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Review Essay: Work Reviewed
Review Essay: Work Reviewed
Review Essay: Work Reviewed
military campaigns of the Third Reich in World War II. He commences his accounts
in the summer of 1938 with the lead-up to the Poland campaign and ends in the spring
17), Manstein excludes all elements of the war in which he played no active role and
furthermore aims not to concern himself with “political problems or matters with no
direct bearing on events in the military field” (von Manstein 1958, 17). Manstein
delineates initial German victories and how these achievements ultimately turned into
defeat. Manstein attributes the loss of formerly gained ground to three main aspects,
book is reflected in his belief in duty, bravery, comradeship, and integrity, which he
As the author actively participated in the events described in Lost Victories, first as
Lieutenant General and eventually as Field Marshal, his accounts provide explicit
insights into the Wehrmacht’s command structure and the inner workings of the Third
1
German original: Verlorene Siege
Adopted style guide: Turabian, A Manual for Writers of Research Papers, Theses and
Dissertations (Turabian 2007)
Lost Victories is divided into three large parts, each concerning itself with one
of the three military campaigns that Manstein was involved in; namely, the campaign
in Poland, the campaign in the West and the war in the East. Throughout the book, a
gradual, yet very noticeable trend of heavier focus on questions of political strategy,
clarify or expand on certain circumstances. The author makes frequent use of military
maps to visualize his description of battle tactics, which adds to the book’s overall
commendable structural effectiveness. For a reader unfamiliar with the sequence and
interplay of the various battles of World War II, Manstein’s accounts are bound to
comprehensive overview of the military occurrences between 1939 and 1945 was
resources as one of the three factors leading to its ultimate defeat, Manstein posits that
this disadvantage on its own was not a decisive factor, as it could have been
victory in Order White2, as well as the successful capturing of the Crimean Peninsula
by the 11th Army3. Both campaigns were conducted under the sole command of the
provides further proof, albeit of the opposite outcome, in his assessment of the Battle
2
Military Codename used for the Poland Campaign 1939
3
11th Army was under Manstein’s command at this time
4
OKH = “Oberkommando des Heeres” (Supreme Command of land forces)
of Stalingrad. He attributes the fact that the 6th Army found itself in such a dire
whereas in his view the culprit for the ultimate fatal outcome is to be found in Hitler
in war: first destroying the enemy’s army, then occupying the country and
of war differ greatly is the separation of military and political command. Clausewitz
understands war as an extension of politics, which by its very nature requires political
objectives to drive military objectives and political leaders to direct the military in
such a way that facilitates the attainment of their political goals (von Clausewitz
1976).
In contrast, Manstein holds that only overall war policy lies in the area of
responsibility of Heads of States, whereas “a land offensive […] must depend entirely
on how, when and whether the army would be able to tackle the task. In these three
5
Compare Clausewitz: “Since of the three objectives named, it is the fighting forces
that assure the safety of the country, the natural sequence would be to destroy them
first, and then subdue the country. Having achieved these two goals and exploiting
our own position of strength, we can bring the enemy to the peace table.” (von
Clausewitz 1976, 91) and Manstein: “Now questions of a political and economic
nature are undoubtedly of great importance when it comes to fixing strategic aims.
What Hitler overlooked was that the achievement and – most important of all – the
retention of territorial objective presupposes the defeat of the enemy’s armed forces.”
(von Manstein 1958, 276)
respects the primacy of the army leadership was inalienable.” (von Manstein 1958,
73)
the Head of State and subsequently letting said commander wage war freely, void of
the three most striking of which are: 1) his claim that the German public did not
believe they were a Master race that should dominate the European continent, which
is at best a generalizing and ambiguous statement (Giordano 1987); 2) his claim that
under his command, which has been proven to be a historical misrepresentation (von
Wrochem 2006); 3) his belief that Germany’s war in the east could still have been
won as late as 1944 if other tactics had been adopted, which is a claim that has been
As Verlorene Siege was first published in 1955, a decade after the war, and
shortly after Manstein’s premature release from war captivity, the possibility of him
consciously engaging in legacy building must be considered. The fact that the three
aforementioned elements exonerate him from the ‘ugliest’ sides of the Third Reich
6
Order to immediately execute political commissars of the Red Army and not treat
them as war prisoners
7
Order delineating the ‘desirable’ behavior of German troops in Eastern Europe,
which amongst others comprised the order to facilitate the persecution and
assassination of Jews
and the circumstance that he was the only Wehrmacht general to ever advise the new
accounts rich in detail which, if not objective in their entirety, offer value by enabling
the reader to approach the battles of WWII through the lens of a high-ranking and
Giordano, Ralph. Die zweite Schuld, oder Von der Last Deutscher zu sein. Hamburg:
Rasch und Röhring, 1987.
Shy, John. „Jomini.“ In Makers of Modern Strategy, von Peter Paret, 143-185.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.
von Clausewitz, Carl. On War. Übersetzung: Michael Howard, & Peter Paret.
Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1976.
von Manstein, Erich. Lost Victories. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1958.