue to be) also
governed by the same code -- e.g., preliminary attachment, by Rule 57; preliminary injunction,
by Rule 58, receivership, by Rule 59; writ of seizure or delivery in a replevin suit, by Rule 60.
At that time, Section 3 of Rule 65 authorized (as it continues to authorize to date) rendition of
judgment in a mandamus action "commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other
specified time, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay
the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant." The [39]
provision makes plain that the damages are an incident, or the result of, the defendant's wrongful
act in failing and refusing to do the act required to be done. It is noteworthy that the Rules of
1940 had an identical counterpart provision. [40]
Moreover, Section 4 of the same Rule 65 authorized, as it continues to authorize to date, the
filing of the petition "in the Supreme Court, or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of an inferior
court, or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in a Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court) having jurisdiction thereof," as well as "in the Court of Appeals (whether or not) in [41]
aid of its appellate jurisdiction."
Worthy of note, too, is that Rule 66 of the Rules of Court similarly authorizes the recovery of
damages in a quo warranto action against a corporate officer -- an action within the concurrent
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals -- as follows: [42]
"SEC. 14. Liability of officer neglecting to deliver property of corporation to receiver. -- An

officer of such corporation who refuses or neglects, upon demand, to deliver over to the receiver
all money, property, books, deeds, notes, bills, obligations, and papers of every description
within his power or control, belonging to the corporation, or in any wise necessary for the
settlement of its affairs, or the discharge of its debts and liabilities, may be punished for
contempt as having disobeyed a lawful order of the court, and shall be liable to the receiver for
the value of all money or other things so refused or neglected to be surrendered, together with all
damages that may have been sustained by the stockholders and creditors of the corporation, or
any of them, in consequence of such neglect or refusal."
An award of damages was and is also allowed in connection with the auxiliary writ of
preliminary attachment, preliminary injunction or receivership which the Court of Appeals has
the power to issue in common with the Supreme Court and the Regional Trial Courts, payable[43]
by the sureties of the bond given in support of the writ, upon seasonable application and
summary hearing. [44]
Since it cannot but be assumed that in formulating, and incorporating in BP 129, the provision
governing the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, the
Batasang Pambansa was fully cognizant of the relevant provisions of the Rules of Court just
cited, as well as the rule against multiplicity of actions, it follows that in conferring on the Court
of Appeals original jurisdiction over the special civil action of mandamus, among others, as well
as over the issuance of auxiliary writs or processes, the Batasang Pambansa clearly intended that
said Court should exercise all the powers then possessed by it under the Rules of Court in
relation to said action of mandamus and auxiliary writs, including the adjudication of damages to
the petitioner in the action in appropriate cases.
IV
The next issue is whether or not the Solicitor General may properly represent a public official
like Dr. Vital-Gozon, who is sued for damages for allegedly refusing to comply with a lawful
and executory judgment of competent authority. The doctrine laid down in the Urbano and Co
cases already adverted to, is quite clear:
[45]
"*** (T)he Office of the Solicitor General is not authorized to represent a public official at any
stage of a criminal case. ***.
This observation should apply as well to a public official who is haled to court on a civil suit for
damages arising from a felony allegedly committed by him (Article 100, Revised Penal Code).
Any pecuniary liability he may be held to account for on the occasion of such civil suit is for his
own account. The State is not liable for the same. A fortiori, the Office of the Solicitor General
likewise has no authority to represent him in such a civil suit for damages."
It being quite evident that Dr. Vital-Gozon is not here charged with a crime, or civilly prosecuted
for damages arising from a crime, there is no legal obstacle to her being represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General.
The last issue is whether or not the decision of the Court of Appeals of June 9, 1989 could still
be modified after it was pronounced final and executory and was in fact executed with respect to
de la Fuente's reinstatement to his position and the payment of the salaries and allowances due
him.
There would seem to be no question about the timeliness of de la Fuente's motion for
reconsideration of the June 9, 1989 decision. As already narrated, notice of said decision was
served on him on the 15th of June, and his motion for reconsideration was presented on June 29,
1989, or fourteen (14) days after receiving a copy of the judgment, i.e., within the fifteen-day
period prescribed by Section 1, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court for filing a motion for new trial or
reconsideration.
This being so, it would certainly have been entirely within the authority of the Court of Appeals,
under normal circumstances, to rule on that motion for reconsideration and, in its discretion, act
favorably on it, as it did through its Resolution of September 27, 1991 -- by amending the
decision of June 9, 1989, declaring it a partial judgment, and setting a date for reception of
evidence on de la Fuente's claim for damages.
It would also appear that the motions for reconsideration of said Resolution of September 27,
1991 separately submitted in Gozon's behalf, by her own private attorney and by the Solicitor
General's Office, were filed way out of time. As also already pointed out, notice of that
Resolution of September 27, 1991 was served on Gozon's counsel on October 3, 1989 and on
Gozon herself on October 4, 1989; but the motion for reconsideration of Atty. Martinez (Gozon's
private lawyer) was not filed until November 10, 1989, thirty-eight (38) days afterwards, and that
of the Solicitor General, until November 16, 1989, or forty-four (44) days later. What is worse is
that, its motion for reconsideration of November 16, 1989 having been denied by a Resolution
dated January 11, 1991, notice of which it received on January 18, 1991, the Solicitor General's
Office filed still another motion for reconsideration on January 30, 1991, ostensibly directed
against that Resolution of January 11, 1991 but actually seeking the setting aside of the
Resolution of September 17, 1989. In effect it filed a second motion for reconsideration which,
of course, is prohibited by law.[46]
However, disposition of the question simply and solely on the foregoing premises is precluded
by the fact that prior to the promulgation by the Appellate Court of its Resolution of September
27, 1989 -- granting de la Fuente's motion for reconsideration of June 29, 1989 -- de la Fuente
had asked for and been granted by the Court of Appeals, authority to execute the decision of
June 9, 1989 and had in fact succeeded in bringing about satisfaction thereof, in so far as
concerned his reinstatement to the position from which he had been illegally ousted and the
payment to him of his salaries and allowances.
It has therefore become essential to determine the effect of the execution of said decision of June
9, 1989 at de la Fuente's instance, on the power of the Court of Appeals to modify that judgment
as earlier prayed for by de la Fuente in such a way as to concede the latter's capacity to claim
damages in his mandamus action, and consequently authorize him to present evidence on the
matter.
The general rule is that when a judgment has been satisfied, it passes beyond review, satisfaction
being the last act and end of the proceedings, and payment or satisfaction of the obligation
thereby established produces permanent and irrevocable discharge; hence, a judgment debtor
[47]
who acquiesces in and voluntarily complies with the judgment, is estopped from taking an appeal
therefrom.[48]
On the other hand the question of whether or not a judgment creditor is estopped from appealing
or seeking modification of a judgment which has been executed at his instance, is one dependent
upon the nature of the judgment as being indivisible or not. This is the doctrine laid down by this
Court in a case decided as early as 1925, Verches v. Rios. In that case this Court held that
[49]
although "there are cases holding the contrary view," where the judgment is indivisible, "the
weight of authority is to the effect that an acceptance of full satisfaction of the judgment
annihilates the right to further prosecute the appeal; * * * that a party who has recovered
judgment on a claim which cannot be split up and made the basis of several causes of action, and
afterwards coerced full satisfaction by writ of execution or authority of the court, cannot
maintain an appeal from the judgment against the objections of the judgment debtor;" and that
even partial execution by compulsory legal process at the instance of a party in whose favor a
judgment appealed from was rendered, places said party in estoppel to ask that the judgment be
amended, either "by appeal or answer to his adversary's appeal, or otherwise." [50]
A converso, where the judgment is divisible, estoppel should not operate against the judgment
creditor who causes implementation of a part of the decision by writ of execution. This is the
clear import of Verches and the precedents therein invoked. It is an aspect of the principle above
mentioned that is fully consistent not only with the dissenting opinion that "(a)cceptance of
payment of ** only the uncontroverted part of the claim ** should not preclude the plaintiff from
prosecuting his appeal, to determine whether he should not have been allowed more," but also
[51]
with logic and common sense.
In this case, the amended judgment of the Court of Appeals is clearly divisible, satisfaction of
which may be "split up." One part has reference to the enforcement of the final and executory
judgment of the Civil Service Commission, that de la Fuente should be reinstated to the position
of Chief of Clinics (now Chief of Medical Professional Staff) without loss of seniority rights and
that he be paid his back salaries and all monetary benefits due him from the date of his illegal
demotion. This part is no longer issuable, and has not in truth been controverted by Gozon
herself. The other part has reference to the damages which de la Fuente contends he suffered as a
result of the unjustified refusal of Gozon and her co-parties to comply with the final and
executory judgment of the Civil Service Commission, and which the Appellate Tribunal has
allowed him to prove. Obviously, the second part cannot possibly affect the first. Whether de la
Fuente succeed or fail in his bid to recover damages against Gozon, et al. because of their refusal
to obey the judgment of the Civil Service Commission, is a contingency that cannot affect the
unalterable enforceability of that judgment. Similarly, the enforcement of the Commission's
judgment (already accomplished by writ of execution of the Court of Appeals issued at de la
Fuente's instance) cannot influence in any manner the question of whether or not there was
culpable refusal on the part of Gozon, et al. to comply with said judgment when first required so
to do, and whether de la Fuente did in fact suffer compensable injury thereby.
It bears stressing that the juridical situation in which de la Fuente finds himself is not of his
making. It is a consequence of circumstances not attributable to any fault on his part, i.e., the
unwarranted refusal or neglect of his superiors to obey the executory judgment of the Civil
Service Commission; the erroneous refusal of the Commission to execute its own decision which
made necessary, in de la Fuente's view, the filing of a mandamus action in the Court of Appeals;
the initial refusal of the latter Court to acknowledge his right to damages in connection with the
mandamus suit; and ultimately, the change of view by the Court of Appeals, on de la Fuente's
motion, as regards its competence to take cognizance of the matter of damages in relation to the
mandamus proceeding.
Under these circumstances, there was no reason whatsoever to defer concession to de la Fuente
of the relief of reinstatement -- to which he was indisputably already entitled -- in the meantime
that issues arising after finality of the Civil Service Commission's judgment were being
ventilated and resolved -- these issues being, to repeat, whether or not the refusal by Gozon, et al.
to obey said judgment of the Commission could be justified, and whether or not, by reason of
that refusal to obey, de la Fuente did in fact suffer compensable injury.
It was therefore correct for the Court of Appeals, albeit by implication, to treat its judgment as
divisible, or capable of being enforced by parts, and to consider de la Fuente as not having been
placed in estoppel to pursue his claim for damages by seeking and obtaining authority for a
partial execution of the judgment. De la Fuente not being in estoppel, it follows that his motion
for reconsideration, timely filed, was not deemed abandoned or waived by the partial execution
of the judgment, and jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to amend the judgment was retained
and not lost. It follows, too, that since no motion for reconsideration was filed against, or appeal
attempted to be taken from, the Resolution of the Court of Appeals amending its original
judgment, within the time prescribed therefore by law, said amendatory resolution has long since
become final and immutable, particularly in so far as it holds itself competent to take cognizance
of the matter of damages and authorizes the reception of evidence on de la Fuente's claim
therefor.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged Resolutions of September 27,
1989, January 11, 1991 and August 7, 1991 are AFFIRMED, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, Nocon, and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
Respectively, G.R. No. 87977 and G.R. No. 88578 (March 19, 1990): 183 SCRA 347, the
[1]
ruling being to the effect that the Office of Solicitor General may not represent a public official
in a criminal case against him or in a civil suit for damages arising from a felony, the doctrine in
Anti-Graft League v. Hon. Ortega, et al., 99 SCRA 644 (1980) and Solicitor General v. Garrido,
100 SCRA 276 (1980), being expressly abandoned.
[2]
Rollo, p. 70
[3]
Article IX-A, Sec. 7
Dr. Vital-Gozon was appointed Medical Center Chief in April, 1988, succeeding Dr. C.
[4]
Agregado, who retired

