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Evidence 2018 - Lecture 2 - Eduardo T Reyes III Law PDF
Evidence 2018 - Lecture 2 - Eduardo T Reyes III Law PDF
Evidence 2018 - Lecture 2 - Eduardo T Reyes III Law PDF
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Subject
1. Object Evidence
2. Documentary Evidence
3. Best Evidence Rule
4. Parol Evidence Rule
5. Authentication and Proof of Documents
J.K. Rowling, the author of the phenomenal “Harry Potter” book series was sued
for copyright infringement. The judge had to read the entire book series and after
doing so, arrived at the conclusion that the “feel and context” of Rowling’s book
particularly its plot and theme are so far removed from the complainant’s book thus
warranting the dismissal of the case. “The contrast between the total concept and
feel of the works is so stark that any comparison of the two strains credulity” –
District Court Judge Shira Sheindlin
A.3. Requisites for Admissibility of object (real) evidence. “An object may be
exhibited, examined or viewed by the court when (1) it is relevant to the fact in
issue, and (2) the present condition of the object be the same at the time in issue”.
A.3.1. “As a general rule, it seems essential that articles shown to the court should
be connected, at least prima facie, with the crime in issue. An article of personal
property, the relevancy of which has been shown by its identification with the
subject matter of the crime, may be exhibited in the courtroom, whether as direct
evidence of a relevant fact, or to enable them to understand the evidence or to
realize more completely its cogency and force, or to assist the court in solving a
material, controverted or doubtful point. Admission of visual, exhibitive or
demonstrative evidence is much within the discretion of the court, and the extent
of identification of such articles necessary before admission varies with
circumstances. The court may inspect and smell the contents of a bottle properly
identified and admitted in evidence. Comparison of materials may also be made
by the court, aided by the evidence of expert witnesses. So, in case the quality of
an article, or its adaptability to a specific use or purpose, is in issue, a sample may
Generally, where the sole purpose is to arouse prejudice, pity or other passion,
and no legitimate aim is served, it is error to admit articles thus offered. Lack of
some sort of identification or connection with the crime, a plea of guilty, failure to
shed light on an issue, or failure to show condition unchanged, are other grounds
for barring articles from admission as evidence”[3].
Exception- “But when justice and the discovery of the truth, are at stake, the
ordinary canons of modesty and delicacy of feeling cannot be allowed to impose a
prohibition upon necessary measures. If such matters were not unshrinkingly
discussed and probed, many kinds of crimes would remain unpunished.
Nevertheless, needless spectators having no responsibility for the course of
justice, may well be avoided. Where it is a question of what would otherwise be an
indecency, two limitations seems appropriate: (a) there should be a fair necessity
for inspection, the trial court to determine; (b) the inspection should take place
apart from the public courtroom, in the sole presence of the tribunal and the
parties[5]”.
The chain of custody rule is but a variation of the principle that real evidence must
be authenticated prior to its admission into evidence. To establish a chain of
custody sufficient to make evidence admissible, the proponent needs only to
prove a rational basis from which to conclude that the evidence is what the party
claims it to be. In other words, in a criminal case, the prosecution must offer
sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact could reasonably believe that an
item still is what the government claims it to be. Specifically in the prosecution of
illegal drugs, the well established federal evidentiary rule in the United States is
that when the evidence is not readily identifiable and is susceptible to alteration by
tampering or contamination, courts require a more stringent foundation entailing a
chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness to render it improbable
that the original item has either been exchanged with another or been
contaminated or tampered with.
This was adopted in Mallillin v. People, where this Court also discussed how,
ideally, the chain of custody of seized items should be established:
“This right, as put by Mr. Justice Holmes in Holt v. United States, 218 US 245, …is
a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications
from him…” It is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the
accused’s own lips, against his will, admission of his guilt. It does not apply to the
instant case where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an
incriminating statement but an object evidence. Wigmore, in 4 Wigmore, 2263,
A.3.4. Demonstrative Evidence. This is now deemed included within the ambit of
“object” evidence. Maps, diagram, a photograph and a model, fall under this
category.
