Hegel and Hume on Perception and Concept-Empiricism

Kenneth R. Westphal

Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 36, Number 1, January

1998, pp. 99-123 (Article)

Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press

DOI: 10.1353/hph.2008.0964

For additional information about this article

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hph/summary/v036/36.1westphal.html

Access provided by Eastern Kentucky University Libraries (7 Jun 2013 10:34 GMT)
Hegel and Hume on Perception
and Concept-Empiricism
KENNETH R. WESTPHAL

1.

MY THESIS IS THAT THE CHAPTER ON " P e r c e p t i o n " in H e g e l ' s Phenomenology of

Spirit is a c r i t i q u e o f t h e s e c t i o n o f H u m e ' s Treatise t i t l e d " O f S c e p t i c i s m w i t h
r e g a r d to t h e s e n s e s " (I.iv w B o t h d i s c u s s i o n s p r o c e e d u n d e r t h e a s s u m p t i o n
t h a t t h e o b j e c t s o f p e r c e p t i o n a r e o r d i n a r y t h i n g s a r o u n d us, e a c h o f w h i c h
has various perceptible properties) Both discussions examine the capacity of
c o n c e p t - e m p i r i c i s m to a c c o u n t f o r t h e c o n c e p t o f t h e i d e n t i t y o f a p e r c e p t i b l e
t h i n g - - a c r u c i a l c o m p o n e n t o f t h e b e l i e f in o r d i n a r y p h y s i c a l objects. H o w -
e v e r , to e x t e n d his c o n c e p t - e m p i r i c i s m to h a n d l e t h e n o n l o g i c a l c o n c e p t o f t h e
i d e n t i t y o f a p e r c e p t i b l e t h i n g , H u m e is f o r c e d to i n t r o d u c e a v a r i e t y o f p s y c h o -
logical " p r o p e n s i t i e s " to g e n e r a t e , in e f f e c t , a priori c o n c e p t s ; h e is f o r c e d to
c o n f r o n t a c e r t a i n k i n d o f " c o n t r a d i c t i o n " in t h e c o n c e p t o f t h e i d e n t i t y o f a
p e r c e p t i b l e t h i n g ; a n d u l t i m a t e l y h e is f o r c e d to r e g a r d this c o n c e p t as a
"fiction." H e g e l r e e x a m i n e s H u m e ' s a c c o u n t to s h o w t h a t t h e c o n c e p t o f t h e
i d e n t i t y o f a p e r c e p t i b l e t h i n g is i n d e e d n o n l o g i c a l a n d c a n n o t b e d e f i n e d in
a c c o r d a n c e w i t h c o n c e p t - e m p i r i c i s m . T h i s is a n i m p o r t a n t p o i n t in f a v o r o f
H e g e l ' s c o n c e p t - p r a g m a t i s m . T h i s p o i n t is also i m p o r t a n t in c o n n e c t i o n w i t h

' Hume insists that "'tis vain to ask, Whether there be body or not? That is a point, which we
must take for granted in all our reasonings." His question is only: "What cause induces us to
believe in the existence of body?" (TreatiseI.iv.~: 187). Hegel's analysis concerns "the thing with
many properties" (G 71.3o/M67), for example, a cube of salt (G 72.~6/M 68). As noted below, in
this chapter Hegel treats only with the concept of the identity of such an object; he treats the
existence of such objects elsewhere.
I cite Hume's Treatiseby book (large Roman numerals), part (small Roman numerals), section
(Arabic numerals), and by page number of A Treatiseof Human Nature, and ed., L. A. Selby-Bigge
and P. H. Nidditch, eds. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978). I cite G. W. F. Hegel, GesammelteWerke,
ed. O. P6ggeler (Hamburg: Meiner, 1968; abbreviated "GW'); I indicate Hegel's Phdnomenologie
des Geistes(GWIX) as "G." All translations are mine. I provide page references to the Phenomenol-
ogy of Spirit, tr. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977), abbreviated "M."

