[G.R. No. 131541.

October 20, 2000]

THERMOCHEM INCORPORATED and JEROME O.

CASTRO, petitioners, vs. LEONORA NAVAL and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This damage suit arose from a collision of vehicles based on the following facts:

"(O)n May 10, 1992, at around 12:00 o'clock midnight, Eduardo Edem[1] was driving a
"Luring Taxi" along Ortigas Avenue, near Rosario, Pasig, going towards Cainta. Prior
to the collision, the taxicab was parked along the right side of Ortigas Avenue, not far
from the Rosario Bridge, to unload a passenger. Thereafter, the driver executed a U-
turn to traverse the same road, going to the direction of EDSA. At this point, the
Nissan Pathfinder traveling along the same road going to the direction of Cainta
collided with the taxicab. The point of impact was so great that the taxicab was hit in
the middle portion and was pushed sideward, causing the driver to lose control of the
vehicle. The taxicab was then dragged into the nearby Question Tailoring Shop, thus,
causing damage to the said tailoring shop, and its driver, Eduardo Eden, sustained
injuries as a result of the incident."[2]

Private respondent, as owner of the taxi, filed a damage suit against petitioner,
Thermochem Incorporated, as the owner of the Nissan Pathfinder, and its driver,
petitioner Jerome Castro. After trial, the lower court adjudged petitioner Castro negligent
and ordered petitioners, jointly and severally, to pay private respondent actual,
compensatory and exemplary damages plus attorney's fees and costs of suit. The
dispositive portion of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 150 of Makati City
dated September 25, 1995, reads:

In view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants,
jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the following:

1. The amount of P47,850.00 as actual damages;

2. The amount of P45,000.00 as compensatory damages for unrealized income;

3. The amount of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages;

4. The amount of P10,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; and

5. Cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.[3]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court a quo.[4] Hence,
this petition for review on certiorari. The petition was denied on February 2, 1998 for
failure to submit an explanation why no personal service of copies of certain pleadings
was made as required by Rule 13, Section 11 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.[5]Upon petitioners' motion for reconsideration, the petition was reinstated and
private respondent was required to file her Comment in a Resolution dated June 22,
1998.[6] A copy of the said Resolution was sent by registered mail to private
respondent's counsel but the same was returned to sender.[7] In a separate Resolution
issued on the same date, this Court ordered that a copy of the June 22, 1998
Resolution be served personally on private respondent's counsel.[8] As the said
Resolution was also returned unserved, "the Court Resolved to consider the said
Resolution as SERVED."[9] After more than a year, no Comment has been
filed. Considering that private respondent was given only ten (10) days to file her
Comment, that period had already lapsed ten days after the June 23, 1999 Resolution
which stated that the June 22, 1998 resolution as "served".
Service of notice or other pleadings which are required by the rules to be furnished
to the parties must be made on their last address on record. If they are represented by
counsel, such notices shall be sent instead to the counsel's last given address on record
in the absence of a proper and adequate notice to the court of a change of
address,[10]unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the court. [11] It is the party
and his counsel's responsibility to device a system for the receipt of mail intended for
them[12] just as it is the duty of counsel to inform the court of a change in his address. In
the case at bar, private respondent's counsel never notified the Court of any change of
his address or whether he no longer holds office in his last address of record. Neither
was the Court informed if his ties with his client has been severed. Insofar as the Court
is concerned, the last address on record is the place where all notices shall be served
until the Court is officially informed to the contrary. What is the effect of the failure of a
private respondent to comply with a court order to file Comment?
Courts are given the option to dispense with the filing of the Comment and consider
the case as deemed submitted for decision. Under Rule 46, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure,[13] when the respondent in an original action filed with the court fails
to file its comment, the case may be decided on the basis of the evidence on record
without prejudice to disciplinary action against the disobedient party. Concomitant
thereto is the rule that pursuant to Rule 51, Section 1(B)(1),[14] where no comment is
filed upon the expiration of the period to comment in an original action or a petition for
review, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision. Both provisions are applicable
to a petition for review filed with the Supreme Court as provided in Rule 56, Section 2(a)
of the Rules.[15] Moreover, a lawyer who fails to submit the required Comment manifests
willful disobedience to a lawful order of the Supreme Court, a clear violation of the
Canon of Professional Ethics.[16] Counsel must remember that his actions and omissions
are binding on his client.[17] He should not neglect legal matters entrusted to him as his
negligence therefrom shall render him liable.[18]
The petition lacks merit.
The issue of whether a party is negligent is a question of fact. It is a time-honored
precept that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, [19] although it has authority to
review and reverse factual findings of lower courts if these do not conform to
evidence.[20] It is also settled that findings of fact of the trial court, particularly when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is binding on the Supreme Court [21] and generally
conclusive,[22] especially if it has not been adequately shown that no significant facts and
circumstances were overlooked or disregarded which when considered would have
altered the outcome of the disposition.
The driver of the oncoming Nissan Pathfinder vehicle was liable and the driver of
the U-turning taxicab was contributorily liable. Contrary to petitioners' contention, the
fact that a party had no opportunity to avoid the collision is of his own making and this
should not relieve him of liability.[23] From petitioner Castro's testimonial admissions, it is
established that he was driving at a speed faster than 50 kilometers per hour because it
was a downhill slope coming from the Rosario bridge. But as he allegedly stepped on
the brake, it locked causing his Nissan Pathfinder to skid to the left and consequently hit
the taxicab. The sudden malfunction of the vehicle's brake system is the usual excuse
of drivers involved in collisions which are the result of speedy driving, particularly when
the road is downhill.
Malfunction or loss of brake is not a fortuitous event. Between the owner and his
driver, on the one hand, and third parties such as commuters, drivers and pedestrians,
on the other, the former is presumed to know about the conditions of his vehicle and is
duty bound to take care thereof with the diligence of a good father of the family. A
mechanically defective vehicle should avoid the streets. As petitioner's vehicle was
moving downhill, the driver should have slowed down since a downhill drive would
naturally cause the vehicle to accelerate. Moreover, the record shows that the Nissan
Pathfinder was on the wrong lane when the collision occurred. This was a disregard of
traffic safety rules. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy or negligent
in a man of ordinary diligence and prudence and determines liability by that. [24] Even
assuming arguendo that loss of brakes is an act of God, by reason of their negligence,
the fortuitous event became humanized, rendering the Nissan driver liable for the
ensuing damages.[25]
As mentioned earlier, the driver of the taxi is contributorily liable. U-turns are not
generally advisable particularly on major streets. The taxi was hit on its side which
means that it had not yet fully made a turn to the other lane. The driver of the taxi ought
to have known that vehicles coming from the Rosario bridge are on a downhill
slope. Obviously, there was lack of foresight on his part, making him contributorily
liable. Most public utility drivers disregard signs and traffic rules especially during the
night when traffic enforcers manning the streets disappear with the light. In driving
vehicles, the primary concern should be the safety not only of the driver or his
passengers, but also his fellow motorists.
 Considering the contributory negligence of the driver of private respondent's taxi,
the award of P47,850.00, for the repair of the taxi, should be reduced in half. All other
awards for damages are deleted for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the assailed decision is
MODIFIED. Petitioners are ordered to pay, jointly and severally, to private respondent
the amount of P23,925.00 as actual damages. All other awards are DELETED.
SO ORDERED.

Thermochem Inc. vs. Naval. Gr. No.131541. 20 Oct 2000

Ponente: Ynares-Santiago

Facts: On May 10, 1992, at around 12:00 o'clock midnight, Eduardo Edem was driving a "Luring Taxi"
along Ortigas Avenue, near Rosario, Pasig, going towards Cainta. Prior to the collision, the taxicab was
parked along the right side of Ortigas Avenue, not far from the Rosario Bridge, to unload a passenger.
Thereafter, the driver executed a U-turn to traverse the same road, going to the direction of EDSA. At this
point, the Nissan Pathfinder traveling along the same road going to the direction of Cainta collided with
the taxicab. The taxicab was then dragged into the nearby Question Tailoring Shop, thus, causing damage
to the said tailoring shop, and its driver, Eduardo Eden, sustained injuries as a result of the incident.
Private respondent, as owner of the taxi, filed a damage suit against petitioner, Thermochem
Incorporated, as the owner of the Nissan Pathfinder, and its driver, petitioner Jerome Castro. After trial,
the lower court adjudged petitioner Castro negligent and ordered petitioners, jointly and severally, to pay
private respondent actual, compensatory and exemplary damages plus attorney's fees and costs of suit.

Issue: Whether or not Castro was Negligent.