[5]
Petition, par. 9; parenthetical insertion supplied
[6]
Rollo, p. 52
[7]
Id., p. 85: emphasis, in original text
[8]
Rollo, pp. 69, 71
[9]
SEE footnotes 10 and 18, infra
[10]
Rollo, p. 64
[11]
Id., pp. 69-72
C.A. Record, p. 87. As regards Jose D. Merencilla, Jr., he too acknowledged receipt of notice
[12]
of said judgment, as did Rizalina D. Pangan, Personnel Officer I, which letter bore the postscript,
"Noted: s/t: Ma. Isabelita S. Vital-Gozon, M.D., F.P.P.S., Medical Center Chief" (CA Record, p.
90).
[13]
Id., p. 87
[14]
C.A. Record, pp. 92 et seq.
[15]
Id., p. 101
[16]
Id., p. 73
[17]
Id., pp. 74-75
"SEC. 9. Writ of execution of special judgment. -- When a judgment requires the performance
[18]
of any other act than the payment of money, or the sale or delivery of real or personal proper;ty,
a certified copy of the judgment shall be attached to the writ of execution and shall be served by
the officer upon the party against whom the same is rendered, or upon any other person required
thereby, or by law, to obey the same, and such party or person may be punished for contempt if
he disobeys such judgment."
[19]
C.A. Record, p. 112
[20]
C.A. Record, pp. 125 et seq. SEE footnotes 9 and 10, supra
[21]
Id., p. 138
[22]
Id., p. 32, supra
[23]
Rollo, pp. 36-37
[24]
Italics supplied
[25]
C.A. Record, p. 161
[26]
Id., p. 163
[27]
Id., pp. 178-183
[28]
Id., pp. 171-177
[29]
Rollo, pp. 38-39; see footnote 1, supra
[30]
Rollo, id., id, par. 3
[31]
Id., id., par. 5
[32]
Id., p. 40
[33]
Id., pp. 38-39, par. 6
[34]
A proposition as to which the record discloses no serious challenge.
[35]
Rollo, p. 85: emphasis, in original text
SEE Cucharo v. Subido, 37 SCRA 523, citing SEC. 35, Civil Service Act of 1959; Yarcia v.
[36]
City of Baguio, 33 SCRA 419; Trocio v. Subido, 20 SCRA 354; Cabigao v. del Rosario, 6 SCRA
578 (1962); Austria v. Auditor General, 19 SCRA 79, 83-84; Gonzales v. Hernandez, 2 SCRA
228, 233-234, in turn cited in GSIS v. Civil Service Commission, et al., G.R. No. 96938, Oct. 15,
1991
[37]
202 SCRA 799, 804-805
[38]
This power is concurrent with this Court and the Regional Trial Court.
[39]
Italics supplied; SEE footnote 16 and related text, supra
[40]
Sec. 3, Rule 67
The original requirement that the writ issue only "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" was, as
[41]
already pointed out, deleted by Sec. 9 of BP 129, supra
[42]
Italics supplied
[43]
Sec. 2, Rule 57; Sec. 2, Rule 58; and Sec. 1, Rule 59, respectively
[44]
Sec. 20, Rule 57; Sec. 9, Rule 58; and Sec. 9, Rule 59, respectively
[45]
183 SCRA 347, 358; SEE footnote 1, supra
Par. 4 of the Interim Rules promulgated by the Supreme Court on January 11, 1983 by
[46]
authority of BP 129, provides that "No party shall be allowed a second motion for
reconsideration of a final order or judgment."
Moran, Comments on the Rules, 1979 ed., Vol. 2, p. 345, citing Estate of Baby, 87 Cal. 200,
[47]
202, 25 Pac. 405
Desbarats v. de Vera, 83 Phil. 382; Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v. Relucio, 47 SCRA
[48]
225; Robert Dollar Co. v. Tuvera, 123 SCRA 354; Tañada v. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 419;
SEE also PVTA v. de los Angeles, 61 SCRA 489; IBA AEU v. Inciong, 132 SCRA 663; cf, Song
Fo & Co. v. Veloso, 26 Phil. 575, 576 where the judgment debtor was held not to be in estoppel
to appeal because payment was made by him only because execution was issued by special order
and he wished to avoid the costs, expense and damage which would necessarily result from the
levy of the execution (cited in Feria, Civil Procedure, 1969 ed., p. 620, citing; and Moran, op.
cit., also at p. 345
[49]
48 Phil. 16
Referring to American cases, e.g., Paine v. Woolley, 80 Ky., 568; Wiemann's Succession, 112
[50]
La. 293, 36 So., 354; Harte v. Castetter, 38 Neb., 571, 57 N.W., 381; Holt v. Rees, 46 Ill., 181;
italics supplied
Per Malcolm, J., with whom concurred Avanceña, C.J., Villamor and Romualdez, JJ., 48 Phil.
[51]
25
268 Phil. 215
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 89898-99, October 01, 1990
MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,

HON. SALVADOR P. DE GUZMAN, JR., AS JUDGE RTC OF MAKATI, BRANCH CXLII,
ADMIRAL FINANCE CREDITORS CONSORTIUM, INC., AND SHERIFF SILVINO R.
PASTRANA, RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION
CORTES, J.:
The present petition for review is an off-shoot of expropriation proceedings initiated by

petitioner Municipality of Makati against private respondent Admiral Finance Creditors
Consortium, Inc., Home Building System & Realty Corporation and one Arceli P. Jo, involving a
parcel of land and improvements thereon located at Mayapis St., San Antonio Village, Makati
and registered in the name of Arceli P. Jo under TCT No. S-5499.
It appears that the action for eminent domain was filed on May 20, 1986, docketed as Civil
Case No. 13699. Attached to petitioner's complaint was a certification that a bank account
(Account No. S/A 265-537154-3) had been opened with the PNB Buendia Branch under
petitioner's name containing the sum of P417,510.00, made pursuant to the provisions of Pres.
Decree No. 42. After due hearing where the parties presented their respective appraisal reports
regarding the value of the property, respondent RTC judge rendered a decision on June 4, 1987,
fixing the appraised value of the property at P5,291,666.00, and ordering petitioner to pay this
amount minus the advanced payment of P338,160.00 which was earlier released to private
respondent.
After this decision became final and executory, private respondent moved for the issuance
of a writ of execution. This motion was granted by respondent RTC judge. After issuance of the
writ of execution, a Notice of Garnishment dated January 14, 1988 was served by respondent
sheriff Silvino R. Pastrana upon the manager of the PNB Buendia Branch. However, respondent
sheriff was informed that a "hold code" was placed on the account of petitioner. As a result of
this, private respondent filed a motion dated January 27, 1988 praying that an order be issued
directing the bank to deliver to respondent sheriff the amount equivalent to the unpaid balance
due under the RTC decision dated June 4, 1987.
Petitioner filed a motion to lift the garnishment, on the ground that the manner of payment
of the expropriation amount should be done in installments which the respondent RTC judge
failed to state in his decision. Private respondent filed its opposition to the motion.
Pending resolution of the above motions, petitioner filed on July 20, 1988 a "Manifestation"
informing the court that private respondent was no longer the true and lawful owner of the
subject property because a new title over the property had been registered in the name of
Philippine Savings Bank, Inc. (PSB). Respondent RTC judge issued an order requiring PSB to
make available the documents pertaining to its transactions over the subject property, and the
PNB Buendia Branch to reveal the amount in petitioner's account which was garnished by
respondent sheriff. In compliance with this order, PSB filed a manifestation informing the court
that it had consolidated its ownership over the property as mortgagee/purchaser at an extra-
judicial foreclosure sale held on April 20, 1987. After several conferences, PSB and private
respondent entered into a compromise agreement whereby they agreed to divide between
themselves the compensation due from the expropriation proceedings.
Respondent trial judge subsequently issued an order dated September 8, 1988 which: (1)
approved the compromise agreement; (2) ordered PNB Buendia Branch to immediately release
to PSB the sum of P4,953,506.45 which corresponds to the balance of the appraised value of the
subject property under the RTC decision dated June 4, 1987, from the garnished account of
petitioner; and, (3) ordered PSB and private respondent to execute the necessary deed of
conveyance over the subject property in favor of petitioner. Petitioner's motion to lift the
garnishment was denied.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was duly opposed by private respondent.
On the other hand, for failure of the manager of the PNB Buendia Branch to comply with the
order dated September 8, 1988, private respondent filed two succeeding motions to require the
bank manager to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court. During the
hearings conducted for the above motions, the general manager of the PNB Buendia Branch, a
Mr. Antonio Bautista, informed the court that he was still waiting for proper authorization from
the PNB head office enabling him to make a disbursement for the amount so ordered. For its
part, petitioner contended that its funds at the PNB Buendia Branch could neither be garnished
nor levied upon execution, for to do so would result in the disbursement of public funds without
the proper appropriation required under the law, citing the case of Republic of the Philippines v.
Palacio [G.R. No. L-20322, May 29,1968, 23 SCRA 899.]
Respondent trial judge issued an order dated December 21, 1988 denying petitioner's motion
for reconsideration on the ground that the doctrine enunciated in Republic v. Palacio did not
apply to the case because petitioner's PNB Account No. S/A 265-537154-3 was an account
specifically opened for the expropriation proceedings of the subject property pursuant to Pres.
Decree No. 42. Respondent RTC judge likewise declared Mr. Antonio Bautista guilty of
contempt of court for his inexcusable refusal to obey the order dated September 8, 1988, and thus
ordered his arrest and detention until his compliance with the said order.
Petitioner and the bank manager of PNB Buendia Branch then filed separate petitions for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which were eventually consolidated. In a decision
promulgated on June 28, 1989, the Court of Appeals dismissed both petitions for lack of merit,
sustained the jurisdiction of respondent RTC judge over the funds contained in petitioner's PNB
Account No. 265-537154-3, and affirmed his authority to levy on such funds.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of Appeals, petitioner now
files the present petition for review with prayer for preliminary injunction.
On November 20, 1989, the Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order enjoining
respondent RTC judge, respondent sheriff, and their representatives, from enforcing and/or
carrying out the RTC order dated December 21, 1988 and the writ of garnishment issued
pursuant thereto. Private respondent then filed its comment to the petition, while petitioner filed
its reply.
Petitioner not only reiterates the arguments adduced in its petition before the Court of
Appeals, but also alleges for the first time that it has actually two accounts with the PNB
Buendia Branch, to wit:
* * *
(1) Account No. S/A 265-537154-3 - exclusively for the expropriation of the subject
property, with an outstanding balance of P99,743.94.
(2) Account No. S/A 263-530850-7 - for statutory obligations and other purposes of the
municipal government, with a balance of P170,098,421.72, as of July 12, 1989.
* * *
[Petition, pp. 6-7; Rollo, pp. 11-12.]
Because the petitioner has belatedly alleged only in this Court the existence of two bank
accounts, it may fairly be asked whether the second account was opened only for the purpose of
undermining the legal basis of the assailed orders of respondent RTC judge and the decision of
the Court of Appeals, and strengthening its reliance on the doctrine that public funds are
exempted from garnishment or execution as enunciated in Republic v. Palacio [supra.] At any
rate, the Court will give petitioner the benefit of the doubt, and proceed to resolve the principal
issues presented based on the factual circumstances thus alleged by petitioner.
Admitting that its PNB Account No. S/A 265-537154-3 was specifically opened for
expropriation proceedings it had initiated over the subject property, petitioner poses no objection
to the garnishment or the levy under execution of the funds deposited therein amounting to
P99,743.94. However, it is petitioner's main contention that inasmuch as the assailed orders of
respondent RTC judge involved the net amount of P4,965,506.45, the funds garnished by
respondent sheriff in excess of P99,743.94, which are public funds earmarked for the municipal
government's other statutory obligations are exempted from execution without the proper
appropriation required under the law.
There is merit in this contention. The funds deposited in the second PNB Account No. S/A
263-530850-7 are public funds of the municipal government. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is
the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise provided for by
statute [Republic v. Palacio, supra.; The Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego, G.R.
No. L-30098, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 616.] More particularly, the properties of a
municipality, whether real or personal, which are necessary for public use cannot be attached and
sold at execution sale to satisfy a money judgment against the municipality. Municipal revenues
derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are intended primarily and exclusively
for the purpose of financing the governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are
exempt from execution [See Viuda De Tan Toco v. The Municipal Council of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 52
(1926); The Municipality of Paoay, Ilocos Norte v. Manaois, 86 Phil. 629 (1950); Municipality
of San Miguel, Bulacan v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 61744, June 25, 1984, 130 SCRA 56.] The
foregoing rule finds application in the case at bar. Absent a showing that the municipal council
of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating from its public funds an amount corresponding
to the balance due under the RTC decision dated June 4, 1987, less the sum of P99,743.94
deposited in Account No. S/A 265-537154-3, no levy under execution may be validly effected on
the public funds of petitioner deposited in Account No. S/A 263-530850-7.
Nevertheless, this is not to say that private respondent and PSB are left with no legal
recourse. Where a municipality fails or refuses, without justifiable reason, to effect payment of a
final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail of the remedy of mandamus in
order to compel the enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance, and the
corresponding disbursement of municipal funds therefor [See Viuda De Tan Toco v. The
Municipal Council of Iloilo, supra; Baldivia v. Lota, 107 Phil. 1099 (1960); Yuviengco v.
Gonzales, 108 Phil. 247 (1960).]
In the case at bar, the validity of the RTC decision dated June 4, 1987 is not disputed by
petitioner. No appeal was taken therefrom. For three years now, petitioner has enjoyed
possession and use of the subject property notwithstanding its inexcusable failure to comply with
its legal obligation to pay just compensation. Petitioner has benefited from its possession of the
property since the same has been the site of Makati West High School since the school year
1986-1987. This Court will not condone petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation
arising from expropriation proceedings it had in fact initiated. It cannot be over-emphasized that,
within the context of the State's inherent power of eminent domain.
. . . [j]ust compensation means not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the
owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking.
Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" for the property owner is
made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to
wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss
[Cosculluela v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77765, August 15, 1988, 164 SCRA
393, 400. See also Provincial Government of Sorsogon v. Vda. de Villaroya, G.R. No. 64037,
August 27, 1987, 153 SCRA 291.]
The State's power of eminent domain should be exercised within the bounds of fair play and
justice. In the case at bar, considering that valuable property has been taken, the compensation
to be paid fixed and the municipality is in full possession and utilizing the property for public
purpose, for three (3) years, the Court finds that the municipality has had more than reasonable
time to pay full compensation.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to ORDER petitioner Municipality of Makati to

immediately pay Philippine Savings Bank, Inc. and private respondent the amount of
P4,953,506.45. Petitioner is hereby required to submit to this Court a report of its compliance
with the foregoing order without non-extendible period of SIXTY (60) DAYS from the date of
receipt of this resolution.
The order of respondent RTC judge dated December 21, 1988, which was rendered in Civil
Case No. 13699, is SET ASIDE and the temporary restraining order issued by the Court on
November 20, 1989 is MADE PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, and Bidin, JJ., concur.
455 Phil. 956
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 146382, August 07, 2003
SYSTEMS PLUS COMPUTER COLLEGE OF CALOOCAN CITY, PETITIONER, VS. LOCAL

GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN CITY, MAMERTO MANAHAN, ATTY. NESTOR D.
FRANCISCO, AS CITY ASSESSOR AND CITY LEGAL OFFICER OF CALOOCAN CITY,
AND ADORACION ANGELES, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
CALOOCAN CITY, BRANCH 121. RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
The instant petition for certiorari assails the Resolution[1] of the respondent Regional Trial Court
of Caloocan City, Branch 121, dated December 29, 1999, dismissing the petition for mandamus
in Civil Case No. C-595, and the Order dated February 23, 2000 denying the subsequent motion
for reconsideration.
Petitioner Systems Plus Computer College is a non-stock and non-profit educational institution
organized and established in 1997 with business address at 141-143 10th Avenue, Caloocan City.
As such, it enjoys property tax exemption from the local government on its buildings but not on
the parcels of land which petitioner is renting for P5,000 monthly from its sister companies,
Consolidated Assembly, Inc. (Consolidated Assembly) and Pair Management and Development
Corporation (Pair Management).
On January 8, 1998, petitioner requested respondent city government of Caloocan, through

respondent Mamerto Manahan, City Assessor and Administrator, to extend tax exemption to the
parcels of land claiming that the same were being used actually, directly and exclusively for
educational purposes pursuant to Article VI, Section 28(3) of the 1987 Constitution[2] and other
applicable provisions of the Local Government Code.
On February 5, 1998, respondent city government, on recommendation of respondent Atty.