[99]
1OO JOURNAL OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 36:1 JANUARY 1998
the quite g e n e r a l p r o b l e m o f h o w we bring various sensations t o g e t h e r into
the p e r c e p t i o n o f any o n e object3
" O f Scepticism with r e g a r d to the senses" is an e x t r e m e l y i m p o r t a n t section
o f H u m e ' s Treatise. T h o u g h H u m e ' s skepticism received growing attention in
G e r m a n y at the turn o f the n i n e t e e n t h century, H e g e l was alone a m o n g his
c o n t e m p o r a r i e s in recognizing the i m p o r t a n c e o f this section.3 I a d m i t that
H e g e l m a k e s n o bibliographic r e f e r e n c e to H u m e ' s Treatise--at least n o t in his
surviving m a n u s c r i p t s . H o w e v e r , close consideration o f the historical back-
g r o u n d o f H e g e l ' s analysis o f p e r c e p t i o n , along with the m a n y ways in which
H u m e ' s skepticism is especially i m p o r t a n t f o r Hegel, shows that it is a l t o g e t h e r
likely that H e g e l r e a d H u m e ' s Treatise, including the a b o v e - n a m e d section.
H e g e l ' s c o n c e r n with that section is f u r t h e r s u p p o r t e d by the fact that r e f e r -
ring to it a f f o r d s a complete, intelligible, a n d s o u n d r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f the aim
a n d course o f H e g e l ' s a r g u m e n t in "Perception." O n this reconstruction, H e -
gel's a r g u m e n t constitutes a t w o - p r o n g e d reductio ad absurdum o f two key e m -
piricist theses: on the one h a n d , the thesis that the c o n c e p t o f the identity o f a
perceptible thing can be r e d u c e d to or d e f i n e d in t e r m s o f the two quantitative
concepts "unity" a n d "plurality" (or analogously "whole" a n d "part"), a n d on
the o t h e r h a n d , the thesis that h u m a n p e r c e p t i o n only involves passive r e c e p -
tion o f sensations. J u s t i f y i n g this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f H e g e l ' s c h a p t e r r e q u i r e s o f
course a c o m p l e t e reconstruction, which is m o r e than can be u n d e r t a k e n here.
I p r o v i d e a full r e c o n s t r u c t i o n elsewhere.4 H e r e I s u m m a r i z e the m a i n
g r o u n d s s u p p o r t i n g m y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a n d show o n e key p o i n t at which H e -
gel's analysis a n d conclusions r e f e r to H u m e ' s .

T h e f u n d a m e n t a l i m p o r t a n c e o f H u m e ' s skepticism for K a n t has b e e n long

recognized. Unlike Kant, w h o expressly a c k n o w l e d g e d H u m e ' s stimulus to his
own thought, H e g e l only rarely n a m e s his m a i n sources a n d o p p o n e n t s , espe-
cially in the Phenomenology.5 H o w e v e r , H e g e l r e c o g n i z e d early in his c a r e e r

*These issues are only touched on by Eli Hirsch, The Concept ofldentity (New York: Oxford,
i98u ). Hirsch's study is concerned primarily with the diachronic issue of identity over time and
supports the general antiempiricist thesis that our criteria for individuation of objects are innate,
without addressing the specific issue about concept-empiricism and without formulating the
issues as sharply as Hume or Hegel.
3See my book, Hegel, Hume und die Identitdt wahrnehmbarerDinge (Frankfurt/Main: Kloster-
mann, i998; abbreviated ~HHW"), w167
4See HHW. Here I develop and defend in detail the brief sketch of ~Perception" I gave in my
book, Hegel'sEpistemologicalRealism (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989; abbreviated "HER"), 159-
sKant expressly acknowledges Hume's inspiration in the second Critique (V 5o.32-35) as
well as in the Prolegomena (IV g6o.6-17). Kant's works are cited according to the volume
(Roman numeral), page, and line numbers (decimals) of Kants Gesammelte Schriften, K6niglich
 HEGEL AND HUME ON PERCEPTION 101

t h a t a p h i l o s o p h i c a l view, i n c l u d i n g his o w n , c a n n o t b e j u s t i f i e d m e r e l y b y its

