ARTICLE IX-B

B. Civil Service Commission

Section 1
(1) The civil service shall be administered by the Civil Service Commission composed of a Chairman
and two Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of
their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, with proven capacity for public administration,
and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately preceding
their appointment.

(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first
appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, a Commissioner for five years, and
another Commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall
be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

Organization of the Commission

Who administers civil service?

● Civil Service Commission

Who composes the Civil Service Commission?

● 1 Chairman-7 year term
● 2 Commissioners- 7 year term (Exception: 1st appointed commissioners)

Requirements to be appointed Chairman or Commissioner

● Natural Born Citizen of the PH
● At least 35 years of age
● Proven capacity for public administration
● Was not a candidate for any elective position in the elections immediately preceding his/her
appointment

Prohibitions
● No one can be appointed as chairman or commissioner without the consent of the COA
● No reappointment
● Any appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor
● No member will be appointed in a temporary or acting capacity
Gaminde v Commission on Appointments ​(term)

Doctrine:
The purpose of the 7-5-3 terms of the first chairman and the first commissioners were to assure
continuity. That vacancy would occur in the positions for a fix interval of 2 years. For this to happen,
there must be a fixed starting point of the term of the appointed chairman and commissioners despite
the fact the fact that their actual qualification for the position may differ.

Facts:
Atty Thelma Gaminde was appointed as CSC commissioner by Pres. Fidel Ramos June 11, 1993 and was
subsequently confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. While her appointment letter stated that
her term will expire on ​Feb 2, 1999​​, the Chief Presidential Consel opined that her term will expire on ​Feb
2, 2000. ​The Che continued to hold the office in good faith even after Feb 2, 1999. The commission on
audit held that she was not entitled to her allowances and emoluments.

Issue:
Whether Atty Gaminde’s term expires on Feb 02, 2000 or Feb 2, 1999?

Held:
There must be a distinction between term and tenure. Term the time during which the officer may claim
to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one
another. Tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the office. The term of
office is not affected by the hold-over. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or
beyond the power of the
incumbent.

Article IX Sec 1 (2) uniformly prescribes a 7 year tenure for the chairman and the commissioner. The first
appointees will have a term of 7-5-3. In order to preserve the periodic succession mandated by the
Constitution, the rotational plan requires two conditions: [​i​] The terms of the first commissioners should
start on a common date; [​ii​​] and fill Any vacancy due to death, resignation or disability before the
expiration of the term should be filled only for the unexpired balance of the term.

The court held that the term of the appointees uniformly start at the same date the 1987 Constitution
took effect (Feb 2, 1987). Despite Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) Sec 15 stating that the incumbent
members of the Comelec, Commission on appointments, and commission on audit will continue in office
for one year after ratification of the Constitution, the court said that this provision refers to tenure and
not the term of the appointees.

In this case, Atty Gaminde’s term expired on Feb 2, 1999. But since she remained as a de facto officer,
holding the office in good faith she was still entitled to compensation.
 Section 2
(1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
(2) Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be
determined, as far as practicable, and, except to positions which are policy determining, primarily
confidential, or highly technical, by competitive examination.
(3) No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause
provided by law.
(4) No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any
electioneering or partisan political campaign.
(5) The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees.
(6) Temporary employees of the Government shall be given such protection as may be provided by
law.

Scope of the Civil Service System (par 1)

● All branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
● Employees of enumerated bodies.
● To test whether a GOCC is subject to the Civil Service Law, the test would be the manner of its
creation - whether or not it was created by a special charter. ​(Philippine-National Oil
Company-Energy Development Corporation v Leogardo 1989)
● The Department of Labor (and labor laws) can still play a role when a government entity
becomes an indirect employer (enters into a contract with another agency). The Labor Code
provides that the liabilities for wages are joint and solidary with the contractor. ​(Philippines
Fisheries Development Authority v NLRC 1992)

Appointments in the Civil Service (par 2)

