US VS.

PINEDA

FACTS: Defendant Pineda is a registered pharmacist of long standing and the owner of
a drug store in the city of Manila. One Feliciano Santos, having some sick horses,
presented a copy of a prescription obtained from Dr. Richardson, and which on other
occasions Santos had given to his horses with good results, at Pineda's drug store for
filling. The medicine prescribed was potassium chlorate. Santos, under the belief that he
had purchased the potassium chlorate which he had asked for, put two of the packages
in water the doses to two of his sick horses. Another package was mixed with water for
another horse, but was not used. The two horses, to which had been given the
preparation, died shortly afterwards. Santos, thereupon, took the three remaining
packages to the Bureau of Science for examination. Drs. Peña and Darjuan, of the Bureau
of Science, on analysis found that the packages contained not potassium chlorate but
barium chlorate. At the instance of Santos, the two chemists also went to the drug store
of the defendant and bought potassium chlorate, which when analyzed was found to be
barium chlorate. Dr. Buencamino, a veterinarian, performed an autopsy on the horses,
and found that death was the result of poisoning.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of the chemist Pena and Darjuan as to their
purchase of potassium chlorate at the drugstore of the accused is admissible as evidence.

RULING: As a general rule, the evidence of other offenses committed by a defendant is

inadmissible. But appellant has confused this maxim and this rule with certain exceptions
thereto. The effort is not to convict the accused of a second offense. Nor is there an
attempt to draw the mind away from the point at issue and thus to prejudice defendant's
case. The purpose is to ascertain defendant's knowledge and intent, and to fix his
negligence. If the defendant has on more than one occasion performed similar acts,
accident in good faith is possibly excluded, negligence is intensified, and fraudulent intent
may even be established. It has been said that there is no better evidence of negligence
than the frequency of accidents. The United States Supreme Court has held that:

On the trial of a criminal case the question relates to the tendency of certain
testimony to throw light upon a particular fact, or to explain the conduct of a
particular person, there is a certain discretion on the part of the trial judge which a
court of errors will not interfere with, unless it manifestly appear that the testimony
has no legitimate bearing upon the question at issue, and is calculated to prejudice
the accused.

Whenever the necessity arises for a resort to circumstantial evidence, either from
the nature of the inquiry or the failure of direct proof, objections to the testimony
on the ground of irrelevancy are not favored.

Evidence is admissible in a criminal action which tends to show motive, although

it tends to prove the commission of another offense by the defendant. (Moore vs.
U. S. [1893], 150 U. S., 57.)
 PEOPLE VS. IRANG

FACTS: Between 7 and 8 o'clock of the night of November 9, 1935, seven individuals with
white stripes upon their faces, two of whom were armed with guns and two with bolos,
went to the house of the spouses Perfecto Melocotones and Maximiniana Vicente. Some
of said individuals went up and others remained on guard downstairs. Those who went
up approached Perfecto Melocotones immediately and ordered him to bring his money.
Melocotones answered in the affirmative but before he could do what was ordered him
he was attacked with bolos until he fell to the floor. Later another armed with a gun went
up and approaching Maximiana Vicente, wife of Perfecto Melocotones, struck herein the
face with the butt of his gun, making her lose consciousness momentarily. When she
regained consciousness he saw her husband already dead. One of the assailants then
said to her: "Bring out the money and jewelry." Maximiniana Vicente turned over to the
man who had struck her with the butt of his gun P70 in cash and jewelry valued at P200,
which she has kept in a trunk. During the short space of time that she was turning over
the money and jewelry, she looked at the man's face and saw that he had pockmarks and
a scar on his left eyelid.

That same night the house of Juana de la Cruz was assaulted by malefactors who had
been firing shots before arriving at and going up the house. All of them had white stripe
upon their faces. Juana de la Cruz noticed that one of them had pockmarks and a scar
on the left eyelid and was dressed in a maong-colored suit. It was he who opened her
trunk.