p r o c l a m a t i o n ; it c a n b e j u s t i f i e d o n l y t h r o u g h critical e n g a g e m e n t w i t h a l t e r n a -
tive views. 6 H u m e ' s T r e a t i s e p r o v i d e s a n i m p o r t a n t p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o i n t o f r e f e r -
ence which alone affords an intelligible and self-sufficient interpretation of
H e g e l ' s a n a l y s i s o f p e r c e p t i o n in t h e Phenomenology. S u c h a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is
c r u c i a l to t h e a i m o f H e g e l ' s a r g u m e n t s in t h e Phenomenology, O n l y b y r e f e r -
e n c e to c o m m o n p r o b l e m s in t h e h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y , i n d e p e n d e n t o f H e -
g e l ' s o w n p r o p o s e d s y s t e m , c a n H e g e l ' s Phenomenology p r o v i d e a n e x o t e r i c
" l a d d e r " t o - - t h a t is, a p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y s o u n d p r o o f o f - - t h e " a c t u a l i t y " o f a b s o -
lute knowledge.7 In other words: only by engaging with alternative philoso-
p h i e s o n t h e i r o w n t e r m s c a n H e g e l , in a c c o r d w i t h his o w n m e t h o d o l o g i c a l
r e q u i r e m e n t s o f t h e Phenomenology, a v o i d o n e o f t h e m a i n o b j e c t i o n s o f
Pyrrhonian skepticism, namely, that philosophers inevitably presume what
t h e y p r o p o s e to p r o v e . 8

Six p o i n t s in t h e h i s t o r i c a l b a c k g r o u n d o f H e g e l ' s a n a l y s i s o f p e r c e p t i o n c l e a r l y
i n d i c a t e H e g e l ' s s t u d y o f H u m e ' s e p i s t e m o l o g y , i n c l u d i n g Treatise, I.iv w
3.x. H e g e l ' s n o t e b o o k s f r o m 178 9 o n L o c k e , B e r k e l e y , H u m e , a n d K a n t
a r e u n f o r t u n a t e l y lost.9 H u m e ' s Treatise was first t r a n s l a t e d ( r a t h e r freely) i n t o
G e r m a n in 1 7 9 o . ~ ~ t r a n s l a t i o n o f H u m e ' s Treatise was r e v i e w e d a t l e a s t