● Appointments to a competitive position shall be based on merit and fitness as determined by a
competitive examination; appointments to non-competitive positions need only be based on
merit and fitness.
● One who is next in rank is entitled to preferential consideration for promotion to the higher
vacancy but he should be appointed. Appointing authority is not bound by the restriction of a
statutory next-in-rank rule. (​Santiago, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission​ ​1989)
● The CSC cannot disapprove an appointment and require the appointment of another person
whom it believes is more qualified for the position. The appointing authority is given ample
discretion in the appointing of qualified persons to vacant positions among those who are
qualified. (​Central Bank v. CSC 1989)
● Non-competitive positions are those which by nature are policy-determining, primarily
confidential, or highly technical. (See ​De los Santos v. Mallare 1950)
○ Policy-determining position: charged with the duty to formulate a method of action for
the government or any of its subdivision.
 ○ Primarily confidential: characterized with close intimacy between the appointee and
appointing authority and free from betrayal of trust on confidential matters of state.
○ Highly technical: when an occupant is required to possess a technical skill or training in
the supreme or superior degree.
● Classification of positions by the Civil Service Code (PD 807):
○ Career Service - (1) merit and fitness; (2) security of tenure; (3) opportunity for
promotion.
○ Non-career Service - (1) entrance based on other tests besides the usual tests for merit
and fitness; (2) tenure is limited to a period specified by law.
● Classification in Section 2 is not exclusive.

Security of Tenure (par 3)

● Efficiency of civil service depends on the morale of the employees. Hence, security of tenure
exists to protect government employees against arbitrary impairment.
● Persons permanently occupying non-competitive positions are also covered by the guarantee of
security of tenure.

Abolition of office (par 3)

● Abolition of office cannot violate security of tenure when done in good faith and not merely as a
cover for an illegal removal. (Briones v Osmena 1958)
● Test for valid abolition: (1) done in good faith; (2) not for personal or political reasons; (3) not in
violation of the law. (Roque v Ericta 1973)
● Abolition of office even if arising from reorganization must be justified by good faith and public
need (Abrogar v Garrucho 1991).

Partisan political activity (par 4)

● Partisan political activity includes every form of solicitation of the elector’s vote in favor of a
specific candidate, including contribution of money for election purposes and distribution of
handbills. (People v de Venecia 1965).
● The provision does not prevent any officer or employee from expressing personal political views
on political issues and problems, or from mentioning the names of candidates for public office
whom he supports. (Based on Section 29, RA 2260)

Right to reorganize (par 5)

● Members of the civil service may unionize under Article III Section 8, Article XI-B Section 2(5);
and Article XIII Section 3.
● The right to organize does not include the right to strike. (SSS v CA 1989)
● Public school teachers do not have the right to strike (Manila Public Teachers Association v.
Secretary of Education 1991)
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v Hernandez ​(GOCCs with charter and created by
special law)

Doctrine: ​Employees of GOCCs fall under the Civil Service, including non-regular and contractual
employees.

Facts:
MWSS was brought before the arbitration branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on
charges of willful failure to pay wage differentials, allowances, and other monetary benefits to its
contractual employees numbering 2,500 or so. MWSS asserts that because it is a government-owned
and controlled corporation, the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the case.
● 1st argument: NLRC agrees with MWSS that if the complainants are regular employees of
MWSS, then it is not under the jurisdiction of the NLRC but under the Civil Commission.
However, because the employees in question are not non-regular or contractual hired only for a
limited period of time, then the NLRC may take cognizance of the case.
● 2nd argument: NLRC also argues that the Civil Service Decree (PD 807 which states that the Civil
Service Law and the CSC shall govern) applies to employees in GOCCs in all matters except
“monetary claims;” in which case the Labor Code shall govern.
Labor Arbiter renders a decision against MWSS; MWSS raises this petition for certiorari and prohibition,
arguing that NLRC has no jurisdiction over it.

Issue:
Whether complainant employees of the MWSS are under the jurisdiction of the NLRC?

Held:
No. MWSS is a government-owned or controlled corporation created by RA 6234 (original charter) and
hence under the CSC, not the NLRC. The employees are part of the civil service. Citing a similar case
involving the National Housing Corporation, the SC held that the MWSS is governed not by the Labor
Code but by the Civil Service law, rules and regulations.

In the ​National Housing Corporation v Juco​​, the SC held that because NHC is a GOCC 100% owned by
the government, it is under the jurisdiction of the civil service law. The labor arbiter in the NHC case was
correct in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. Similarly, the doctrine laid out in that case can be
applied here.

Argument of Labor Arbiter that only disputes between MWSS and its regular employees are beyond the
jurisdiction of the NLRC has no legal or logical justification for such a distinction. In response to the
second argument: patently illogical and deserves no confutation (no legal basis for such an argument.)