Toribio Melocotones, who had seen the assailants arrive but without recognizing them,
immediately reported the matter to the municipal authorities and to the constabulary, who
went to the scene of the crime without loss of time. Maximiniana Vicente informed
Lieutenant Roman Alejandre of the Constabulary that the person who had struck her with
the butt of his gun and taken her money and jewelry was a man of regular statute, with a
lean body and pockmarked face. With this description, said lieutenant went in search of
said individual. Having arrested a group of persons, he brought them to Maximiniana
Vicente's house so that the latter might identify among them the one who struck her with
the butt of his gun. She identified the herein accused-appellant Benjamin Irang as the one
who had struck her with the butt of his gun and demanded delivery of her money and
jewelry. Juana de la Cruz also recognized Benjamin Irang, through his pockmarks and
scar on his left eyelid, as one of the men who had gone up to her house that same night.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of Juana de la Cruz is admissible as evidence

RULING: Maximiniana Vicente, whom the accused-appellant Benjamin Irang struck in the
face with the butt of his gun and of whom he demanded delivery of her money and jewelry
scrutinized the latter's face and notice that he had pockmarks and a scar on his left eyelid.
When on that same night of the assault Lieutenant Alejandre, guided by the description
given him by Maximiniana Vicente, went in search of the person who might have
maltreated the latter and robbed her of her money and jewelry and presented a group of
persons to said Maximiniana Vicente, she said that the man who had maltreated her was
not among those who composed that first group. Said lieutenant later presented another
group to her but neither did the widow find in it the man who had struck her with the butt
of his gun. In the third group presented to her, she immediately pointed at one who turned
out to be the herein accused-appellant. The man pointed at protested but when she told
him that it was he who had struck her in the face with the butt of his gun, the appellant
became silent.

The testimony of Juana de la Cruz to the effect that her house, situated only about one
hundred meters from that of Perfecto Melocotones, was assaulted that same night by
some malefactors with white stripes upon their faces, and that one of them, with
pockmarks on his face and a scar on his left eyelid and dressed in a maong-colored suit,
who later turned out to be the herein accused-appellant, opened her box, indirectly
corroborates Maximiniana Vicente's testimony that the man of the same description was
the open who went to her house and demanded delivery of her money and jewelry, having
recognized him later to be the herein accused-appellant. While evidence of another crime
is, as a rule, not admissible in a prosecution for robbery, it is admissible when it is
otherwise relevant, as where it tends to identify defendant as the perpetrator of the
robbery charged, or tends to show his presence at the scene or in the vicinity of the crime
at the time charged, or when it is evidence of a circumstance connected with the crime
(16, C. J., 610, 611, sec. 1196).
 BOSTON BANK VS. MANALO

FACTS: Xavierville Estate, Inc. (XEI) sold to Overseas Bank of Manila (OBM), initial bank-
buyer) some residential lots in Xavierville subdivision. XEI became agent of the bank and
continued selling the residential lots. Carlos Manalo, Jr. proposed to XEI, through its
President Emerito Ramos (Ramos), that he will purchase two lots in the subdivision and
offered as part of the downpayment the PHP 34, 887.66 that Ramos owed him. XEI,
through Ramos, agreed. In a letter-agreement dated 22August 1972 to Perla Manalo,
Carlos’ wife, Ramos confirmed the reservation of the lots. In the letter, he also pegged
the price of the lots at PHP 348,060 with a 20% downpayment of the purchase price
amounting to PHP 69,612 (less the PHP 34,887.66 owing from Ramos) payable as soon
as XEI resumes its selling operations; the corresponding Contract of Conditional Sale
would then be signed on or before the same date. Perla Manalo conformed to the letter
agreement. The spouses constructed a house on the property. They were notified of XEI’s
resumption of selling operation but they did not pay the balance of the downpayment
because XEI failed to give them a contract of conditional sale. XEI turned over its selling
operations to OBM. Then, Commercial Bank of Manila (CBM) acquired the Xavierville
Estate from OBM. In the meantime, CBM was renamed as Boston Bank. CBM requested
Perla Manalo to stop any on-going construction on the property since she had no
permission for such construction. Perla informed them that her husband had a contract
with OBM, through XEI, to purchase the property. She promised to send CBM the
documents but she failed to do so. The spouses filed a complaint for damages and
specific performance against bank to obtain contract. The spouses alleged that upon their
partial payment of the downpayment, they were entitled to the execution and delivery of
a Deed of Absolute Sale covering the subject lots. RTC ruled in favor of spouses and
ordered delivery of Deed of Sale of lots, stating letter agreement was a valid Contract to
Sell. CA upheld ruling of RTC.

