255

DOMINADOR MALANA VS TIAGA

549 SCRA 451 (2001)

FACTS:

The petitioners were charged with the crime of murder before RTC of Malolos Bulacan, branch
12. The charges stemmed from an incident on May 28, 2000 that left Betty Cabsa-Roxas (Betty)
dead, and her daughter and granddaughter injured. The appellants pleaded not guilty during
the arraignment.

Vicente testified that at around 11:30 pm, he was awakened by the sound of the dogs barking.
He saw the kitchen door of their house on fire. Vicente woke Betty and told her to fetch for
help. When Becky opened the main door, Dominador, Rodel and a third man whom he
identified, suddenly appeared and entered the house. Vicente upon seeing them ran through
the burning kitchen door and asked for help. After escaping from his house, Vicente heard an
explosion and saw fire engulf his entire house. Vicente also testified that appellants had been
threatening to liquidate him and his family.

Meanwhile Suzette, who was awakened by her parents panicked reaction to the kitchen fire,
cradled Jenny and saw three men enter their house when her mother opened the main door.
Dominador and Rodek were standing behind the third man. She said that the third man carried
a round one-gallon container with a wick of three to four inches in length. Rodel lit the wick of
match, and the third man threw the container into Suzettes bedroom. After that, the three
men simultaneously ran away. Suzette saw the container burst into flames and explode and
killed Betty instantly.

Dominador and Elenito testified and gave their alibi that they were working as construction
workers in Parian, Calamba Laguna during that time.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellants should be acquitted under the equipoise rule in view of what to
them are doubts as to their guilt.

HELD:

This rule of equipoise provides that where the balanced, the constitutional presumption of
innocence should tilt the scales in favour of the accused. There is, therefore, no equipoise if the
evidence is not evenly balanced. Said rule is not applicable in the case before us because the
evidence here presented is not equally weighty. The equipoise rule cannot be invoked where
the evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming.
Against the direct, positive and convincing evidence for the prosecution, appellants could only
offer denials and uncorroborated alibi. It is elementary that alibi and denial are outweighed by
positive identification that is categorical, consistent and untainted by any ill motive on the part
of the eyewitness testifying on the matter. Alibi and denial, if not substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. The
prosecution witnesses positively identified appellants as two of the perpetrators of the crime.
It is incumbent upon appellants to prove that they were at another place when the felony was
committed, and that it was physically impossible for them to have been at the scene of the
crime at the time it was committed.
256
PORNELLOSA VS. LAND TENURE ADMINISTRATION
1 SCRA 375 (1961)

FACTS:

An action to compel the Director of Lands to execute a deed of sale of a residential lot in favor
of the petitioners upon payment of the purchase price of P1,505, to declare null and void a
deed of sale of the lot executed by the then Minister of Agriculture and Natural Resources in
favor of the respondent Herminio Guzman, to collect from the defendants the sum of P1,000 as
actual and P5,000 as moral damages, and to secure other just and equitable relief, was brought
by the petitioners in the Court of First Instance of Manila (civil No. 8695). After trial the Court
rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners granting them the relief prayed for except the
amount of moral damages which was reduced to P2,000. The trial court dismissed the
defendant's counterclaim. They appealed and the Court of Appeals rendered judgment
reversing that of the Court of First Instance and dismissing the petitioners' complaint (C.A.-G.R.
No. 13901-R). Hence this petition for certiorari to review the judgment rendered by the Court
of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Pornellosa have competent evidence in proving his allegations in the complaint.

Held:

The finding of the Court of Appeals that the petitioners have failed to prove that lot 44 is
included in the lot formerly occupied by Vicenta San Jose, their predecessor-in-interest, is
binding upon this Court. A party claiming a right granted or created by law must prove his claim
by competent evidence. A plaintiff is duty bound to prove his allegations in the complaint. He
must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of that of his opponent.

In their amended complaint, the petitioners, allege that they and their predecessor Vicenta San
Jose, from whom they bought the residential lot in litigation containing an area of 200 sq. m.
more or less, had been for many years in actual possession thereof, and that following the
avowed policy of the government to sell the lots acquired from the Santa Clara Estate, of which
the residential lot in litigation forms part, only to bona fide occupants or tenants thereof, the
defunct Rural Progress Administration agreed to sell to them the said residential lot (pp.1, 2-3,
rec. on app.). Reviewing the petitioners' evidence, the Court of Appeals found that in Exhibit A,
the deed of sale executed by Vicenta San Jose in favor of Pornellosa, "the area of the lot on
which San Jose's house stood had not been specified, nor had the boudaries thereof been
mentioned;" and that there is no showing of the extent of the alleged vendor's holding or
interest. Besides, the petitioners have not presented any document or evidence showing that
the defunct Rural Progress Administration had agreed to sell to them the residential lot in
litigation. Granting that the respondent Herminio Guzman is not entitled to acquire by purchase
the said residential lot, still that fact does not relieve the petitioners from the duty of proving
by competent evidence the allegations of their complaint.
257
Industrial Finance Corporation vs Castor Tobias

FACTS:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the CA. On June 16, 1968, respondent Tobias
bought on instalment one dodge truck from Leelin Motors Inc. to answere for his obligation he
executed a promissory note in favour of the latter. To secure payment of the promissory note,
respondent Tobias executed in favour of Leelin Motors, Inc. a chattel mortgage on Dodge Truck.

On June 19, 1969, Leelin Motors indorsed the promissory note and assigned the chattel
mortgage to petitioner Industrial Finance Corporation. As a consequence respondent Tobias
paid 6 instalments on the promissory note directly to the petitioner Industrial Finance
Corporation.

Upon learning that the truck met an accident, petitioner decided not to get the truck anymore
from Leelin Motors, Inc.

Petitioner filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila an action against Tobias to recover
unpaid balance of the promissory note.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Tobias has the burden of disproving that he has no knowledge of the truck’s
accident.

HELD:

In the present case petitioner claims it had no knowledge of the accident when it gave the
respondent the choice of either paying the balance of the promissory note or of surrendering
the truck. It is hard to believe that petitioner would make such offer to respondent either to
pay the balance on the promissory note or to surrender the truck in question if it knew that the
truck has had an accident. The more plausible thing it would have asked the respondent is to
ask for the balance on the promissory note. Besides the allegation of petitioner that it had no
knowledge of the accident is a negative allegation and needs no evidence to support it, not
being an essential part of the statement of the right on which the cause of action is founded. It
is therefore the respondent Tobias who has the burden of disproving the claim of petitioner
that he has no knowledge of the accident when it made the offer to respondent either to pay
the balance on the promissory note or to surrender the truck. Respondent failed in this.
258
VENANCIO SAMBAR, doing business under the name and style of CVS Garment Enterprises vs.
LEVI STRAUSS & CO., LEVI STRAUSS (PHIL.), INC.

FACTS:

Private respondents alleged in their complaint that Levi Strauss and Co. (LS&Co.), an
internationally known clothing manufacturer, own the arcuate design trademark which was
registered under US Trademark Registration No. 404,248 on November 16, 1943. That
sometime in 1987, CVSGIC and Venancio Sambar, without the consent and authority of private
respondents and in infringement and unfair competition, sold and advertised, and despite
demands to cease and desist, continued to manufacture, sell and advertise denim, pants under
the brand name “Europress” with back pockets bearing a design similar to the arcuate
trademark of private respondents, thereby causing confusion on the buying public, prejudiced
to private respondent’s goodwill and property right.

Sambar filed a separate answer. He admitted that copyright Registration No. 1-1998 was issued
to him, but he denied using it. He said he did not authorize anyone to use the copyrighted
design.

Trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining CVSGIC and petitioner from
manufacturing, advertising and selling pants with the arcuate design on their back pockets.

Private respondents moved for reconsideration praying for the cancellation of petitioner’s
copyright registration.

Trial court granted the prayer.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the ruling of the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner infringe on private respondent’s arcuate design.

HELD:

To be entitled to a copyright, the thing being copyrighted must be original, created by the
author through his own skill, labor and judgment, without directly copying or evasively
imitating the work of another.

Both the trail court and the Court of Appeals found there was infringement.
259
Prudential Guarantee and Assurance vs. Trans Asia Shipping Lines

FACTS:

