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15
TANK PLATOON
FEBRUARY 2007
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:
Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their
contractors only. This publication contains technical or opera
tional information that is for official Government use. This deter
mination was made on 31 October 2006. Other requests for this
document must be referred to Director, Directorate of Training,
Doctrine, and Combat Development, ATTN: ATZK-TDD-G, 204 1st
Cavalry Regiment Rd Ste 207, US Army Armor Center, Fort Knox,
KY 40121-5123.
HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
This publication is available at
*FM 3-20.15
Tank Platoon
Contents
Page
PREFACE ...........................................................................................................xiii
Gunner................................................................................................................ 1-8
Leadership........................................................................................................ 2-11
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to U.S. government agencies and their contractors only
to protect technical or operational information that is for official government use. This determination was made on
31 October 2006. Other requests for this document must be referred to Director, Directorate of Training,
Doctrine, and Combat Development, ATTN: ATZK-TDD-G, USAARMC, 204 1st Cavalry Regiment Road Ste 207,
DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of
the document.
22 February 2007 i
Contents
War-Fighting Functions.......................................................................................3-2
Section II - Planning..........................................................................................3-3
Intelligence ..........................................................................................................3-4
Protection ............................................................................................................3-4
Sustainment ........................................................................................................3-5
Intelligence ..........................................................................................................3-6
Protection ............................................................................................................3-6
Sustainment ........................................................................................................3-6
Techniques of Movement....................................................................................3-9
Formations ........................................................................................................3-11
Overwatch .........................................................................................................3-16
Assault ..............................................................................................................3-40
Bypass ..............................................................................................................3-42
Consolidation ....................................................................................................3-46
Reorganization ..................................................................................................3-46
Navigation......................................................................................................... 3-47
Displacement.................................................................................................... 4-25
Composition........................................................................................................ 5-1
Air Cavalry...........................................................................................................6-9
Capabilities........................................................................................................6-10
Area Security.....................................................................................................6-15
Section I - Organization....................................................................................7-1
Maneuver............................................................................................................ 8-7
Sustainment...................................................................................................... 8-13
Overwatch a Blockade/Roadblock....................................................................9-14
REFERENCES.................................................................................. References-1
Figures
Figure 1-1. Tank platoon.................................................................................................1-2
Figure 1-3. Tank and Bradley main gun and coax dead space above street level ........1-3
Figure 2-19. Target reference point (graphic control measure) ................................... 2-21
Figure 2-21. Platoon reports own position using TIRS (checkpoint)............................ 2-23
Figure 2-25. Use of cross fire pattern and simultaneous fire technique to engage
Figure 2-26. Use of frontal fire pattern and simultaneous fire technique to engage
Figure 2-27. Use of different fire patterns in each section (with simultaneous fire
Figure 2-28. Use of depth fire pattern and simultaneous fire technique (with section
Figure 2-29. Use of cross fire pattern and alternating fire technique (with section fire
Figure 2-30. Use of observed fire technique (with section fire command)................... 2-37
Figure 3-13A. Platoon makes initial contact, deploys using an action drill, and
reports ........................................................................................................3-22
Figure 3-14A. Platoon makes initial contact, deploys, and reports ..............................3-23
Figure 3-14B. Platoon executes a battle drill; platoon leader evaluates the situation
Figure 3-14C. Platoon develops the situation and identifies a superior enemy force ..3-24
Figure 3-14D. Platoon leader chooses and recommends an alternate COA; platoon
Figure 3-23B. Platoon uses attack by fire against an enemy reconnaissance platoon
company assault.........................................................................................3-40
Figure 3-25A. Tank section assaults an inferior force as another section supports by
fire...............................................................................................................3-41
Figure 3-25B. Platoon executes an assault as two other platoons support by fire ......3-42
Figure 4-11. Displacement with cover from another element (entire platoon moves at
Figure 4-12. Displacement without cover from another element (sections move using
Figure 5-3A. Battalion assembly area; company team adjacent to other company
Figure 5-3B. Company team assembly area independent of the battalion.................... 5-7
Figure 5-5B. Platoon performing flank security for a convoy ....................................... 5-11
Figure 5-5C. Platoon performing rear security for a convoy ........................................ 5-11
Figure 5-7. Platoon escort using modified traveling overwatch ................................... 5-12
Figure 5-9A. Escort suppresses the ambush to facilitate attack by the reaction force 5-14
Figure 5-11B. Convoy moves back into column formation .......................................... 5-18
Figure 5-19. Plow tanks create multiple lanes while the section leaders’ tanks
Figure 6-4. Shift from a known point method using direction (in mils)............................6-6
Figure 6-5. Lateral and range shifts from a known point ................................................6-7
Figure 7-5A. DA Form 1156, Casualty Feeder Card (front side) ..................................7-15
Figure 7-5B. DA Form 1156, Casualty Feeder Card (back side) .................................7-15
Figure 7-6. DD Form 2745, Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Capture Tag....................7-18
Figure 7-7. Sample tag for captured documents and equipment .................................7-19
Figure 8-3. Tank main gun and coax dead space above street level.............................8-4
Figure 8-8. Example task force attack in an urban environment, with tank platoons in
Figure 9-3. Battle position and reserve/reaction force missions .................................. 9-13
Figure 9-4. Traffic control point, choke point, blockade, convoy escort, and route
Figure 9-6. Tank platoon manning a heavy traffic checkpoint ..................................... 9-16
Figure 9-7B. Equipment list for roadblocks and checkpoints ....................................... 9-17
Figure A-4A. Tank sections maneuvering separately on actual terrain outside of their
Figure A-4B. FBCB2 display of the tank sections maneuvering separately .................. A-4
Figure C-1. Infantry leads while tank platoon remains stationary ..................................C-6
Figure E-6. Using smoke to confuse the enemy and silhouette his vehicles............... E-18
Figure E-9. Using screening smoke to conceal a breaching operation ....................... E-21
Figure E-10. Tank platoon occupying an alternate battle position that is not obscured
Figure G-1. Risk levels and impact on mission execution ............................................. G-3
Tables
Table 6-1. Characteristics and capabilities of fixed-wing aircraft .................................6-14
Table 8-3. Structure penetrating capabilities of 7.62-mm round (NATO ball) against
Table 8-4. Structure penetrating capabilities of caliber .50 ball against typical urban
Table A-1. Capabilities and limitations of the digitized tank platoon ............................. A-5
Table G-2. Instructions for completing DA Form 7566, Composite Risk Management
Chapter 1
Introduction
The fundamental mission of the tank platoon is to close with and destroy the enemy.
The platoon’s ability to move, shoot, and communicate—and do so with armored
protection—is a decisive factor on the modern battlefield. It moves, attacks, defends,
and performs other essential tasks to support the company or troop mission. In
accomplishing its assigned missions, the tank platoon employs firepower, maneuver,
and shock effect, synchronizing its capabilities with those of other maneuver
elements and warfighting functions. When properly supported, the platoon is capable
of conducting sustained operations against any sophisticated threat.
The tank platoon can survive and win in battle only if it is well trained, effectively
led, and highly motivated. Crews must be aggressive, and their tactics must reflect
the tempo and intensity of maneuver warfare. Platoon training must prepare them to
operate effectively in hostile territory with the enemy to their front, flanks, and rear.
SECTION I - ORGANIZATIONS
TANK PLATOON
1-1. By itself, any tank can be vulnerable in the face of diverse battlefield hazards (such as enemy forces
or unfavorable terrain) and situations; these vulnerabilities are significantly reduced when tanks are
employed as units.
1-2. A tank platoon consists of four main battle tanks organized into two sections, with two tanks in each
section. Section leaders are the platoon leader, who is the tank commander (TC) of the vehicle designated
as Tank 1 and the platoon sergeant (PSG), who is the TC of Tank 4. Tank 2 is the wingman in the platoon
leader’s section, and Tank 3 is the wingman in the PSG’s section (see Figure 1-1).
Note. For information on light infantry organizations and their relationship with the tank
platoon, refer to the discussion in Appendix C of this manual and to FM 7-20. Additional
information concerning task organized company teams is found in Appendix C of this manual
and in FM 3-90.1 (FM 71-1).
1-4. Under battlefield conditions, the wingman concept facilitates control of the platoon when it operates
in sections. The concept requires that one tank orient on another tank on either its left or right side. In the
absence of specific instructions, wingmen move, stop, and shoot when their leaders do. In the tank
platoon, Tank 2 orients on the platoon leader’s tank, while Tank 3 orients on the PSG’s tank. The PSG
orients on the platoon leader’s tank (see Figure 1-2).
Figure 1-3. Tank and Bradley main gun and coax dead space above street level
1-7. The platoon leader and platoon sergeant must understand the factors involved with operating in
concert with light and mechanized infantry forces. Gaining dismounted infantry significantly changes the
need to understand the differences in movement rates and communication challenges. The leaders must
have a solid communication plan and conduct rehearsals, including the infantry squad. If the armor section
is attached to the infantry or mechanized infantry section, then the infantry/mechanized infantry leaders
must understand the supply and maintenance needs of heavy armor forces. This poses the biggest
challenge for the dismounted infantry, because their need for fuel is far less than that of an armor section.
Also, the armor section’s ammunition requirements will pose issues in acquisition and distribution. The
following checklist is not limited to, but should include, the platoon leader’s responsibilities when gaining
an infantry section or losing a tank section.
Section (Losing)
• Section leader receives coordination data: linkup time, location, gaining unit designation,
frequencies, and point of contact from the platoon leader.
• Section is refueled and rearmed.
• Section moves to the linkup point.
• Section leader enters the gaining unit’s radio net.
• Section leader reports to the gaining unit’s point of contact and provides a status report.
• Section leader receives:
• Mission.
• Maps.
• Orders/overlays.
• TACSOP.
• Direct fire and control SOP.
• Digital SOP.
• Casualty evacuation plan.
• Section leader submits:
• Battle roster.
• CS report.
• Sensitive items report.
• Any general issues.
• Section conducts digital communications check.
• Section leader confirms linkup with parent unit.
Section (Gaining)
• Receiving unit issues coordination data to losing unit: linkup time, location, frequencies.
• Receiving unit conducts linkup with attaching unit.
• Receiving unit conducts digital communications check with attaching unit.
• Receiving unit receives status report from attaching unit.
• Receiving unit issues:
• Mission.
• Maps.
• Orders/overlays.
• TACSOP and communications security (COMSEC) information.
• Unit SOP.
• Direct fire and control SOP.
• Digital SOP.
• Casualty evacuation SOP.
• Receiving unit receives:
• Battle roster.
• CS report.
• Sensitive items report.
• Any general issues.
• Receiving unit conducts battle drill rehearsals for all five forms of contact.
TANK COMPANY
1-8. The tank company is organized, equipped, and trained to fight pure or as a task organized company
team. The tank company consists of a headquarters and three tank platoons. The company headquarters
consists of the commanding officer (CO), executive officer (XO), first sergeant (1SG), and supply section.
The company headquarters is equipped with two tanks, one M113A2/A3 armored personnel carrier (APC),
two M1025 or M998 high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV), and one cargo truck with a
400-gallon water trailer (see Figure 1-4). A maintenance section from the forward support company (FSC)
is normally attached to the tank company. The maintenance section consists of one APC, one heavy
recovery vehicle, one cargo truck with trailer carrying spare parts based on the prescribed load list (PLL),
and one cargo truck with trailer as a tool truck. A medic team, normally attached from the battalion
medical platoon, travels in a medic APC.
Note. As part of continued modernization of equipment, units are receiving the forward repair
system (FRS) as a replacement for the maintenance M113.
Note. As part of continued modernization of equipment, units are receiving the FRS as a
replacement for the maintenance M113.
CAPABILITIES
1-12. Tanks offer an impressive array of capabilities on the modern battlefield: excellent cross-country
mobility, sophisticated communications, enhanced target acquisition, lethal firepower, and effective armor
protection. In combination, these factors produce the shock effect that allows armor units to close with and
destroy the enemy in most weather and light conditions.
1-13. Today’s tanks can move rapidly under a variety of terrain conditions, negotiating soft ground,
trenches, small trees, and limited obstacles. In addition, global positioning systems (GPS) and inertial
position navigation (POSNAV) systems allow tanks to move to virtually any designated location with
greater speed and accuracy than ever before. Use of visual signals and the single channel ground/airborne
radio system (SINCGARS) facilitates rapid and secure communication of orders and instructions. This
capability allows tank crews to quickly mass the effects of their weapon systems while remaining dispersed
to limit the effects of the enemy’s weapons.
1-14. On-board optics and sighting systems enable tank crews to acquire and destroy enemy tanks,
armored vehicles, and fortifications using the main gun or to use machine guns to suppress enemy
positions, personnel, and lightly armored targets. The tank’s armor protects crew members from small-
arms fire, most artillery, and some antiarmor systems.
1-15. Perhaps the most important technological advance available to the tank platoon is the digital
information capability of its vehicles. Some tank crews now employ the Force XXI battle command
brigade and below (FBCB2) system, to improve situational understanding, command, control, and
navigation. The enhanced capabilities provided by these digitized systems represent a distinct advantage
for the platoon leader. They enable him to gain and maintain the initiative on the battlefield by
synchronizing his elements with other units through the use of faster, more accurate tactical information.
Additional details on the capabilities and operational considerations of FBCB2 are provided in Appendix A
and in discussions throughout this manual.
LIMITATIONS
1-16. Tanks require extensive maintenance, proficient operators, and skilled mechanics, as well as daily
resupply of large quantities of petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) products. They are vulnerable to the
weapons effects of other tanks, attack helicopters, mines, antitank guided missiles (ATGM), antitank guns,
and close attack aircraft. When tanks operate in built-up areas, dense woods, or other restricted terrain,
reduced visibility leaves them vulnerable to dismounted infantry attacks. In such situations, they may be
restricted to trails, roads, or streets; severely limiting maneuverability and observation. Existing or
reinforcing obstacles can also restrict or stop tank movement.
PLATOON LEADER
1-18. The platoon leader is responsible to the commander for the discipline and training of his platoon, the
maintenance of its equipment, and its success in combat. He must be a subject matter expert in the tactical
employment of his section and the platoon, both by itself and in concert with a company team or troop. He
must have a solid understanding of troop-leading procedures and develop his ability to apply them quickly
and efficiently on the battlefield.
1-19. The platoon leader must know the capabilities and limitations of the platoon’s personnel and
equipment; at the same time, he must be well versed in enemy organizations, doctrine, and equipment. He
must serve as an effective TC. Most importantly, the platoon leader must be flexible and capable of using
sound judgment to make correct decisions quickly and at the right times based on his commander’s intent
and the tactical situation. During decentralized operations, the platoon leader cannot rely on the company
commander for guidance and instructions. He must be capable of making decisions based on his unit’s
task and purpose and the commander’s intent.
1-20. Platoon leaders must know and understand the task force mission and the task force commander’s
intent. They must be prepared to assume the duties of the company commander in accordance with the
succession of command.
PLATOON SERGEANT
1-21. The PSG is second in command of the platoon and is accountable to the platoon leader for the
training, discipline, and welfare of the Soldiers in the platoon. He coordinates the platoon’s maintenance
and CS requirements and handles the personal needs of individual Soldiers. The PSG is the most
experienced TC in the platoon. His tactical and technical knowledge allow him to serve as mentor to
crewmen, other noncommissioned officers (NCO), and the platoon leader. His actions on the battlefield
must complement those of the platoon leader. He must be able to fight his section effectively, either in
concert with the platoon leader’s section or by itself.
TANK COMMANDER
1-22. The TC is responsible to the platoon leader and PSG for the discipline and training of his crew, the
maintenance of assigned equipment, the reporting of CS needs, and the tactical employment of his tank.
He briefs his crew, directs the movement of the tank, submits all reports, and supervises initial first-aid
treatment and evacuation of wounded crewmen. He is an expert in using the tank’s weapon systems,
requesting indirect fires, and executing land navigation using both digital systems and more traditional
methods such as terrain association.
1-23. The TC must know and understand the company mission and company commander’s intent. Again
with decentralized operations, the TC may operate as a section and must be able to execute independently.
He must be prepared to assume the duties and responsibilities of the platoon leader or PSG in accordance
with the succession of command. These requirements demand that the TC maintain constant, thorough
situational understanding. He does this by using all available optics for observation, eavesdropping on
radio transmissions, and monitoring the FBCB2 display.
GUNNER
1-24. The gunner searches for targets and aims and fires both the main gun and the coaxial machine gun.
He is responsible to the TC for the maintenance of the tank’s armament and fire control equipment. The
gunner serves as the assistant TC and assumes the responsibilities of the TC as required. He also assists
other crew members as needed. Several of his duties involve the tank’s communications and internal
control systems: logging onto and monitoring communications nets, maintaining digital links if the tank is
equipped with FBCB2, inputting graphic control measures on digital overlays, and monitoring digital
displays during the planning and preparation phases of an operation.
DRIVER
1-25. The driver moves, positions, and stops the tank. While driving, he constantly searches for covered
and concealed routes and for covered positions to which he can move if the tank is engaged. He maintains
his tank’s position in formation and watches for visual signals. If the tank is equipped with a steer-to
indicator, the driver monitors the device and selects the best tactical route. During engagements, he assists
the gunner and TC by scanning for targets and sensing fired rounds. The driver is responsible to the TC
for the automotive maintenance. He assists other crew members as needed.
LOADER
1-26. The loader stows and cares for ammunition, loads the main gun and the coaxial machine gun ready
box, and aims and fires the loader’s machine gun. He is also responsible to the TC for the maintenance of
communications equipment. Before engagement actions are initiated, the loader searches for targets,
maintains rear security, and acts as air guard or ATGM guard. He also assists the TC as needed in
directing the driver so the tank maintains its position in formation. He assists other crew members as
necessary. Because the loader is ideally positioned both to observe around the tank and to monitor the
tank’s digital displays, platoon leaders and TCs should give strong consideration to assigning their second
most experienced crewman as the loader.
Battle command is the process of assimilating information and then using the data to
visualize the battlefield, assess the situation, and direct military action required to
achieve victory. Thinking and acting are simultaneous activities for leaders in battle.
The process known as command and control (C2) is the biggest challenge faced by
combat leaders on the modern battlefield. Command involves directing various
combat, CS, and sustainment elements; control entails the measures taken to make
sure these directions are carried out. Even the most knowledgeable tactician will be
ineffective if he cannot properly use the techniques available to direct and control his
combat elements.
In exercising C2, the tank platoon leader, assisted by the PSG, employs a variety of
techniques to prepare for operations, issue orders, employ the platoon, and
communicate. The success of this process rests mainly on decisive leadership,
realistic training, thoroughly understood SOPs, and the effective use of
communications equipment. For maximum efficiency, the platoon leader must keep
command and control as simple as possible while ensuring that he provides the
platoon with all required information and instructions.
SECTION I - COMMAND
2-1. Command has two vital components: decision-making and leadership. This section examines in
detail how the platoon leader and his subordinate leaders use these elements to develop the flexible,
productive command structure that is the catalyst for success on the battlefield.
DECISION-MAKING
2-2. Decision-making is a conscious process for selecting a course of action (COA) from two or more
alternatives. At platoon level, many decisions are based on SOPs and standard unit drills. SOPs and drills
cover an array of routine and emergency actions, such as evacuation of wounded Soldiers, rearming and
resupply procedures, and individual crew responsibilities; they allow the platoon to operate quickly and
efficiently without constant guidance from the platoon leader. SOPs and checklists are especially critical
in maintaining combat preparedness when leaders are tired or under stress as a result of continuous
operations. Because of this, it is absolutely necessary that everyone in the platoon thoroughly understand
all applicable SOPs. Refer to ST 3-20.153, Tank Platoon SOP, for a sample SOP that can be adapted for
use in various tank platoon organizations. In the modern operational environment, the platoon leader may
operate in a decentralized fashion requiring him to make rapid decisions with minimal guidance.
Additionally, the platoon leader may conduct missions that will transition from combat operations to
stability operations. The enemy will not conform or act in a manner that will fit into the doctrinal named
operations. The platoon leader must understand that the enemy is always adapting his tactics to best defeat
our forces.
TROOP-LEADING PROCEDURES
2-3. Troop-leading is a dynamic process that begins when the platoon receives a new mission or is
notified by a warning order (WARNO) that a new mission is imminent. Most tactical decisions are made
by the company or troop commander, who then announces them in the form of orders that include his
intent and concept of the operation. Based on these orders, the platoon leader executes troop-leading
procedures to organize his time during planning and preparation and to develop his platoon’s scheme of
maneuver. Effective use of troop-leading procedures allows the platoon leader to lead his platoon more
effectively in the execution of the mission.
2-4. Whenever possible, the eight steps of troop-leading procedures are integrated and accomplished
concurrently rather than sequentially. Time management is the key. The platoon leader maximizes
available planning time by starting as soon as he receives the first bit of information about the upcoming
operation. He normally uses one-third of the available time to plan, prepare, and issue the order; his TCs
then have the remaining two-thirds of the time available to prepare their tanks and crews for the operation.
This time allocation, known as the “one-third/two-thirds” rule, is applicable in planning and preparation at
all levels and for virtually all tactical situations and must be enforced.
2-5. The troop-leading process, although discussed here with the eight steps in traditional order, is not
rigid, and the steps are not necessarily sequential. The tasks involved in some steps (such as initiate
movement, issue the WARNO, and conduct reconnaissance) may recur several times during the process.
Although listed as the last step, activities associated with supervising and refining the plan and other
preparations occur throughout the troop-leading process.
2-6. The following discussion focuses on the eight steps of troop-leading procedures:
• Receive and analyze the mission.
• Issue the WARNO.
• Make a tentative plan.
• Initiate movement.
• Conduct reconnaissance and coordination.
• Complete the plan.
• Issue the order.
• Supervise and refine.
Note. Before the OPORD or FRAGO arrives, the platoon leader may receive a series of
WARNOs from the company commander providing advance notice of an impending operation.
The platoon leader should disseminate all pertinent information contained in the WARNOs as
quickly as possible after they are received.
Initial Actions
2-8. Upon receipt of the WARNO, FRAGO, or OPORD, the platoon leader’s first task is to extract his
mission from the commander’s overall plan. The key to understanding the platoon mission as part of the
company team or troop mission lies in two elements of the plan: the commander’s intent and the concept
of operations. One platoon will be designated as the company/troop main effort. This platoon’s task and
purpose accomplishes the company’s stated mission. The other platoons are supporting efforts; their task
and purpose ensures the success of the main effort platoon. The platoon leader’s understanding of the
commander’s intent and his task and purpose allows him to use his initiative, exploit battlefield
opportunities, and accomplish the commander’s plan. If he does not understand the intent or purpose, he
must ask the commander for clarification.
2-9. Although mission analysis is continuously refined throughout the troop-leading process, the platoon
leader’s actions are normally based only on the WARNO from higher. These include an analysis covering
the terrain and enemy and friendly situations. The platoon leader may also conduct his time analysis,
develop a security plan, and issue his own WARNO to provide guidance and planning focus for his
subordinates. At a minimum, the platoon WARNO should cover the enemy and friendly situations,
movement instructions, and coordinating instructions such as a time line and security plan. (Note. The
analysis is normally conducted as quickly as possible to allow the platoon leader to issue the WARNO in a
timely manner. He then conducts a more detailed METT-TC analysis, as outlined in the following
discussion, after the WARNO is issued.)
Note. The technique of using multiple WARNOs is a valuable tool for the platoon leader during
the troop-leading process. He can issue WARNOs for several purposes: to alert subordinates of
the upcoming mission, to initiate the parallel planning process, and to put out tactical
information incrementally as it is received (ultimately reducing the length of the OPORD).
Refer to FM
3-90.1 (FM 71-1) for a discussion of how WARNOs are employed at various stages of the
troop-leading procedures.
METT-TC Analysis
2-10. The platoon leader analyzes the mission using the factors of METT-TC: mission, enemy, terrain
(and weather), troops, time available, and civilian considerations. Careful analysis of the company
OPORD allows the platoon leader to identify the platoon’s purpose; the specified, implied, and essential
tasks it must perform; and the time line by which the platoon will accomplish those tasks. The following
outline of METT-TC factors will assist the platoon leader in analyzing the mission and creating a time line.
2-11. Mission. The platoon leader’s analysis includes the following points:
• What is the battalion commander’s intent?
• What are the company or troop commander’s intent and purpose?
• What tasks did the commander say must be accomplished (specified tasks)? In the OPORD,
specified tasks are contained in paragraphs 3, 4, and 5.
• What other tasks must be accomplished to ensure mission success (implied tasks)? Implied
tasks are those that are not specified in the OPORD, but that must be done to complete the
mission. They do not include tasks that are covered in the unit SOP. The platoon leader
identifies implied tasks by analyzing the enemy, the terrain, friendly troops available, and the
operational graphics. As an example, the commander may direct the platoon to occupy a
support-by-fire position near a known enemy observation post (OP). The platoon leader will
immediately recognize that he must occupy the designated position (the specified task).
Through his analysis, he will probably determine that the platoon must also destroy or neutralize
the enemy OP (the implied task) because it can affect the platoon and/or company mission. If
time is available, the platoon leader should confirm implied tasks with the commander.
2-12. Enemy. The analysis of the enemy situation includes these considerations:
• What have been the enemy’s recent activities?
• What is the composition of the enemy’s forces?
• What are the capabilities of his weapons?
• What is the location of current and probable enemy positions?
• What is the enemy’s most probable COA? The platoon leader must apply knowledge of the
enemy’s doctrine and his most recent activities and locations to answer these questions:
• Will the enemy attack or defend?
Note. This analysis should also cover the effects of weather on smoke and chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons.
2-16. Troops. The analysis of friendly forces and other personnel-related issues includes these
considerations:
• What is the supply status of ammunition, fuel, and other necessary items?
• What is the current physical condition of the Soldiers, as well as of vehicles and equipment?
• What is the training status of the platoon?
• What is the state of morale?
• How much sleep have the Soldiers had?
• How much sleep will they be able to get before the operation begins?
• Does the platoon need any additional assets to support or accomplish its mission?
• What attachments are available to help the platoon accomplish its mission?
2-17. Time available. The platoon leader’s analysis includes the following factors:
• What times were specified by the commander in the OPORD for such activities as movement,
reconnaissance, rehearsals, and logistics package (LOGPAC) operations?
• What priorities of work can the platoon accomplish (examples include security, maintenance,
resupply, coordination, rehearsals, inspections, and sleep) in the time available?
• How much time is available to the enemy for the activities listed in the previous items?
• How does the potential enemy time line for planning and preparation compare with that
developed for friendly forces?
2-18. As part of this analysis, the platoon leader conducts reverse planning to ensure that all specified,
implied, and essential tasks can be accomplished in the time available. He develops a reverse planning
schedule (time line) beginning with actions on the objective and working backward through each step of
the operation and preparation to the present time. This process also helps the platoon in making efficient
use of planning and preparation time.
2-19. Civilian considerations. The platoon leader uses this analysis to identify how the platoon will
handle situations involving civilians and/or nonmilitary agencies or organizations. Considerations that may
affect the platoon mission include the following:
• What are the applicable rules of engagement (ROE) and/or rules of interaction (ROI)? Soldiers
must understand when to fire as much as when not to.
• What procedures and guidelines will the platoon use in dealing with refugees, prisoners, and
other civilians?
• Will the platoon be working with civilian organizations, such as governmental agencies, private
groups, or the media?
• Will the platoon be tasked to conduct stability operations (such as peace operations or
noncombatant evacuation) or support operations (such as humanitarian or environmental
assistance)? The platoon must be prepared for the operation to change based on the situation. A
stability operation could very quickly escalate into a combat mission, as much as a combat
mission can change to a stability operation. Leaders need to be prepared for this and make sure
the platoon understands how the plan may change.
Mission Statement
2-20. Once his METT-TC analysis is complete, the platoon leader can then write the platoon mission
statement, including the task and purpose of the mission and answering the questions of WHO, WHAT,
WHEN, WHERE, and WHY. This is a clear, concise statement of the purpose of the operation and the
essential task(s) that will be crucial to its success. The essential tasks (the WHAT) should be stated in
terms that relate to enemy forces, friendly forces, and/or the terrain (for example, “SUPPRESS THE
ENEMY,” “OVERWATCH 2D PLATOON,” or “SEIZE AN OBJECTIVE”). The purpose (the WHY)
explains how the platoon mission supports the commander’s intent. The elements of WHO, WHERE, and
WHEN add clarity to the mission statement (for example, “3D PLT, C CO ATTACKS TO SEIZE OBJ
RAIDERS NLT 152200OCT2006, TO ALLOW THE COMPANY TO COMPLETE DESTRUCTION OF
ENEMY FORCES.”).
Note. Simultaneous planning and preparation are key factors in effective time management
during the troop-leading procedures. The next five steps (issue a WARNO, make a tentative
plan, initiate movement, conduct reconnaissance and coordination, and complete the plan) may
occur simultaneously and/or in a different order. As noted, the final troop-leading step,
supervise and refine, is on-going throughout the process.
sources of ideas concerning the platoon plan and war-gaming COAs. Refer to Chapters 3 and 4 of this
manual for more detailed discussions of planning considerations in offensive and defensive operations.
Crew Orders
2-33. The platoon leader and PSG make sure all crew members have been briefed by their TCs and
understand the platoon mission and concept of the operation through the use of backbriefs.
Rehearsals
2-34. A rehearsal is a practice session conducted to prepare units for an upcoming operation or event. The
platoon leader should never underestimate the value of rehearsals. They are his most valuable tools in
preparing the platoon for the upcoming operation. Effective rehearsals require crewmen to perform
required tasks, ideally under conditions that are as close as possible to those expected for the actual
operation. Participants maneuver their actual vehicles or use vehicle models or simulations while
interactively verbalizing their elements’ actions.
2-35. In a platoon-level rehearsal, the platoon leader selects the tasks to be practiced and controls
execution of the rehearsal. He will usually designate someone to role-play the enemy elements he expects
to face during the operation. Refer to FM 5-0 for a detailed discussion of rehearsal types, techniques, and
procedures.
Note. A rehearsal is different from the process of talking through what is supposed to happen.
For example, in a rehearsal, TCs should actually send spot reports (SPOTREP) when reporting
enemy contact, rather than simply saying, “I would send a SPOTREP now.”
2-36. Rehearsal purposes. The platoon leader uses well-planned, efficiently run rehearsals to accomplish
the following purposes:
• Reinforce training and increase proficiency in critical tasks.
• Reveal weaknesses or problems in the plan.
• Synchronize the actions of subordinate elements.
• Confirm coordination requirements between the platoon and adjacent units.
• Improve each Soldier’s understanding of the concept of the operation, the direct and indirect fire
plan, anticipated contingencies, and possible actions and reactions for various situations that
may arise during the operation.
2-37. Rehearsal types. The platoon leader can choose among several types of rehearsals, each designed
to achieve a specific result and with a specific role in the planning and preparation time line. The primary
types of rehearsals available to the tank platoon are the following:
• Confirmation brief. The confirmation brief is, in effect, a reverse briefing process routinely
performed by subordinate leaders immediately after receiving any instructions, such as an
OPORD or FRAGO. They confirm their understanding by repeating and explaining details of
the operation for their leader. The platoon leader should conduct confirmation briefs after his
TCs have received the OPORD, but before other phases of the platoon rehearsal begin.
• Backbrief. The backbrief allows the platoon leader to identify problems in his own concept of
the operation and his subordinates’ understanding of the concept; he also uses the backbrief to
learn how subordinates intend to accomplish their missions.
• Battle drill or SOP rehearsal. This rehearsal, conducted throughout the planning and
preparation time line, is used to ensure that all participants understand a technique or a specific
set of procedures. It does not necessarily cover a published drill or SOP, giving the commander
or leader flexibility in designing the rehearsal. For example, the platoon leader could rehearse
procedures for marking obstacle lanes or establishing local security. This rehearsal is critical
when working with new units/forces (such as light units); it allows all elements to understand
what each will be doing during a specific action and allows heavy and light forces to better mesh
their drills together.
2-38. Rehearsal techniques. The platoon leader can choose among several techniques in conducting
rehearsals, which should follow the crawl-walk-run training methodology to prepare the platoon for
increasingly difficult conditions. Considerations in selecting a rehearsal technique include the following:
• Time. How much will be needed for planning, preparation, and execution?
• Multi-echelon. How many echelons will be involved?
• Operations security (OPSEC). Will the rehearsal allow the enemy to gain intelligence about
upcoming operations?
• Terrain. What are the applicable terrain considerations?
• Training. Is this a new skill or something they have never done before, either individually or as
a platoon?
2-39. As noted in FM 5-0, techniques for conducting rehearsals are limited only by the resourcefulness of
the commander or leader; that manual outlines six basic techniques. Listed in descending order in terms of
the preparation time and resources required to conduct them, these techniques are the following:
• Full dress rehearsal. This rehearsal produces the most detailed understanding of the mission,
but is the most difficult to conduct in terms of preparation and resources. It involves every
Soldier and system participating in the operation. If possible, units should conduct the full dress
rehearsal under the same conditions (such as weather, time of day, terrain, and use of live
ammunition) that they will encounter during the actual operation. The platoon generally will
take part in full dress rehearsals as part of a larger unit.
• Reduced force rehearsal. This rehearsal normally involves only key leaders of the unit and is
thus less extensive than the full dress rehearsal in terms of preparation time and resources. The
commander decides the level of leader involvement. The selected leaders then rehearse the plan,
if possible on the actual terrain to be used for the actual operation. The reduced force rehearsal
is often conducted to prepare leaders for the full dress rehearsal.
• Terrain model rehearsal. This is the most popular rehearsal technique, employing an
accurately constructed model to help subordinates visualize the battle in accordance with the
commander’s or leader’s intent. When possible, the platoon leader places the terrain model
where it overlooks the actual terrain of the area of operations or is within walking distance of
such a vantage point. Size of the model can vary, but it should be large enough to depict
graphic control measures and important terrain features for reference and orientation.
Participants walk or move “micro” armor around the table or model to practice the actions of
their own vehicles in relation to other members of the platoon.
• Sketch map rehearsal. Units can use the sketch map technique almost anywhere, day or night.
Procedures are similar to those for the terrain model rehearsal. The sketch must be large enough
to allow all participants to see as each subordinate “walks” through an interactive oral
presentation of his actions. Platoon elements can use symbols or “micro” armor to represent
their locations and maneuver on the sketch.
• Map rehearsal. Procedures are similar to those for the sketch map rehearsal except that the
commander or leader uses a map and operation overlay of the same scale as he used to plan and
control the operation. This technique is useful in conjunction with a confirmation brief or
backbrief involving subordinate leaders and vehicle commanders. The platoon leader uses the
map and overlay to guide participants as they brief their role in the operation.
• Radio/digital rehearsal. The leader conducts this rehearsal by sending the OPORD and overlay
digitally (if equipped). He then may review this information by FM radio. The radio rehearsal
may be especially useful when the situation does not allow the platoon to gather at one location.
Subordinate elements check their communications systems and rehearse events that are critical
to the platoon plan. To be effective, the radio rehearsal requires all participants to have working
communications equipment.
Inspections
2-40. Precombat inspections allow the platoon leader to check the platoon’s operational readiness. The
key goal is to ensure that Soldiers and vehicles are fully prepared to execute the upcoming mission.
Inspections also contribute to improved morale.
2-41. It is essential that the entire platoon chain of command know how to conduct PCCs and PCIs in
accordance with applicable SOPs (ST 3-20.153 or the platoon’s own SOP) or based on the procedures
outlined in ARTEP 17-237-10-MTP. Examples of an inspection include the following:
• Perform before-operation maintenance checks, and report or repair deficiencies, if necessary.
• Perform communications checks of voice and digital systems.
• Inspect and verify maps and graphics.
• Ensure that crews understand the plan and are in the correct uniform and mission-oriented
protective posture (MOPP) level.
• Review the supply status of rations, water, fuel, oil, all types of ammunition, pyrotechnics, first-
aid kits, and batteries (for such items as flashlights, night-vision devices, and CBRN alarms).
Direct resupply operations as necessary.
2-42. The platoon leader and/or PSG should observe each crew during preparation for combat. They
should conduct the inspection once the TCs report that their crews and vehicles are prepared. It should be
understood that the platoon leader will check items he deems critical for the upcoming operations, but the
TCs need to check all items based on the platoon SOP. Failure at the TC level to check all systems, and
not just the ones the platoon leader is going to check could lead to a critical element or piece of equipment
to fail during operations.
2-43. PCCs differ from PCIs in that they are quick combat checks performed at crew level and designed to
account for individuals and equipment. PCCs do not require formal notification or conduct. They are
designed to be quick and concise in verification that the crew, section, and platoon have all necessary
equipment to accomplish the mission. Examples for PCCs include the following:
• Perform prepare-to-fire checks for all weapons, and report or repair deficiencies, if necessary.
Weapons are boresighted, and all sights are referred. Machine guns are test fired, if possible.
Ammunition is checked and stored properly.
• Upload vehicles in accordance with the platoon SOP. The standardization of load plans allows
the platoon leader and PSG to quickly check accountability of equipment. It also ensures
standard locations of equipment in each vehicle; this can be an important advantage if the
platoon leader is forced to switch to a different vehicle during an operation.
• Account for Soldiers’ uniforms and equipment necessary to accomplish the tasks.
CONTINGENCY PLANS
2-44. Leaders must use contingency planning to ensure that the platoon knows what actions to do in the
absence of the leadership. Less experienced crews, or crews faced with unusual, unexpected circumstances
will tend to carry out only their last orders. This tendency could place them in danger as the enemy is
developing tactics of rapid hit and run operations which will capitalize on platoons that are not proactive
and relay on the platoon leader or platoon sergeant to tell them what to do. The basic six-point
contingency plan is used whenever the key leadership is going to be gone from the platoon. Some
examples of when this is to be used: leader’s reconnaissance, dismounted patrols, or coordinating with
other units or local government agencies.
SPECIAL NOTE
Whenever time is available, there is no substitute for effective, thorough rehearsals conducted
prior to an operation, even if time is limited. Successful platoon leaders make the most of
every available minute.
LEADERSHIP
2-50. Competent, confident leadership inspires Soldiers, instilling in them the will to win and providing
them with purpose, direction, and motivation in combat. Leadership involves numerous important personal
principles and traits:
• Taking responsibility for decisions.
• Exemplifying and demanding loyalty.
SECTION II – CONTROL
SITUATIONAL UNDERSTANDING
2-52. Situational understanding is the product of applying analysis and judgment to the common
operational picture to determine the relationship among the factors of METT-TC (FM 3-0). For the
platoon leader, this is the ability to maintain a constant, clear mental “picture” of the tactical situation. This
picture includes an understanding of relevant terrain and the relationship between friendly and enemy
forces, as well as an awareness of the culture with which you are interacting. It also includes the ability to
correlate battlefield events as they develop. For platoon leaders and PSGs, situational understanding is the
key to making sound, quick tactical decisions. It allows them to form logical conclusions and to make
decisions that anticipate future events and information. A critical benefit of situational understanding on
the part of TCs is a reduction in fratricide incidents (see Appendix F, this FM, for information about
fratricide prevention). Situational understanding also gives leaders the ability to compress the time
necessary to conduct troop-leading procedures; this is especially critical when there is limited time to plan
and prepare for an operation.
2-53. The commander structures the battlefield based on his intent and the conditions of METT-TC. How
he does this affects the tank platoon leader’s mission planning and his ability to maintain situational
understanding. The framework of the battlefield can vary from a highly rigid extreme, with obvious front
and rear boundaries and closely tied adjacent units, to a dispersed and decentralized structure with few
secure areas and unit boundaries and no definable front and/or rear boundary.
2-54. Between these extremes are an unlimited number of possible variations. Maintaining situational
understanding becomes more difficult as the battlefield becomes less structured. Modern, highly mobile
operations involving small forces lend themselves to a less rigid framework that challenges the platoon
leader’s ability to maintain an accurate picture of the battlefield.
REDCON LEVELS
2-56. REDCON levels allow quick responses to changing situations and ensure completion of necessary
work and rest plans. The commander uses the REDCON status as a standardized way to adjust the unit’s
readiness to move and fight.
Note. Depending on the tactical situation and orders from the commander,
dismounted OPs may remain in place.
WORK PLAN
2-57. The work plan enables TCs and crewmen to focus their efforts in preparing vehicles, equipment, and
themselves for operations. Activities designated in the timeline include, but are not limited to, the
following:
• Reconnaissance, as required and within capabilities.
• Orders at crew and platoon level.
• Crew- and platoon-level training and rehearsals.
• Vehicle maintenance.
• Vehicle preparation (camouflage, stowage, boresighting, communications checks).
REST PLAN
2-58. The rest plan allows some soldiers to sleep while other crewmen conduct priorities of work and
maintain security. To be effective in sustained combat, a soldier should get a minimum of 4 to 6 hours of
uninterrupted sleep every 24 hours. Less than 4 hours of sleep can significantly degrade combat
performance.
2-59. Planning and decision-making are among the skills that suffer most dramatically when soldiers
cannot get enough sleep. The platoon SOP must provide for an adequate division of duties to allow leaders
to get some sleep. This may require the platoon leader, PSG, and one or both of the other TCs to share
duties. When soldiers are tired, confirmation briefings and backbriefs become critical whenever orders are
issued, even for the simplest task.
2-60. Whenever possible, the tank platoon leader should coordinate with the commander to use
infantrymen to assist with security. This coordination may enable the platoon leader to rest more soldiers
for longer periods of time as the infantry mans OPs and conducts dismounted patrols to augment the
security of the platoon.
BATTLEFIELD VISUALIZATION
2-61. To “see” the battlefield accurately, the platoon leader must have virtually perfect knowledge of the
friendly situation one level higher than his own (the company team or troop situation). It is also important
that he update the TCs periodically regarding the higher situation. The platoon leader must also have a
relatively complete knowledge of the terrain and the enemy situation. He must be able to visualize enemy
and friendly elements through time and to picture how the terrain will affect their actions.
Note. The requirement to maintain a real-time awareness of the battlefield one level higher does
not relieve the platoon leader of his responsibility to understand the situation and commander’s
intent two levels higher than his own. The difference is that his understanding of the situation
two levels higher does not have to be as specific or as timely.
2-62. Most of the information the platoon leader requires comes from what he can observe from his tank
and from reports he receives through his communications systems. Although few voice and digital reports
are specifically addressed to him, particularly on the company team or troop net, the platoon leader must
monitor them by eavesdropping. He then can track enemy and friendly elements and plot all movement on
his map and/or his digital display (FBCB2). This allows him to adjust his own movement so the platoon
makes contact with the enemy from positions of advantage, which are identified during the map/ground
reconnaissance step of the troop-leading procedures. Care must be taken in that inexperienced leaders do
not become dependent on digitalization for their situational understanding. The enemy may employ tactics
to jam digital systems or overload the leader and cause indecision.
2-63. How effectively the platoon leader can keep track of events on the battlefield depends, to some
degree, on experience. No matter what his experience level, the platoon leader is responsible for learning
techniques that allow him to relate the information he receives to his map or display and thereby track the
tactical situation and increase situational understanding.
The Operational Environment
2-64. Joint doctrine describes the operational environment as the air, land, maritime, space, and associated
adversary, friendly, and neutral systems (that is, political, military, economic, social, informational,
infrastructure, legal, and others) that are relevant to a specific Joint operation (JP 1-02). Understanding
this environment has always required a broad perspective. Leaders must consider more than the enemy’s
military forces and other combat capabilities.
2-65. The better leaders understand their own forces and capabilities, threats, and the environment, the
better they can employ and integrate the platoon’s actions to create conditions that lead to mission
accomplishment. The key to understanding is determining what information is relevant to the mission and
making informed decisions based on relevant information.
2-66. The structure for visualizing and analyzing the operational environment is METT-TC. The six
factors of METT-TC make up the major subject categories into which relevant information is grouped for
tactical operations.