Justice Narvasa notes that the case at bar (argument of NLRC) is a waste of time. It is absurd to claim
that “existence of employer-employee relationship (between MWSS and an individual) is not per se
equivalent to being a government employee.”
BLISS v Callejo (​ GOCCs with charter and created by special law)

Doctrine​​: A corporation is created by operation of law under the Corporation Code while a government
corporation is normally created by special law referred to often as a charter. Government-owned
corporation created under the Corporation Law is governed by the Labor Code while a government
corporation created through a charter is governed by the Civil Service Law, and not the Labor Code.

Facts:
Bliss Development Corp. Employees Union (BDC EU) a duly registered labor union, filed with the
Department of Labor a petition for certification election of private respondent Bliss Development
Corporation (BDC). Petition was dismissed as majority of BDC’s stocks is owned by the Human
Settlement Development Corporation (HSDC), a wholly-owned government corporation; therefore,
making BDC subject to Civil Service law, rules and regulations.

Executive Order No. 180 was issued by President Corazon C. Aquino extending to government
employees the right to organize and bargain collectively. Government employees are now given the
right to organize and bargain collectively provided that it shall apply to all employees of all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters. Section 7 of the said EO provides that government
employees’ organizations shall register with the Civil Service Commission and the Department of Labor
and Employment. The application shall be filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations of the Department
which shall process the same in accordance with the provisions of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as
amended. BCD EU argues that it is not under the Civil Service Law; therefore, the requirements under
Section 7 of EO 180 does not apply to it.

Issue:
Whether Bliss Development Corporation is a government-owned or controlled corporation and
governed by Civil Service Law?

Held:
BDC is a government-owned corporation created under the Corporation Law and is without a charter. It
is governed by the Labor Code and not by the Civil Service Law. Executive Order No. 180 does not apply
to it. Under the 1987 Constitution, Civil Service embraces government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charter; therefore, by clear implication, the Civil Service does not include GOCCs which are
organized as subsidiaries of GOCCs under the general corporation law. A corporation is created by
operation of law. It acquires a juridical personality either by special law or a general law. The general law
under which a private corporation may be formed or organized is the Corporation Code. On the other
hand, a government corporation is normally created by special law, referred to often as a charter.

In summary, Bliss Development Corporation is a government-owned corporation created under the

Corporation Law. It is without a charter, governed by the Labor Code and not by the Civil Service Law
hence, Executive Order No. 180 does not apply to it. Thus, Director of Labor Relations was directed to
give due course to BCD EU’s application for certification election.
Torres v De Leon (​ GOCCs under Corporation Code)

Doctrine​​: Generally, the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is treated as a sui generis entity and is
NOT considered a GOCC. However, if it involves the enforcement of labor laws and penal statutes like in
this case, it CAN be treated as a GOCC.

Facts​​:
Mary Lou Torres was the Chapter Administrator of Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC), General Santos
City Chapter. When the PNRC Auditing Office conducted an audit, it found that Torres incurred a
“technical shortage” of P4M. Thus, Corazon De Leon (De Leon), as Secretary General of the PNRC
charged Torres with Grave Misconduct. De Leon issued a Memorandum suspending her for 1 month and
transferring her to the National Headquarters (NHQ).

She filed an MR. It was denied. She filed a Notice of Appeal with the PNRC, and thereafter she appealed
to the CSC. The CSC dismissed her appeal and dismissed her from the service. CA affirmed.

Issues:
1. Whether PNRC a GOCC?
2. Whether the CSC have jurisdiction over this case?

Held:
1. In Liban vs. Gordon, the SC ruled that the PNRC, although not a GOCC, is sui generis in character. It is
a protected component of the Red Cross movement under Art. 24 and 26 of 1st Geneva Convention.
These require staff of a National Society to be respected and protected even in times of armed
conflict. National societies are directly regulated by international humanitarian law (IHL), in contrast
to other ordinary private entities, including NGOs. Thus, the SC is to approach controversies
involving the PNRC on a case-to-case basis. PNRC is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
of the government, nor a GOCC or a subsidiary thereof, as explained in Liban. However, this does
not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a "private corporation," that must be organized under the
Corporation Code. Remember, it is regulated by IHL and treated as an auxiliary of the State.
Auxilliary status means that it is both a private institution and a public service organization. This is
because its work implies cooperation with authorities, and linkage with the State.