TRANS-ASIA is the owner of the vessel M/V Asia Korea. In consideration of payment of
premiums, PRUDENTIAL insured M/V Asia Korea for loss/damage of the hull and machinery
arising from perils, inter alia, of fire and explosion for the sum of P40 Million, beginning from
the period of July 1, 1993 up to July 1, 1994.On October 25, 1993, while the policy was in force,
a fire broke out while [M/V Asia Korea was] undergoing repairs at the port of Cebu. On October
26, 1993 TRANS-ASIA filed its notice of claim for damage sustained by the vessel evidenced by a
letter/formal claim. TRANS-ASIA reserved its right to subsequently notify PRUDENTIAL as to the
full amount of the claim upon final survey and determination by average adjuster Richard Hogg
International (Phil.) of the damage sustained by reason of fire. TRANS-ASIA executed a
document denominated “Loan and Trust receipt”, a portion of which states that “Received from
Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc., the sum of PESOS THREE MILLION ONLY
(P3,000,000.00) as a loan without interest under Policy No. MH 93/1353 [sic], repayable only in
the event and to the extent that any net recovery is made by Trans-Asia Shipping Corporation,
from any person or persons, corporation or corporations, or other parties, on account of loss by
any casualty for which they may be liable occasioned by the 25 October 1993: Fire on Board.
“PRUDENTIAL later on denied Trans-Asia’s claim in stated in a letter that “After a careful review
and evaluation of your claim arising from the above-captioned incident, it has been ascertained
that you are in breach of policy conditions, among them “WARRANTED VESSEL CLASSED AND
CLASS MAINTAINED”. Accordingly, we regret to advise that your claim is not compensable and
hereby DENIED.” and asked for the return of the 3,000,000. TRANS-ASIA filed a Complaint for
Sum of Money against PRUDENTIAL with the RTC of Cebu City, wherein TRANS-ASIA sought the
amount of P8,395,072.26 from PRUDENTIAL, alleging that the same represents the balance
of the indemnity due upon the insurance policy in the total amount of P11,395,072.26. TRANS-
ASIA similarly sought interest at 42% per annum citing Section 243 of Presidential Decree No.
1460, otherwise known as the “Insurance Code,” as amended. PRUDENTIAL denied the material
allegations of the Complaint and interposed the defense that TRANS-ASIA breached insurance
policy conditions, in particular: PRUDENTIAL posits that TRANS-
ASIA violated an express and material warranty in the subject insurance contract, i.e., Marine
Insurance Policy No. MH93/1363, specifically Warranty Clause No. 5 thereof, which stipulates
that the insured vessel, “M/V ASIA KOREA” is required to be CLASSED AND CLASS MAINTAINED.
According to PRUDENTIAL, on 25 October 1993, or at the time of the occurrence of the fire,
“M/V ASIA KOREA” was in violation of the warranty as it was not CLASSED AND CLASS
MAINTAINED. PRUDENTIAL submits that Warranty Clause No. 5 was a condition precedent to
the recovery of TRANS-ASIA under the policy, the violation of which entitled PRUDENTIAL to
rescind the contract under Sec. 74 of the Insurance Code. By way of a counterclaim,
PRUDENTIAL sought a refund of P3,000,000.00, which it allegedly advanced to TRANS-ASIA by
way of a loan without interest and without prejudice to the final evaluation of the claim,
including the amounts of P500,000.00, for survey fees and P200,000.00, representing attorney’s
fees. Trial court ruled in favor of Prudential. It ruled that a determination of the parties’
liabilities hinged on whether TRANS-ASIA violated and breached
the policy conditions on WARRANTED VESSEL CLASSED AND CLASS MAINTAINED. It interpreted
the provision to mean that TRANS-ASIA is required to maintain the vessel at a certain class at all
times pertinent during the life of the policy. According to the court a quo, TRANS-ASIA failed to
prove compliance of the terms of the warranty, the violation thereof entitled PRUDENTIAL to
rescind the contract. The court of appeals reversed the decision. It ruled that PRUDENTIAL, as
the party asserting the non-compensability of the loss had the burden of proof to show that
TRANS-ASIA breached the warranty, which burden it failed to discharge.It considered
PRUDENTIAL’s admission that at the time the insurance contract was entered into between the
parties, the vessel was properly classed by Bureau Veritas, a classification society recognized by
the industry. It similarly gave weight to the fact that it was the responsibility of Richards Hogg
International (Phils.) Inc., the average adjuster hired by PRUDENTIAL, to secure a copy of such
certification to support its conclusion that mere absence of a certification does not warrant
denial of TRANS-ASIA’s claim under the insurance policy.Also the C.A. ruled that TRANS-ASIA is
entitled to the unpaid claims covered by Marine Policy, or a total amount of P8,395,072.26
however even if there was unreasonable denial or withholding of the payment of the
claims due Trans-Asia is still not entitled to pay for attorney’s fees for it can only be awarded in
the cases enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. But Trans-Asia is entitled to double
interest on the policy for the duration of the delay of payment of the unpaid balance, citing
Section 244 of the Insurance Code.

ISSUE:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PRUDENTIAL, AS INSURER HAD THE BURDEN
OF PROVING THAT THE ASSURED, TRANS-ASIA, VIOLATED A MATERIAL WARRANTY.

HELD:

At the outset, it must be emphasized that the party which alleges a fact as a matter of defense
has the burden of proving it. PRUDENTIAL, as the party which asserted the claim that TRANS-
ASIA breached the warranty in the policy, has the burden of evidence to establish the same.
Hence, on the part of PRUDENTIAL lies the initiative to show proof in support of its defense;
otherwise, failing to establish the same, it remains self-serving. Clearly, if no evidence on the
alleged breach of TRANS-ASIA of the subject warranty is shown, a fortiori, TRANS-ASIA would be
successful in claiming on the policy. It follows that PRUDENTIAL bears the burden of evidence to
establish the fact of breach.

In our rule on evidence, TRANS-ASIA, as the plaintiff below, necessarily has the burden of proof
to show proof of loss, and the coverage thereof, in the subject insurance policy. However, in
the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the
duty or the burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff’s prima facie case,
otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff.23 TRANS-ASIA was able to establish
proof of loss and the coverage of the loss, i.e., 25 October 1993: Fire on Board. Thereafter, the
burden of evidence shifted to PRUDENTIAL to counter TRANS-ASIA’s case, and to prove its
special and affirmative defense that TRANS-ASIA was in violation of the particular condition on
CLASSED AND CLASS MAINTAINED.

We sustain the findings of the Court of Appeals that PRUDENTIAL was not successful in
discharging the burden of evidence that TRANS-ASIA breached the subject policy condition on
CLASSED AND CLASS MAINTAINED.
260
People vs Openiano Pajenado

FACTS:

In the Court of First Instance of Samar appellant Openiano Pajenado was charged with murder
and with illegal possession of a firearm. Upon arraignment pleaded not guilty in both cases,
and after a joint trial thereof he was convicted and sentenced as guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder and likewise guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession
of firearm.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Openiano be convicted of the crime of Illegal possession of a firearm.

HELD:

Upon the question of whether or not the appellant should also be convicted of the crime of
illegal possession of a firearm, we agree with both appellant’s counsel and the Solicitor General
that the appealed decision should be reversed.

It is true that People vs. Lubo and People vs Ramos could be invoked to support the view that it
is incumbent upon a person charged with illegal possession of a firearm, to prove the issuance
to him of a license to possess the firearm, but we are, of the considered opinion that under the
provisions of Section 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court which, provide that in criminal cases the
burden of proof as to the offense charged lies on the prosecution and that a negative fact
alleged by the prosecution must be proven if “it is an essential ingredient of the offense
charged”, the burden of proof was with the prosecution in this case to prove that the firearm
used by appellant in committing the offense charged was not properly licensed.

It cannot be denied that the lack or absences of a license is an essential ingredient of the
offense of illegal possession of a firearm. The information filed against appellant in Criminal
case no. 3558 of the lower court, specifically alleged that he had no “license or permit to
possess” the .45 caliber pistol mentioned therein. Thus it seems clear that it was the
prosecution’s duty not merely to allege that negative fact but to prove it. This view is
supported by similar adjudicated cases. In U.S vs. Tria, the accused was charged with having
criminally inscribed himself as a voter knowing that he had none of the qualifications required
to be a voter. It was there held that the negative fact of lack of qualification to be a voter was
an essential element of the crime charged and should be proved by the prosecution. In another
case (People vs Quebral) where the charged with illegal practice of medicine because he had
diagnosed, treated and prescribed for certain disease suffered by certain patients from whom
he received monetary compensation, without having previously obtained the proper certificate
of registration from Board of Medical Examiners, as provided in Section 770 of the
Administrative Code, this court held that if the subject of the negative averment like, for
instance, the act of voting without the qualifications provided by law is an essential ingredient
of the offense charged, the prosecution has the burden of proving the same, although in view
of the difficulty of proving a negative allegation, the prosecution, under such circumstance,
need only establish a prima facie case from the best evidence obtainable. In the case before us,
both appellant and the Solicitor General agree that there was not even a prima facie case upon
which to hold appellant guilty of the illegal possession of a firearm. The mere fact that the
adverse party has the control of the better means of proof of the fact alleged, should not
relieve the party making the averment of the burden of proving it. This is so, because a party
who alleges a fact must be assumed to have acquired knowledge thereof, otherwise he could
not have alleged it. Familiar instance of this is the case of a person prosecuted for doing an act
or carrying on a business, such as, the sale of liquor without a license. How could the
prosecution aver the want of a license if it had acquired no knowledge of that fact?
Accordingly, although proof of the existence or non-existence of such license can, with more
facility, be adduced by the defendant, it is, nevertheless, incumbent upon the party alleging the
want of the license to prove the allegation. Naturally, as the accused prima facie evidence
thereof on the part of the prosecution shall suffice to cast the onus upon him.

Wherefore, the appealed decision is reversed and set aside in so far as it finds appellant guilty
of illegal possession of a firearm, with the result that he is hereby acquitted of said charge.
261
People vs. Ricardo Verzola

FACTS:

Appeal by Ricardo Verzola and Josefina Molina from the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Abra, finding them guilty of the crime of Murder and sentencing them, respectively: Verzola,
as principal, to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, to indemnify the offended party in the
amount of P12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay ¾ of
the costs; and Molina, as an accessory after the fact, to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six
(6) years of prision correccional as maximum, and to pay ¼ of the indemnity and costs.

Both appellants admit that ft was appellant Verzola who the fatal blows on the victim. Versola,
however, after impugning the (Exhibit "L'), claims that he did so in self- defense. Thus, V
veracity of the facts contained in his extrajudicial confession testified that while he was feeding
his two cows in front of his house at about 10:00 o'clock on the night of September 28, 1969, he
heard cries for help coming from the direction of the house of Bernardo Molina- Upon
recognize it to be the voice of the wife of Bernardo, he proceeded to the couples house. Upon
reaching the yard of said house he heard the loud voice of a man. Thus that some intruder had
entered the Molina's residence, he to am himself. At the threshold of the ladder, he picked up a
pan of a plow (Exhibit B) At the door of the room, he heard the man say: 'Vulva of your mother,
I will kill you." As he entered the room, he saw his co-appellant Josefina Mo in a comer, being
maltreated by Bernardo Molina. After noticed his presence, he said: "Vulva of your mother, I
will kill all of you." At that juncture, Bernardo stooped to pick up a bolo from the floor. As
Bernardo was still bending towards the Mm V struck him twice with the piece of wood, hitting
the head of the victim, causing him to fall. After he had fallen, he tried to revive the victim by ng
the head of the latter on his lap will it, saying: "Hoy, Hoy, Hoy". He explained that this was the
reason why there were bloodstains on his clothes. When Josefina asked him what happened, he
replied that Bernardo met an accident. At his suggestion, they both carried the body of the
victim down the stairs because according to him they wanted to bring the body to the hospital.
As the hospital was too far and it was too dark, they left the body on the ground. After
instructing Josefina to go and summon persons to help the victim , he went home. After
changing his clothes and throwing his bloodstained clothing inside their toilet, he went to the
municipal building in Bangued, Abra, and reported to the guard that there was a person who
met an accident in Lipcan.

His co-appellant, Josefina Molina, also testified that during the first week of September, 1969
she had a quarrel with her husband because of Bernardo's o theft men, namely, Bocarile Santos
Beloy and appellant Ricardo Verzola; that on the night in question, she and her husband had
another quarrel and in the course thereof, she was boxed and strangled by her husband,
causing her. to shout for help; that after a while, as she was crouching in a comer of the house,
with her face covered, she heard a thud As she looked up, she noticed that Verzola was already
inside their room, squatting on the floor and holding on his lap the head of her husband, that
while Verzola was shaking the head of the deceased, he was saying: "Hoy, Hoy, Hoy." She c that
out of fear, she assisted Verzola in carrying the body of Bernardo at the foot of the stairs where
Verzola left her. After looking at the wounds of her husband, she became afraid and went up
the house where her children were sleeping.