ISSUE: whether respondents spouse Manalo are bound to pay the balance of the
purchase price of the property in instalment basis.

RULING: Respondents, as plaintiffs below, failed to allege in their complaint that the
terms of payment of the ₱278,448.00 to be incorporated in the "corresponding contract
of conditional sale" were those contained in the contracts of conditional sale executed by
XEI and Soller, Aguila and Roque.76 They likewise failed to prove such allegation in this
Court.

The bare fact that other lot buyers were allowed to pay the balance of the purchase price
of lots purchased by them in 120 or 180 monthly installments does not constitute evidence
that XEI also agreed to give the respondents the same mode and timeline of payment of
the ₱278,448.00.

Under Section 34, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, evidence that one did a certain
thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did the same or similar thing at another
time, although such evidence may be received to prove habit, usage, pattern of conduct
or the intent of the parties.

Similar acts as evidence. – Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time
is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or a similar thing at another
time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system,
scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like.

However, respondents failed to allege and prove, in the trial court, that, as a matter of
business usage, habit or pattern of conduct, XEI granted all lot buyers the right to pay the
balance of the purchase price in installments of 120 months of fixed amounts with pre-
computed interests, and that XEI and the respondents had intended to adopt such terms
of payment relative to the sale of the two lots in question. Indeed, respondents adduced
in evidence the three contracts of conditional sale executed by XEI and other lot buyers
merely to prove that XEI continued to sell lots in the subdivision as sales agent of OBM
after it acquired said lots, not to prove usage, habit or pattern of conduct on the part of
XEI to require all lot buyers in the subdivision to pay the balance of the purchase price of
said lots in 120 months. It further failed to prive that the trial court admitted the said
deeds77 as part of the testimony of respondent Manalo, Jr.78

Habit, custom, usage or pattern of conduct must be proved like any other facts. Courts
must contend with the caveat that, before they admit evidence of usage, of habit or pattern
of conduct, the offering party must establish the degree of specificity and frequency of
uniform response that ensures more than a mere tendency to act in a given manner but
rather, conduct that is semi-automatic in nature. The offering party must allege and prove
specific, repetitive conduct that might constitute evidence of habit. The examples offered
in evidence to prove habit, or pattern of evidence must be numerous enough to base on
inference of systematic conduct. Mere similarity of contracts does not present the kind of
sufficiently similar circumstances to outweigh the danger of prejudice and confusion.

In determining whether the examples are numerous enough, and sufficiently regular, the
key criteria are adequacy of sampling and uniformity of response. After all, habit means
a course of behavior of a person regularly represented in like circumstances.79 It is only
when examples offered to establish pattern of conduct or habit are numerous enough to
lose an inference of systematic conduct that examples are admissible. The key criteria
are adequacy of sampling and uniformity of response or ratio of reaction to situations. 80

There are cases where the course of dealings to be followed is defined by the usage of a
particular trade or market or profession.

However, the respondents inexplicably failed to adduce sufficient competent evidence to

prove usage, habit or pattern of conduct of XEI to justify the use of the terms of payment
in the contracts of the other lot buyers, and thus grant respondents the right to pay the
₱278,448.00 in 120 months, presumably because of respondents’ belief that the manner
of payment of the said amount is not an essential element of a contract to sell. There is
no evidence that XEI or OBM and all the lot buyers in the subdivision, including lot buyers
who pay part of the downpayment of the property purchased by them in the form of
service, had executed contracts of conditional sale containing uniform terms and
conditions. Moreover, under the terms of the contracts of conditional sale executed by
XEI and three lot buyers in the subdivision, XEI agreed to grant 120 months within which
to pay the balance of the purchase price to two of them, but granted one 180 months to
do so.84 There is no evidence on record that XEI granted the same right to buyers of two
or more lots.
 MICHELSON VS. UNITED STATES

FACTS: Defendant Michelson is on trial for bribing a federal revenue agent. The
defendant called character witnesses and volunteered information that he was convicted
of an offense twenty years ago. The character witnesses testified that the defendant had
a good reputation for honesty and truthfulness. The defense was allowed to cross-
examine the witnesses and asked them whether they were familiar with the fact that the
defendant had been arrested twenty seven years prior for receiving stolen goods. The
court allowed the cross-examination and warned the jury of the limited purpose of such
testimony. The defendant argued that he did not bribe the official and that this was a case
of entrapment.