2. The CSC has jurisdiction over the PNRC because the issue at hand is the enforcement of labor laws
and penal statutes, thus, in this particular matter, the PNRC can be treated as a GOCC. CSC has
appellate jurisdiction in cases involving the penalty of suspension of >30 days, or fine >30 days
salary. Her period of suspension was actually expressly from July 1-31, 2007 = 31 days. Since the CSC
has jurisdiction, it can modify the penalty and order the dismissal of Torres from the service.
Samson v CA ​(positions in competitive service)

Facts:
Mayor Marcial Samson of Caloocan City issued No.3 on 10 January 1972. This assailed order ordered the
termination of then Assistant Secretary to the Mayor Feliciano Talens due to lack and loss of confidence.
Replacing him was co-petitioner Hermogenes Liwag. The Civil Service Act of 1959 provided that the
position of secretaries to the mayor are non-competitive. Petitioners interpreted this to include
assistant secretaries.

Samson’s predecessor Asistio appointed Talens in 1970. Talens is an eligible civil servant and his
appointment was permanent as per Section 24(n) of the4 Civil Service Act. He demurred the
Administrative Order citing Section 5(f) of the Civil Service Law wherein only Secretaries are competitive
positions and that his appointment was permanent. He further argues that he can only be terminated
for cause and after the observance of due process.

Given Samson’s refusal to recall his termination, Talens filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus and quo warranto against Mayor Samson and Liwag with the CFI of Caloocan City on 21
January 1972. The CFI ruled in favor of Talens, thus the petition.

Issue
Whether or not Talens’ position was non-competitive which warrants his termination based on the loss
and lack of confidence (NO)

Held:
The CFI rendered A.O. 3 null and void. They also compelled for the payment of salaries and emoluments
due to Talens as Assistant Secretary to the Mayor.

The Supreme Court rejected the argument that an assistant secretary is also a secretary. Generally,
positions in all branches, instrumentalities and subdivisions in the government are competitive.
However, exceptions to this general rule are those provided by law and those positions which are
policy-determining or those highly confidential and technical in nature. Under the rules of Statutory
Construction, exceptions are strictly but reasonably construed. When in doubt, resolution should be
made for the general rule.

The Court premised that the petitioners concluded that since Assistant Secretaries are effectively
secretaries, their position is non-competitive and that their term lasts only for as long as the mayor’s
confidence in him remains.

Despite handling confidential matters, the position of Assistant Secretary to the Mayor in itself is not
primarily and highly confidential. The Court also points out that the positions of Secretary and Assistant
Secretary are two distinct positions, with the former being higher than the latter. If the legislature
intended to include Assistant Secretaries within the provisions covering non-competitive positions, they
would have done so and included them in the exceptions.
Grino v Court of Appeals ​(test of confidentiality of positions)

Doctrine: ​The positions of city legal officer and provincial attorney were created under Republic Act No.
5185 which categorized them together as positions of "trust"​. ​By virtue of Republic Act No. 5185, both
the provincial attorney and city legal officer serve as the legal adviser and legal officer for the civil cases
of the province and the city that they work for. Their services are precisely categorized by law to be
"trusted services."

Facts:
Sixto Demaisip was first appointed as the provincial attorney of Iloilo. He served from 1973- 1986. He
offered to resign and recommended Teotimo Arandela to succeed him. OIC Governor Licurgo Tirador
later on appointed Arandela. Aside from Arandela, Cirilo Gelvezon, Teodolfo Dato-on and Nelson
Geduspan were all promoted as Senior Legal Officer and Legal Officer II and Legal Officer II; accordingly.
Simplicio Grino assumed office as the newly elected governor of Iloilo. A month later, he decided to
terminate the services of Arandela and the legal officers. Petitioner Griño mentioned an article
pertaining to the said appointed Iloilo officers which appeared in the ​Panay News and which
“undermined that trust and confidence” he reposed to them. On March 15, 1988, Governor Griño
formally terminated the services of Gelvezon, Dato-on and Geduspan on the ground of loss of trust and
confidence. Merit Systems Board issued an order for the restoration of positions with back salaries, as
the termination was illegal. Griño appealed to the Civil Service Commission. CSC affirmed the order of
Merit Systems Board. This is a petition for review for the reversal of CSC’s decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the position of a provincial attorney and those of his legal subordinates are primarily
confidential in nature so that the services of those holding the said items can be terminated upon loss of
confidence.