Both appellants c that they were not aware of the contents of their extra- judicial confessions
as they were made to sign them by the police authorities without being able to read their
contents.

ISSUE:

HELD:

There can be no question that once an accused has admitted the killing of a human being, the
burden is on him to establish the existence of any circumstance which may justify the killing or
at least attenuate the offense committed. To establish his exculpation, or the justification for
the act, he must prove such affirmative allegation by clear, satisfactory and convincing
evidence. 1 He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that
for the prosecution for even if that were weak, it could not be disbelieved after the accused
himself had admitted the killing. 2It is evident that no such proof was adduced by appellant
Verzola.

To begin with, the conduct of appellant Verzola lately after he committed the crime is
incompatible with the reaction of one who killed another in legitimate self-defense. Although
he claims that he brought the victim down the stairs in order to bring him to the hospital, yet
when he was able to get a jeep he did not utilize it for that purpose but instead used it in going
to town. Moreover, although appellant Verzola was present at the scene of the crime when the
police authorities were investigating the case, he kept quiet about the incident. It was only
from Josefina Molina that the police learned for the first time that Verzola was the assailant of
the deceased. Even then, Josefina had to request the police authorities to bring her to the
poblacion so that she could talk more freely about the killing For his part, Verzola attempted to
conceal his participation in the crime by hiding inside his toilet his bloodstained clothes and the
weapon that he used in clubbing the deceased . These actuations of appellant Verzola reveal a
behaviour which is incompatible with the reaction of one who acted in legitimate self-
defense. 3 More significant however, are the undisputed physical facts of the case, such as
nature, character and location of the wounds sustained by the deceased and the presence of
the bloodstains on the beddings of the victim. These facts and circumstances belie the claim of
the appellant that he clubbed the victim in self- defense. On the contrary, they sufficiently
indicate that the fatal injuries were inflicted upon the victim when the latter was lying
defenseless on the floor, as he was either sleeping or was just beginning to wake up.
262
Patterson vs New York

Brief Fact Summary. Appellant was charged with and convicted of the second-degree murder
of his estranged wife. Under New York law, the state permits a person to raise an affirmative
defense that he “acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance.” The defendant
bears the burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence. Appellant sought to
invalidate the statutory scheme by claiming it violated due process because it improperly
shifted the burden of persuasion from the prosecutor to the defendant.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. In a criminal case, the defendant who raises an affirmative defense
shall bear the burden of persuasion unless the affirmative defense is a presumed element of
the offense under the statute.

Facts. Appellant, Patterson was charged with and convicted of the second-degree murder of his
estranged wife. In December of 1970, Patterson borrowed a rifle and went to his father-in-laws
house where he witnessed his wife through a window half-dressed in the presence of another
man. Patterson entered the house and killed the man by shooting him in the head. At trial,
Appellant raised the defense of extreme emotional disturbance. The jury was instructed on the
elements of the crime of murder. Appellant sought to invalidate the statutory scheme by
claiming it violated due process because it improperly shifted the burden of persuasion from
the prosecutor to the defendant. Appellant based his argument on Mullaney v. Wilbur, where
the court held a Maine statute in violation of the Due Process Clause.

ISSUE:

Were the defendant’s due process rights violated when he was required under state law to
bear the burden of persuasion for his affirmative defense to the crime of murder?

HELD:

New York also recognizes the crime of manslaughter. A person is guilty of manslaughter if he
intentionally kills another person "under circumstances which do not constitute murder
because he acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance." [Footnote 3] Appellant
confessed before trial to killing Northrup, but at trial he raised the defense of extreme
emotional disturbance. [Footnote 4]

The jury was instructed as to the elements of the crime of murder. Focusing on the element of
intent, the trial court charged:
"Before you, considering all of the evidence, can convict this defendant or anyone of murder,
you must believe and decide that the People have established beyond a reasonable doubt that
he intended, in firing the gun, to kill
263
People Vs Abdul Macalaba

FACTS:

SPO1 Pandez, a PNP member of the Laguna Criminal Investigation Detection Group (CIDG),
testified that on 12 April 1999, at 5:15 p.m., Major R Win Pagkalinawan ordered the search of
ABDUL, alias Boy Muslim, based on a verified information that the latter was driving a
carnapped Mitsubishi olive green car with Plate No. UPV 511 and was a drug-pusher in San
Pedro, Laguna. Two teams were formed for the search. The first was headed by Major
Pagkalinawan, with SPO4 Aberion and five others as members; and the second was led by Capt.
Percival Rumbaoa, with SPO1 Pandez and PO3 Mendez as members.
Between 6:30 p.m. and 7:00 p.m., the two groups proceeded to Barangay Nueva, San Pedro,
Laguna, on board a car and a van. They went to ABDULs apartment where he was reportedly
selling shabu, but they learned that ABDUL had already left. While looking for ABDUL, they saw
the suspected carnapped car somewhere at Pacita Complex I, San Pedro, Laguna, going towards
the Poblacion. When it stopped due to the red traffic light, the CIDG officers alighted from their
vehicles. Capt. Rumbaoa positioned himself at the passenger side of the suspected carnapped
car, while Major Pagkalinawan stood in front of the car. SPO1 Pandez, with PO3 Mendez beside
him, went straight to the driver and knocked at the drivers window. ABDUL, who was driving
the car, lowered the glass window. SPO1 Pandez introduced himself as a member of the Laguna
CIDG and asked ABDUL to turn on the light and show them the cars certificate of registration.
When the light was already on, SPO1 Pandez saw a black Norinco .45 caliber gun inside an open
black clutch/belt bag placed on the right side of the drivers seat near the gear. He asked ABDUL
for the supporting papers of the gun, apart from the cars certificate of registration, but the
latter failed to show them any. When ABDUL opened the zipper of the clutch/belt bag, the
CIDG officers saw inside it four plastic sachets of what appeared to be shabu. They likewise
found a self-sealing plastic bag which contained the following items: two fake P1,000 bills, a list
of names of persons, a magazine and five ammunitions for a .45 caliber gun. They confiscated
the gun, the shabu, and the fake P1,000 bills and thereafter brought ABDUL to the CIDG office.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Appellant proved that he was authorized to possess shabu.

HELD:
In the Appellees Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that ABDUL had the
burden of proving that he was authorized to possess shabu, but he failed to discharge such
burden. Therefore, it is presumed that he had no authority; consequently, he is liable for
violation of Section 16, Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. The OSG
likewise refutes ABDULs argument that there was a violation of his right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
The general rule is that if a criminal charge is predicated on a negative allegation, or that a
negative averment is an essential element of a crime, the prosecution has the burden of
proving the charge. However, this rule is not without an exception. Thus, we have held:

Where the negative of an issue does not permit of direct proof, or where the facts are more
immediately within the knowledge of the accused, the onus probandi rests upon him. Stated
otherwise, it is not incumbent upon the prosecution to adduce positive evidence to support a
negative averment the truth of which is fairly indicated by established circumstances and
which, if untrue, could readily be disproved by the production of documents or other evidence
within the defendants knowledge or control. For example, where a charge is made that a
defendant carried on a certain business without a license (as in the case at bar, where the
accused is charged with the selling of a regulated drug without authority), the fact that he has a
license is a matter which is peculiarly within his knowledge and he must establish that fact or
suffer conviction.

In the instant case, the negative averment that ABDUL had no license or authority to possess
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug, has been fairly indicated by the
following facts proven by the testimonies of the CIDG officers and the forensic chemist: (a)
ABDUL was driving the suspected carnapped vehicle when he was caught, and he appeared to
be healthy and not indisposed as to require the use of shabu as medicine; (b) the contents of
the sachets found in ABDULs open clutch bag inside the car were prima facie determined by the
CIDG officers to be shabu; and (c) the said contents were conclusively found to be shabu by the
forensic chemist. With these established facts, the burden of evidence was shifted to
ABDUL. He could have easily disproved the damning circumstances by presenting a doctors
prescription for said drug or a copy of his license or authority to possess the regulated drug.
Yet, he offered nothing.
264
People vs Guillermo Florendo

FACTS:

GUILLERMO FLORENDO alias Imong was found guilty of parricide with the aggravating
circumstance of cruelty and sentenced to death. He was ordered to indemnify the heirs of his
wife, Erlinda Ragudo Florendo, the amount of P500,000.00 in moral and exemplary damages
and to pay the costs of suit. His conviction is the subject of this automatic review.
The records show that on 28 August 1996 at around 2:30 in the afternoon appellant and his
wife Erlinda were inside their house engaged in an animated conversation. Living with them in
the same house in Barangay Bulbulala, La Paz, Abra, was appellants father Agustin Florendo.
After Erlinda was heard to have told Imong to go to sleep, the latter all of a sudden and without
any provocation hacked Erlinda with a bolo in the head and other parts of her body. The victim
could only exclaim, Patayennak met ni Imong ngen (Imong is going to kill me)!.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Florendo’s insanity during the commission of the crime was substantiated by
sufficient evidence.