A.3.4.1. Photographs. – “The courts take judicial notice that all civilized
communities rely on photographic pictures for presenting resemblances of
persons and animals, scenery, natural objects, buildings, and other artificial
objects. It is accordingly well established that photographs of persons, things, and
places, when duly verified and shown by extrinsic evidence to be faithful
representations of the subjects as of the time in question, are, in the discretion
of the trial court, admissible in evidence as aids to it in arriving at an
understanding of the evidence or the condition of objects or premises, the
circumstances of an accident, or the condition or the identity of a person when any
such matter is relevant to the issues being litigated”[8].
A.3.4.2. Maps. “The draftsman of the map must testify as to its accuracy, but any
other witnesses may refer to it while testifying, to illustrate his testimony. It is not
material by whom the map or diagram was prepared providing that he can testify
In Agustin v. CA[10], it was ruled that A person’s DNA is the same in each
cell and it does not change throughout a person’s lifetime; the DNA in a person’s
blood is the same as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft
of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue and vaginal or rectal cells. Most
importantly, because of polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no two
individuals have the same DNA, with the notable exception of identical twins”.
Guidelines
DNA Profile.
The chain of custody of evidence was not established Appellant impugns the
prosecution’s failure to establish the charges of illegal sale and possession of
shabu against her due to the gaps in the chain of custody and the assailable
integrity of the evidence in view of non-compliance with Section 21, Article II ofRA
9165. There is merit in this protestation. The offense of illegal sale of shabu has the
following elements: “(1) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object and
consideration of the sale; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor.” 18 On the other hand, the offense of illegal possession of shabu has the
following elements: “(l) the accused is in possession of an item or an object which
is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law;
and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed said drug.” 19 In the
prosecution for illegal sale and possession of shabu, there must be proof that
these offenses were actually committed, coupled with the presentation in court of
evidence of corpus delicti 16 People v. Gatong-o, 250 Phil. 710, 711 (1988). 17
People v. Sta. Maria, 545 Phil. 520, 528-529 (2007). 18 People v. Lorenzo, 633 Phil.
393, 402 (2010). 19 Id. at 403. 20 Id. Decision 8 G.R. No. 206590 In both illegal
sale and illegal possession of [ shabu,] conviction cannot be sustained if there is a
persistent doubt on the identity of said drug. The identity of the [shabu] must be
established with moral certainty. Apart from showing that the elements of
possession or sale are present, the fact that the [shabu] illegally possessed and
sold x xx is the same [shabu] offered in court as exhibit must likewise be
established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty
verdict.21 “The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it
ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are
first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the
accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug
seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover
by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug
seized from the forensic chemist to the court.25 Marking is the placing by the
arresting officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the items
after they have been seized. It is the starting point in the custodial link. It is vital
that the seized items be marked immediately since the succeeding handlers
thereof will use the markings as reference. 26 The chain of custody rule also
requires that the marking of the seized contraband be done “(l) in the presence of
the apprehended violator, and (2) immediately upon confiscation.”27 In this case,
the records do not show that the arresting officers marked the seized items with
their initials in the presence of appellant and immediately upon confiscation. While
P02 Isip testified that the seized sachets of shabu were marked in the police
station,28 no evidence was presented to show that the marking was accomplished
in the presence of appellant. Moreover, the author of the markings on said items
was never identified. None of the police officers admitted placing the markings.
There was therefore a complete absence of evidence to prove authorship of the
markings. While marking of the evidence is allowed in the nearest police station,
this contemplates a case of warrantless searches and seizures.29 Here, the police
officers secured a search warrant prior to their operation. They therefore had
sufficient time and opportunity to prepare for its implementation. However, the
second link in the chain of custody. In this regard, the Court takes note that the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses failed to identify the person to whom the
seized items were turned over at the police station. While SP03 Salamida was
identified as the property custodian of the police station, this does not necessarily
mean that he is also the investigating officer. There is nothing in the records to
substantiate this presumption. This total want of evidence gains importance
considering that none of the arresting officers presented as witnesses identified
the shabu presented during trial as the same shabu seized from appellant. Thus,
the second link in the chain of custody is missing.
The transfer of the seized shabu from the investigating officer to the forensic
chemist in the crime laboratocy is the third link in the chain of custody. While the
seized shabu was turned over by PI Barber to the PDEA, he no longer had any
personal knowledge of the manner it was handled therein. He also did not identify
the police officer in whose custody the seized sachets of shabu were placed at the
PDEA. He left it to the responsibility of the PDEA to forward the seized shabu to the
crime laboratory. The request for laboratory examination of the PDEA identifies the
ü The Rule on Authentication and Proof of Documents- Sec. 19-33, Rule 132
1. The Best Evidence Rule; Applicability. “Stated in simple form, the best
evidence rule is that rule which requires the highest grade or evidence
obtainable to prove a disputed fact.”