Held:
In ​Cadiente v Santos​, it is ​undeniable that the position of a City Legal Officer is one of which is
“primarily confidential.” As when the respondent City Mayor of Davao terminated the services of the
petitioner, he was not removed or dismissed. There being no removal or dismissal it could not,
therefore, be said that there was a violation of the constitutional provision that "no officer or employee
in the civil service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law" (Article XII-B,
Section 1 (3), 1973 Constitution)

Other important jurisprudence:

o In ​Claudio v Subido,​ it was held that the position of a ​City Legal Officer is one requiring that
utmost confidence on the part of the mayor be extended to the said officer. ​As the
relationship between a lawyer and client, is one that depends on the highest degree of
trust.
o In ​Pinero v Hechanova​, ​“primarily confidential” means ​close intimacy, which insure
freedom of intercourse, without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of
betrayals of personal trust on confidential matters.
 o In ​Hernandez v Villegas, officials and employees holding primarily confidential positions
continue only for so long as confidence in them endures. The termination of their official
relation can be justified on the ​ground of loss of confidence because in that case their
cessation from office involves no removal but merely the expiration of the term of
office
o In ​Ingles v Mutuc​, when an ​incumbent of a primarily confidential position holds office at
the pleasure of the appointing power, and the pleasure turns into a displeasure, the
incumbent is not removed or dismissed from office — his term merely expire​​.
o In ​Besa v PNB​, what was questioned was the transfer of a Chief Legal Counsel to the position
of Consultant on Legal Matters in the Office of the President. SC held that the position is
primarily confidential. The work of the Chief Legal Counsel of respondent Bank, as of any
lawyer for that matter, is impressed with a highly technical aspect. In that sense, it is
equally clear that where the position partakes of the attributes of being both technical
and confidential, ​there can be no insistence of a fixed or a definite term if the latter
aspect predominates. At any time the appointing power may decide that his services
are no longer needed.

Thus, Arandela’s position as provincial attorney is classified as one under the career service and certified
as permanent by the CSC cannot conceal or alter its highly confidential nature. The Court finds that
private respondent Arandela was not dismissed or removed from office when his services were
terminated as his term merely expired, given the principle that the tenure of an official holding a
primarily confidential position ends upon loss of confidence. The ruling in ​Cadiente can be applied to the
provincial attorney, as by the nature of the function, it is primarily confidential.

In the Office of the Provincial Attorney, work is delegated as there is the power of administrative
supervision and control over the acts and decision of his subordinates. These subordinates are
considered confidential employees if the predominant reason they were chosen by the appointing
authority is that they can share a close intimate relationship with. In this case, the positions of Senior
Legal Officer and Legal Officers and their relationship with the appointing authority in terms of trust is
no longer predominant. The nature of their work lies on their legal skills to facilitate the work of the
confidential employee.

The positions of Gelvezon, Dato-on and Geduspan are highly technical in character and not confidential,
so they are permanent employees, and they belong to the category of classified employees under the
Civil Service Law. Thus, they are permanent employees who should enjoy security of tenure as
guaranteed under the Constitution.
Achacoso v Macaraig ​(temporary appointments)

Doctrine​​: A permanent appointment can only be issued only to a person who meets all the
requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility
prescribed.

Facts​​: Tomas D. Achacoso was appointed Administrator of the POEA on October 16, 1987. On January 2,
1990, the President requested all department heads, under secretaries, assistant secretaries, bureau
heads, and other government officials to tender their courtesy resignations. Achacoso tendered his
courtesy resignation.

But he went to the Supreme Court saying that his resignation was void because it was not done freely
and that since he is a member of the Career Service of the Civil Service, he enjoys security of tenure.

Respondents on the other hand offered the certification from the CSC to show that the petitioner did
not possess the necessary qualifications when he was appointed Administrator of POEA

Issue​​:
Whether Achacoso was illegally removed as Administrator of the POEA.

Held​​:
No. Since Achacoso did not have all the qualifications for being Administrator of the POEA, then he
cannot claim that he was a permanent appointee to the position, at best he is only a temporary
appointment. Temporary appointments have no fixed tenure of office, his employment can be
terminated at the pleasure of the appointing power. Furthermore, the mere fact that a position belongs
to the career service does not automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant even if he does
not possess the required qualifications. Such right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment,
which in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it.
Santiago v Civil Service Commission (​ next-in-rank rule not mandatory)

Doctrine​​: No mandatory nor peremptory requirement in the Civil Service law that persons next-in-rank
are entitled to preference in appointment.