PreuBische (now Deutsche) Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: G. Reimer [now De Gruyter],
19o2- ), commonly referred to as the "Akademie Ausgabe."
6 Cf G55.8-31AM48-49.
7 G ~3.3-5/M 14-15, cf. G 47.34-48.a/M 4~-43 . What Hegel says there about "feeling" as a
basis for philosophy counts in general against any philosophy (or any interpretation of a philoso-
phy) as a hermetically sealed comprehensive system, through which alone other ideas or issues are
to be considered. In this connection, see my essay, "Hegel's Attitude toward Jacobi in the 'Third
Attitude of Thought toward Objectivity'," The Southern Journal of Philosophy ~7 0989): t35-56"
SSee HER, esp. chs. x, 6, 7'
9On the basis of Hegel's apparently dated notes, Karl Rosenkranz reports: "Philosophy has its
own section. Because the context [Zusammenhang] is so essential for philosophy, Hegel dropped
the alphabetical divisions and began to extend the excerpts [from his sources] to whole [note-]
books. Locke's, Hume's and Kant's works are expansively excerpted in this way, although of
course first after the academic term. At least [Hegel's] study of Kant's [first] Critique definitely
occurs in the year t 789" (Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels Leben [Berlin, 1844; Darmstadt: Wissen-
schaftliche Buchgesellschaft Darmstadt, 1963], 14). 1789 is the year just before the first German
translation of Hume's Treatise. As Norbert Waszek has shown in great detail, Hegel knew the
writings of the Scottish Enlightenment very early in his career. See The Scottish Enlightenment and
Hegel's Account of'Civil Society' (Dordrecht: Kluwer, t988), 1o4-28.
I~ H. Jakob, ed. and tr., Uber die menschlicheNatur. Aus dem Englisch nebst kritischen Versuchen
zur Beurteilung dieses Werkes, 3 vols. (Halle, 179o-9~). Theodor Lipps found this translation useless
as a basis for his own tralaslation (Ein Traktat ~ber die menschliche Natur, 1894; R. Brandt, ed.,
Hamburg: Meiner, 1989).
102 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY o r P H I L O S O P H Y 36:1 JANUARY 1998
five t i m e s b e t w e e n 179 ~ a n d 1793, i n c l u d i n g in j o u r n a l s w h i c h H e g e l r e a d . ~
R i g h t a t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f his l o n g r e v i e w o f 179 ~ F e d e r w r o t e t h e f o l l o w i n g
a b o u t H u m e ' s Treatise " T h e m a n i f o l d v a l u e o f this w o r k is a l r e a d y f o r m o s t
[ p h i l o s o p h e r s ] so c r u c i a l t h a t I d o n ' t b e l i e v e it is n e c e s s a r y to say a n y t h i n g
a b o u t it. " ~ I s u b m i t t h a t it is a l t o g e t h e r i m p r o b a b l e t h a t t h e b i b l i o p h i l e H e g e l
d i d n ' t r e a d s u c h a c r u c i a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l m a s t e r p i e c e , o n e w h i c h g a t h e r e d in-
c r e a s i n g a t t e n t i o n in G e r m a n y a f t e r 179 o, d u r i n g t h e r o u g h l y f i f t e e n y e a r s
p r i o r to w r i t i n g t h e Phenomenology in t 8 o 6 .
3.2. I n a n i m p o r t a n t p a s s a g e f r o m t h e J e n a " L o g i c " m a n u s c r i p t H e g e l
d e s i g n a t e s i m p r e s s i o n s as " H u m e ' s s u b s t a n c e s " a n d as " t h a t w h i c h H u m e calls
t h i n g s . " ' s N o w o n l y in " O f S c e p t i c i s m w i t h r e g a r d to t h e s e n s e s " d o e s H u m e
t r y to s h o w t h a t i n d i v i d u a l , i s o l a t e d " i m p r e s s i o n s " c a n e x i s t i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f
t h e m i n d (of " b u n d l e s o f p e r c e p t i o n s " ) , a n d i n d e e d H u m e o n l y m e n t i o n s this
i d e a in this s e c t i o n . ' 4 I m p r e s s i o n s c a n c o u n t as " t h i n g s " o r " s u b s t a n c e s " o n l y i f
t h e y a r e m i n d - i n d e p e n d e n t . C o n s e q u e n t l y , this p a s s a g e f r o m H e g e l ' s e a r l y
logic m a n u s c r i p t p r o v i d e s c l e a r e v i d e n c e t h a t H e g e l h a d r e a d H u m e ' s Treatise
b y 18o 4, a n d i n d e e d , t h a t h e p a i d a t t e n t i o n to " O f s c e p t i c i s m w i t h r e g a r d to
t h e senses."~5