Nestor Francisco, City Legal Officer, denied the request on the ground that the subject parcels of
land were owned by Consolidated Assembly and Pair Management which derived income
therefrom in the form of rentals and other local taxes assumed by the petitioner. Hence, from the
land owners' standpoint, the same were not actually, directly and exclusively used for
educational purposes.[3]
On February 15, 1999, the petitioner, on the one hand, and the Consolidated Assembly and Pair
Management, on the other, entered into separate agreements [4] which in effect novated their
existing contracts of lease on the subject parcels of land and converted them to donations of the
beneficial use thereof.
On February 19, 1999, the petitioner wrote respondent City Assessor informing the latter of the
new agreements and seeking a reconsideration of respondent's earlier denial of the application
for tax exemption.[5] In this connection, a duly notarized certification[6] jointly issued by
Consolidated Assembly and Pair Management to the effect that they no longer received income
by way of rentals from the subject properties, accompanied by the corresponding board
resolutions,[7] were submitted by the petitioner. Nevertheless, on July 21, 1999, respondent city
government again denied the application for tax exemption, reasoning out as follows:
Firstly, it may be reasonably implied from the above facts that SYSTEMS COMPUTER
COLLEGE is an agency for its sister corporations, particularly, PAIR MANAGEMENT &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and CONSOLIDATED ASSEMBLY, INC. to evade
payment of Real Property Taxes.
It bears stress (sic) that immediately after the denial by this Office of the first request of
SYSTEMS PLUS COMPUTER COLLEGE for Real Property Tax Exemption of the properties
then leased to it by its sister companies; PAIR MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION and CONSOLIDATED ASSEMBLY, INC., the latter corporations donated the
beneficial use of the subject properties to SYSTEMS PLUS COMPUTER COLLEGE, if only to
evade payment of Real Property Taxes.
The revenue officers, in proper cases, may disregard the separate corporate entity where it serves
as a shield for tax evasion. xxx.
Secondly, the grant of exemption from taxation rests upon the theory that an exemption will
benefit the body of people, and not upon any idea of lessening the burden of individual or
corporate owners.
Thirdly, while the beneficial use of the properties being sought to be exempt from Real Property
Taxes were donated to SYSTEMS PLUS COMPUTER COLLEGE, there is no showing that the
same are "actually, directly and exclusively" used either for religious, charitable, or educational
purposes.[8]
Twice debunked, petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with the respondent Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City, Branch 121, which, however, dismissed it for being premature. Its
timely motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the instant petition for
certiorari[9] imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court when it ruled: (1) that
mandamus does not lie against the public respondents and (2) that petitioner failed to exhaust
available administrative remedies.
Mandamus is defined as a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do the act
required to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office or which such other is entitled, there
being no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[10] Where
administrative remedies are available, a petition for mandamus does not lie.[11]
Under Section 226 of RA 7160,[12] the remedy of appeal to the Local Board of Assessment
Appeals is available from an adverse ruling or action of the provincial, city or municipal assessor
in the assessment of property, thus:
Section 226. Local Board of Assessment Appeals. -Any owner or person having legal interest in
the property who is not satisfied with the action of the provincial, city or municipal assessor in
the assessment of his property may, within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the written
notice of assessment, appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals of the province or city by filing
a petition under oath in the form prescribed for the purpose, together with copies of the tax
declarations and such affidavits or documents submitted in support of the appeal.
However, petitioner argues that it is not contesting any assessment made by respondent City
Assessor. Petitioner's argument obviously proceeds from its misunderstanding of the term
"assessment." Under Section 199(f), Title II, Book II, of the Local Government Code of 1991,
"assessment" is defined as the act or process of determining the value of a property, or proportion
thereof subject to tax, including the discovery, listing, classification and appraisal of properties.
Viewed from this broader perspective, the determination made by the respondent City Assessor
with regard to the taxability of the subject real properties squarely falls within its power to assess
properties for taxation purposes subject to appeal before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals.
Petitioner also argues that it is seeking to enforce, through the petition for mandamus, a clear
legal right under the Constitution and the pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code
granting tax exemption on properties actually, directly and exclusively used for educational
purposes. But petitioner is taking an unwarranted shortcut. The argument gratuitously presumes
the existence of the fact which it must first prove by competent and sufficient evidence before
the City Assessor. It must be stressed that the authority to receive evidence, as basis for
classification of properties for taxation, is legally vested on the respondent City Assessor whose
action is appealable to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals and the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals, if necessary.
The petitioner cannot bypass the authority of the concerned administrative agencies and directly
seek redress from the courts even on the pretext of raising a supposedly pure question of law
without violating the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Hence, when the law
provides for remedies against the action of an administrative board, body, or officer, as in the
case at bar, relief to the courts can be made only after exhausting all remedies provided
therein.[13] Otherwise stated, before seeking the intervention of the courts, it is a precondition that
petitioner should first avail of all the means afforded by the administrative processes.[14]
Besides, mandamus does not lie against the respondent City Assessor in the exercise of his
function of assessing properties for taxation purposes. While its duty to conduct assessments is a
ministerial function, the actual exercise thereof is necessarily discretionary. Well-settled is the
rule that mandamus may not be availed of to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a
particular way, or to retract or reverse an action already taken in the exercise of either.[15]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
[1]
Penned by Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, Rollo, pp. 52-54.
[2]
Article VI, Section 28(3) of the 1987 Constitution reads:
"Charitable institution, churches, parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques and non-
profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvement actually, directly and exclusively
used for religious, charitable or educational purposes, shall be exempt from taxation."
[3]
Petition, Annex "E," Rollo, pp. 32-36.
[4]
Petition, Annexes "F" and "G," Rollo, pp. 37-40.
[5]
Petition, Annex "H," Rollo, p. 41.
[6]
Petition, Annex "L," Rollo, p. 46.
[7]
Petition, Annexes "J" and "K," Rollo, pp. 43-45.
[8]
Petition, Annex "N," Rollo, pp. 48-51.
[9]
Rollo, pp. 3-15.
[10]
Rule 65, Section 3, Revised Rules of Court.
[11]
Militante vs. Court of Appeals, 330 SCRA 318, 330-331 [2000] citing Perez vs. City Mayor
of Cabanatuan, 3 SCRA 431, 434 [1961]; Booc vs. Osrneña, Jr., 2 SCRA 418, 422 [1961].
[12]
Local Government Code of 1991.
[13]
Lopez vs. City of Manila, 303 SCRA 448, 458 [1999].
[14]
Zabat vs. Court of Appeals, 338 SCRA 551, 560 [2000].
[15]
JG Summit Holdings, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 345 SCRA 143, 152-153 [2000].
658 Phil. 223
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 171947-48, February 15, 2011
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF

ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
CULTURE AND SPORTS,[1] DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE MARITIME GROUP, AND DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, PETITIONERS, VS. CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY,
REPRESENTED AND JOINED BY DIVINA V. ILAS, SABINIANO ALBARRACIN, MANUEL
SANTOS, JR., DINAH DELA PEÑA, PAUL DENNIS QUINTERO, MA. VICTORIA LLENOS,
DONNA CALOZA, FATIMA QUITAIN, VENICE SEGARRA, FRITZIE TANGKIA, SARAH
JOELLE LINTAG, HANNIBAL AUGUSTUS BOBIS, FELIMON SANTIAGUEL, AND JAIME
AGUSTIN R. OPOSA, RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION
VELASCO JR., J.:
On December 18, 2008, this Court rendered a Decision in G.R. Nos. 171947-48 ordering
petitioners to clean up, rehabilitate and preserve Manila Bay in their different capacities. The
fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 28, 2005 Decision of the CA in CA-
G.R. CV No. 76528 and SP No. 74944 and the September 13, 2002 Decision of the RTC in Civil
Case No. 1851-99 are AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATIONS in view of subsequent
developments or supervening events in the case. The fallo of the RTC Decision shall now read:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed defendant-government