Facts​​: Narciso Y. Santiago, Jr. was appointed by Customs Commissioner Wigberto Tanada from Customs
Collector I to Customs Collector III. This was questioned by Leonardo A. Jose as being Customs Collector
II, he was the next-in-rank to be Customs Collector III. The CSC agreed with Jose and ordered Tanada to
revoke the appointment of Santiago, Jr. and give the appointment instead to Jose.

Issue​​:
Whether the Civil Service Commission has the right to order the revocation on the basis of next-in-rank

Held​​:
No mandatory nor peremptory requirement in the Civil Service law that persons next-in-rank are
entitled to preference in appointment. What it does provide is that they would be among the first to be
considered for the vacancy, but it does not necessarily follow that he and no one else can be appointed.
The rule neither grants a vested right to the holder nor imposes a ministerial duty on the appointing
authority to promote such person to the next higher position. The power to appoint is a matter of
discretion. The appointing power has a wide latitude of choice as to who is best qualified for the
position. The CSC can only check whether or not the appointee possesses the appropriate civil service
eligibility or the required qualifications.
Government Service Insurance System v Kapisanan (​ right to self-organization and right to strike)

Doctrine​​: Employees in the public service may not engage in strikes or in concerted and unauthorized
stoppage of work. The right of government employees to organize is limited to the formation of unions
or associations, without including the right to strike.

Facts​​:
On October 4-7, 2004, there was a four-day concerted demonstration, rally and en masse walkout
waged in front of the GSIS Main Office. Some of the participants were GSIS personnel, among them
members of the Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa GSIS (KMG), a public sector union of GSIS
rank-and-file employees. The mass action target appeared to have been Winston Garcia, the GSIS
President and General Manager, and his management style.

The absence of the participating GSIS employees was not covered by a prior approved leave, thus AWOL
(Absence without Leave). On Oct. 10, a memo was issued directing 131 union and non-union members
to show cause why they should not be charged administratively for their participation in said rally. KMG
sought reconsideration on the ground that the subject employees resumed work on Oct. 8, in obedience
to the return-to-work order. KMG filed a suit before the CA and faulted the GSIS and Garcia for
disregarding Civil Service Resolution No. 021316 (Guidelines for Prohibited Mass Action)​. C ​ A ruled in
favor of KMG. Garcia then brought this petition to the SC via Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Issue​​:
Whether the mass action staged by or participated in by said GSIS employees partook of a strike or
prohibited concerted mass action?

Held​​:
Yes. The employee's act of attending, joining, participating and taking part in the strike/rally is a
transgression of the rules on strike in the public sector. What the respondent's members launched or
participated in during that time partook of a strike or, what contextually amounts to the same thing, a
prohibited concerted activity. The phrase "​prohibited concerted activity​" refers to any collective activity
undertaken by government employees, by themselves or through their employees' organization, with
the intent of affecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their demands or force
concessions, economic or otherwise; it includes mass leaves, walkouts, pickets and acts of similar
nature.

As regards the right to strike, the Constitution itself qualifies its exercise with the provision "​in
accordance with law​​." This is a clear manifestation that the state may, by law, regulate the use of this
right, or even deny certain sectors such right. Executive Order 180 which provides guidelines for the
exercise of the right of government workers to organize, for instance, implicitly endorsed an earlier CSC
circular which "enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees
from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walkouts and other forms of mass action which will
result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service" by stating that the Civil Service law and
rules governing concerted activities and strikes in government service shall be observed.
Gloria v Court of Appeals (​ temporary employees)

Doctrine​​: While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without the
employees prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step toward his removal,
or designed to indirectly terminate his service, or force his resignation. Such a transfer would in effect
circumvent the provision which safeguards the tenure of office of those who are in the Civil Service.