Ruling: Decision modified. Award is reduced in half, considering the contributory negligence of the driver
of private respondent's taxi.
The Supreme Court held that the driver of the oncoming Nissan Pathfinder vehicle was liable and the
driver of the U-turning taxicab was contributorily liable. Contrary to petitioners' contention, the fact that
a party had no opportunity to avoid the collision is of his own making and this should not relieve him of
liability. The driver of the taxi is contributorily liable. U-turns are not generally advisable particularly on
major streets. The taxi was hit on its side which means that it had not yet fully made a turn to the other
lane. The driver of the taxi ought to have known that vehicles coming from the Rosario bridge are on a
downhill slope. Obviously, there was lack of foresight on his part, making him contributorily liable. Most
public utility drivers disregard signs and traffic rules especially during the night when traffic enforcers
manning the streets disappear with the light. In driving vehicles, the primary concern should be the safety
not only of the driver or his passengers, but also his fellow motorists.

QUINGWA VS. PUNO (19 SCRA 439)

FACTS: Flora Quingwa filed a verified complaint charging Armando Puno, a
member of the Bar, with gross immorality and misconduct. Complainant is
an educated woman, having been a public school teacher for a number of
years. The respondent took her to the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958,
signing the hotel register as "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and succeeded in
having sexual intercourse with her on the promise of marriage. Complainant
submitted to respondent's plea for sexual intercourse because of
respondent's promise of marriage and not because of a desire for sexual
gratification or of voluntariness and mutual passion. Complainant gave birth
to a baby boysupported by a certified true copy of a birth certificate and to
show how intimate the relationship between the respondent and the
complainant was, the latter testified that she gave money to the respondent
whenever he asked from her.

The respondent denied all the material allegations of the complaint, and as a
special defense averred that the allegations therein do not constitute
grounds for disbarment or suspension under section 25, Rule 127 of the
former Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Puno should be disbarred/suspended.

HELD: YES. One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the
Bar is that the applicant must produce before the Supreme Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character (Section 2, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court). It is essential during the continuance of the practice and the
exercise of the privilege to maintain good moral character. When his
integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the
charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for
the relator and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of
morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of him. With respect to
the special defense raised by the respondent in his answer to the charges of
the complainant that the allegations in the complaint do not fall under any of
the grounds for disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar as
enumerated in section 25 of Rule 127 of the (old) Rules of Court, it is
already a settled rule that the statutory enumeration of the grounds for
disbarment or suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general
power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent powers of the
court over its officers cannot be restricted. Times without number, our
Supreme Court held that an attorney will be removed not only for
malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct,
which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges
which his license and the law confer upon him. Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of court states that:

A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office

as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilfull
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or
wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to
 do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The respondent has committed a grossly immoral act and has, thus
disregarded and violated the fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, it
is important that members of this ancient and learned profession of law
must conform themselves in accordance with the highest standards of
morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics:

The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the
profession of candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in either moral
character or education. He should strive at all times to uphold the honor and
to maintain the dignity of the profession and to improve not only the law but
the administration of justice.

Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby disbarred and, as a

consequence, his name is ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.

36 ROYONG v OBLENA

FACTS:
 Royong, the niece it the common-law wife of Oblena, filed a rape case against the latter.
 In her complaint, Royong alleged that in 1958 Oblena forced her to have intercourse with her and that she refrained to report the
incident because Oblena threatened to kill her family.
 As a result if the sexual intercourse, Royong gave birth to a child
 Oblena denied all the allegations and argued that he and Royong had a relationship and Royong consented to have intercourse with
him.
 The Solicitor General recommended that Oblena be permanently removed from the roll of attorney eventhough the acts of the Royong
before and after the rape incident showed that she is more of a sweetheart than a victim because of the circumstances behind the
incident
 The Solicitor General also charged Oblena of falsifying and deliberately alleging in his application in the bar in1958 that he is a person
of good moral character while having an illicit and adulterous relationship with Angeles who is not only the aunt of Royong but
also has a legal husband in the province
 Oblena moved to dismiss the case because the offenses charged are different from those originally charged in the complaint but the
court overruled his petition
 After the hearing, the investigators concluded that A.) Oblena used his knowledge in law to commit immoral acts without incurring
any criminal liability; B.) he committed gross immorality by continuously cohabiting with Angeles, his common-law wife, even after
he became a lawyer and C.) Oblena falsified the truth as to his good moral character in his application to take the bar.