HELD:

The alleged insanity of Florendo was not substantiated by sufficient evidence. He was not
completely bereft of reason or discernment and freedom of will when he mortally hacked his
wife. The following circumstances clearly and unmistakably negate a complete absence of
intelligence on his part when he committed the felony: (a) He was apparently well until about
three (3) to four (4) months prior to his admission in the hospital when he was noted to have
blank stares, claiming that he was in deep thought because he suspected his wife of having an
extramarital affair, and at times would confront his wife about the matter but the latter would
deny it; (b) That he became irritable at home and was easily angered by his children slightest
mistakes; (c) That due to his jealousy he claimed that he only wanted to frighten his wife with
his bolo in order to confront her but hacked her instead many times to death; (d) He denied
having hallucinations at that time or being possessed by an evil spirit; (e) Immediately after the
incident he went to the barangay captain, never thought of running away, and apparently felt
guilty about what happened; (f) In jail, he said he started having auditory hallucinations where
he would hear voices commanding him to do something but refused to elaborate on this; and,
(g) He claimed that he frequently thought of his three (3) children whom he missed so much.
These were hardly the acts of a person with a sick mind.
A perusal of appellant testimony would show that he was aware of his emotions, bearing
and temperament. Except for his testimony in open court that he had no recollection of what
happened on 28 August 1996, he attested that he saw his children a few days before the
incident; that he was brought to the provincial jail by the police authorities; and, that
he thumbmarked a form given him in jail. Since he remembered the vital circumstances
surrounding the ghastly incident, he must have been in full control of his mental faculties. His
recall of the events that transpired before, during and after the stabbing incident, as well as the
nature and contents of his testimony, does not betray an aberrant mind. An insane person has
no full and clear understanding of the nature and consequences of his act.
The issue of insanity is a question of fact for insanity is a condition of the mind, not
susceptible of the usual means of proof. As no man would know what goes on in the mind of
another, the state or condition of a person mind can only be measured and judged by his
behavior. Establishing the insanity of an accused requires opinion testimony which may be
given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with appellant, or who has rational basis to
conclude that appellant was insane based on the witness own perception of appellant, or who
is qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist.
The first four (4) witnesses of the prosecution were one in alleging that appellant was crazy
and had lost his mind as they noticed him to be behaving oddly, i.e., singing, dancing and
talking to himself. The prosecution witnesses may have testified that appellant appeared to
them to be insane prior to, during and subsequent to the commission of the crime, but there is
a vast difference between an insane person and one who has worked himself into such a frenzy
of anger that he fails to use reason or good judgment in his action. The fact that a person
behaves crazily is not conclusive that he is insane. The prevalent meaning of the word crazy is
not synonymous with the legal terms insane, non compos mentis, unsound mind, idiot, or
lunatic. The popular conception of the word crazy is being used to describe a person or an act
unnatural or out of the ordinary. A man may behave in a crazy manner but it does not
necessarily and conclusively prove that he is legally so.
The evidence adduced consisting of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that appellant
was insane immediately before or on the day the crime was committed consisted merely of
assumptions, and is too speculative, presumptive and conjectural to be convincing. Their
observation that appellant manifested unusual behavior does not constitute sufficient proof of
his insanity because not every aberration of the mind or mental deficiency constitutes insanity
hence exempting.
In the case at bar, appellant was diagnosed to be suffering from schizophrenia when he was
committed to the BGHMC a few months after he killed his wife. Medical books
describe schizophrenia as a chronic mental disorder characterized by a persons inability to
distinguish between fantasy and reality, and is often accompanied by hallucinations and
delusions. Symptomatically, schizophrenic reactions are recognizable through odd and bizarre
behavior apparent in aloofness or periods of impulsive destructiveness and immature and
exaggerated emotionality. During the initial stage, the common early symptom is aloofness, a
withdrawal behind barriers of loneliness, hopelessness, hatred and fear. Frequently, the patient
would seem preoccupied and dreamy and may appear far away.
Well-settled is the rule that an inquiry into the mental state of an accused should relate to the
period immediately before or at the very moment the felony is committed. The medical
findings of the BGHMC, which diagnosed appellant mental disorder as schizophrenic psychosis,
paranoid type, refer to appellants treatment after the incident happened. It is bereft of any
proof that appellant was completely deprived of intelligence or discernment at the time or at
the very moment he killed his wife. It is inconclusive as to whether he was insane at the time
immediately preceding or at the very moment of the killing.
In compliance with this Courts Resolution of 15 August 2000, an evaluation of the psychological
and psychiatric condition of appellant was conducted by the Supreme Court Clinic Services at
the National Penitentiary on 22 August 2000. The neuro-psychiatric evaluation report disclosed
that appellant was suffering from psychosis or insanity, classified as chronic schizophrenia,
paranoid type. It divulged further that prior to the onset of the overt psychotic symptoms,
appellant manifested unusual behavior prior to the commission of the crime of parricide
described as fearfulness, irritability, suspiciousness and jealousy or preoccupation with the
fidelity of his wife. In retrospect, this group of symptoms could have possibly been
the prodromal phase heralding the onset of the psychotic illness. The report revealed that
symptoms of appellants mental illness were conceivably manifested prior to the date of the
crime and that substantial evidence was lacking to conclude that his abnormal behavior was
due to the use of drugs or any prohibited substance.
As can be gleaned from the reports, appellant could only be undergoing the percursory stages
of a disease prior to and at the time of the killing. It is, therefore, beyond cavil that assuming
that he had some form of mental illness by virtue of the premonitory symptoms
of schizophrenia, it did not totally deprive him of intelligence. The presence of his reasoning
faculties, which enabled him to exercise sound judgment and satisfactorily articulate certain
matters such as his jealousy over the supposed infidelity of his wife, sufficiently discounts any
intimation of insanity when he committed the dastardly crime. While appellant on many
occasions before the commission of the crime did things that would indicate that he was not of
sound mind, such acts only tended to show that he was in an abnormal mental state and not
necessarily of unsound mind that would exempt him from criminal liability. Mere abnormality
of mental faculties will not exclude imputability. The odd or bizarre behavior of appellant prior
to the commission of the crime as described by the prosecution witnesses, if anything else, did
not completely deprive the offender of consciousness of his acts. If the defense of insanity is
sustained, the floodgates to abuse will be opened by the cunning and ingenious
public. Testimony that a person acted in a crazy or deranged manner days before the
commission of the crime does not prove insanity. The grant of absolution on the basis of
insanity should be done with utmost care and circumspection as the State must keep its guard
against murderers seeking to escape punishment through a general plea of insanity.
265
Pascual vs Angeles

FACTS:

Neighbors Pascual and Angeles were registered owners of adjacent parcels of land
Each of them built a house on his respective lot, believing all the while that his respective lot
was properly delineated. It was not until Metropolitan
Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank), as the highest bidder in the foreclosure sale... caused
the relocation survey... that the geodetic engineer discovered that Pascual's house had
encroached on Lot 3. As a consequence, Metrobank... successfully ejected Pascual.
In turn, Pascual caused the relocation survey of his own Lot... and discovered that Angeles'
house also encroached on his lot.
Pascual demanded rentals... for the use of the encroached area... from Angeles, or the removal
of Angeles' house.
Angeles refused the demand. Accordingly, Pascual sued Angeles for recovery of possession and
damages in the Regional Trial Court... judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff
Angeles appealed... to... the CA affirmed the RTC
ISSUES:
the options laid down by the CA, i.e., for Pascual either to buy the portion of
Angeles' house or to sell to Angeles the portion of his land occupied by Angeles were contrary
to its finding of good faith.
HELD:
CA's application of Article 448 of the Civil Code was correct and proper.
Article 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good
faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after
payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige... the one who built
or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the
builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that
of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay... reasonable rent, if the owner of the land
does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall
agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms
thereof.
The provision contemplates a person building, or sowing, or planting in good faith on land
owned by another.
The RTC and CA found and declared Angeles to be a builder in... good faith.
We cannot veer away from their unanimous conclusion, which can easily be drawn from the
fact that Angeles insists until now that he built his house entirely on his own lot. Good faith
consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on... is his and in his ignorance of
a defect or flaw in his title.
With the unassailable finding that Angeles' house straddled the lot of Pascual, and that Angeles
had built his house in good faith, Article 448 of the Civil Code, which spells out the rights and
obligations of the owner of the land as well as of the builder, is... unquestionably applicable.
The land being the principal and the building the accessory, preference is given to Pascual as
the owner of the land to make the choice as between appropriating the building or obliging
Angeles as the builder to pay the value... of the land.
266
Manuel Ormachea Tin-Congco vs Santiago Trillana
FACTS:

On January 15, 1904 Tin-Congco, Chinese, presented an amended complaint against Trillana,
alleging that the plaintiff Tin-congco and Luis Queco were engaged in a business in Hagonoy,
Malolos and that the defendant (Trillana) purchased from them merchandise in the value of
4,000 pesos. Two years later the partnership was dissolved and the business was divided
between the partners, all the debts of the defendant were allotted to Tin-Congco. The debt is
proven by the documents signed by defendant or his agents in favour of Ormachea or Ong
Queco or agent Lawa in charge of the business. The 135 documents atate the total debt of
5,500 pesos (4000 initial debt plus 1500 legal interest).
Defendant’s answer- alleges that he had already settled his accounts and obligations by means
of periodical payments in tuba (liquor of the nipa palm) and that if accounts are still pending
the same should be paid in kind and not in money.
Trial judge ordered Trillana to pay to Tiu Tusay (judicial administrator of the deceased plaintiff),
the sum of P 2,832.22 in tuba.
Defendant appealed by means of a bill of exceptions.
Judge overruled the motion to modify his former decision as far as it referred to the amount of
the indebtness found against the defendant and the said judgement was modified by adding
the provision that the defendant should make payment in tuba which he should deliver at the
plaintiff’s distillery within the term of 6 months but if the term expires. He must pay his debt in
cash.
Defendant requested a motion for a new trial but it was denied. He presented an amended bill
of exceptions and the court ordered the suspension of the execution providing that the
defendant furnish a bond of 4,000 pesos. 8 of the vales were signed by other persons so the
amount of 173 pesos should be deducted from the debt. The total debt amounted to 2,832.22
4/8 pesos.
Defendant showed a document made by Jose R. Lopes Lawa stating that Trillana has no
outstanding debt with distillery.

ISSUES:
W/N the defendant should be absolved from his debt due to the document made by Jose R.
Lopea Lawa?
Ruling:
No. In view of the foregoing, and accepting the conclusions contained in the judgement of
February 27, 1907, appealed from, it it our opinion that the same should be affirmed, and we
hereby affirm it, with addition made in order of May 7 of the same year, with the cos against
the appellant.
Lopez Lawa gave the document because the latter was not indebted to him but to Manuel
Ormachea. It was not his intention to annul and set aside the vales which represented the
indebtness of Trillana. Two years after ceasing to be a manager, he cannot relieve the debtor
from paying what he owed by virtue of the document because the right to recover the debts of
the defendant still belonged to Ormachea and Lawa was not authorized by Ormachea to
release Trillana from his debt. Payment shall be made to the person in whose favour the
obligation has been constituted, or his successor in interest, or any person authorized to
receive it.
267
People vs Nona Salazar Padiernos

FACTS:
Padiernos was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of her husband. She claimed that
he pushed her against the wall and he reached under the bed for his gun. Seeing this, she
pulled a knife from under the bed, closed her eyes, and started slashing from side to side. Non-
presentation of the written statement of a witness to the police gave rise to the presumption
that it “contained declarations disastrous to the prosecution case.”