Facts​​:
Dr. Bienvenido Icasiano was appointed Schools Division Superintendent, Division of City Schools, Quezon
City, by then President Corazon C. Aquino. On October 10, 1994 DECS Secretary Gloria recommended to
the President of the Philippines that Dr. Icasiano be reassigned as Superintendent of the MIST (Marikina
Institute of Science and Technology), to fill up the vacuum created by the retirement of its
Superintendent, Mr. Bannaoag F. Lauro. The President approved the recommendation of the DECS
Secretary. A copy of the recommendation for reassignment, as approved by the President, was
transmitted by Secretary Gloria to Director Rosas for implementation. Dr. Icasiano requested Sec. Gloria
to reconsider the reassignment, but the latter denied the request. Private respondent filed for TRO in
the Court of Appeals. CA granted and restrained Sec. Gloria from implementing the re-assignment.

Issue​​:
Whether the reassignment of private respondent from School Division Superintendent of Quezon City to
Vocational School Superintendent of MIST is violative of his security of tenure?

Held​​:
Yes, the reassignment of Dr. Icasiano to MIST "appears to be indefinite" and is definitely violative of the
security of tenure of the private respondent. It can be inferred from the Memorandum of Sec. Gloria for
President Fidel Ramos to the effect that the reassignment will "best fit his qualifications and experience"
being "an expert in vocational and technical education." Besides, there is nothing in the said
Memorandum to show that the reassignment of private respondent is temporary or would only last until
a permanent replacement is found as no period is specified or fixed; which fact shows an intention on
the part of the Secretary to reassign Dr. Icasiano with no definite period or duration. As held in ​Bentain:​

“​Security of tenure is a fundamental and constitutionally guaranteed feature of our civil service. The
mantle of its protection extends not only to employees removed without cause but also to cases of
unconsented transfers which are tantamount to illegal removals

While a ​temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without the employee’s
prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step toward his removal, or is a
scheme to lure him away from his permanent position, or designed to indirectly terminate his service, or
force his resignation. Such a transfer would in effect circumvent the provision which safeguards the
tenure of office of those who are in the Civil Service.”
 Section 3
The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government, shall establish a
career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness,
progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen the merit and rewards system,
integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a
management climate conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the President and the
Congress an annual report on its personnel programs.

Powers of the Commission as an Administrative Agency

(1) Executive powers
(2) Quasi - judicial powers
(3) Quasi - legislative or rule - making powers

● Key Functions:
(1) Promulgate and enforce policies on personnel actions
(2) Classify positions
(3) Prescribe conditions of employment ​except ​compensation and other monetary benefits
which shall be provided by law

Section 4
All public officers and employees shall take an oath or affirmation to uphold
and defend this Constitution.

Oath to Defend the Constitution

Executive Order No. 292 Chapter 10​​ provides the guidelines for the Official Oaths.
Section 41: ​The following officers have the general authority to administer oaths
● Notaries public
● Members of the judiciary
● Clerks of court
● Secretary of
○ either House of Congress
○ departments
● Bureau directors
● Registers of deeds
● Provincial governors and lieutenant-governors
● City and Municipal Mayors
● Any other officer in the service of government appointed by the President
Oaths may also be administered by any officer whose duties, as defined by law or
regulation, require presentation to him of any statement under oath.
 Section 5
The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of government officials and
employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters,
taking into accent the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for
their positions.

Standardization of Compensation
● This provision was taken from the 1973 Constitution.
● The Justification and Supporting Table which accompanied the Integrated Reorganization Plan of
1972 may provide the rationalization of this provision.
○ Part III, Chapter II, Article II- Re-examination of the WAPCO Plans revealed the average
compensation of positions as base-100%.
■ DBP-203%, CB-196%, GSIS-147%, SSS-150%, and NWSA-111%
○ Proprietary corporations are not covered by the Plans
○ Government corporation employees are able to increase salaries and benefits through
collective bargaining.

Section 6
No candidate who has lost in any election shall, within one year after such election, be appointed to
any office in the Government or any Government-owned or controlled corporations or in any of their
subsidiaries.

Political Lame Ducks

● This is intended to help eradicate the spoils system
● It covers the so-called political lame ducks or those who were defeated in their bid for reelection

Section 7
No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public
office or position during his tenure

Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official
shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.

Political Opportunism and Spoils

● The first paragraph concerns ​Elected Officials​​.
○ Elected officials are specifically ​not allowed to hold appointive positions (eg. Member
of Cabinet, Chair of Dept.)
 ○ Unlike Congress members, their acceptance of appointive positions does not
automatically resign them from their previous elected position; ​the elected official must
first resign and then accept the appointive position​​. To do ​otherwise would make their
acceptance a nullity​​.