C.1. Primary Evidence. The highest or best evidence which, from the abstract
nature of the facts to be proved, is procurable, and which, under circumstances of
the particular case, affords the greatest certainty of the fact, that is, renders the
probability of its existence most evident to the understanding. It is that evidence
which does not indicate the existence of other evidence nearer the facts to be
proved.[12]
“The best evidence rule as encapsulated in Rule 130, Section 3, of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure applies only when the content of such document is the
subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether such document was
actually executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its
execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is
admissible. Any other substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible without need
to account for the original. Moreover, production of the original may be
dispensed with, in the trial courts discretion, whenever the opponent does
not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful
purpose will be served by requiring production.
Accordingly, we find that the best evidence rule is not applicable to the instant
case. Here, there was no dispute as to the terms of either deed; hence, the RTC
correctly admitted in evidence mere copies of the two deeds. The petitioner never
even denied their due execution and admitted that she signed the Deed of
Partition. As for the Deed of Sale, petitioner had, in effect, admitted its
genuineness and due execution when she failed to specifically deny it in the
manner required by the rules. The petitioner merely claimed that said documents
do not express the true agreement and intention of the parties since they were only
– Both cases were for prosecution of Bouncing checks law where only
photocopies of checks were offered in evidence
C.3. Best evidence rule not applicable when document is merely collateral to
issue.“When a document is involved in the inquiry but the document is only
collaterally in issue, the best evidence rule does not apply. A document is
collaterally in issue when the purpose of introducing the document is not to
establish its terms, but to show facts that have no reference to its contents like its
existence, condition, execution or delivery[16].
“The best evidence rule is the rule which requires the highest grade of
evidence obtainable to prove a disputed fact. Although there are certain
recognized exceptions when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document
itself.
(a) The original of the document is one the contents of which are the subject
of inquiry.
(b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same
time, with identical contents, all such copies are equally regarded as
originals.
“The burden of proof rests upon petitioner, as plaintiff, to establish its case based
on a preponderance of evidence. It is well-settled that in civil cases, the party that
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. Petitioner failed to prove that
respondent had an obligation in the principal amount of P24,388.36, because the
photocopies of the original sales invoices it had presented in court were
inadmissible in evidence. Moreover, had they been admissible, they would still
have had little probative value.
SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable. When the original document has
been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of
its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on
his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some
authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
Applying the above Rule to the present case, before a party is allowed to adduce
secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original sales invoices, the offeror
must prove the following: (1) the existence or due execution of the original; (2)
the loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its nonproduction in
court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the
unavailability of the original can be attributed. The correct order of proof is as
follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents. At the sound discretion of
the court, this order may be changed if necessary.
In the present case, the existence of the original sales invoices was established by
the photocopies and the testimony of Hernandez. Petitioner, however, failed to
prove that the originals had been lost or could not be produced in court after
reasonable diligence and good faith in searching for them.
Finally, when more than one original copy exists, it must appear that all of them
have been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court before secondary
evidence can be given of any one. A photocopy may not be used without
accounting for the other originals.
In Santos v. Santos
(http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/oct2000/139524.htm) the Court
upheld the pronouncement of the CA that before the appellees therein could be
allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original, they
had to prove — with the requisite quantum of evidence — the loss, the destruction
or the unavailability of all original copies of the document.
In the present case, triplicates were produced, although the cardholder signed the
sales invoice only once. During the trial, Hernandez explained that an original
copy had gone to respondent, another to the merchant, and still another to
petitioner.
“Rule 130, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Evidence embodies the parol
evidence rule and states:
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms
of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties thereto;
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors-
in-interest after the execution of the written agreement.
The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to, or contradiction of, the terms
of a written agreement by testimony or other evidence purporting to show
that different terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying the
purport of the written contract.[9]
(http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/october2008/164326.htm#_ftn10)
This principle notwithstanding, petitioner would have the Court rule that this
case falls within the exceptions, particularly that the written agreement failed
to express the true intent and agreement of the parties. This argument is
untenable.