' Viz., anonymously in Frankfurter GelehrteAnzeigen, nos. 104 and 105, Dec. z 8 and 3 l, 179o,
pp. 836-4t; twice by Feder in Gb'ttingischeAnzeigenyon gelehrten Sachen, no. a44, Sept. 9, 179~ PP'
1441-48 and in PhilosophischeBibliothek (J. G. H. Feder and Chr. Meiners, eds., G6ttingen:J. Chr.
Dieterich, x791; Bruxelles: Aetas Kantiana, 1968: IV, 155-69); by Tiedemann in Allgemeine
DeutscheBibliothek (F. Nicoli, ed., Berlin and Stettin, 1765-96), 97, no. z, 1791 , pp. 437-47; anony-
mously in Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung, 3, nos. 174 and 175, 1792, pp. 17-24, 25-3~. Norbert
Waszek notes that Hegel began already in Stuttgart regularly to read the Allgemeine Deutsche
Bibliothek (op. cit., p. 1o4); that is, already before 1788.
'~This review appeared in the fourth volume of Feder's Philosophische Bibliothek; see the
preceding note.
is "Kant has the same [view] as Hume; Hume's substances, which follow one another or are
next to one another, are altogether mutually indifferent; they are the same in Kant; [they are]
what Hume calls things--[namely,] sensations, perceptions, sensory representations" ("Logik,"
re: causal relations; GW VII 5o.13-17; The Jena System, z8o4-5: Logic and Metaphysics, J. W.
Burbidge, G. di Giovanni, and H. W. Harris, eds. and trs. [Kingston and Montreal: McGill-
Queen's University Press, 1986], 53). Hegel doesn't speak here expressly of "impressions" in
Hume's sense, but instead of "sensations, perceptions, sensory representations." However, Hume
expressly equated impressions and perceptions. (I discuss this point further in w below.)
~4TreatiseI.iv.z: ~o 7.
,s One may think that the passage cited from Hegel's logic manuscript is too brief to prove that
Hegel read Hume's Treatise. However, in similar cases of Hegel's brief allusions or references to
other philosophers and their texts, one typically finds that much more, rather than less, stands
behind Hegel's references. I have discussed and illustrated this point in detail elsewhere. See "Kant,
Hegel, and the Transcendental Material Conditions of Possible Experience," Bulletin of the Hegel
Society of GreatBritain 33 0996): z3-4 a, "On Hegel's Early Critique of Kant's MetaphysicalFounda-
tions of Natural Science,"in S. Houlgate, ed., Hegel and thePhilosophy ofNature (Albany: SUNY, 1998),
137-66, and "Hegel's Critique of Kant's Moral World View," PhilosophicalTopics 19 (1991 ): 133-76.
 H E G E L A N D H U M E ON P E R C E P T I O N lO 3
3"3. My interpretation builds on Hegel's heretofore unexplained subtitle:
"Perception or the Thing and Deception." The apposition of "perception" and
"deception" (Tiiuschung) may suggest that Hegel refers to perceptual illusions,
which served as main premises in both ancient and modern arguments for
representational theories of perception. ,6 However, this topic is hardly dis-
cussed in Hegel's chapter on "Perception"mand it is also hardly discussed by
H u m e in "Of scepticism with regard to the senses."7
An important clue for interpreting Hegel's subtitle is found in the conclud-
ing section of Book I of Hume's Treatise, where H u m e designates causality as a
mere "illusion" of the imagination. By following the history of the German
reception of Hume's synopsis of his view of causality we can see, first, that
Hegel was indeed in a position to pay special attention to this summary, and
moreover, that Hegel had compelling grounds to examine closely the back-
ground of Hume's view of causality, and thus to examine Hume's view of the
identity of perceptible things, which H u m e also presents as a kind of decep-
tion or illusion.
The concluding section of Book I of Hume's Treatise was translated byJ. G.
Hamann and published in Summer 1771 in his Kb'nigsbergsche Zeitung. ~8 This
section apparently provided Kant "the recollection of David H u m e " as the
final impetus to write the first Critique.'9 Subsequently Kant recapitulated
Hume's synopsis, though much more briefly. In the long Remark to the Pref-
ace of the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (t 786) Kant summarizes
Hume's view of causality as "mere deception [Tiiuschung] due to habit. "~~The