Cultural Awareness
2-67. Successful accomplishment of military missions requires that Soldiers and leaders possess an
awareness of the cultures with which they interact. To develop this cultural awareness, and subsequently
apply this knowledge, Soldiers and leaders must first understand the key elements of a culture. These key
elements are the beliefs, values, behaviors, and norms that compose (or are important to) any culture,
whether friendly or enemy, local or foreign. Soldiers and leaders must then take into account these
considerations:
• US culture. They must understand the key elements of the US culture, and how these elements
influence their own perceptions of other cultures. In addition, they must realize how US culture
can affect other cultures, and that these effects influence other cultures’ perceptions of the US
and its people.
• COE culture. They must understand the key elements of the specific cultures within the COE
with which they expect to interact during operations. This includes indigenous populations as
well as multinational partners.
• Impact of culture on military operations. Military personnel must not only know what
cultural awareness is, but must also factor specific cultural information into the decisions and
actions they take to accomplish their missions. Information that may have a direct impact on
military operations includes—
• The influences of religion(s) on how a population behaves.
• The impact of geography on a population.
• Actions or speech that might insult or offend the members of certain cultures.
• The dangers of stereotyping and other biases.
• Differences in what indigenous populations and multinational partners value.
• The influences of social structure and relationships.
• Historical events and how they impact behaviors, beliefs, and relationships.
• How to communicate effectively with multinational partners and indigenous persons.
• The impact of cultural awareness on battle command.
MAPS, OVERLAYS, GRAPHIC CONTROL MEASURES, AND NAVIGATION
Maps and Overlays
2-68. Purposes. The most important role of maps and the accompanying overlays is to allow the platoon
to understand and visualize the scheme of maneuver. They are the primary tools the platoon leader uses to
organize information concerning the battlefield and to synchronize his assets once the battle begins. Maps
also provide TCs with a visual reference they can consult as needed. The platoon leader must ensure that
each TC has an updated map with the latest graphic control measures posted on the overlays and verify
their accuracy.
2-69. The map and overlays also assist the platoon leader in performing a variety of other functions. He
consults them constantly during reconnaissance operations, which can vary in complexity from a quick
map reconnaissance to a fully mounted ground reconnaissance of the area of operations. The map and
overlays help him to communicate the company or troop commander’s concept while he is issuing the
OPORD or briefing the TCs on the plan. During mission execution, the map and overlays play an
invaluable role in helping leaders to maintain situational understanding.
2-70. Types of overlays. Overlays can be prepared either in traditional fashion (written out by hand) or
digitally. The platoon leader may receive one or more types of overlays from the commander covering
such areas as maneuver, enemy forces, obstacles, fire support, and sustainment. All of the information is
important; the key for the platoon leader is to combine, augment, and unclutter the overlays so the
information needed for a specific situation is readily available to the platoon on one simple, combined
overlay.
2-71. Traditional overlays. Copied on acetate, traditional overlays display graphic control measures as
illustrated in Figure 2-1. They are prepared even if a platoon is equipped with FBCB2 digital systems in
the event the platoon loses digital data or has its digital link broken. Overlays allow the TCs to use the
graphic during rehearsals and dismounted operations when they will not have access to digital systems.
2-73. Although fairly accurate, digital systems suffer from minor flaws that detract from their effectiveness
as a stand-alone battle command tool. They serve as an enhancement to, not a substitute for, the platoon
leader’s map with traditional overlays.
2-77. Phase line. Phase lines are used to control and coordinate movement and synchronize tactical
actions. Platoons report crossing phase lines, but normally do not halt unless directed to do so. The
abbreviation on overlays is “PL.” (See Figure 2-4.)
2-78. Assembly area. Abbreviated “AA” on overlays, this is a location at which the platoon gathers
(usually as part of the company or troop) to conduct maintenance and resupply activities and to make other
preparations for future operations. The platoon must be able to defend from the assembly area. (See
Figure 2-5.)
2-79. Route. This is the prescribed course of travel from a specific point of origin (the start point [SP]) to
a specific destination, usually the release point (RP). The route should be named, and checkpoints should
be designated at key locations. The abbreviation on overlays is “RTE.” (See Figure 2-6.)
2-80. Checkpoint. Checkpoints are used to control and direct the maneuver of the tank platoon and tank
section. They are usually placed on identifiable terrain features, such as hilltops, road intersections, or
towers. (See Figure 2-7.)
2-81. Attack position. This is the last position the platoon occupies or passes through before crossing the
line of departure (LD). The platoon assumes the proper formation and performs last-minute checks of its
weapons systems. The abbreviation on overlays is “ATK POS.” (See Figure 2-8.)
2-82. Contact point. A contact point is a designated location, usually an easily identifiable terrain feature,
where two or more units are required to physically meet. The headquarters assigning the contact point
must specify what sort of activity is required when the units meet. The platoon leader may be tasked to
man or move to a contact point for coordination. (See Figure 2-9.)
2-83. Passage lane. This is the area or route through which a passing unit moves to avoid stationary units
and obstacles. Tank platoons may move on a lane or serve as the overwatch for a passing unit moving
through a lane. (See Figure 2-10.)
2-84. Passage point. This is the place where a unit physically passes through another unit. Tank platoons
may move through a passage point or overwatch other units moving through a passage point. The
abbreviation for a passage point is “PP.” (See Figure 2-11.)
2-85. Objective. An objective is a location on the ground used to orient operations, phase operations,
facilitate changes of direction, and provide for unity of effort (FM 1-02). The objective is the physical
object or area (such as enemy personnel, a man-made object, or a terrain feature) to be seized or held.
Tank platoons usually occupy some portion of the company objective. The abbreviation on overlays is
“OBJ.” (See Figure 2-12.)
2-86. Axis of advance. This is the general route and direction of advance extending toward the enemy. It
graphically portrays the commander’s intent, such as envelopment of the enemy. The unit may maneuver
and shoot supporting fires to either side of the axis provided it remains oriented on the axis and the
objective. For example, platoons may maneuver on or to the side of the axis assigned to their company as
long as deviations do not interfere with the maneuver of adjacent units. (See Figure 2-13.)
2-87. Direction of attack. This is the specific direction and route that the main attack or center of mass of
the unit will follow. Tank platoons move along directions of attack specified by the commander to take
advantage of terrain or to ensure maximum control of the moving unit. The overlay abbreviation is
“DOA.” (See Figure 2-14.)
2-88. Assault position. This is the location from which a unit assaults the objective. Ideally, it is the last
covered and concealed position before the objective. Tank platoons may occupy an assault position or
serve as overwatch for occupation of the position by the assault force. The abbreviation on overlays is
“ASLT POS.” (See Figure 2-15.)
2-89. Attack-by-fire position. This is the location from which a unit employs direct fire to destroy the
enemy from a distance. Tank platoons occupy an attack-by-fire position alone or as part of the company or
troop. From this position, the platoon can attack the enemy on the objective when occupation of the
objective is not advisable; the position can also be used in an attack on a moving enemy force. In addition,
this type of position can serve as a counterattack option for a reserve force. The overlay abbreviation is
“ABF.” (See Figure 2-16.)
2-90. Support-by-fire position. This is another type of position from which a maneuver element can
engage the enemy by direct fire, with the fires providing support for operations by other units. The tank
platoon usually occupies a support-by-fire position when providing supporting fires for an assault or
breach force or when serving as the overwatch for a moving force. The overlay abbreviation is “SBF.”
(See Figure 2-17.)
2-91. Battle position. This is a defensive location, oriented on the most likely enemy avenue of approach,
from which a unit defends. Tank platoon BPs and direct-fire orientations are designated in the OPORD.
(See Figure 2-18.)
2-92. Target reference point. This is an easily recognizable point on the ground (either natural or man
made) used to locate enemy forces or control fires. TRPs can designate either the center of an area on
which the platoon can mass its fires or the left or right limit of such an area. The tank platoon leader
controls platoon fires by designating platoon TRPs as necessary to supplement company or troop TRPs
issued by the commander. (See Figure 2-19.)
Navigation
2-93. To protect his platoon, the platoon leader must learn to use terrain to his advantage. Land navigation
of armored vehicles requires him to master the technique of terrain association. This entails the ability to
identify terrain features on the ground by the contour intervals depicted on the map. The platoon leader
analyzes the terrain using the factors of OAKOC and identifies major terrain features, contour changes, and
man-made structures along his axis of advance. As the platoon advances, he uses these features to orient
the platoon and to associate ground positions with map locations.
2-94. The intellectual concept of the area of operations (AO) is vital to the platoon’s survival during
navigation and movement. The platoon leader must constantly be aware of key terrain and enemy fields of
observation and fire that may create danger areas as the platoon advances. This allows him to modify
movement techniques, formations, and routes and to maintain cross talk with overwatch elements to make
sure the enemy does not surprise the platoon.
2-95. Navigation under limited visibility conditions is especially challenging. Vehicle thermal sights and
night-vision devices provide assistance, but leaders nonetheless can easily confuse terrain features and
become disoriented. See Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 for a discussion of limited visibility operations.
2-96. The platoon can employ a variety of techniques and equipment to assist in navigation. These are
summarized in the following discussion.
2-97. Fires. Using field artillery (FA) or mortars to fire smoke (during the day) or ground-burst
illumination (day or night) can provide a useful check on estimated locations or preplanned targets.
2-98. Global positioning systems. GPS devices receive signals from satellites or land-based transmitters.
They calculate and display the position of the user in military grid coordinates as well as in degrees of
latitude and longitude. Most GPS navigation readings are based on waypoints, the known positions
entered into the system’s memory. The platoon leader identifies points along the route or at the destination
and designates them as waypoints. Once waypoints are entered in the GPS, the device can display
information such as distance and direction from point to point. Leaders must still know how to employ
terrain association while navigating in case satellite or land signals are inoperative or unavailable.
2-99. Inertial navigation systems. Based on an initial calculation of the vehicle’s location from a known
point, inertial navigation systems use the rotation of the track to determine the location of the vehicle. The
M1A2’s POSNAV system is an example. POSNAV allows the TC to determine his exact location and
gives him the ability to plot up to 99 waypoints. Tank drivers can then use the steer-to function on their
driver’s integrated display (DID) as they move toward the designated waypoints. To compensate for track
slippage that could affect the accuracy of the inertial system, TCs should reinitialize their systems often,
using a GPS or a known point.
Note. In using the GPS or POSNAV, the platoon leader must remember that waypoints are only
one of several navigational tools he can use. He must still be prepared to use terrain association
and map-reading skills in case of digital system failures. In addition, the platoon leader must not
disregard the effects of terrain on the direction of movement. Terrain features that do not show
up on the digital display (such as hills, valleys, and cliffs) may cause deviations in the route the
platoon must take to reach the next waypoint.
2-100. Terrain/Grid Index Reference System (TIRS/GIRS). TIRS/GIRS are convenient tools for the
platoon leader to use as he maneuvers the platoon and disseminates control measures. Known points are
usually previously distributed graphic control measures. Referencing a location from a known point is
done in kilometers. For example, 500 meters is given as “POINT FIVE,” 1,000 meters as “ONE,” and
3,500 meters as “THREE POINT FIVE.” Cardinal directions are used. Shifts to the east or west are given
first, followed by shifts to the north or south. Consider the following transmission: “RED SET FROM
CHECKPOINT SEVEN—EAST ONE POINT EIGHT—NORTH ONE POINT SEVEN.” This means,
“We (the Red element) are set at a position 1,800 meters east and 1,700 meters north from checkpoint 7.”
Figure 2-20 illustrates this example.
times. On digitally linked vehicles, crews can monitor the commander’s integrated display (CID), with its
standardized graphics; this significantly reduces the need to send voice updates of friendly vehicle
positions.
2-105. Messenger. Use of a messenger is the most secure means of communications available to the tank
platoon. When security conditions and time permit, it is the preferred means. It is generally very flexible
and reliable. A messenger can be used to deliver platoon fire plans, status reports, or lengthy messages.
When possible, lengthy messages sent by messenger should be written to prevent mistakes and confusion.
2-106. Wire. This method of communications is especially effective in static positions. The platoon will
frequently employ a hot loop in initial defensive positions, OPs, and assembly areas. Unit SOPs, tailored
to counter the enemy’s electronic warfare capability, prescribe conditions and situations in which the
platoon will employ wire. Tank crews can communicate directly with dismounted infantry by routing wire
from the vehicle internal communications (VIC)-3 system through the loader’s hatch or vision block to a
field phone attached to the outside of the tank.
2-107. Visual. Visual communications are used to identify friendly forces or to transmit prearranged
messages quickly over short distances. Standard hand-and-arm or flag signals work well during periods of
good visibility. Crews can use thermal paper, flashlights, chemical lights, or other devices during periods
of limited visibility, but they must exercise extreme care to avoid alerting the enemy to friendly intentions.
TCs must clearly understand visual signals as they operate across the battlefield; each TC must be ready to
pass on visual signals from the platoon leader to other vehicles in the platoon. See STP 17-19K1-SM (the
skill level 1 Soldier’s manual for MOS 19K) and FM 21-60 for a description of hand-and-arm signals.
2-108. Pyrotechnics. Pyrotechnic ammunition can be used for visual signaling. The meaning of these
signals is identified in paragraph 5 of the OPORD and in the signal operation instructions (SOI). The main
advantage of pyrotechnics is the speed with which signals can be transmitted. The main disadvantages are
the enemy’s ability to detect and imitate them and to use them to identify friendly positions.
2-109. Radio. The radio is the platoon’s most flexible, most frequently used, and least secure means of
communications. It can quickly transmit information over long distances with great accuracy. Secure
equipment and the ability of the SINCGARS to frequency-hop provide the platoon with communications
security against most enemy direction-finding, interception, and jamming capabilities. Sophisticated
direction-finding equipment, however, can trace almost any radio signal, allowing the enemy to locate and
destroy the transmitter and its operator. Survival of the tank platoon depends on good communications
habits, especially when it is using the radio; the platoon leader must strictly enforce radio discipline. The
most effective way to use the radio is to follow standard radiotelephone procedures (RTP), including
brevity and proper use of approved operational terms; these techniques are covered later in this section.
2-110. Digital. FBCB2 enables the platoon leader to transmit digitally encoded information over the
SINCGARS radio to other similarly equipped vehicles. Linkup refers to the ability of the tank’s radio to
transmit and receive digital information. When properly linked, the platoon leader receives continuously
updated position location information for the platoon’s vehicles, as well as for those of the company or
troop commander and executive officer (XO) and of adjacent platoons. Using the digital link with other
platoon vehicles and the company/troop commander, the platoon leader can also send and receive
preformatted reports and overlays with graphic control measures. ST 3-20.153 provides an example SOP
for use of digital systems.
2-113. Company/troop command. The commander uses this net to maneuver the company or troop as
well as to process routine administrative/logistical (A/L) reports. Platoon leaders and PSGs monitor this
net to keep abreast of the current tactical situation from the reports of the commander, XO, and other
platoon leaders. They transmit on the company net to keep the commander informed and to cross talk with
other platoon leaders coordinating the tactical actions of their platoons. Both the platoon leader and PSG
must have the ability to monitor and transmit on this net. All TCs must be able to switch to this net to send
reports and receive guidance if they are unable to contact their platoon leader or PSG.
Net Control
2-114. Each crewman must be an expert in the technical aspects of his voice and digital communications
systems. In particular, he must understand how to maintain each system, how to place it into operation,
and how to troubleshoot it whenever he suspects it is not functioning properly. The smooth functioning of
the platoon net allows accurate information to be passed quickly to and from the platoon leader. This
information flow is critical in maintaining the platoon leader’s situational understanding. It becomes
especially important when contact is made and the volume of traffic on the platoon and company/troop nets
increases drastically. To ensure that information flowing over the net is organized and controlled in a
manner that permits the platoon leader to understand it and to issue orders, use the following techniques.
2-115. Radiotelephone procedures. Proper RTP is the cornerstone of effective command and control in
the tank platoon. Every platoon member must be an expert in communications procedures. This ensures
efficient communications within the platoon and allows members of the platoon to communicate
effectively with outside elements such as other platoons or the company or troop headquarters.
2-116. Depending on the enemy’s electronic warfare capability, the company commander may elect to
use standardized call signs to simplify RTP. These call signs allow all users of a net to instantly recognize
the calling station. Examples would be the use of RED, WHITE, and BLUE to designate 1st, 2d, and 3d
platoons, respectively, and the use of bumper numbers to identity tanks within a platoon.
2-117. Techniques of effective communications. The platoon leader and PSG must ensure that every
member of the platoon understands and adheres to the following techniques and guidelines, which can
contribute to more effective, more secure tactical communications.
2-118. Minimize duration. All messages sent within or from the tank platoon must be short and
informative. The longer the message, the greater the opportunity for enemy elements to use electronic
detection to pinpoint the platoon’s location. Message length can be controlled in several ways:
• Write down the message and then eliminate all unnecessary words from the written message
before sending it.
• Read the message as written when sending it.
• Use brevity codes that reduce the need to explain the tactical picture in detail.
• Break long messages into several parts and send each part separately.
2-119. Minimize signature. When sending a message, every tanker must be conscious of the size and
nature of the electronic signature that he is emitting. To reduce the size of the signature, he can use terrain
to mask his transmissions from known or suspected enemy positions. He should set the transmitter to the
lowest possible power that will provide sufficient range.
2-120. Know the system. Each crewman must be an expert in the technical aspects of his voice and
digital communications systems. In particular, he must understand how to maintain each system, how to
place it into operation, and how to troubleshoot it whenever he suspects it is not functioning properly.
2-121. Use an effective format. A thorough knowledge of report formats is critical in ensuring timely
reporting of enemy information, especially in fast-moving tactical situations. Every crewman should be
familiar with the report formats that are outlined in Appendix B and know how to use them effectively. At
the same time, however, they must never delay reports only to assure the correct format. ALWAYS
REPORT ACCURATE INFORMATION AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE!
2-122. Reporting. In keeping the platoon leader informed, TCs must avoid redundant voice and digital
reports. They monitor the platoon net so they can avoid reporting information the platoon leader has
already received from other TCs. The PSG pays close attention to the company or troop net while the
platoon net is active; he then relays critical information to the platoon. This technique allows the platoon
leader to concentrate on fighting the platoon. Once the platoon leader begins to develop the situation, he is
responsible for reporting the platoon’s tactical situation to the commander using SPOTREPs and situation
reports (SITREP). Refer to Appendix B for information on report formats.
2-123. As a basic guideline, reports of enemy activity should follow the SALUTE format, which covers
these factors:
• Size. This includes the number of sighted personnel, vehicles, or other equipment.
• Activity. This covers what the enemy is doing.
• Location. This is usually reported as the grid coordinates of enemy elements.
• Unit. This covers any indications useful in unit identification, such as patches, signs, and
vehicle markings.
• Time. This item details when enemy activity was observed.
• Equipment. This includes description or identification of all equipment associated with the
enemy activity.
2-124. Initial contact. Any vehicle can alert the platoon to an enemy. The section leader in contact
(platoon leader or PSG) deploys and fights his section according to the platoon leader’s intent. The section
leader not in contact forwards the report to higher headquarters. If the entire platoon is in contact, the
platoon leader fights the platoon while the PSG reports the contact to the commander.
2-125. Routine traffic. The PSG normally receives and consolidates A/L reports and other routine
communications from the TCs and passes the reports to the platoon leader or higher headquarters using the
procedures prescribed in unit SOPs.
2-126. Digital traffic. Digital traffic may precede, replace, or follow voice transmissions; in many cases,
it will reduce the need for and redundancy of voice traffic. Do not duplicate digital traffic with voice
messages if digital transmissions precede or can replace voice traffic in a timely manner. Because digital
systems are not totally reliable, it may be necessary to verify the receipt of critical digital traffic.
Note. The following discussion focuses on platoon-level operations only. For more information
on company-level operations, see FM 3-90.1 (FM 71-1).
• OPSEC.
• Organizing for combat.
• Tactical operations.
• Personnel.
• CS.
2-137. In addition to guidance in these general categories, ST 3-20.153 covers specific operational factors
that the platoon leader must take into account in fire distribution and control. These additional SOP items
include the following:
• Vehicle positions (for example, Tank 2 will always be the left flank tank).
• TRP marking procedures and materials.
• Sectors of fire for each tank.
• Engagement bands (based on ammunition capabilities and expected enemy forces).
• Procedures for coordination with adjacent units.
• Guidelines for identifying and covering dead space.
2-138. The platoon leader should supplement his SOP by developing standardized procedures for
offensive and defensive fire planning. These procedures should be detailed enough to allow rapid fire
planning after the terrain has been analyzed. This initial planning may be refined and improved as time
permits.
Note. Visual control measures (and the accompanying SOP actions) may be used to start and
stop engagements, shift fires, and signal prearranged actions. On the other hand, an important
consideration for the platoon leader in developing the unit SOP is that the dynamics of battle
will normally require that fires be controlled using the radio. The radio instructions used to
initiate SOPs (as well as issue fire commands) must be brief and precise.
Distribution
2-139. The platoon leader employs two primary methods to ensure effective distribution of direct fires:
fire patterns and firing techniques.
Fire Patterns
2-140. The entire platoon must thoroughly understand the three basic fire patterns: frontal, cross, and
depth. In addition, each tank crew must understand its responsibilities, by SOP, in using the fire patterns
for target engagement. The basic fire patterns cover most situations and promote rapid, effective platoon
fire distribution. They are normally used in the defense, but may be modified for employment with
techniques of movement. They may be used at both platoon and section level.
2-141. Regardless of the fire pattern used, the goal is to engage near targets first, and then shift fires to far
targets. Tanks should engage targets near to far and most dangerous to least dangerous in their sector. A
most dangerous enemy is any enemy antitank system preparing to engage the platoon. The platoon sector
is defined by TRPs, which are used to mass platoon fires at specific locations and to mark the left and right
planning limits for platoon fires. As directed or when he determines it is necessary, the section or platoon
leader may make exceptions to the most dangerous to least dangerous guideline; an example would be
engagement of designated priority targets (such as command and control vehicles).
2-142. Frontal fire pattern. The frontal pattern is used when all tanks within the platoon can fire to their
front (see Figure 2-22). Flank tanks engage targets to their front (right tank shoots right target, left tank
shoots left target) and shift fires toward the center as targets are destroyed. Leader tanks engage targets to
their front and shift fire to the outside as targets are destroyed. The frontal fire engagement rule is near to
far, flank to center, and center to flank.
2-143. Cross fire pattern. The cross fire pattern is used when obstructions prevent some or all tanks
within the platoon from firing to the front or when the enemy’s frontal armor protection requires use of
flank shots to achieve penetration. In this pattern, each tank engages targets on the flank of its position.
The right flank tank engages the left portion of the target area while the left flank tank engages the right
portion. As targets are destroyed, tanks shift fires inward. The leader tanks engage the center targets and
shift fire to the outside as targets are destroyed. The cross fire engagement rule is outside in, near to far.
An example of the cross pattern is shown in Figure 2-23.
2-144. Depth fire pattern. The depth fire pattern is used when targets are exposed in depth.
Employment of depth fire is dependent on the position and formation of both the engaging platoon and the
target. For example, the entire platoon may be required to fire on a column formation in depth; in other
cases, individual tanks engaging in their sector may have to fire in depth. If the whole platoon is firing, it
may be possible for each tank to fire in depth on a portion of the enemy formation (see Figure 2-24). The
far left tank engages the far target and shifts fire toward the center of the formation as targets are
destroyed; the left center tank engages the center target and shifts fire toward the rear as targets are
destroyed. The right center tank engages the closest (front) target and shifts fire to the rear as targets are
destroyed; the far right tank engages the center target and shifts fire to the front as targets are destroyed.
Firing Techniques
2-145. In addition to employing fire patterns, the platoon leader may choose one of three firing
techniques to distribute and control the direct fires of the platoon: simultaneous, alternating, and observed.
Figures
2-25 through 2-30 illustrate a variety of situations in which the firing techniques are employed; the
illustrations include the applicable fire commands. (Note. Refer to the discussion of fire commands later
in this section.)
2-146. Simultaneous fire. This is the primary firing technique used by the platoon. It is employed
during most offensive engagements when the unit encounters surprise targets. It is also used in most
defensive engagements when the enemy array is numerous enough to require multiple engagements by
each tank in the unit. In that case, all tanks engage simultaneously in their assigned sectors. Figures 2-25
through 2-28 illustrate various simultaneous fire situations.
2-147. Alternating fire. Alternating fire is normally used when the platoon is in a defensive position or
is undetected. Each tank alternates firing and observing in conjunction with the other tank in the section
until both are satisfied that they are hitting the target consistently. Subsequent fire, by command, is then
simultaneous. During alternating fire, Tanks 2 and 3 (the wingmen in each section) are normally the first
to fire at their outside targets. The section leaders (the platoon leader and PSG) provide observation before
firing at their targets. The process continues until all targets are destroyed or the leader switches to
simultaneous fire. Refer to Figure 2-29 for an illustration of how alternating fire is employed.
2-148. Observed fire. Observed fire is normally used when the platoon is in protected defensive
positions and engagement ranges are in excess of 2,500 meters. The first tank to fire in each section
engages designated targets while the second tank observes. The second tank prepares to engage targets in
the event the first tank misses consistently, experiences a malfunction, or runs low on ammunition. This
technique maximizes observation and assistance capabilities for the observing tank while protecting its
location. See Figure 2-30 for an example of observed fire.
Figure 2-25. Use of cross fire pattern and simultaneous fire technique to engage enemy PCs
(with platoon leader’s fire command)
Figure 2-26. Use of frontal fire pattern and simultaneous fire technique to engage multiple
enemy tanks (with platoon leader’s fire command)
Figure 2-27. Use of different fire patterns in each section (with simultaneous fire technique) to
engage enemy targets (with platoon leader’s fire command)
Figure 2-28. Use of depth fire pattern and simultaneous fire technique (with section fire
command)
Figure 2-29. Use of cross fire pattern and alternating fire technique (with section fire
command)
Figure 2-30. Use of observed fire technique (with section fire command)
Control
2-149. The platoon leader uses two processes to control fires: fire planning and fire commands. He
decides how to control fires based on the factors of METT-TC, especially the specific tactical situation and
the time available to plan and prepare.
Fire Planning
2-150. The more thoroughly the platoon leader can plan an operation, the more effective the platoon’s
fires are likely to be. The amount of time available for fire planning, however, depends almost entirely on
the collective factors of METT-TC. There are also important considerations based on whether the
operation is offensive or defensive in nature.
2-151. For example, some defensive operations may allow the platoon leader hours or days to conduct
fire planning. Intelligence assets may be able to acquire, track, and report enemy elements as they move
toward the platoon. The platoon leader can then initiate fires with a platoon fire command or a
predetermined event (such as the enemy crossing a trigger line). He can also rely on detailed planning and
preparation to assist him in distributing fires effectively during the fight. Further fire commands may be
required, but the object of the planning phase is to anticipate events and coordinate fires before the fight
starts. A well-planned defense requires minimum radio traffic over the platoon net during execution;
trigger points, priority of engagements, and targets are established in advance.
2-152. In other situations, especially during offensive operations (such as a meeting engagement or in a
movement to contact), the platoon will have only limited time to plan and prepare. At best, the platoon
leader may have time to issue a full platoon fire command; on the other hand, a member of the platoon may
acquire and engage a “most dangerous” target before the platoon leader has an opportunity to initiate his
fire command. In the absence of adequate planning time, the platoon leader must initially rely on
preestablished, well-rehearsed SOPs to distribute and control fires and ensure fast, predictable engagement
by all tanks.
Note. Fire planning for offensive and defensive situations is covered in detail in a discussion
later in this section and in Chapters 3 and 4 of this manual.
2-153. No matter what kind of situation it expects to face, the platoon must learn and rehearse target
acquisition responsibilities; use of TRPs and fire patterns; and procedures for initiating, shifting, and
stopping fires. Its survival depends on it.
Fire Commands
2-154. The effective use of fire commands is a function of the leader’s knowledge of the enemy and the
fire control process and of the time available to plan, prepare, and rehearse. Using a standard format for a
platoon or section fire command ensures that all essential information and control measures are given in a
minimum amount of time. It enables the unit to react instantly and effectively, even under the most
adverse conditions. Standardized platoon and section fire command formats must be established by unit
SOP and then practiced by platoon leaders and PSGs (the section leaders) for optimum proficiency.
Brevity and clarity are essential. Abbreviated methods for identifying target locations are encouraged;
however, these methods must be familiar and understandable.
2-155. The platoon leader may provide coordinating instructions or additional information to individual
TCs; this information is not part of the platoon fire command. When one tank sends a contact or spot
report and it is reasonable to believe all other tanks in the section or platoon have received it, the section or
platoon leader issues only the elements needed to complete the fire command. In all cases, a TC has the
freedom to engage a target without a section or platoon fire command if he is under immediate
enemy contact.
2-156. The battlefield situation and/or platoon SOP dictate the number of elements used in a fire
command. The standard platoon fire command includes up to six elements, transmitted in the following
order:
• Alert.
• Weapon or ammunition (optional).
• Target description.
• Orientation.
• Control (optional).
• Execution.
2-157. Alert. The alert element addresses the tanks that are being directed to fire; it does not require the
individual initiating the fire command to identify himself. (Note. Wingman tanks or sections not
designated to engage should sense the target effects and be prepared to engage targets as necessary.)
2-158. The platoon or company/troop SOP may specify code words to be used to standardize the alert
element, as in the following example:
• RED. Entire platoon prepare to fire.
• ALPHA. Platoon leader and his wingman prepare to fire.
• BRAVO. PSG and his wingman prepare to fire.
2-159. Weapon or ammunition (optional). The weapon is not announced unless specific control
measures are required. Ammunition is not announced unless a specific type is dictated by the situation.
The TC selects ammunition based on the platoon SOP, the number and type of enemy targets, and the
supply status of ammunition (how much of each type is on hand).
2-160. Target description. This element briefly describes the target in terms of number, type, and
activity (“THREE TANKS MOVING EAST TO WEST”). If the target is stationary, the activity may be
omitted.
2-161. Orientation. Target location is described using one of two methods:
• Reference point or terrain feature. This method is used for most defensive engagements and
can also be applied to offensive situations. If the platoon leader designates separate targets for
each section, he assigns responsibility and clarifies target location in the orientation element.
For example: “ALPHA—TWO TANKS—TRP 3126—BRAVO—BMPs AND TROOPS—
ROAD JUNCTION.”
• Direction of target. This method is used most often in the offense when no TRP or definitive
terrain feature is near the target. Direction is indicated from the projected line of movement
(LOM) of the platoon in the offense or from the center of sector (COS) in the defense (for
example, “LEFT FRONT” or “RIGHT FLANK”). The clock option indicates direction starting
with the LOM or COS at 12 o’clock (for example: “TWO O’CLOCK;” “NINE O’CLOCK”).
The cardinal direction may also be used (for example: “NORTHWEST” or “SOUTHWEST”).
When using the direction method, the platoon leader will announce a range to help his TCs
locate the targets. Examples of this method: “RIGHT FRONT—ONE EIGHT HUNDRED” or
“TEN O’CLOCK—TWO FOUR HUNDRED.”
2-162. Control (optional). The platoon leader can use the control element to provide the platoon with
critical firing information in several areas, including the following:
• Fire pattern. The platoon leader may specify which pattern (frontal, cross, or depth) he has
selected based on his plan for fire distribution. As noted, if the control element is omitted, the
platoon engages targets using frontal fire. Refer to the discussion of fire patterns earlier in this
section.
• Firing technique. The platoon leader may designate which of the three firing techniques
(simultaneous, alternating, or observed) he wants to employ. If no technique is specified, all
tanks engage simultaneously. If the platoon leader wishes to designate a firing tank or section,
he specifies which tanks will fire in the alert element of the fire command. Refer to the
discussion of firing techniques earlier in this section.
• Ammunition or weapon. The platoon leader may designate the amount or type of ammunition
or weapons to be fired. For example, he might direct four bursts from the coax machine gun for
every two main gun rounds fired. (Note. This information may also be provided in the weapon
or ammunition element of the fire command. Refer to the discussion of that element.)
2-163. Execution. The execution element indicates when firing will begin. Normally, this is simply the
command “FIRE.” If simultaneous fire is desired or if the platoon’s fire is to be coordinated with other
direct or indirect fires, the execution element “AT MY COMMAND” is given first. The resulting delay
allows the coordination of all fires to be completed while the individual crews select their targets, issue
their own fire commands, and prepare to engage. If for any reason a tank is not prepared to fire (for
example, because it is conducting ammunition transfer or has experienced an equipment malfunction), the
TC informs the platoon leader or PSG immediately. The TC estimates and reports the time required for the
tank to become ready to fight.
2-164. As he prepares and issues the fire command, the platoon leader must remember that tanks have to
occupy hull-down positions before firing. A pro-word (for example, “TOP HAT”) can be used in the
execution element to signal this move.
Note. Once engagement of the enemy begins, the platoon leader controls fires by issuing
subsequent fire commands or individual elements of the fire command; this serves to focus and
distribute the fires of individual tanks, a section, or the entire platoon. Figure 2-31 illustrates an
example of a platoon fire command; note that the optional element specifying the weapon or
ammunition has been omitted. Refer to Figures 2-25 through 2-30 on pages 2-29 through 2-34
for examples of how fire commands are used to control and distribute fires in a number of
tactical situations. The engagement is terminated when all targets are destroyed or when the
platoon leader announces “CEASE FIRE.”
Alert “RED—
Target description THREE TANKS—
Orientation VICINITY TRP ZERO ZERO SIX—
Control (optional) CROSS—
Execution AT MY COMMAND—FIRE”
Figure 2-31. Example platoon fire command
2-170. If possible, the platoon leader, along with his TCs, physically inspects the ground where the
company team commander has directed him to orient his platoon to engage the enemy. Looking back
toward the BP, the platoon leader selects the platoon’s primary firing positions, alternate positions (50 to
100 meters from each tank’s primary position), and supplementary positions (to orient platoon fires into
another engagement area or TRP).
2-171. As the platoon leader walks the engagement area, he identifies dead space based on how the
enemy is expected to move through the area. He either adjusts the firing positions or plans indirect fires to
cover the dead space. He verifies grids using the GPS.
Note. Materials that can be used in constructing TRPs include target panels, heated with Class
VIII heating pads, and caliber .50 or 7.62-mm ammunition cans filled with charcoal or a mixture
of sand and diesel fuel.
2-173. The two main types of firing positions are defilade and keyhole. In defilade positions, tanks are
vulnerable from the flanks and to enemy overwatch fire. Keyhole positions (also called window positions)
provide greater protection by taking advantage of terrain features that create a “keyhole” around the
position. Ideally, the platoon should employ a combination of defilade and keyhole positions whenever
possible to take advantage of their respective advantages and negate their weaknesses.
2-174. Defilade positions. There are three types of defilade positions:
• Turret-down. A turret-down position uses terrain to mask most of the tank, with only the
highest parts of the vehicle (such as the GPS and CITV) exposed to the enemy. Targets cannot
be engaged with the main gun from this position, but can use the turret top mounted machine
guns.
• Hull-down. A hull-down position exposes only as much of the tank as needed to engage targets
with the main gun.
• Hide. The platoon leader may assign a hide position to the rear of the BP for each tank to
occupy after the initial preparation of its firing positions. The hide position serves two
purposes: A well-constructed, effectively camouflaged hide position may delay enemy
acquisition of the platoon; a hide position located away from the prepared position may protect
the platoon from the full effects of enemy artillery fires. (Locations of hide positions are terrain-
dependent, but they should offer cover and concealment.)
2-175. Keyhole positions. Keyhole positions afford the firing tank a measure of protection from enemy
overwatching fires (see Figure 2-33). They restrict observation, and thus limit vulnerability to only one
segment of the platoon’s engagement; therefore, only those targets that can be seen (and engaged) by the
tank can return fire on it. The platoon leader must select each keyhole position carefully so the ability to
interlock fires with other tanks in the platoon is not degraded. Moving into or away from the opening to
the position can vary the width of the field of fire. Weaknesses of keyhole positions are limited sectors of
fire and excessive dead space. In built-up areas, dismounted infantry should be used to provide protection
from infiltration.
the increased PK; however, due to their smaller size, the PH for these vehicles will normally be lower than
that for tanks.
Note. Frontal engagements of enemy fighting vehicles with lighter armor can begin at longer
ranges; the PK is higher due to the difference in protection levels.
2-179. Further consideration on engagement range will be based on enemy capabilities and type of
equipment. Platoons may be faced with a full spectrum of equipment from converted civilian trucks, older
equipment upgrade with new sensors and capabilities, to high level state of the art equipment. Now the
platoon leader must not only understand how far his forces can see and shoot, but how far the enemy can
see and shot. The tank platoon is no longer in an environment where it can see or fire farther than the
enemy: it may even be faced with an enemy with superior equipment.
2-180. Long-range engagement considerations. When the decision is made to engage the enemy at
longer ranges, several additional planning factors must be considered. In choosing long-range
engagement, the platoon leader is almost certain to compromise his positions and loses the element of
surprise. At the same time, however, the forward placement of a platoon may deceive the enemy as to the
location of the main defensive position and cause the enemy to deploy sooner than he had planned. Long-
range engagements require the use of sensing tanks and observed fire techniques; as a result, the platoon
leader should always attempt to conduct them from an elevated firing position. He should task only his
most proficient firing crews and most accurate tanks to execute the long-range gunnery mission.
Note. Refer to FM 3-20.12 for an in-depth discussion of the training issues involved in
preparing crews for long-range engagements.
Sketch Cards
2-189. As each tank crew prepares its position, it completes a sketch card, a rough topographical sketch
of the tank’s assigned sector showing its deliberate or hasty defensive fighting position. The sketch card
aids the crew in target acquisition and enables the platoon leader to develop his platoon fire plan. The crew
makes two copies, one to keep and one to send to the platoon leader. Sketch cards are prepared either
traditionally (handwritten) or using the tank’s digital equipment (FBCB2). Refer to Chapter 4, pages 4-11
through 4-16 for additional information about sketch cards.
Rehearsals
2-191. During rehearsals for defensive operations, the platoon leader ensures the platoon practices the
platoon fire plan. It is absolutely critical that all crewmen understand the complete plan. Each TC must
know what actions he is required to execute at each point in the mission. Each gunner must understand
what his exact sector is and under what conditions engagement priorities will change. (Note. The gunners
on the platoon leader’s and PSG’s tanks should be the most experienced at their positions within the
platoon, capable of executing the plan without further guidance from their TCs. This frees the platoon
leader and PSG to fight the battle rather than spend too much time controlling their individual tanks.)
Preparation Summary
2-192. The platoon leader must be resourceful and thorough in making sure all crews understand and can
execute the plan under all conceivable conditions. This includes planning, preparing, and conducting
rehearsals for supplementary and successive BPs that he has been directed to prepare. If time does not
permit all of these steps, he must prioritize his preparation activities.
2-193. The end product of the platoon leader’s fire planning and preparation is not merely a thorough,
accurate fire plan, although this is an indispensable component of the defense. To be successful in battle,
he must complete these phases of the defensive operation with tank crews that understand in detail what
they are supposed to do and a platoon that, as a package, is completely prepared to fight.
TC adjusts fire and switches targets in accordance with the platoon fire command or platoon SOP. The
commander and/or platoon leader will already have assigned engagement priorities according to the
mission and other factors. As an example, defensive engagement priorities might be the following:
• Priority 1. Most dangerous targets (tanks, ATGMs).
• Priority 2. Dangerous targets.
• Priority 3. Command and control assets (vehicles with the most antennas).
• Priority 4. Air defense assets.
• Priority 5. Engineer assets.
• Priority 6. Least dangerous targets (supply vehicles).
2-200. How long each tank can safely remain in a hull-down position will depend on the enemy situation.
Whenever possible, a tank should remain in position to kill enemy targets. Taking the time to move
between a turret-down position and a hull-down position, however, increases the enemy’s probability of a
hit because he will be closing on the tank’s position. If the enemy is within 2,000 meters, relatively
numerous, closing rapidly, and the mission requires a defense (as opposed to delay), a defending tank will
normally be more successful continuing to fire and not moving to his turret-down position. On the other
hand, if the enemy is stationary and/or has tanks or ATGMs in overwatch, the crew should fire no more
than two rounds before returning to a turret-down position. When the crew is not engaging enemy targets,
the tank should return to a turret-down position and provide observation or assistance to other tank crews.
Note. Similar considerations, problems, and criteria also apply to movement between primary
and alternate positions.
Contingencies
2-201. After direct fire has been initiated, platoon fire commands will be used only to cover previously
unanticipated contingencies. For example, the platoon leader might have one section engaging to the left
side of the sector and the other to the right after anticipating an enemy company deployed on line across
the platoon’s sector. If the entire enemy force arrives along the right side, use of a fire command gives the
platoon leader the flexibility to adapt his distribution of fires rapidly and economically to the new situation.
He issues the appropriate fire command to initiate the direct-fire fight.
Ammunition Transfer
2-202. Important considerations as the engagement continues are each tank’s supply of ready ammunition
and the related requirement for ammunition transfer. No tank should totally deplete its ready ammunition
before initiating the transfer of rounds from its semi-ready storage area. The loader must maintain a
running count of ready ammunition available and keep the TC informed of the tank’s ammunition status.
In turn, the platoon leader and PSG must monitor the status of their wingmen. In addition, because all four
tanks cannot transfer ammunition at the same time, the platoon leader must issue guidance on how and
when each tank will conduct the transfer.
2-203. As ready ammunition is depleted, each crew must be ready to transfer rounds. Based on the
platoon leader’s guidance, the tank backs into its hide position and completes ammunition transfer when
the situation allows. The platoon leader needs to ensure that if prestock is available, he takes advantage of
it during low points in the battle to keep his tanks as close as possible to full load of main gun ammunition.
before turning around. To accomplish this, he turns over control of the main gun and coax machine gun to
the gunner. He faces the rear and quickly guides the tank backward to a covered route by giving the driver
short commands (for example, “LEFT FAST” or “HARD RIGHT”). The gunner acquires, engages, and
adjusts fire on targets while the TC maintains command of the vehicle’s movement.
Note. If exhaust smoke prevents the crew from seeing where the tank is going and the tank is no
longer screened by the first salvo of smoke grenades, the TC should use a second salvo of
grenade-launched smoke.
CAUTION
VEESS will be used only when the vehicle is burning diesel fuel. Use
of VEESS when burning any other type of fuel will cause a fire hazard.
Chapter 3
Offensive Operations
Offense is the decisive form of war. While tactical considerations may call for the
platoon to execute defensive operations for a period of time, defeat of the enemy
requires a shift to offensive operations. To ensure the success of the attack, the tank
platoon leader must understand the fundamentals of offense and apply troop-leading
procedures during the planning and preparation phases of the operation.
SURPRISE
3-3. Platoons achieve surprise by following OPSEC procedures and making the best possible use of
vehicle speed, covered and concealed routes, vehicle optics, firepower, and stand-off capabilities during
tactical movement.
CONCENTRATION
3-4. Platoons achieve concentration by massing the effects of their weapon systems without necessarily
massing platoon vehicles at a single location. Modern navigation and position location/reporting systems
allow the platoon leader to disperse his vehicles while retaining the ability to quickly mass the effects of
the platoon’s weapon systems whenever necessary. In addition, these advanced systems allow him to
maintain command, control, and OPSEC at all times. The platoon leader must remember that it is more
important to move using covered and concealed routes to positions from which the platoon can mass fires
and engage the enemy than it is to maintain precise formations and predetermined speeds.
TEMPO
3-5. Tempo, the rate of military action, can range from fast to slow. While a fast tempo is preferred, the
platoon leader must remember that synchronization sets the stage for successful platoon operations.