Oral testimony on the alleged conditions, coming from a party who has an
interest in the outcome of the case, depending exclusively on human
memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence.[17]
(http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/october2008/164326.htm#_ftn18)
Hence, petitioners contention that the document falls within the exception to the
parol evidence rule is untenable. The exception obtains only where the written
contract is so ambiguous or obscure in terms that the contractual intention of the
parties cannot be understood from a mere reading of the instrument. In such a
case, extrinsic evidence of the subject matter of the contract, of the relations of the
parties to each other, and of the facts and circumstances surrounding them when
they entered into the contract may be received to enable the court to make a
proper interpretation of the instrument.
Even assuming there is a shred of truth to petitioners contention, the same cannot
be made a basis for holding respondents liable therefor.
The Lease Purchase Agreement clearly shows that the parties thereto are two
corporations not parties to this case: Focus Point and Uniline. Under this Lease
Purchase Agreement, it is Uniline, as lessee/purchaser, and not Rodriguez, that
incurred the debt to Focus Point. The obligation of Uniline to Focus Point arose out
of a transaction completely different from the subject of the instant case.
It is settled that a corporation has a personality separate and distinct from its
individual stockholders or members, and is not affected by the personal rights,
obligations and transactions of the latter. The corporation may not be held liable for
the obligations of the persons composing it, and neither can its stockholders be
held liable for its obligation.
Of course, this Court has recognized instances when the corporations separate
personality may be disregarded. However, we have also held that the same may
only be done in cases where the corporate vehicle is being used to defeat public
convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime.[23]
To reiterate, the transaction under the Vehicle Sales Invoice is separate and
distinct from that under the Lease Purchase Agreement. In the former, it is Seaoil
that owes Autocorp, while in the latter, Uniline incurred obligations to Focus. There
was never any allegation, much less any evidence, that Autocorp was merely an
alter ego of Uniline, or that the two corporations separate personalities were being
used as a means to perpetrate fraud or wrongdoing.
The burden of proving bad faith or wrongdoing on the part of Rodriguez was, on
petitioner, a burden which it failed to discharge. Thus, it was proper for the trial
court to have dismissed the third-party complaint against Rodriguez on the ground
Petitioners claim against Rodriguez was fully ventilated in the proceedings before
the trial court, tried and decided on its merits. The trial courts ruling operates
as res judicata against another suit involving the same parties and same cause of
action. This is rightly so because the trial court found that Rodriguez was not a
party to the sale of the excavator. On the other hand, petitioner Seaoils liability has
been successfully established by respondent.
A last point. We reject Seaoils claim that the ownership of the subject excavator,
having been legally and completely transferred to Focus Point International, Inc.,
cannot be subject of replevin and plaintiff [herein respondent Autocorp] is not
[30]
Considering, first, that Focus Point was not a party to the sale of the excavator
and, second, that Seaoil indeed failed to pay for the excavator in full, the same still
rightfully belongs to Autocorp. Additionally, as the trial court found, Seaoil had
already assigned the same to its contractor for the construction of its depot in
Batangas. Hence, Seaoil has already enjoyed the benefit of the transaction even
as it has not complied with its obligation. It cannot be permitted to unjustly enrich
itself at the expense of another.
“The appellate court is correct in declaring that under the parole evidence rule,
when the parties have reduced their agreement into writing, they are deemed to
have intended such written agreement to be the sole repository and memorial of
everything that they have agreed upon. All their prior and contemporaneous
agreements are deemed to be merged in the written document so that, as
between them and their successors-in-interest, such writing
becomes exclusive evidence of the terms thereof and any verbal agreement
which tends to vary, alter or modify the same is not admissible.
Here, the terms of the subject promissory note and the deed of chattel mortgage
are clear and explicit and devoid of any conditionality upon which its validity
depends. To be sure, Allied Bank was not a party to SEC Case No. 2042 where the
management committee was ordered created; hence, it would not be correct to
presume that it had notice of the existence of the management committee which,
incidentally, was still to be created when the subject promissory note was
executed on 12 August 1981. Notably, while the parties in SEC Case No. 2042
agreed to form the management committee on 27 July 1981, it was only on 14
August 1981 when the committee was actually created and its members
We thus declare and so hold that Allied Banks foreclosure of the chattel mortgage
constituted over the vessel Jean III was justified. On this score, we also rule that
the loss of the mortgaged chattel brought about by its sinking must be borne not
by Allied Bank but by the spouses Cheng. As owners of the fishing vessel, it was
incumbent upon the spouses to insure it against loss. Thus, when the vessel sank
before the chattel mortgage could be foreclosed, uninsured as it is, its loss must
be borne by the spouses Cheng”[20].