RATIO:

The presumption that suppressed evidence is unfavorable does not apply where the evidence
was at the disposal of both the defense and the prosecution. Where the defense fails to show
their inability to acquire and use for themselves evidence allegedly suppressed by the
prosecution, the presumption that the allegedly suppressed evidence is unfavorable will not
apply.
It is well settled rule that one who admits the infliction of injuries which caused the death of
another has tha burden of proving self-defense with sufficient and convincing evidence. If such
evidence is of doubtful veracity, and is not clear and convincing, the defense must necessarily
fail, for having admitted that he was the author of the death of the deceased. It was incumbent
upon appellant, in order to avoid criminal liability, to prove the justifying circumstance claimed
by him without relying on the weakness of that of the prosecution but on the strength of his
own evidence, for even if the evidence of the prosecution were weak it could not be
disbelieved after the accused himself admitted the killing. Having failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence her plea of self-defense, the appellant must suffer the consequences of her
unlawful act.

Coming now to the question of credibility, "the rule consistently adhered to by this Court is to
give due respect to the finding of the trial court on the matter, the latter tribunal having had
the opportunity to observe the demeanor and conduct of witnesses while testifying and,
therefore, is in a better position to properly gauge their credibility. Thus, appellate tribunals will
not disturb the findings of fact of the trial court unless there is proof that said court, in making
the findings, had failed to appreciate some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that
would have altered the results of the case. 7

Upon a review of the records, We find no reason to reject the findings and conclusions of the
trial court. To begin with, the appellant's contention that prosecution witness Letty Basa is
biased because she is the cousin of the deceased, is without merit. While witnesses may be said
to be interested by reason of their relationship with one of the parties, their declarations
should not be disregarded or rejected capriciously on the ground of bias alone where-as in the
present case-they are reasonable, consistent and supported by facts and circumstances. 8 Nor
do We find merit in the contention that the non-presentation of the written statement of this
witness to the police which she allegedly did not sign, gave rise to the presumption that it
"contained declarations disastrous to the prosecution case". The presumption that suppressed
evidence is unfavorable does not apply where the evidence was at the disposal of both the
defense and the prosecution. 9 In the case at bar, the alleged statement of prosecution witness
Letty Basa was in the possession of the police authorities. Hence, the defense could have
requested the court below to issue a subpoena requiring the police to produce such statement,
but as the defense failed to do that, they cannot now argue that said statement if produced
would have been adverse to the prosecution.
268
Yee Hem vs United States

FACTS:

Congress has power to prohibit the importation of opium and, as a measure reasonably
calculated to aid in the enforcement of the prohibition, to make its concealment, with
knowledge of its unlawful importation, a crime.

The Act of February 9, 1909, §§ 1 and 2, as amended, January 17, 1914, prohibited the
importation of smoking opium after April 1, 1909, made it an offense to conceal such opium
knowing it to have been imported contrary to law, and provided that possession by the
defendant "shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction unless the defendant
shall explain the possession to the satisfaction of the jury." Section 3 provided that, on and
after July 1, 1913, all smoking opium within the United States should be presumed to have been
imported after April 1, 1909, and that the burden of proof should be on the claimant or accused
to rebut the presumption. Held that the presumptions thus created are reasonable, and do not
contravene the due process of law and the compulsory self-incrimination clauses of the Fifth
Amendment.

HELD:

MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND delivered the opinion of the Court.

Plaintiff in error was convicted in the court below of the offense of concealing a quantity of
smoking opium after importation with knowledge that it had been imported in violation of Act
Feb. 9, 1909, c. 100, 35 Stat. 614, as amended by Act Jan. 17, 1914, c. 9, 38 Stat. 275. Sections 2
and 3 of the act as amended are challenged as unconstitutional, on the ground that they
contravene the due process of law and the compulsory self-incrimination clauses of the Fifth
Amendment of the federal Constitution.

Section 1 of the act prohibits the importation into the United States of opium in any form after
April 1, 1909, except that opium and preparations and derivatives thereof, other than smoking
opium or opium prepared forsmoking, may be imported for medicinal purposes only, under
regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury. Section 2 provides, among other things,
that if any person shall conceal or facilitate the concealment of such opium, etc., after
importation, knowing the same to have been imported contrary to law, the offender shall be
subject to fine or imprisonment or both. It further provides that, whenever the defendant on
trial is shown to have, or to have had, possession of such opium, etc.," such possession shall be
deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction unless the defendant shall explain the
possession to the satisfaction of the jury."
Section 3 provides that, on and after July 1, 1913:

"all smoking opium or opium prepared for smoking found within the United States shall be
presumed to have been imported after the first day of April, nineteen hundred and nine, and
the burden of proof shall be on the claimant or the accused to rebut such presumption."

The plaintiff in error, at the time of his arrest in August, 1923, was found in possession of and
concealing a quantity of smoking opium. The lower court overruled a motion for an instructed
verdict of not guilty, and, after stating the foregoing statutory presumptions, charged the jury
in substance that the burden of proof was on the accused to rebut such presumptions, and that
it devolved upon him to explain that he was rightfully in possession of the smoking opium -- "at
least explain it to the satisfaction of the jury." The court further charged that the defendant was
presumed to be innocent until the government had satisfied the minds of the jurors of his guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt; that the burden to adduce such proof of guilt beyond the existence
of a reasonable doubt rested on the government at all times and throughout the trial, and that
a conviction could not be had "while a rational doubt remains in the minds of the jury."

The authority of Congress to prohibit the importation of opium in any form and, as a measure
reasonably calculated to aid in the enforcement of the prohibition, to make its concealment
with knowledge of its unlawful importation a criminal offense is not open to doubt. Brolan v.
United States, 236 U. S. 216; Steinfeldt v. United States, 219 F. 879. The question presented is
whether Congress has power to enact the provisions in respect of the presumptions arising
from the unexplained possession of such opium and from its presence in this country after the
time fixed by the statute.

In Mobile, etc., R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35, 219 U. S. 42-43, this Court, speaking through
Mr. Justice Lurton, said:

"The law of evidence is full of presumptions either of fact or law. The former are, of course,
disputable, and the strength of any inference of one fact from proof of another depends upon
the generality of the experience upon which it is founded. . . ."

"Legislation providing that proof of one fact shall constitute prima facie evidence of the main
fact in issue is but to enact a rule of evidence, and quite within the general power of
government. Statutes, national and state, dealing with such methods of proof in both civil and
criminal cases abound, and the decisions upholding them are numerous. . . ."

"That a legislative presumption of one fact from evidence of another may not constitute a
denial of due process of law or a denial of the equal protection of the law, it is only essential
that there shall be some rational connection between the fact provided and the ultimate fact
presumed, and that the inference of one fact from proof of another shall not be so
unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate. So also it must not, under a guise of
regulating the presentation of evidence, operate to preclude the party from the right to present
his defense to the main fact thus presumed. "
269
Country of Ulster vs Allen

FACTS:
Respondents were jointly tried on weapon and drug charges. Respondents objected to
introduction of the weapons and drugs into evidence, but the trial court overruled respondents'
objection, relying on the presumption of possession created by N.Y. Penal Law § 265.15(3).
Respondents moved to dismiss the charges. The trial court denied respondents' motion, and
respondents were found guilty. Respondents filed a post-trial motion challenging the
constitutionality of N.Y. Penal Law § 265.15(3), which was denied and affirmed on review.
Respondents filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, contending that they were denied due
process of law by application of the statutory presumption of possession. The statute was held
unconstitutional, and a writ of certiorari was granted.

DISCUSSION

 The Court reversed the judgment for the State, finding that that it was improper in the
habeas corpus proceeding to determine the constitutionality of the statute, and the application
of the statutory presumption of possession was not unconstitutional.
 The Court held that N.Y. Penal Law § 265.15(3) created a permissive presumption, and
the record as a whole established respondents' guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

CONCLUSION
The Court reversed the judgment for the State, found that the habeas corpus proceeding was
improper for determining constitutionality of the presumption statute, and the application of
the statutory presumption was not unconstitutional. The Court held that the state statute
created a permissive presumption, and the record established respondents' guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.
270
Sandstorm vs Montana

FACTS:

Based upon a confession and other evidence, petitioner was charged under a Montana statute
with "deliberate homicide," in that he "purposely or knowingly" caused the victim's death. At
trial, petitioner argued that, although he killed the victim, he did not do so "purposely or
knowingly," and therefore was not guilty of deliberate homicide. The trial court instructed the
jury that "[t]he law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary
acts," over petitioner's objection that such instruction had the effect of shifting the burden of
proof on the issue of purpose or knowledge. The jury found petitioner guilty, and the Montana
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that although shifting the burden of proof to the defendant by
means of a presumption is prohibited, allocation of "some burden of proof" to a defendant is
permissible. Finding that under the instruction in question petitioner's sole burden was to
produce "some" evidence that he did not intend the ordinary consequences of his voluntary
acts, and not to disprove that he acted "purposely or knowingly," the Montana court held that
the instruction did not violate due process standards.

HELD:

Because the jury may have interpreted the challenged presumption as conclusive, like the
presumptions in Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246, and United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 438 U. S. 422, or as shifting the burden of persuasion, like that in Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684, and because either interpretation would have violated the Fourteenth
Amendment's requirement that the State prove every element of a criminal offense beyond a
reasonable doubt, the instruction is unconstitutional. Pp. 442 U. S. 514-527.

"conflict with the overriding presumption of innocence with which t,he law endows the accused
and which extends to every element of the crime,"

Morissette, supra at 342 U. S. 275, and they "invad[e the] factfinding function," United States
Gypsum Co. supra at 438 U. S. 446, which, in a criminal case, the law assigns to the jury. The
presumption announced to petitioner's jury may well have had exactly these consequences,
since upon finding proof of one element of the crime (causing death), and of facts insufficient
to establish the second (the voluntariness and "ordinary consequences" of petitioner's action),
the jury could have reasonably concluded that it was directed to find against petitioner on the
element of intent. The State was thus not forced to prove "beyond a reasonable doubt . . .
every fact necessary to constitute the crime . . . charged," In re Winship,397 U. S. 358, 397 U. S.
364, and petitioner was deprived of his constitutional rights. Pp. 442 U. S. 521-523.
(c) A presumption which, although not conclusive, had the effect of shifting the burden of
persuasion to petitioner, would have suffered from similar infirmities. If the jury interpreted the
presumption in this manner, it could have concluded that, upon proof by the State of the
slaying, and of additional facts not themselves establishing the element of intent, the burden
was then shifted to petitioner to prove that he lacked the requisite mental state. Such a
presumption was found constitutionally deficient in Mullaney, supra. P. 442 U. S. 524.
271
People vs Magbanua

FACTS:

The victim was sexually abused continuously from the time she was13 years old until she got
pregnant after 4 years of sexual abuse by appellant, her own father. The sexual assaults usually
took place at noontime when she was left alone with appellant while her mother went to town
to buy their basic needs and while her brother and sisters were at the house of their
grandmother which was far from their house.