Leaders must understand the different rates of speed when comparing dismounted forces to mounted
forces. To support the commander’s intent, he must ensure that his platoon’s movement is synchronized
with the movement of other company or troop elements as well as with adjacent and supporting units. If
the platoon is forced to slow down because of terrain or enemy resistance, the platoon leader reports this
change so the commander can alter the tempo of company or troop movement to maintain synchronization.
AUDACITY
3-6. At the platoon level, audacity is marked by violent execution of the mission and a willingness to
seize the initiative. Knowledge of the commander’s intent two levels up allows the platoon leader to take
advantage of battlefield opportunities whenever they present themselves, enhancing the effectiveness of the
platoon’s support for the entire offensive operation.
FORMS OF OFFENSE
3-7. The four general forms of tactical offense described in FM 3-0 are movement to contact, attack,
exploitation, and pursuit. Characteristics include the following:
• Movement to contact is conducted to develop the situation and to establish or regain contact
with the enemy force.
• An attack is conducted to defeat, destroy, and neutralize the enemy, as well as seize and secure
terrain. The attack can be deliberate or hasty, depending on the amount of planning time
available.
• An exploitation extends the destruction of the enemy by maintaining offensive pressure.
• A pursuit is conducted against a retreating enemy force and follows a successful attack to
complete the destruction of the enemy force.
3-8. The company can execute movements to contact and either hasty or deliberate attacks on their own;
the nature of these operations depends largely on the amount of time and enemy information available
during the planning and preparation phases. Companies execute an exploitation or pursuit as part of a
larger force.
WAR-FIGHTING FUNCTIONS
3-10. In conducting his planning and preparation for offensive operations, the platoon leader pays close
attention to the considerations applicable for the war-fighting functions, which are outlined in the
following discussion. The war-fighting functions, which help the platoon leader to logically organize his
thoughts to cover the mission, are the following:
• Movement and maneuver.
• Fire support.
• Intelligence.
• Protection.
• Sustainment.
• Command and control.
Note. Sections II and III of this chapter, which cover, respectively, the planning and preparation
phases of the offense are organized using the war-fighting functions in the order listed above.
Included in each section is a discussion of the human aspect of operations, focusing on
intangible, Soldier-related factors.
SECTION II - PLANNING
3-11. The planning phase begins when the platoon receives the higher WARNO or OPORD and ends
when the platoon leader issues his own OPORD or FRAGO. During this phase, the platoon leader
conducts troop-leading procedures as outlined in Chapter 2. In developing his OPORD or FRAGO, the
platoon leader must take into account the considerations applicable for the operating systems, which are
outlined in this section.
3-12. After he issues the WARNO, the platoon leader may initiate rehearsals of tactical movement, battle
drills, or breaching actions. These generic rehearsals allow the platoon to begin preparing for the mission.
Once the platoon leader completes his plan, the generic rehearsals are matched to the actual terrain and
anticipated actions on enemy contact.
DIRECT FIRES
3-14. The platoon leader identifies multiple attack-by-fire and support-by-fire positions along the direction
of attack from which the platoon can engage known or suspected enemy positions. He designates TRPs
and assigns sectors of fire, observation, and weapons orientation. He specifies platoon fire patterns (if
different from those identified by SOP) and addresses restrictions on direct fire imposed by the ROE for
the operation.
OBSTACLE TYPES
3-15. The platoon will encounter two types of obstacles, existing and reinforcing. The platoon leader can
expect the enemy to employ both types in executing his defensive plan.
Existing Obstacles
3-16. Existing obstacles are those that are present on the battlefield but were not emplaced through military
effort. They may be natural (such as streams, lakes, thick forests, and mountains) or cultural (towns or
railroad embankments).
Reinforcing Obstacles
3-17. These are obstacles that are placed on the battlefield through military effort to slow, stop, turn, or
canalize the enemy. Examples include minefields, wire, road craters, log cribs, and tank ditches.
BREACH PLANNING
3-18. The commander will designate each platoon to be part of the support force, the breach force, or the
assault force. The support force usually leads the company during movement and identifies the obstacle. It
then suppresses any enemy overwatching the obstacle. A tank platoon can conduct breach force operations
only if it is equipped with the assets required to breach the type of obstacle encountered; such assets
include demolitions, grappling hooks, rakes, mine plows, and mine rollers. The breach force is responsible
for creating, proofing, and marking a lane through the obstacle and for securing the far side. It then
suppresses remaining enemy forces as the assault force moves through the breach to continue the attack.
(See Chapter 5 of this manual for more information on breaching operations.)
FIRE SUPPORT
3-19. Most fire support planning is conducted at company level and higher. The platoon leader reviews
the plan to ensure that responsibilities for initiating, lifting, and shifting indirect fires are designated. As
necessary, he identifies additional indirect fire targets on known or suspected enemy positions and submits
recommendations to the company FIST. When working with light forces the platoon leader must ensure he
has an understanding of the fire support capability inherent within the light force structure. The platoon
leader evaluates and recommends the use of smoke to help conceal or obscure movement and suppress
likely enemy positions while the platoon is moving through danger areas; in addition, he evaluates the need
for illumination or smoke rounds for marking and/or to assist in navigation. See the discussion of
navigation in Chapter 2 of this manual.
INTELLIGENCE
ENEMY
3-20. Most analysis of the enemy situation and probable enemy COAs is done at the battalion and
company level; however, it is the platoon leader’s responsibility to understand how the enemy’s disposition
and possible COAs may affect the platoon’s area of operations and the accomplishment of its mission. The
platoon leader uses what is developed from higher, but must be able to conduct intelligence preparation of
the battlefield (IPB) refining information received from higher. The platoon leader identifies and plots on
his overlay all known and suspected enemy positions that affect his area of operations and identifies
indirect and direct fire range fans of enemy weapon systems. The enemy overlay for FBCB2 should also
be updated to include the latest enemy information.
3-21. The platoon leader then identifies terrain features or determines the standoff distance of friendly
weapon systems that will negate the effects of enemy weapons if possible. Next, he determines the
enemy’s most probable COAs. Using information from his own analysis and from higher headquarters, he
identifies anticipated contact situations. This process includes estimating whether the enemy will defend in
place, delay, or counterattack upon contact; when and where contact is most likely to be made; what type
and size of enemy force the platoon will face; and what is then the enemy’s intent. Finally, the platoon
leader must develop specific plans for the platoon’s actions against the enemy. Refer to the discussion of
enemy analysis in the explanation of troop-leading procedures in Chapter 2 of this manual.
TERRAIN
3-22. The platoon leader conducts a map reconnaissance and uses the factors of OAKOC, as discussed in
Chapter 2, to systematically analyze the terrain in his AO. He pays close attention to key terrain that could
support positions offering unobstructed observation and fields of fire. These are danger areas that can be
used by enemy or friendly forces when contact is made during the execution of the mission. This analysis
is followed by a ground reconnaissance, conducted with the commander as far forward as possible and as
extensively as time and security considerations permit. The ground reconnaissance covers the platoon’s
movement routes to the LD, routes to the objective, and the objective itself. The platoon leader should
check and record the time-distance factors to any SPs or to the LD.
PROTECTION
3-23. The protection warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that preserve the force so the
commander can apply maximum combat power. Some of the tasks related to protection are:
• Air and missile defense. (Refer to Chapter 6 of this manual for a discussion of planning
considerations for air defense.)
• Countermobility/survivability.
• CBRN operations.
• Force protection/physical security.
Note. CBRN defensive operations are a critical consideration during offensive operations.
These are discussed in detail in Section V of this chapter (as part of the execution of battle
drills) and in Appendix E of this manual.
SUSTAINMENT
3-24. The platoon leader ensures that Soldiers are familiar with procedures for maintenance and medical
treatment and evacuation; these as outlined in paragraph 4 of the platoon OPORD or in the unit SOP. See
Chapter 7 of this manual for more details concerning sustainment operations.
STANDARDIZED DRILLS
3-30. If possible the platoon should develop standardized drills for the following that will allow the
platoon to operate in a near automatic mode. It should cover the following subjects:
• Movement from current positions.
• Routes.
• Platoon and company formations and movement techniques.
• Vehicle positions within the platoon formation.
• Weapons orientation and fire control.
• Triggers.
• Actions on contact.
• Actions on the objective (consolidation and reorganization.)
• Reporting procedures.
• Signals.
• Breaching drills.
3-31. Actions at obstacles should be rehearsed during the preparation phase. Breaching equipment should
be checked durin PCCs and PCIs.
FIRE SUPPORT
3-32. During the rehearsal, the platoon leader should address responsibility for targets in the platoon AO.
He should cover any scheduled indirect fires and the effects of smoke on the battlefield. In addition, he
should discuss the direct-fire plan, with emphasis on platoon responsibilities, known and suspected enemy
locations, friendly unit locations, and applicable ROE.
INTELLIGENCE
3-33. During the preparation phase, the platoon leader will receive updated SPOTREPs listing known and
suspected enemy locations as well as the latest friendly actions. He should plot the updated enemy and
friendly locations on his overlay and on the enemy overlay (digital systems); based on his terrain
reconnaissance, he adjusts the maneuver plan accordingly. It is critical that the platoon has a standard
method of either the PSG or platoon leader relaying this information to the wing tanks to maintain
situational understanding for all crews.
PROTECTION
3-34. Air defense preparations during this phase should include a rehearsal of the react to air attack drill,
which is outlined in Section V of this chapter.
SUSTAINMENT
3-35. During the preparation phase, tank crews conduct resupply operations to replenish their combat
loads. They also perform preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) on their vehicles and
equipment.
3-36. Rehearsals should cover aspects of the logistical plan that will support the upcoming operation,
including emergency resupply and personnel and vehicle evacuation procedures. For more information on
sustainment, refer to Chapter 7 of this manual.
Note. The fire and movement mission has been called advance in contact in some previous
doctrinal and training publications, including FM 3-90.1 (FM 71-1).
3-41. Although each of these missions is distinct and serves individual purposes, they all require
coordination of platoon fires (both direct and indirect) and movement, which are the components of the
tactical concept of maneuver. The major difference among the types of missions is the amount of
information about the enemy and preparation time available.
OFFENSIVE FIRE PLANNING
3-42. It is critical to have a fire plan in the offense to reduce the chances of fratricide. It is not possible,
however, to develop fire plans in the offense in the same detail as in a defensive operation. As a result, the
platoon leader must take advantage of the available resources that make it easier for him to effectively
distribute the platoon’s firepower, such as advance planning, reconnaissance (including leader’s and map
reconnaissance), TRPs, platoon targets, and platoon SOPs.
3-43. Before beginning movement, the platoon leader plans how the platoon will engage known or
suspected enemy locations. He identifies and assigns sufficient TRPs and platoon targets to allow him to
adjust fields of fire quickly. In doing this, he considers tactical aspects of the operation, including—
• The mission to be accomplished.
• Enemy strengths and weaknesses.
• Likely or known enemy locations. (Note. The platoon leader will establish additional platoon
targets as the platoon moves during the operation.)
• Indirect fire support and smoke employment (preplanned targets).
• Friendly forces.
• Control measures, including phase lines, checkpoints, the LOA, and TRPs.
• The route.
• The movement technique.
• Section and individual tank sectors of responsibility.
• The operational status of platoon equipment.
3-44. An important part of offensive fire planning is the assignment of overlapping sectors of fire for each
element in the platoon (see Figure 3-1). These sectors, also called sectors of responsibility, are covered in
the platoon SOP and are based on the formation and movement technique the platoon will use. During the
operation, as the situation requires, the platoon leader then adjusts the sectors he assigned initially. Factors
that may necessitate a change in sectors of fire include the following:
• Changes in terrain or visibility.
• Contact with previously unknown enemy positions.
• Use of fires or smoke to conceal or cover the platoon’s movement.
• The scheme of maneuver of adjacent units.
Figure 3-1. Example sectors of fire in a moving engagement (platoon moving in wedge
formation)
ENGAGING TARGETS
3-45. Once movement begins but before contact is made, the platoon leader maneuvers the unit to take full
advantage of his tanks, whose capabilities are maximized in the offense. Crews should stay aware of
visible TRPs and control points as they come into view. The platoon leader uses these to adjust sectors of
responsibility. He may also use the clock or cardinal direction method to designate sectors of
responsibility. As noted, he modifies assigned sectors of fire as necessary while the platoon is moving.
3-46. Each TC identifies the tank’s sector of fire for his gunner and then monitors the gunner’s target
search to make sure it covers the entire sector and does not stray beyond it. In addition, some offensive
situations may require the platoon to operate in an area where the line of sight between tanks in the
sections is interrupted by terrain or vegetation. The platoon leader and TCs must ensure that each crew
conducts a 360-degree search for air and ground targets and maintains effective communications with the
other tanks.
Moving Engagements
3-47. Most moving engagements begin with one tank in the platoon acquiring surprise targets. These
targets should be engaged immediately. The TC who makes first contact gives a contact report after he has
engaged a target. The other tanks may orient their gun tubes in the direction the tank in contact is firing,
but continue to maintain 360-degree security. The tanks do not change direction unless the platoon leader
orders an action drill; they scan and return fire on additional targets.
3-48. When targets are identified, the platoon leader or PSG sends a contact or spot report (depending on
the enemy situation and the amount of time available) to the company team commander. The commander
and/or platoon leader will already have assigned engagement priorities according to the mission and other
factors. As an example, offensive engagement priorities might be the following:
• Priority 1. Most dangerous targets (tanks, ATGMs).
• Priority 2. Dangerous targets.
• Priority 3. Command and control assets (vehicles with the most antennas).
• Priority 4. Air defense assets.
• Priority 5. Engineer assets.
• Priority 6. Least dangerous targets (supply vehicles).
3-49. After initial contact, the platoon leader controls the platoon fires by issuing fire commands and
additional instructions as appropriate. He keeps the company team commander informed while developing
the situation.
TECHNIQUES OF MOVEMENT
3-52. The commander or platoon leader selects a technique of movement based on several battlefield
factors:
• The likelihood of enemy contact.
• The availability of another element to provide overwatch for the moving element.
• The terrain over which the moving element will pass.
3-53. In open terrain, such as deserts, one company will normally overwatch the movement of another
company. In close terrain, such as rolling hills or countryside, platoons will normally overwatch other
platoons. In restricted terrain, such as mountains, forests, or urban areas, a tank section will rely on
another tank section or dismounted infantry to overwatch movement.
3-54. The tank platoon must be able to employ any of the following techniques of movement:
• Traveling. Characterized by continuous movement of all elements, traveling is best suited to
situations in which enemy contact is unlikely and speed is important.
• Traveling overwatch. Traveling overwatch is an extended form of traveling that provides
additional security when contact is possible but speed is desirable. The lead element moves
continuously. The trail element moves at various speeds and may halt periodically to overwatch
the movement of the lead element. The trail element maintains dispersion based on its ability to
provide immediate suppressive fires in support of the lead element. The intent is to maintain
depth, provide flexibility, and sustain movement in case the lead element is engaged.
• Bounding overwatch. Bounding overwatch is used when contact is expected. It is the most
secure, but slowest, movement technique. Bounding may be no greater than one-half the
weapon’s planning range. This allows the overwatch section to have effective fires forward of
the bounding section. There are two methods of bounding:
• Alternate bounds. Covered by the rear element, the lead element moves forward, halts,
and assumes overwatch positions. The rear element advances past the lead element and takes up
overwatch positions. The initial lead element then advances past the initial rear element and
takes up overwatch positions. Only one element moves at a time. This method is usually more
rapid than successive bounds. (Refer to Figure 3-2.)
FORMATIONS
3-55. Formations are used to establish tank positions and sectors of responsibility during tactical
operations. They facilitate control; alleviate confusion, and increase protection, speed, and the
effectiveness of fires.
3-56. Formations are not intended to be rigid, with vehicles remaining a specific distance apart at every
moment. The position of each tank in the formation depends on the terrain and the ability of the wingman
driver to maintain situational understanding in relation to the lead tank. At the same time, individual tanks
should always occupy the same relative position within a formation. This will ensure that the members of
each crew know who is beside them, understand when and where to move, and are aware of when and
where they will be expected to observe and direct fires. Weapons orientation for all tanks should be
adjusted to ensure optimum security based on the position of the platoon in the company formation.
3-57. The following paragraphs and illustrations describe the six basic movement formations the platoon
will use.
Note. In these examples, vehicle numbers are used to illustrate the wingman concept. In the
field, the location and sequence of vehicles in the formation will be prescribed in the platoon
SOP and/or the OPORD. The tactical situation will also influence vehicle location.
COLUMN
3-58. The column formation provides excellent control and fire to the flanks, but permits less fire to the
front (see Figure 3-4). It is used when speed is critical, when the platoon is moving through restricted
terrain on a specific route, and/or when enemy contact is not likely.
STAGGERED COLUMN
3-59. The staggered column formation is a modified column formation with one section leading and one
section trailing to provide overwatch (see Figure 3-5). The staggered column permits good fire to the front
and flanks. It is used when speed is critical, when there is a limited area for lateral dispersion, and/or when
enemy contact is possible.
WEDGE
3-60. The wedge formation permits excellent firepower to the front and good firepower to the flanks (see
Figure 3-6). It is employed when the platoon is provided with overwatch by another element and is
moving in open or rolling terrain. Depending on the platoon location within the company formation, the
platoon leader and PSG (with wingmen) can switch sides of the formation. When the platoon leader’s tank
is slightly forward, one flank has more firepower.
ECHELON
3-61. The echelon formation permits excellent firepower to the front and to one flank (see Figure 3-7). It
is used to screen an exposed flank of the platoon or of a larger moving force.
VEE
3-62. The vee formation provides excellent protection and control, but limits fires to the front (see Figure
3-8). This formation is used when terrain restricts movement or when overwatch within the platoon is
required.
LINE
3-63. The line formation provides maximum firepower forward (see Figure 3-9). It is used when the
platoon crosses danger areas and is provided with overwatch by another element or when the platoon
assaults enemy positions.
Herringbone
3-66. The herringbone formation is used when the platoon must assume a hasty defense with 360-degree
security while remaining postured to resume movement in the direction of travel (see Figure 3-11). It is
normally employed during scheduled or unscheduled halts in a road march. If terrain permits, vehicles
should move off the route and stop at a 45-degree angle, allowing passage of vehicles through the center of
the formation.
OVERWATCH
3-67. Overwatch is the tactical mission in which an element observes and provides direct fire support for a
friendly moving element. Situational understanding is a crucial factor in all overwatch missions, whose
objective is to prevent the enemy from surprising and engaging the moving unit.
3-68. The overwatch force must maintain communications with the moving force and provide early
warning of enemy elements that could affect the moving force. It also scans gaps and dead space within
the moving element’s formations. If the overwatch is unable to scan dead space and engage the enemy, it
must alert the moving element of the lapse in coverage. The overwatch must also be able to support the
moving force with immediate direct and indirect fires.
3-69. The overwatch element can be either stationary or on the move. Figure 3-12 suggests what to look
for and where to look during an overwatch mission.
Note. While the main function of overwatch is to provide early warning and/or timely
supporting fires for a moving element, overwatch crews must also maintain 360-degree
observation and security for themselves.
STATIONARY OVERWATCH
3-70. The section or platoon occupies hull-down firing positions that provide effective cover and
concealment, unobstructed observation, and clear fields of fire. (Note. Firing positions are discussed in
Chapter 4 of this manual.)
3-71. The section or platoon leader assigns sectors of fire. Individual crews aggressively scan their sectors
using applicable search techniques to identify enemy positions. They employ all available sights, including
the thermal channel (using various polarities) and daylight channel of the gunner’s primary sight,
binoculars, PVS-7s, and CITV. (Note. See FM 3-20.12 for a discussion of search techniques.)
3-72. The overwatch element scans the area of operations of the moving element, paying close attention to
gaps and dead space. If contact is made, the overwatch element initiates a high volume of direct and
indirect suppressive fires; it moves as necessary between primary and alternate positions to avoid being
decisively engaged.
3-78. The four-step process is not a rigid, lockstep response to the enemy contact. Rather, the goal is to
provide an orderly framework that enables the platoon to survive the initial contact, and then apply sound
decision-making and timely actions to complete the operation. In simplest terms, the platoon must react
instinctively and instantly to the contact, and the platoon leader must decide, with equal dispatch, whether
to execute a preplanned battle drill or COA or to recommend and execute an alternate drill or action.
3-79. At times, the platoon leader, and the platoon, will have to execute several of the steps
simultaneously. This makes thorough preparation an absolute requirement in contact situations. To ensure
the platoon functions as a team, reacting correctly and yet instinctively, the platoon leader must establish
SOPs and conduct comprehensive training and rehearsals covering each step.
3-85. There are no hard and fast rules for determining the superiority or inferiority of an enemy; the result
is dependent on the situation. An inferior force is defined as an enemy element that the platoon can destroy
while remaining postured to conduct further operations. A superior force is one that can be destroyed only
through a combined effort of company- or combined arms battalion-level combat and CS assets.
3-86. The platoon leader bases his evaluation on the enemy’s capabilities, especially the number of lethal
weapon systems the enemy force is known to have, and on the enemy’s current activity. Lethality varies;
the enemy may employ rapid-fire antitank weaponry, slow-firing wire-guided systems, or dismounted
Soldiers with automatic weapons. Likewise, enemy activity can range from an entrenched force using
prepared fighting positions to a unit conducting refueling operations with little security.
3-87. After making contact and evaluating the situation, the platoon leader may discover that he does not
have enough information to determine the superiority or inferiority of the enemy force. To make this
determination, he can further develop the situation using a combination of techniques, including maneuver
(fire and movement), reconnaissance by direct and/or indirect fire, and dismounted surveillance. In such a
situation, however, the platoon leader must exercise caution, ensuring that his actions support the
commander’s intent. Mission accomplishment and the survivability of the platoon are crucial
considerations. Once he develops the situation sufficiently, the platoon leader sends an updated SPOTREP
to the commander.
Figure 3-13A. Platoon makes initial contact, deploys using an action drill, and reports
Figure 3-14B. Platoon executes a battle drill; platoon leader evaluates the situation as the drill
is executed
Figure 3-14C. Platoon develops the situation and identifies a superior enemy force
Figure 3-14D. Platoon leader chooses and recommends an alternate COA; platoon executes
the new COA
BATTLE DRILLS
3-103. When the tank platoon makes contact with the enemy, the platoon leader usually initiates a battle
drill. Drills can be initiated following reports or observation of enemy activity or ordered upon receipt of
enemy fires.
3-104. Battle drills provide virtually automatic responses to situations in which the immediate, violent
execution of an action is vital to the platoon’s safety or its success in combat. Drills allow the platoon
leader to protect the platoon from the effects of enemy fires, quickly mass the platoon’s combat power and
fires, or move the platoon to a position of advantage over the enemy.
3-105. Drills are standardized collective actions, executed by each tank crew with minimal instruction and
without application of a deliberate thought process. They can be carried out under almost any type of
battlefield conditions and from any formation or technique of movement, although execution can be
affected by the factors of METT-TC.
3-106. The platoon can expect to execute any of the following standard battle drills:
• Change of formation drill.
• Contact drill.
• Action drill.
• React to indirect fire drill.
• React to air attack drill.
• React to a nuclear attack drill.
• React to a chemical/biological attack drill.
3-107. Commanders and leaders at all levels must be ready to augment or adjust these seven basic drills
based on the enemy, terrain, and ROE. In addition, they must ensure their platoons rehearse battle drills
until they are able to execute the drills perfectly no matter what command and control problems arise.
Note. In the figures that accompany the following discussion of the seven battle drills, vehicle
numbers are used to illustrate the wingman concept. In the field, the location and sequence of
vehicles during the drill will be prescribed in the platoon SOP, OPORD, or tactical situation.
ACTION DRILL
3-111. The action drill permits the entire platoon to change direction rapidly in response to terrain
conditions, obstacles, FRAGOs from the commander, or enemy contact. The platoon leader uses visual
signals or the radio to order the action drill, which can be initiated with or without enemy contact.
Action Drill Without Enemy Contact
3-112. The platoon leader can execute an action drill to avoid a danger area or obstacle or to respond to
FRAGOs from the commander. When the platoon leader initiates the action drill, tanks come on line and
continue to move in the prescribed direction unless the platoon leader directs a change of formation.
Figures 3-17A through 3-17C illustrate tanks’ relative positions during various action drills without
contact.
artillery impact area, individual crews place their hatches in the appropriate position, open ballistic doors
(M1A2 and M1A2 SEP crews scan with CITV), check antennas, and return to positions or continue the
mission.
3-116. The commander should address the platoon’s reaction to anticipated indirect fires in the actions on
contact subparagraph of the OPORD. When the platoon receives anticipated indirect fires, it reacts
according to the commander’s guidance. It is important to note the different drills conducted by mounted
forces and light forces, and address the differences. If the platoon needs to execute a COA different from
that directed by the commander, the platoon leader should request permission from the commander before
executing the alternate action.
• Step 3. Prepare to engage. TCs and loaders get ready to engage the aircraft with machine-gun
and/or main-gun fire on order of the platoon leader.
3-118. If the platoon leader determines that the platoon is in the direct path of an attacking aircraft, he
initiates the active react to air attack drill, which entails these actions:
• Step 1. The platoon initiates fire. The primary intent is to force aircraft to take self-defense
measures that alter their attack profile and reduce their effectiveness. The platoon leader may
use a burst of tracers to designate an aim point for platoon machine gun antiaircraft fires (see
Figure 3-20). Volume is the key to effectiveness of these fires; tanks throw up a “wall of steel”
through which aircraft must fly. The main gun is effective against hovering attack helicopters.
The platoon leader may also direct some vehicles to engage high-performance aircraft with
multipurpose antitank (MPAT) main gun rounds.
• Step 2. Tanks create a nonlinear target by moving as fast as possible at a 45-degree angle away
from the path of flight and toward attacking aircraft (see Figure 3-21). The platoon maintains an
interval of at least 100 meters between tanks, forcing aircraft to make several passes to engage
the entire platoon.
• Step 3. Tanks move quickly to covered and concealed positions and freeze their movement for
at least 60 seconds after the last flight of aircraft has passed.
• Step 4. The platoon leader sends a SPOTREP to update the commander.
Note. If the M256/M256A1 detection kit records a negative reading inside an overpressurized
M1A1, M1A2, or M1A2 SEP tank, the crew can initiate unmasking procedures.
ATTACK BY FIRE
3-126. The commander may order the platoon to execute this task, either as specified in his original plan
or on recommendation of the platoon leader. The task is to destroy the enemy using long-range fires from
dominating terrain or using standoff of the main gun. The platoon can use an attack by fire to destroy
inferior forces when the platoon leader does not desire to close with the enemy or when the platoon is part
of a company-level effort. In addition, the platoon may occupy an attack-by-fire position as part of a
company-level hasty defense with the goal of destroying a superior force.
3-127. In executing this task, the platoon uses tactical movement to move to a position that allows it to
employ weapon standoff or that offers cover for hull-down firing positions. It also must be ready to move
to alternate firing positions for protection from the effects of enemy direct and indirect fires.
3-128. As time permits, the platoon leader designates TRPs and assigns sectors of fire and tentative firing
positions for individual tanks. He issues a platoon fire command specifying the method of fire, firing
pattern, and rate of fire the platoon must sustain to accomplish the task in support of the company.
3-129. A successful attack by fire destroys the enemy force. Figures 3-232A and 3-23B illustrate attack-
by-fire situations.
Figure 3-23B. Platoon uses attack by fire against an enemy reconnaissance platoon as part of
a hasty defense
OVERWATCH/SUPPORT BY FIRE
3-130. Either as specified in his original plan or on recommendation of the platoon leader, the
commander may order the platoon to provide overwatch or support by fire during the movement of a
friendly force. The purpose is to suppress the enemy using long-range direct and indirect fires from a
dominating piece of terrain or using the standoff of the main gun. This support sets the conditions that
allow moving (supported) friendly elements to engage and destroy the enemy.
3-131. The techniques involved in occupying an overwatch or support-by-fire position and in focusing
and controlling fires are similar to those for an attack by fire. Some specific considerations exist, however.
As noted, the overwatch/support-by-fire task is always tied directly to the movement and/or tactical
execution of other friendly forces. In executing overwatch or support by fire, the platoon must maintain a
high level of situational understanding relative to the supported force so it can lift and shift direct and
indirect fires as required to prevent fratricide. Throughout this type of operation, the supporting platoon
maintains cross talk with the moving force on the company net. In addition to reducing fratricide risk,
cross talk allows the platoon to provide early warning of enemy positions it has identified and to report
battle damage inflicted on the enemy force.
3-132. A successful overwatch/support-by-fire operation suppresses the enemy, permitting the moving
(supported) force to conduct tactical movement, breaching operations, or an assault. Figure 3-24 illustrates
a support-by-fire situation in support of an assault.
Figure 3-24. Platoon supports by fire to suppress an enemy element during a company
assault
ASSAULT
3-133. The commander may direct the platoon to execute an assault, either on its own or as part of a
larger assault force. The purpose of the assault is to seize key terrain or to close with and destroy the
enemy while seizing an enemy-held position. Designation of the platoon as the assault force may be made
as part of the commander’s original plan or on recommendation of the platoon leader.
3-134. The platoon usually assaults the enemy while receiving supporting fires from an overwatch
element. If supporting fire is not available, the platoon conducts tactical movement to a position of
advantage over the enemy, and then conducts the assault. A successful assault destroys the enemy
elements or forces them to withdraw from the objective.
3-135. To prepare for the assault, the assault force occupies or moves through an assault position. This
should be a predetermined covered and concealed position that provides weapon standoff from the enemy.
The platoon leader receives updated enemy information from support-by-fire elements. He assigns targets
or weapons orientations and confirms the axis of advance and the LOA for the assault. On order, the
platoon assaults on line, moving and firing as quickly as possible to destroy the enemy and seize the
objective.
3-136. The assault must be extremely violent. If the platoon assaults buttoned up, machine gun fire from
the support force or wingman tanks can provide close-in protection against dismounted enemy elements on
the objective. If tanks are unbuttoned, the TCs and loaders use personal weapons, hand grenades, and
machine guns to provide close-in protection.
3-137. Following a successful assault, the assault force occupies a defensible position, either on the
objective or on the far side of it, and begins consolidation and reorganization procedures. Figures 3-25A
and 3-25B illustrate two assault situations.
Figure 3-25A. Tank section assaults an inferior force as another section supports by fire
Figure 3-25B. Platoon executes an assault as two other platoons support by fire
BYPASS
3-138. As part of his original plan or on recommendation of the platoon leader, the commander may order
the platoon to bypass the enemy to maintain the tempo of the attack. This COA can be taken against either
an inferior or superior force. The commander may designate one platoon to suppress the enemy, allowing
the other platoons to use covered and concealed routes, weapon standoff, and obscuration to bypass known
enemy locations. (Note. Units may have to execute contact drills while conducting the bypass.)
3-139. Once clear of the enemy, the supporting platoon hands the enemy over to another force, breaks
contact, and rejoins the company. If necessary, the platoon leader can employ tactical movement to break
contact with the enemy and continue the mission; he can also request supporting direct and indirect fires
and smoke to suppress and obscure the enemy as the platoon safely breaks contact. See Figures 3-26A and
3-26B for an example of a bypass.
RECONNAISSANCE BY FIRE
3-140. Based on his original plan or a recommendation from the platoon leader, the commander may
direct the platoon to execute reconnaissance by fire when enemy contact is expected or when contact has
occurred but the enemy situation is vague. The platoon then conducts tactical movement, occupying
successive overwatch positions until it makes contact with the enemy or reaches the objective.
3-141. At each overwatch position, the platoon leader may designate TRPs. He then either requests
indirect fires or employs direct fires on likely enemy locations to cause the enemy force to return direct fire
or to move, thus compromising its positions. He directs individual tanks or sections to fire their caliber .50
and/or coax machine guns into targeted areas. (Note. In some situations, main-gun fire can also be used.)
3-142. Individual tanks and sections not designated to reconnoiter by fire observe the effects of the firing
tanks and engage enemy forces as they are identified. Focus of the reconnaissance by fire is on the key
terrain that dominates danger areas, on built-up areas that dominate the surrounding terrain, and on wooded
areas not yet cleared.
Note. A disciplined enemy force may not return fire or move if it determines that the pattern or
type of fires employed will be nonlethal. The platoon leader must analyze the situation and
direct the use of appropriate fires on suspected positions. For example, he would use small-arms
fire against suspected dismounted elements but employ main guns to engage bunkers or other
fortified positions.
BREACHING OPERATIONS
3-144. When they expect to make contact with enemy obstacles, the commander and platoon leader must
plan and rehearse actions at an obstacle, tailoring their preparations to templated locations for the expected
obstacles. They must ensure the platoon knows how to accomplish early detection of both anticipated and
unexpected obstacles and how to react instinctively when contact is made.
3-145. A critical consideration is that the tank platoon has only limited ability to deal independently with
an obstacle or restriction. If it is equipped with mine plows or other breaching assets, the platoon can
create track-width lanes through most wire, mine, and other reinforcing obstacles. The commander and
platoon leader must keep in mind, however, that the platoon cannot internally accomplish all of the
SOSRA elements of the breach (suppress the enemy; obscure the breach; secure the far side; reduce the
obstacle; and assault through the obstacle). Refer to the discussion of breaching operations, including
SOSRA procedures, in Chapter 5 of this manual.
3-146. When tanks encounter an unexpected obstacle, crew members must assume that the enemy is
covering the obstacle with observation and fire. They must immediately seek cover and establish an
overwatch to evaluate the situation. The overwatch tanks scan for evidence of enemy forces in and around
the obstacle and on dominant terrain on the far side of the obstacle. They attempt to locate a bypass so the
operation can continue without delay. If no bypass is found, the overwatch determines the dimensions of
the obstacle and sends a report to the commander so he can designate a COA.
Note. It is critical that the tank platoon initially remain under cover while evaluating the
situation. The platoon must NEVER attempt to approach the obstacle area or breach the
obstacle without first killing or obscuring enemy elements overwatching the obstacle.
3-147. If he needs to develop the situation further, the commander ideally will use scouts or infantry to
reconnoiter the obstacle, with the tanks continuing to provide overwatch. This usually requires him to
move mounted or dismounted elements to the far side. If this reconnaissance locates a bypass route, the
commander often will order the unit to execute a bypass as the preferred COA. If a bypass is not possible,
he may order a breaching operation, with the tanks either executing an in-stride breach within their
capabilities or supporting a deliberate breach.
3-148. Deliberate breaching operations are conducted at the company or higher level and require engineer
augmentation. The HBCT has one engineer company for mobility support that is capable of establishing,
proofing, and marking two lanes through a complex wire and mine obstacle. Tank platoons generally
operate in support of deliberate breaching operations by overwatching engineer forces, providing
suppressive fires, and/or assaulting to the far side of the obstacle to establish a foothold. Tank platoons
may also be called upon to serve as a breaching or proofing force if BCT assets are unavailable or disabled.
CONSOLIDATION
3-150. Consolidation consists of actions taken to secure an objective and to defend against an enemy
counterattack. The company commander designates platoon positions and weapons orientations. The
platoon takes these steps:
• Eliminate remaining enemy resistance and secure detainees.
• Establish security and coordinate mutual support with adjacent platoons.
• Occupy positions on defensible terrain as designated in the OPORD or FRAGO. Tanks move to
hull-down positions, and the platoon leader assigns sectors of fire. If the location designated in
the OPORD/FRAGO is not defensible, the platoon leader notifies the commander and searches
for terrain that is defensible and supports the commander’s intent. The platoon leader informs
the commander of the new location.
• Execute procedures for a hasty defense to prepare for possible counterattacks (see Chapter 4 of
this manual for details on hasty defense).
REORGANIZATION
3-151. Reorganization, the process of preparing for continued fighting, is normally accomplished by
SOP. Responsibilities during reorganization include the following:
• TCs take these actions:
• Reload machine guns and redistribute main gun ammunition to ready areas.
• Move crewmen who are wounded in action (WIA) to a covered position and provide first
aid.
• Send a SITREP to the PSG reporting casualties and supply status of equipment,
ammunition, and fuel.
• Conduct essential maintenance.
• The PSG takes these actions:
• Compile SITREPs from TCs and, as required by unit SOP, submit a consolidated report to
the platoon leader or 1SG.
• Direct cross-leveling of supplies within the platoon.
• Oversee evacuation of casualties.
• Coordinate the movement of detainees to the detainee collection point.
• The platoon leader takes these actions:
• Forward a consolidated SITREP to the commander.
• Redistribute personnel as necessary to maintain combat readiness.
• Oversee consolidation of Soldiers who have been killed in action (KIA).
• Reestablish communications with elements that are out of contact.
Note. SITREPs are sent using voice or digital format (or a combination). Refer to ST 3-20.153
and unit SOPs for additional information.
effect on the ability of Soldiers to see the battlefield. There are, however, other conditions that restrict
visibility; the most common are the following:
• Dust, smoke, and other obscuration factors caused by weapon firing and movement of Soldiers
and equipment.
• Weather conditions, including rain, snow, fog, and blowing sand and dust.
3-153. If it is to use its superior technology and basic combat skills to sustain continuous operations and
destroy the enemy, the tank platoon must train to fight effectively in all types of visibility conditions. The
platoon must first master the execution of tasks under optimum visibility conditions and then continue its
training in progressively more difficult situations.
EQUIPMENT
3-154. The tank platoon is equipped with the following types of equipment for use in limited visibility
conditions:
• Driver’s night-vision viewer. This sight is either passive (the vehicle visualization system
(VVS)-2/driver’s vision enhancer [DVE]) or thermal (the driver’s thermal viewer [DTV]). It
enhances the driver’s ability to move the tank and enables him to assist in target acquisition and
to observe rounds in darkness or other limited visibility conditions.
• PVS-7. This passive-vision device enables the TC to observe from his opened hatch to control
movement and provide close-in security. There are normally two PVS-7s per tank.
• Gunner’s primary sight and commander’s extension. This integrated thermal sight gives the
gunner and TC the capability to see and engage targets under almost any visibility condition.
• CITV. This is a fully integrated, full-target engagement sight on the M1A2. It provides the TC
with a redundant target acquisition and surveillance capability equivalent to that of the gunner’s
primary sight and the TIS. The CITV extends the TC’s field of view, giving him 360-degree
observation capability independent of the gunner’s primary sight.
NAVIGATION
3-155. The platoon leader uses the GPS and/or POSNAV (if available), terrain association, and the
compass and odometer method to navigate in limited visibility conditions. When they are fired to create a
ground-burst effect, artillery or mortar illumination rounds can be helpful in confirming locations. Refer to
Chapter 2 of this manual for a detailed discussion of navigation techniques.
VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION
3-156. The problem of vehicle identification is compounded in limited visibility conditions. TCs must be
able to distinguish vehicles of their platoon and company/troop and of other friendly elements from those
of the enemy. Most unit SOPs cover vehicle marking and identification procedures. In addition, the
platoon can use the following techniques to enhance command and control and to help prevent fratricide
(see also Appendix F, this FM, for information about fratricide prevention):
• Attach color-coded lights or chemical lights to the rear of the turret or the hull.
• Replace the brake light cover with color-coded plastic.
• Use luminous or thermal tape to “outline” vehicles or to make battle boards.
• Use radio and digital systems (if available) to provide the platoon with frequent updates of
friendly unit locations.
PLANNING
3-158. During the planning phase, the platoon leader must pay particular attention to routes, formations,
and navigational aids. He must conduct a thorough reconnaissance to identify locations where the platoon
could become disoriented. The reconnaissance must also focus on finding rough or restricted terrain that
will be even more difficult to negotiate with limited visibility. Such terrain may require a change in
formation or movement technique or employment of dismounted ground guides.
PREPARATION
3-159. In the preparation phase, the platoon leader conducts rehearsals in as many types of adverse
conditions as possible to prepare the platoon for potential command and control problems. He must stress
light discipline. During PCCs and PCIs, the platoon leader or PSG views each tank using a passive sight to
ensure that sources of light have been dimmed or covered so they are not visible to the enemy. During
confirmation briefs and rehearsals, the platoon leader must ensure that all personnel understand the
platoon’s projected actions during each phase of the operation. One technique is to designate waypoints or
phase lines as trigger points for platoon actions.
EXECUTION
3-160. During the execution phase, TCs use the PVS-7 and the CITV (if available) to assist their drivers
with navigation and to enhance situational understanding. The platoon leader must assume that the enemy
possesses the same limited visibility observation capabilities as friendly units. Use of terrain to mask
movement and deployment remains critical since limited visibility may create a false sense of protection
from observation. During movement, the distance between platoon vehicles is reduced to allow vehicles to
observe each other and to decrease the time necessary to react to enemy contact.
3-161. When the platoon encounters enemy elements, an effective technique is to have the vehicle that
makes contact fire a steady burst of machine gun fire in the direction of the enemy to orient the rest of the
platoon. The platoon must adhere strictly to applicable control measures, especially those covering the
employment of direct fires and maintain strict situational understanding of friendly force locations.
PREPARATION
4-2. The critical element affecting preparation is time management, beginning with receipt of the
WARNO, OPORD, or FRAGO. Effective use of the available time allows the platoon leader to conduct a
thorough reconnaissance of engagement areas, BPs, displacement routes, and the axis for possible
counterattacks. Section III of this chapter describes preparation at the platoon level in detail.
SECURITY
4-3. The OPSEC measures discussed in Appendix D of this manual will assist the platoon leader in
maintaining security during the planning, preparation, and execution of the defense. The platoon leader
must integrate his security plan with that of the company or troop. He enhances the platoon’s early
warning capability by identifying potential mounted and dismounted avenues of approach and then
positioning early warning devices and OPs to cover these avenues.
FLEXIBILITY
4-5. The platoon leader contributes to the flexibility of company or troop operations by developing a
thorough understanding of the company/troop plan, including on-order and be-prepared missions. He must
be alert to any possible contingencies that have not been addressed by the commander. During the
preparation phase of the defense, the platoon increases flexibility by conducting thorough reconnaissance
and mounted rehearsals of all possible plans. A crucial indicator of platoon flexibility is the ability to
move quickly under all battlefield conditions, between primary, alternate, and supplementary fighting
positions as well as subsequent BPs.
WARFIGHTING FUNCTIONS
4-9. In conducting planning, preparation, and execution of defensive operations, the platoon leader must
pay close attention to the considerations applicable for the war-fighting function (WFF), which help him to
logically organize his thoughts to cover the mission. The WFFs are the following:
• Movement and maneuver.
• Fire support.
• Intelligence.
• Protection.
• Sustainment.
• Command and control.
Note. Sections II and III of this chapter, which cover, respectively, the planning and preparation
phases of the defense, are organized using the WFFs in the order listed above. Included in each
section is a discussion of the human aspect of operations, focusing on intangible, Soldier-related
factors.
SECTION II - PLANNING
4-10. The planning phase of a defensive operation is a continuous process that begins when the platoon
leader receives the higher order (WARNO, FRAGO, or OPORD). It ends when the platoon leader issues
his own OPORD or FRAGO. Planning may continue into the preparation phase as the platoon gains more
information through the plan of the higher headquarters and from further reconnaissance and rehearsals.
Note. Primary and alternate fighting positions are oriented on the same sectors of fire.
Supplementary fighting positions orient on different sectors of fire (see Figure 4-1). Subsequent
BPs are oriented on sectors of fire along the same avenue of approach as the primary/alternate
positions. Supplementary BPs are oriented on sectors of fire along different avenues of
approach (see Figure 4-2).
FIRE SUPPORT
4-18. The platoon leader posts targets on his overlays (in both traditional and digital format). Although
most fire support planning is done by the company or troop FIST, the platoon leader can, if necessary,
provide the FIST with nominations for additional targets for inclusion in the company fire support plan.
As these targets are approved, the platoon leader plots them on his overlays. If a target is disapproved, he
notes its grid coordinates so he can, if needed, submit a speedy call for fire using the grid method. See
Chapter 6 of this manual for methods of transmitting calls for fire.