,6 ~Representational" theories of perception in the sense that we directly perceive only sen-
sory representations, which are themselves supposedly caused by things or events in our environ-
ment, where those causes count as the indirect objects of our perception.
'THume briefly mentions perceptual illusions, not to support skepticism, but only to show
that perceptions have no i n d e p e n d e n t existence (Treatise I.iv.2:2 lO- i 1). The closest thing to an
example of a perceptual illusion in Hegel's chapter concerns the reduction of the perceptible
thing to a plurality of sensed qualities (G 7 4 - 7 5 / 3 / 7 o - 7 1 ). However, Hegel makes no mention of
perceptual relativity or other sources of perceptual illusions in this (or any other) connection; the
problem is generated out of the apparent conflict between the multitude of a thing's properties
and the "pure unity" which it presents to us (G 74.15- t 6/M 7o). See H H W w12.
'8Kdnigsbergsche Zeitung, supplement to nos. 53 (July 5, 177 l) and 55 (July t~, 1771); rpt. in
J. Nadler, ed.,J. G. Hamann, Sdratliche Werke (Wien: Herder, 1952), IV, 3 6 4 - 7 o. H a m a n n was the
editor of this paper.
tgThis view is defended by Manfred Kuehn, "Kant's Conception of Hume's Problem,"Journal
@the History of Philosophy 21 0983): t 7 5 - 9 3 , and "Hume's Antinomies," Hume Studies 9 (1983):
25-45, and by Gfinter Gawlick and Lothar Kreimendahl, Hume in der Deutschen AuJkldrung
(Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1987).
*'Kant writes: "but everything remains objectively merely contingent coincidence, just as
Hume wants when he calls [objective necessity] mere deception [Tduschung] through habit"
(MAdN IV 476.29-31).
104 JOURNAL OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 36: I JANUARY 1998
n e x t year, in the second Critique, Kant summarizes H u m e ' s view o f causality in
similar terms. 2~
Hegel studied Kant's Metaphysical Foundations a n d its crucial role within
Kant's Critical system very carefully by 1801.22 It is altogether likely that H e g e l
n o t e d Kant's s u m m a r y o f H u m e ' s view o f causality there. Schelling noticed
this topic, and surely b r o u g h t it to Hegel's attention.23 However, unlike Kant
and Schelling, in his c h a p t e r on "Perception" Hegel connects "deception," not
with causality, but with the "thing" and "perception." Why does he do this? As
n o t e d above, in his J e n a Logic m a n u s c r i p t o f 1 8 0 4 - 1 8 o 5 Hegel examines the
causal relations a m o n g sensory impressions or empirical intuitions and main-
tains that the p r o b l e m o f such relations arises equally in H u m e ' s and in Kant's
philosophies.24 This issue a m o u n t s to the p r o b l e m o f perceptual synthesis,
and this p r o b l e m is closely allied with the concept o f the identity o f perceptible
things. Now H u m e develops his views on the identity o f perceptible things
only in the Treatise, not in the first Enquiry, and i n d e e d only in " O f scepticism
with r e g a r d to the senses." W h a t led Hegel, unlike Kant and his successors, to
analyze H u m e ' s view o f the concept o f the identity o f perceptible things?
3.4. This question can be answered by considering three subquestions.
T h e s e suhquestions concern three central issues in H u m e ' s analysis in " O f
scepticism with r e g a r d to the senses": (I) the a posteriori derivation o f the
concept o f causality; (2) the lack o f justification o f the common-sense belief in
external things; a n d (3) the fictional derivation o f the concept o f the identity
o f perceptible things f r o m the imagination. Briefly stated, Kant r e s p o n d s as
follows. (I) In the second Analogy o f E x p e r i e n c e Kant argues (correctly) that,
despite the a posteriori sources o f o u r beliefs in particular causal relations
a m o n g things or events, the general concept o f causality c a n n o t be derived a
posteriori, especially not by H u m e a n principles o f psychological association.25
(2) T h e belief in external things is justified by Kant's "Refutation o f Idealism,"
an a r g u m e n t which was already sketched in the first-edition Paralogisms. 26 (3)

2, KdpVV 51.7-21.
~2See the first two articles cited in note 15.
93E.g., Scheiling writes in 1797 in the first installment of his "General Review of the Newest
Philosophical Literature": "Hume had correctly concluded that all our natural science would thus
be deception [Tduschung], all natural laws would be nothing but habits of the imagination"
(PhilosophischesJournal einer Gesellschaft Teutscher Gelehrten 5; W. G. Jacobs and W. Schieche, eds.,
Werke: Historisch-KritischeAusgabe [Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1988], IV 79.22-24).
24GWVII 5o.t2-29, TheJena System, op. cit., 53.
25KdrVAt95-96/B24o-4t, III 17x.25-x72. 9. See L. W. Beck, "A Prussian Hume and a
Scottish Kant," in Essays on Kant and Hume (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), a x1-29,
esp. t~t-25.
KdrVB274-79, III 19o.24- t93.24; first-edition fourth Paralogism: A344, 370; IV 218.2-
3, ~32-26-36.
 HEGEL AND HUME ON PERCEPTION 10 5