agencies to clean up, rehabilitate, and preserve Manila Bay, and restore and maintain its waters
to SB level (Class B sea waters per Water Classification Tables under DENR Administrative
Order No. 34 [1990]) to make them fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact
recreation.
In particular:
(1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the primary agency responsible for the
conservation, management, development, and proper use of the country's environment and
natural resources, and Sec. 19 of RA 9275, designating the DENR as the primary government
agency responsible for its enforcement and implementation, the DENR is directed to fully
implement its Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy for the rehabilitation,
restoration, and conservation of the Manila Bay at the earliest possible time. It is ordered to call
regular coordination meetings with concerned government departments and agencies to ensure
the successful implementation of the aforesaid plan of action in accordance with its indicated
completion schedules.
(2) Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the Administrative Code of 1987 and Sec. 25 of
the Local Government Code of 1991, the DILG, in exercising the President's power of general
supervision and its duty to promulgate guidelines in establishing waste management programs
under Sec. 43 of the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), shall direct all LGUs in Metro
Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to inspect all factories,
commercial establishments, and private homes along the banks of the major river systems in
their respective areas of jurisdiction, such as but not limited to the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan
Rivers, the NCR (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-
Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan)
River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and waterways that
eventually discharge water into the Manila Bay; and the lands abutting the bay, to determine
whether they have wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic septic tanks as prescribed by
existing laws, ordinances, and rules and regulations. If none be found, these LGUs shall be
ordered to require non-complying establishments and homes to set up said facilities or septic
tanks within a reasonable time to prevent industrial wastes, sewage water, and human wastes
from flowing into these rivers, waterways, esteros, and the Manila Bay, under pain of closure or
imposition of fines and other sanctions.
(3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275, the MWSS is directed to provide, install, operate, and
maintain the necessary adequate waste water treatment facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal, and
Cavite where needed at the earliest possible time.
(4) Pursuant to RA 9275, the LWUA, through the local water districts and in coordination with
the DENR, is ordered to provide, install, operate, and maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities
and the efficient and safe collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage in the provinces of
Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan where needed at the earliest possible time.
(5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550, the DA, through the BFAR, is ordered to improve and
restore the marine life of the Manila Bay. It is also directed to assist the LGUs in Metro Manila,
Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan in developing, using recognized
methods, the fisheries and aquatic resources in the Manila Bay.
(6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP Maritime Group, in accordance
with Sec. 124 of RA 8550, in coordination with each other, shall apprehend violators of PD 979,
RA 8550, and other existing laws and regulations designed to prevent marine pollution in the
Manila Bay.
(7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 513 and the International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships, the PPA is ordered to immediately adopt such measures to prevent the
discharge and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into the
Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators.
(8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs and projects for flood control
projects and drainage services in Metro Manila, in coordination with the DPWH, DILG, affected
LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council
(HUDCC), and other agencies, shall dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and
other encroachments established or built in violation of RA 7279, and other applicable laws
along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the
Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways and esteros in Metro
Manila. The DPWH, as the principal implementor of programs and projects for flood control
services in the rest of the country more particularly in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and
Laguna, in coordination with the DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, HUDCC, and
other concerned government agencies, shall remove and demolish all structures, constructions,
and other encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other applicable laws along the
Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite)
River, the Laguna De Bay, and other rivers, connecting waterways, and esteros that discharge
wastewater into the Manila Bay.
In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and maintain a sanitary landfill, as
prescribed by RA 9003, within a period of one (1) year from finality of this Decision. On
matters within its territorial jurisdiction and in connection with the discharge of its duties on the
maintenance of sanitary landfills and like undertakings, it is also ordered to cause the
apprehension and filing of the appropriate criminal cases against violators of the respective penal
provisions of RA 9003, Sec. 27 of RA 9275 (the Clean Water Act), and other existing laws on
pollution.
(9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8 of RA 9275, within one (1)
year from finality of this Decision, determine if all licensed septic and sludge companies have
the proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic
tanks. The DOH shall give the companies, if found to be non-complying, a reasonable time
within which to set up the necessary facilities under pain of cancellation of its environmental
sanitation clearance.
(10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152, Sec. 118 of RA 8550, and Sec. 56 of RA 9003, the DepEd
shall integrate lessons on pollution prevention, waste management, environmental protection,
and like subjects in the school curricula of all levels to inculcate in the minds and hearts of
students and, through them, their parents and friends, the importance of their duty toward
achieving and maintaining a balanced and healthful ecosystem in the Manila Bay and the entire
Philippine archipelago.
(11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in the General Appropriations
Act of 2010 and succeeding years to cover the expenses relating to the cleanup, restoration, and
preservation of the water quality of the Manila Bay, in line with the country's development
objective to attain economic growth in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and
revival of our marine waters.
(12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA, DPWH, DBM, PCG,
PNP Maritime Group, DILG, and also of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, in line with the principle of
"continuing mandamus," shall, from finality of this Decision, each submit to the Court a
quarterly progressive report of the activities undertaken in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
The government agencies did not file any motion for reconsideration and the Decision became
final in January 2009.
The case is now in the execution phase of the final and executory December 18, 2008
Decision. The Manila Bay Advisory Committee was created to receive and evaluate the
quarterly progressive reports on the activities undertaken by the agencies in accordance with said
decision and to monitor the execution phase.
In the absence of specific completion periods, the Committee recommended that time frames be
set for the agencies to perform their assigned tasks. This may be viewed as an encroachment
over the powers and functions of the Executive Branch headed by the President of the
Philippines.
This view is misplaced.
The issuance of subsequent resolutions by the Court is simply an exercise of judicial power
under Art. VIII of the Constitution, because the execution of the Decision is but an integral part
of the adjudicative function of the Court. None of the agencies ever questioned the power of the
Court to implement the December 18, 2008 Decision nor has any of them raised the alleged
encroachment by the Court over executive functions.
While additional activities are required of the agencies like submission of plans of action, data or
status reports, these directives are but part and parcel of the execution stage of a final decision
under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Section 47 of Rule 39 reads:
Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders.--The effect of a judgment or final order rendered
by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may
be as follows:
xxxx
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties of their successors in interest, that only is
deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its
face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear that the final judgment includes not only what appears upon its face to have been so
adjudged but also those matters "actually and necessarily included therein or necessary
thereto." Certainly, any activity that is needed to fully implement a final judgment is necessarily
encompassed by said judgment.
Moreover, the submission of periodic reports is sanctioned by Secs. 7 and 8, Rule 8 of the Rules
of Procedure for Environmental cases:
Sec. 7. Judgment.--If warranted, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ of continuing
mandamus requiring respondent to perform an act or series of acts until the judgment is fully
satisfied and to grant such other reliefs as may be warranted resulting from the wrongful or
illegal acts of the respondent. The court shall require the respondent to submit periodic
reports detailing the progress and execution of the judgment, and the court may, by itself
or through a commissioner or the appropriate government agency, evaluate and monitor
compliance. The petitioner may submit its comments or observations on the execution of the
judgment.
Sec. 8. Return of the writ.--The periodic reports submitted by the respondent detailing
compliance with the judgment shall be contained in partial returns of the writ. Upon full
satisfaction of the judgment, a final return of the writ shall be made to the court by the
respondent. If the court finds that the judgment has been fully implemented, the satisfaction of
judgment shall be entered in the court docket. (Emphasis supplied.)
With the final and executory judgment in MMDA, the writ of continuing mandamus issued in
MMDA means that until petitioner-agencies have shown full compliance with the Court's orders,
the Court exercises continuing jurisdiction over them until full execution of the judgment.
There being no encroachment over executive functions to speak of, We shall now proceed to the
recommendation of the Manila Bay Advisory Committee.
Several problems were encountered by the Manila Bay Advisory Committee.[2] An evaluation of
the quarterly progressive reports has shown that (1) there are voluminous quarterly progressive
reports that are being submitted; (2) petitioner-agencies do not have a uniform manner of
reporting their cleanup, rehabilitation and preservation activities; (3) as yet no definite deadlines
have been set by petitioner DENR as to petitioner-agencies' timeframe for their respective duties;
(4) as of June 2010 there has been a change in leadership in both the national and local levels;
and (5) some agencies have encountered difficulties in complying with the Court's directives.
In order to implement the afore-quoted Decision, certain directives have to be issued by the
Court to address the said concerns.
Acting on the recommendation of the Manila Bay Advisory Committee, the Court hereby
resolves to ORDER the following:
(1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), as lead agency in the
Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004, shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the
updated Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy.
The DENR is ordered to submit summarized data on the overall quality of Manila Bay waters for
all four quarters of 2010 on or before June 30, 2011.
The DENR is further ordered to submit the names and addresses of persons and companies in
Metro Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan that generate toxic and
hazardous waste on or before September 30, 2011.
(2) On or before June 30, 2011, the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG)
shall order the Mayors of all cities in Metro Manila; the Governors of Rizal, Laguna, Cavite,
Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan; and the Mayors of all the cities and towns in said provinces to
inspect all factories, commercial establishments and private homes along the banks of the major
river systems--such as but not limited to the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the National
Capital Region (Paranaque-Zapote, Las Pinas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros
Rivers, the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus
(Cavite) River, and the Laguna De Bay--and other minor rivers and waterways within their
jurisdiction that eventually discharge water into the Manila Bay and the lands abutting it, to
determine if they have wastewater treatment facilities and/or hygienic septic tanks, as prescribed
by existing laws, ordinances, rules and regulations. Said local government unit (LGU) officials
are given up to September 30, 2011 to finish the inspection of said establishments and houses.
In case of non-compliance, the LGU officials shall take appropriate action to ensure compliance
by non-complying factories, commercial establishments and private homes with said law, rules
and regulations requiring the construction or installment of wastewater treatment facilities or
hygienic septic tanks.
The aforementioned governors and mayors shall submit to the DILG on or before December 31,
2011 their respective compliance reports which will contain the names and addresses or offices
of the owners of all the non-complying factories, commercial establishments and private homes,
copy furnished the concerned environmental agency, be it the local DENR office or the Laguna
Lake Development Authority.
The DILG is required to submit a five-year plan of action that will contain measures intended to
ensure compliance of all non-complying factories, commercial establishments, and private
homes.
On or before June 30, 2011, the DILG and the mayors of all cities in Metro Manila shall consider
providing land for the wastewater facilities of the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage
System (MWSS) or its concessionaires (Maynilad and Manila Water, Inc.) within their
respective jurisdictions.
(3) The MWSS shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the list of areas in Metro
Manila, Rizal and Cavite that do not have the necessary wastewater treatment facilities. Within
the same period, the concessionaires of the MWSS shall submit their plans and projects for the
construction of wastewater treatment facilities in all the aforesaid areas and the completion
period for said facilities, which shall not go beyond 2037.
On or before June 30, 2011, the MWSS is further required to have its two concessionaires submit
a report on the amount collected as sewerage fees in their respective areas of operation as of
December 31, 2010.
(4) The Local Water Utilities Administration is ordered to submit on or before September 30,
2011 its plan to provide, install, operate and maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities in said
cities and towns and the completion period for said works, which shall be fully implemented by
December 31, 2020.
(5) The Department of Agriculture (DA), through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources, shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 a report on areas in Manila Bay
where marine life has to be restored or improved and the assistance it has extended to the LGUs
in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan in developing the
fisheries and aquatic resources in Manila Bay. The report shall contain monitoring data on the
marine life in said areas. Within the same period, it shall submit its five-year plan to restore and
improve the marine life in Manila Bay, its future activities to assist the aforementioned LGUs for
that purpose, and the completion period for said undertakings.
The DA shall submit to the Court on or before September 30, 2011 the baseline data as of
September 30, 2010 on the pollution loading into the Manila Bay system from agricultural and
livestock sources.
(6) The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) shall incorporate in its quarterly reports the list of
violators it has apprehended and the status of their cases. The PPA is further ordered to include
in its report the names, make and capacity of the ships that dock in PPA ports. The PPA shall
submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the measures it intends to undertake to implement
its compliance with paragraph 7 of the dispositive portion of the MMDA Decision and the
completion dates of such measures.
The PPA should include in its report the activities of its concessionaire that collects and disposes
of the solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes, which shall state the names, make
and capacity of the ships serviced by it since August 2003 up to the present date, the dates the
ships docked at PPA ports, the number of days the ship was at sea with the corresponding
number of passengers and crew per trip, the volume of solid, liquid and other wastes collected
from said ships, the treatment undertaken and the disposal site for said wastes.
(7) The Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group shall submit on or before June 30,
2011 its five-year plan of action on the measures and activities it intends to undertake to
apprehend the violators of Republic Act No. (RA) 8550 or the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998
and other pertinent laws, ordinances and regulations to prevent marine pollution in Manila Bay
and to ensure the successful prosecution of violators.
The Philippine Coast Guard shall likewise submit on or before June 30, 2011 its five-year plan of
action on the measures and activities they intend to undertake to apprehend the violators of
Presidential Decree No. 979 or the Marine Pollution Decree of 1976 and RA 9993 or the
Philippine Coast Guard Law of 2009 and other pertinent laws and regulations to prevent marine
pollution in Manila Bay and to ensure the successful prosecution of violators.
(8) The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) shall submit to the Court on or
before June 30, 2011 the names and addresses of the informal settlers in Metro Manila who, as of
December 31, 2010, own and occupy houses, structures, constructions and other encroachments
established or built along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Parañaque-Zapote, Las
Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways and
esteros, in violation of RA 7279 and other applicable laws. On or before June 30, 2011, the
MMDA shall submit its plan for the removal of said informal settlers and the demolition of the
aforesaid houses, structures, constructions and encroachments, as well as the completion dates
for said activities, which shall be fully implemented not later than December 31, 2015.
The MMDA is ordered to submit a status report, within thirty (30) days from receipt of this
Resolution, on the establishment of a sanitary landfill facility for Metro Manila in compliance
with the standards under RA 9003 or the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act.
On or before June 30, 2011, the MMDA shall submit a report of the location of open and
controlled dumps in Metro Manila whose operations are illegal after February 21, 2006,[3]
pursuant to Secs. 36 and 37 of RA 9003, and its plan for the closure of these open and controlled
dumps to be accomplished not later than December 31, 2012. Also, on or before June 30, 2011,
the DENR Secretary, as Chairperson of the National Solid Waste Management Commission
(NSWMC), shall submit a report on the location of all open and controlled dumps in Rizal,
Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan.
On or before June 30, 2011, the DENR Secretary, in his capacity as NSWMC Chairperson, shall
submit a report on whether or not the following landfills strictly comply with Secs. 41 and 42 of
RA 9003 on the establishment and operation of sanitary landfills, to wit:
National Capital Region
1. Navotas SLF (PhilEco), Brgy. Tanza (New Site), Navotas City

2. Payatas Controlled Dumpsite, Barangay Payatas, Quezon City
Region III
3. Sitio Coral, Brgy. Matictic, Norzagaray, Bulacan

4. Sitio Tiakad, Brgy. San Mateo, Norzagaray, Bulacan
5. Brgy. Minuyan, San Jose del Monte City, Bulacan
6. Brgy. Mapalad, Santa Rosa, Nueva Ecija
7. Sub-zone Kalangitan, Clark Capas, Tarlac Special Economic Zone
Region IV-A
8. Kalayaan (Longos), Laguna

9. Brgy. Sto. Nino, San Pablo City, Laguna
10. Brgy. San Antonio (Pilotage SLF), San Pedro, Laguna
11. Morong, Rizal
12. Sitio Lukutan, Brgy. San Isidro, Rodriguez (Montalban), Rizal (ISWIMS)
13. Brgy. Pintong Bukawe, San Mateo, Rizal (SMSLFDC)
On or before June 30, 2011, the MMDA and the seventeen (17) LGUs in Metro Manila are
ordered to jointly submit a report on the average amount of garbage collected monthly per
district in all the cities in Metro Manila from January 2009 up to December 31, 2010 vis-à-vis
the average amount of garbage disposed monthly in landfills and dumpsites. In its quarterly
report for the last quarter of 2010 and thereafter, MMDA shall report on the apprehensions for
violations of the penal provisions of RA 9003, RA 9275 and other laws on pollution for the said
period.
On or before June 30, 2011, the DPWH and the LGUs in Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan,
Pampanga, and Bataan shall submit the names and addresses of the informal settlers in their
respective areas who, as of September 30, 2010, own or occupy houses, structures, constructions,
and other encroachments built along the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the
Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna de Bay, and other rivers, connecting
waterways and esteros that discharge wastewater into the Manila Bay, in breach of RA 7279 and
other applicable laws. On or before June 30, 2011, the DPWH and the aforesaid LGUs shall
jointly submit their plan for the removal of said informal settlers and the demolition of the
aforesaid structures, constructions and encroachments, as well as the completion dates for such
activities which shall be implemented not later than December 31, 2012.
(9) The Department of Health (DOH) shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the
names and addresses of the owners of septic and sludge companies including those that do not
have the proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from
septic tanks.
The DOH shall implement rules and regulations on Environmental Sanitation Clearances and
shall require companies to procure a license to operate from the DOH.
The DOH and DENR-Environmental Management Bureau shall develop a toxic and hazardous
waste management system by June 30, 2011 which will implement segregation of
hospital/toxic/hazardous wastes and prevent mixing with municipal solid waste.
On or before June 30, 2011, the DOH shall submit a plan of action to ensure that the said
companies have proper disposal facilities and the completion dates of compliance.
(10) The Department of Education (DepEd) shall submit to the Court on or before May 31, 2011
a report on the specific subjects on pollution prevention, waste management, environmental
protection, environmental laws and the like that it has integrated into the school curricula in all
levels for the school year 2011-2012.
On or before June 30, 2011, the DepEd shall also submit its plan of action to ensure compliance
of all the schools under its supervision with respect to the integration of the aforementioned
subjects in the school curricula which shall be fully implemented by June 30, 2012.
(11) All the agencies are required to submit their quarterly reports electronically using the forms
below. The agencies may add other key performance indicators that they have identified.
SO ORDERED.
Corona, C.J., Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama,
Jr., Perez, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., see dissenting opinion.
Carpio Morales and Brion, JJ. I join the dissent of J. Carpio.
Sereno, J., see dissenting opinion.
[1]
Now the Department of Education (DepEd).
[2]
On February 10, 2009, the Court En Banc approved a resolution creating an Advisory
Committee "that will verify the reports of the government agencies tasked to clean up the Manila
Bay." It is composed of two members of the Court and three technical experts:
Hon. Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.

Chairperson and ponente of MMDA vs. Concerned Residents of Manila
Hon. Jose Midas P. Marquez
Court Administrator
Vice-Chairperson
Members/Technical Experts:
Dr. Gil S. Jacinto