ISSUE: Whether a party has the right to cross-examine another parties character
witnesses and inquire about past bad acts such as arrests and/or convictions?

RULING: Arrest without more does not impeach the integrity or impair the credibility of
witness and hence only a conviction may be inquired about to undermine the
trustworthiness of a witness. Before a character witness is cross-examined as to a prior
arrest of the defendant, the prosecution should demonstrate privately to the court that it
is not based on unsupported or untrue innuendo.

Generally, the prosecution may not resort in its case in chief to any kind of evidence of
defendant’s evil character, disposition, and reputation to establish probability of his guilt.
However, when the defendant puts his reputation in issue, the entire subject is fair game
and the prosecution may cross-examine the defendant’s character witnesses as to the
contents and extent of the hearsay on which they base their conclusions. When the
defendant elects to initiate a character inquiry commonly called character evidence, the
witness may not testify about defendant’s specific acts or courses of conduct.

In this case, the inquiry concerned an arrest twenty-seven years before the trial. Events
a generation old are likely to be lived down and dropped from the present thought and
talk of the community and to be absent from the knowledge of younger or more recent
acquaintances. But, where defendant has put his reputation in issue by the calling of
character witnesses, he cannot complain at the latitude which is allowed the prosecution
in meeting, by cross-examination the issue thus voluntarily tendered, notwithstanding the
difficulty which the jury may experience in comprehending the court’s limiting instructions.
 PEOPLE VS. SOLIMAN

FACTS: Appellants, Soliman Buenaventura and Sofronio Palin, were charged with
murder before the Court of First Instance of Manila and were sentenced each to suffer
the extreme penalty of death.

Appellant Soliman testified that prior to the present incident, or on April 21, 1955,
the deceased tried to borrow his pushcart and, as he was not able to lend it to him, the
deceased boxed him and as a consequence, he suffered physical injuries; that incident
was settled amicably on the same day by the companions of the deceased; that on
another occasion the beat up Soliman with an iron pipe and the latter had to undergo
medical treatment; that in the night of April 29, 1955, after he had eaten in Folgueras St.,
he proceeded to a truck by the United Bus Line of which he was a watchman; that while
he was passing Sto. Cristo Street, the deceased called him and asked for a drink; that he
told the deceased he had no money, but the deceased forced him to give him money and
even boxed him; that because the deceased had three companions, he pulled out his
knife and upon seeing this, the three companions ran away; that he and the deceased
fought in the course of which he stabbed him; that while they were fighting, one Sofronio
Palin came and separated them; and that when they were separated Palin advised him
to surrender to the police, so he went home and asked his brothers to accompany him to
the Meisic Station.
Appellant Palin merely corroborated the testimony of his co-accused by declaring
that while he was eating at a restaurant at the corner of Sto. Cristo and Azcarraga Streets
in the morning in question, he saw Soliman and the deceased grappling with each other;
that he tried to separate them and succeeded in doing so; that after the two were
separated, he asked Soliman to surrender and the latter heeded his advice.
The defense, however, claims that the testimony of Ernesto Balaktaw should not
be given credit because it is self-contradictory and inconsistent with the testimony of Pat.
Tolentino and Det. Senen. But, aside from the fact that the alleged contradictions refer to
unimportant details or circumstances, they can be explained and reconciled.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellants are disqualified to be a witness for the reason of
conviction of moral turpitude

RULING: No. In this respect, we notice that the trial court has been most careful in taking
notice not only of the conduct of the witness during the trial, but of other extraneous
matters that may help in reaching a correct conclusion. The Court found the testimony of
Balaktaw worthy of credence not only because it is in part corroborated by the testimony
of appellant Soliman himself who admitted having inflicted the wounds that caused the
death of the victim, (although by way of self-defense) but also because it is supported by
the nature of the wounds as found by Dr. Lara in his autopsy.
The fact that a person has been previously convicted of a crime does not necessarily
disqualify him as a witness for he may still prove to be a truthful one.
 CALIFORNIA VS. GREEN

FACTS: Defendant Green was charged with felony offenses related to the sale of
marijuana. Green was charged on the basis of statements made to an undercover police
officer by Porter. The state called Porter to testify at Green’s preliminary hearing. The
state called Porter as a witness again during Green’s trial. When Porter gave testimony
that conflicted with his testimony at the preliminary hearing, the prosecution introduced
excerpts from the preliminary hearing. The prosecution also called a police officer to
testify about Porter’s initial statements to police. Green was convicted. The state supreme
court had previously held that prior statements of a witness could not be admitted as
evidence if the statements had not previously been subject to cross examination. In
Green’s case, the state supreme court applied the same ban to Porter’s preliminary
hearing testimony. The state of California (plaintiff) petitioned the United States Supreme
Court for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of the porter is admissible.