She did not report the rape incidents to her mother because appellant threatened to kill her.
When her mother noticed her pregnancy and asked her about the supposed father, she did not
tell her that it was appellant who authored her pregnancy. Instead, as suggested by appellant,
she named one Ricky Pacaul as the one who impregnated her. However, later on, she claimed
that she does not know any person by that name. And only later on when she moved to live
with her aunt did she tell the truth about the crime.

Held:

Denial, just like alibi, is insufficient to overcome the positive identification made by the witness
for the prosecution. Denial is an inherently weak defense which cannot prevail over the
credible testimony of the witness that the accused committed the crime charged. It must be
supported by strong evidence of non-culpability in order to merit acceptability. Appellant, in
the present case, failed to discharge this burden. His lame attempt to shift the blame to a
certain Ricky Pacaul, who may not even exist, in order to exculpate himself, cannot save him.
Moreover, where there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper motive why a
prosecution witness would testify falsely against an accused or falsely implicate him in a
heinous crime, the testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.
272
Magbunga vs People

FACTS:

The Court of Appeals having, by Decision of June 30, 1999,[1] affirmed that of the Regional Trial
Court of Romblon[2] convicting appellant Modesto Mabunga of robbery with force upon things
under Article 299 of the Revised Penal Code, he comes to this Court on a petition for review.
In the morning of October 2, 1994, employees of the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) including
Davy Villaruel (Villaruel) discovered that the hasp of the door of the BFP office in Barangay
Capaclan, Romblon, Romblon was destroyed, and that the only typewriter in their office, a
Triumph bearing Serial Number 340118640, was missing.

That on or about the 1st day of October, 1994, at around 12:00 midnight, in [B]arangay
Capaclan, municipality of Romblon, province of Romblon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent [to] gain, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the Office of the Bureau of Fire Protection by forcibly
breaking the door hasp of the main door and upon having gained entry therein, take, steal and
carry away one (1) typewriter (Triumph brand) with Serial No. 340118640, valued at P5,894.00,
Philippine currency, belonging to and owned by the government, without its consent, and to
the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforestated amount.[11]

RATIO:

While courts have consistently looked upon alibi with suspicion not only because it is
inherently weak and unreliable as a defense, but because it can easily be fabricated, [19] the
basic rule is for the prosecution, upon which lies the onus, to establish all the elements of a
crime to thereby hold him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Such burden does not shift as it
remains with the prosecution. Tasked with the burden of persuasion, the prosecution must thus
rely on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. [20]
Admittedly, the evidence for the prosecution is circumstantial. The alleged robbery was
discovered when the employees of the BFP reported for work on October 2, 1994 and noticed
that the hasp of the office door was broken and the typewriter was missing.
On the sole basis of the presumption laid down under above-quoted Section 3(j) of Rule
131 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the appellate court affirmed the conviction of appellant.
A presumption is an assumption of fact that the law requires to be made from another fact
or group of facts found or otherwise established in the action.[21] It is an inference as to the
existence of a fact not actually known, arising from its usual connection with another which is
known, or a conjecture based on past experience as to what course of human affairs ordinarily
take.[22]
A presumption has the effect of shifting the burden of proof to the party who would be
disadvantaged by a finding of the presumed fact. The presumption controls decision on the
presumed fact unless there is counterproof that the presumed fact is not so. [23]
In criminal cases, however, presumptions should be taken with caution especially in light of
serious concerns that they might water down the requirement of proof beyond reasonable
doubt. As special considerations must be given to the right of the accused to be presumed
innocent, there should be limits on the use of presumptions against an accused.
Although possession of stolen property within a limited time from the commission of the
theft or robbery is not in itself a crime, it being possible to possess the same and remain
innocent, such possession may be sufficient for the formation of an inference that the
possessor is the thief unless the evidence satisfactorily proves that the property was acquired
by the accused by legal means.
How the presumption under Section 3(j) Rule 131 is to be understood, United States v.
Catimbang[24] explains:

According to the modern view convictions in cases of this kind are not sustained upon a
presumption of law as to the guilt of the accused. The conviction rests wholly upon an inference
of fact as to the guilt of the accused. If as a matter of probability and reasoning based on the
fact of possession of the stolen goods, taken in connection with other evidence, it may fairly
be concluded beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty of the theft, judgment or
conviction may properly be entered. x x x

The inference of guilt is one of fact and rests upon the common experience of men. But the
experience of men has taught them that an apparently guilty possession may be explained so as
to rebut such an inference and an accused person may therefore put witness on the stand or go
to the witness stand himself to explain his possession, and any reasonable explanation of his
possession, inconsistent with his guilty connection with the commission of the crime, will rebut
the inference as to his guilt which the prosecution seeks to have drawn from his guilty
possession of the stolen goods.

It is in this sense that it is sometimes said that the unexplained possession of recently stolen
goods will sustain a conviction of the crime of larceny.[25] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
273
Ong vs Sandiganbayan

FACTS:

Congressman Bonifacio H. Gillego executed a Complaint-Affidavit, claiming that petitioner Jose

U. Ong, then Commissioner of the BIR, has amassed properties worth disproportionately more
than his lawful income.

Ong submitted an explanation and analysis of fund sourcing, reporting his net worth covering
the calendar years 1989 to 1991 and showing his sources and uses of funds, the sources of the
increase in his net worth and his net worth as of December 13, 1991.

Ong filed a Counter-Affidavit, submitting his Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the years
1988-1990, income tax return for 1988, bank certificate showing that he obtained a loan from
Allied Bank, certificate from SGV & Co. showing that he received retirement benefits from the
latter, a document entitled Acknowledgement of Trust showing that he acquired one of the
questioned assets for his brother-in-law, and other documents explaining the sources of funds
with which he acquired the questioned assets.

ISSUE:

Does the presumption of innocence apply to forfeiture proceedings?

HELD:

No. The presumption of innocence clause of the Constitution refers to criminal prosecutions
and not to forfeiture proceedings which are civil actions in rem. The Constitution is likewise not
violated by RA 1379 because statutes which declare that as a matter of law a particular
inference follows from the proof of a particular fact, one fact becoming prima facie evidence of
another, are not necessarily invalid, the effect of the presumption being merely to shift the
burden of proof upon the adverse party.

The presumption of innocence clause is not violated by Sec. 2 of RA 1379 which states that
property acquired by a public officer or employee during his incumbency in an amount which is
manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other
lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property shall be presumed prima
facie to have been unlawfully acquired. As elaborated by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, under the
principle of presumption of innocence, it is merely required of the State to establish a prima
facie case, after which the burden of proof shifts to the accused.
274

Pilipinas Bank vs Glee Chemical

FACTS:

Glee Chemichal Laboratories (GCL) alleged that it applied for a loan with Pilipinas Bank (PB) in
the amount of P800,000.00. Payment was secured by a mortgage on its real property in San
Juan, Metro Manila. The mortgage specifically stated that the mortgagor shall not apply the
amount obtained from the loans except as additional working capital fir the purchase of
fertilizers.

GCL claims that PB never delivered the loan proceeds and instead applied the amount to a debt
owed by a certain Rustica Tan from GCL.

Pilipinas Bank Insisted the payment of Rustica Tan’s debt was secured by the real estate
mortgage executed by GCL pursuant to a third-party liability inserted therein. Since part of
Rustica Tan’s debt remained unpaid, Pilipinas bank served on GCL a notice of foreclosure and
auction sale.

GCL filed a complaint for annulment of contract and damages with preliminary injunction. In a
supplemental complaint, CGL alleged that PB was also attempting to foreclose a chattel
mortgage as a security for an additional lan of P 12,000,000. This document did not bear the
consent or conformity of GCL to the mortgage as Rustica Tan stated that she owned the
chattels.

RTC issued the writs of preliminary injunction, and after trial, rendered judgment in favour of
GCL. CA affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUE:

WON the stipulation pour autrui should be given effect.

HELD:

No. CA decision affirmed. To constitute a valid stipulation it must be for the purpose and
intent of the stipulating parties benefit the third person and it is not sufficient that the third
person may be incidentally benefited by the stipulation. Cheng Yong and Melacio Hernandez, a
manager who signed the document as witness, testified that such stipulation was not
typewritten into the blank spaces of the pre-printed, pro-forma document. Guillermo,
however, the Senior Loans Clerk of PB, testified that he typed that stipulation one day before
he presented the same to Cheng yong. PB’s contention that there should be no doubt as to the
due execution of the document because it was notarized and registered with the Register of
Deeds is not tenable. According to Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the presumption
that a notarized document was duly executed is rebuttable. In this case, the testimony of
Guillermo too the effect that Cheng Yong and Melecio Hernandez did not appear before the
notary public destroyed this presumption. The notary public did not see them affix their
signatures on the document. Such being the cases, SC held to rely upon the factual findings of
the RTC and CA, and both ruled in favour of GCL. Therefore, without any reason to review the
factual findings of the CA, they are deemed final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on
appeal.
275
Surtida vs Rural Bank

FACTS:

On June 16, 1986, the spouses Pedro and Paz Surtida executed a real estate mortgage over
their 1,750 square meters residential land, located in Sto. Domingo, Albay, in favor of the Rural
Bank of Malinao (Albay), Inc. (Rural Bank). The deed was executed as security for the payment
of the P100,000.00 loan the spouses Surtida had applied for.4 The deed was filed in the Office of
the Registry of Deeds on August 12, 1986.

The spouses Surtida secured a loan of P149,500.00 from the Rural Bank evidenced by a
Promissory Note dated June 16, 1986.5 On the same day, the spouses received Cashier's Check
Nos. 69476 and 69487 totalling P140,862.22. The loan was to mature on December 2, 1987.

On November 4, 1987, the spouses Surtida secured another loan in the amount of P106,800.00
from the Rural Bank to mature on October 29, 1988.8 The spouses Surtida also received the net
proceeds of their loan on the same day via Cashier's Check No. 76419 as shown by their
signatures at the dorsal portions thereof.

The spouses Surtida failed to pay their loans. On August 31, 1989, they executed a Dation in
Payment over a 300 sq m undivided portion of their property covered by T.D. No. 519, in
payment of their P157,968.20 loan.10On January 5, 1990, the spouses Surtida executed another
Dation in Payment in favor of the Rural Bank over a portion of their property, located in Sto.
Niño, Sto. Domingo, Albay.11

In a letter dated January 14, 1993, the Rural Bank informed the spouses Surtida that they were
being given a preferential right to repurchase the property.12 The spouses Surtida rejected the
offer.