Former Director, UP Marine Science Institute
Dr. Elisea G. Gozun

Chair of Earth Day Network and Former DENR Secretary
Dr. Antonio G.M. La Viña

Former DENR Undersecretary
Dean of the Ateneo School of Government
[3]
Our Decision in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of
Manila Bay, G.R. Nos. 171947-48, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 661, 690, states: "RA 9003
took effect on February 15, 2001 and the adverted grace period of five (5) years [in Sec. 37
of RA 9003] which ended on February 21, 2006 has come and gone, but no single sanitary
landfill which strictly complies with the prescribed standards under RA 9003 has yet been set
up." (Emphasis supplied.)
DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
The Resolution contains the proposed directives of the Manila Bay Advisory Committee to the
concerned agencies[1] and local government units (LGUs) for the implementation of the 18
December 2008 Decision of the Court in this case.
Among the directives stated in the Resolution is for the affected agencies to submit to the Court
their plans of action and status reports, thus:
The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), as lead agency in the
Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004, shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the
updated Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy (OPMBCS);[2]
The DILG is required to submit a five-year plan of action that will contain measures
intended to ensure compliance of all non-complying factories, commercial establishments,
and private homes;[3]
The MWSS shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the list of areas in Metro
Manila, Rizal and Cavite that do not have the necessary wastewater treatment facilities. Within
the same period, the concessionaires of the MWSS shall submit their plans and projects for
the construction of wastewater treatment facilities in all the aforesaid areas and the
completion period for said facilities, which shall not go beyond 2020;[4]
The Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) shall submit to the Court on or before June
30, 2011 the list of cities and towns in Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan that do
not have sewerage and sanitation facilities. LWUA is further ordered to submit on or before
September 30, 2011 its plan to provide, install, operate and maintain sewerage and
sanitation facilities in said cities and towns and the completion period for said works which
shall be fully implemented by December 31, 2020;[5]
The Department of Agriculture (DA), through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
(BFAR), shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 a report on areas in Manila Bay
where marine life has to be restored or improved and the assistance it has extended to the LGUs
in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan in developing the
fisheries and aquatic resources in Manila Bay. The report shall contain monitoring data on the
marine life in said areas. Within the same period, it shall submit its five-year plan to restore
and improve the marine life in Manila Bay, its future activities to assist the aforementioned
LGUs for that purpose, and the completion period for said undertakings;[6]
The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) shall incorporate in its quarterly reports the list of violators
it has apprehended and the status of their cases. The PPA is further ordered to include in its
report the names, make and capacity of the ships that dock in PPA ports. The PPA shall submit
to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the measures it intends to undertake to implement
its compliance with paragraph 7 of the dispositive portion of the MMDA Decision and the
completion dates of such measures;[7]
The Philippine National Police (PNP) - Maritime Group shall submit on or before June 30,
2011 its five-year plan of action on the measures and activities they intend to undertake to
apprehend the violators of RA 8550 or the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998 and other
pertinent laws, ordinances and regulations to prevent marine pollution in Manila Bay and to
ensure the successful prosecution of violators;[8]
The Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) shall likewise submit on or before June 30, 2011 its five-
year plan of action on the measures and activities they intend to undertake to apprehend
the violators of Presidential Decree (PD) 979 or the Marine Pollution Decree of 1976 and RA
9993 or the Philippine Coast Guard Law of 2009 and other pertinent laws and regulations to
prevent marine pollution in Manila Bay and to ensure the successful prosecution of violators;[9]
The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) shall submit to the Court on or
before June 30, 2011 the names and addresses of the informal settlers in Metro Manila who
own and occupy houses, structures, constructions and other encroachments established or
built in violation of RA 7279 and other applicable laws along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan
Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways and esteros as of December 31, 2010. On or before
the same date, the MMDA shall submit its plan for the removal of said informal settlers and
the demolition of the aforesaid houses, structures, constructions and encroachments, as
well as the completion dates for said activities which shall be fully implemented not later
than December 31, 2015;[10]
[T]he DPWH and the aforesaid LGUs shall jointly submit its plan for the removal of said
informal settlers and the demolition of the aforesaid structures, constructions and
encroachments, as well as the completion dates for such activities which shall be
implemented not later than December 31, 2012;[11]
[T]he DOH shall submit a plan of action to ensure that the said companies have proper
disposal facilities and the completion dates of compliance;[12]
On or before June 30, 2011, the DepEd shall also submit its plan of action to ensure
compliance of all the schools under its supervision with respect to the integration of the
aforementioned subjects in the school curricula which shall be fully implemented by June
30, 2012;[13] (Emphasis supplied)
What is the purpose of requiring these agencies to submit to the Court their plans of action and
status reports? Are these plans to be approved or disapproved by the Court? The Court does not
have the competence or even the jurisdiction to evaluate these plans which involves technical
matters[14] best left to the expertise of the concerned agencies.
The Resolution also requires that the concerned agencies shall "submit [to the Court] their
quarterly reports electronically x x x."[15] Thus, the directive for the concerned agencies to
submit to the Court their quarterly reports is a continuing obligation which extends even beyond
the year 2011.[16]
The Court is now arrogating unto itself two constitutional powers exclusively vested in the
President. First, the Constitution provides that "executive power shall be vested in the
President."[17] This means that neither the Judiciary nor the Legislature can exercise executive
power for executive power is the exclusive domain of the President. Second, the Constitution
provides that the President shall "have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices."[18] Neither the Judiciary nor the Legislature can exercise control or even supervision
over executive departments, bureaus, and offices.
Clearly, the Resolution constitutes an intrusion of the Judiciary into the exclusive domain of the
Executive. In the guise of implementing the 18 December 2008 Decision through the Resolution,
the Court is in effect supervising and directing the different government agencies and LGUs
concerned.
In Noblejas v. Teehankee,[19] it was held that the Court cannot be required to exercise
administrative functions such as supervision over executive officials. The issue in that case was
whether the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by the Supreme Court,
in view of the conferment upon him by law (Republic Act No. 1151) of the rank and privileges
of a Judge of the Court of First Instance. The Court, answering in the negative, stated:
To adopt petitioner's theory, therefore, would mean placing upon the Supreme Court the duty of
investigating and disciplining all these officials whose functions are plainly executive and the
consequent curtailment by mere implication from the Legislative grant, of the President's power
to discipline and remove administrative officials who are presidential appointees, and which the
Constitution expressly place under the President's supervision and control.
xxx
But the more fundamental objection to the stand of petitioner Noblejas is that, if the Legislature
had really intended to include in the general grant of "privileges" or "rank and privileges of
Judges of the Court of First Instance" the right to be investigated by the Supreme Court, and to
be suspended or removed only upon recommendation of that Court, then such grant of privilege
would be unconstitutional, since it would violate the fundamental doctrine of separation of
powers, by charging this court with the administrative function of supervisory control over
executive officials, and simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief Executive
over such officials.[20] (Boldfacing supplied)
Likewise, in this case, the directives in the Resolution are administrative in nature and
circumvent the constitutional provision which prohibits Supreme Court members from
performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions. Section 12, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution provides:
SEC. 12. The members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be
designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
Thus, in the case of In Re: Designation of Judge Manzano as Member of the Ilocos Norte
Provincial Committee on Justice,[21] the Court invalidated the designation of a judge as member
of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, which was tasked to receive complaints and
to make recommendations for the speedy disposition of cases of detainees. The Court held that
the committee performs administrative functions[22] which are prohibited under Section 12,
Article VIII of the Constitution.
As early as the 1932 case of Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Co.,[23] this Court has
already emphasized that the Supreme Court should only exercise judicial power and should not
assume any duty which does not pertain to the administering of judicial functions. In that case, a
petition was filed requesting the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators,
to fix the terms and the compensation to be paid to Manila Electric Company for the use of right
of way. The Court held that it would be improper and illegal for the members of the Supreme
Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, whose decision of a majority shall be final, to act on the
petition of Manila Electric Company. The Court explained:
We run counter to this dilemma. Either the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of
arbitrators, exercise judicial functions, or as members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of
arbitrators, exercise administrative or quasi judicial functions. The first case would appear not to
fall within the jurisdiction granted the Supreme Court. Even conceding that it does, it would
presuppose the right to bring the matter in dispute before the courts, for any other construction
would tend to oust the courts of jurisdiction and render the award a nullity. But if this be the
proper construction, we would then have the anomaly of a decision by the members of the
Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, taken therefrom to the courts and eventually
coming before the Supreme Court, where the Supreme Court would review the decision of its
members acting as arbitrators. Or in the second case, if the functions performed by the members
of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, be considered as administrative or quasi
judicial in nature, that would result in the performance of duties which the members of the
Supreme Court could not lawfully take it upon themselves to perform. The present petition also
furnishes an apt illustration of another anomaly, for we find the Supreme Court as a court asked
to determine if the members of the court may be constituted a board of arbitrators, which is not a
court at all.
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of power in our
government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by the Supreme
Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction
usurpations by any other department of the government, so should it as strictly confine its own
sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act.
The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or
to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering
of judicial functions.[24]
Furthermore, the Resolution orders some LGU officials to inspect the establishments and houses
along major river banks and to "take appropriate action to ensure compliance by non-
complying factories, commercial establishments and private homes with said law, rules and
regulations requiring the construction or installment of wastewater treatment facilities or
hygienic septic tanks."[25] The LGU officials are also directed to "submit to the DILG on or
before December 31, 2011 their respective compliance reports which shall contain the names and
addresses or offices of the owners of all the non-complying factories, commercial establishments
and private homes."[26] Furthermore, the Resolution mandates that on or before 30 June 2011, the
DILG and the mayors of all cities in Metro Manila should "consider providing land for the
wastewater facilities of the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) or its
concessionaires (Maynilad and Manila Water Inc.) within their respective jurisdictions."[27] The
Court is in effect ordering these LGU officials how to do their job and even gives a deadline
for their compliance. Again, this is a usurpation of the power of the President to supervise
LGUs under the Constitution and existing laws.
Section 4, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that: "The President of the Philippines
shall exercise general supervision over local governments x x x."[28] Under the Local
Government Code of 1991,[29] the President exercises general supervision over LGUs, thus:
SECTION 25. National Supervision over Local Government Units. â€’ (a) Consistent with the
basic policy on local autonomy, the President shall exercise general supervision over local
government units to ensure that their acts are within the scope of their prescribed powers
and functions.
The President shall exercise supervisory authority directly over provinces, highly urbanized
cities and independent component cities; through the province with respect to component cities
and municipalities; and through the city and municipality with respect to barangays. (Emphasis
supplied)
The Resolution constitutes judicial overreach by usurping and performing executive

functions. The Court must refrain from overstepping its boundaries by taking over the functions
of an equal branch of the government - the Executive. The Court should abstain from exercising
any function which is not strictly judicial in character and is not clearly conferred on it by the
Constitution.[30] Indeed, as stated by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Noblejas v. Teehankee,[31] "the
Supreme Court of the Philippines and its members should not and can not be required to exercise
any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the
administration of judicial functions."[32]
The directives in the Resolution constitute a judicial encroachment of an executive function

which clearly violates the system of separation of powers that inheres in our democratic
republican government. The principle of separation of powers between the Executive,
Legislative, and Judicial branches of government is part of the basic structure of the Philippine
Constitution. Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be vested
in the Congress of the Philippines;[33] (b) the executive power shall be vested in the President of
the Philippines;[34] and (c) the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established.[35]
Since the Supreme Court is only granted judicial power, it should not attempt to assume or be
compelled to perform non-judicial functions.[36] Judicial power is defined under Section 1,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution as that which "includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." The Resolution
contains directives which are outside the ambit of the Court's judicial functions.
The principle of separation of powers is explained by the Court in the leading case of Angara v.
Electoral Commission:[37]
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not
through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its
own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and
distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of
each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to
secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. x x x And the
judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other
department in its exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and
legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.[38]
Even the ponente is passionate about according respect to the system of separation of powers
between the three equal branches of the government. In his dissenting opinion in the 2008 case
of Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on
Ancestral Domain (GRP),[39] Justice Velasco emphatically stated:
Separation of Powers to be Guarded
Over and above the foregoing considerations, however, is the matter of separation of powers
which would likely be disturbed should the Court meander into alien territory of the executive
and dictate how the final shape of the peace agreement with the MILF should look like. The
system of separation of powers contemplates the division of the functions of government
into its three (3) branches: the legislative which is empowered to make laws; the executive
which is required to carry out the law; and the judiciary which is charged with interpreting
the law. Consequent to actual delineation of power, each branch of government is entitled
to be left alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit. Being one such branch, the judiciary, as
Justice Laurel asserted in Planas v. Gil, "will neither direct nor restrain executive [or
legislative action]." Expressed in another perspective, the system of separated powers is
designed to restrain one branch from inappropriate interference in the business, or
intruding upon the central prerogatives, of another branch; it is a blend of courtesy and
caution, "a self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one
branch at the expense of the other." x x x
Under our constitutional set up, there cannot be any serious dispute that the maintenance of the
peace, insuring domestic tranquility and the suppression of violence are the domain and
responsibility of the executive. Now then, if it be important to restrict the great departments
of government to the exercise of their appointed powers, it follows, as a logical corollary,
equally important, that one branch should be left completely independent of the others,
independent not in the sense that the three shall not cooperate in the common end of
carrying into effect the purposes of the constitution, but in the sense that the acts of each
shall never be controlled by or subjected to the influence of either of the branches.[40]
(Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, adherence to the principle of separation of powers which is enshrined in our Constitution
is essential to prevent tyranny by prohibiting the concentration of the sovereign powers of state
in one body.[41] Considering that executive power is exclusively vested in the President of the
Philippines, the Judiciary should neither undermine such exercise of executive power by the
President nor arrogate executive power unto itself. The Judiciary must confine itself to the
exercise of judicial functions and not encroach upon the functions of the other branches of the
government.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote against the approval of the Resolution.
[1]
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Department of Interior and
Local Government (DILG), ), Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), Local
Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), Department of Agriculture (DA), Philippine Ports
Authority (PPA), Philippine National Police (PNP), Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority (MMDA), Department of Health (DOH), Department of Education (DepEd), and
Department of Budget and Management (DBM).
[2]
Resolution, p. 4.
[3]
Resolution, p. 6.
[4]
Resolution, p. 6.
[5]
Resolution, p. 6-7.
[6]
Resolution, p. 7.
[7]
Resolution, p. 7.
[8]
Resolution, p. 8.
[9]
Resolution, p. 8.
[10]
Resolution, pp. 8.
[11]
Resolution, p. 10.
[12]
Resolution, p. 11.
[13]
Resolution, p. 11.
[14]
For instance, the Resolution orders the PPA to "include in its report the activities of the
concessionaire that collects and disposes of the solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated
wastes, which shall state the names, make and capacity of the ships serviced by it since August
2003 up to the present date, the dates the ships docked at PPA ports, the number of days the ship
was at sea with the corresponding number of passengers and crew per trip, the volume of solid,
liquid and ship-generated wastes collected from said ships, the treatment undertaken and the
disposal site for said wastes;" Resolution, pp. 7-8.
[15]
Resolution, p.11.
[16]
For example, the Resolution directs that "[i]n its quarterly report for the last quarter of
2010 and thereafter, MMDA shall report on the apprehensions for violations of the penal
provisions of RA 9003, RA 9275 and other laws on pollution for the said period; Resolution, p.
10. (Emphasis supplied.)
[17]
Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 1.
[18]
[19]
131 Phil. 931 (1968).
[20]
Id. at. 934-935.
[21]
248 Phil. 487 (1988).
[22]
Administrative functions are "those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct
and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to
better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative
agency by the organic law of its existence." Id. at 491.
[23]
57 Phil 600 (1932).
[24]
Id. at 604-605.
[25]
Resolution, p. 5.
[26]
Resolution, p. 6.
[27]
Resolution, p. 6.
[28]
Emphasis supplied.
[29]
Republic Act No. 7160.
[30]
Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Co., supra note 23.
[31]
Supra note 19.
[32]
Id. at 936, citing Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Co., 57 Phil. 600, 605 (1932).
[33]
Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 1.
[34]
[35]
Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 1.
[36]
J. Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary 828
(1996).
[37]
63 Phil. 139 (1936).
[38]
Id. at 156-157.
[39]
G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951 & 183962, 14 October 2008, 568 SCRA 402.
[40]
Dissenting Opinion, id. at 669-670. (Citations omitted)
[41]
S. Carlota, The Three Most Important Features of the Philippine Legal System that Others
Should Understand, in IALS Conference Learning from Each Other: Enriching the Law School
Curriculum in an Interrelated World 177 (visited 5 November 2010).
DISSENTING OPINION
SERENO, J.:
"The judicial whistle needs to be blown for a purpose and with caution. It needs to be
remembered that the Court cannot run the government. The Court has the duty of implementing
constitutional safeguards that protect individual rights but they cannot push back the limits of
the Constitution to accommodate the challenged violation."[1]
These are the words of Justice Anand of the Supreme Court of India, from which court the idea
of a continuing mandatory injunction for environmental cases was drawn by the Philippine
Supreme Court. These words express alarm that the Indian judiciary has already taken on the role
of running the government in environmental cases. A similar situation would result in the
Philippines were the majority Resolution to be adopted. Despite having the best of intentions to
ensure compliance by petitioners with their corresponding statutory mandates in an urgent
manner, this Court has unfortunately encroached upon prerogatives solely to be exercised by the
President and by Congress.
On 18 December 2008, the Court promulgated its decision in MMDA v. Concerned Residents of
Manila Bay, G.R. Nos. 171947-48, denying the petition of the government agencies, defendants
in Civil Case No. 1851-99. It held that the Court of Appeals, subject to some modifications, was
correct in affirming the 13 September 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case
No. 1851-99. It ordered "the abovenamed defendant-government agencies to clean up,
rehabilitate, and preserve Manila Bay, and restore and maintain its waters to SB level (Class B
sea waters per Water Classification Tables under DENR Administrative Order No. 34 [1990]) to
make them fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation."
The Court further issued each of the aforementioned agencies specific orders to comply with
their statutory mandate.[2] Pursuant to the judgment above, the Court established its own Manila
Bay Advisory Committee. Upon the recommendations of the said Committee, the present
Resolution was issued. It encompasses several of the specific instructions laid out by the court in
the original case, but also goes further by requiring reports and updates from the said government
agencies, and setting deadlines for the submission thereof.
I find these directives in the Majority Resolution patently irreconcilable with basic
constitutional doctrines and with the legislative mechanisms already in place, such as the
Administrative Code and the Local Government Code, which explicitly grant control and
supervision over these agencies to the President alone, and to no one else. For these reasons, I
respectfully dissent from the Majority Resolution.
In issuing these directives, the Court has