RULING: Admitting a declarant's out-of-court statements, as long as the declarant was

testifying as a witness and was subject to cross-examination, did not violate U.S.
Constitutional Amendment VI.

State or federal evidence rules could restrict resort to prior sworn testimony where the
declarant was present at trial, but the restriction would not be as a constitutional matter.
The judgment was vacated and remanded. The court concluded that because the
declarant was testifying as a witness and subject to full and effective cross-examination,
admitting his out-of-court statements did not violate the Sixth Amendment.
 US VS. ZENNI

FACTS: Defendant Zenni was arrested under suspicion of illegal bookmaking activities.
The police had gone to Zenni’s house and answered his phone. A number of unknown
people called and tried to place bets with Zenni. They seek to introduce evidence that
individuals who called during that time placed bets, and thus believed that the premises
was used for such purposes, and was thus likely used for such a purpose. The Trial Court
convicted Zenni of bookmaking. Zenni appealed. Zenni argued that the evidence about
the phone calls was inadmissible because it was hearsay.

ISSUE: Whether implied assertions are hearsay

RULING: No. To be hearsay an assertion must be made, and in this case the statements
made by the gamblers on the telephone were non-assertive verbal conduct. They were
not made to prove that the place they were calling was a bookmaking establishment, but
simply made to place bets. The dangers inherent in hearsay do not exist in the context of
non-assertive verbal conduct, or implied assertions. The declarant’s veracity is not at
issue, and so one of the reasons that it is so important to have an out of court declarant
available for cross examination is not present. The statement was not made to show the
truth or falsity of something, and so the veracity is not in issue.
 OHIO VS. ROBERTS

FACTS: Defendant Herschel Roberts was charged with forgery of a check and
possession of stolen credit cards belonging to the Isaacses. At the preliminary hearing,
the Isaacses’ daughter, Anita, denied Roberts’s contention that she had given Roberts
her parents’ checkbook and credit cards with the instruction that he could use them.
Despite being subpoenaed, Anita did not show up at Roberts’s trial and her mother said
Anita was traveling out of state and did not know Anita’s whereabouts. The prosecution
sought to introduce into evidence a transcript of Anita’s testimony at the preliminary
hearing. Roberts objected to the admission of the transcript on the basis of the
Confrontation Clause. The trial court admitted the transcript and convicted Roberts. The
Supreme Court of Ohio reversed, holding that admission of the transcript violated the
Confrontation Clause. The prosecution appealed.

ISSUE: Whether the preliminary hearing testimony by an unavailable witness is

admissible.

RULING: When a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, the
Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is unavailable. Even then, his
statement is admissible only if it bears adequate indicia of reliability. Reliability can be
inferred without more in a case where evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. The admission of the preliminary hearing
testimony does not violate Defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause of the
United States Constitution. The witness was unavailable, but the prosecution made a
good-faith effort in trying to locate her. There were also several factors that demonstrated
the reliability of her testimony such as Defendant’s counsel asked her leading questions
at length during the preliminary hearing. The court breaks the Confrontation Clause
requirements into two parts. First, the state needs to prove that they made a good-effort
attempt to reach the witness. Second, the state has to prove that the prior testimony
carries an indicia of trustworthiness.
 DASMARINAS GARMENTS, INC. VS REYES

FACTS: American President Lines, LTD (APL) sued Dasmarinas Garments for sum of
money at the hearing. Instead of presenting its witness, APL filed a motion praying that it
intended to take the depositions of some Taiwan nationals. The lower court granted the
deposition which was in compliance with the rules on taking of testimony by deposition
upon written interrogatories under Rules of Court. Court of Appeals affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether or not a party could present its evidence by taking the deposition of its
witness in a foreign jurisdiction before a private entity.