4-19. The platoon leader should plan and request artillery targets on potential avenues of approach, at
choke points along the avenues of approach, at possible enemy support by fire positions, at obstacles, and
in dead space within the platoon’s AO. He should also be prepared to request a mix of smoke and dual-
purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM) rounds in front of his BP to disrupt an enemy assault
or behind his BP to help the platoon disengage from the enemy.
4-20. Each artillery target should have a trigger line overwatched by at least a crew or section. The trigger
line triggers the call for fire on a target to ensure that the impact of the rounds coincides with the enemy’s
arrival. The platoon’s laser range finders or target designation capabilities (on digitally equipped tanks)
enhance its effectiveness in requesting artillery fires using trigger lines. The location of the trigger line is
based on the enemy’s expected rate of advance over the terrain, the time of flight of the rounds, and the
priority of fires. The company or troop FIST should assist in determining all trigger points.
4-21. The platoon leader should plan and coordinate mortar targets on dismounted avenues of approach.
In addition, because mortar smoke is generally more responsive than smoke delivered by FA, he may be
able to gain a tactical advantage by employing mortar support in certain situations. Mortars should be the
platoon leader’s first choice as indirect fire due to the probability of the company’s or troop’s low priority
of FA fires. (See Appendix E of this manual for information on smoke operations.)
INTELLIGENCE
4-22. Security decisions are based on enemy capabilities. Platoons use OPs to provide early warning of
the enemy’s actions; their REDCON status and other OPSEC preparations then enable them to respond in a
timely manner. See Appendix D of this manual for more information on OPSEC measures.
4-23. OPSEC is especially critical during the platoon leader’s ground reconnaissance. The platoon leader
ensures that he provides security for the reconnaissance based on the commander’s guidance. Because it is
probable that enemy elements are already in the area, he must ensure that platoon reconnaissance elements
have the capability to protect themselves effectively.
4-24. As he conducts the reconnaissance, the platoon leader orients his map and references graphic control
measures to the terrain. He conducts a terrain analysis, using the results in conjunction with his knowledge
of possible enemy COAs to identify key terrain that may define potential enemy objectives. He identifies
mounted and dismounted avenues of approach and determines the probable formations the enemy will use
when occupying support-by-fire positions or when assaulting the platoon’s position. Based on his analysis
and available fields of observation and fire, the platoon leader confirms vehicle positions that will allow
the platoon to mass fires into the company or troop engagement area.
4-25. The platoon leader should complete his reconnaissance by conducting initial coordination with
adjacent platoons to establish mutual support and to cover dead space between the platoons. At the
conclusion of the reconnaissance, he may leave an OP to report enemy activity in the area of operations.
PROTECTION
Survivability
4-26. The platoon leader may be responsible for supervising engineer efforts. He should incorporate plans
for linkup, supervision, and handoff of engineer assets into his time line.
both the platoon and the company or troop have only limited ability to transport and emplace obstacles.
This means that in most situations the platoon will have to depend on the task force or squadron for
obstacle planning and transport and on engineers for emplacement.
4-28. The commander’s intent will guide the emplacement of obstacles based on the following principles
and characteristics:
• Obstacles are integrated with and reinforce the scheme of maneuver and the direct fire plan.
• They are integrated with existing obstacles.
• They are employed in depth and positioned where they will surprise enemy forces.
• They should be covered by direct and indirect fires at all times.
4-29. In general, obstacles are used to disrupt, turn, fix, and block the enemy based on the factors of
METT-TC. Figure 4-3 illustrates considerations for obstacle employment in relation to platoon BPs. If the
commander does not specify the intent for obstacles, the platoon leader should analyze the situation and
plan hasty or engineer-emplaced obstacles to meet these purposes:
• To block the final assault of an enemy force to the front of the platoon.
• To block the seams between vehicles or between adjacent platoons.
• To disrupt enemy forces that are assaulting on the flanks of the platoon.
• To shape the engagement area by forcing enemy elements to turn, slow down, stop, or flank
themselves at known ranges in the engagement area.
Survivability Considerations
4-30. The platoon leader must plan the priority of survivability efforts. His plan should specify the
sequence (first through fourth) in which his tanks will receive digging assets. When designating priorities,
he considers the survivability of unimproved positions and the relative importance of each firing position
within the BP. The engineer platoon leader, section leader, or dozer operator can estimate how much time
it will take to improve firing positions. These estimates will range from 45 minutes to 2 hours depending
on soil and light conditions and the type and amount of engineer equipment available. Figure 4-4
illustrates dug-in positions and lists considerations for their construction and use.
Air Defense
4-31. Refer to Chapter 6 of this manual for a discussion of air defense planning and employment.
SUSTAINMENT
4-32. The platoon leader conducts resupply operations to replenish basic loads in accordance with the
company or troop plan. Ammunition may be pre-positioned on the battlefield to facilitate resupply once
the battle begins. The platoon leader determines prestock requirements based on the commander’s intent
and scheme of maneuver. He discusses prestock requests with the commander, identifying resupply
locations, the types (usually ammunition) and amounts of supplies involved, the time required to conduct
resupply, and any necessary security considerations.
PHASE OF PREPARATION
4-35. The commander may designate the phase of preparation for each BP. There are three phases, listed
here in descending order of thoroughness and time required: (Note. The platoon leader may raise but not
lower the phase of preparation directed by the commander.)
• Reconnoiter. This phase of preparation consists of the steps conducted during the ground
reconnaissance of the planning phase.
• Prepare. This phase includes the steps conducted during the planning and preparation phases
for the deliberate occupation of a BP.
• Occupy. This is complete preparation of the position from which the platoon will initially
defend. The position is fully reconnoitered, prepared, and occupied prior to the “defend NLT”
time specified in the OPORD.
PREPARATION TASKS
HASTY OCCUPATION
4-36. Tank platoons conduct a hasty occupation under a variety of circumstances. During a movement to
contact, the platoon may prepare to destroy a moving enemy force by conducting a hasty occupation of
BPs or attack-by-fire positions in defensible terrain. During defensive operations, hasty occupation may
take place during counterattack missions, after disengagement and movement to subsequent BPs, or in
response to FRAGOs reflecting a change of mission.
DELIBERATE OCCUPATION
4-43. The tank platoon can conduct deliberate occupation of a BP when all of the following conditions
exist:
• Time is available.
• The enemy is not expected or has not been located within direct fire range.
• A friendly element is forward of the BP with the mission of providing security for the occupying
force.
4-44. The platoon begins by occupying a hide position behind the BP. It assumes a formation that will
provide 360-degree security based on considerations of METT-TC and OAKOC. TCs move to the platoon
leader’s vehicle and prepare to reconnoiter the position. The platoon leader briefs his gunner on actions to
take if the reconnaissance group does not return by a specified time or if contact occurs.
Occupation Procedures
4-52. After completing the reconnaissance and coordination, the platoon leader and TCs move back to
their vehicles. The TCs remount, start vehicles simultaneously, and move to hide positions behind their
primary fighting positions. On order, the platoon moves simultaneously into turret-down firing positions
(see Figure 4-6A). These positions allow the tanks to fire only their caliber .50 or loader’s M240 machine
gun. Observation can be executed using the CITV (if available); the gunner’s primary sight also provides
observation capability.
4-53. The platoon leader checks with the OPs to ensure that the enemy situation has not changed, then
orders platoon vehicles to occupy their primary hull-down firing positions (see Figure 4-6B). Tank crews
orient on the engagement area and complete their sketch cards. Each crew sends its completed sector
sketch to the platoon leader, either by messenger or by digital transmission (FBCB2, if available); the crew
retains a copy of the sketch card for its own reference. Tanks then move individually to their hide
positions and assume the appropriate REDCON status. (Note. See Chapter 2 of this manual for a
discussion of REDCON levels.)
4-17). The fire plan should provide information necessary to distribute and control the fires of all available
direct and indirect fire weapons, both organic and attached. It is prepared using the same two methods
(handwritten or FBCB2).
4-55. Traditional sketch card development. The ability to create traditional, handwritten sketch cards,
while important for all tank crewmen, is especially critical for crews of the M1 and M1A1. These tanks
lack the digital capabilities that provide valuable assistance to crews of later-model vehicles in preparing
their sketch cards. The process begins with the platoon leader designating the primary and supplementary
positions for his tanks and each TC selecting his alternate fighting position. After the positions have been
designated and reconnoitered (time permitting), the platoon leader will designate the sector limits of fire
for each tank and the TRPs within the sector. The platoon leader must give the TC the number designators
for the TRPs.
4-56. As the positions are prepared, the TC and gunner will prepare the sketch cards for each position.
When the cards are completed (normally within 20 minutes), one copy will be sent to the platoon leader
and the other copy will be kept with the tank.
4-57. When the tank is moved into position, and before engineer assets are released from the position, the
crew will make sure the target areas and obstacles within the sector can be fired upon, and determine if
assigned TRPs can be engaged. A TRP that could be engaged before the position was prepared may be
masked when the tank is dug in. The platoon leader must be informed of any inability to engage assigned
TRPs and may direct a change in position. If time permits, the TC will make physical contact with his
wing or flanking elements to determine overlapping fire within the sectors and the position of friendly OPs.
4-58. As a minimum, the traditionally drawn sketch card, which is illustrated in Figure 4-7 on page 4-14,
will depict the following:
• All key terrain features.
• TRPs. TRPs should be marked with a cross and their assigned number in the upper right
quadrant of the cross. Mark all TRPs that are visible, whether they are in your sector or not.
• High-speed avenues of approach.
• Symbol indicating north.
• Preplanned fires (direct and indirect). These may be added after the platoon leader receives this
information from the FIST officer and constructs a platoon fire plan. These should be marked
with a cross, with the letter designation in the top left block and numeric designation in the top
right.
• Range bands. These will help when the LRF fails. The number of bands will be determined by
the terrain or mission. (If terrain permits, range bands of 1,200, 1,800, and 2,400 meters will be
used.) A minimum of three range bands should be used.
• Right and left limits of assigned sector. These limits are marked by double lines beginning at
the tank’s position and extending through the terrain feature that designates the boundary limit.
• Reference point. This is located near the center of the sector and, ideally, at or beyond the
tank’s maximum engagement range. The reference point should be a prominent, immovable,
and readily identifiable feature; it should not be a target and should not be easily destroyed. The
reference point should be depicted using a military map symbol, sketch of feature, or brief word
description, and marked with the letters Ref Pt inside a circle.
• Obstacles and dead space. Obstacles should be marked on the sketch card using approved
military symbols. Dead space should be marked using diagonal lines with the words “DEAD
SPACE.”
• The positions of elements to the left and right and of friendly OPs/listening posts (LPs). These
positions should be marked with standard symbols. (This information will be omitted if the
tactical situation does not allow enough time to make contact with wing and flank elements, or
otherwise determine their exact location).
• Identification data. This consists of the vehicle bumper number, placed directly below the tank
symbol, and the firing position (primary, alternate, or supplementary), marked with a capital P,
A, or S and placed below the vehicle bumper number.
• Marginal information. Placed in the bottom left third of the sketch card, this information
includes the following:
• List of TRPs.
• Range to TRPs.
• Reference points.
• Description of TRPs.
• Description of obstacles and other likely target areas visible to your position.
• Range to obstacles and other likely targets.
• Legend. The legend, placed in the bottom right third of the sketch card, includes an explanation
of symbols used on the card and other control measures and pertinent information, as required.
4-59. Creating sketch cards using FBCB2 (M1A1D and M1A2 SEP). While FBCB2 currently does not
have the capability to produce a tank sketch card, crews can use the range card tool to produce a rough,
nondoctrinal sketch card. Upon receipt of these tank sketch cards, the platoon leader must redraw them
onto the platoon fire plan before forwarding it to the commander. Future software upgrades of the FBCB2
will include the sketch card function.
4-60. Sketch card verification. As he receives the platoon’s sketch cards, the platoon leader must verify
them. Either he or the PSG mounts each tank and views its sector through the gunner’s primary sight,
gunner’s primary sight extension (GPSE), or CITV. The sketch card check should ensure that the TCs
have covered each of the following considerations:
• Tank sectors are mutually supporting and overlapping.
• Each tank crew understands and has recorded the designated TRPs and FPF.
• All TRPs assigned to the platoon are covered by fire.
• Each crew has marked ranges to all TRPs or identifiable targets within the tank’s sector. These
ranges are especially critical in limited visibility or degraded (LRF) operations.
• The risk of fratricide between platoon tanks and adjacent elements has been evaluated and
appropriate adjustments or restrictions implemented. (Note. Each crew member needs to know
the location of adjacent vehicles and OPs and what they look like through the tank’s sights.
Using pickets to indicate left and right limits for individual tank main gun fire can help TCs to
observe their limits of fire. Rehearsals are the best method of achieving fratricide reduction.)
• The sketches show friendly obstacles, with each obstacle covered by machine gun or main gun
fire from at least one tank.
• Dead space is covered by indirect fire or alternate positions.
• Each tank and the platoon as a whole has identified alternate positions that cover the same area
as the primary positions and supplementary positions that cover additional areas of
responsibility assigned to the tank or platoon.
4-61. Backbriefs. The sketch card verification process provides an optimum opportunity for the platoon
leader to conduct backbriefs to confirm that each TC understands his mission. If time permits, the
backbrief includes a field-expedient sand table or chalkboard exercise (using a chalked side-skirt, “micro”
armor, or a rough terrain model scratched in the dirt). The platoon leader can use the exercise to reinforce
operational considerations for the mission, including the following:
• Individual tank responsibilities (which tank will engage where within the platoon sector).
• Tactical contingencies, such as which tank will pick up a sector if another tank is knocked out or
what happens if a particular tank’s sector is overloaded with targets.
• Adjustments to positions, such as when a tank is unable to cover its entire assigned sector.
(Note. This should be verified immediately after the position has been prepared, while engineer
assets are still on site.)
4-62. Graphics, maps, and overlays. These are critical elements of fire plan development. As discussed
earlier in this chapter, they are the platoon leader’s primary tool for organizing information and
synchronizing his assets on the battlefield. They assist him in depicting the fire plan accurately.
4-63. The platoon leader must have both maneuver and fire support graphics posted on his map and make
sure that all the TCs have done the same. He then prepares the overlay, which, like the fire plan, can be
developed by either traditional (handwritten) or digital means. The overlay technique eliminates the
tedious process of recopying operational graphics onto a sketch. As an example, if the platoon leader
believes a TRP should be added to the company graphics, he marks it on his overlay. He also places at
least two reference marks on the overlay to ensure proper alignment with his map.
4-64. The platoon leader prepares two copies of the overlay. He gives one copy to the company
commander during the OPORD confirmation brief. The commander can then apply the platoon overlays to
ensure his assigned engagement area is covered. After evaluating the platoon overlays, he may wish to
adjust platoon positions or assign supplementary positions if the entire engagement area is not covered by
either observation or direct fire. If a portion of the engagement area appears as dead space on all platoon
overlays, the commander may wish to plan indirect fires to cover the area.
4-65. Depiction of the fire plan. With the information from the individual tank sector sketches, the
platoon leader uses the available tools to prepare the platoon fire plan. As with other tactical products, the
fire plan product can be handwritten or displayed on the tank’s digital display. Figure 4-8 shows a
handwritten fire plan.
4-66. To enhance the platoon’s understanding of the fire plan and the operation itself, the platoon leader
must know how to make effective use of marginal data. These notations cover numerous types of tactical
information. They may vary according to mission, means of fire plan development (handwritten or
digital), and higher unit guidance. As an example, marginal data required on the fire plan for an M1 or
M1A1 platoon might include the following types of entries:
• Unit designation.
• Date.
• Type of position (primary, alternate, or supplementary).
• Information on TRPs (description, range, list of tanks that can engage each TRP).
• Additional notes as necessary, covering such areas as specific coordination with adjacent units
and engagement criteria and priority.
Note. On digitally equipped vehicles, much of the information normally included in marginal
data can be developed and transmitted using FBCB2.
Priorities of Work
4-67. At this point, the platoon executes its defensive priorities of work. (Note. Some tasks will be
performed simultaneously. Figure 4-9 is an example of a platoon time line to assist the platoon leader in
managing the defensive preparation and division of labor based on the “defend NLT” time.) Priorities of
work include, but are not limited to, the following tasks:
• Maintain platoon OPSEC and surveillance of the engagement area. (Note. See Appendix D for
more information.)
• Verify each vehicle’s location, orientation, and sector of fire.
• Supervise any allocated engineer assets.
• Conduct reconnaissance and mark supplementary engagement areas and subsequent BPs as time
permits.
• Conduct rehearsals.
• Oversee vehicle maintenance and prepare-to-fire checks.
• Improve the position by emplacing M8/M22 alarms and hot loops and by upgrading camouflage
protection.
Despite this complexity, however, engagement area development resembles a drill in that the commander
and his subordinate leaders use an orderly, fairly standard set of procedures. Beginning with evaluation of
METT-TC factors, the development process covers these steps:
• Identify all likely enemy avenues of approach.
• Determine likely enemy schemes of maneuver.
• Determine where to kill the enemy.
• Plan and integrate obstacles.
• Emplace weapon systems.
• Plan and integrate indirect fires.
• Rehearse the execution of operations in the engagement area.
4-70. Tank leaders need to be experts in building their sectors of the company engagement area using the
same seven steps outlined above. By doing this, they will be able to destroy the enemy force where the
command wants. A detailed discussion of each of the seven steps can be found in FM 3-90.1.
COORDINATION
4-83. Throughout the preparation phase, the platoon leader coordinates with adjacent platoons and other
elements to ensure that platoon sectors of fire overlap and that CS and sustainment requirements are met.
Coordination is initiated from left to right and from higher to lower. The platoon leader, however, should
initiate coordination through the chain of command if he desires support not specified in the company or
troop OPORD. He must also ensure that the platoon conducts necessary internal coordination.
Platoon Coordination
4-85. Effective internal coordination within the platoon enhances the situational understanding of tank
crews and alerts them to the actions needed to prepare the defense. One method of ensuring this
coordination is dissemination of enemy and friendly information in the form of intelligence updates, which
were discussed earlier in this chapter. In addition, sector sketches and the platoon fire plan facilitate
coordination of fires before the fight begins.
4-86. Rehearsals are especially effective in helping the platoon to practice and coordinate necessary
tactical skills, including these:
• Occupation procedures.
• Calls for fire.
• Initiation, distribution, and control of direct and indirect fires.
• Movement to alternate and supplementary fighting positions.
• Displacement to subsequent BPs.
4-87. Rehearsals can begin as soon as the platoon receives the company or troop WARNO, with individual
crews practicing berm drills, snake board exercises, and ammunition transfer drills. Initial walk-through
rehearsals on a sand table can focus on deliberate or hasty occupation procedures, fire distribution, and the
disengagement plan. The platoon can then conduct mounted movement rehearsals and force-on-force
rehearsals, continually raising the level of difficulty by conducting the rehearsals at night and at various
MOPP levels. The platoon leader should integrate voice and digital radio traffic as well as calls for fire
during all rehearsals.
INTELLIGENCE
4-90. OPSEC is critical during defensive preparations. The platoon should adhere to the procedures
outlined in Appendix D of this manual to limit the effectiveness of enemy reconnaissance efforts.
4-91. Intelligence is constantly updated by higher headquarters as the battlefield situation develops, such
as when the enemy fights through a screening or covering force. The platoon leader keeps the platoon
informed with periodic intelligence updates. The updated information may force him to reevaluate and
adjust his time line to ensure preparations are as complete as possible. For example, the platoon leader
may determine that engineer assets only have time to dig hull-down firing positions rather than turret-down
and hide positions; in another situation, he may direct the engineers to prepare fighting positions for only
one section because the other section has access to terrain that provides excellent natural hull-down firing
positions.
4-92. During the preparation phase, the platoon leader may conduct reconnaissance of subsequent or
supplementary BPs. Simultaneous planning for these positions during the preparation of initial positions is
a critical component in effective time management.
PROTECTION
4-93. Because engineer assets are at a premium during defensive preparations, they should never be
allowed to remain idle for any reason other than maintenance checks and services. A member of the
platoon, either the platoon leader or a designated TC, must physically link up with the engineers as directed
in the platoon OPORD and escort them to each firing position. The escort provides local security and
instructions to the engineers.
Survivability Considerations
4-94. Engineers improve the platoon’s survivability by digging or improving hide, turret-down, or hull-
down positions (see Figure 4-4 on page 4-7). Each TC should be responsible for the improvement of his
firing position. He must make sure that the location, orientation, and depth of the hole are correct before
the engineer departs for the next fighting position. He should also be aware of the importance of selecting
a site with a background that will break up the silhouette of his vehicle (see Figure 4-10); this helps to
prevent skylining.
4-95. Several factors can help the platoon to significantly increase the number of kills it achieves while
executing the defense. Firing positions should maximize weapon standoff and/or the platoon’s ability to
mass fires from survivable positions. As discussed previously, firing positions and obstacles should be
complementary. The platoon leader must coordinate with engineers to ensure that the platoon’s direct fires
can cover the entire area of any obstacle that the commander intends to emplace in the platoon’s sector of
fire. Additionally, the platoon should know the exact location of the start point, end point, and turns of the
obstacle. This knowledge contributes to the accuracy of calls for fire. The platoon leader can also locate a
TRP on the obstacle to ensure more accurate calls for fire.
Engineer Considerations
4-96. Engineer mobility operations in the defense normally are of lower priority than those involving
survivability and countermobility. Engineers can improve routes from the platoon’s hide position to its
primary, alternate, and supplementary fighting positions as well as to subsequent BPs. Such efforts are
labor-intensive, however, and should be evaluated carefully based on the commander’s priority of work for
the engineers.
SUSTAINMENT
4-97. Resupply methods and procedures are discussed in detail in Chapter 7 of this manual. If the
commander authorizes pre-positioning, the platoon leader determines the amount and type of prestock
(normally ammunition) that will be required for the operation. For example, to calculate ammunition
requirements, he evaluates the number and type of enemy vehicles the platoon expects to engage and the
amount of time available to conduct resupply between engagements. He then directs the PSG to select and
prepare the prestock location and coordinate the delivery of the prestock supplies.
4-98. Prestock resupply can be accomplished successfully in virtually any location where supplies can be
hidden and protected, such as in or behind the primary fighting position, along the displacement route, or
in the firing positions of a subsequent BP. Preparation of the site includes providing cover, concealment,
and protection for platoon and delivery personnel and vehicles during the transfer process. The site must
also protect the supply materials from enemy observation and the effects of artillery and weather.
4-99. Once the supplies are delivered, the prestock site should be concealed. The platoon should conduct
periodic security checks or keep the site under constant surveillance to ensure safekeeping of the prestock.
SECTION IV - EXECUTION
4-101. This section contains a “best case,” chronological discussion of the procedures and considerations
that apply during the execution of a typical tank platoon defensive mission.
HIDE POSITION
4-102. The platoon’s hide positions are located behind its primary battle and/or fighting positions. The
platoon occupies hide positions in one of two ways: either as a unit, using perimeter defense techniques
discussed in Chapter 5 (this method is used when hide positions are behind the BP), or with individual
vehicles occupying hide positions behind their primary fighting positions.
4-103. While in the hide position, the platoon employs all applicable OPSEC measures to limit aerial,
thermal, electronic, and visual detection. It deploys OPs as discussed in Appendix D of this manual to
provide surveillance of its sectors of fire and early warning for vehicles in the hide position. It also
maintains the REDCON status prescribed in the OPORD. The hide position should not be located on or
near obvious artillery targets.
Note. The platoon leader may decide to occupy turret-down positions rather than hide positions
based on terrain considerations, such as availability of cover and concealment, or if the enemy
situation is vague and observation of the engagement area is necessary.
INDIRECT FIRES
4-106. As the enemy approaches the direct-fire trigger line, the platoon leader updates his crews on the
situation reported on the company or troop net. He monitors the SPOTREPs and calls for fire being sent
on the company/troop net and compares these reports with the SPOTREPs from his platoon net. He reports
any new enemy information higher using the SPOTREP format (see ST 3-20.153). The platoon leader
employs available artillery to engage targets that are not being requested by other platoon leaders or the
company/troop commander. He initiates calls for fire on moving enemy elements using previously
identified triggers and the “AT MY COMMAND” method of control (calls for fire are discussed in
Chapter 6 of this manual).
4-107. Crews of M1A2 SEP tanks can track enemy vehicle movement toward a target location by
employing the vehicle’s far target designate capability; they can use this information to initiate artillery
fires. Additionally, they can use the far target locator capability to determine the location of stationary
targets and to quickly process a tactical fire (TACFIRE) direction system or FBCB2 call-for-fire message
to attack unplanned targets.
DIRECT FIRES
FIRE COMMANDS
4-108. The platoon leader initiates tank direct fires using a fire command as discussed in Chapter 2 of this
manual. The fire command enables him to engage single targets (for example, a reconnaissance vehicle)
using a single section or an individual vehicle without exposing the entire platoon. It also allows the
platoon to maintain the element of surprise by simultaneously engaging multiple targets with a lethal initial
volley of tank fires. Sectors of fire and the preplanned fire pattern should be selected to help prevent target
overkill and the resulting waste of ammunition.
TRIGGER LINE
4-109. The trigger line is a backup to the fire command. In the absence of communications from the
platoon leader, a preestablished direct-fire trigger line allows each TC to engage enemy vehicles in his
sector of fire. The criteria for the direct-fire trigger line should specify the number of enemy vehicles that
must pass a designated location before the TC can engage without any instructions from the platoon leader.
Selection of the trigger line is dependent on METT-TC factors. Considerations might include the
following:
• A maximum range or a point, such as an obstacle, at which the platoon will initiate fires to
support the company or troop scheme of maneuver.
• The survivability of enemy armor.
• The fields of fire that the terrain allows.
• The planning ranges for the platoon’s weapon systems. The planning range for the 105-mm
main gun is 2,000 meters; for the 120-mm main gun, it is 2,500 meters.
MOVEMENT CONSIDERATIONS
4-110. Individual TCs move from hull-down to turret-down firing positions within their primary and
alternate positions based on two considerations: the necessity to maintain direct fire on the enemy and the
effectiveness of enemy fires. Influencing each TC’s decision to move between firing positions are such
factors as enemy movement rates, the number of advancing enemy vehicles, the accuracy with which the
enemy is acquiring and engaging friendly fighting positions, and the lethality of enemy weapon systems.
REPORTING
4-111. During the direct-fire fight, TCs describe the situation for the platoon leader, who in turn describes
what is happening for the commander. Contact reports, SPOTREPs, and SITREPs are used as appropriate.
In the defense, contact reports are used to alert the platoon to previously unidentified enemy targets.
SPOTREPs and SITREPs are sent to list the number, types, and locations of enemy vehicles
observed, engaged, and/or destroyed and to provide the strength and status of friendly forces.
Everyone involved in the reporting process must avoid sending redundant or inflated descriptions of the
situation. Such reports not only are confusing, but also may trigger unnecessary, and possibly dangerous,
actions by higher headquarters.
RESUPPLY
4-112. The platoon may expend main gun ammunition quickly in a direct-fire fight. Based on the terrain
and expected enemy situation, the platoon leader must develop and execute resupply procedures to
maintain a constant supply of main gun rounds. He must balance the necessity of maintaining direct fires
on the enemy against the demands imposed on the platoon’s crews by the ammunition transfer process and
the retrieval of prestock supplies.
DISPLACEMENT
4-113. Displacement may become necessary in several types of situations. For example, a numerically
superior enemy may force the platoon to displace to a subsequent BP. In another situation, a penetration or
enemy advance on a secondary avenue of approach may require the platoon or section to occupy
supplementary BPs or fighting positions.
CAUTION
On-board smoke (VEESS) will be used only when the vehicle is
burning diesel fuel. Use of VEESS when burning any other type of fuel
will cause a fire hazard.
Figure 4-11. Displacement with cover from another element (entire platoon moves at once)
4-117. The platoon leader issues instructions or uses a prearranged signal to initiate movement. The
platoon simultaneously backs down to hide positions, keeping front hulls toward the enemy until adequate
cover protects each tank. Individual tanks orient weapon systems toward the enemy as they move to the
subsequent or supplementary positions along previously identified and reconnoitered routes.
Note. In some instances, the platoon may have to use bounding overwatch to the rear during
tactical movement to the subsequent or supplementary position (see Figure 4-12). This may
become necessary when such factors as the distance to the new position, the enemy’s rate of
advance, and terrain considerations (fields of fire) do not allow the original overwatch section to
displace without the benefit of an overwatch of its own.
Figure 4-12. Displacement without cover from another element (sections move using
bounding overwatch)
COMPLETION OF DISPLACEMENT
4-119. The displacement is complete when the platoon has occupied the subsequent BP and all vehicles
are prepared to continue the defense. If the platoon leader and TCs were able to reconnoiter and rehearse
the disengagement and occupation, the occupation should go quickly. If reconnaissance and rehearsals
were not possible, the platoon leader must conduct the steps of a hasty occupation outlined earlier in this
chapter.
COUNTERATTACKS
4-120. The platoon is capable of conducting limited counterattacks, either alone or as part of a larger
force (usually the company team). It can employ one of two methods: counterattack by fire and
counterattack by fire and movement.
PURPOSES
4-121. The platoon may conduct (or take part in) a counterattack to accomplish the following purposes:
• Complete the destruction of the enemy.
• Regain key terrain.
• Relieve pressure on an engaged unit.
• Initiate offensive operations.
COORDINATION AND CONTROL
4-122. Coordination and control are critical to the success of the counterattack. Locations of routes and
positions must be planned and disseminated to all units; this assists the counterattack force and other
elements in controlling indirect and direct fires. If adjustments to any route or position become necessary,
the counterattack force must take immediate action to ensure that other forces lift and shift fires; otherwise,
fratricide becomes a distinct danger.
COUNTERATTACK METHODS
Counterattack By Fire
4-123. When the company team executes a counterattack by fire, one platoon conducts tactical movement
on a concealed route to a predetermined BP or attack-by-fire position from which it can engage the enemy
in the flank and/or rear. The remaining platoons hold their positions and continue to engage the enemy
(see Figure 4-13). The intent of this method is to use weapon standoff and/or cover to full advantage and
destroy the enemy by direct fires.
Consolidation
4-126. To consolidate a defensive position, the platoon takes these steps:
• Eliminate remaining enemy resistance by conducting a counterattack as directed by the
commander.
• Reestablish communications.
• Ensure positions are mutually supporting; check all sectors of fire to eliminate gaps and dead
space that result when tanks are disabled.
• Secure detainees.
• Reestablish OPSEC by emplacing OPs and early warning devices (such as M8 alarms) and
enhancing camouflage for platoon positions.
• Replace, repair, or fortify obstacles.
• Improve positions in accordance with procedures for a deliberate defense and established
priorities of work.
REORGANIZATION
4-127. Reorganization, the process of preparing for continued fighting, is usually conducted by unit SOP.
Reorganization in the defense is accomplished in the same manner as in the offense. Refer to Section VII
in Chapter 3 of this manual for a detailed discussion.
PLANNING
4-129. In the planning phase, the commander, the platoon leader, and the TCs conduct a thorough
reconnaissance, usually during daylight hours, to mark positions and routes. They must keep in mind that
obscurants that limit visibility may also degrade the effectiveness of their thermal sights and laser range
finders. This may force them to designate engagement areas that are closer than anticipated to the unit’s
BPs. In marking their positions, they use materials that will facilitate occupation either in daylight or under
limited visibility conditions.
PREPARATION
4-130. During the preparation phase, the platoon leader ensures that TRPs and artillery targets are
“thermalized” to allow for positive identification during limited visibility. Used with a sector sketch
during direct fire engagements, thermalized TRPs also help TCs to more accurately estimate the range to
their targets when smoke or other factors inhibit the use of the LRF. Ideally, rehearsals of occupation and
displacement are conducted in limited visibility conditions; the same applies to preparation and occupation
of fighting positions and to any necessary repositioning.
4-131. OPSEC is strictly enforced during all phases of defensive preparation. OPs are critical in
providing security and early warning of enemy activities. The platoon leader emplaces mounted OPs to
take advantage of the capabilities of his vehicles’ thermal sights in scanning the engagement area and the
platoon’s assigned sector. Dismounted OPs provide local security and augment mounted OPs with shorter-
range observation and the ability to listen for approaching enemy elements.
EXECUTION
4-132. As the platoon enters the execution phase, the platoon leader must ensure that all crewmen
thoroughly understand the occupation and displacement criteria and TCs strictly enforce all fire control
measures. TCs use sketch cards and the CITV (if available) to estimate target range when visibility factors
prevent use of the LRF.
Chapter 5
Other Tactical Operations
This chapter describes additional tasks the tank platoon may conduct to complement
or support its primary operations of move, attack, and defend. The platoon executes
these additional tasks separately or as part of a larger force.
COMPOSITION
5-5. A road march is composed of three elements:
• The quartering party (or advance party).
• The main body.
• The trail party.
5-6. The tank platoon normally travels as a unit in the main body. Before the march begins, the platoon
may provide individual Soldiers or a vehicle and crew to assist with quartering party activities (see Section
II of this chapter).
MARCH COLUMNS
5-7. The following discussion focuses on the three primary road march techniques. (Note. The
commander bases his decision on the formation used during the march on which technique is employed.
The road march is usually executed in column or staggered column formation.)
OPEN COLUMN
5-8. The open column technique is normally used for daylight marches. It can be used at night with
blackout lights or night-vision equipment. The distance between vehicles varies, normally from 50 meters
to 200 meters depending on light and weather conditions.
CLOSE COLUMN
5-9. The close column technique is normally used for marches conducted during periods of limited
visibility. The distance between vehicles is based on the ability to see the vehicle ahead; it is normally less
than 50 meters.
INFILTRATION
5-10. Infiltration involves the movement of small groups of personnel or vehicles at irregular intervals. It
is used when sufficient time and suitable routes are available and when maximum security, deception, and
dispersion are desired. It provides the best possible passive defense against enemy observation and
detection. (Note. Infiltration is most commonly used by dismounted elements.)
CONTROL MEASURES
5-11. The following discussion covers control measures the platoon leader can use in effectively
controlling his platoon during the conduct of a road march.
DIGITAL OVERLAYS
5-13. When available, digital overlays serve as the platoon’s primary source of graphic control measures,
although the traditional hard-copy map and overlay must be maintained as a backup. Digital overlays
display waypoints and information concerning unit locations along the route of march that can assist TCs
in navigation and help them in maintaining situational understanding.
CHECKPOINTS
5-14. Locations along the route of march where interference with movement may occur or where timing is
critical are represented using checkpoints. The SP, RP, and all checkpoints are considered critical points.
STRIP MAPS
5-15. A strip map can be used to assist in navigation. It must include the SP, RP, and checkpoints and
must list the distances between these points. Detailed blow-up sketches should be used for scheduled halt
locations and other places where confusion is likely to occur. Strip maps are included as an annex to the
movement order; if possible, a copy should be provided to all TCs. See Figure 5-1 for an example of a
strip map.
VISUAL SIGNALS
5-16. Hand-and-arm signals provide an alternate means of passing messages between vehicles. This
becomes important because the enemy may have the ability to interfere with FM communication. Leaders
must understand that this is a perishable skill.
TRAFFIC CONTROL
5-17. Road guides and traffic signs may be posted at designated traffic control points by the headquarters
controlling the march. At critical points, guides assist in creating a smooth flow of traffic along the march
route. Military police, members of the battalion scout platoon, or designated elements from the quartering
party may serve as guides. They should have equipment that will allow march elements to identify them
during periods of limited visibility.
columns and conduct final inspections and briefings before movement. Other units require platoons to
move directly to the column from their current positions. To avoid confusion during the initial move, the
platoon leader and TCs conduct a reconnaissance of the route to the SP, issue clear movement instructions,
and conduct thorough rehearsals, paying particular attention to signals and timing.
MARCH SPEED
5-19. An element’s speed in a march column will change as it encounters variable routes and road
conditions. This can produce an undesirable accordion effect. The movement order establishes the speed
of march and maximum catch-up speed. During the march, the platoon’s lead vehicle must not exceed
either the fixed march speed or the top catch-up speed. In addition, it should accelerate slowly out of turns
or choke points; this allows the platoon to gradually resume the speed of march after moving past the
restriction.
ORIENTATION
5-20. Each tank in the platoon has an assigned sector of fire (see Figure 5-2). TCs assign sectors of
observation to crewmen both to cover their portion of the platoon sector and to achieve 360-degree
observation.
HALTS
5-21. While taking part in a road march, the platoon must be prepared to conduct both scheduled and
unscheduled halts.
Scheduled Halts
5-22. These are executed to conduct maintenance, refueling, and personal relief activities and to allow
other traffic to pass. The time and duration of halts are established in the movement order; unit SOP
specifies actions taken during halts. The first priority at a halt is to establish and maintain local security
(see Appendix D of this manual). A maintenance halt of 15 minutes is usually taken after the first hour of
the march, with a 10-minute break every two hours thereafter.
5-23. During long marches, the unit may conduct a refuel-on-the-move (ROM) operation. Depending on
the tactical situation and the company or troop OPORD, the platoon may conduct ROM for all vehicles
simultaneously or by section. The OPORD will specify the amount of fuel or the amount of time at the
pump for each vehicle. It will also give instructions for security at the ROM site and at the post-fueling
staging area.
Unscheduled Halts
5-24. Unscheduled halts are conducted under a variety of circumstances, such as when the unit encounters
obstacles or contaminated areas or if a disabled vehicle blocks the route. The platoon conducts actions on
contact and establishes 360-degree security.
5-25. A disabled vehicle must not be allowed to obstruct traffic. The crew moves the vehicle off the road
immediately (if possible), reports its status, establishes security, and posts guides to direct traffic. If
possible, the crew repairs the vehicle and rejoins the rear of the column. Vehicles that drop out of the
column should return to their original positions only when the column has halted. Until then, they move at
the rear just ahead of the trail element, usually comprised of the maintenance team with the M88 recovery
vehicle and some type of security. If the crew cannot repair the vehicle, the vehicle is recovered by the
maintenance element.
company/troop XO or 1SG or by a senior NCO. The quartering party takes these actions in preparing the
assembly area:
• Reconnoiter for enemy forces, CBRN contamination, condition of the route to the assembly
area, and suitability of the area (covering such factors as drainage, space, and internal routes). If
the area is unsatisfactory, the party contacts the commander and requests permission to find a
new location for the site.
• Organize the area based on the commander’s guidance. This includes designating and marking
tentative locations for the platoon, trains, and CP vehicles.
• Improve and mark entrances, exits, and internal routes.
• Mark and/or remove obstacles (within the party’s capabilities).
• Mark tentative vehicle locations.
OCCUPATION PROCEDURES
5-29. Once the assembly area has been prepared, the quartering party awaits the arrival of the company or
troop, maintaining surveillance and providing security of the area within its capabilities. Quartering party
members guide their elements (including the platoon) from the RP to their locations in the assembly area.
SOPs and prearranged signals and markers (for day and night occupation) should assist the TCs in finding
their positions. The key consideration is to move quickly into position to clear the route for follow-on
units.
5-30. Once in position, the platoon conducts hasty occupation of a BP as described in Chapter 4 of
this manual. It establishes and maintains security (see the OPSEC discussion in Appendix D) and
coordinates with adjacent units. These actions enable the platoon to defend from the assembly area
as necessary. The platoon can then prepare for future operations by conducting troop-leading procedures
and the priorities of work in accordance the company or troop OPORD. Priorities of work are:
• Establish and maintain security (REDCON status).
• Position vehicles.
• Emplace OPs.
• Emplace CBRN alarms.
• Establish lateral communications/flank coordination.
• Prepare range cards and fire plans.
• Establish wire communication (if directed by unit SOP).
• Camouflage vehicles.
• Select alternate, supplementary positions, and rally points.
• Develop an obstacle plan.
• Conduct troop-leading procedures.
• Perform maintenance activities on vehicles, communications equipment, and weapon systems.
• Verify weapon system status; conduct boresighting, muzzle reference system (MRS) updates,
test-firing, and other necessary preparations.
• Conduct resupply, refueling, and rearming operations.
• Conduct rehearsals and training for upcoming operations.
• Conduct PCCs and PCIs.
• Eat, rest, and conduct personal hygiene.
• Establish field sanitation.
5-31. Normally, the platoon occupies an assembly area as part of a company team or troop. The team or
troop may be adjacent to or independent of the task force or squadron (see Figures 5-3A and 5-3B). The
company or troop commander assigns a sector of responsibility and weapons orientations for each platoon.
If the platoon occupies an assembly area alone, it establishes a perimeter defense (explained later in this
chapter).
Figure 5-3A. Battalion assembly area; company team adjacent to other company teams
OCCUPATION BY FORCE
5-32. In some cases, a company or troop will occupy an assembly area without first sending out a
quartering party. During this “occupation by force,” the platoon leader orders a hasty occupation of a BP
at the platoon’s designated location. He establishes local security, directs adjacent unit coordination,
begins troop-leading procedures, and establishes priorities of work.
variety of units and because some vehicles may not have tactical radios. The order should follow the
standard five-paragraph OPORD format, but special emphasis should be placed on the following subjects:
• Route of march (with a strip map provided for each vehicle commander).
• Order of march.
• Actions at halts.
• Actions if a vehicle becomes disabled.
• Actions on contact.
• Chain of command.
• Communications and signal information.
TACTICAL DISPOSITION
5-38. During all escort missions, the convoy security commander and tank platoon leader must establish
and maintain security in all directions and throughout the length of the convoy. They can adjust the
disposition of the platoon, either as a unit or dispersed, to fit the security requirements of each particular
situation. As noted, several factors, including convoy size and METT-TC, affect this disposition. Perhaps
the key consideration is whether the platoon is operating as part of larger escort force or is executing the
escort mission independently.
Note. The convoy commander may also designate the tank platoon as part of a reaction force
for additional firepower in the event of enemy contact. The reaction force will either move with
the convoy or be located at a staging area close enough to provide immediate interdiction
against the enemy.
5-43. When the platoon is deployed as a unit during a large-scale escort operation, it can provide forward,
flank, or rear close-in security. In such situations, it executes tactical movement based on the factors of
METT-TC. Figures 5-5A through 5-5C illustrate the platoon using various formations while performing
escort duties as a unit.
5-45. In some independent escort missions, variations in terrain along the route may require the platoon to
operate using a modified traveling overwatch technique. Figure 5-7 illustrates such a situation. It shows
one section leading the convoy while the other trails the convoy. Dispersion between vehicles in each
section is sufficient to provide flank security. Depending on the terrain, the trail section may not be able to
overwatch the movement of the lead section.
ACTIONS ON CONTACT
5-46. As the convoy moves toward its new location, the enemy may attempt to interdict it. This contact
will usually occur in the form of an ambush, often with the use of a hastily prepared obstacle or improvised
explosive device (IED). The safety of the convoy then rests on the speed and effectiveness with which
escort elements can execute appropriate actions on contact.
5-47. Based on the factors of METT-TC, portions of the convoy security force, such as the tank platoon or
a tank section, may be designated as a reaction force. The reaction force performs its escort duties,
conducts tactical movement, or occupies an assembly area as required until enemy contact occurs; it then is
given a reaction mission by the convoy commander.
ACTIONS AT AN AMBUSH
5-48. An ambush is one of the most effective ways to interdict a convoy. Conversely, reaction to an
ambush must be immediate, overwhelming, and decisive. Actions on contact must be planned for and
rehearsed so they can be executed as a drill by all escort and convoy elements, with care taken to avoid
fratricide.
5-49. In almost all situations, the platoon will take several specific, instantaneous actions when it must
react to an ambush. These steps, illustrated in Figures 5-8A and 5-8B, include the following:
• As soon as they acquire an enemy force, the escort vehicles conduct action toward the enemy
(see Figure 5-8A). They seek covered positions between the convoy and the enemy and
suppress the enemy with the highest possible volume of fire permitted by the ROE. Contact
reports are sent to higher headquarters as quickly as possible.