encroached upon the exclusive authority
of the Executive Department and violated
the doctrine of Separation of Powers
The Resolution assigned the Department of Natural Resources as the primary agency for
environment protection and required the implementation of its Operational Plan for the Manila
Bay Coastal Strategy. It ordered the DENR to submit the updated operational plan directly to the
Court; to summarize data on the quality of Manila Bay waters; and to "submit the names and
addresses of persons and companies...that generate toxic or hazardous waste on or before
September 30, 2011."
The Department of the Interior and Local Government is directed to "order the Mayors of all
cities in Metro Manila; the Governors of Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan;
and the Mayors of all the cities and towns in said provinces to inspect all factories, commercial
establishments and private homes along the banks of the major river systems..." to determine if
they have wastewater treatment facilities, on or before 30 June 2011. The LGUs are given a
deadline of 30 September 2011 to finish the inspection. In cooperation with the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH), these local governments are required to submit their plan
for the removal of informal settlers and encroachments which are in violation of Republic Act
No. 7279. The said demolition must take place not later than 31 December 2012.
The Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) is required to submit its plans for
the construction of wastewater treatment facilities in areas where needed, the completion period
for which shall not go beyond the year 2020. On or before 30 June 2011, the MWSS is further
required to have its two concessionaires submit a report on the amount collected as sewerage
fees. The Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) is ordered to submit on or before 30
September 2011 its plan to install and operate sewerage and sanitation facilities in the towns and
cities where needed, which must be fully implemented by 31 December 2020.
The Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of Aquatic Fisheries and Resources are ordered to
submit on or before 30 June 2011 a list of areas where marine life in Manila Bay has improved,
and the assistance extended to different Local Government Units in this regard. The Philippine
Ports Authority (PPA) is ordered to report the names, make, and capacity of each ship that would
dock in PPA ports; the days they docked and the days they were at sea; the activities of the
concessionaire that would collect solid and liquid ship-generated waste, the volume, treatment
and disposal sites for such wastes; and the violators that PPA has apprehended.
The Department of Health (DOH) is required to submit the names and addresses of septic and
sludge companies that have no treatment facilities. The said agency must also require companies
to procure a "license to operate" issued by the DOH. The Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority (MMDA) and the seventeen (17) LGUs in Metro Manila must submit a report on the
"amount of garbage collected per district...vis-à-vis the average amount of garbage disposed
monthly in landfills and dumpsites." MMDA must also submit a plan for the removal of informal
settlers and encroachments along NCR Rivers which violate R.A. No. 7279.
Clearly, the Court has no authority to issue these directives. They fall squarely under the domain
of the executive branch of the state. The issuance of specific instructions to subordinate agencies
in the implementation of policy mandates in all laws, not just those that protect the environment,
is an exercise of the power of supervision and control - the sole province of the Office of the
President.
Both the 1987 Constitution and Executive Order No. 292, or the Administrative Code of the
Philippines, state:
Exercise of Executive Power. - The Executive power shall be vested in the President.[3]
Power of Control.- The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus,
and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.[4]
In Anak Mindanao Party-list Group v. Executive Secretary,[5] this Court has already asserted that
the enforcement of all laws is the sole domain of the Executive. The Court pronounced that the
express constitutional grant of authority to the Executive is broad and encompassing, such that it
justifies reorganization measures[6] initiated by the President. The Court said:
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the laws. The
executive power is vested in the President. It is generally defined as the power to enforce and
administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing
their due observance.
As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents the
government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of
his department. He has control over the executive department, bureaus and offices. This means
that he has the authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and
office, or interfere with the discretion of its officials. Corollary to the power of control, the
President also has the duty of supervising and enforcement of laws for the maintenance of
general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and
offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively.
To herein petitioner agencies impleaded below, this Court has given very specific instructions to
report the progress and status of their operations directly to the latter. The Court also required the
agencies to apprise it of any noncompliance with the standards set forth by different laws as to
environment protection. This move is tantamount to making these agencies accountable to the
Court instead of the President. The very occupation streamlined especially for the technical and
practical expertise of the Executive Branch is being usurped without regard for the delineations
of power in the Constitution. In fact, the issuance of the Resolution itself is in direct
contravention of the President's exclusive power to issue administrative orders, as shown thus:
Administrative Orders. - Acts of the President which relate to particular aspect of governmental
operations in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in
administrative orders.[7]
The Court's discussion in Ople v. Torres[8] pertaining to the extent and breadth of administrative
power bestowed upon the President is apt:
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as
determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of
administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue
administrative orders, rules and regulations.
... ... ...
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects
in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be
for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.
The implementation of the policy laid out by the legislature - in the Philippine Clean Water Act
of 2004, the Toxic and Hazardous Waste Act or Republic Act 6969, the Environment Code, and
other laws geared towards environment protection - is under the competence of the President.
Achieved thereby is a uniform standard of administrative efficiency. And since it is through
administrative orders promulgated by the President that specific operational aspects for these
policies are laid out, the Resolution of this Court overlaps with the President's administrative
power. No matter how urgent and laudatory the cause of environment protection has become, it
cannot but yield to the higher mandate of separation of powers and the mechanisms laid out by
the people through the Constitution.
One of the directives is that which requires local governments to conduct inspection of homes
and establishments along the riverbanks, and to submit a plan for the removal of certain informal
settlers. Not content with arrogating unto itself the powers of "control" and "supervision" granted
by the Administrative Code to the President over said petitioner administrative agencies, the
Court is also violating the latter's general supervisory authority over local governments:
Sec. 18. General Supervision Over Local Governments. - The President shall exercise general
supervision over local governments.[9]
Sec. 25. National Supervision over Local Government Units.--(a) Consistent with the basic
policy on local autonomy, the President shall exercise general supervision over local government
units to ensure that their acts are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.[10]
The powers expressly vested in any branch of the Government shall not be exercised by, nor
delegated to, any other branch of the Government, except to the extent authorized by the
Constitution.[11]
As has often been repeated by this Court, the doctrine of separation of powers is the very
wellspring from which the Court draws its legitimacy. Former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno has
traced its origin and rationale as inhering in the republican system of government:
The principle of separation of powers prevents the concentration of legislative, executive, and
judicial powers to a single branch of government by deftly allocating their exercise to the three
branches of government...
In his famed treatise, The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu authoritatively analyzed the nature
of executive, legislative and judicial powers and with a formidable foresight counselled that any
combination of these powers would create a system with an inherent tendency towards tyrannical
actions...
Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and the
executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed
to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then the legislator. Were it joined to the executive
power, the judge might behave with violence and oppression.
There would be an end of everything, were the same man or the same body, whether of the
nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing
the public resolutions, and that of trying the causes of individuals. [12]
Nor is there merit in the contention that these directives will speed up the rehabilitation of
Manila Bay better than if said rehabilitation were left to the appropriate agencies. Expediency is
never a reason to abandon legitimacy. "The Separation of Powers often impairs efficiency,
interms of dispatch and the immediate functioning of government. It is the long-term staying
power of government that is enhanced by the mutualaccommodation required by theseparation of
powers."[13]
Mandamus does not lie to

compel a discretionary act.
In G.R. Nos. 171947-48, the Court explicitly admitted that "[w]hile the implementation of the
MMDA's mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or
the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be
compelled by mandamus."[14] In denying the appeal of petitioners and affirming the Decision of
the RTC, the Court of Appeals stressed that the trial court's Decision did not require petitioners
to do tasks outside of their usual basic functions under existing laws.[15]
In its revised Resolution, the Court is now setting deadlines for the implementation of policy
formulations which require decision-making by the agencies. It has confused an order
enjoining a duty, with an order outlining specific technical rules on how to perform such a duty.
Assuming without conceding that mandamus were availing under Rule 65, the Court can only
require a particular action, but it cannot provide for the means to accomplish such action. It is at
this point where the demarcation of the general act of "cleaning up the Manila Bay" has become
blurred, so much so that the Court now engages in the slippery slope of overseeing technical
details.
In Sps. Abaga v. Sps. Panes[16] the Court said:
From the foregoing Rule, there are two situations when a writ of mandamus may issue: (1) when
any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an
act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; or (2)
when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully excludes another from the
use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the other is entitled. The "duty" mentioned in the
first situation is a ministerial duty, not a discretionary duty, requiring the exercise of
judgment...In short, for mandamus to lie, the duty sought to be compelled to be performed must
be a ministerial duty, not a discretionary duty, and the petitioner must show that he has a well-
defined, clear and certain right.
Discretion, on the other hand, is a faculty conferred upon a court or official by which he may
decide the question either way and still be right.[17]
The duty being enjoined in mandamus must be one according to the terms defined in the law
itself. Thus,the recognized rule is that, in the performance of an official duty or act involving
discretion, the corresponding official can only be directed by mandamus to act, but not to act one
way or the other. This is the end of any participation by the Court, if it is authorized to
participate at all.
In setting a deadline for the accomplishment of these directives, not only has the Court provided
the means of accomplishing the task required, it has actually gone beyond the standards set by
the law. There is nothing in the Environment Code, the Administrative Code, or the Constitution
which grants this authority to the judiciary. It is already settled that, "If the law imposes a duty
upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide when and how the duty shall be
performed, such duty is not ministerial."[18]
In Alvarez v. PICOP Resources,[19] the Court ruled that,
As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a
ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of
discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment
in reference to any manner in which he is required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be
exercised and not that of the court.
The Constitution does not authorize

the courts to "monitor" the execution
of their decisions.
It is an oft-repeated rule that the Court has no power to issue advisory opinions, much less
"directives" requiring progress reports from the parties respecting the execution of its decisions.
The requirements of "actual case or controversy" and "justiciability" have long been established
in order to limit the exercise of judicial review. While its dedication to the implementation of the
fallo in G.R. 171947-48 is admirable, the Court's power cannot spill over to actual encroachment
upon both the "control" and police powers of the State under the guise of a "continuing
mandamus."
In G.R. 171947-48, the Court said: "Under what other judicial discipline describes as `continuing
mandamus,' the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in
view of ensuring that its decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or
indifference."
Needless to say, the "continuing mandamus" in this case runs counter to principles of "actual
case or controversy" and other requisites for judicial review. In fact, the Supreme Court is in
danger of acting as a "super-administrator"[20] - the scenario presently unfolding in India where
the supposed remedy originated. There the remedy was first used in Vineet Narain and Others v.
Union of India,[21] a public interest case for corruption filed against high-level officials. Since
then, the remedy has been applied to environmental cases as an oversight and control power by
which the Supreme Court of India has created committees (i.e. the Environment Pollution
Authority and the Central Empowered Committee in forest cases) and allowed these committees
to act as the policing agencies.[22] But the most significant judicial intervention in this regard was
the series of orders promulgated by the Court in T.N. Godavarman v. Union of India.[23]
Although the Writ Petition filed by Godavarman was an attempt to seek directions from the
Court regarding curbing the illegal felling of trees, the Supreme Court went further to make
policy determinations in an attempt to improve the country's forests. The Court Order suspending
felling of trees that did not adhere to state government working plans resulted in effectively
freezing the country's timber industry. The Supreme Court completely banned tree felling in
certain north-eastern states to any part of the country. The court's role was even more
pronounced in its later directions. While maintaining the ban on felling of trees in the seven
northeast states, the court directed the state governments to gather, process, sell, and otherwise
manage the already felled timber in the manner its specified the Supreme Court became the
supervisor of all forest issues, ranging from controlling, pricing and transport of timber to
management of forest revenue, as well as implementation of its orders.[24]
Thus, while it was originally intended to assert public rights in the face of government inaction
and neglect, the remedy is now facing serious criticism as it has spiraled out of control.[25] In
fact, even Justice J. S. Verma, who penned the majority opinion in Vineet Narain in which
`continuing mandamus' first made its appearance, subsequently pronounced that "judicial
activism should be neither judicial ad hocism nor judicial tyranny."[26] Justice B.N. Srikrishna
observed that judges now seem to want to engage themselves with boundless enthusiasm in
complex socio-economic issues raising myriads of facts and ideological issues that cannot be
managed by "judicially manageable standards."[27] Even Former Chief Justice A. S. Anand, a
known defender of judicial activism, has warned against the tendency towards "judicial
adventurism," reiterating the principle that "the role of the judge is that of a referee. I can blow
my judicial whistle when the ball goes out of play; but when the game restarts I must neither take
part in it nor tell the players how to play."[28]
Unless our own Supreme Court learns to curb its excesses and apply to this case the standards for
judicial review it has developed over the years and applied to co-equal branches, the scenario in
India could very well play out in the Philippines. The Court must try to maintain a healthy
balance between the departments, precisely as the Constitution mandates, by delineating its "deft
strokes and bold lines,"[29] ever so conscious of the requirements of actual case and controversy.
While, admittedly, there are certain flaws in the operation and implementation of the laws, the
judiciary cannot take the initiative to compensate for such perceived inaction.
The Court stated in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance:[30]
Disregard of the essential limits imposed by the case and controversy requirement can in the long
run only result in undermining our authority as a court of law. For, as judges, what we are called
upon to render is judgment according to law, not according to what may appear to be the opinion
of the day...
Hence, "over nothing but cases and controversies can courts exercise jurisdiction, and it is to
make the exercise of that jurisdiction effective that they are allowed to pass upon constitutional
questions."[31] Admirable though the sentiments of the Court may be, it must act within
jurisdictional limits. These limits are founded upon the traditional requirement of a cause of
action: "the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another."[32] In constitutional
cases, for every writ or remedy, there must be a clear pronouncement of the corresponding right
which has been infringed. Only then can there surface that "clear concreteness provided when a
question emerges precisely framed and necessary for decision from a clash of adversary
argument exploring every aspect of a multifaceted situation embracing conflicting and
demanding interests."[33]
Unfortunately, the Court fails to distinguish between a pronouncement on violation of rights on