RULING: Depositions are chiefly a mode of discovery. They are intended as a means to
compel disclosure of facts resting in the knowledge of a party or other person which are
relevant in some suit or proceeding in court. Depositions are principally made by law to
the parties as a means of informing themselves of all the relevant facts. They are not
therefore generally meant to be a substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a
party witness. Leave of court is not necessary where the deposition is to be taken before
a secretary or embassy or legation, consul general, etc., and the defendants answer has
already been served.

Depositions may be taken at any time after the institution of any action, whenever
necessary or convenient. There is no rule that limits deposition. Taking only to the period
of pre-trial or before it. No prohibition against the taking of deposition after pre-trial. The
law authorizes the taking of depositions before or after an appeal is taken from the
judgment of RTC to perpetuate their testimony for use in event of further proceedings in
court or during the process of execution of a final and executor judgment.
 LEA MER INDUSTRIES VS. MALAYAN INSURANCE

FACTS: Ilian Silica Mining entered into a contract of carriage with Lea Mer Industries,
Inc., for the shipment of 900 metric tons of silica sand valued at ₱565,000.5 Consigned to
Vulcan Industrial and Mining Corporation, the cargo was to be transported from Palawan
to Manila. On October 25, 1991, the silica sand was placed on board Judy VII, a barge
leased by Lea Mer.6 During the voyage, the vessel sank, resulting in the loss of the cargo.7

Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., as insurer, paid Vulcan the value of the lost cargo. 8 To
recover the amount paid and in the exercise of its right of subrogation, Malayan
demanded reimbursement from Lea Mer, which refused to comply. Consequently,
Malayan instituted a Complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila on
September 4, 1992, for the collection of ₱565,000 representing the amount that
respondent had paid Vulcan.9

On October 7, 1999, the trial court dismissed the Complaint, upon finding that the cause
of the loss was a fortuitous event.10 The RTC noted that the vessel had sunk because of
the bad weather condition brought about by Typhoon Trining. The court ruled that
petitioner had no advance knowledge of the incoming typhoon, and that the vessel had
been cleared by the Philippine Coast Guard to travel from Palawan to Manila. 11

ISSUE: Whether or not the survey report of the cargo surveyor, Jesus Cortez, who had not been
presented as a witness of the said report during the trial of this case before the lower court can
be admitted in evidence to prove the alleged facts cited in the said report.

RULING: That witnesses must be examined and presented during the trial, 50 and that
their testimonies must be confined to personal knowledge is required by the rules on
evidence, from which we quote:

"Section 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. –A

witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is,
which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules." 51

On this basis, the trial court correctly refused to admit Jesus Cortez’s Affidavit, which
respondent had offered as evidence.52 Well-settled is the rule that, unless the affiant is
presented as a witness, an affidavit is considered hearsay.53

An exception to the foregoing rule is that on "independently relevant statements." A report

made by a person is admissible if it is intended to prove the tenor, not the truth, of the
statements.54 Independent of the truth or the falsity of the statement given in the report,
the fact that it has been made is relevant. Here, the hearsay rule does not apply. 55

In the instant case, the challenged Survey Report prepared by Cortez was admitted only
as part of the testimonies of respondent’s witnesses. The referral to Cortez’s Report was
in relation to Manlapig’s final Adjustment Report. Evidently, it was the existence of the
Survey Report that was testified to. The admissibility of that Report as part of the
testimonies of the witnesses was correctly ruled upon by the trial court.

At any rate, even without the Survey Report, petitioner has already failed to overcome the
presumption of fault that applies to common carriers.
 PATULA VS. PEOPLE

FACTS: Petitioner Patula was charged with estafa under an information filed in RTC. The
only other witness for the Prosecution was Karen Guivencan, who is a store auditor. she
based her testimony on the entries found in the receipts supposedly issued by petitioner
iin the ledgers corresponding each customer, as well as on the unsworn statements of
some of the customers.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of Guivencan is a mere hearsay.

RULING: Section 36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court states that a witness can testfy only to
those facts that she knows of her personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from her
own perception, except as otherwise provided in the Rules of Court. Witness bereft of
personal knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called upon for that purpose because
her testimony derives its value not from the credit accorded to her as a witness presently
testifying but from the veracity and competency of the extrajudicial source of her
information.