• The convoy commander retains control of the convoy vehicles and continues to move them
along the route at the highest possible speed (see Figure 5-8A).
• Convoy vehicles, if they are armed, may return fire only if the escort has not positioned itself
between the convoy and the enemy force.
• Security forces must plan to secure all damaged or disabled vehicles and equipment. The
platoon leader or the convoy commander may request, as a last resort, that any damaged or
disabled vehicles be abandoned and pushed off the route (see Figure 5-8B).
• The escort leader (in the example included here, this is the tank platoon leader) uses SPOTREPs
to keep the convoy security commander informed. If necessary, the escort leader or the convoy
security commander can then request support from the reaction force; he can also call for and
adjust indirect fires.
5-50. Once the convoy is clear of the kill zone, the escort element executes one of the following COAs
based on the composition of the escort and reaction forces, the commander’s intent, and the strength of the
enemy force:
• Continues to suppress the enemy as combat reaction forces move to support (see Figure 5-9A).
• Assaults the enemy (see Figure 5-9B).
• Breaks contact and moves out of the kill zone (see Figure 5-9C).
5-51. In most situations, tanks continue to suppress the enemy or execute an assault to destroy enemy
forces. Contact should be broken only when the tactical situation requires.
Figure 5-9A. Escort suppresses the ambush to facilitate attack by the reaction force
ACTIONS AT AN OBSTACLE
5-52. Obstacles are a major threat to convoys. Obstacles can be used to harass the convoy by delaying it
or stopping it altogether. In addition, obstacles may canalize or stop the convoy to set up an enemy
ambush.
5-53. The purpose of the route reconnaissance ahead of a convoy is to identify obstacles and either breach
or bypass them. In some cases, however, the enemy or its obstacles may avoid detection by the
reconnaissance element. If this happens, the convoy must take actions to reduce or bypass the obstacle.
5-54. When an obstacle is identified, the convoy escort faces two problems: reducing or bypassing the
obstacle and maintaining protection for the convoy. Security becomes critical, and actions at the obstacle
must be accomplished very quickly. The convoy commander must assume that the obstacle is overwatched
and covered by the enemy. To reduce the time the convoy is halted and thus to reduce its vulnerability, the
following actions should occur when the convoy escort encounters a point-type obstacle:
• The lead element identifies the obstacle and directs the convoy to make a short halt and establish
security. The convoy escort overwatches the obstacle (see Figure 5-10) and requests that the
breach force move forward.
• The convoy escort maintains 360-degree security of the convoy and provides overwatch as the
breach force reconnoiters the obstacle in search of a bypass.
• Once all reconnaissance is complete, the convoy commander determines which of the following
COAs he will take:
• Bypass the obstacle.
• Breach the obstacle with the assets on hand.
• Breach the obstacle with reinforcing assets.
• The convoy security commander relays a SPOTREP higher and requests support by combat
reaction forces, engineer assets (if they are not part of the convoy), and/or aerial reconnaissance
elements.
• Artillery units are alerted to be prepared to provide fire support.
5-55. Tanks equipped with mine plows are ideal for breaching most obstacles encountered during convoy
escort missions. If the convoy escort is required to breach limited obstacles using plow tanks, the platoon
leader must maintain the security of the convoy, ensuring that adequate support forces are in place to
overwatch the breach operation.
• Once the convoy is in column, local security elements (if used) return to their vehicles, and the
escort vehicles rejoin the column (see Figure 5-11C).
• When all elements are in column, the convoy resumes movement.
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
5-58. Units are highly vulnerable during a passage of lines. Vehicles may be concentrated, and fires may
be masked. The passing unit may not be able to maneuver and react to enemy contact.
5-59. Detailed reconnaissance and coordination are critical in overcoming these potential problems and
ensuring the passage of lines is conducted quickly and smoothly. The commander normally conducts all
necessary reconnaissance and coordination for the passage. At times, he may designate the XO, 1SG, or a
platoon leader to conduct liaison duties for reconnaissance and coordination. The following items of
information are coordinated (Note. An asterisk indicates items that should be confirmed by
reconnaissance):
• Unit designation and composition, including type and number of passing vehicles.
• Passing unit arrival time(s).
• Location of attack positions or assembly areas. *
• Current enemy situation.
• Stationary unit’s mission and plan (to include OP, patrol, and obstacle locations). *
• Location of contact points, passage points, and passage lanes. (Note. The use of
GPS/POSNAV waypoints will simplify this process and, as a result, speed the passage.) *
• Guide requirements.
• Order of march.
• Anticipated and possible actions on enemy contact.
• Supporting direct and indirect fires, including location of the restrictive fire line (RFL). *
• CBRN conditions.
• Available CS and sustainment assets and their locations. *
• Communications information (to include frequencies, digital data, and near and far recognition
signals).
• Chain of command, including location of the battle handover line (BHL).
• Additional procedures for the passage.
TYPES OF OBSTACLES
5-68. Obstacles are any obstructions that stop, delay, divert, or restrict movement. They are usually
covered by observation and enhanced by direct or indirect fires and as such the platoon leader needs to
plan for this possibility. This discussion examines the two categories of obstacles.
EXISTING OBSTACLES
5-69. Existing obstacles are already present on the battlefield and are not emplaced through military effort.
They fall into two major classifications:
• Natural obstacles, which include these types:
• Ravines, gullies, gaps, or ditches over 3 meters wide.
• Streams, rivers, or canals over 1 meter deep.
• Mountains or hills with a slope in excess of 60 percent (30 degrees).
• Lakes, swamps and marshes over 1 meter deep.
• Tree stumps and large rocks over 18 inches high.
• Forests or jungles with trees 8 inches or more in diameter and with less than 4 meters of
space between trees on a slope.
• Man-made obstacles, which include built-up areas such as towns, cities, or railroad
embankments.
REINFORCING OBSTACLES
5-70. Reinforcing obstacles are placed on the battlefield through military effort and are designed to slow,
stop, or canalize the enemy. Whenever possible, both friendly and enemy forces will enhance the
effectiveness of their reinforcing obstacles by tying them in with existing obstacles. The following
discussion focuses on several types of reinforcing obstacles.
Minefields
5-71. The minefield is the most common reinforcing obstacle the platoon will encounter on the battlefield.
It is easier and quicker to emplace than other obstacles and can be very effective in destroying vehicles.
The minefield may be emplaced in several ways: by hand, by air or artillery delivery using scatterable
mines, or by mechanical means (the Volcano system). It can be used separately or in conjunction with
other obstacles; refer to Figure 5-12 for possible minefield locations.
Antitank Ditch
5-72. The antitank ditch, illustrated in Figure 5-13, may be reinforced with wire and/or mines to make it
more complex and more difficult for the attacker to overcome. In addition, soil from the ditch can be built
up into a berm on the emplacing unit side.
Log Crib
5-75. A log crib is a framework of tree trunks or beams filled with dirt and rock (see Figure 5-16). It is
used to block roads or paths in wooded and mountainous terrain.
BREACHING PROCEDURES
5-79. Breaching operations entail the coordinated efforts of three task-organized elements: the support
force, the breach force, and the assault force. The discussion in this section covers the actions and
responsibilities of these elements, as well as the tank platoon’s role in the operation.
SOSRA STEPS
5-80. The following actions, known by the abbreviation SOSRA, occur during a breaching operation:
• Sufficient support elements are employed to suppress enemy elements that are overwatching the
obstacle. The support force uses direct and indirect fires to accomplish its mission.
• The support force requests immediate or preplanned smoke to obscure the enemy and prevent
observation of the breach operation.
• The breach force must organize in such a manner as to secure the reduction area to prevent the
enemy from interfering with the obstacle reduction.
• The breach force takes actions to reduce the obstacle and allow follow-on forces to assault
enemy forces beyond the obstacle after the lane is proofed and marked.
BREACHING ORGANIZATION
5-81. The commander in charge of the breaching operation will designate support, breach, and assault
forces. He may task the tank platoon to serve in any of these elements, as detailed in the following
discussion. During operations with light forces the platoon leader may need to be prepared to cover any
one or several of the above missions. The light forces will not have the capability to create a breach large
enough for a tank force.
Support Force
5-82. This element usually leads movement of the breach elements. After identifying the obstacle, it
moves to covered and concealed areas and establishes support-by-fire positions. The support force leader
sends a voice or digital SPOTREP to the commander. This report must describe the location and
complexity of the obstacle, the composition of enemy forces that are overwatching the obstacle, and the
location of possible bypasses. The commander decides whether to maneuver to a bypass or to breach the
obstacle. (Note. He must keep in mind that a bypass may lead to an enemy kill zone.)
5-83. In either case, the support force suppresses any enemy elements that are overwatching the obstacle to
allow the breach force to breach or bypass the obstacle. The support force should be in position to request
suppressive artillery fires and smoke for obscuration. As the breach and assault forces execute their
missions, the support force lifts or shifts supporting fires. Because the enemy is likely to engage the
support force with artillery, the support force must be prepared to move to alternate positions while
maintaining suppressive fires.
Breach Force
5-84. The breach force receives a voice or digital SPOTREP identifying the location of the obstacle or
bypass. It then must organize internally to fulfill these responsibilities:
• Provide local security for the breach site as necessary.
• Conduct the actual breach. The breach force creates, proofs, and marks a lane through the
obstacle or secures the bypass.
• Move through the lane to provide local security for the assault force on the far side of the
obstacle. In some instances, the breach force may move to hull-down firing positions that allow
it to suppress enemy elements overwatching the obstacle. At other times, it may assault the
enemy, with suppressive fires provided by the support force.
Breaching Methods
5-85. The tank platoon can create a lane by itself if it is equipped with the assets required to breach the
type of obstacle encountered. If the platoon does not have this capability, it may be required to provide
close-in protection for attached engineers with breaching assets. Three breaching methods are available to
the platoon:
• Mechanical breaching, usually with mine plows or mine rakes.
• Explosive breaching, employing such means as the mine-clearing line charge (MICLIC), M173
line charge, or 1/4-pound blocks of TNT.
• Manual breaching, with Soldiers probing by hand or using such items as grappling hooks,
shovels, picks, axes, and chain saws. Manual breaching is the least preferred method for the
tank platoon.
Note. In extreme cases, the commander may order the platoon to force through an obstacle.
This technique requires the breach force to move in column formation through the obstacle
location. If available, a disabled vehicle can be pushed ahead of the lead breach vehicle in an
attempt to detonate mines.
Note. If the location and/or dimensions of the obstacle are unknown, the platoon leader may
choose to lead with tanks equipped with mine rollers to identify the beginning of the obstacle.)
5-88. If the platoon is allocated one plow, the PSG’s wingman normally serves as the breach tank. The
PSG follows immediately behind to proof the lane and provide overwatch. The platoon leader’s section
follows the PSG.
5-89. If the platoon has two or more plows, it can create multiple lanes, usually 75 to 100 meters apart.
The wingman tanks are normally equipped with the plows, with the section leader’ tanks following to
proof the lanes and provide overwatch (see Figure 5-19).
Figure 5-19. Plow tanks create multiple lanes while the section leaders’ tanks provide
overwatch
Note. The assault force will often move behind the breach force and closely follow the breach
vehicles through the new lane.)
Assault Force
5-93. While the breach is in progress, the assault force assists the support force or follows the breach force
while maintaining cover and dispersion. Once a lane is cleared through the obstacle, the assault force then
moves through the breach. It secures the far side of the obstacle by physical occupation and/or continues
the attack in accordance with the commander’s intent.
5-94. Tank units, including the tank platoon, are ideally suited for assault force operations against mobile
enemy defenses in open terrain. Consideration should have mechanized infantry as an assault force
attacking dug-in enemy positions in close terrain.
tank platoon may be required to break contact or conduct a withdrawal and then execute a passage of lines.
These tasks are discussed in other sections of this chapter.
5-99. In a moving flank screen (platoons normally execute this as a follow and support operation,
discussed earlier in this chapter), the tank platoon conducts tactical movement to the rear of scout platoons.
It may periodically occupy hasty BPs. When the scouts identify enemy elements, the commander issues a
FRAGO for the tank platoon to occupy a hasty defensive position or attack-by-fire position or to conduct a
hasty attack to destroy the enemy.
5-100. It is critical that the tank platoon leader keep these considerations in mind during all screen
operations:
• OPSEC requirements. During screen missions, the platoon may be required to operate apart
from other units.
• Location and identification of friendly forces. The platoon leader should know all patrol
routes and OP locations within the platoon’s AO. The platoon should maintain voice and digital
(if available) communications with the OPs.
• Engagement criteria. To reduce the potential for fratricide, engagement criteria should be as
specific as possible when friendly units operate to the front and flanks of the tank platoon as it
executes a screen mission.
SECTION IX – DELAY
5-101. A delay operation is a continuous series of defensive actions over successive positions in depth.
The purpose is to trade the enemy space for time while retaining freedom of action. Units involved in a
delay maximize the use of terrain and obstacles, maintaining contact with the enemy but avoiding decisive
engagement. In some instances, local counterattacks are used to assist units during disengagement or to
take advantage of battlefield opportunities.
5-102. The tank platoon conducts the delay as part of a company team. In some cases, it will occupy
either a hasty or deliberate BP; it will then disengage and occupy successive BPs in depth as part of the
delaying force. The platoon may also be required to conduct local counterattacks or to support the
movement of other platoons during the delay. The considerations involved in planning and executing a
delay at platoon level are the same as for offensive operations (refer to Chapter 3 of this manual) and
defensive operations (refer to Chapter 4).
RELIEF PROCEDURES
5-107. After reconnaissance and coordination are complete, the platoon leaders continue with their troop-
leading procedures and prepare to execute the relief. Initially, the relieving unit moves to an assembly area
behind the unit to be relieved. Final coordination is conducted, and information is exchanged between the
two units.
5-108. The relieving unit links up with guides or finalizes linkup procedures. Individual vehicles then
relieve forward positions using one of three techniques:
• The relieving vehicles occupy primary positions after the relieved unit has moved to alternate
positions. Once OPs are in place, the relieved unit can withdraw.
• The relieving vehicles occupy alternate positions while the relieved unit remains in primary
positions. Once OPs are in place, the relieved unit withdraws. The platoon leader then orders
the relieving unit to occupy primary positions as necessary.
• The relieving unit occupies a hide position while the relieved unit occupies hide, primary, or
alternate positions. Once OPs are in place, the relieved unit withdraws.
• The relieving unit never loses the digital link (if applicable) as it assumes the new mission.
Once the relief is complete, the relieved unit simply logs off the digital net and switches to an
alternate FM frequency; it can then reestablish a digital link after leaving the relief site.
• Maintaining radio traffic on the same frequency before, during, and after the operation will help
deceive the enemy as to whether a relief has occurred.
SECTION XI - WITHDRAWAL
5-112. The purpose of this retrograde operation is to free a force in contact with the enemy so it can
execute a new mission. Conducting a withdrawal at platoon level is identical to disengagement (see the
discussion in Chapter 4 of this manual). The withdrawal may be conducted under pressure (with direct or
indirect fire enemy contact) or with no pressure.
Chapter 6
Combined Arms Operations
The tank platoon must take full advantage of available combined arms assets to
accomplish its mission and to reduce its vulnerability on the battlefield. Combined
arms integration may include mortars, FA, combat engineers, ADA, and aviation
units. These assets are not organic to the tank platoon, but they may be available to
through its parent battalion, company, or troop. The platoon leader must understand
the capabilities and limitations of each combined arms asset in order to effectively
employ them in combat.
MORTAR SUPPORT
6-2. Mortars afford immediate and responsive indirect fire support to maneuver forces. Each combined
arms battalion (CAB) has four 120-mm mortar systems organized into two sections. Each reconnaissance
squadron has six 120-mm mortar systems organized with two systems organic to each troop.
CAPABILITIES
6-3. With a maximum effective range of 7,200 meters, 120-mm mortars can provide a heavy volume of
accurate, sustained fires. They are ideal weapons for attacking a variety of targets, including the following:
• Infantry in the open.
• Targets on reverse slopes.
• Targets in narrow ravines or trenches.
• Targets in forests, towns, and other areas that are difficult to strike with low-angle fires.
6-4. In addition to these highly flexible targeting options, mortars have the following capabilities and
advantages:
• Rapid response time.
• Effective against low-density targets.
• Highly destructive target effects.
LIMITATIONS
6-5. Mortars are limited in the following ways:
• Maximum range is limited in comparison to the indirect fire support capability of FA elements.
• They cannot be used against targets inside their minimum indirect fire effective range (200
meters from the mortar tube position).
• Only limited types of ammunition are available.
EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS
6-6. Mortars can be extremely effective when used for the purposes outlined in the following discussion.
Destruction
6-7. High-explosive (HE) rounds, mounted with variable-time (VT) fuses, can be used to destroy or
disperse dismounted infantry and vehicles that are in the open. HE mortar rounds have the capability to
destroy or disable some armored vehicles.
Suppression
6-8. HE rounds can be used to force the enemy to button up or move to less advantageous positions.
Smoke
6-9. Mortar smoke builds up more rapidly than artillery smoke. White phosphorus (WP) rounds are used
for obscuration and screening. See Appendix E of this manual for detailed information on the use of
smoke.
Illumination
6-10. Illumination rounds are used to light an area or enemy position during periods of limited visibility.
Illumination can increase the effectiveness of the tank platoon’s image intensification devices (passive
sights). This helps the platoon in gathering information, adjusting artillery fire, and engaging enemy
targets. Ground-burst illumination can also be used to mark enemy positions and to provide a thermal TRP
for control of fires.
6-11. Units must be careful, however, not to illuminate friendly positions. Also, because U.S. night-vision
devices may or may not be superior to those of most potential adversaries, illuminating the battlefield may
be unnecessary or even counterproductive.
CAPABILITIES
6-14. In support of the tank platoon, FA elements can accomplish the following tasks:
• Provide immediate suppression on unplanned targets.
• Provide continuous fire support on planned targets in all weather conditions and types of terrain.
• Allow commanders and platoon leaders to shift and mass fires rapidly.
• Offer a variety of conventional shell and fuse combinations.
• Provide obscuration and screening smoke to conceal movement.
• Fire battlefield illumination rounds as necessary.
LIMITATIONS
6-15. FA support has the following limitations:
• Limited capability against moving targets.
• Limited capability to destroy point targets without considerable ammunition expenditure or use
of specialized munitions.
• Highly vulnerable to detection by enemy target acquisition systems.
SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS
6-17. FISTs are organized, equipped, and trained to provide the following personnel and support to the
company or troop:
• A fire support advisor and coordinator.
• A communications link to all available indirect fire support assets.
• On-the-spot support for infantry companies (ten-man team) or for armor companies and cavalry
troops (four-man team).
COMMUNICATIONS
6-18. The armor or mechanized infantry FIST normally monitors the following radio nets:
• Attached unit command net (battalion, company team, or troop).
• Battalion mortar fire direction net.
• Direct support (DS) battalion fire direction net (digital).
• Battalion fire support net (voice).
6-19. The armored cavalry troop FIST normally monitors these radio nets:
• Troop command net.
• Troop fire support net.
• Supporting artillery fire direction net (digital and voice).
• Squadron fire support net.
6-20. The FIST serves as the net control station (NCS) on the unit fire support net, while the fire support
element (FSE) serves as the NCS on the maneuver battalion fire support net. The FIST relays calls for fire
to supporting artillery on a digital net (TACFIRE) or sends the fire mission to the mortar platoon or
section. The command net allows the FIST to monitor operations and links the FIST to the commander
and platoon leaders for planning and coordination.
Grid Method
6-28. In the grid method, the target location normally consists of a two-letter grid zone identifier with eight
digits (example: “AB180739”). The direction from the observer to the target (in mils, if possible) must be
given to the FDC after the call for fire, but before the first adjusting rounds are shot.
Note. With the likelihood of operating in built-up areas, crew members should call for fire
using eight- or ten-digit grids to reduce collateral damage.
Figure 6-4. Shift from a known point method using direction (in mils)
6-31. The observer then determines the lateral and range shifts (see Figure 6-5). Lateral shifts are left or
right from the known point to the OT line and are given to the nearest 10 meters. Range shifts are given as
“ADD” (when the target is beyond the known point) or “DROP” (when the target is closer than the known
point). Range shifts are given to the nearest 100 meters. FM 6-30 explains in detail how to determine
lateral and range shifts.
Target Description, Method of Engagement, and Method of Fire and Control (Third
Transmission)
6-32. The observer includes the target description, method of engagement, and method of fire and control
in his call for fire using the guidelines discussed in the following paragraphs.
Target Description
6-33. The observer describes the target to the FDC; see Figure 6-6 for examples. The FDC then
determines the type and amount of ammunition needed. The target description should be brief but
accurate. This is the last required element in the call for fire.
Method of Engagement
6-34. The observer tells how he wants to attack the target (including type of ammunition, fuse, and
distance from friendly troops). The FDC may change the ammunition type and fuse based on availability
or other constraints. If the target is within 600 meters of friendly troops, the observer announces
“DANGER CLOSE” to supporting mortars and artillery.
Method of Fire and Control
6-35. The observer will state who will give the command for fire to begin firing. If the observer wants to
control the time of firing, he will say, “AT MY COMMAND.” The FDC will tell the observer when the
unit is ready to fire. At the proper time, the observer will say, “FIRE.” If the observer does not say, “AT
MY COMMAND,” the FDC will fire as soon as the platoon or battery is ready.
6-39. After receiving the company offensive fire plan, the platoon leader checks it to ensure that targets are
planned on all known or suspected enemy positions in front of, on, behind, and to the flanks of the
objective. The company defensive fire plan should list planned targets in front of, on, behind, and to the
flanks of BPs; likely areas for these targets include observed choke points, avenues of approach, obstacles,
and likely support-by-fire positions. If more targets are necessary for either the offensive or defensive
plan, the platoon leader coordinates them with the commander and the FIST.
AIR CAVALRY
6-41. Armed reconnaissance, found in combat aviation brigades, is organized, equipped, and trained to
conduct reconnaissance and security missions.
ATTACK HELICOPTERS
6-42. Attack helicopter units operate either as a separate element within a division or as part of the air
cavalry. Attack helicopter companies are maneuver units and are normally integrated into the ground
scheme of maneuver. When working with ground maneuver units, the attack helicopter unit may be placed
OPCON to the ground force. Normally, it is OPCON to a maneuver brigade or regiment; on rare
occasions, it can be OPCON to a battalion or squadron.
6-43. The primary aircraft in air cavalry units is the OH-58D. This helicopter provides substantial limited-
visibility and all-weather acquisition capability. The aircraft features a stabilized mast-mounted sight
(MMS) with a low-light TV camera, TIS, and laser range finder/designator. It can acquire armored vehicle
targets at night at ranges up to 10 kilometers. It can be armed with a wide assortment of weapons and thus
can be configured for a variety of threat situations (see Figure 6-7).
6-44. Aeroscouts usually arrive before attack aircraft, establish communications with ground forces, and
coordinate the situation and mission with the commander. Aeroscouts identify targets, choose general BPs,
and control attack helicopter fires.
6-45. The attack helicopter is primarily employed as an anti-armor weapon system. Figure 6-8 shows the
type of attack aircraft in the Army’s inventory, the AH-64 Apache.
CAPABILITIES
6-47. The combat engineer platoon is organized, trained, and equipped to conduct mobility,
countermobility, and survivability missions in support of ground operations. The higher unit commander
determines the engineers’ specific tasks and responsibilities in these three roles.
ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT
Organization
6-48. The combat engineer platoon consists of three squads mounted in M113s or M2 IFV (see Figure
6-9). Every squad has a demolition set, chain saw, and two mine detectors. The platoon headquarters is
authorized one M9 armored combat earthmover (ACE), which is highly mobile, armored, and amphibious
(see Figure 6-10).
Equipment
6-49. The platoon may also be supplemented with equipment from the engineer company.
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
6-50. In mobility operations, the engineer platoon can provide the following support:
• Obstacle reduction. The engineers can reduce or negate the effects of obstacles, thereby
improving their supported unit’s maneuver capability.
• Route construction. The engineers can construct, improve, and maintain roads, bridges, and
fords.
6-51. In a countermobility role, engineers can assist with obstacle construction to obstruct the enemy’s
scheme of maneuver. They can reinforce terrain and existing obstacles to disrupt, fix, turn, or block the
enemy force.
6-52. Engineers can improve survivability by constructing dug-in positions and overhead protection to
reduce the effectiveness of enemy weapons.
Note. Air and missile defense warnings of RED, YELLOW, and WHITE are established at
levels higher than division. These roughly parallel the local warning levels, but they cover a
larger area of operations, such as a theater.
ATTACK AVOIDANCE
6-58. If an enemy pilot cannot find friendly elements, he cannot attack them. The platoon should use
concealment, camouflage, deception, communications security, and any other necessary action to prevent
enemy detection. Refer to the discussion of OPSEC in Appendix D of this manual.
6-59. Whenever possible, static positions must provide effective overhead concealment. When
concealment is not available, vehicles must be camouflaged to blend into the natural surroundings. Track
marks leading into the position must be obliterated. All shiny objects that could reflect light and attract
attention must be covered.
DAMAGE-LIMITING MEASURES
Dispersion
6-60. Dispersion is one of the most effective ways to reduce the effects of enemy air attack. It is essential
when a unit is occupying static positions such as assembly areas or is preparing to cross a water obstacle or
pass through a breached obstacle. When the platoon is on the move and air guards identify an enemy air
attack, vehicles disperse quickly, move to covered and concealed positions if possible, and stop (a
stationary vehicle is more difficult to see than a moving vehicle). Refer to the discussion of the react to air
attack battle drill in Chapter 3 of this manual. An early warning system that includes both visual and
audible signals can help to limit damage by enabling the platoon to begin dispersion at the earliest possible
moment.
Cover
6-61. Another damage-limiting measure is the use of natural or man-made cover to reduce the effects of
enemy munitions. Folds in the earth, depressions, buildings, and sandbagged positions can provide this
protection.
and the capabilities of organic weapon systems. All platoon members must understand that they can
defend against a direct attack but cannot engage aircraft that are not attacking them unless the weapon
control status allows it.
Note. Refer to the battle drill for reaction to air attack in Chapter 3 of this manual. For further
information on MPAT ammunition, refer to FM 3-20.12.
AREA SECURITY
6-74. The MPs perform the area security (AS) function to protect the force and enhance the freedom of
units to conduct their assigned missions. The MPs, who provide AS, play a key role in supporting forces
in operations outside main battle area. The MPs act as a response force that delays and defeats enemy
attempts to disrupt or demoralize military operations in the AO. The MPs’ mobility makes it possible for
them to detect the threat as they aggressively patrol the AO, MSRs, key terrain, and critical assets. The
MPs’ organic communications enable them to advise the appropriate headquarters, bases, base clusters, and
moving units of impending enemy activities. With organic firepower, the MPs are capable of engaging in
decisive operations against a Level II threat and delaying (shaping) a Level III threat until commitment of
the tactical combat force (TCF).
DETAINEE OPERATIONS
6-75. The Army is the Department of Defense’s (DOD) executive agent for all detainee operations.
Additionally, the Army is DOD’s executive agent for long-term confinement of U.S. military prisoners.
Within the Army and through the combatant commander, the MPs are tasked with coordinating shelter,
protection, accountability, and sustainment for all types of detainees. A detained person in the custody of
US armed forces who has not been classified as an RP (retained person) or a CI (civilian internee) is
treated as an EPW until a legal status is ascertained by competent authority.
6-76. The I/R function is of humane as well as tactical importance. In any conflict involving U.S. forces,
safe and humane treatment of detainees is required by international law. Military actions on the modern
battlefield will result in many detainees. Entire units of enemy forces, separated and disorganized by the
shock of intensive combat, may be captured. This can place a tremendous challenge on tactical forces and
can significantly reduce the capturing unit’s combat effectiveness. The MPs support the battlefield
commander by relieving him of the problem of handling detainees with combat forces. The MPs perform
their I/R function of collecting, evacuating, and securing detainees throughout the AO. In this process, the
MPs coordinate with military intelligence (MI) to collect information that may be used in current or future
operations.
Sustainment elements arm, fuel, fix, feed, clothe, and provide transportation and
personnel for the platoon. The platoon leader is responsible for supervising
sustainment within the platoon. The PSG is the sustainment operator for the platoon,
as the 1SG is for the company and troop. The PSG advises the platoon leader of
logistical requirements during preparation for combat operations. He also keeps the
platoon leader informed of the platoon’s status. During combat operations, the PSG
coordinates directly with the 1SG, informing him of the platoon’s supply,
maintenance, and personnel requirements. The PSG is assisted by the other TCs and
the gunners on the platoon leader’s and PSG’s vehicles.
SECTION I - ORGANIZATION
7-1. The platoon has no organic sustainment assets. The PSG coordinates directly with his 1SG for all
sustainment assets. The PSG is also the primary recipient of all maintenance, supply, and personnel reports
within the platoon. He is assisted by the TCs, but it is his responsibility to keep the platoon leader
informed of the current status of the platoon.
7-2. Most routine sustainment functions are accomplished by SOP. These procedures and services
include the following:
• Accountability, maintenance, and safeguarding of the unit’s assigned equipment.
• Reporting of the status of personnel, equipment, and classes of supply.
• Requests for resupply.
• Turn-in of equipment for repair.
• Evacuation of personnel (WIA, KIA, detainees).
• Evacuation of equipment and vehicles for replacement and/or repair.
7-6. For ammunition (Class V), the basic load is the quantity of ammunition required to be on hand to
meet combat needs until resupply can be accomplished. The basic ammunition load is specified by the
theater army and is expressed in rounds, units, or units of weight, as appropriate.
COMBAT LOAD
7-7. The combat load is the quantity of supplies, in all classes, that the platoon must have on hand to
sustain operations in combat for a prescribed number of days. The platoon’s parent unit must be capable of
moving the combat load, using organic transportation assets, into combat in a single delivery. Like the
basic load, the platoon’s combat load is specified by higher headquarters.
CLASSES OF SUPPLY
CLASS I
7-8. Class I includes subsistence items (rations, water, and ice) as well as gratuitous issue of items related
to health, morale, and welfare.
7-9. Each vehicle maintains a supply of rations, usually a three- to five-day stock, in the form of meals,
ready-to-eat (MRE). Hot meals are brought forward whenever possible. All meals should be eaten in
shifts, and they should never be served at one centralized location. The platoon leader and PSG must make
sure not only that the platoon is fed, but also that their Soldiers eat nutritious meals to maintain the energy
levels required in combat. During continuous or cold-weather operations, Soldiers will eat more than three
meals per day. This extra allowance must be planned and requested.
7-10. Potable water should be replenished daily, either by refilling from the water trailer or by rotating 5
gallon cans with the 1SG or supply sergeant. Each combat vehicle should maintain a minimum of 10
gallons of potable water, more during operations in arid climates or in MOPP gear. The platoon should
also maintain a minimum amount of nonpotable water for vehicle and equipment maintenance; one
technique is to recycle water previously used for personal hygiene.
CLASS II
7-11. Class II includes items of equipment, other than principal items, that are prescribed in authorization
and allowance tables. Among these items, which are requested through the supply sergeant, are individual
tools and tool sets, individual equipment and clothing items, chemical lights, batteries, engineer tape,
tentage, and housekeeping supplies. Supply sergeant should also keep 10-percent overage of central issue
facility (CIF) items in order to replace Soldier’s equipment that is lost or damaged during operations.
CLASS III
7-12. Class III comprises all types of POL products. Rearming and refueling usually occur daily or at the
conclusion of major operations; for optimum security, they should be executed simultaneously under the
cover of limited visibility. The two techniques of refueling and rearming and tailgate and service-station
resupply are covered later in this section.
7-13. The platoon leader must control redistribution of fuel and ammunition when these supplies cannot be
delivered or when only limited quantities are available. The PSG continually monitors the platoon’s
supply status through CS reports and, on digitally equipped vehicles, automated SITREPs. Refer to ST
3-20.153 for report formats. The PSG notifies the platoon leader before a specific vehicle or the platoon as
a whole is critically short of these major classes of supply.
7-14. In planning for refueling operations, the platoon leader should balance the range and fuel capacity of
his vehicles against the requirements of future operations. The platoon must top off vehicles whenever the
tactical situation permits. When time is limited, however, the platoon leader must choose between topping
off vehicles that need the most fuel first and giving limited amounts to each vehicle. Vehicle crews must
maintain a stock of oil, grease, and hydraulic fluid, replenishing these POL products every time they refuel.
CLASS IV
7-15. Class IV includes construction and barrier materials used by the platoon to construct OPs and
obstacles and to improve fighting positions. Barrier materials include lumber, sandbags, concertina or
barbed wire, and pickets. Based on unit SOP, some Class IV materials may be part of the tank load plan;
other materials are requested through the company or troop headquarters. Prior planning for resupply is
required due to long delivery and large amounts of haul assets required.
CLASS V
7-16. Class V is ammunition, to include small arms, artillery and tank rounds, mines and demolitions,
fuses, missiles, and bombs.
7-17. He should take steps to ensure ammunition is equally distributed throughout the platoon before the
start of any tactical operation, after direct-fire contact with the enemy, and during consolidation on an
objective.
CLASS VI
7-18. Class VI covers personal-demand items. Tobacco products, candy, and toiletry articles are normally
sold through the exchange system during peacetime or for units not in a combat environment. In a combat
environment, these items are sent with Class I as health and comfort packs.
CLASS VII
7-19. Class VII includes major-end items. These are major pieces of equipment, assembled and ready for
intended use, such as combat vehicles, missile launchers, artillery pieces, and major weapon systems.
Major-end items that are destroyed are reported immediately by means of CS reports (see ST
3-20.153 for report formats). The items will be replaced by the parent unit as they are reported and as
available.
CLASS VIII
7-20. Class VIII includes medical supplies, which are provided through the battalion or squadron medical
platoon and ordered through the medical team supporting the platoon, company, or troop. Included are
individual medical supplies such as first-aid dressings, refills for first-aid kits and combat lifesaver bags,
water purification tablets, and foot powder.
CLASS IX
7-21. Class IX comprises repair parts carried by the maintenance team. These basic-load supplies are part
of the PLL. PLL items carried by the platoon usually include spare track, road wheels, assorted bolts,
machine gun parts, and light bulbs. Class IX supplies are requisitioned through the company or troop
maintenance section by using the DA Form 2404, Equipment Inspection and Maintenance Worksheet.
METHODS OF RESUPPLY
7-22. The tank platoon uses three methods in conducting supply operations: pre-positioning, routine
resupply, and emergency resupply. The method to be used is determined after an analysis of the factors of
METT-TC.
PRE-POSITIONING
7-23. Pre-positioning of supplies, also known as prestock resupply, may be required in some defensive
operations. Normally, only Class V items will be prestocked, but Class I and Class III supplies may be
included in some situations. Prestock operations are fairly rare in the offense and generally are limited to
refueling.
Operational Considerations
7-24. The location and amount of a prestock must be carefully planned and then verified through
reconnaissance and rehearsals. Each TC must be informed of prestock locations. The following
considerations influence selection of prestock sites and execution of the resupply operation:
• Availability of overhead cover for the prestock location.
• Cover and concealment for the location and routes that vehicles will take to reach it.
• Security procedures required to safeguard the resupply operation.
• Procedures for protecting friendly personnel and vehicles in the event prestock ammunition is
ignited.
ROUTINE RESUPPLY
7-28. These operations include regular resupply of items in Classes I, III, V, and IX and of any other items
requested by the company or troop. Routine resupply is planned at battalion level and normally takes place
at every opportunity. The LOGPAC comprises company/troop and battalion/squadron assets that transport
supplies to the company or troop (see Figure 7-1).
7-29. The company or troop supply sergeant assembles his LOGPAC in the battalion/squadron field trains
area under the supervision of the support platoon leader from the FSC and the company 1SG.
Replacements and hospital returnees travel to company/troop locations on LOGPAC vehicles as required.
7-30. Once the LOGPAC is prepared for movement, the supply sergeant moves the vehicles forward from
the field trains as part of the battalion/squadron resupply convoy to the logistics resupply point (LRP). The
1SG or his representative meets the LOGPAC and guides it to the company or troop resupply point. The
company or troop then executes tailgate or service-station resupply; refer to the discussion of these
resupply techniques later in this section.
EMERGENCY RESUPPLY
7-31. Emergency resupply, normally involving Class III and Class V, is executed when the platoon has
such an urgent need for resupply that it cannot wait for the routine LOGPAC. Emergency resupply
procedures start with immediate redistribution of ammunition in individual vehicles, followed by cross-
leveling of ammunition within the platoon. It is better to have four tanks with 20 rounds of ammunition
each than two tanks with 40 rounds and two others with none.
7-32. Once requested through the commander or 1SG, emergency supplies are brought forward by the
battalion/squadron support platoon. Based on the enemy situation, the tank platoon may have to conduct
resupply while in contact with the enemy. Two techniques are used to resupply units in contact:
• Limited supplies are brought forward to the closest concealed position, where the tailgate
technique of resupply is used.
• Individual vehicles or sections disengage and move to a resupply point, obtain their supplies,
and then return to the fight. This is a version of the service-station technique.
Note. Refer to the following discussion of the tailgate and service-station resupply techniques.
TECHNIQUES OF RESUPPLY
7-33. The tactical situation will dictate which technique of resupply the platoon will use: tailgate, service
station, a variation of one type, or a combination of both types. The situation will also dictate when to
resupply. Generally, the platoon should attempt to avoid resupply during the execution of offensive
operations; resupply should be done during mission transition. Resupply is unavoidable during defensive
missions of long duration.
TAILGATE RESUPPLY
7-34. In the tailgate technique, fuel and ammunition are brought to individual tanks by the 1SG or another
responsible individual who is assisting him (see Figure 7-2). This method is used when routes leading to
vehicle positions are available and the unit is not under direct enemy observation and fire. It is time-
consuming, but it is useful in maintaining stealth during defensive missions because tanks do not have to
move. If necessary, supplies can be hand carried to vehicle positions to further minimize signatures.
SERVICE-STATION RESUPPLY
7-35. In the service-station technique, vehicles move to a centrally located point for rearming and
refueling, either by section or as an entire platoon (see Figure 7-3). Service-station resupply is inherently
faster than the tailgate method; because vehicles must move and concentrate, however, it can create
security problems. During defensive missions, the platoon must be careful not to compromise the location
of fighting positions.
7-42. The platoon leader is concerned primarily with supervising operator maintenance. He also must
ensure that personnel perform scheduled services as part of organizational maintenance. In addition, he
must ensure that personnel provide support for DS maintenance elements when equipment must be
evacuated.
LEADER RESPONSIBILITIES
PLATOON LEADER
7-43. The platoon leader has ultimate responsibility for the condition and performance of the platoon’s
equipment and materiel. In that role, his duties include the following:
• Ensuring, within the platoon’s maintenance capabilities, that all platoon vehicles, weapon
systems, and equipment such as night-vision devices, mine detectors, and communications
equipment are combat ready at all times. The platoon leader also ensures that equipment that
cannot be repaired at platoon level is reported to organizational maintenance as soon as possible
using DA Form 2404.
• Knowing the status of current platoon maintenance activities, including corrective actions for
equipment faults, job orders to DS maintenance elements, and requisition of repair parts. The
platoon leader keeps his commander informed of the platoon’s maintenance status.
• Coordinating with the maintenance officer in planning, directing, and supervising unit
maintenance for the platoon.
• Developing and supervising an ongoing maintenance training program.
• Ensuring that tank crews have appropriate technical manuals on hand and are trained and
supervised to complete operator maintenance properly.
• Ensuring that unit-level PMCS are performed on all assigned equipment in accordance with
appropriate operator’s manuals.
• Ensuring that drivers are trained and licensed to operate platoon vehicles and equipment.
• Planning and rehearsing a maintenance evacuation plan for every mission.
PLATOON SERGEANT
7-44. The PSG has primary responsibility for most of the platoon’s maintenance activities. His duties
include the following:
• Directing and supervising unit maintenance of platoon equipment, vehicles, and weapon
systems. Because time constraints will not allow all equipment to be PMCS’d every day, the
PSG will need to develop a schedule to ensure all equipment is checked in a reasonable time. At
a minimum, weapons and vehicles must be checked daily.
• Helping the platoon leader to comply with his responsibilities and assuming these
responsibilities in his absence.
• Coordinating with the 1SG to arrange organizational or DS maintenance.
• Supervising and accounting for platoon personnel during maintenance periods.
• Ensuring that repair parts are used or stored as they are received.
• Collecting reports of the platoon’s maintenance status in the field and sending the appropriate
consolidated reports to maintenance personnel.
• Ensuring that vehicles are always topped off with fuel in garrison and that they receive adequate
fuel in the field.
• Keeping the platoon leader informed of the platoon’s maintenance and logistics status.
LEVELS OF MAINTENANCE
FIELD MAINTENANCE—OPERATOR
7-46. Operator maintenance includes proper care, use, and maintenance of assigned vehicles and crew
equipment such as weapons, CBRN equipment, and night-vision devices. Checks and services prescribed
for the automotive system, weapon systems, and turret are divided into three groups:
• Before-operation.
• During-operation.
• After-operation.
7-47. The driver and other crew members perform daily checks and services on their vehicle and
equipment, to include inspecting, servicing, tightening, performing minor lubrication, cleaning, preserving,
and adjusting. The driver and gunner are required to record the results of checks and services, as well as
all equipment faults and deficiencies that they cannot immediately correct, on the equipment inspection and
maintenance worksheet (DA Form 2404). The worksheet is the primary means of reporting equipment
problems through the TC to the PSG and platoon leader and ultimately to organizational maintenance
personnel.
7-48. The M1A2 is equipped with embedded nonintrusive and intrusive diagnostic test capabilities; these
include the built-in test (BIT) and fault isolation test (FIT). These tests enable crews to identify and isolate
many system and component failures prior to the arrival of organizational mechanics. Unit SOP should
specify how to report the results of these tests as well as identify the duties of organizational mechanics.
Special Note
Detailed vehicle and equipment checks and services are outlined in every operator’s
manual and should always be conducted as stated in the manual. Although
operators must learn to operate equipment without referring to the manual,
maintenance must be performed using the appropriate technical manual—not from
memory!
7-57. If a recovery vehicle is not available or if time is critical, other platoon vehicles can evacuate the
damaged vehicle for short distances. The decision to do this rests with the platoon leader. Towing
procedures are outlined in the operator’s manual. Self-evacuation by the platoon is a last resort that should
be considered only to prevent losing the damaged vehicle to the enemy.
7-58. If the damaged vehicle will be lost for an extended period, the platoon can replace other vehicles’
damaged equipment (such as weapons and radios) with properly functioning items from the damaged
vehicle within the commander’s controlled substitution policy. Damaged equipment can then be repaired
or replaced while the vehicle is being repaired.
PERSONNEL SERVICES
7-59. Many of the personnel services required by the platoon are provided automatically by higher-level
support elements; nonetheless, the platoon leader is ultimately responsible for coordinating personnel
services and providing them to his platoon. These services are nearly always executed and supervised by
the PSG and TCs and include the following:
• Personal needs and comfort items, such as clothing exchange and showers.
• Awards and decorations.
• Leaves and passes.
• Command information.
• Mail.
• Religious services.
• Financial services.
• Legal assistance.
• Rest and relaxation.
• Any other service designed to maintain the health, welfare, and morale of the Soldier.
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
7-60. Personnel management includes classification, assignment, promotions, and reenlistments. Although
the platoon leader requests these actions through the company or troop, they are normally performed by the
battalion or squadron staff or by a division-level organization. The platoon leader must submit accurate
strength reports to ensure that crew positions, in which critical shortages exist, such as TCs and gunners,
are filled with qualified personnel.
refer to FM 21-10. Each platoon should have an NCO designated a field sanitation representative to ensure
the platoon follows proper procedure when operating in a decentralized environment.