one hand, and non-performance of duties vis-à-vis operational instructions, on the other.
Moreover, it also dabbles in an interpretation of constitutional rights in a manner that is
dangerously pre-emptive of legally available remedies.
The "continuing mandamus" palpably

overlaps with the power of congressional
oversight.
Article 6, Section 22 of the 1987 Constitution states:
The heads of department may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or
upon the request of either House, or as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and
be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be
submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least
three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written
questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the state or the public
interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in
executive session.
This provision pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to
obtain information in pursuit of Congress' oversight function. Macalintal v. Comelec[34]
discussed the scope of congressional oversight in full. Oversight refers to the power of the
legislative department to check, monitor and ensure that the laws it has enacted are enforced:
The power of Congress does not end with the finished task of legislation. Concomitant with
its principal power to legislate is the auxiliary power to ensure that the laws it enacts are
faithfully executed. As well stressed by one scholar, the legislature "fixes the main lines of
substantive policy and is entitled to see that administrative policy is in harmony with it; it
establishes the volume and purpose of public expenditures and ensures their legality and
propriety; it must be satisfied that internal administrative controls are operating to secure
economy and efficiency; and it informs itself of the conditions of administration of remedial
measure.
... ... ...
Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor

bureaucratic compliance with program objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are properly
administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive
usurpation of legislative authority, and (d) to assess executive conformity with the congressional
perception of public interest.
... ... ...
Congress, thus, uses its oversight power to make sure that the administrative agencies
perform their functions within the authority delegated to them.
Macalintal v. Comelec further discusses that legislative supervision under the oversight power
connotes a continuing and informed awareness on the part of Congress regarding executive
operations in a given administrative area. Because the power to legislate includes the power to
ensure that the laws are enforced, this monitoring power has been granted by the Constitution to
the legislature. In cases of executive non-implementation of statutes, the courts cannot justify the
use of "continuing mandamus," as it would by its very definition overlap with the monitoring
power under congressional oversight. The Resolution does not only encroach upon the general
supervisory function of the Executive, it also diminished and arrogated unto itself the power of
congressional oversight.
Conclusion
This Court cannot nobly defend the environmental rights of generations of Filipinos enshrined in
the Constitution while in the same breath eroding the foundations of that very instrument from
which it draws its power. While the remedy of "continuing mandamus" has evolved out of a
Third World jurisdiction similar to ours, we cannot overstep the boundaries laid down by the rule
of law. Otherwise, this Court would rush recklessly beyond the delimitations precisely put in
place to safeguard excesses of power. The tribunal, considered by many citizens as the last
guardian of fundamental rights, would then resemble nothing more than an idol with feet of clay:
strong in appearance, but weak in foundation.
...The Court becomes a conscience by acting to remind us of limitation on power, even judicial
power, and the interrelation of good purposes with good means. Morality is not an end
dissociated from means. There is a morality of morality, which respects the limitation of office
and the fallibility of the human mind...self-limitation is the first mark of the master. That, too is
part of the role of the conscience.[35]
The majority Resolution would, at the same time, cast the light of scrutiny more harshly on
judicial action in which the Court's timely exercise of its powers is called for - as in the cases of
prisoners languishing in jail whose cases await speedy resolution by this Court. There would
then be nothing to stop the executive and the legislative departments from considering as fair
game the judiciary's own accountability in its clearly delineated department.
[1]
Justice Dr. A.S. Anand, Supreme Court of India,"Judicial Review - Judicial Activism - Need
for Caution," in Soli Sorabjee's Law and Justice: An Anthology, Universal Law Publishing
Company, (2003), at 377. Also in Justice A.S. Anand, Millenium Law Lecture Series, Thursday,
October 21, 1999, Kochi, Kerala, available at http://airwebworld.com/articles/index.php.
(visited 17 November 2010)
[2]
"In particular: (1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the primary agency
responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper use of the country's
environment and natural resources, and Sec. 19 of RA 9275, designating the DENR as the
primary government agency responsible for its enforcement and implementation, the DENR is
directed to fully implement its Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy for the
rehabilitation, restoration, and conservation of the Manila Bay at the earliest possible time. It is
ordered to call regular coordination meetings with concerned government departments and
agencies to ensure the successful implementation of the aforesaid plan of action in accordance
with its indicated completion schedules.
(2) Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the Administrative Code of 1987 and Sec. 25 of
the Local Government Code of 1991, the DILG, in exercising the President's power of general
supervision and its duty to promulgate guidelines in establishing waste management programs
under Sec. 43 of the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), shall direct all LGUs in Metro
Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to inspect all factories,
commercial establishments, and private homes along the banks of the major river systems in
their respective areas of jurisdiction, such as but not limited to the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan
Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan)
River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and waterways that
eventually discharge water into the Manila Bay; and the lands abutting the bay, to determine
whether they have wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic septic tanks as prescribed by
existing laws, ordinances, and rules and regulations. If none be found, these LGUs shall be
ordered to require non-complying establishments and homes to set up said facilities or septic
tanks within a reasonable time to prevent industrial wastes, sewage water, and human wastes
from flowing into these rivers, waterways, esteros, and the Manila Bay, under pain of closure or
imposition of fines and other sanctions.
(3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275, the MWSS is directed to provide, install, operate, and
maintain the necessary adequate waste water treatment facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal, and
Cavite where needed at the earliest possible time.
(4) Pursuant to RA 9275, the LWUA, through the local water districts and in coordination with
the DENR, is ordered to provide, install, operate, and maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities
and the efficient and safe collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage in the provinces of
Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan where needed at the earliest possible time.
(5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550, the DA, through the BFAR, is ordered to improve and
restore the marine life of the Manila Bay. It is also directed to assist the LGUs in Metro Manila,
Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan in developing, using recognized
methods, the fisheries and aquatic resources in the Manila Bay.
(6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP Maritime Group, in accordance
with Sec. 124 of RA 8550, in coordination with each other, shall apprehend violators of PD 979,
RA 8550, and other existing laws and regulations designed to prevent marine pollution in the
Manila Bay.
(7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 513 and the International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships, the PPA is ordered to immediately adopt such measures to prevent the
discharge and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into the
Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators.
(8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs and projects for flood control
projects and drainage services in Metro Manila, in coordination with the DPWH, DILG, affected
LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council
(HUDCC), and other agencies, shall dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and
other encroachments established or built in violation of RA 7279, and other applicable laws
along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the
Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways and esteros in Metro
Manila. The DPWH, as the principal implementor of programs and projects for flood control
services in the rest of the country more particularly in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and
Laguna, in coordination with the DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, HUDCC, and
other concerned government agencies, shall remove and demolish all structures, constructions,
and other encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other applicable laws along the
Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite)
River, the Laguna De Bay, and other rivers, connecting waterways, and esteros that discharge
wastewater into the Manila Bay.
In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and maintain a sanitary landfill, as
prescribed by RA 9003, within a period of one (1) year from finality of this Decision. On matters
within its territorial jurisdiction and in connection with the discharge of its duties on the
maintenance of sanitary landfills and like undertakings, it is also ordered to cause the
apprehension and filing of the appropriate criminal cases against violators of the respective penal
provisions of RA 9003, Sec. 27 of RA 9275 (the Clean Water Act), and other existing laws on
pollution.
(9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8 of RA 9275, within one (1)
year from finality of this Decision, determine if all licensed septic and sludge companies have
the proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic
tanks. The DOH shall give the companies, if found to be non-complying, a reasonable time
within which to set up the necessary facilities under pain of cancellation of its environmental
sanitation clearance.
(10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152, Sec. 118 of RA 8550, and Sec. 56 of RA 9003, the DepEd
shall integrate lessons on pollution prevention, waste management, environmental protection,
and like subjects in the school curricula of all levels to inculcate in the minds and hearts of
students and, through them, their parents and friends, the importance of their duty toward
achieving and maintaining a balanced and healthful ecosystem in the Manila Bay and the entire
Philippine archipelago.
(11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in the General Appropriations
Act of 2010 and succeeding years to cover the expenses relating to the cleanup, restoration, and
preservation of the water quality of the Manila Bay, in line with the country's development
objective to attain economic growth in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and
revival of our marine waters.
(12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA, DPWH, DBM, PCG,
PNP Maritime Group, DILG, and also of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, in line with the principle of
"continuing mandamus," shall, from finality of this Decision, each submit to the Court a
quarterly progressive report of the activities undertaken in accordance with this Decision.
No costs.
SO ORDERED."
[3]
E.O. 292, Book II, Chapter 3, Sec. 11; and 1987 Constitution, Art. 7, Sec. 1.
[4]
E.O. 292, Book III, Chapter 1, Sec. 1; and 1987 Constitution, Art. 7, Sec. 17.
[5]
G.R. No. 166052, 29 August 2007, 531 SCRA 583.
[6]
E.O. 379 and 364 were promulgated, placing the Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor
(PCUP) under the supervision and control of the DAR, and the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) as an attached agency under the Department of Agrarian Reform.
[7]
E.O. 292, Book 3, Title 1, Chapter 2, Sec 3.
[8]
G.R. No. 127685, 23 July 1998, 293 SCRA 141.
[9]
1987 Constitution, Art. 2 on State Policies.
[10]
E.O. 292, Book 3, Title 1, Chapter 6, Sec. 25.
[11]
E.O 292, Book 2, Chapter 1, Sec 1(8).
[12]
C.J. Reynato S. Puno, Separate Concurring Opinion, Macalintal v. Comelec, G.R. No
.157013, 10 July 2003, 405 SCRA 614.
[13]
United States v. American Tel. &Tel Co.,567 F 2d 121 (1977), citing J. Brandeis, Separate
Dissenting Opinion, Myers v. United States, US 52 293, 47 (1926).
[14]
P. 12, MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, G.R. Nos. 171947-48, 15 December
2008, 574 SCRA 661.
[15]
Id. at 9.
[16]
G.R. No. 147044, 24 August 2007, 531 SCRA 56, 62- 63.
[17]
Asuncion v. De Yriarte, 28 Phil 67.
[18]
Meralco Securities v. Savellano, L-36748, 23 October 1982, 117 SCRA 804.
[19]
G.R. No. 162243, 29 November 2006, 508 SCRA 498.
[20]
A term used by Manu Nair, correspondent of The International Environment News,
describing the Supreme Court of India in the Forest Conservation Case. Available at
http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/committees/business_regulation/environment/nairreportjune05.pdf.
(visited 17 November 2010)
[21]
1996 SC (2) 199 JT 1996 (1) 708 1996 SCALE (1) SP 31.
[22]
Rajeev Davan, Supreme Court advocate, Supreme Court of India, Judicial Excessivism,
available at http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/content/judicialexcessivism. (visited 17
November 2010)
[23]
T.N. Godavarman Thirumulkpad v. Union of India & Ors (1997) 2 SCC 267.
[24]
Supra note 20 at page 2.
[25]
Abhaykumar Dilip Ostwal, Supreme Court advocate, Supreme Court of India, Judicial
Activism and Self-Restraint, available at http://airwebworld.com/articles/index.php. (visited 17
November 2010)
[26]
Justice J.S. Verma, "Judicial activism should be neither judicial ad hocism nor judicial
tyranny", as published in The Indian Express, 06th April 2007 (http://www.indianexpress.com).
[27]
Justice B.N. Srikrishna, "Skinning a Cat" (2005) 8 SCC (J) 3.
[28]
Supra note 1.
[29]
A phrase used by Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 130 (1936).
[30]
G.R. No. 115525, 25 August 1994, 435 SCRA 630, holding that judicial inquiry whether the
formal requirements for the enactment of statutes -- beyond those prescribed by the Constitution
-- have been observed, is precluded by the principle of separation of powers.
[31]
Vicente V. Mendoza, "The Nature and Function of Judicial Review," 31 IBP Journal 1
(2005).
[32]
Rules of Court, Rule 2, Sec. 2.
[33]
United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146, 157 (1968).
[34]
Macalintal v. Comelec, G.R. No .157013, 10 July 2003, 405 SCRA 614.
[35]
Paul Freund, quoting Justice Brandeis, in Law and Justice 36 (1968).
624 Phil. 200
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 176831, January 15, 2010
UY KIAO ENG, PETITIONER, VS. NIXON LEE, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the August 23, 2006 Amended Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 91725 and the February 23, 2007 Resolution,[2] denying the motion for reconsideration
thereof.
The relevant facts and proceedings follow.
Alleging that his father passed away on June 22, 1992 in Manila and left a holographic will,
which is now in the custody of petitioner Uy Kiao Eng, his mother, respondent Nixon Lee filed,
on May 28, 2001, a petition for mandamus with damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 01100939,
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, to compel petitioner to produce the will so that
probate proceedings for the allowance thereof could be instituted. Allegedly, respondent had
already requested his mother to settle and liquidate the patriarch's estate and to deliver to the
legal heirs their respective inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so without any justifiable
reason.[3]
In her answer with counterclaim, petitioner traversed the allegations in the complaint and posited
that the same be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action, for lack of cause of action, and
for non-compliance with a condition precedent for the filing thereof. Petitioner denied that she
was in custody of the original holographic will and that she knew of its whereabouts. She,