ISSUE:
 W/N the illicit relationship with Royong and the open cohabitation with Angeles, a married woman, are sufficient grounds to cause
Oblena’s disbarment

HELD:
 YES!
 Although Oblena is not yet convicted of the crime of rape, seduction or adultery and he is not guilty of any of the grounds for
disbarment enumerated in Sec 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, the enumeration is not exclusive and the power of the court to
exclude unworthy members of the bar is inherent and is a necessary incident to the proper administration of justice and can be
exercised even without any statutory authority, in all cases unless properly prohibited by statutes.
 American jurisprudence provides that the continued possession of a good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful
continuance in the practice of law. The loss requires suspension or disbarment eventhough the statues do not explicitly specify that
as a ground of disbarment.
 Oblena’s argument that he believed himself to be a person with good moral character when he filed his application to take the bar
examination is wrong. One’s own approximation of himself is not a gauge of his moral character. Moral character is not a
subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. Moral character is what the person really is and not what he other
people thinks he is.
 His pretension to wait for the 18th birthday of Royong before having carnal knowledge with her shows the scheming mind of Oblena
and his taking advantage of his knowledge of the law.
 Also, Royong is the niece of his common-law wife and he enjoyed moral ascendancy over her. Oblena took advantage of Royong’s
trust on him.
 Oblena’s contention that the Solicitor General exceeded his authority in filing the present complain which is entirely different from the
original complaint filed is untenable. There is nothing in the law requiring the Solicitor General to charge in his complaint the same
offence charged in the original complaint. What the law provides is that if the Solicitor General finds sufficient grounds to proceed
against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint accompanied by the evidence introduced in his investigation.
ROYONG VS. OBLENA
AC No. 376 April 30, 1963
En Banc, Barrera

FACTS:
• Complainant Josefina Royong charge the respondent Ariston Oblena, a member of the bar
and bench, with rape. The Solicitor General immediately conducted an investigation and found
out that there was no rape, the carnal knowledge between complainant and respondent seems
to be consensual sex.
• In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if respondent did not
commit the alleged rape, nevertheless, he was guilty of other misconduct. The Solicitor General
made another complaint charging the respondent of falsely and deliberately alleging in his
application for admission to the bar that he is a person of good moral character, of living
adulterously with Briccia Angeles at the same time maintaining illicit relations with the 18 year
old Josefina Royong. Thus rendering him unfit to practice law, praying that this Court render
judgment ordering the permanent removal of the respondent as lawyer and judge.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the illicit relation of the respondent with Josefina Royong and the adulterous
cohabitation of respondent with Briccia Angeles warrants disbarment.

HELD:
Ariston Oblena was disbarred.

RATIO:
The continued possession of a fair private and professional character or a good moral character
is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law for one who has been
admitted, and its loss requires suspension or disbarment even though the statutes do not
specify that as ground for disbarment.
Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing on his
profession, has nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer.
Fornication, if committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as have proven in
this case, as to shock common sense of decency, certainly may justify positive action by the
Court in protecting the prestige of the noble profession of the law.
As former Chief Justice Moran observed: An applicant for license to practice law is required to
show good moral character, or what he really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from
the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the
place where he is known.
Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the time he applied for
admission to the bar. He lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles, and the fact that people
who knew him sqemed to have acuuiesced to his utatus, did noq render him a person of good
moral character. It is of no moment that his immoral state was discovered then or now as he is
clearly not fit to remain a member of the bar.

A.M. No. 997 September 10, 1979

PILAR ABAIGAR, complainant,

vs.
DAVID D.C. PAZ, respondent.

FERNANDEZ, J.:

On April 27, 1971, Pilar Abaigar filed this administrative case for disbarment against David D. C.
Paz, a member of the Philippine Bar.