EVACUATION PROCEDURES
7-65. If wounded crewmen require evacuation, the platoon leader or PSG takes one of the following steps:
• Coordinate with the 1SG or company/troop aidman for ground evacuation.
• Coordinate with the company or troop commander for self-evacuation using organic platoon
assets.
• Coordinate with the 1SG or company/troop commander for aerial evacuation.
7-66. Regardless of the method of evacuation, all TCs must have the necessary sustainment graphics
available, including casualty collection points for the company/troop and/or combined arms
battalion/squadron. Evacuation procedures must be included in the platoon plan and should be rehearsed
as part of mission preparation.
7-67. Aerial evacuation, if it is available, is preferred because of its speed. The platoon leader or PSG
coordinates with higher headquarters and then switches to the designated frequency to coordinate directly
with aerial assets for either MEDEVAC or casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) services. He must pick a
relatively flat, open, and covered and concealed position for the aircraft’s landing zone. The location
should be given to the aircraft by radio and marked with colored smoke as the aircraft approaches the area.
The tank platoon provides local security of the landing zone until the evacuation is complete.
7-69. A wounded crewman’s individual weapon becomes the responsibility of the TC, or senior remaining
crewmen. Personal effects, weapons, and equipment are turned in to the company or troop supply sergeant
at the earliest opportunity. The crewman’s protective mask stays with him at all times. All sensitive items
remain with the vehicle; these include maps, overlays, and SOPs.
personal effects of the KIA Soldier remain with the body. The Soldier’s weapon, equipment, and issue
items become the responsibility of the TC until they can be turned over to the supply sergeant or 1SG.
7-71. As a rule, the bodies of KIA Soldiers should not be placed on the same vehicle as wounded Soldiers.
If the PSG or 1SG cannot expedite evacuation, however, a vehicle may have to carry dead and wounded
personnel together to its next stop. In the attack, this may be the objective. In the defense, it may be the
next BP.
SECTION VI - DETAINEES
7-72. If enemy soldiers want to surrender, it is the tank crew’s responsibility to take them into custody and
control them until they can be evacuated. Detainees are excellent sources of combat intelligence; however,
this information will be of tactical value only if the prisoners are processed and evacuated to the rear
quickly.
7-73. The unit SOP or company/troop OPORD should designate specific detainee handling procedures,
such as collection points, responsibilities for safeguarding prisoners, and procedures for moving prisoners.
The following discussion focuses on considerations that may apply when the platoon must deal with
detainees, captured equipment and materiel, and civilians. (See FM 3-19.40 for additional information on
the handling of detainees.)
HANDLING DETAINEES
BASIC PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES
7-74. The basic principles for handling detainees are covered by the “five-S’s and T” procedures (search,
segregate, silence, speed, safeguard, and tag) outlined below.
7-75. The first rule that platoon members must keep in mind is that they must never approach an enemy
soldier, even when it appears certain that he wants to surrender. He may have a weapon hidden nearby, or
he may be booby-trapped. The following procedures apply for taking the prisoner into custody:
• Gesture for him to come forward, and then wait until it is clear that he is honestly surrendering
and not trying to lure friendly troops into an ambush.
• Use a thermal sight to locate possible ambushes.
• When searching the prisoner, always have another friendly Soldier cover him with a weapon.
• Do not move between the enemy and the Soldier covering him.
7-76. As directed by the platoon leader, crewmen take the detainees to an area designated by the
commander. The prisoners are then evacuated to the rear for interrogation. If a detainee is wounded and
cannot be evacuated through medical channels, the platoon leader notifies the XO or 1SG. The detainee
will be escorted to the company or troop trains, or the 1SG will come forward with guards to evacuate him.
TAGGING OF DETAINEES
7-79. Before evacuating the detainee, attach a DD Form 2745, Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Capture
Tag to him listing all pertinent information and procedures. DD Form 2745 tags are not available by
electronic media, but may be obtained through supply channels or made from materials available on the
battlefield. An example is illustrated in Figure 7-6.
Figure 7-6. DD Form 2745, Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Capture Tag
7-81. The platoon should tag each captured item (see Figure 7-7 for an example). If the item is found in
the detainee’s possession, include the prisoner’s name on the tag and give the item to the guard. The guard
delivers the item with the detainee to the next higher headquarters. Platoons may find themselves in a fast-
paced operation where equipment that is not of significant intelligence value may not be transported or
recovered. In such cases, the platoon needs to have a plan on destroying the equipment so it will not fall
back into the enemy’s hands. (Note. Enemy medical equipment will never be destroyed.)
CIVILIANS
7-82. Civilians who are captured as the result of curfew violations or suspicious activities are treated the
same other detainees. The platoon evacuates them quickly to higher headquarters using the “five-S’s and
T” principles discussed earlier in this section.
EVACUATION OF CIVILIANS
7-84. If the brigade or battalion task force is tasked to facilitate the evacuation of civilians from the AO,
the unit is normally augmented by CA personnel. Infantry units may provide security and command and
control for the execution of this operation, which is accomplished in two separate but supporting actions.
• CA personnel coordinate with the military police and local police officials for evacuation
planning. They plan for establishing evacuation routes and thoroughfare crossing control, and
for removing civilians from the MSRs.
• CA personnel coordinate with U.S. Army PSYOP assets, local government officials, radio and
television stations, newspapers, and so on, to publicize the evacuation plan.
TACTICAL PSYOP
7-86. Tactical PSYOP in support of urban operations are planned and conducted to achieve immediate and
short-term objectives. PSYOP are an integral and coordinated part of the overall tactical plan. They
provide the tactical commander with a system that can weaken the enemy soldier’s will to fight, thereby
reducing his combat effectiveness. They can also help prevent civilian interference with military
operations. PSYOP are designed to exploit individual and group weaknesses. For example, infantry units
may be given the mission to clear a specific urban objective where it has been determined that a graduated
response will be used. The PSYOP unit would be in support of the unit conducting this mission, and they
use loudspeakers to broadcast warnings and or incentives not to resist.
OTHER PSYOP
7-87. PSYOP units also provide support during urban operations using television, radio, posters, leaflets,
and loudspeakers to disseminate propaganda and information. Television, including videotapes, is one of
the most effective media for persuasion. It offers many advantages for PSYOP and is appropriate for use
during urban operations. In areas where television is not common, receivers may be distributed to public
facilities and selected individuals.
The platoon may take part in large-scale urban operations as part of a larger force.
This chapter examines the basic characteristics of urban operations as well as special
planning considerations and techniques of offensive and defensive operations as well
as employment of attack and assault/cargo helicopters. For more detailed
information, refer to FM 3-90.1 (FM 71-1) or FM 3-06.11 (FM 90-10-1).
installations (examples, Camp Lejeune, Fort Huachuca, Travis Air Force Base, and Norfolk
Navy Base).
Figure 8-3. Tank main gun and coax dead space above street level
Employment
8-5. The primary consideration that impacts the employment of machine guns within urban areas is the
limited availability of long-range fields of fire.
8-6. The caliber .50 machine gun is often employed on its vehicular mount during both offensive and
defensive operations. The caliber .50 machine gun can be used as an accurate, long-range weapon and can
supplement sniper fires.
8-7. The M240 machine gun is useful to suppress and isolate enemy defenders.
8-8. The M240 is less effective against masonry targets than the caliber .50 machine gun because of its
reduced penetration power.
Weapon Penetration
8-9. The ability of the 7.62-mm and caliber .50 rounds to penetrate is also affected by the range to the
target and type of material fired against. The 7.62-mm round is affected less by close ranges than the 5.56
mm; the caliber .50 round’s penetration is reduced least of all.
8-10. At 50 meters, the 7.62-mm ball round cannot reliably penetrate a single layer of well-packed
sandbags. It can penetrate a single layer of sandbags at 200 meters, but not a double layer. The armor-
piercing round does only slightly better against sandbags. It cannot penetrate a double layer but can
penetrate up to 10 inches at 600 meters.
8-11. The penetration of the 7.62-mm round is best at 600 meters. Most urban targets are closer. The
longest effective range is usually 200 meters or less. Table 8-1 explains the penetration capabilities of a
single 7.62-mm (ball) round at closer ranges.
Protection
8-13. Barriers that offer protection against 5.56-mm rounds are also effective against 7.62-mm rounds with
some exceptions. The 7.62-mm round can penetrate a windowpane at a 45-degree obliquity, a hollow
cinder block, or both sides of a car body. It can also penetrate wooden frame buildings easily. The caliber
.50 round can penetrate all the commonly found urban barriers except a sand-filled 55-gallon drum.
Wall Penetration
8-14. Continued and concentrated machine gun fire can breach most typical urban walls. Such fire cannot
breach thick, reinforced-concrete structures or dense, natural-stone walls. Internal walls, partitions, plaster,
floors, ceilings, common office furniture, home appliances, and bedding can be penetrated easily by both
7.62-mm and caliber .50 rounds (Tables 8-3 and 8-4).
Table 8-4. Structure penetrating capabilities of caliber .50 ball against typical
urban targets (range 35 meters)
Type Thickness Hole Diameter Rounds
(inches) (inches) Required
Reinforced concrete 10 12 50
18 24 100
7 140
Triple brick wall 12 8 15
26 50
Concrete block with single brick veneer 12 10 25
33 45
Armor plate 1 * 1
Double sandbag wall 24 * 5
Log wall 16 * 1
* Penetration only, no loop hole. (A small hole or slit in a wall, especially one through
which small arms may be fired.)
• ROE/ROI and civilians. The ROE and/or ROI may restrict the use of certain weapon systems
and TTPs. As an integral part of urban operations, noncombatants create special operational
problems. To deal with these concerns, units operating in urban terrain must know how to
effectively employ linguists and counterintelligence and civil affairs teams.
• The slow pace of urban operations. This will usually prevent the platoon from taking full
advantage of the speed and mobility of its tanks. When buttoned up, the tank platoon’s
command and control and freedom of maneuver will be reduced due to limited visibility.
MANEUVER
PLANNING AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
8-16. The following factors related to maneuver will affect the platoon’s urban operations planning and
execution:
• The need for detailed centralized planning and decentralized execution. Urban operations
are usually executed as a deliberate attack, demanding extensive intelligence activities and
rehearsals.
• Requirements for cooperation. Urban operations are most successful when close cooperation
is established between dismounted forces, armored vehicles, and aviation elements at the lowest
level.
• Formation of combined arms teams at the lowest levels. Whereas task organization normally
is done no lower than platoon level, urban operations may require task organization of squads
and sections. The tank platoon may face a variety of organizational options, such as a tank
section or an individual tank working with an infantry platoon or squad. Leaders must strive to
employ armored vehicles in sections at a minimum. Whether conducting operations as a two-
tank section or a tank/Bradley section, armored vehicles must work together to overwatch
movements and defeat threats outside the capabilities of dismounted forces. Integration of
aviation assets and their ability to communicate and act in coordination with small-unit ground
forces greatly increases the chances of mission success. For a detailed discussion of
employment of Army aviation in an urban environment, see Section IV of this chapter.
• Vulnerability of friendly forces. Tanks can provide firepower to effectively support
accompanying infantry squads, but they are, in turn, vulnerable to attack from enemy infantry.
The attacking force in urban operations must also guard against local counterattacks.
• Absolute necessity to maintain all-around security and situational awareness. When
conducting urban operations, it is absolutely imperative that leaders and units at all levels
maintain all-around situational awareness and security. The ability of the enemy to move
rapidly within an urban environment to gain positions above, behind, or below friendly forces
necessitates an active and vigilant reconnaissance and IPB of the tank platoon’s area of
operations and area of interest. In addition, individual tanks, sections, and platoons must be
extremely vigilant in conducting local security of their vehicles and formation as well as
providing overwatch for attached mechanized or dismounted elements.
• The role of infantry. Infantry squads are employed extensively during urban operations as part
of the combined arms team. They can be employed against both enemy vehicles and enemy
dismounted elements.
8-17. Additionally, the infantry can help the tank platoon by—
• Locating targets for tanks to engage.
• Destroying antitank weapons.
• Assaulting enemy positions and clearing buildings with tank support.
• Protecting tanks from antitank fires.
• Light infantry forces lack heavy supporting firepower, protection, and long-range mobility.
• Exposed light infantry forces are subject to a high number of casualties between buildings.
• Light infantry forces are more vulnerable to fratricide-related casualties from friendly direct and
indirect fire.
HULL DOWN
8-24. If fields of fire are restricted to streets, hull-down positions should be used to gain cover and fire
directly down streets (Figures 8-4A and 8-4B). From those positions, tanks and BFVs are protected and
can move to alternate positions rapidly. Buildings collapsing from enemy fires are a minimal hazard to the
armored vehicle and crew if operating in a closed hatch configuration.
BUILDING HIDE
8-26. The building hide position (Figure 8-6) conceals the vehicle inside a building. If basement hide
positions are inaccessible, engineers must evaluate the building’s floor strength and prepare for the vehicle.
Once the position is detected, it should be evacuated to avoid enemy fires.
INTELLIGENCE
8-27. Threats to the U.S. have one common goal: to coerce the U.S. military or a U.S.-led multinational
force to redeploy out of the theater of operations. The primary means of accomplishing this goal is for the
threat to cause a politically unacceptable level of casualties to friendly forces. Urban areas provide a
casualty-producing and stress-inducing environment ideally suited for threat operations. Moreover, urban
areas provide the threat with an unmatched degree of cover and concealment from friendly forces.
community. Even conventional and paramilitary troops may often have a “civilian” look. Western
military forces adopted the clean-shaven, close-cut hair standard at the end of the nineteenth century to
combat disease and infection, but twenty-first-century opponents might very well sport beards as well as
civilian-looking clothing and other “non-military” characteristics. The civil population may also provide
cover for threat forces, enhancing their mobility in proximity to friendly positions. Allowing the enemy to
shoot and then disappear into the crowd.
8-32. Threat forces may take advantage of U.S. moral responsibilities and attempt to make the civil
population a burden on the Army’s logistical and force-protection resources. They may herd refugees into
friendly controlled sectors, steal from U.S.-paid local nationals, and hide among civilians during offensive
operations.
8-33. The civil population may also serve as an important intelligence source for the threat. Local hires
serving among U.S. Soldiers, civilians with access to base camp perimeters, and refugees moving through
friendly controlled sectors may be manipulated by threat forces to provide information on friendly
dispositions, readiness, and intent. In addition, threat SPF and hostile intelligence service (HOIS) assets
may move among well-placed civilian groups.
FIRE SUPPORT
8-39. The urban operations environment affects how and when indirect fires are employed. The following
factors may have an impact on planning and execution of indirect fire support:
• When taking part in urban operations, the platoon must always keep in the mind that the urban
operations environment creates unique requirements for centrally controlled fires and more
restrictive fire control measures.
• An urban operation requires the careful use of VT ammunition to prevent premature arming.
• Indirect fire may cause unwanted rubble.
• The close proximity of friendly troops to enemy forces and other indirect fire targets requires
careful coordination.
• WP ammunition may create unwanted fires or smoke.
• Artillery may be used in direct fire mode against point targets.
• Fuse delay should be used to ensure rounds penetrate fortifications as required.
• VT and ICM rounds are effective for clearing enemy positions, observers, and antennas on
rooftops.
• Illumination rounds can be effective in the urban setting; however, employment must be
carefully planned to ensure friendly positions remain in the shadows while enemy positions are
highlighted. Tall buildings may mask the effects of illumination rounds.
• Mortars are the most responsive indirect fires available to the platoon in the urban environment.
They are well suited for combat in built-up areas because of their high rate of fire, steep angle of
fall, and short minimum range. In employing mortars, however, the platoon faces difficulties in
target acquisition and the effects of the rounds (rubble).
SUSTAINMENT
8-40. Guidelines for providing effective sustainment to units fighting in built-up areas include the
following:
• Plan for a higher consumption rate of supplies when operating in an urban environment due to
the slow pace.
• Plan the locations of casualty collection points and evacuation sites.
• Plan for the use of carrying parties and litter bearers.
• Plan for and use host-country support and civil resources when authorized and practical.
• Develop plans for requesting and obtaining special equipment such as ladders and toggle ropes
with grappling hooks.
HASTY ATTACK
8-43. Task forces and company teams conduct hasty attacks in a variety of tactical situations:
• As a result of meeting engagements.
• When unexpected contact occurs and bypass has not been authorized.
• When the enemy is in a vulnerable position and can be quickly defeated through immediate
offensive action.
8-44. The following special considerations apply for hasty attacks in the urban environment:
• In built-up areas, incomplete intelligence and concealment may require the maneuver unit to
move through, rather than around, the unit fixing the enemy in place (the base of fire element).
Control and coordination become important factors in reducing congestion at the edges of the
built-up area.
• Once its objective is secured, an urban hasty attack force may have to react to contingency
requirements, either by executing on-order or be-prepared missions or by responding to
FRAGOs.
DELIBERATE ATTACK
8-45. A deliberate attack is a fully integrated operation that employs all available assets against the
enemy’s defense. It is employed when enemy positions are well prepared, when the built-up area is large
or severely congested, or when the element of surprise has been lost. Deliberate attacks are characterized
by precise planning based on detailed information and reconnaissance and thorough preparations and
rehearsals.
8-46. Given the nature of urban terrain, the techniques employed in the deliberate attack of a built-up area
are similar to those used in assaulting a strongpoint. The attack avoids the enemy’s main strength, instead
focusing combat power on the weakest point in the defense. A deliberate attack in a built-up area is
usually conducted in four phases: reconnoiter the objective, isolate the objective, secure a foothold, and
clear the built-up area. The following discussion examines these phases in detail.
WARNING
GAIN A FOOTHOLD
8-50. Gaining a foothold involves seizing an intermediate objective that provides attacking forces with
cover from enemy fire as well as a place at which they can enter the built-up area. When the tank platoon
is operating with the company, the foothold is normally one to two city blocks. As the platoon attacks to
gain the foothold, it should be supported by direct and indirect suppressive fires and by obscuring or
screening smoke.
TASK ORGANIZATION
8-54. The task organization of a platoon taking part in an attack during an urban operation may vary
according to the specific nature of the built-up area and the objective. In general, the parent task force
and/or company team will employ an assault force, a support force, and a reserve; in some cases, a security
force is also used. Normally, there is no separate breach force; however, breaching elements may be part
of the assault or support force, depending on the type and location of anticipated obstacles.
SUPPORT FORCE
8-55. Most mounted elements of the urban unit, such as the tank platoon, are generally task organized in
the support force. This allows the task force/company team commander to employ the firepower of the
fighting vehicles without compromising their survivability, a distinct danger when heavy forces move into
an urban area. The support force isolates the area of operations and the actual entry point into the urban
area, allowing assault forces to secure a foothold.
ASSAULT FORCE
8-56. The assault force is the element that gains a foothold in the urban area and conducts the clearance of
actual objectives in the area. This force is normally a dismounted element task organized with engineers,
with specific augmentation by armored vehicles.
RESERVE FORCE
8-57. The reserve force normally includes both mounted and dismounted forces. It should be prepared to
conduct any of the following tasks:
• Attack from another direction.
• Exploit friendly success or enemy weakness.
• Secure the rear or flank of friendly forces.
• Clear bypassed enemy positions.
• Maintain contact with adjacent units.
• Conduct support by fire or attack by fire as necessary.
8-59. The commander may position the platoon outside the built-up area, where it will remain for the
duration of the attack to cover high-speed avenues of approach. This is especially true during the isolation
phase. (Note. Before providing support for the attack, tanks must be able to maneuver into overwatch or
base-of-fire positions; this will normally require support from organic infantry weapons to suppress enemy
strongpoints and ATGM assets.) Additionally, the tank platoon can conduct the following urban offensive
operations:
• Neutralize enemy positions with machine gun fire.
• Destroy enemy strongpoints with main gun fire.
• Destroy obstacles across streets.
• Force entry of infantry into buildings.
• Emplace supporting fires as directed by the infantry.
• Establish roadblocks and barricades.
MUTUAL SUPPORT
8-60. In house-to-house and street fighting, tanks move down the streets protected by the infantry, which
clears the area of enemy ATGM weapons. The armored vehicles in turn support the infantry by firing their
main guns and machine guns from a safe standoff range to destroy enemy positions. Particular attention
must be paid to the layout of the urban area. Streets and alleys provide ready-made firing sectors and
killing zones for tanks to use.
Note. Figure 8-8 illustrates a situation in which two tank platoons are participating in a task
force attack in an urban operations environment.
Figure 8-8. Example task force attack in an urban environment, with tank platoons in the
support and assault forces
adjacent to buildings (using the buildings to mask enemy observation), or in culverts. Refer to
Figure 8-5 on page 8-9 for an example of a tank using an urban hide position.
• Since the crew will not be able to see the advancing enemy from the hide position, an observer
from the tank or a nearby infantry unit must be concealed in an adjacent building to alert the
crew (see Figure 8-5 on page 8-9). When the observer acquires a target, he signals the tank to
move to the firing position and, at the proper time, to fire.
• After firing, the tank moves to an alternate position to avoid compromising its location.
EMPLOYMENT OF INFANTRY SQUADS
8-67. Infantry squads are usually employed abreast so that they all can fire toward the expected direction
of attack. In a company team defense, however, the limited number of available infantrymen may require
squad positions to be interspersed with tank positions for mutual support.
EMPLOYMENT OF THE RESERVE FORCE
8-68. The commander’s defensive scheme of maneuver in an urban operation must always include the
employment of a reserve force. This force should be prepared to counterattack to regain key positions, to
block enemy penetrations, to protect the flanks of the friendly force, or to provide a base of fire for
disengaging elements. For combat in built-up areas, the reserve force has these characteristics:
• It normally consists of infantry elements.
• It must be as mobile as possible.
• It may be supported by tanks.
• In platoon-level urban operations, the reserve force may be a section or squad.
evacuation, and support by fire for ground forces. Army aviation also enhances the combined arms team’s
ability to quickly and efficiently transition to new missions.
MARKING METHODS
8-75. Table 8-5, page 8-21 describes different marking methods.
such as, “The third floor of the Hotel Caviar, south-east corner.” This transition should be facilitated by
using a “big to small” acquisition technique.
Note. Ground forces should make every attempt to pass along accurate 8-digit grid coordinates.
The AH-64D can easily and accurately engage targets using this method.
WEAPONS MIX
8-78. Armed helicopters can carry a mix of weapons. Commanders must choose the weapons to use on a
specific mission based on the effects on the target, employment techniques, and the target’s proximity to
ground forces. Leaders must consider proportionality, collateral damage, and noncombatant casualties.
Leaders and air crew must consider the following when choosing weapons:
• Hard, smooth, flat surfaces with 90-degree angles are characteristic of man-made targets. Due
to aviation delivery parameters, munitions will normally strike a target at an angle less than 90
degrees. This may reduce the effect of munitions and increase the chance of ricochets. The
tendency of rounds to strike glancing blows against hard surfaces means that up to 25 percent of
impact-fused rounds may not detonate when fired onto rubbled areas.
• Identification and engagement times are short.
• Depression and elevation limits create dead space. Target engagement from oblique angles,
both horizontal and vertical, must be considered.
• Smoke, dust, and shadows mask targets. Additionally, rubble and man-made structures can
mask fires. Targets, even those at close range, tend to be indistinct.
• Urban fighting often involves units attacking on converging routes. The risks from friendly
fires, ricochets, and fratricide must be considered during the planning of operations.
• The effect of the weapon and the position of friendly and enemy personnel with relation to
structures must be considered. Chose weapons for employment based on their effects against
the building’s material composition rather than against enemy personnel.
• Munitions can produce secondary effects, such as fires.
from the ground maneuver battalion on the enemy and friendly situations. The battalion also verifies
frequencies and call signs of the unit in contact. By this time, the ground maneuver battalion has contacted
the ground maneuver unit leader in contact to inform him that attack aviation is en route to conduct a hasty
attack. Figure 8-15 shows an example of radio traffic and what may occur.
8-82. Upon receiving the required information from the ground maneuver battalion, the attack team leader
changes frequency to the ground company’s FM command net to conduct final coordination before
progressing on attack routes to BPs or ABF/SBF positions. Coordination begins with the ground maneuver
company commander and ends with the leader of the lowest-level unit in contact.
8-83. Regardless of which key leader the attack team leader conducts coordination with, the ground
command net is the most suitable net on which both air and ground elements can conduct the operation. It
allows all key leaders on the ground, including the FIST chief and the attack team leader and his attack
crews, to communicate on one common net throughout the operation. Operating on the command net also
allows the attack team to request responsive mortar fire for either suppression or immediate suppression of
the enemy. The AH-64 Apache and the AH-1 Cobra are limited to only one FM radio due to aircraft
configuration; however, the OH-58 is dual-FM capable, which gives the attack team leader the capability to
maintain communications with the ground maneuver company, as well as its higher headquarters or a fire
support element (see Figure 8-16).
Attack Team Ground Maneuver Battalion
“HARDROCK 06, THIS IS BLACKJACK 26 ON FH “BLACKJACK 26, THIS IS HARDROCK 06, L/C,
478, OVER.” OVER.”
“HARDROCK 16, BLACKJACK 26, ENGAGEMENT “ROGER BLACKJACK 26, HARDROCK 16.
COMPLETE, TWO T-80s DESTROYED, OVER.” REQUEST FOLLOWS. FRIENDLY LOCATION VQ
96000050, 360-DEGREES TO TARGET, 800
METERS, TWO T-80S AT THE ROAD
INTERSECTION, TARGET LOCATION VQ 96000850,
AN/PAQ-4 SPOT ON, NO FRIENDLIES NORTH OF
THE 00 GRID LINE, LOW WIRES DIRECTLY OVER
OUR POSITION, OVER.”
“BLACKJACK 26, HARDROCK 16, STROBES ON AT
THIS TIME, OVER.”
“HARDROCK 16, ROGER.”
“BLACKJACK 26, HARDROCK 16, ROGER TWO T
80s DESTROYED, END OF MISSION, OUT.”
8-89. After receipt of a request for immediate ACF, the attack team leader informs the ground unit leader
of the BP, SBF, or the series of positions his team will occupy that provide the best observation and fields
of fire into the engagement or target area.
• The BP or SBF is a position from which the attack aircraft will engage the enemy with direct
fire. It includes a number of individual aircraft firing positions and may be preplanned or
established as the situation dictates. Size will vary depending on the number of aircraft using
the position, the size of the engagement area, and the type of terrain.
• The BP or SBF is normally offset from the flank of the friendly ground position, but close to the
position of the requesting unit to facilitate efficient target handoffs. This also ensures that rotor
wash, ammunition casing expenditure and the general signature of the aircraft does not interfere
with operations on the ground. The offset position also allows the aircraft to engage the enemy
on its flanks rather than its front, and lessens the risk of fratricide along the helicopter gun target
line.
8-90. The attack team leader then provides the ground maneuver unit leader with his concept for the
team’s attack on the objective. This may be as simple as relaying the direction the aircraft will be coming
from or attack route, time required to move forward from their current position, and the location of the BP.
Only on completion of coordination with the lowest unit in contact does the flight depart the holding area
for the battle position. As the attack team moves out of the holding area, it uses nap of the earth (NOE)
flight along attack routes to mask itself from ground enemy observation and enemy direct fire systems.
The attack team leader maintains FM communications with the ground unit leader while he maintains
internal communications on either his very high frequency (VHF) or ultra high frequency (UHF) net.
Note. Grid locations may be difficult for the ground maneuver, depending on the intensity of
the on-going engagement, and actual FM communications between the ground and air may not
work this well.
Chapter 9
Stability Operations and Civil Support Operations
Stability operations promote and protect U.S. national interests during stable peace
by influencing the operational environment in ways that reduce the likelihood of
conflict. They do this through a combination of peacetime developmental,
cooperative activitied and coercive actions in response to crisis. Regional security is
supported by a balanced approach that enhances government and economic
prosperity.
Note. U.S. Army policy normally does not allow a unit to modify its warfighting mission-
essential task list (METL) unless and until the unit is selected for stability operations or civil
support operations. Only then should a unit train for specific mission-related tasks. Chief
among these are operations with very restrictive ROE/ROI and orientation on the area, its
culture, and the nature of the conflict.
BALANCED MINDSET
9-2. A balance must be achieved between the mindset of peacetime military engagement in areas of stable
peace through major combat operations during general war. Soldiers cannot become too complacent in
their warrior spirit, but also must not be too eager to rely on the use of force to resolve conflict. This
balance is the essence of full-spectrum operations and the fundamental aspect that will enable the company
team to perform its mission successfully and avoid an escalation to combat. Proactive leaders that are
communicating and enforcing the ROE are instrumental to achieving this mindset.
PEACETIME
9-4. In peacetime, a variety of measures are employed to achieve national objectives; these include
political, economic, and informational measures, as well as military actions short of combat operations or
active support of warring parties. Within this environment, U.S. forces may conduct training exercises to
demonstrate national resolve; conduct peacekeeping operations; participate in nation-building activities;
conduct disaster relief and humanitarian assistance; provide security assistance to friends and allies; or
execute shows of force. Confrontations and tensions may escalate during peacetime to reach a point of
transition into a state of conflict.
CONFLICT
9-5. Conflict can encompass numerous types of situations, including the following:
• Clashes or crises over boundary disputes and land and water territorial claims.
• Situations in which opposing political factions engage in military actions to gain control of
political leadership within a nation.
• Armed clashes between nations or between organized parties within a nation to achieve limited
political or military objectives.
9-6. While regular military forces are sometimes involved, the use of irregular forces frequently
predominates in conflict actions. Conflict is often protracted, confined to a restricted geographic area, and
limited in weaponry and level of violence. In this state, military response to a threat is exercised indirectly,
usually in support of other elements of national power. Limited objectives, however, may be achieved by
the short, focused, and direct application of military force. Conflict approaches the threshold of a state of
war as the number of nations and/or troops, the frequency of battles, and the level of violence increase over
an extended time.
9-7. Stability operations and civil support operations involving tank platoons often occur in the state of
peacetime. Refer to Section IV of this appendix for examples of stability and support situations in which
the tank platoon may participate.
• Civil control. Regulating the behavior and activity of individuals and groups to reduce risk to
individuals or groups and to promote security. Control channels the population’s activity to
allow for the provision of security and essential services while coexisting with a military force
conducting operations. A curfew is an example of civil control.
• Essential services. Essential services include emergency life-saving medical care, the
prevention of epidemic disease, provision of food and water, provision of emergency shelter
from the elements, and the provision of basic sanitation (sewage and garbage disposal).
• Governance. The provision of societal control functions that include regulation of public
activity, taxation, maintenance of security, control and essential services, and normalizing means
of succession of power.
9-10. The degree to which Army forces engage in these types of stability operations is circumstantial. In
some operations, the host nation is capable of carrying out these types of operations and Army forces are
engaged in civil-military operations to minimize the impact of military presence on the populace. Army
forces located in Kuwait but supporting operations in Iraq is an example of this. On the other hand, Army
forces within Iraq may be responsible for the well-being of the local population, while working with other
agencies to restore basic capabilities to the area or region. (Note. See FM 3-07 [FM 100-20] for detail on
stability operations.)
populations in unstable areas. They support this by isolating irregular forces from the population. Forces
engaged in an operation where stability predominates may have to defend themselves. Conversely, they
may conduct defensive and offensive operations to physically isolate, defeat, or destroy forces seeking to
undermine the effectiveness or credibility of the stability mission. Following conventional hostilities,
forces conduct stability operations to provide a secure environment for civil authorities. Security is vital to
achieving reconciliation, providing governance, rebuilding lost infrastructure, and resuming vital services.
LEADER REQUIREMENTS
9-26. Flexibility and situational understanding are paramount requirements, especially for the tank platoon
leader. The platoon’s role and/or objectives in stability operations and civil support operations will not
always be clear. The platoon leader will sometimes be called upon to make on-the-spot decisions that
could have an immediate, dramatic effect on the strategic or operational situation. In this uniquely tense
setting, leaders who disregard the will of belligerent parties and the lethality of these groups’ weapons
compromise the success of their mission and risk the lives of their Soldiers.
DECENTRALIZED OPERATIONS
9-33. Although stability operations are normally centrally planned, execution takes the form of small-
scale, decentralized actions conducted over extended distances. Responsibility for making decisions on the
ground will fall to junior leaders. Effective command guidance and a thorough understanding of the
applicable ROE and/or ROI (refer to the following discussions) are critical at each operational level.
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
9-34. ROE are politically imposed restrictions on military operations. The ROE are directed by higher
military authorities based on the political and tactical situations and the level of threat. For example, these
restrictions may require that the forces involved limit their use of firepower to a certain geographical area
or that they limit the duration of their operations. Refer to Figure 9-1 for an example of ROE for one
possible situation.
9-35. While ROE must be considered during the planning and execution of all operations, understanding,
adjusting for, and properly executing ROE are especially important to success in stability operations and
civil support operations. The unit’s SOP will require adjustment based on each particular situation’s
ROE. The restrictions change whenever the political and military situations change; this means ROE must
be explained to friendly Soldiers continuously.
9-36. ROE provide the authority for the Soldier’s right to self-defense. Each Soldier must understand
the ROE and be prepared to execute them properly in every possible confrontation. In addition, ROE
violations can have operational, strategic, and political consequences that may affect national security; the
enemy can be expected to exploit such violations.
All enemy military personnel and vehicles transporting enemy personnel or their
equipment may be engaged subject to the following restrictions:
A. Armed civilians will be engaged only in self-defense.
B. Civilian aircraft will not be engaged, except in self-defense, without approval
from division level.
C. All civilians should be treated with respect and dignity. Civilians and their
property should not be harmed unless necessary to save U.S. lives. If possible,
civilians should be evacuated before any U.S. attack. Privately owned property
may be used only if publicly owned property is unavailable or its use is
inappropriate.
D. If civilians are in the area, artillery, mortars, AC-130s, attack helicopters, tube-
launched or rocket-launched weapons, and main tank guns should not be used
against known or suspected targets without the permission of a ground
maneuver commander (LTC or higher).
E. If civilians are in the area, all air attacks must be controlled by FAC or FO, and
CAS, WP weapons, and incendiary weapons are prohibited without approval
from division.
F. If civilians are in the area, infantry will shoot only at known enemy locations.
G. Public works such as power stations, water treatment plants, dams, and other
public utilities may not be engaged without approval from division level.
H. Hospitals, churches, shrines, schools, museums, and other historical or cultural
sites will be engaged only in self-defense against fire from these locations.
I. All indirect fire and air attacks must be observed.
J. Pilots must be briefed for each mission as to the location of civilians and friendly
forces.
K. Booby traps are not authorized. Authority to emplace mines is reserved for the
division commander. Riot control agents can be used only with approval from
division level.
9-38. ROI are based on the applicable ROE for a particular operation; they must be tailored to the specific
regions, cultures, and/or populations affected by the operation. Like ROE, the ROI can be effective only if
they are thoroughly rehearsed and understood by every Soldier in the unit.
FORCE PROTECTION
9-39. Because of the influence of local politics and news media in stability operations and civil support
operations, precautions and operations required to minimize casualties and collateral damage become a
particularly important operational consideration during these operations. At the same time, however, force
protection must be a constant priority. Armored forces are commonly deployed in a force protection role.
9-40. In attempting to limit the level and scope of violence used in stability operations and civil support
operations, leaders must avoid making tactically unsound decisions or exposing the force to unnecessary
risks. On the other hand, an overpowering use of force correctly employed and surgically applied, can
reduce subsequent violence or prevent a response from the opposing force. These considerations must be
covered in the ROE and the OPORD from the battalion or brigade.
9-41. OPSEC, tempered by restrictions in the ROE and ROI, is an important tool for the platoon leader in
accomplishing his force protection goals. Security procedures should encompass the full range of
antiterrorist activities for every Soldier and leader. Examples include proper RTP; strict noise, light, and
litter discipline; proper wear of the uniform; display of the proper demeanor for the situation; as well as
effective use of cover and concealment, obstacles, OPs and early warning devices, the protection afforded
by armor vehicles, and safe locations for eating and resting.
9-42. A final consideration in force protection is hygiene. Proper field sanitation and personal hygiene are
mandatory if Soldiers are to stay healthy.
TASK ORGANIZATION
9-43. Because of the unique requirements of stability operations and civil support operations, the tank
platoon may be task organized to operate with a variety of units. As noted, this may include armor or
mechanized company team or a light infantry company or battalion. In addition, the platoon may operate
with other elements with linguists, counterintelligence teams, and civil affairs teams.
SUSTAINMENT CONSIDERATIONS
9-44. The operational environment that the platoon faces during stability operations and civil support
operations may be very austere, creating special sustainment considerations. These factors include, but are
not limited to, the following:
• Reliance on local procurement of certain items.
• Shortages of various critical items, including repair parts, Class IV supplies (barrier materials),
and lubricants.
• Special Class V supply requirements, such as pepper spray.
• Reliance on bottled water.
SOLDIERS’ RESPONSIBILITIES
9-46. U.S. Soldiers may have extensive contact with civilians during stability operations and civil support
operations. As a result, their personal conduct has a significant impact on the opinions, and thus the
support, of the local population. As noted, Soldiers must understand that misconduct by U.S. forces (even
those deployed for only a short time) can damage rapport that took years to develop. U.S. Soldiers must
treat local civilians and military personnel as personal and professional equals, affording them the
appropriate customs and courtesies.
9-47. Every Soldier must be updated continuously on changes to operational considerations (such as
environment, ROE/ROI, media, and force protection). Such changes can have an immediate impact on his
freedom to react to a given situation. Keeping the Soldier informed of changes enhances his situational
understanding and his ability to adapt to changing conditions. Leaders must disseminate this information
quickly and accurately.
9-48. Every individual is an intelligence-collecting instrument. The collection of information is a
continuous process, and all information must be reported. Intelligence is provided by many sources,
including friendly forces, enemy elements, and the local populace. From the friendly standpoint, each
Soldier must be familiar with the local PIR and other applicable intelligence requirements. At the same
time, enemy Soldiers or other outside countries’ intelligence agencies will be continuously seeking
intelligence on U.S. actions, often blending easily into the civilian population. U.S. Soldiers must be aware
of this and use OPSEC procedures at all times.
9-49. To emphasize Soldier responsibilities, leaders conduct PCCs and PCIs that focus on each Soldier’s
knowledge of the environment and application of the ROE. These checks and inspections should also
identify possible OPSEC violations and deficiencies that could place the Soldier and his equipment at risk.
Leaders should stress that terrorists and thieves may attempt to infiltrate positions or mount vehicles either
to steal equipment and supplies or to cause harm to U.S. forces or facilities.
9-50. To enhance civilian cooperation and support, the tank platoon leader is responsible for obtaining a
key word and phrase card from the S2 to assist in translation of key english phrases into the language of
the host nation. These phrases should apply specifically to the area of operations.
training prepare Soldiers and units to address the ambiguities and complexities inherent in civil support
operations.
Note. Refer to Chapter 6 of this manual for a discussion of urban operations. As noted, these
operations often provide the operational framework for stability operations and civil support
operations.
Figure 9-4. Traffic control point, choke point, blockade, convoy escort, and route proofing
missions
OVERWATCH A BLOCKADE/ROADBLOCK
9-65. The tank platoon (or section) overwatches a blockade or roadblock, either a manned position or a
reinforcing obstacle covered by fires only (the circled “E” in Figure 9-4). It coordinates with dismounted
infantry from the company for local security (OPs and dismounted patrols). Positions are improved using
procedures for deliberate occupation of a BP (see Chapter 4). Also see Figures 9-7A and 9-7B for
examples of tank platoon roadblocks set up and a list of equipment needed to conduct the operation.
9-70. The tank platoon (or section) must be prepared to take immediate action if the search team or OPs
identify enemy elements. Enemy contact may require the platoon to execute tactical movement and linkup;
it would then coordinate with other units to destroy the enemy using techniques discussed in Chapter 3 of
this manual.
9-71. Additionally, the tank platoon may support the infantry by conducting vehicle and personnel
searches as part of the search operation or traffic control points. Refer to FM 3-20.98 (FM 17-98),
Appendix E, for a detailed discussion on vehicle and personnel search procedures.
Appendix A
Digitization
Army digitization is the result of the desire to employ existing and emerging
technology to enhance Army operations from the strategic to the tactical level by
providing its Soldiers an automated, near real-time capability for planning,
coordinating, monitoring, controlling, and executing operations. At the tactical level,
the Army is capitalizing on this technology by digitizing its vehicles, weapons, and
equipment. Digitized systems enhance operational effectiveness in many ways.
Providing the user the ability to take the initiative on the battlefield and achieve
combat superiority over an enemy through increased situational understanding
especially enhances it. Situational understanding is the ability to maintain a constant,
clear mental picture of relevant information and the tactical situation. This picture
includes the knowledge of both the friendly and threat situation and of relevant
terrain. (Note. Even with the addition of these digital enablers, the basic combat
skills of tankers must be mastered and reinforced in the event digital technology is
compromised or fails. Once the basic skills are mastered, the digital enablers can be
exploited to their fullest capabilities.)
As outlined throughout this manual, the tank platoon’s primary tools on the digitized
battlefield is the Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBCB2) system.
This appendix focuses on the impact of these systems on various phases of platoon
operations and on the duties and responsibilities of platoon leaders and crewmen
employing these systems while conducting tactical operations. This appendix also
provides a brief overview of the structure of the tactical Internet (TI) and its major
subcomponents.
relation to the mission. Both the lower and upper TIs support FBCB2 communications. (Figure A-1
shows the FBCB2 system.)
A-4. FBCB2 displays the relevant information regarding the situational understanding environment. This
information shows the user his location, the location of other friendly forces, reported enemy locations, and
known enemy and plotted friendly battlefield obstacles. The warfighter receives data “pushed” from all the
battlefield systems to maintain real-time battle information. (Figure A-2 shows the FBCB2 tactical
display.)
A-5. FBCB2 receives data across the TI via the Internet controller (INC). The INC is a tactical router
built into the SINCGARS. The enhanced position location reporting system (EPLRS) data radio, blue
force tracker (BFT), and SINCGARS data/voice radio transmit and receive digital information between
vehicles. Each FBCB2 derives its own location via the precision lightweight GPS receiver (PLGR).
Utilizing these interfaces, the FBCB2 automatically updates and broadcasts its current location to all other
FBCB2 and embedded battle command (EBC) platforms. EBC platforms, such as selected M1A2s and
M2A3s, are not installed with FBCB2 hardware, but are equipped with software capabilities that allow
them to share situational understanding and command and control information with the FBCB2 platforms.
(Figure A-3 shows the tank platoon FBCB2 TI architectural diagram.)
A-6. Digital systems on the battlefield pass messages using the joint variable message format (JVMF).
The JVMF is a Department of Defense standardized message format. It prescribes uniform message
formats for all branches of the armed services.
WINGMAN CONCEPT
A-8. The FBCB2 system allows tank sections and platoons to maneuver outside their direct line of sight
of each other and still maintain situational understanding and mutual support (see Figures A-4A and A
4B). Even as they improve command and control within the platoon, however, these digital systems
increase the command and control demands on the individual TC. They require the platoon to make more
effective use of the wingman concept.
Figure A-4A. Tank sections maneuvering separately on actual terrain outside of their direct
line of sight of each other
A-9. The M1A1D, M1A2, or M1A2 SEP platoon must be able to operate as two independent sections.
This capability provides the platoon leader and company/troop commander with the flexibility to maneuver
using sections. (Note. Although FBCB2 allows the ability to spread forces over a large area, the platoon
leader must still consider mutual support between sections.)
NAVIGATION
A-10. The POSNAV system (a built-in navigational system on digitally-equipped tanks that operates
through FBCB2) significantly improves navigation for the company team and platoon. This inertial
navigation system allows the unit to maintain greater depth and dispersion. It also enhances the ability of
the company team commander or platoon leader to maneuver his unit on the battlefield.