On April 20, 1993, the Rural Bank demanded that the spouses Surtida vacate that portion of Lot
1635 which the spouses Surtida had ceded to it. The spouses Surtida rejected the Rural Bank's
demand, and even sent a letter dated May 6, 1993, where they denied having received any loan
from the bank. They further stated that the note in the real estate mortgage and the dation in
payment were simulated contracts. They likewise demanded for a detailed statement of their
loans.

This prompted the Rural Bank to file a complaint against the spouses Surtida for unlawful
detainer in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC).

For their part, the spouses Surtida filed a complaint against the Rural Bank in the RTC of Legazpi
City for the annulment of the promissory notes, real estate mortgage, and dation in payment.
They alleged that they had never secured any loan from the bank; the said deeds were
fictitious; and they were made to sign the documents to enable it to avail of rediscounting
facilities from the Central Bank of the Philippines. They further stated that they never appeared
before the notary public, who appeared to have notarized the said documents.

Issue:

Whether or not the Decision and Resolution of the CA are in accord with the evidence and the
law.

Held:

Further, appellees are not unlettered persons without a modicum of intelligence and
unfamiliar with the transactions they entered into. They are educated persons with nay
a little experience in bank transactions specifically in applying for loans as they have
obtained several bank loans previously. Thus, there is no question that appellees fully
understood the import and consequences of their acts when they signed the two
promissory notes, real estate mortgage and the two daciones en pago on separate
occasions.29

Petitioners' bare denial that they had secured several loans from respondent on June 16, 1986
and November 4, 1987 cannot prevail over the testimonial and documentary evidence
presented in the trial court.

Under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the following are disputable presumptions: (1)
private transactions have been fair and regular;30 (2) the ordinary course of business has been
followed;31 and (3) there was sufficient consideration for a contract.32 A presumption may
operate against an adversary who has not introduced proof to rebut it. The effect of a legal
presumption upon a burden of proof is to create the necessity of presenting evidence to meet
the legal presumption or the prima facie case created thereby, and which if no proof to the
contrary is presented and offered, will prevail. The burden of proof remains where it is, but by
the presumption, the one who has that burden is relieved for the time being from introducing
evidence in support of the averment, because the presumption stands in the place of evidence
unless rebutted.33

The presumption that a contract has sufficient consideration cannot be overthrown by the bare
uncorroborated and self-serving assertion of petitioners that it has no consideration. To
overcome the presumption of consideration, the alleged lack of consideration must be shown
by preponderance of evidence.34 Petitioners failed to discharge this burden.

The contracts of Dation in Payment dated August 31, 1989 and January 5, 1990 were duly
notarized. It was only after respondent filed its complaint for unlawful detainer against
petitioners that the latter filed their complaint in the RTC. Obviously, the complaint of
petitioners in the RTC was intended to derail the complaint for unlawful detainer.
276
People vs Estenzo

FACTS:

In Criminal Case No. 2891, entitled "People of the Philippines, plaintiff, versus Gregorio Ojoy,
accused", of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch III, after the accused himself had
testified in his defense, his counsel manifested that for his subsequent witnesses he was filing
only their affidavits subject to cross-examination by the prosecution on matters stated in the
affidavits and on all other matters pertinent and material to the case. Private prosecutor Atty.
Amelia K. del Rosario, one of the petitioners here, objected to the proposed procedure but this
notwithstanding, respondent Judge gave his conformity thereto and subsequently issued the
questioned Order. Contending that respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion because the
aforesaid Orders violates Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
requires that the testimony of the witness should be given orally in open court, and there is no
appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, petitioners
instituted the present petition

ISSUE:

Did the judge’s orders violate Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which requires
that testimony of witnesses be given orally in open court?

HELD:

Yes. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 132 and Section 1, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court clearly
require that the testimony of a witness shall be given orally in open court. Theessential purpose
of requiring a witness to appear and testify orally at a trial is to secure for the adverse party the
opportunity of cross-examination. Cross-examination cannot be had except by the direct and
personal putting of questions and obtaining immediate answers. Personal appearance of the
witness before the judge also enables the judge as the trier of facts, to obtain the elusive and
incommunicable evidence of a witness' deportment while testifying, and a certain subjective
moral effect is produced upon the witness. It is only when the witness testifies orally that the
judge may have a true idea of his countenance, manner and expression, which may confirm or
detract from the weight of his testimony. Certainly, the physical condition of the witness will
reveal his capacity for accurate observation and memory, and his deportment and physiognomy
will reveal clues to his character. These can only be observed by the judge if the witness
testifies orally in court. Indeed, the great weight given the findings of fact of the trial judge in
the appellate court is based upon his having had just that opportunity and the assumption that
he took advantage of it to ascertain the credibility of the witnesses.
Section 1 of Rule 133 of the Rule requires that in determining the superior weight of evidence
on the issues involved, the court, aside from the other factors therein enumerated, may
consider the "witness manner of testifying" which can only be done if the witness gives his
testimony orally in open court". If a trial judge prepares his opinion immediately after the
conclusion of the trial, with the evidence and his impressions of the witnesses fresh in his mind,
it is obvious that he is much more likely to reach a correct result than if he simply reviews the
evidence from a typewritten transcript, without having had the opportunity to see, hear and
observe the actions and utterances of the witnesses.
277
People vs Go

FACTS: A raiding team armed with a warrant entered the home of appellant Benny Go in search
of evidence for the violation of Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 . Upon their entry, they met Jack Go, son of
the Go and restrained him. As the former was the only one present at the time they then called
on two baranggay kagawads to act as witnesses on the said search. They then siezed properties
and objects even those which were not included in the warrant. When they were almost
finished with their search Go arrived and immediately together with the two witnesses was
made to sign the inventory reciept.

Based on the evidence taken from the search Go was charged for violation of R.A. 6425. Upon
hearing, testimonies as well as evidences were presented by the prosecution against Go.
However, the two witnesses questioned the validity of some of the evidence presented such as
the inventory receipt as well as the illegal drugs said to have been seized from the search.

The Regional Trial Court of Manila convicted Go for violation of the offense cahrged. On appeal,
Go assails the decision of the RTC as well the validity of the search performed by the raiding
team and the admissibility of the evidence taken therefrom. Go also asks for the return of the
properties seized that were not included in the search warrant.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the properties not included in the search warrant may be returned to Go

HELD:

It bears reiterating that the purpose of the constitutional requirement that the articles to be
seized be particularly described in the warrant is to limit the things to be seized to those, and
only those, particularly described in the search warrant - to leave the officers of the law with no
discretion regarding what articles they should seize. At the same time, the raiding team
characterized the seizure of the assorted documents, passports, bankbooks, checks, check
writer, typewriter, dry seals and stamp pads as ―seizure of evidence in plain view. Under the
plain view doctrine, objects falling in the ―plain view‖ of an officer who has a right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.

To be sure, the policemen also filed a complaint against Go for alleged possession of
instruments or implements intended for the commission of falsification under paragraph 2 of
Article 176 of the Revised Penal Code on the basis of dry seals and rubber stamps also found in
appellant‘s residence.
The counterfeit nature of the seals and stamps was in fact not established until after they had
been turned over to the Chinese embassy and Bureau of Immigration and Deportation for
verification. It is, therefore, incredible that SPO1 Fernandez could make such determination
from a ―plain view‖ of the items from his vantage point in the sala.

In sum, the circumstances attendant to the case at bar do not warrant the application of the
―plain view‖ doctrine to justify the seizure and retention of the questioned seized items. The
things belonging to appellant not specifically mentioned in the warrants, like those not
particularly described, must thus be ordered returned to him.

Be that as it may, considering that the two (2) dry seals and eight (8) of the rubber stamps have
been certified to be counterfeit by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, they may not
be returned and are hereby declared confiscated in favor of the State to be disposed of
according to law.

Moreover, the various bankbooks and passports not belonging to appellant may not be ordered
returned in the instant proceedings. The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party
whose rights have been impaired thereby, and the objection to an unlawful search and seizure
is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.
278
People vs Bisda

FACTS:

The victim’s classes had just ended and she was on her way to her school bus unkonown to
Angela, appellants Alma and Jenny Rose were outside of the school gate waiting for her.
They approached the young girl, and told her that her parents were waiting for her at the
Jollibee Restaurant. Angela initially refused to go with the two women, but because Alma
held on to her hand so tightly and poked a knife at her. With Angela in tow, Alma and Jenny
Rose boarded a white taxi and went to a dirty house where they changed Angelas clothes.
The girl was made to wear blouse and shorts, yellow t-shirt and pair of panties. Several days
have passed when the mother Marymae received a telephone call from a woman demanding
for ransom money.

ISSUE:

WON the competency of the witness and the truth of testimony are impaired when child
witness is not examined on the nature of the oath and the need for her to tell the whole
truth.

HELD:

In this case, Angela was six years old when she satisfied. She took an oath to tell the truth,
the whole truth and nothing but the truth before she testified on direct examination. There
was a nary whimper of protest or objection on the part of the appellants to Angeles
competence as a witness and the prosecutions failure to propound questions to determine
whether Angela understood her obligation and responsibility of telling the truth respecting
the matter of her testimony before the court. The appellants did not even bother requesting
the trial court for leave to conduct a voir direct examination of Angela/ After the prosecution
terminated its direct examination, the appellants thereafter cross-examined Angela
extensively and intensively on the matter of her testimony on direct examination. It was only
in this court that the appellants raised the matter for the first time, that there was a failure
on the part of the prosecution to examine Angela on the nature of her oath, and to ascertain
whether she had the capacity to distinguish right from wrong. It is too late in the day for the
appellants to raise the issue.
279
Galman v. Pamaran
138 SCRA 294 (1985)

FACTS:

In order to determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing and to allow a free,
unlimited and exhaustive investigation of all aspects and the killing of Sen Aquino at MIA PD
1886 was promulgated creating an ad hoc Fact Finding Board a.k.a tha Agrava Board. The
board conducted public hearings wherein various witnesses appeared and testified and/or
produced documentary and other evidence either in obedience to a subpoena or in response
to an invitation issued by the board. Among those who testified and produced evidence
before the board are the respondents in this petition.

Respondents contend that their individual testimonies before said board should not be
admitted in evidence and prayed that the same be rejected as evidence for the prosecution.
However, said prayer was denied by the Sandiganbayan contending that their testimonies
could not be execluded because the immunity was not available to them because of their
failure to invoke their right against self-incrimination before the ad hoc Fact Finding Board.

Issue:

1. WON the testimonies given by the 8 respondents who did not invoke the rights against
self-incrimination before tha Agrava Board is admissible evidence.