● The second paragraph discusses ​Appointed Officials​​.

○ Unlike the latter, appointed officials ​may hold other positions​​-- ​provided that a law
allows them,​​ or through ​primary function​​.
○ ‘​Primary function​​’ refers to positions which may ​serve as mere additions congruent to
the already-present authority or scope of the appointed officer. (eg. The Minister of
Trade and Industry also functions as the head of the National Development Company.)
Flores v. Drilon (​ prohibition against designation of elective officer during tenure)

Doctrine: The first paragraph of Sec 7 is more stringent than the second paragraph (which deals with
appointive officials) by not providing any exception to the rule against appointment or designation of an
elective official to the government post, except when the Constitution provides otherwise.

Facts:
● Richard J. Drilon (Drilon), as mayor of Olongapo City was appointed as Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer of The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA)
● The appointment was authorized by Sec. 13 of R.A. 7227: “the mayor of the City of Olongapo
shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive of the Subic Authority.” (SBMA
Chairman)
● Petitioners contest this appointment, citing the prohibition set by The 1987 Constitution Art. 9-B
Sec. 7: “No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any
public office or position during his tenure”
● Respondents counter the following paragraph from the same provision: “Unless otherwise
allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any
other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.”
● Petitioners further argue that the appointment was violative of the Omnibus Election Code Sec.
261: “The following shall be guilty of an election offense: x x x x (g) Appointment of new
employees, creation new position, x x x x during the period of forty-give days before a regular
election x x x x “
Issues:
1. Whether the appointment of the mayor of Olongapo, an elected official, as the SBMA Chairman
violative of the prohibition set by Art. 9-B Sec. 7 of The 1987 Constitution?
2. Whether the unconstitutionality of the appointment, if true, retroact to the executive actions
performed by Drilon?

Held:
1. Yes. The appointment is unconstitutional.
○ “It is an affirmation that a public office is a full-time job. Hence, a public officer or employee, like
the head of an executive department x x x should be allowed to attend to his duties and
responsibilities without the distraction of other governmental duties or employment.”
○ While the second paragraph authorizes holding of multiple offices by an ​appointive o ​ fficial x x x
the ​first paragraph appears to be more stringent by not providing any exception to the rule
against appointment or designation of an ​elective ​official to the government post. (note the
wording of Par. 1: “​No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation i​ n any
capacity​ to ​any public office or position during his tenure​”
2. No. Though unconstitutional, Drilon held the position as ​de facto
○ Further, the court mentioned that ​Drilon must first resign as mayor if he wishes to be part of
the SBMA​​; his acceptance ​does not relinquish his position as mayor, ​nor does it confer him as
de jure​ member​​ of the SBMA.
 ○ “He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily
null and void; he may be considered a de facto officer, "one whose acts, ​though not those of a
lawful officer​​, the law, ​upon principles of policy and justice, will hold valid so far as they
involve the interest of the public and third persons​​, where the duties of the office were
exercised”

Section 8
No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect
compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of the Congress,
any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind from any foreign government.

Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation

● The purpose of the prohibition of additional or double compensation is to manifest a
commitment to the fundamental principle that a ​public office is a public trust
● Additional compensation - when for one and the same office for which a compensation has
been fixed there is added to such fixed compensation an extra reward in the form, for instance,
of a bonus. This is not allowed in the absence of a law specifically authorizing such reward
● Double compensation - two sets of compensation for two different offices held concurrently by
one officer. Allowed when an officer is specifically authorized by law to receive double
compensation
● “​specifically authorized by law​​” - the authority required by the Constitution to receive double
or additional compensation is a specific authority given to a particular employee or officer of the
Government because of peculiar or exceptional reasons warranting the payment of extra or
additional compensation
● Bonuses given to one whose compensation under the law is merely a per diem violate the rule
against additional or double compensation
● Overtime pay, travel and meal allowances paid after regular office hours do not constitute
double compensation
● Absent of clear and unequivocal statutory authority, the grant of both separation pay and
retirement benefits violates the constitutional proscription on additional compensation
● Retiree receiving pension can continue to receive the same even if he accepts another
government office of position

Present, emolument, office, or title of any kind from any foreign government
● The provision prohibiting the acceptance of any present, emolument, office, or title from any
state was first taken by the 1973 Constitution from Section 1 (9) of the 1935 Bill of Rights.