The verified complaint alleged that sometime in March 1970, the complainant, Pilar Abaigar sought
the aid of a legal counsel regarding her divorce case filed by her husband in the Superior Court of
California, County of Alameda, U.S.A.; that she called on the telephone the office of Congressman
Bagatsing in Manila; that the respondent David D.C. Paz, answered the telephone call and
volunteered his legal services; that believing that the respondent had the necessary legal
experience, the complainant confided her legal problems to him: that after the termination of the
divorce case, the respondent became exceedingly friendly with the complainant and started to
profess his love for her; that at the start, the complainant was hesitant in continuing the cordial
relations between her and the respondent but the respondent made her believe that although he was
living with another woman, his relations with said woman were no impediment that the respondent
convinced the complainant that he had been compelled to contract a civil marriage with the woman
and that since it was not a marriage under the church laws, it was no bar for him to get married
under the church laws with the complainant; that the respondent proposed marriage to the
complainant; that believing in this good faith, the complainant accepted the proposal of the
respondent; that sometime in the latter part of November 1970, an application for the issuance of a
marriage license to the complainant and the respondent was made and executed: that thereafter, the
respondent convinced the complainant that since they were going to get married anyway, they
should act as husband and wife; that because of the confidence which the complainant reposed
upon the respondent, she reluctantly acceded to said demands; that as a result of their being
together, the complainant became pregnant but due to causes beyond her control, the pregnancy
was lost; that sometime in the third week of April 1971, one Virginia Paz was introduced to the
complainant by the respondent; that said Virginia Paz was the woman previously referred to by the
respondent as his wife with whom he had contracted a forced civil marriage; that said Virginia Paz,
in the course of the meeting, informed the complainant that there had been actually two marriages
between Virginia Paz and the respondent, one under the civil law and one under the church law; that
upon being confronted by the complainant, the respondent made no explanation whatsoever and
merely kept silent; that since that time, the respondent had done nothing to make amends for having
deceived the complainant and for having taken advantage of her; and that the complainant has no
other recourse but to ask for the disbarment of the respondent who is a member of the Philippine
Bar and an officer of the courts of justice. 1
In his answer filed on June 10, 1971, the respondent denied having had any illicit relations with the
complainant.

In a resolution dated August 20, 1971, this Court referred this case to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. After hearing the parties, the Solicitor General submitted
on June 30, 1973 his report and recommendation containing finding that the complainant testified
that she acceded to his proposal that they live as husband and wife and as a matter of fact they had
three sexual intercourses that took place in the Tower Hotel and Singian Clinic in Manila and in the
Sulo Hotel in Quezon City. While there is no proof that sexual intimacy took place in Singian Clinic
except her testimony, her allegation that they had trysts at the Tower Hotel and Sulo Hotel was
supported by the guest cards at said hotels.

ISSUE: W/N respondent Paz may be disbarred on grounds that may properly fall under the category
of deceit and grossly immoral conduct as found in Sec. 27 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

HELD: No. The evidence adduced by the complainant has failed to establish any cause for
disciplinary action against the respondent. As the Sol. Gen. said in his report, “From all indications,
there is little room for doubt that she filed his disbarment case not in redress of a wrong, for there
was no wrong committed. It was a voluntary act of indiscretion between two consenting adults who
were fully aware of the consequences of their deed and for which they were responsible only to their
own private consciences.

NOTES

 In Arboleda vs Gatchalian, this Court held: that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of
proof rests upon the complainant and the charge against the lawyer must be established by
convincing proof. The record must disclose as free from doubt a case which compels the
exercise by this Court of its disciplinary powers.

PEOPLE VS. TUANDA (A.M. NO. 3360

01/30/1990)
FACTS: Respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of the Philippine Bar, asks this
Court to lift the suspension from the practice of law imposed upon her by a
decision of the Court of Appeals. In 1983, Atty. Fe Tuanda received from one
Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of jewelry with a total value of P36,000
for sale on commission basis. In 1984, instead of returning the unsold pieces
of jewelry worth P26,250, she issued 3 checks. These checks were
dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency of
funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor, Tuanda made no
effort to settle her obligation. Criminal cases were filed, wherein she was
acquitted of estafa but was found guilty of violation of BP 22 (The Anti-
Bouncing Check Law). The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial
court and imposed further suspension against Tuanda in the practice of law,
on the ground that the offense involves moral turpitude. Tuanda is now
appealing to the Supreme Court for her suspension to be lifted arguing that
her suspension was a penalty so harsh on top of the fines imposed to her in
violation of the aforementioned law. Arguing further that she intends no
damage to the plaintiff-appellee (Herminia A. Marquez)and she is not guilty
of the offense charged.

ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension of Atty. Tuanda be lifted.

HELD: NO. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which
she is found guilty involved moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138
of the Revised Rules of Court provide as follows:
 Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what
grounds. A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court of any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice. (Italics supplied)
 Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of
First Instance. — The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may
suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the
last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not
practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the
premises.
Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude relates to and affects the
good moral character of a person convicted of such offense. Herein, BP 22
violation is a serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects public
interest and public order. The effects of the issuance of a worthless check
transcends the private interest of parties directly involved in the transaction
and touches the interest of the community at large. Putting valueless
commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very well
pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. The crimes of
which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of her
attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of
which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land."

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of

Suspension. Respondent shall remain suspended from the practice of law
until further orders from this Court.