HELD:

NO. The Board is in truth and in fact, and to all legal intents and purposes, an entity charged,
not only with the function of determining the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing,
but more importantly, the determination of the person or persons criminally responsible
therefore so that they may be brought before the bar of justice.

The investigation therefore is also geared, as any other similar investigation of itd sort, to the
ascertainment and/or determination of the culprit or culprits, their consequent prosecution
and ultimately, their conviction.

In the course of receiving evidence, persons summoned to testify will include nt merely plain
witnesses but also those suspected as authors and co-participants in the tragic killing. And
when suspects are summoned and called to testify and/or produce evidence, the situation is
one where the person testifying or producing evidence is undergoing investigation for the
commission of an offense and not merely in order tp shed light on the facts and surrounding
circumstances of the assassination, but more importantly, to determine the character and
extent of his participation therein.
This notwithstanding, PD No. 1886 denied them the right to remain silent. They were
compelled to testify or be witness against themselves. Section 5 of PD 1886 leave them no
choice. They have to take the witness stand, testify or produce evidence, under pain of
contempt if they failed or refused to do so. The jeopardy of being placed behind prison bars
even before conviction dangled before their very eyes. Similarly, they cannot invoke the right
not to be witness against themselves, both of which are sacrosanct enshrined and protected
by our fundamental law. Both these constitutional rights to remain silent and not to be
compelled to be witness against himself were right away totally foreclosed by PD 1886. And
yet when they so testified and produced evidence as ordered, they were not immune from
prosecution by reason of the testimony given by them.
 280
Herrera vs Alba

In May 1998, Armi Alba, mother of minor Rosendo Alba filed a suit against Rosendo Herrera in
order for the latter to recognize and support Rosendo as his biological son. Herrera denied
Armi’s allegations. In the year 2000, the trial court ordered the parties to undergo a
(deoxyribonucleic acid )DNA testing to establish whether or not Herrera is indeed the biological
father of Rosendo Alba. However, Herrera questioned the validity of the order as he claimed
that DNA testing has not yet garnered widespread acceptance hence any result therefrom will
not be admissible in court; and that the said test is unconstitutional for it violates his right
against self-incrimination.
ISSUE: Whether or not Herrera is correct.
HELD: No. It is true that in 1997, the Supreme Court ruled in Pe Lim vs CA that DNA testing is
not yet recognized in the Philippines and at the time when he questioned the order of the trial
court, the prevailing doctrine was the Pe Lim case; however, in 2002 there is already no
question as to the acceptability of DNA test results as admissible object evidence in Philippine
courts. This was the decisive ruling in the case of People vs Vallejo (2002).
In the Vallejo Case, the Supreme Court recognized DNA analysis as admissible evidence. On the
other hand, as to determining the weight and probative value of DNA test results, the Supreme
Court provides, which is now known as the Vallejo Guidelines:
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among
other things, the following data:

1. how the samples were collected,

2. how they were handled,
3. the possibility of contamination of the samples,
4. the procedure followed in analyzing the samples,
5. whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests,
6. and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.

The above test is derived from the Daubert Test which is a doctrine adopted from US
jurisprudence (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.) The Daubert Test is a test to be
employed by courts before admitting scientific test results in evidence. More specifically, the
Daubert Test inquires:

1. Whether the theory or technique can be tested,

2. Whether the proffered work has been subjected to peer review,
3. Whether the rate of error is acceptable,
4. Whether the method at issue enjoys widespread acceptance

In this case, the Supreme Court declared that in filiation cases, before paternity inclusion can be
had, the DNA test result must state that the there is at least a 99.9% probability that the person
is the biological father. However, a 99.9% probability of paternity (or higher but never possibly
a 100% ) does not immediately result in the DNA test result being admitted as an overwhelming
evidence. It does not automatically become a conclusive proof that the alleged father, in this
case Herrera, is the biological father of the child (Alba). Such result is still a disputable or a
refutable evidence which can be brought down if the Vallejo Guidelines are not complied with.
What if the result provides that there is less than 99.9% probability that the alleged father is the
biological father?
Then the evidence is merely corroborative.
Anent the issue of self-incrimination, submitting to DNA testing is not violative of the right
against self-incrimination. The right against self-incrimination is just a prohibition on the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort communication (testimonial evidence) from a
defendant, not an exclusion of evidence taken from his body when it may be material. There is
no “testimonial compulsion” in the getting of DNA sample from Herrera, hence, he cannot
properly invoke self-incrimination.
281
Rosete vs Lim

FACTS:

Juliano Lim and Liia Lim filed complint for annulment, specific performance with damages
against the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits Sytem, Espreme Realty and Development
Co., Alfredo Rosete, Maj. Oscar Mapalo, Chito Rosete, BPI, and Register of Deeds of Mindori
Occidental. Asks for annulment of deed of sale, executed by AFP-RSBS to Espreme Realty of
parcels of land, and for the cancellation of the title of the lands to the Lims.

Lots of procedural stuff happened, relevant to us is that the respondents filed a Notice to take
Deposition upon Oral Examination. Lower court denied the petitioners’ ex parte motion and
scheduled the taking of deposition.

ISSUE:

WON the trial court erred in declaring that the right against self incrimination would not be
violated by the taking of their deposition in the civil case.

HELD:

CA decision affirmed. Right against self-incrimination is accorded to every person who gives
evidence, whether voluntary or through subpoena. The right can only be claimed when specific
question is actually put to the witness, and not at any other time. Witness cannot decline to be
appear before the court or refuse to testify. Subpoena must obey. An accused in criminal case
may refuse to take witness stand and as a witness, as held in People v Ayson where the court
held an accused to occupy a different tier of protection. Under the ROC, in all criminal
prosecutions the defendant is entitled among others (1) to be exempt from being witness
against himself, and (2) to testify as a witness in his own behalf, his refusal to be a witness shall
not in any manner prejudice or be used against him.

In this case, what is involved is a civil case for annulment specific performance with damages. It
cannot be considered in the nature of a criminal proceeding.
282
Dela Paz v IAC

FACTS:

 Loreto de la Paz filed a complaint against the petitioners for a judicial declaration of
ownership of a 43,830 square meter parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. 901 in the name of Ponciano de la Paz
 Loreto alleged that the subject parcel of land was among the properties adjudicated to her
and her mother as a result of a partition submitted by the heirs of Ponciano de la Paz and
approved by the court in Civil Case No. 1399.
 The subject matter of Civil Case No. 1399 was Ponciano's testate estate.
 In their answer, the petitioners denied that the disputed lot was among the properties
adjudicated to Loreto and her mother. They claimed that the parcel of land was not
accounted for in the probate proceedings but is actually community property of the parties.
 The parties, except for petitioner Enrique de la Paz, were admittedly compulsory heirs of
Ponciano de la Paz who died in 1916
 Loreto was the only legitimate child of Ponciano
 As regards petitioner Enrique de la Paz, Loreto denied his claim that he is one of the heirs of
Ponciano. The petitioners, however, allege that he is also a compulsory heir of Ponciano, he
being the son of Ponciano de la Paz, Jr., the eldest child of the decedent.
 Loreto took the witness stand. She finished her direct testimony on March 12, 1984.
 On April 25, 1984, the petitioners' counsel began his cross-examination of Loreto. The cross-
examination was, however, not completed.
 The petitioners' counsel moved in open court for the continuance of the cross-examination
on the ground that he still had to conduct a lengthy cross-examination.
 On May 18, 1984, Loreto's counsel filed a motion for "correction of transcript" due to some
errors in the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the direct testimony of Loreto.
The motion was granted.
 This order granting the correction prompted the petitioners'' counsel to manifest that he
would not be able to undertake the cross-examination of the witness as scheduled. The trial
court postponed the trial of the case to May 31, 1984 and later to July 5, and 11, 1984
 Trial resumed. The petitioners' counsel, however, asked for still another postponement of
the cross-examination to give him a chance to go over the stenographic notes.
 During the scheduled trial on September 14, 1984, neither the petitioners, nor their counsel
appeared despite due notice. Loreto's counsel, therefore, filed a motion that she be allowed
to present evidence ex parte before a commissioner.
 Despite this development, the petitioners upon their motion were allowed to cross-examine
Loreto.
 On the scheduled hearing however, the petitioners' counsel failed to appear, and the cross-
examination of Loreto was deferred for the fourth time.
 Finally, on November 7, 1984, the petitioners' counsel resumed his repeatedly postponed
cross-examination of Loreto. The cross-examination was, however, cut short and
rescheduled again on motion of the petitioners' counsel.
 Unfortunately, Loreto died on December 1, 1984. An amended complaint was filed for the
purpose of substituting the respondents as heirs of Loreto
 The petitioners moved verbally to strike off the record the entire testimony of Loreto. The
motion was denied. Thus, they filed a petition before the IAC, however the same was also
denied.
 The petitioners contend that the appellate committed grave abuse of discretion when it
sanctioned the trial court's orders which denied the striking out of the testimony of original
plaintiff Loreto de la Paz from the record.

ISSUES:

W/N petitioners were deprived of their right to cross examination when the court denied
their motion to strike off the record, the testimony of Loreto

HELD:

NO.

 Well settled is the rule that the right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing
witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before
administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental right which is part of
due process.
 The right of a party to cross-examine the witness of his adversary in invaluable as it is
inviolable in civil cases, no less than the right of the accused in criminal cases. The express
recognition of such right of the accused in the Constitution does not render the right
thereto of parties in civil cases less constitutionally based, for it is an indispensable part of
the due process guaranteed by the fundamental law. ... Until such cross-examination has
been finished, the testimony of the witness cannot be considered as complete and may not,
therefore, be allowed to form part of the evidence to be considered by the court in deciding
the case.
 But also, it is ruled that it is not an absolute right which a party can demand at all times.
 The right is a personal one which may be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct
amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-examination. Thus, where a party has had
the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily
forfeits the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct examination of the
witness will be received or allowed to remain in the record.
 In the case at bar, the petitioners' failure to cross-examine Loreto was through no fault of
the respondents. As can be gleaned from the record, Loreto was available for cross-
examination from the time she finished her direct testimony on March 12, 1984
 The petitioners not only kept on postponing the cross-examination but at times failed to
appear during scheduled hearings.
 The postponement of the trial on May 23, 1984 to a later date due to the correction of the
stenographic notes of Loreto's testimony may be justified, but the same cannot be said for
the subsequent postponements requested by the petitioners.
 Under these circumstances, we rule that the petitioners had waived their right to cross-
examine Loreto. Through their own fault, they lost their right to cross-examine Loreto. Her
testimony stands.