A-11. On the M1A2, the navigation system must be periodically updated to increase accuracy; however,
the POSNAV system on the M1A2 SEP automatically updates itself with a GPS built into the system. This
allows the platoon leader and TCs to use waypoints to orient vehicles during movement. The tank driver
can then steer to these waypoints to maintain orientation and dispersion within the company team or
platoon.
A-12. One method of controlling platoon movement is for the platoon leader to preselect checkpoints and
add them to the FBCB2 overlay. He then sends the overlay to the remainder of the platoon. Each TC uses
the CID or commander’s display unit (CDU) to designate these checkpoints as waypoints for the driver in
accordance with the platoon leader’s guidance, movement orders, and designated movement technique.
Once the TC selects a waypoint to which he wants the driver to steer, the DID will display direction and
distance information to that waypoint. (Note. The DID does not display terrain relief. The driver must not
become ‘fixed’ on driving the tank via the DID only, but should maneuver the tank visually and
periodically check the DID to apply course corrections as needed. Also, the platoon leader’s driver, using
his DID steer-to capability, can lead the platoon via the waypoint designated by the platoon leader. The
remainder of the tanks will orient on the lead tank and maintain their position in the formation.)
A-13. Unless the tank is in contact, the loader should be up in the hatch to assist the driver and provide
security. The TC must ensure that the loader is knowledgeable of tank platoon formations and active in
acquiring targets. This loader’s assistance will give the TC more freedom to send and receive digital traffic
and monitor the CID or CDU. As a result, the TC can focus more effectively on the tactical situation and
maintain better overall command of the tank.
A-15. Battle command of the tank platoon is significantly enhanced through the use of FBCB2. It allows
the platoon to—
• Maintain friendly situational understanding (Blue SU).
• Track actual and templated enemy positions and obstacles (Red SU).
• Submit preformatted, standardized reports (SALUTE, SITREP, MEDEVAC, NBC, call-for-fire,
and so forth).
• Rapidly disseminate graphic overlays and written FRAGOs.
• Maneuver in dispersed formations.
• Enhance situational understanding and decrease dependency on graphic control measures.
ROLE OF TRAINING
A-17. The skills required to operate and maintain the highly technical systems on the M1A1D, M1A2, and
M1A2 SEP are extremely perishable. To ensure combat effectiveness of their units, leaders in both the
company team and platoon must place special emphasis on the training of individual tank crews. Constant
sustainment training is a must in order to remain proficient on the digital systems particular to their vehicle.
A-18. A comprehensive training program must include cross training. Even though each crewman has
specific duties and responsibilities, success in battle often depends on his ability to function at any position
on the tank. Every crewman must be proficient in the operation of all tank systems, including the FBCB2,
CITV, and SINCGARS. In addition, tank crew members must have a thorough understanding of how to
maintain and service the tank and its component parts to keep the vehicle fully mission capable.
(Note. Training programs for digitized units must be coordinated with the training programs of
nondigitized units. Digital units must understand that they need to push situational understanding
information to nondigitized units and attachments.)
using live-fire screening ranges and zero ranges. During the planning and preparation phases of an
operation, the master gunner may be called upon to help coordinate and execute the sustainment
operations, to serve as NCOIC of the command post, and to help the company team commander with his
troop-leading procedures. In combat operations, the master gunner may serve as the gunner on one of the
command tanks, as a sustainment operator riding on the APC, or as a section NCOIC in the company
team’s wheeled vehicles with responsibility for handling communications with the task force.
PLATOON RESPONSIBILITIES
Platoon Leader
A-30. Platoon leaders in M1A1D, M1A2, and M1A2 SEP units inform the company team commander and
XO on the tactical situation by forwarding FBCB2 contact reports and SITREPs. Prior to contact, they
keep FM voice communications to a minimum to facilitate the timely transmission and receipt of FBCB2
reports. The platoon leaders act as forward observers (FO) for the commander and FIST, using the
interface between the POSNAV system and LRF to identify targets and initiate calls for fire. They transmit
digital reports, overlays, and the ammunition and fuel status of their platoons to the commander and XO as
required by unit SOP.
A-31. As applicable (either as directed by unit SOP or at the conclusion of the battle), each platoon leader
receives a situation rollup report from his PSG containing consolidated individual tank CS reports for the
platoon. The platoon leader reviews the situation rollup report and forwards the platoon report to the 1SG
and XO.
Platoon Sergeant
A-32. All TCs, including the platoon leader, use the FBCB2 to forward SITREPs to the PSG. The PSG
consolidates these reports and forwards an FBCB2 situation rollup report to the platoon leader. He then
sends the same report and any other A/L reports to the 1SG, either digitally or via FM voice.
A-33. In general, although the PSG’s duties will lean more heavily toward sustainment activities, he must
be prepared to handle the tactical aspects of digitized operations as well. If the platoon leader’s vehicle is
destroyed or disabled and standard FBCB2 routing is affected, the PSG must log on as the platoon leader to
receive operations overlays from the company team commander or XO. (Note. With custom routing, the
commander or XO can send FBCB2 operations overlays to the PSG at any time.)
Tank Commander
A-34. The TC monitors the FBCB2 screen for friendly vehicle position updates, digital overlay updates,
and digital reports. He uses FBCB2 to transmit reports as requested by the platoon leader or PSG. He
employs the CITV (along with such nondigitized equipment as binoculars and/or the PVS-7) to scan his
assigned sector and to assist the driver as necessary during limited visibility. The TC also lases to possible
indirect-fire targets and forwards FBCB2 call-for-fire requests to the platoon leader as necessary.
A-35. The TC can use waypoints from his digital system to mark his map with key positions that will be
critical to mission accomplishment. Examples include checkpoints, the battalion aid station, and rally
points.
Gunner
A-36. The gunner’s duties include many communications tasks that are applicable to digitized operations,
including the following:
• Monitoring both digital and radio traffic.
• Logging onto nets.
• Inputting graphic control measures on digital overlays.
• Monitoring digital displays during the planning and preparation phases of an operation.
A-37. The gunner also assists the TC in performing other digitized functions. In turn, this allows the TC to
participate directly (on the ground) in such activities as orders drills, leader’s reconnaissance, and
rehearsals. These digital-related duties include the following:
• Entering graphics into FBCB2 overlays.
• Sending FBCB2 reports.
• Building FBCB2 sketch and range cards.
• Monitoring the CID or CDU during the planning and preparation phases of an operation.
Driver
A-38. In the M1A2 and M1A2 SEP tanks, the driver can monitor the DID steer-to indicator and select the
best tactical route using preselected waypoints as designated by the TC. It is the driver’s responsibility to
maneuver the tank to the next waypoint, with the loader’s assistance, but with minimal guidance from the
TC. He uses terrain to conceal the tank’s movement at all times.
Loader
A-39. The loader’s duties include logging into unit radio nets and being an expert in operating and
manipulating the SINCGARS radio and VIC-3 intercom system. Because the loader is ideally positioned
to assist the TC in maintaining battlefield awareness, platoon leaders and TCs should give strong
consideration to assigning their second-most experienced crewman as the loader. (Note. The loader may
assist the TC in entering graphics on FBCB2 overlays, sending FBCB2 reports, and monitoring the CID or
CDU during the planning and preparation phases of an operation.)
A-40. Once an operation is under way, the loader performs a variety of functions when the TC is occupied
with digital traffic on the FBCB2 screen or CITV. These duties include the following:
• Assisting the driver in keeping the tank in its position in formation.
• Assisting in acquiring targets for the gunner.
• Acting as the air guard or ATGM guard.
• Dismounting for local reconnaissance and security as required.
DIGITAL TRANSMISSIONS
USES OF DIGITAL COMMUNICATIONS
A-42. Digital messaging at the individual, platoon, and company level is recommended as the primary
means of communication for the following purposes:
• Transmitting graphics and orders, when the situation allows.
• Sending routine reports, such as personnel and CS status or requests.
• Sending contact reports (vehicles not in contact).
• Requesting MEDEVAC support.
• Sending enemy SPOTREPs when not in contact (FBCB2 creates an enemy icon).
• Transmitting planned call-for-fire missions (follow up via FM).
• Sending digital NBC-1 reports. (This creates a contaminated area icon across the network.
Follow up with an FM report on the company team or battalion task force command net.)
A-43. Some other types of orders and reports that can be sent via FBCB2 include the following:
• Fragmentary orders. A digital FRAGO can be used to provide changes to existing OPORDs.
It should include all five paragraphs of the OPORD. Each paragraph should state either “No
Change” or give the new information to ensure that recipients know they have received the
entire FRAGO.
• Free-text messages. A free-text message can be used to send an unstructured digital message to
other FBCB2 or Army battle command systems (ABCS) (like an e-mail message).
THREADED MESSAGES
A-44. Certain messages require specific routing for them to be effective. These are called “threaded
messages.” The exception to this is the personnel status report and the task management message. The
routing for these is SOP driven.
Note. Users may add to the threaded message addressee list but should not delete from it.
These defaults are dictated by Army doctrine and communication architecture; for example, the
size, activity, location, type of resource, and time frame (SALTT) report feeds into the all-source
analysis system (ASAS) intelligence database for correlation into the joint common database for
higher situational understanding and analysis.
A-45. Most threaded messages must follow specific paths for information to reach intended personnel or
communication systems or to feed into the correct databases. For example, the call-for-fire (CFF) message
must be threaded properly to interface with the advanced field artillery tactical data system (AFATDS).
The CFF message originator may add as many recipients as desired to the addressee list; however, if he
alters any of the default recipients, the message may not reach AFATDS, and the fire mission will not be
processed. If all addressees are not kept on the thread, “orphan” fire missions will occur. An orphan
mission is where a mission task order and target number was not received from AFATDS.
A-46. The following are threaded messages:
• SALTT reports.
• NBC-1 reports.
• Obstacle reports.
• Fire support messages.
FM TRANSMISSIONS
A-47. FM radio remains the primary means of communication after crossing the LD because it is more
responsive. Multiple stations can monitor the net, and parties can convey emotion during the
transmission—a critical tool in assessing and understanding the battlefield situation. Light discipline in
night operations may dictate the use of FM communications; for example, brigade cavalry troop Soldiers
may go to blackout light FBCB2 operations and send SPOTREPs via FM to a vehicle (usually the troop
CP, which is stationary and postured to use the FBCB2 display while maintaining light discipline). The CP
can generate and manage FBCB2 SPOTREPs based on FM SPOTREPs and updates.
A-48. FM radio is recommended as the primary means of communication for—
• Making initial contact report.
• Coordinating operations when in contact or moving.
• Calling for fire on targets of opportunity.
• Making subsequent adjustment of fires on planned and unplanned targets.
• Requesting urgent MEDEVAC support.
• Transmitting enemy air reports.
Orders and reports are the means by which the tank platoon receives and transmits
information, from the earliest notification that an operation will occur through the
final phases of execution. They are absolutely critical to mission success. In a
tactical situation, the platoon leader and PSG work with these vital tools on a daily
basis; obviously, they must have precise knowledge of orders formats and reporting
procedures. At the same time, they must ensure that every member of the platoon
understands how to receive and respond to the various types of orders and how to
compile and submit accurate, timely reports.
SECTION I – ORDERS
B-1. The tank platoon leader must be familiar with the formats of WARNOs, OPORDs, and FRAGOs.
He must be able to convert these into concise, yet thorough, orders for the platoon.
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
B-2. Before the commander issues the OPORD, the platoon leader may receive one or more WARNOs.
He analyzes all information in these orders and transmits important details to the platoon as soon as
possible.
B-3. When the higher headquarters issues a complete five-paragraph OPORD, analysis of the order is a
fairly simple, straightforward process for the platoon leader. Commanders, however, do not always have
the time to issue a full OPORD; instead, they may have to issue a FRAGO.
B-4. The tank platoon leader normally issues instructions to his platoon in the OPORD format. He
derives much of the content from the higher order he received during execution of his troop-leading
procedures. He should always plan to issue his own five-paragraph order when time permits. When time
is short, he still issues as complete an order as possible, but he does so using a FRAGO.
B-5. Once an operation begins, FRAGOs become the normal method of issuing orders. Digital systems
allow commanders and leaders to supplement oral orders with overlays and a limited text capability; these
items can enhance their subordinates’ understanding of the FRAGOs.
B-6. Units may find themselves conducting the same type of operations on a repeat basis, such as route
clearance. There will tend to be a point where units will want to stop using the combat orders process.
This must be avoided; all operations are combat missions and must be planned as such, to do otherwise
leads to the Soldiers not having the combat focus.
WARNING ORDERS
B-7. During the planning phase of an operation, commanders and leaders use WARNOs as a shorthand
method of alerting their units and individual Soldiers (see Figure B-1 for a sample of a platoon WARNO).
The company or troop commander usually sends a series of WARNOs to his platoon leaders. These orders
help subordinates to prepare for new missions by providing directions and guidelines for platoon-level
planning and preparation. Each platoon leader immediately analyzes the information, and then issues a
WARNO of his own to alert the platoon to the upcoming operation. This allows the platoon to conduct
parallel planning and perpetrations.
B-8. Warning orders generally follow the five-paragraph OPORD format (illustrated in Figure B-2). The
key consideration is that they should be as brief as possible while giving units and Soldiers the information
they need to begin preparing for the operation. A company-level WARNO normally includes these
elements:
• Enemy situation.
• Higher headquarters’ mission.
• Commander’s intent (if available).
• Earliest time of movement.
• Specific instructions for preliminary actions (including security, reconnaissance, rehearsals,
training, maintenance, resupply, rest, movement, and coordination requirements).
• Time and place at which the company or troop OPORD will be issued.
B-9. Before he issues his own WARNO, the platoon leader should send graphics to the TCs, either by
traditional overlay or by using their digital systems (if available). The order is almost always given orally
and in person, but it may be issued by radio or, on digitally equipped tanks using the free-text message
capability of FBCB2. As a minimum, the platoon WARNO includes the following information:
• Updated enemy situation.
• Company and platoon mission statement.
• Company or troop commander’s intent (if available).
• A tentative time line, including the following:
• Earliest time of movement.
• Specific instructions for preliminary actions (including security, reconnaissance, rehearsals,
training, maintenance, resupply, rest, movement, and coordination requirements).
• Time and location at which the platoon OPORD will be issued.
B-10. If he knows other times, events, or details related to the operation, the platoon leader may include the
information in the WARNO. (Figure B-1 shows an example of a platoon WARNO.)
OPERATION ORDERS
B-11. When time and information are available, the company or troop commander will normally issue a
complete OPORD as part of his troop-leading procedures. The OPORD provides platoon leaders with the
essential information required to conduct the operation and to carry out the commander’s intent. The
commander should distribute graphics (traditional and digital) before issuing the OPORD.
d. Personnel.
(1) Handling and disposition instructions for detainees.
(2) Detainee guard instructions.
(3) Location of detainee collection point.
(4) Instructions for interaction with local civil populace (ROI).
(5) Number of expected replacements.
(6) Cross-leveling procedures.
e. Miscellaneous.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.
a. Command.
(1) Location of commander, XO, TOC, and/or tactical command post (TAC
CP).
(2) Succession of command.
b. Signal.
(1) SOI/ANCD index and edition in effect.
(a) Key frequencies.
(b) Key call signs.
(c) Current item number identifier.
(2) KY-57/ANCD fill and changeover data.
(3) Listening silence instructions.
(4) Challenge and password.
(5) Special signals, to include use of pyrotechnics.
(6) Code words.
(7) Digital traffic instructions (digital systems only).
(8) Actions to counteract jamming or “hot mike” situations.
6. TIME CHECK (for synchronization).
Figure B-2. Sample platoon OPORD format
FRAGMENTARY ORDERS
B-16. The FRAGO is a brief oral or written order that can serve any of the following purposes:
• Implement timely changes to existing orders.
• Provide pertinent extracts from more detailed orders.
• Provide instructions until a detailed order is developed.
• Provide specific instructions to subordinates who do not require a complete order.
B-17. There is no specific format for a FRAGO. For simplicity and complete clarity, it normally follows
the five-paragraph OPORD structure; however, it includes only the information required for subordinates
to accomplish their mission. To enhance understanding of voice FRAGOs, digitally equipped units can
quickly develop hasty graphics and transmit digital overlays.
B-18. Platoon FRAGOs normally include the following information:
• Updated enemy or friendly situation.
• Mission. (Note. The platoon leader must ensure that platoon tasks and purpose are clearly
stated.)
• Scheme of maneuver.
• Specific instructions as necessary.
B-19. Figure B-3 illustrates a platoon FRAGO transmitted by voice over a secure net.
SECTION II – REPORTS
B-20. Reports are the unit’s primary means of providing information for plans and decisions. They must
be accurate, timely, and complete.
B-21. Procedures for preparing, transmitting, and safeguarding reports will vary from unit to unit and from
situation to situation. Among the factors influencing tank platoon report procedures are the preferences
and requirements of the chain of command, the tactical environment in which the platoon is operating,
available equipment, terrain, and the electronic warfare situation. Digital systems, for example, enable the
transmission of accurate preformatted reports.
B-22. For leaders at all levels, two guidelines remain constant throughout the reporting process: the
importance of compiling timely, accurate information and the need to relay that information by the clearest,
quickest, and most secure method possible. The tank platoon leader, along with the PSG and TCs, can
save time, ensure completeness, and reduce confusion by developing and implementing thorough SOPs
covering report procedures. Refer to ST 3-20.153 for an extensive sample SOP that includes line-by-line
descriptions of voice and digital report formats used by the platoon. (See Figures B-4 through B-7 for
sample reports/sample formats.)
Tank units, including the platoon, almost never fight alone. Open terrain such as
desert, plains, and flat countryside is conducive to the employment of massed armor
formations. In such terrain, mechanized infantry supports the forward movement of
the armor units by providing local security, retaining key terrain, clearing dug-in
enemy positions, and enhancing direct fires with organic small arms and antitank
fires. On the other hand, restricted terrain (such as built-up areas, forests, and
jungles) increases the vulnerability of armor units. In close terrain, it is more
advantageous for tanks to take a supporting role in the forward movement of the
infantry. Armor provides close-in direct fire support against hard and soft targets that
could slow the infantry’s advance.
This appendix examines, in detail, how both elements are employed to support each
other. Regardless of terrain, infantry and armor units fight as part of a combined
arms team to maximize their respective capabilities and minimize their limitations.
Leaders of both tank (heavy) and infantry (light) forces must understand the TTP
employed by their operational counterparts. The principles of offense, defense, and
movement discussed in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 are applicable. Covered here will be the
employment of the tank platoon as part of an infantry organization. To cover the
employment of an infantry platoon in use in an armor unit would be out of the scope
of this manual and is covered as part of the company team manual FM 3-90.1 (FM
71-1).
Note. In some situations, the armor platoon also may be used as a separate special platoon, or it
may be attached to one of the infantry companies in a DS role.
C-3. The platoon is the lowest level at which the armor leader must be trained to interact with a
controlling headquarters. The platoon leader must act as the armor force advisor to the battalion
commander. He must rely on the infantry staff for immediate support.
Note. If the platoon’s parent company or troop is in the vicinity, he may be able to coordinate
some assistance through the company/troop commander or XO; however, this support may not
be available.
C-4. It is important that the tank platoon leader understand the infantry unit he supports; this generally
will be a light infantry, air assault, or airborne battalion. Characteristics of these battalions vary by the
composition and mission of the forces involved, as outlined in the following discussion.
INFANTRY ORGANIZATIONS
LIGHT INFANTRY BATTALION
C-5. This is the most austere conventional combat battalion. The light infantry battalion has only three
rifle companies and a headquarters and headquarters company (HHC). Of the three types of infantry units
described in this section, the organization of the light infantry battalion differs most from that of the armor
battalion.
C-6. There are also differences among this battalion and the air assault and airborne battalions, the
greatest being the organization of support and logistics. The light infantry battalion has no trucks larger
than its 27 cargo HMMWVs. The battalion has only 18 long-range radios. It has limited antiarmor
capability: four HMMWV-mounted TOW systems in one platoon at battalion level and six Dragon
(Javelin) launchers at company level.
C-7. Infantry leaders must understand the tactical doctrine for employing a heavy company team (as
prescribed in FM 3-90.1), a tank platoon (refer to this FM), and a mechanized infantry platoon (refer to FM
7-7 and FM 3-21.71). To effectively employ any armored vehicle, leaders must know the specific
capabilities and limitations of the vehicle and its weapon systems. The platoon leader must be able to brief
the battalion leadership on how to best use the tank platoon. He is the subject matter expert, and must
ensure the battalion understands the capabilities and limitations of the tank platoon. For example, M1
series tanks provide rapid mobility as well as excellent protection and lethal, accurate direct fires. These
tanks are most effective in open terrain with extended fields of fire.
INFANTRY CONSIDERATIONS
C-13. Besides understanding the capabilities and limitations of his tanks, the armor platoon leader must
appreciate the tactical assets and liabilities of the infantry. He must realize that infantry elements move
much more slowly than tanks over certain types of terrain. At the same time, he will learn that infantry can
use terrain very effectively to gain a positional advantage over the enemy and that terrain has a direct
impact on survivability for the infantryman.
C-14. The tank platoon leader must ensure that the controlling infantry headquarters understands that
considerations for positioning and control of the tank’s crew-served direct-fire weapon systems are the
same as those for the infantry’s crew-served and AT weapons. In addition, he must be able to anticipate
the effects of his weapon systems on both friendly and enemy forces. As an example, he must remember
that sabot ammunition cannot be fired over the heads or flanks of unprotected infantry because of the
danger created by the concussion of the main gun and the discarding sabot petals of tank rounds.
ROLE OF TRAINING
C-15. Finally, light/heavy liaison activities must emphasize the importance of combined arms training.
Armor and infantry elements must train together, or they will not be able to execute combined arms
operations smoothly in combat. Ideally, this training is conducted prior to deployment. To enhance
coordination and execution, however, light/heavy forces must take advantage of every training opportunity
that arises.
C-16. An important aspect of training is teaching leaders of light and heavy elements how to work together
and how their forces can support each other. For example, leaders must know how to communicate by
digital, radio, phone, and visual means. Other areas of the training include the following:
• Infantrymen help heavy forces by finding and breaching or marking antitank obstacles. They
detect and destroy or suppress enemy antitank weapons. The infantry may also designate targets
for armored vehicles and protect them in close terrain.
• Heavy forces lead infantrymen in open terrain and provide them with a protected, fast-moving
assault weapon system. Tanks can suppress and destroy enemy weapons, bunkers, and tanks by
fire and maneuver. They can also transport infantrymen when the enemy situation permits.
Note. A section should normally be OPCON to a company for only a limited time to
accomplish a specific direct-fire support mission. In longer-duration operations, the logistical
demands of the armor section would overwhelm the separate infantry company’s sustainment
capabilities.
C-19. The tank platoon leader and PSG maintain communications with the controlling infantry battalion
headquarters. When attached at lower levels, the platoon leader or PSG gains and maintains contact with
the company commander and talks to other platoon leaders on the company net. Individual tanks and
dismounted infantry communicate with each other using one of these techniques:
• FBCB2 (digital). The TI provides situational understanding at company/troop level and above.
Leaders are responsible for ensuring proper connectivity of digital assets, which enhance their
ability to send and receive OPORDs and FRAGOs, friendly graphics, locations of adjacent
units, and known and templated threat locations.
• FM radio. The infantry platoon leader uses his SOI information and contacts supporting tanks
on the tank platoon frequency. This is a fast, reliable method of communications that does not
require any additional assets.
• Wire. Tank crewmen can route WD-1 wire from the VIC-1 through the loader’s hatch or vision
block and attach it to a field phone on the back of the tank. (Note. The field phone must be
rigged inside a protective container, such as an ammunition can, which is then welded, bolted, or
otherwise affixed to the tank.) The platoon leader needs to understand this is only a stop gap
method and should only be used when all other methods fail.
• Hand-held radios. Infantry squad radios or other short-range hand-held radios can be
distributed during the linkup to provide a reliable means of communications between infantry
and supporting TCs. These radios allow the infantry to use terrain more effectively in providing
close-in protection for the tank; infantrymen can watch for enemy elements while limiting
exposure to enemy fires directed against the tank. The use of nonsecure radios is not
recommended.
• Visual signals. Visual signals, as prescribed by SOP or coordinated during linkup, can facilitate
simple communications. Platoon leader needs to remember that tanks and infantry use different
visual signals, so without prior coordination and training, this method will cause confusion and
lead to either infantry or tank leader exposing them selves to enemy fire in an attempt to
understand what the other element requires.
INTELLIGENCE
C-20. The tank platoon leader must obtain information from the battalion S2 on enemy capabilities,
especially those of antiarmor assets. He should focus not only on direct fire capabilities, but also on the
capacity of the enemy’s mines, artillery, and mortar fires to disable his vehicles.
C-21. Terrain analysis is another area of supreme importance in which the platoon leader must work
closely with the S2. Platoon leaders must understand and account for the fact that infantry do not view the
terrain in the same manner as a mounted element. They determine trafficability of the terrain, examining
the effects of weather, obstacles, and limited visibility on the speed and mobility of armored vehicles.
Following this detailed analysis, TCs and section leaders conduct a ground reconnaissance of the area of
operations. The reconnaissance confirms the trafficability of routes and aids in the effective positioning of
weapon systems. The terrain analysis and subsequent reconnaissance also confirm whether the platoon
needs to employ ground guides who are knowledgeable of the terrain and the limitations it will impose on
tracked vehicle movement.
MANEUVER
C-22. When the light/heavy operation begins, either the tanks or the infantry can lead. The following
discussion of moving with infantry covers a situation in which terrain and other factors of METT-TC
clearly favor the use of infantry in the lead, supported by armor.
TANK PLATOON EMPLOYMENT
C-23. When operating with infantry, the tank platoon may execute missions “pure,” either on its own or as
part of a tank company or cavalry troop. In such a situation, the platoon can perform one of several roles,
including the following:
• Execute reserve/reaction force missions.
• Attack separate objectives.
• Support the advance of infantry with close-in direct fires.
C-24. When infantry leads, the platoon can be employed in one of three ways:
• It can remain stationary at the battalion or company command post until called forward.
• It can follow and support the infantry, staying close enough to provide direct-fire support when
requested.
• During company-level tactical movement, it can overwatch forward movement of the infantry
from stationary positions.
MOVEMENT CONSIDERATIONS
C-25. Infantrymen conduct tactical movement until they identify an enemy force that halts their progress
(see Figure C-1). They deploy into position, suppress enemy AT weapons with direct and indirect fires,
and request tank support to destroy the enemy. The tanks move forward and link up with the infantry (see
Figure C-2). At the linkup point, the tank platoon or section leader (depending on the size of the
supporting armor element) dismounts and coordinates the following information with the infantry leader:
• Enemy disposition.
• Friendly disposition.
C-26. The armor leader (either the platoon or section leader) conducts a ground reconnaissance of the route
to the final firing position and finalizes the plan with the infantry leader. He then returns to the platoon or
section and briefs the plan to his platoon or section.
C-27. Depending on task organization and terrain factors, the tank platoon or section moves forward to the
firing position, using guides provided by the infantry (see Figure C-3). If the entire platoon is involved,
one section overwatches the movement of the lead section to the firing position. If a single section is used,
the trail vehicle must overwatch the movement of the lead vehicle to the firing position.
C-28. Depending on the amount of suppressive fires received, the firing tank may move to the position
buttoned up, with the ballistic doors closed (M1A2 crews may stow the CITV). This provides better
protection for the crew and helps to prevent damage to the gunner’s sights. At the same time, however, it
degrades the tank’s target acquisition capability and makes it easier for dismounted enemy forces to attack
the tank with small arms or machine gun fires.
ENGAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS
C-29. If tank crews cannot immediately identify targets when they reach the firing position, the infantry
designates each target using tracers, mortars, smoke, or grenades fired from the M203 grenade launcher.
TCs open the ballistic doors as necessary to acquire and lase to their targets; tanks then suppress or destroy
targets using main gun or machine gun fire. When targets are destroyed, the infantry signals the tanks to
cease fire (see Figure C-4).
SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS
C-30. Tank and infantry leaders at all levels must be aware of the safety considerations involved in
light/heavy operations. Leader awareness and involvement is particularly important if the infantry unit has
had little training with armored vehicles. All personnel in both the light and heavy units must be aware of
these considerations to prevent unnecessary casualties.
C-31. Tank crewmen are often unable to see infantry Soldiers operating close to their vehicle. This
limitation is worse during limited visibility and when the hatches are closed; in these conditions, the crew
is focused on the enemy or on potential enemy locations rather than any nearby infantrymen. It is the
infantry’s responsibility to stay alert and to maintain a safe position in relation to the vehicle.
C-32. Infantry Soldiers operating near tanks are exposed to the effects of any fires the enemy directs
against the vehicles. This is true whether the infantry and vehicles are moving or stationary. Proximity
also severely degrades the infantry’s to avoid detection by the enemy. It therefore becomes the
responsibility of infantry leaders to maintain sufficient distance to avoid the effects of fires directed against
the tanks, even when they are required to provide security or close support.
C-33. Tanks fire high-velocity, armor-piercing, discarding sabot rounds that pose hazards to infantry.
Dismounted Soldiers should be at 70 meters to the left or right of the line of fire and/or at least 1,000
meters to the front of a firing tank. Any infantry within this danger area must have overhead cover and
protection (a berm or tree) from the rear.
C-34. The exhaust from an M1-series tank may reach more than 1,700˚F. Dismounted Soldiers following
behind the tank must position themselves either to the side of the exhaust grill or, if they are directly
behind the vehicle, at a safe distance away. The use of exhaust shield will overcome this problem. The
shield is a critical element in tanks recovering other tanks, so they should be readily available in the tank
platoons. Consideration should be given to fabricating enough for all tanks as a leader will not know when
he will be working with the infantry.
C-35. Infantrymen may ride on tanks if conditions allow, but they must be aware of the serious safety
concerns involved.
TRANSPORTING INFANTRY
C-36. At times, the tank platoon may be required to transport infantrymen on its tanks (as illustrated in
Figure C-5). This is done only when contact is not expected. This is the least preferred method of
transporting infantry and should only be used when both the mounted and dismounted element have had
time to train and have a firm understanding of how each element will work. If the platoon is moving as
part of a larger force and is tasked to provide security for the move, the lead section or element should not
carry infantry.
C-37. Infantry and armor leaders must observe the following procedures, precautions, and considerations
when infantrymen ride on tanks:
• Infantry teams should thoroughly practice mounting and dismounting procedures and actions on
contact.
• Passengers must always alert the TC before mounting or dismounting. They must follow the
commands of the TC.
• Infantry platoons should be broken down into squad-size groups, similar to air assault chalks,
with the infantry platoon leader on the armor platoon leader’s vehicle and the infantry PSG on
the armor PSG’s vehicle.
• Platoon leaders, PSGs, and team leaders should position themselves near the TC’s hatch, using
the external phone (if available) to talk to the TC and relay signals to the unit.
• If possible, the lead vehicle should not carry infantrymen. Riders restrict turret movement and
are more likely to be injured or killed on initial contact.
• Tank crewmen must remember that the vehicle cannot return fire effectively with infantry on
board.
• Whenever possible, passengers mount and dismount over the left front slope of the vehicle.
This ensures that the driver can see the infantrymen and that the infantrymen do not pass in front
of the coax machine gun. Passengers must ensure that they remain behind the vehicle’s smoke
grenade launchers. This will automatically keep them clear of all weapon systems.
• Passengers must always have three points of contact with the vehicle; they must watch for low-
hanging objects like tree branches.
• All passengers should wear hearing protection.
• Infantrymen should not ride with anything more than their battle gear. Rucksacks and B-bags
should be transported by other means.
• Infantrymen should scan in all directions. They may be able to spot a target the vehicle crew
does not see.
• Passengers should be prepared to take the following actions on contact:
• Wait for the vehicle to stop.
• At the TC’s command, dismount immediately (one fire team on each side). Do not move
forward of the turret.
• Move at least 5 meters to the sides of the vehicle. Do not move behind or forward of the
vehicle.
• Do not move in front of vehicles unless ordered to do so.
• Do not dismount a vehicle unless ordered or given permission to do so.
• Do not dangle arms or legs, equipment, or anything else off the side of a vehicle; they could get
caught in the tracks, causing death, injury, or damage to the equipment or vehicle.
• Do not carry too many riders on the vehicle.
• Do not fall asleep when riding. The warm engine may induce drowsiness; a fall could be fatal.
• Do not smoke when mounted on a vehicle.
• Do not stand near a moving or turning vehicle at any time. Tanks have a deceptively short
turning radius.
FIRE SUPPORT
C-41. The use and control of indirect and direct fires are critical to the effective employment of armor with
infantry.
INDIRECT FIRES
C-42. Indirect fires are used to suppress enemy AT weapons and dismounted infantry in the area of
operations. The tank platoon uses its optics to detect targets and its communications systems to initiate
calls for fire in support of infantry. In addition, the noise of mortar and artillery fires, combined with the
use of smoke, helps to conceal the movement of tanks moving forward, adding the element of surprise to
the operation. The platoon leader needs to have an understanding of the light force’s indirect capabilities
and limitations. He must understand they do not have the same capabilities and limitations as a self
propelled artillery unit.
DIRECT FIRES
C-43. One of the primary assets that tanks offer in working with infantry is their ability to provide accurate,
lethal direct fires from a mobile, survivable platform. The weapon systems on each tank offer unique
capabilities and limitations that must be considered in relation to infantry support; these characteristics are
covered later in this discussion.
Target Acquisition
C-44. The target acquisition capabilities of the tank exceed the capabilities of all systems in the infantry
battalion. The thermal sight provides a significant capability for observation and reconnaissance. It can
also be used during the day to identify heat sources (personnel and vehicles), even through light vegetation.
Infantry units can take advantage of the tank’s laser range finder to enhance their capabilities in
establishing fire control measures (such as trigger lines and TRPs) and in determining exact locations on
the battlefield.
Machine Guns
C-45. The TC’s caliber.50 machine gun is effective against both personnel and materiel. The 7.62-mm
coax machine gun is an effective AP weapon. These machine guns provide a high volume of supporting
fires for the infantry.
Main Gun
C-46. The main gun remains the best antitank weapon on the battlefield. The main gun is extremely
accurate and lethal at ranges up to 2,500 meters. Tanks with stabilized main guns can fire effectively even
when moving at high speeds across country.
C-47. All current tanks fire sabot, MPAT, and HEAT rounds. These have great penetrating power against
armored vehicles, but may not have the destructive capability necessary to destroy prepared fighting
positions or penetrate walls in built-up areas. High explosive, obstacle-reducing with tracer (HE-OR-T)
rounds (the M908) have enough destructive power to destroy most prepared positions and to create large
holes in walls. The canister is an AP round that is extremely effective for area suppression.
Tank Capabilities
C-48. The Army’s tanks have the following firepower capabilities and limitations:
• M1A1 and M1A2. Both vehicles are limited in ammunition storage capacity (40 rounds in the
M1A1, 42 in the M1A2). They can fire sabot, HEAT, and MPAT ammunition, as well as the
HE-OR-T and canister rounds. On the M1A1, the TC can fire the M2 caliber .50 without
exposing himself. The M1A2 TC must expose himself to fire the M2, unless equipped with
common remotely operated weapons station (CROWS). Both vehicles consume fuel at a high
rate, and their mobility is limited in terrain that does not support heavy tracked vehicles.
AIR DEFENSE
C-52. The tank platoon leader must be familiar with the air defense considerations applicable to light/heavy
operations, including ADA capabilities and employment considerations. Refer to the discussion in Chapter
6 of this manual.
SUSTAINMENT
C-53. When attached to infantry, the tank platoon must prepare to operate under austere conditions. The
key to effective combat support in this situation is to maintain a constant flow of reports updating the
platoon’s supply status and requirements.
C-54. In an infantry task force, the tank platoon leader and PSG will do much of their logistical
coordination directly through the battalion staff. They coordinate reporting procedures within the platoon
and notify the staff when classes of supply fall below the levels of 80 percent (identified by the code word
AMBER), 70 percent (RED), and 60 percent (BLACK). When a class of supply falls below 70 percent,
the platoon leader or PSG requests resupply.
C-55. Fuel, ammunition, recovery, and maintenance are the primary concerns of the attached platoon.
Other logistical needs are usually handled through the normal sustainment functions of the battalion.
These considerations apply:
• Fuel. Fuel conservation must be a priority at all times. Engines should be shut down whenever
possible. REDCON status should be used to help regulate engine start-up requirements and to
assist in operational preparations. The tank platoon can normally support infantry operations for
24 hours before refueling. Infantry units normally do not understand the amount of fuel that
tanks will consume. If fuel support is coming through the infantry battalion only, it will be
critical that fuel requests are forecasted in advance so that the battalion will have the required
amounts on hand or request support from their parent brigade.
• Ammunition. The tank platoon’s ammunition requirements present a unique challenge for the
infantry battalion. The type of rounds requested should be based on the S2’s analysis to fit the
needs for direct fire support of the light/heavy mission. A basic load of ammunition should be
on hand to provide for emergency resupply during periods of heavy contact. Infantry battalions
will not be able to support the requirements of main gun ammunition, but can support the
platoon for small arms and grenade requirements. Platoon sergeants must constantly think about
CS constraints, and not limit themselves to only one area (the parent company) for support.
• Recovery and maintenance. When a tank is disabled, the platoon should first attempt self-
recovery. If this is not possible, the crew makes the necessary coordination to secure the vehicle
until recovery and maintenance personnel reach it. Infantry personnel can be employed to
provide local security during recovery operations or to protect the vehicle as the attack
progresses. Recovery and maintenance assets may be part of the infantry battalion’s attached
slice within the brigade forward support battalion, or they may be on call from the tank
platoon’s parent company or troop headquarters.
Throughout the area of operations, the enemy will, at any given moment, be
attempting to acquire intelligence information and gain a tactical advantage.
Tank platoon leaders must understand the demands of continuous operations under all
possible conditions. They then must provide their Soldiers with the training and
leadership they will need to meet the challenges of the battlefield.
COUNTERSURVEILLANCE
D-3. Maneuver units use countersurveillance measures to protect against surprise, observation, and
infiltration. In future operations, tank platoons may find themselves to be high-value targets for the enemy.
One destroyed M1-series tank would not be a large military victory, but would be a large victory from a
propaganda standpoint. The enemy will continue to further his use of precision weapons in place of
massed artillery fire. As was true in the past is even more so now, what can be seen, can be hit, and what
can be hit will be destroyed. The following considerations and procedures will assist the tank platoon in
executing countersurveillance operations:
• Enforce noise and light discipline. Follow these procedures:
• Turn off the circuit breaker for the brake lights.
• Dim or cover all sources of light in the turret. Use a passive night observation device
(NOD) to check vehicles for light leaks before operations begin.
• Move only when necessary.
• Use headsets or the combat vehicle crewman (CVC) helmet to monitor the radio; do not use
the radio’s external speakers.
• Do not slam hatches.
• Use short-count procedures to start engines simultaneously.
• Use terrain to mask resupply and maintenance areas.
• Use hand-and-arm signals and digital communications whenever possible.
• Do not allow smoking outdoors at night.
• Collect and turn in all garbage during LOGPAC. As a last resort, garbage will be burned
and buried.
INFORMATION SECURITY
D-4. INFOSEC entails the protection of all materials, both classified and unclassified, that may be of
intelligence value to the enemy. Refer to the discussion in Appendix A of this manual. The following
procedures will assist the platoon in maintaining INFOSEC:
• Ensure that Soldiers do not put critical information in the mail. This includes unit identification,
location, and capabilities; the commander’s name; and information on combat losses or morale.
• Before leaving an area, police it to make sure items of intelligence value are not left behind.
• Garbage will be turned in with LOGPAC or burned to prevent the enemy from gathering any
type of information.
• As operations are conducted near and around foreign nationals, care must be taken in
exchanging information between Soldiers. Soldiers tend to assume that local people do not
speak English and could inadvertently give up details of operations to enemy agents who appear
as local population.
SIGNAL SECURITY
D-5. The discussion of communications in Chapter 2 of this manual outlines considerations and
procedures for establishing and maintaining signal security. Refer to the discussion of INFOSEC in
Appendix A.
• Conducting area sweeps right before or right after BMNT/EENT will allow the platoon to
destroy enemy reconnaissance elements, and or dismounted elements. This when used in a
varied method will keep the enemy off guard and will force him to react to the platoon and not
the other way around.
• Do not allow foreign nationals and unauthorized observers in or near the unit’s area or positions
during operations. In accordance with ROE/ROI and the company or troop commander’s intent,
establish procedures for handling civilian intruders. In urban areas, the platoon will not be able
to stop every person walking in the area. Attention must be paid to ensure the civilians stay out
of a stand off zone to prevent them from placing explosives on the vehicles. Also, platoons
need to be observant of civilians taking too much interest in unit actions or missions.
• During all operations and especially during areas of close-in terrain, it is critical that the
platoon’s tanks have an M4 rifle positioned on the turret, ready to be used rapidly. Close-in
terrain, or more restrictive ROE, will allow the enemy to get closer to the tank prior to the crew
being able to engage him. Due to dead space of the turret machine guns and limited stopping
power of the pistol, the M4 will allow the crew to engage and destroy dismounted threats as they
approach the tank.
• Crews must ensure that the caliber .50 machine gun and tank radios are manned at all times, and
the Soldier is looking around to prevent the enemy or unknown personnel from getting too close
to the tank. The enemy will constantly be watching vehicles to detect a period of low security in
which to conduct attacks.
• Local vehicles will not be allowed to park near or place objects close to the platoon. An IED or
a VBIED could, but may not, cause catastrophic damage to the tank itself, but would be deadly
to exposed crewmen or supporting infantry.
• Crews faced with multi-echelon threats will need to ensure they wear their protective equipment.
The wearing of interceptor body armor (IBA) with the small arms protective inserts (SAPI) by
the loader and TC will reduce their vulnerability to small-arms fire when they are exposed out of
the turret hatches. In addition, crews may be required to conduct dismounted operations or OPs
and will be required to wear IBA as a force protection measure.
• Employ OPs to maintain surveillance on avenues of approach into the platoon’s AO.
OBSERVATION POSTS
D-7. OPs are especially important in maintaining the platoon’s OPSEC and enhancing its AO. They help
to protect the platoon when long-range observation from current positions is not possible; this can occur
when the platoon is in a hide position or when close terrain offers concealed avenues of approach to the
platoon’s position. OPs can be employed either mounted or dismounted.
• A location that is within range of platoon small-arms fire. This enables the platoon to cover the
OP if withdrawal becomes necessary.
Note. OP personnel are designated in the unit SOP, but are normally the loaders from wingman
tanks. In two-man OPs, one crewman observes the sector while the other provides local
security. Some short-duration OPs may consist of one crewman providing local security for
individual vehicles in close terrain.
• The platoon leader or PSG briefs the OP personnel to ensure that they are trained in reporting
procedures and individual camouflage techniques and that they have the proper equipment as
designated in the unit SOP. Equipment will normally include the following:
• Individual weapons, M4 rifle, and grenades.
• Communications equipment (such as wire, flag set, flashlight, and/or radio). (Note. The
use of nonsecure radios, to include hand-held types, is not recommended. If used; however,
platoons must exercise extreme caution.)
Note. Flag use will be based on local SOP, but a general rule of thumb is green flag for friendly
elements, yellow flag for unknown elements, and red flag for enemy elements.
• Seasonal uniform with load-bearing equipment (LBE) and appropriate MOPP gear.
• Binoculars and NODs.
• Paper and pen/pencil for making a sector sketch.
MEDIA CONSIDERATIONS
D-13. The presence of the media is a reality that confronts everyone conducting military operations. All
leaders and Soldiers are subject to instantaneous worldwide scrutiny as a result of the growth of news
coverage via international television and radio broadcasts and the Internet. They must realize that
operations that run counter to official U.S. policy may damage the nation’s interests and international
standing.