E.1. Applicability of Parol Evidence Rule Does not Require A Particular form
“In determining arbitral awards then, aside from the MOA, courts considered other
factors and documents including, as in this case, the financial documents[6]
(http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/june2011/190515.htm#_ftn6) submitted
by respondent as well as its previous bargaining history and financial outlook and
improvements as stated in its own website.[7]
(http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/june2011/190515.htm#_ftn7)
The appellate courts ruling that giving credence to the Pahayag and the minutes of
the meeting which were not verified and notarized would violate the rule on parol
evidence is erroneous. The parol evidence rule, like other rules on evidence,
[R]eliance on the parol evidence rule is misplaced. In labor cases pending before
the Commission or the Labor Arbiter, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of
law or equity are not controlling. Rules of procedure and evidence are not applied
in a very rigid and technical sense in labor cases. Hence, the Labor Arbiter is not
precluded from accepting and evaluating evidence other than, and even contrary
to, what is stated in the CBA. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)”[22]
Statute of Frauds
1. Waiver; Estoppel
1.4. Basically, in Nool v. CA,[24] the doctrine was laid down that a right of
repurchase must be part and parcel of a contract of sale and cannot be
embodied in a separate contract.
-“under the wise, just and equitable presumption in Article 1602, a document
which appears on its face to be a sale- absolute or with pacto de retro- may be
proven by the vendor or vendor-a –retro to be one of a loan with mortgage. In this
case, parol evidence becomes competent and admissible to prove that the
instrument was in truth and in fact given merely as a security for the payment of a
loan. And upon proof of the truth of such allegations, the court will enforce the
agreement or understanding in consonance with the true intent of the parties at the
time of the execution of the contract”[25].
[3] See Francisco on Evidence, pp. 105-106, Volume VII Part I, 1997 Edition citing
Underhill’s Evidence, 5th Ed., Vol. I, pp. 196-197
[9] Underhill’s Criminal Evidence, 5th Ed., Vol. I, pp. 228, 229, 230-231, cited on p.
119, Francisco, Ibid.
[13] Concepcion Chua Gaw v. Sps. Chua, G.R. No. 160855, April 16, 2008
[17] Bank of the Philippine Islands v. SMP, Inc., G.R. No. 175466, December 23,
2009
[18] Citibank v. Efren Teodoro, [G.R. No. 150905. September 23, 2003]
[19] Seaoil Petroleum Corporation v. Autocorp Group and Paul L. Rodriguez, G.R.
No. 164326, October 17, 2008
[20] Allied Banking Corporation v. Cheng Yong and Lilia Gaw, G.R. Nos. 151040 &
154109, October 6, 2005
[21] Baldomero Inciong, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96405, June 26, 1996
[23] Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals, 263 SCRA
736 (1996)
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority,
official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a
foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledge before a notary public except last wills and
testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to
the entered therein.
Section 20. Proof of private document. — Before any private document offered as
authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be
proved either:
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to
be. (21a)
COMMENT:
Section 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to
in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer
having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the
record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the
Section 19 (a), Rule 132 of the Rules of Court should be read in tandem with
Section 24, Rule 132, thus:
Sec. 19 (a)
X x x”
In the 23 January 2017 case of Republic v. Carmen Santo Rio, (G.R. No.
215009), it was held that:
Section 26. Irremovability of public record. — Any public record, an official copy
of which is admissible in evidence, must not be removed from the office in which it
is kept, except upon order of a court where the inspection of the record is essential
to the just determination of a pending case. (27a)
Section 29. How judicial record impeached. — Any judicial record may be
impeached by evidence of: (a) want of jurisdiction in the court or judicial officer, (b)
collusion between the parties, or (c) fraud in the party offering the record, in
respect to the proceedings. (30a)
Section 32. Seal. — There shall be no difference between sealed and unsealed
private documents insofar as their admissibility as evidence is concerned. (33a)