moreover, asserted that photocopies of the will were given to respondent and to his siblings. As a
matter of fact, respondent was able to introduce, as an exhibit, a copy of the will in Civil Case
No. 224-V-00 before the RTC of Valenzuela City. Petitioner further contended that respondent
should have first exerted earnest efforts to amicably settle the controversy with her before he
filed the suit.[4]
The RTC heard the case. After the presentation and formal offer of respondent's evidence,
petitioner demurred, contending that her son failed to prove that she had in her custody the
original holographic will. Importantly, she asserted that the pieces of documentary evidence
presented, aside from being hearsay, were all immaterial and irrelevant to the issue involved in
the petition--they did not prove or disprove that she unlawfully neglected the performance of an
act which the law specifically enjoined as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, for the
court to issue the writ of mandamus.[5]
The RTC, at first, denied the demurrer to evidence.[6] In its February 4, 2005 Order,[7] however, it
granted the same on petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Respondent's motion for
reconsideration of this latter order was denied on September 20, 2005.[8] Hence, the petition was
dismissed.
Aggrieved, respondent sought review from the appellate court. On April 26, 2006, the CA
initially denied the appeal for lack of merit. It ruled that the writ of mandamus would issue only
in instances when no other remedy would be available and sufficient to afford redress. Under
Rule 76, in an action for the settlement of the estate of his deceased father, respondent could ask
for the presentation or production and for the approval or probate of the holographic will. The
CA further ruled that respondent, in the proceedings before the trial court, failed to present
sufficient evidence to prove that his mother had in her custody the original copy of the will.[9]
Respondent moved for reconsideration. The appellate court, in the assailed August 23, 2006
Amended Decision,[10] granted the motion, set aside its earlier ruling, issued the writ, and ordered
the production of the will and the payment of attorney's fees. It ruled this time that respondent
was able to show by testimonial evidence that his mother had in her possession the holographic
will.
Dissatisfied with this turn of events, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The appellate
court denied this motion in the further assailed February 23, 2007 Resolution.[11]
Left with no other recourse, petitioner brought the matter before this Court, contending in the
main that the petition for mandamus is not the proper remedy and that the testimonial evidence
used by the appellate court as basis for its ruling is inadmissible.[12]
The Court cannot sustain the CA's issuance of the writ.
The first paragraph of Section 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides that--
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.--When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment
be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by
the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the
damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.[13]
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of
the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some
corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which
duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from operation
of law.[14] This definition recognizes the public character of the remedy, and clearly excludes the
idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the performance of duties in which
the public has no interest.[15] The writ is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a
public right and to compel the performance of a public duty, most especially when the public
right involved is mandated by the Constitution.[16] As the quoted provision instructs, mandamus
will lie if the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance
of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station.[17]
The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not
his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to which he is
not entitled by law.[18] Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute
or as to which a substantial doubt exists, although objection raising a mere technical question
will be disregarded if the right is clear and the case is meritorious.[19] As a rule, mandamus will
not lie in the absence of any of the following grounds: [a] that the court, officer, board, or person
against whom the action is taken unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station; or [b] that such court, officer,
board, or person has unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right
or office to which he is entitled.[20] On the part of the relator, it is essential to the issuance of a
writ of mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be
the imperative duty of respondent to perform the act required.[21]
Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus cannot be used to enforce
contractual obligations.[22] Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private contract
rights, and will not lie against an individual unless some obligation in the nature of a public or
quasi-public duty is imposed.[23] The writ is not appropriate to enforce a private right against an
individual.[24] The writ of mandamus lies to enforce the execution of an act, when, otherwise,
justice would be obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in cases relating to the public and to the
government; hence, it is called a prerogative writ.[25] To preserve its prerogative character,
mandamus is not used for the redress of private wrongs, but only in matters relating to the
public.[26]
Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there should be no
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the remedy of
mandamus being invoked.[27] In other words, mandamus can be issued only in cases where the
usual modes of procedure and forms of remedy are powerless to afford relief.[28] Although
classified as a legal remedy, mandamus is equitable in its nature and its issuance is generally
controlled by equitable principles.[29] Indeed, the grant of the writ of mandamus lies in the sound
discretion of the court.
In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the obligation involved
here--the production of the original holographic will--is in the nature of a public or a private
duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent Lee because there
lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Let it be noted that
respondent has a photocopy of the will and that he seeks the production of the original for
purposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however, does not prevent him from instituting probate
proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the same is in his possession or not. Rule 76,
Section 1 relevantly provides:
Section 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will.--Any executor, devisee, or legatee named
in a will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time, after the death of the
testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in
his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
An adequate remedy is further provided by Rule 75, Sections 2 to 5, for the production of the
original holographic will. Thus--
SEC. 2. Custodian of will to deliver.--The person who has custody of a will shall, within twenty
(20) days after he knows of the death of the testator, deliver the will to the court having
jurisdiction, or to the executor named in the will.
SEC. 3. Executor to present will and accept or refuse trust.--A person named as executor in a
will shall within twenty (20) days after he knows of the death of the testator, or within twenty
(20) days after he knows that he is named executor if he obtained such knowledge after the death
of the testator, present such will to the court having jurisdiction, unless the will has reached the
court in any other manner, and shall, within such period, signify to the court in writing his
acceptance of the trust or his refusal to accept it.
SEC. 4. Custodian and executor subject to fine for neglect.--A person who neglects any of the
duties required in the two last preceding sections without excuse satisfactory to the court shall be
fined not exceeding two thousand pesos.
SEC. 5. Person retaining will may be committed.--A person having custody of a will after the
death of the testator who neglects without reasonable cause to deliver the same, when ordered so
to do, to the court having jurisdiction, may be committed to prison and there kept until he
delivers the will.[30]
There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the
production of the subject will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of. Suffice it to state
that respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his petition. Thus, the Court grants the demurrer.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The
August 23, 2006 Amended Decision and the February 23, 2007 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91725 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 01100939
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Corona, (Chairperson), Velasco, Jr., Peralta, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. de Los Santos, with Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes,
Jr. and Arturo G. Tayag, concurring; rollo, pp. 26-29.
[2]
Penned by Associate Justice Arturo G. Tayag, with Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and
Jose C. Reyes, Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 31-32.
[3]
Records, pp. 1-4.
[4]
Id. at 14-19.
[5]
Id. at 227-229.
[6]
Id. at 238 and 262-263.
[7]
Id. at 320-321.
[8]
Id. at 399-401.
[9]
[10]
Supra note 1.
[11]
Supra note 2.
[12]
Rollo, pp. 139-146.
[13]
Italics supplied.
[14]
Abaga v. Panes, G.R. No. 147044, August 24, 2007, 531 SCRA 56, 61-62.
[15]
Segre v. Ring, 163 A.2d 4, 5 (1960).
[16]
Enriquez v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 174902-06, February 15, 2008, 545 SCRA
618, 625; Lumanlaw v. Peralta, Jr., G.R. No. 164953, February 13, 2006, 482 SCRA 396, 417.
[17]
Mayuga v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123899, August 30, 1996, 261 SCRA 309, 316-317;
Reyes v. Zamora, No. L-46732, May 5, 1979, 90 SCRA 92, 112; Kapisanan ng mga
Manggagawa sa Manila Railroad Company Credit Union, Inc. v. Manila Railroad Company,
No. L-25316, February 28, 1979, 88 SCRA 616, 621; Gabutas v. Castellanes, No. L-17323, June
23, 1965, 14 SCRA 376, 379; Alzate v. Aldana, No. L-18085, May 31, 1963, 8 SCRA 219, 223;
Dulay v. Merrera, No. L-17084, August 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 922, 926; Quintero v. Martinez, 84
Phil. 496, 497 (1949).
[18]
Tangonan v. Paño, No. L-45157, June 27, 1985, 137 SCRA 245, 255; Gonzalez v. Board of
Pharmacy, 20 Phil. 367, 375 (1911).
[19]
Palileo v. Ruiz Castro, 85 Phil. 272, 275 (1949).
[20]
Samson v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 117741, September 29, 2004, 439 SCRA 315,
325.
[21]
University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100588, March 7, 1994, 230
SCRA 761, 771.
[22]
Manalo v. PAIC Savings Bank, G.R. No. 146531, March 18, 2005, 453 SCRA 747, 754-755;
National Marketing Corporation v. Cloribel, No. L-27260, April 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 398, 403;
National Marketing Corporation v. Cloribel, No. L-26585, March 13, 1968, 22 SCRA 1033,
1037-1038. See, however, Mantrade/FMMC Division Employees and Workers Union v.
Bacungan, No. L-48437, September 30, 1986, 144 SCRA 510, in which the Court considered
mandamus as an appropriate equitable remedy to compel a corporation to grant holiday pay to its
monthly salaried employees. See also Hager v. Bryan, 19 Phil. 138 (1911), cited in Ponce v.
Alsons Cement Corporation, G.R. No. 139802, December 10, 2002, 393 SCRA 602, 614-615,
and in Rural Bank of Salinas, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96674, June 26, 1992, 210
SCRA 510, 515-516, in which the Court ruled that mandamus may be issued to compel the
secretary of a corporation to make a transfer of the stock on the books of the corporation if it
affirmatively appears that he has failed or refused so to do, upon the demand either of the person
in whose name the stock is registered, or of some person holding a power of attorney for that
purpose from the registered owner of the stock.
[23]
Carroll v. American Agricultural Chemical Co., 167 S.E. 597 (1932).
[24]
Crawford v. Tucker, 64 So.2d 411, 415 (1953).
[25]
The American Asylum at Hartford for the education and instruction of the Deaf and Dumb v.
The President, Directors and Company of the Phoenix Bank, 4 Conn. 172, 1822 WL 12 (Conn.),
10 Am.Dec. 112 (1822). See, however, Bassett v. Atwater, 32 L.R.A. 575, 65 Conn. 355, 32 A.
937 (1895), in which the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut recognized the principle that,
in the issuance of the writ of mandamus, the value of the matter, or the degree of its importance
to the public police, should not be scrupulously weighed. If there be a right, and no other specific
remedy, mandamus should not be denied.
[26]
State ex rel. Moyer v. Baldwin, 83 N.E. 907, 908 (1908).
[27]
Pimentel III v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 178413, March 13, 2008, 548 SCRA 169,
209; Balindong v. Dacalos, G.R. No. 158874, November 10, 2004, 441 SCRA 607, 612;
Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 134278, August 7, 2002, 386 SCRA 492, 499; see
Manalo v. Gloria, G.R. No. 106692, September 1, 1994, 236 SCRA 130, 136-137, in which the
Court ruled that petitioner's claim for backwages could be the appropriate subject of an ordinary
civil action and there is absolutely no showing that the said remedy is not plain, speedy and
adequate.
[28]
Segre v. Ring, supra note 15.
[29]
Walter Laev, Inc. v. Karns, 161 N.W.2d 227, 229 (1968).
[30]
Theses rules were taken from Sections 626-629 of Act No. 190, "An Act providing a Code of
Procedure in civil actions and special proceedings in the Philippine Islands," enacted on August
9, 1901.

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Supreme Court of the Philippines

G.R. No. 173861, July 14, 2014

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

WHETHER X X X THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 42 OF THE CITY OF SAN

The Petition is bereft of merit.

Petitioners failed to allege that

Assuming the assailed October 12, 2005

In Triplex Enterprises, Inc. v. PNB-Republic Bank,[18] the Court held that:

No grave abuse of discretion.

Petitioners violated the principle

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

Supreme Court of the Philippines

G.R. No. 211356, September 29, 2014

CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO, PETITIONER, VS. MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY, AKLAN,

VELASCO JR., J.:

Nature of the Case

SECTION 3. – No building or structure of any kind whether temporary or permanent shall be

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

a. Whether or not declaratory relief is still available to petitioner;

2. Whether or not respondent mayor committed grave abuse of discretion when he

The Court’s Ruling

We deny the petition.

Certiorari, not declaratory relief, is the proper remedy

a. Declaratory relief no longer viable

b. Petitioner correctly resorted to certiorari

We are not persuaded.

Respondents did not commit grave abuse of discretion

a. The hotel’s classification as a nuisance

c. Requirements for the exercise of the power are present

(a) No building or structure shall be allowed to start construction unless a Building

SECTION 10. – Penalties.

Petitioner next directs our attention to the following FLAgT provision:

SECTION 6. – No building or structure shall be allowed to be constructed on a slope Twenty

SECTION 8. – No building or structure shall be allowed to be constructed on a swamp or other

Section 447. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. –

Section 17. Basic Services and Facilities. –

(2) For a Municipality:

Peralta, Villarama, Jr., Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

October 23, 2014

Very truly yours,

Copyright 2016 - Batas.org

Supreme Court of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-47518, June 18, 1990

MANUEL CALAGUI, AND RODOLFO MAPAGU, PETITIONERS, VS. THE COURT OF

The facts are as follows:

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Sarmiento, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Penned by Associate Justice Nestor B. Alampay, and concurred in by Associate Justices

Pacifico P. de Castro and Jose G. Bautista.

Copyright 2016 - Batas.org

Supreme Court of the Philippines

G.R. No. 145169

G.R. No. 145169, May 13, 2004

SIENA REALTY CORPORATION, AS REPRESENTED BY LYDIA CO HAO AND LILIBETH

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules on Evidence reads:

Vitug, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, JJ., concur.

Copyright 2016 - Batas.org

Supreme Court of the Philippines

G.R. No. 189028, July 16, 2013

NATIONAL ARTIST FOR LITERATURE VIRGILIO ALMARIO, NATIONAL ARTIST FOR

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

History of the Order of National Artists