D-14. Tank platoon crewmen must learn how to deal effectively with broadcast and print reporters and
photographers. Training should cover any information restrictions imposed on the media. Soldiers must
also gain an understanding of which subjects they are authorized to discuss and which ones they must refer
to higher authorities, such as their chain of command or the public affairs office (PAO). PAOs usually
issue daily guidance dealing with these subjects.
Because many potential adversaries have the capability to employ nuclear, biological,
and chemical weapons, the tank platoon must prepare to fight in a CBRN
environment. Faced with the contemporary operating environment it is as likely now
as at any point for enemy forces to use CBRN weapons, both at the small unit level
as well as strategic level. Collecting, processing, and disseminating needed CBRN
hazard information are also vital functions. To survive and remain effective on the
integrated battlefield, the tank platoon must be proficient in the three fundamentals of
CBRN defense: contamination avoidance, CBRN protection, and decontamination. A
thorough understanding of CBRN capabilities and unit detection equipment will
allow the platoon to function and operate. It’s has been proven that a units fear of
CBRN weapons is as disabling as the weapons themselves.
signal security reduces the chances of being acquired as a target. The tank platoon should continually
analyze its vulnerability to chemical or nuclear attack and take appropriate protective measures.
E-4. Attacks and contamination must be detected quickly and reported to adjacent units and headquarters
elements. The tank platoon must have an effective method of quickly giving the alarm in the event of a
CBRN attack. Alarms can be passed by radio, audible signals, or hand-and-arm signals. The unit SOP
should specify criteria and automatic procedures for employing detection teams and submitting the
required CBRN reports following a CBRN attack or when contamination is encountered.
E-5. Whenever possible, all movement routes and future positions should be reconnoitered for CBRN
contamination. Quartering party personnel should be prepared to conduct monitoring operations; if they
detect contaminated areas, they identify, report, and mark them. The quartering party can then evaluate the
location and type of hazard (nuclear radiation or chemical/biological agent) to determine the best plan for
bypassing, crossing, or operating in the contaminated area. Based on the situation, the platoon leader and
company commander must be able to implement protective measures specified in the SOP to minimize
personnel losses and limit the spread of contamination.
NUCLEAR DEFENSE
E-7. The best defense against a nuclear attack is to dig in. Unit defensive positions, which range from
individual foxholes to full-scale improved fighting positions, should be prepared whenever the tactical
situation permits. Personnel should keep their individual weapons, equipment, clothing, and other issue
items in their vehicles. Inside the vehicle, equipment and any loose items must be secured because the
blast wave can turn unsecured objects into lethal missiles. Supplies, explosives, and flammable materials
should be dispersed and protected.
E-8. Reverse slopes of hills and mountains give some nuclear protection. The initial radiation and the
heat and light from the fireball of a nuclear blast tend to be absorbed by hills and mountains. The use of
gullies, ravines, ditches, natural depressions, fallen trees, and caves can also reduce nuclear casualties.
E-9. Equipment that would be damaged in the explosion must be safe guarded. One technique is not
using all night-vision goggles at the same time, if not required by the mission, to prevent damage to the
image enhancing mechanism by the flash.
CHEMICAL DEFENSE
General Guidelines
E-10. Make sure all personnel have their protective masks available, and make sure each mask fits and
functions properly. All personnel should wear the proper protective clothing in accordance with the MOPP
level designated by the commander. Inform everyone to remain alert and to be constantly aware of the
chemical threat. Protect all equipment and supplies from liquid chemical contamination by keeping them
organized and covered with a tarp. Exposed gear will not be decontaminated and will be destroyed and
deprive the platoon of its equipment. The platoon must have a standardized plan for placing M9 tape on
the vehicles as part of the early warning process.
in sealed containers; consume it only after washing and cleaning the outside of the container. All water
must be boiled for at least 15 minutes. Leaders continue to monitor for signs of delayed acting agents.
Note. Refer to the battle drill for reaction to a chemical/biological attack in Chapter 3 of this
manual.
NUCLEAR DEFENSE
Defense During a Nuclear Attack
E-19. This discussion focuses on defensive measures the platoon must be prepared to take to protect tank
crewmen, whether they are in their vehicle or have dismounted.
Mounted Defensive Actions
E-20. If time permits, the platoon should take the following actions:
• Position each vehicle behind the best available cover with the front of the vehicle toward the
blast.
• Point the gun away from the blast.
• Lock the brakes.
• Secure loose equipment inside the vehicle to prevent injuries and equipment damage.
• Secure all exterior components that could be damaged by the blast (such as water cans, duffel
bags, and antennas) inside the vehicle.
• Turn off all radios as well as turret and master power.
• Close and lock all hatches, including ballistic shields.
• Take actions to protect the head and eyes. As necessary, wear helmets and eye protection
whenever possible.
Note. Refer to Chapter 3 of this manual for a discussion of the battle drill for reaction to a
nuclear attack.
Fallout Warning
E-24. The first person to detect the arrival of fallout is usually a member of the radiological survey and
monitoring team. As soon as the recorded dose rate reaches 1 centigray per hour (cGy/hr) or higher, issue
a fallout warning. All personnel hearing the warning relay it to others. If the mission allows, Soldiers
should get into a shelter with overhead cover and stay there until given an “ALL CLEAR” signal or until
otherwise directed to move. If the mission does not allow the unit to take cover, decontamination becomes
more important and, in many cases, more difficult.
Supervision of Radiological Monitoring
E-25. Designate a point in the platoon area where readings will be taken, and note the grid coordinates of
that point. Check the monitor operator to make sure that he takes readings at least once each hour from this
point, that he zeroes the radiacmeter (AN/VDR-2) before taking each reading, and that he uses the device
properly. Have the operator monitor continuously if any of the following conditions occur:
• A reading of 1 cGy/hr or more is obtained.
• A fallout warning is received.
• A nuclear burst is seen, heard, or reported.
• An order to monitor is received.
• The unit begins to move.
E-26. Ensure that the operator immediately reports all readings showing the presence of radiation, as well
as the time of these readings. Use this information and the location of the readings to prepare a NBC-4
report. Continue these operations until monitoring shows a dose rate of less than 1 cGy/hr or until directed
to stop.
Supervision of Tactical Dosimetry
E-27. The tank platoon is normally issued two dosimeters. Select two Soldiers, one from each section, to
wear them ideally the TC but at a minimum a loader that is outside the armor to get an accurate reading.
Before the operation begins, check all dosimeters; any that do not read zero should be turned in for
recharging if applicable. If a charger is not available, note the original reading on the dosimeter and adjust
subsequent readings accordingly. Make sure dosimeter readings are reported accurately. Collect readings
at least once daily. Average these readings, round to the nearest 10, and report this average to higher
headquarters.
CHEMICAL DEFENSE
Defense During a Chemical Attack
E-28. Give the alarm. Have all unmasked Soldiers put on their protective masks and other MOPP gear.
All personnel should move inside their tanks; in most cases, they should place their hatches in the closed
position to protect against gross contamination. Direct the crews of vehicles that are equipped with CBRN
overpressurization to turn the system on. Use M256 chemical agent detector kits to determine the type of
agent, and forward a NBC-1 chemical report. Continue the mission.
Notes. Tactical and safety considerations (such as observation of the terrain, enemy disposition,
and the amount of gross contamination that may be spread inside the vehicle) may outweigh the
need to keep the tank’s hatches closed. Depending on the tactical situation and unit SOP,
platoon members may be required to keep their hatches in the open or open-protected position.
Refer to Chapter 3 of this manual for a discussion of the battle drill for reaction to a
chemical/biological attack.
Poisoning Symptoms
E-43. Early symptoms usually appear in the following progression:
• Runny nose.
• Redness and tearing of the eyes.
• Sudden headache.
• Excessive flow of saliva (drooling).
• Tightness in the chest, leading to breathing difficulty.
• Impaired vision.
• Muscular twitching in the area of exposed or contaminated skin.
• Stomach cramps.
• Nausea.
E-44. Severe nerve agent poisoning is likely when any of the early symptoms are accompanied by all or
most of the following symptoms:
• Strange or confused behavior.
• Gurgling sounds when breathing.
• Severely pinpointed pupils.
• Loss of bladder and/or bowel control.
• Vomiting.
• Convulsions.
• Breathing that becomes extremely labored or stops.
Self-Aid Procedures
E-45. No effective drug exists to remedy the effects of nerve agents on vision. If Soldiers experience any
of the other mild symptoms of nerve agent poisoning, they must perform the following self-aid measures,
which are covered in more detail in FM 4-25.11 (FM 21-11):
• Step 1. Immediately put on the protective mask.
• Step 2. Remove a Mark I nerve agent autoinjector kit (NAAK) from the protective mask
carrier (see Figure E-3).
• Step 3. Inject one thigh with the first injector from the kit (atropine in the small auto-
injector). Hold the injector against the thigh for at least 10 seconds. Remove the injector.
• Step 4. Immediately inject the thigh with the second injector (pralidoxime chloride in the
large injector). Hold the injector against the thigh for at least 10 seconds.
• Step 5. Remove the injector and place each injector needle through the jacket pocket flap of
the overgarment, bending each needle to form a hook.
• Step 6. Massage the injection area, if time permits and the overgarment suit is not
contaminated.
• Step 7. If symptoms persist or recur, wait 10 to 15 minutes and repeat both injections.
Repeat a third time if needed. Allow 10 to 15 minutes between each set of injections. Do not
administer more than three NAAK sets. Medical support personnel must authorize the
administration of more than three sets.
Blister Agents
E-47. Casualties resulting from blister agents may not be noticeable immediately. Symptoms may take
several hours or days to appear. They include the following:
• Redness or inflammation of the eyes.
• Temporary blindness or, with severe poisoning, permanent blindness.
• Itching, burning, or reddening of the skin.
• Welts or, in an advanced state, blisters on the skin.
• Hoarseness.
• Coughing.
• Difficult or labored breathing.
• Stomach pain.
• Nausea.
• Vomiting.
• Diarrhea.
E-48. If a blister agent comes in contact with skin or eyes, remove it immediately. To remove an agent
from the eyes, flush repeatedly with plain water. Decontaminate the skin using the M258A1/M291 kit. If
severe blisters form, seek medical attention as soon as possible.
Blood Agents
E-49. A seemingly mild case of blood agent poisoning can progress to death within 10 minutes. Symptoms
include the following:
• Rapid or shallow respiration (panting).
• Headache.
• Dizziness or giddiness.
• Red or pink color change in light-colored skin.
• Convulsions.
• Coma.
E-50. There is no self-aid or buddy-aid treatment for blood agent poisoning. When hit with blood agent
the platoon must mask as soon as possible. Victims must receive immediate medical attention. Blood
agent leads to a break down of protective mask filters and leaders must plan actions accordingly.
Choking Agents
E-51. These agents produce casualties by means of inhaled vapors. They damage blood vessels in the lung
walls, causing body fluid to slowly fill the lung cavity. Ordinary field concentrations do not cause death,
but prolonged exposure to high concentrations of the vapor, coupled with neglect or delay in masking, can
be fatal. Maximum damage will occur between 12 and 24 hours after exposure. In most cases, the excess
fluid in the lungs will absorb back into the body. Slow recovery will begin approximately 48 hours after
exposure.
E-52. During and immediately after exposure, choking agent symptoms may include the following:
• Coughing.
• Choking.
• Tightness in the chest.
• Nausea.
• Headache.
• Tearing of the eyes.
E-53. Following the early symptoms, a symptom-free period of 2 to 24 hours is likely. This will be
followed by these signs of fluid collecting in the lungs:
• Rapid, shallow breathing.
• Painful coughing.
• Blue lips and fingernails.
• In severe cases, clammy skin and rapid heartbeat.
E-54. No self-aid or buddy-aid treatment exists for choking agent symptoms. If only minimum amounts
were inhaled, the Soldier may continue with normal duties. If definite symptoms occur, the Soldier should
keep warm and seek immediate medical attention and rapid evacuation to an aid station.
TYPES OF MARKERS
E-56. U.S. forces use NATO standard markers (illustrated in Figure E-5) to make it easier for allies to
recognize the hazards. These markers are in the standard CBRN marking set. The colors and inscriptions
on a marker indicate the type of hazard. Additional information is written on the front of the sign.
MARKING PROCEDURES
E-57. Markers face away from the contamination. For example, if markers are placed on the edge of a
contaminated area to mark a radiological hot spot, they face away from the point of the highest
contamination reading. Markers are placed along roads and trails and at other likely points of entry. When
time and mission permit, additional markers should be emplaced. The distance between signs varies. In
open terrain, they can be placed 25 to 100 meters apart; in hilly or wooded areas, they should be placed
more frequently. An observer should be able to stand in front of a marker and see the markers to the left
and right of it.
E-58. Units discovering a marked contaminated area do not have to conduct elaborate, time-consuming
surveys. They simply check the extent of contamination and use the information to adjust their plans, if
necessary. If the size of the hazard has changed, they relocate the signs. If the hazard is gone, they remove
the signs. Changes are reported to higher headquarters.
UNMASKING PROCEDURES
E-59. Soldiers should unmask as soon as possible except when a live biological or toxin attack is expected.
Use the following procedures to determine if unmasking is safe.
Note. Time to complete the M256/M256A1 detector kit, including using M8 detector paper for
liquid, takes approximately 20 minutes. Two kits completed simultaneously along with
unmasking procedures with the M256/M256A1 detector kit will take approximately 35 minutes
to complete.
IMMEDIATE DECONTAMINATION
E-68. Immediate decontamination is a basic Soldier survival skill. Any contact between chemical or toxic
agents and bare skin should be treated as an emergency. Some agents can kill if they remain on the skin
for longer than a minute.
OPERATIONAL DECONTAMINATION
E-72. Operational decontamination allows a force to continue fighting and sustain momentum after being
contaminated. It limits the hazard of transferring contamination by removing most of the gross
contamination on equipment and nearly all the contamination on individual Soldiers.
E-73. Operational decontamination speeds the weathering process and allows clean areas (people,
equipment, and terrain) to stay clean. When they complete the decontamination process, Soldiers who
have removed sources of vapor contamination from their clothing and equipment can use hazard-free areas
to unmask temporarily and eat, drink, and rest.
E-74. Operational decontamination is accomplished using assets of the parent unit. It makes use of two
decontamination techniques:
• Vehicle wash down.
• MOPP gear exchange.
E-75. These procedures can be performed separately from each other; both are best performed at crew
level. Uncontaminated vehicles and personnel should not go through either technique.
VEHICLE WASH DOWN
E-76. Vehicle wash down is conducted as far forward as possible and is performed by the battalion
decontamination specialist with assistance from the company or troop decontamination team. It is most
effective if started within one hour after contamination. There are two steps in vehicle wash down:
• Step 1. Button up the vehicle and secure equipment.
• Step 2. Wash down the vehicle and equipment with hot, soapy water for two to three minutes.
E-77. Because speed is important, do not check vehicles for contamination after the vehicle has been
washed down. Remove only gross contamination.
MOPP GEAR EXCHANGE
E-78. There are eight steps in a MOPP gear exchange:
• Step 1. Decontaminate gear and set it aside.
• Step 2. Decontaminate hood and gloves, and roll up hood.
• Step 3. Remove overgarment.
• Step 4. Remove overboots and gloves.
• Step 5. Put on new overgarment.
• Step 6. Put on new overboots and gloves.
• Step 7. Secure hood.
• Step 8. Secure gear.
E-79. MOPP gear exchange is best performed using the buddy system. Both Soldiers perform Step 1.
Steps 2 through 7 are performed first by one Soldier, then by the other. Both Soldiers perform Step 8. The
company or troop assists the platoon by bringing replacement overgarments and decontaminants to the
exchange site.
THOROUGH DECONTAMINATION
E-80. Thorough decontamination operations restore the combat power of maneuver units by removing
nearly all contamination from Soldiers and individual equipment. Executed promptly and correctly, these
detailed procedures reduce the danger of contamination exposure to negligible risk levels. Just as
important, they allow Soldiers to operate equipment safely for extended periods at reduced MOPP levels.
PROCEDURES
E-81. Contaminated units conduct detailed troop decontamination (DTD) for their crewmen under the
supervision of the chemical unit. When detailed equipment decontamination (DED) operations are
required, the chemical unit usually selects a site, sets it up, and performs detailed procedures with
assistance from the contaminated unit.
E-82. After completing thorough decontamination, the unit moves into an adjacent assembly area for
reconstitution. Support elements from the brigade, division, or corps support area replenish combat stocks,
refit equipment, and replace personnel and equipment. The newly reconstituted unit leaves the assembly
area fully operational and fit to return to battle. A small risk from residual contamination remains, so
periodic contamination checks must be made following this operation.
USES OF SMOKE
E-93. Smoke has four general uses on the battlefield, as described in the following discussion.
OBSCURATION
E-95. Smoke can be fired on enemy positions to degrade the vision of gunners and known or suspected
OPs, preventing them from seeing or tracking targets and thereby reducing their effectiveness. Employed
against an attacking force, nonthermal smoke (white phospherous) can cause confusion and disorientation
by degrading the enemy’s command and control capabilities; at the same time, friendly units retain the
ability to engage the enemy using thermal sights and from your sketch card. In addition, enemy vehicles
become silhouetted as they emerge from the smoke. If smoke employment is planned and executed
correctly, this will occur as the enemy reaches the trigger line. (Figure E-6 illustrates this use of smoke.)
Figure E-6. Using smoke to confuse the enemy and silhouette his vehicles
DECEPTION
E-96. Smoke can mislead the enemy regarding friendly intentions. For example, it can be employed on
several avenues of approach at once to deceive the enemy as to the direction of the main attack. In the
defense, smoke may be fired at a remote location for the sole purpose of attracting attention and confusing
the enemy.
SCREENING
E-97. Smoke is used in friendly areas of operation or in areas between friendly and enemy forces to
degrade enemy ground and aerial observation and to defeat or degrade enemy acquisition systems.
Screening smoke helps to conceal the platoon as it displaces from a BP or as it conducts tactical movement
approaching enemy positions. Smoke can also be employed to conceal a platoon as it conducts a bypass,
breach, or assault mission. Figures E-7 through E-9 illustrate uses of screening smoke.
SOURCES OF SMOKE
E-98. There are a number of sources of smoke on the battlefield, including the residual effects of burning
vehicles, equipment, and storage facilities. Depending on availability, the tank platoon can employ the
following smoke delivery systems during tactical operations.
MORTARS
E-99. Mortar support, provided by the CAB mortar platoon or cavalry troop mortar section, is the most
rapid and responsive means of indirect smoke delivery. The tank platoon leader coordinates the planning
and execution of mortar smoke missions with the commander and the company or troop FIST. Mortars use
WP rounds, which can degrade the effectiveness of thermal sights and can also produce casualties to
friendly troops. Refer to FM 3-11.11 (FM 3-11).
FIELD ARTILLERY
E-100. FA can place smoke on distant targets. Artillery-delivered smoke is not as responsive as mortar
smoke support and may not be available if it is not planned and coordinated well in advance. Artillery
smoke is made up of hexachloroethane (HC) and has less effect on thermal sights than does WP smoke.
SMOKE POTS
E-101. These produce a large volume of white or grayish-white smoke that lasts for extended periods.
The smoke has minimal effect on thermal sights. This is the only system that floats on water and that can
be delivered by hand or vehicle. The tank platoon will normally employ smoke pots to screen
displacement or breaching operations.
CAUTION
VEESS will be used only when the vehicle is burning diesel fuel. Use
of VEESS when burning any other type of fuel will cause a fire
hazard.
Note. Even types of smoke that do not affect thermal sights may prevent the tank’s laser range
finder from computing an accurate ballistic solution. Under such conditions, crewmen must rely
on such techniques as range bands, range estimation, and battlesighting.
NAVIGATION
E-108. Navigational aids such as POSNAV, GPS, and thermal sights assist individual vehicles during
movement through smoke, while FBCB2 and other digital systems help the platoon leader to maintain
situational understanding and control of the platoon. The platoon leader also decreases the interval
between vehicles to further enhance control of the platoon.
MANEUVER
Offense
E-109. A defending enemy may employ smoke to confuse and disorient the attacker. Whenever the
platoon is traveling through smoke, whether it is of friendly or enemy origin, the platoon leader must
remember that his tanks will be silhouetted as they emerge from the smoke. The critical consideration is
for all vehicles to emerge at the same time. The navigational tools discussed previously enable the platoon
leader to maintain command and control during movement and to ensure that the platoon is postured, as it
exits the smoke, to mass fires against previously unidentified enemy vehicles.
E-110. During an assault, friendly smoke should be shifted in advance of the arrival of the assault
element. The use of multispectral smoke for obscuration must be carefully planned. The duration of the
effects of the smoke should be controlled based on the capability of enemy and friendly units to acquire
and engage targets through the smoke and on the ability of friendly units to maintain situational
understanding during movement.
Defense
E-111. An attacking enemy may employ smoke on the tank platoon’s positions or in the platoon’s
engagement area. As noted, this may not only “blind” thermal sights but also prevent laser range finders
from accurately computing ballistic data. One solution is to occupy alternate BPs that conform to the
commander’s intent but that are not obscured by smoke (see Figure E-10).
Figure E-10. Tank platoon occupying an alternate battle position that is not obscured by
enemy smoke
E-112. If multispectral smoke does not disable thermal sights, the TC can use sector sketches with grid
lines, range bands, and TRPs to estimate the target range in the absence of a laser-computed range. On the
M1A2, the choke sight of the CITV enables the TC to estimate and input ranges for a ballistic solution.
CID MEASURES
F-1. Combat identification measures must be established early in all operational orders and planning
cycles to ensure subordinates fully understand and have opportunity to implement all established measures
prior to combat operations.
F-2. Combat identification measures must be consistent with ROE and not interfere unduly with unit and
individual rights and responsibilities to engage adversary forces.
F-3. There is no perfect combat identification system, but by analyzing combat identification
requirements from planning to execution, friendly forces can be more effective in combat and reduce the
potential for fratricide and undesired collateral damage. Soldiers make the engage/don’t engage decision at
the point of engagement and must be fully proficient in all aspects of CID. This includes situational
awareness and TI systems and understanding of doctrine, TTPs, and ROE. Figure F-1 depicts the complete
combat identification system. Noncooperative TI does not always work at optimum ranges due to climatic
conditions and equipment status. Noncoperative TI systems require no response, equally support friendly,
enemy, and neutral ID, and include optics. Cooperative TI (CTI) only identifies friendly entities that have
an operational CTI device; it does not identify enemy or neutral entities. Cooperative systems also directly
address fratricide avoidance and expedite force sorting for improved combat effectiveness. Other
limitations pertain to how many entities are equipped with a blue force tracker (BFT) or similar device.
BFT does not automatically report enemy or neutral entities. Accuracy of SA systems and latency is
another limitation.
DEFINITIONS
F-4. Combat identification is “the process of attaining an accurate characterization of detected objects in
the joint battlefield to the extent that high confidence, timely application of military options, and weapons
resources can occur.”
F-5. Target identification is “the accurate and timely characterization of a detected object on the
battlefield as friend, neutral, or enemy. This aspect of combat identification is time sensitive and directly
supports a combatant’s shoot or don’t-shoot decision for detected objects on the battlefield.” TI is shooter-
focused for “shoot/don’t shoot” decisions with friendly identification systems like the joint combat
identification marking system (JCIMS) that requires no response from either platform observed.
F-6. Situational awareness is a “...general knowledge of the dynamic, operational, and tactical situation
and the events occurring on the battlefield...” within their area of operations.
SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS
F-7. Tank and infantry leaders at all levels must be aware of the safety considerations involved in
light/heavy operations. Leader awareness and involvement is particularly important if the infantry unit has
had little training with armored vehicles. All personnel in both the light and heavy units must be aware of
these considerations to prevent unnecessary casualties.
F-8. Tank crewmen are often unable to see dismounted infantry soldiers operating close to their vehicle.
This limitation is worse during limited visibility and when the hatches are closed. In these conditions, the
crew is focused on the enemy or on potential enemy locations rather than any nearby infantrymen. The use
of JCIMS CID marking systems like the dismounted soldier combat identification marking system
(DCIMS) and Phoenix IR lights can help identify and illuminate other friendly vehicles and dismounted
infantrymen at night. Employment of JCIMS will assist TCs/gunners and allow the driver to assist in
positive identification.
F-9. JCIMS is used to reduce the risk of fratricide. JCIMS devices include combat identification panels
(CIP), thermal identification panels (TIP), DCIMS, Phoenix IR lights, and IR tape. JCIMS marking
devices are used in conjunction with forward looking infrared (FLIR) optics and image intensification
devices (such as night-vision goggles [NVG]) to assist in identifying friendly vehicles and soldiers at the
point of engagement. The markings must be installed, turned on, and visible on friendly vehicles and
dismounted soldiers to be effective and operational status in accordance with the unit TACSOP and
specifics contained in the OPORD must be included in precombat inspection procedures.
Appendix G
Risk Management
Risk is the chance of injury or death for individuals and damage to or loss of vehicles
and equipment. Risks, and/or the potential for risks, are always present in every
combat and training situation the tank platoon faces. Risk management must take
place at all levels of the chain of command during each phase of every operation; it is
an integral part of all tactical planning. The tank platoon leader, his NCOs, and all
other platoon soldiers must know how to use risk management, coupled with
fratricide reduction measures, to ensure that the mission is executed in the safest
possible environment within mission constraints.
The primary objective of risk management is to help units protect their combat power
through accident prevention, enabling them to win the battle quickly and decisively,
with minimum losses. This appendix outlines the process that leaders can use to
identify hazards and implement a plan to address each identified hazard. It also
includes a detailed discussion of the responsibilities of the platoon’s leaders and
individual soldiers in implementing a sound risk management program. For
additional information on risk management, refer to FM 3-100.14 (FM 100-14).
• Taking into account both the probability and severity of a hazard, determine the associated risk
level (extremely high, high, moderate, and low). Figure G-1 summarizes the four risk levels.
• Based on the factors of hazard assessment (probability, severity, and risk level, as well as the
operational factors unique to the situation), complete the composite risk management worksheet.
Refer to Table G-1 for an outline of the risk assessment matrix used to determine the level of
risk. Figure G-2A and B show an example of a composite risk management worksheet (pages 1
and 2). Refer to Table G-2 for instructions on completing the worksheet. (Note. DA Form
7566, Composite Risk Management Worksheet, can be found on the AKO website, Self-Help,
DA Pubs and Forms.)
LEVELS OF RISK
EXTREMELY HIGH
• Someone will die or suffer permanent disability.
HIGH
• More often than not, someone will suffer an injury that requires less than 3
months to heal.
MODERATE
• More often than not, someone will require first aid or minor medical treatment.
LOW (WORST CASE)
• Someone is likely to need first aid or minor medical treatment.
Figure G-2A. DA Form 7566, Composite Risk Management Worksheet, page 1 of 2 pages
Figure G-2B. DA Form 7566, Composite Risk Management Worksheet, page 2 of 2 pages
Table G-2. Instructions for completing DA Form 7566, Composite Risk Management
Worksheet
Item Instruction
1 through 4 Self explanatory.
5 Subtask relating to the mission or task in block 1.
6 Hazards — Identify hazards by reviewing METT-TC factors for the mission or task.
Additional factors include historical lessons learned, experience, judgment,
equipment characteristics and warnings, and environmental considerations.
7 Initial Risk Level — Includes historical lessons learned; intuitive analyses,
experience, judgment, equipment characteristics and warnings; and environmental
considerations. Determine initial risk for each hazard by applying the risk
assessment matrix (Table G-1). Enter the risk level for each hazard.
8 Controls — Develop one or more controls for each hazard that will either eliminate
the hazard or reduce the risk (probability and/or severity) of a hazardous incident.
Specify who, what, where, why, when, and how for each control. Enter controls.
9 Residual Risk Level — Determine the residual risk for each hazard by applying the
risk assessment matrix (Table G-1). Enter the residual risk level for each hazard.
10 How to Implement — Decide how each control will be put into effect or
communicated to the personnel who will make it happen (written or verbal
instruction; tactical, safety, garrison SOPs, rehearsals). Enter controls.
11 How to Supervise (Who) — Plan how each control will be monitored for
implementation (continuous supervision, spot-checks) and reassess hazards as the
situation changes. Determine if the controls worked and if they can be improved.
Pass on lessons learned.
12 Was Control Effective — Indicate “Yes” or “No.” Review during AAR.
13 Overall Risk Level — Select the highest residual risk level and circle it. This
becomes the overall mission or task risk level. The commander decides whether
the controls are sufficient to accept the level of residual risk. If the risk is too great
to continue the mission or task, the commander directs development of additional
control or modifies, changes, or rejects the COA.
14 Risk Decision Authority — Signed by the appropriate level of command.
SUPERVISION
G-12. Leadership and unit discipline are the keys to ensuring that effective risk management controls are
implemented. All leaders are responsible for supervising mission rehearsals and execution to ensure
standards and controls are enforced. In particular, NCOs must enforce established safety policies as well
as controls developed for a specific operation or task. Techniques include spot checks, inspections,
SITREPs, confirmation briefs, buddy checks, and close supervision.
G-13. During mission execution, leaders must continuously monitor risk management controls, both to
determine whether they are effective and to modify them as necessary. Leaders must also anticipate,
identify, and assess new hazards. They ensure that imminent danger issues are addressed on the spot and
that ongoing planning and execution reflect changes in hazard conditions.
EVALUATION
G-14. Whenever possible, the risk management process should also include an after-action review (AAR)
to assess unit performance in identifying risks and preventing hazardous situations. Leaders should then
incorporate lessons learned from the process into unit SOPs and plans for future missions.
accident risks. The same risk management process is used to manage both types. The platoon leader alone
determines how and where he is willing to take tactical risks. With the assistance of his PSG, NCOs, and
individual soldiers, the platoon leader manages accident risks.
G-16. Sometimes, despite the need to advise higher headquarters of a risk taken or about to be assumed, the
risk management process may break down. Such a failure can be the result of several factors; most often, it
can be attributed to the following:
• The risk denial syndrome in which leaders do not want to know about the risk.
• A soldier who believes that the risk decision is part of his job and does not want to bother his
platoon leader or section leader.
• Outright failure to recognize a hazard or the level of risk involved.
• Overconfidence on the part of an individual or the unit in the capability to avoid or recover from
a hazardous incident.
• Subordinates not fully understanding the higher commander’s guidance regarding risk decisions.
G-17. The tank platoon leader gives the platoon direction, sets priorities, and establishes the command
climate (values, attitudes, and beliefs). Successful preservation of combat power requires him to embed
risk management into individual behavior. To fulfill this commitment, the platoon leader must exercise
creative leadership, innovative planning, and careful management. Most important, he must demonstrate
support for the risk management process. The tank platoon leader and others in the platoon chain of
command can establish a command climate favorable to risk management integration by taking the
following actions:
• Demonstrate consistent and sustained risk management behavior through leading by example
and by stressing active participation throughout the risk management process.
• Provide adequate resources for risk management. Every leader is responsible for obtaining the
assets necessary to mitigate risk and for providing them to subordinate leaders.
• Understand their own and their soldier’s limitations, as well as their unit’s capabilities.
• Allow subordinates to make mistakes and learn from them.
• Prevent a “zero defects” mindset from creeping into the platoon’s culture.
• Demonstrate full confidence in subordinates’ mastery of their trade and their ability to execute a
chosen COA.
• Keep subordinates informed.
• Listen to subordinates.
G-18. For the platoon leader, his subordinate leaders, and individual soldiers alike, responsibilities in
managing risk include the following:
• Make informed risk decisions; establish and then clearly communicate risk decision criteria and
guidance.
• Establish clear, feasible risk management policies and goals.
• Train the risk management process. Ensure that subordinates understand the “who,” “what,”
“when,” “where,” and “why” of managing risk and how these factors apply to their situation and
assigned responsibilities.
• Accurately evaluate the platoon’s effectiveness, as well as subordinates’ execution of risk
controls during the mission.
• Inform higher headquarters when risk levels exceed established limits.
This appendix focuses on actions the tank platoon leader and his subordinate leaders
can take with current resources to reduce the risk of fratricide.
Special Note. Prior to all missions, commanders must ensure that their units conduct
detailed planning and rehearsals emphasizing fratricide prevention.
WEAPONS ERRORS
H-12. Lapses in individual discipline can result in fratricide. These incidents include charge errors,
accidental discharges, mistakes with explosives and hand grenades, and use of incorrect gun data.
BATTLEFIELD HAZARDS
H-13. A variety of explosive devices and materiel may create danger on the battlefield: unexploded
ordnance; unmarked or unrecorded minefields, including scatterable mines; booby traps. Failure to mark,
record, remove, or otherwise anticipate these threats will lead to casualties.
Special Note. In many situations, the primary cause of fratricide is the lack of positive target
identification. To prevent fratricide incidents, commanders and leaders at all levels must ensure
positive target identification before they issue commands to fire. In addition, all units must
accurately report their locations during combat operations, and all TOCs and CPs must carefully
track the location of all subordinate elements in relation to all friendly forces.
H-14. The measures outlined in this section, including those listed in the special note above, provide the
platoon with a guide to actions it can take to reduce and/or prevent fratricide risk. These guidelines are not
directive in nature, nor are they intended to restrict initiative by the tank platoon’s leaders and crewmen.
Rather, commanders and leaders must learn to apply them as appropriate based on the specific situation
and METT-TC factors.
LEADER RESPONSIBILITIES
H-26. In all situations involving the risk of fratricide and friendly fire, leaders must be prepared to take
immediate actions to prevent casualties as well as equipment damage or destruction. Recommended
actions in fratricide situations include the following:
• Identify the incident and order the parties involved to cease fire.
• Conduct an in-stride risk assessment.
• Identify and implement controls to prevent the incident from recurring.
Appendix I
Battle Damaged Tank
If the tank sustains a hit making it impossible to move and remaining in the tank will
jeopardize the safety of the crew, the TC should consider abandoning the tank. The
procedures in Table I-1 are used to abandon and disable a crippled tank.
Note. The crew cannot totally destroy all parts of a tank; therefore, the chain of command must
make every effort to recover the disabled tank. The following procedures are just a guideline to
ensure all sensitive items are properly accounted for and or destroyed. Crews may deviate from
these procedures if the tactical situation allows. For example, the crew may want to keep the
loader’s machine gun and ammunition. METT-TC will dictate the actions of the crew in the
event of abandon tank. Also the wingman or platoon should assist in security of the crew as
they perform these tasks.
WARNING
Crews should take additional safety measures because of the use of depleted uranium (DU)
if they are―
• In, on, or near (within 50 meters) a vehicle at the time of impact by DU ammunitions
or a DU armored vehicle at the time of impact by munitions.
• Near (within 50 meters) actively burning fires involving DU.
• Routinely entering vehicles with penetrated DU armor or that have been struck by DU
munitions.
Good safety procedures to take in the event of the occurrences listed above are:
• Wear a protective mask as long as it does not degrade your ability to fight or protect
yourself.
• Cover exposed skin; an increase in MOPP is not required.
• Dust off your uniform after you leave the vehicle or area. Observe standard field
hygiene, including washing your hands before eating.
Crews should follow the three basic principles of hazard avoidance, which are:
• Minimize the time near the radioactive source.
• Maximize the distance between crew members and the radioactive source.
• Improve the shielding (use cardboard, tape, and so forth).
tank and destroyed. Pour fuel, engine oil, and other combustible liquid over the TA-50 inside the turret
and ignite it by lighting it or using hand grenades. The crew must download all main gun ammunition to
another vehicle if the situation permits; otherwise, the ammunition must be destroyed.
I-3. If enemy contact or capture is imminent, the TC will destroy the ANCD.
Note. For training purposes, use practice grenades and simulate rupturing heater fuel lines.
Glossary
A alternate (position)
A/L administrative/logistical
ammo ammunition
BP battle position
CA civil affairs
cdr commander
CFF call-for-fire
cm centimeter(s)
CO commanding officer
CP command post
CS combat support
DU depleted uranium
EA engagement area
FA field artillery
FM field manual
FO forward observer
GS general support
HB heavy barrel
HC hexachloroethane
HE high explosive
JP joint publication
km kilometer(s)
KY Kentucky
lbs pound(s)
LD line of departure
LP listening post
MP Military Police
MPAT multipurpose antitank (ammunition)
NG National Guard
OAKOC observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and
cover and concealment
obj objective
OP observation post
OR obstacle-reducing (MPAT-OR)
OT observer-target
P primary (position)
Pam pamphlet
PH probability of hit
PK probability of kill
S supplementary (position)
SM Soldier’s manual
ST special text
SU situational understanding
TB technical bulletin
TC tank commander
TI tactical Internet
UN United Nations
UO urban operations
These sources were quoted or paraphrased in this publication, are needed in conjunction with this manual,
and/or contain relevant supplemental information. For the latest dates and versions of these references, refer to
DA Pam 25-30 or the Reimer Digital Library (RDL).
SOURCES USED
These are the sources quoted or paraphrased in this publication.
FM 3-90.1 (FM 71-1), Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team, 9 December 2002
FM 5-0 (FM 101-5), Army Planning and Orders Production, 20 January 2005
FM 6-22 (FM 22-100), Army Leadership: Competent, Confident, and Agile, 12 October 2006
FM 6-30, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Observed Fire, 16 July 1991
FM 7-7, The Mechanized Infantry Platoon and Squad (APC), 15 March 1985
DOCUMENTS NEEDED
These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication.
DA Form 1156, Casualty Feeder Card.
DA Form 2028, Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.
DA Form 2404, Equipment Inspection Maintenance Worksheet.
DA Form 7566, Composite Risk Management Worksheet.
DD Form 2745, Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Capture Tag.
READINGS RECOMMENDED
These sources contain relevant supplemental information. The source listed in parenthesis is the superceded
manual under the old numbering system.
Index
A 6-14
12
Abrams tank
collective tactical tasks (see
time management, 2-12
capabilities, 1-6
platoon tactical tasks), 3-36
counterattack, 4-28
limitations, 1-7
actions on contact
communications, 2-26
measures, F-1
driver, 1-8
offense, 3-18
combat service support (see
platoon sergeant, 1-7
6-11
combat support (see combined
tank commander, 1-7
organization, 1-5
combined arms operations, 6-1
cultural awareness, 2-15
11
D
B Army aviation, 6-9
defensive operations, 4-1
25
infantry/armor
coordination for fires, 4-21
react to chemical/biological
command, 2-1
execution, 4-24
32
leadership, 2-11
fundamentals of, 4-1
3-35
(see also troop-leading
8
procedures), 2-2
planning, 4-3
command, 2-1
control, 2-12
avoidance, E-1
2-45
communications, 2-24
priorities of work, 4-17
company/troop command
decontamination, E-14
deliberate occupation of BP, 4
net, 2-26
marking contaminated
11
digital, 2-25
areas, E-12
platoon fire plan, 4-13
movement in CBRN
priorities of work, 4-17
environment, E-16
procedures for, 4-12
protection, E-3
detainees
visual, 2-25
casualties, E-8
unmasking procedures, E
consolidation and
digital communications, 2-25
13
reorganization, 3-46
digitization, A-1
11
fire distribution and control
A-5
Index
displacement, 4-26
14, 4-20, 4-28, 5-8, 5-13, 5
infantry/armor operations),
methods, 4-26
20, 5-30, 5-31, 8-6, 8-8, 8
C-1
digitization, A-9
combat identification
47
measures, F-1
additional considerations for
FBCB2, A-1
safety considerations, F-2
extreme conditions, 4-20
operational considerations,
situational awareness, F-2
equipment for use during, 3
A-3
stopping friendly fire
47
2-39
vehicle ID techniques
control, 2-40
graphic control measures, 2-17
loader responsibilities, 1-8
control, 2-40
assembly area, 2-18
weapon or ammunition
boundries, 2-17
levels of, 7-11
39
contact point, 2-19
digital overlays, 2-16
28
objective, 2-20
use of, 2-15
control, 2-38
passage lane, 2-19
distribution, 2-29
measures, navigation, 2-15
route, 2-18
graphic control measures,
4-19
2-17
in defense, 2-41
support-by-fire position, 2
21
navigation, 2-22
fire patterns
evacuation operations, 7-13
cross, 2-30
gunner responsibilities, 1-8
depth, 2-31
KIA actions, 7-15
effective distribution of
maintenance operations,
frontal, 2-30
digitization, A-8
civilian considerations, 2-5
enemy, 2-3
4
time available, 2-5
FA, 6-2
troops, 2-5
4-9
FIST, 6-3
overwatch, 3-16
mortar, 6-1
MOPP levels, E-3
planning, 6-8
navigation, 2-22
formations
infantry organizations, C-2
11
operational considerations,
systems, 2-23
sample, B-8
transporting infantry, C-10
O characteristics of successful
using maps and overlays, 2
observation posts, D-3
combat leader, 2-12
16
offensive operations
6-1
when gaining an infantry
characteristics, 3-1
communications, 2-24
section or losing a tank
execution (actions on
communications guidance,
section, 1-4
contact), 3-18
2-26
WIA evacuation, 7-14
execution (consolidation
conducting backbrief, 4-15
tasks), 3-36
coordinating sustainment
execution (tactical
distribution and control in
movement), 3-7
digitization, A-8
2-41
C-4
defensive preparation of
maintenance operations, 7
fundamentals, 3-1
BP, 4-8
digitization, A-8
operating with light and
offense, 3-2
executing the defense
functions, 3-3
precombat inspections, 2-10
execution of defensive
reporting, 2-27
sample, B-3
graphics, maps, overlays, 4
breaching operations, 3-45
16
bypass, 3-42
operational environment
destroy an inferior force, 3
C-4
36
orders, B-1
10
3-39
reports, B-8
offensive fire planning, 3-7
reconnaissance by fire, 3-44
organizations
(technique of movement),
phases, 4-8
mechanized infantry
overwatch, 3-16
prisoners of war (see
forces, 1-3
detainees), 7-16
P planning offensive
operations, 3-3
R
personnel operations, 7-13
planning
REDCON levels, 2-13
2-10
2-45
digital traffic, 2-27
development, 4-16
troop-leading procedures
SALUTE format, 2-27
sample, 4-17
(see also troop-leading
rules of engagement, 9-7
understanding operational
S
1-7
actions on contact, 3-18
environment, 2-15
sector sketch card, 4-13
characteristics of effective
use of terrain (see also
verification of, 4-14
defense, 4-1
navigation), 2-22
situational understanding, 2-12
Index
control measures,
wingman concept, 1-2
navigation, 2-15
war-fighting functions
operational environment, 2
section concept), 1-3
15
considerations, 4-3
8
urban operations, 8-6
principles of employing
other tactical operations, 5
war-fighting functions
forces, 1-3
passage of lines, 5-19
war-fighting functions
dismounted infantry
planning and occupying
squad or mechanized
assembly area, 5-5
war-fighting functions
sustainment, 7-1
target identification, F-2
maintenance operations, 7
target reference points
9
use of for directing and
evacuation, 7-13
28
troop-leading procedures
T abbreviated procedures, 2
tactical movement
METT-TC factors to analyze
formations, 3-11
precombat inspections, 2-10
overwatch, 3-16
rehearsals, 2-8
tank commander
command and control, 8-6
responsibilities, 1-7
defensive operations, 8-17
digitization, A-8
fire support, 8-12
maintenance operations, 7
intelligence, 8-10
11
maneuver, 8-7
reporting, 2-27
offensive operations, 8-13
vehicles, weapons,
tank company
munitions, 8-3
organization, 1-5
tank platoon
PETER J. SCHOOMAKER
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
JOYCE E. MORROW
Administrative Assistant to the
0703202
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve: To be distributed in accordance with the
initial distribution number (IDN) 111029, requirements for FM 3-20.15.
PIN: 079435-000