However, K a n t would not have r e g a r d e d the third subquestion as r e q u i r i n g a

special answer. A c c o r d i n g to Kant's "Refutation" we must have, and be able to
use, an objectively valid c o n c e p t o f empirical (perceptible) things. A l t h o u g h
Kant was deeply influenced by H u m e , he n e v e r d o u b t e d that we have a priori
concepts. Kant is confident f r o m the outset that we have two distinct sources
o f knowledge, sensibility and u n d e r s t a n d i n g , f r o m which we obtain the two
c o m p o n e n t s o f any empirical cognition, intuitions and concepts.~7 Kant's ques-
tion was only w h e t h e r , or which, a priori concepts are objectively valid. O u r a
priori concepts, the Categories, can be derived f r o m a Table o f J u d g m e n t s ,
including the concept o f substance, which t h r o u g h a complete (transcendental
and empirical) schematism would supposedly serve as a concept o f the identity
o f perceptible things. Kant would not view himself as n e e d i n g to r e s p o n d
directly to H u m e ' s empiricist critique o f the concept o f the identity o f percepti-
ble things.
H e g e l responds to the first subquestion, that r e g a r d i n g the c o n c e p t o f
causality, in the third c h a p t e r o f the Phenomenolog) ("Force and U n d e r s t a n d -
ing"), not in "Perception." H e g e l r e s p o n d s to the second subquestion, that
r e g a r d i n g the evidence for or justification o f o u r belief in o u t e r things, in his
analysis o f "Self-Consciousness. "~8 C o n c e r n i n g the third subquestion, how-
ever, Hegel must take a very d i f f e r e n t a p p r o a c h than Kant. Due to his p e n e -
trating internal critique o f Kant's transcendental idealism, by 18ol H e g e l had
already rejected Kant's sharp distinction between a priori and a posteriori con-
cepts.~9 However, that does not m e a n that Hegel no longer m a i n t a i n e d that
some conceptions c o u n t as relatively a p r i o r / a n d others c o u n t as relatively a
posteriori. It does mean, however, that Hegel c a n n o t simply assume that some
concepts are a prior/, and especially he c a n n o t assume that such concepts can
be derived f r o m a T a b l e o f J u d g m e n t s . Hegel must prove the a priori status o f
any a n d every s u p p o s e d (relatively) a priori conception. Moreover, in accord
with his regressive m e t h o d o f proof, Hegel must d e m o n s t r a t e the a priori
status o f each such conception t h r o u g h an internal critique o f the o p p o s e d
concept-empiricist derivation o f that concept f r o m e l e m e n t a r y sensory experi-
ences.3O T h e s e r e q u i r e m e n t s hold, o f course, for the main point o f Hegel's
analysis o f "Perception," namely, the concept o f the identity o f perceptible

~7KdrV A5o_52/B74-76; III 74.9-75.26.

*SSeeHER, 156-64.
~gSee the first two essays cited in note 15.
n~ is the thesis that the content of any genuine concept can be derived
from or defined in terms of elementary sensory experiences (impressions or sense data) through
logical conjunction or addition. Verification-empiricism is the thesis that every genuine statement
or proposition which is not logically or necessarily either true or false can only be justified by
sensory evidence. See HER, 48-5 o.
106 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 36:1 J A N U A R Y 1998
things. Now Hegel already justified some (relatively) apriori conceptions in the
first chapter of the Phenomenology ("Sense-Certainty"). However, he must jus-
tify each such conception. Moreover, his analysis of the concept of the identity
of perceptible things extends his critique of a key thesis of concept-empiricism
which is not examined in "Sense-Certainty," namely the derivation or defini-
tion of complex concepts by logical conjunction of simple sensory concepts
(i.e., names of simple sensory qualities). Third, the concept of the identity of
perceptible things is important to Hegel because he purports to show that this
concept contains a special kind of objectively valid contradiction--a result
which can be obtained by critical examination of Hume's view of the concept
of the identity of perceptible things!
By studying Hume's text and issues, Hegel recognized that Hume's notion
of "deception" applies not only to causality but also to the validity, indeed to
the very possibility, of the concept of the identity of perceptible things. Strictly
speaking, according to Hume's empiricism the "deception" lies precisely in the
fact that we are naturally convinced that perceptible things exist outside of us.
According to Hume's concept-empiricism this belief is neither true nor intelli-
gible, precisely because the concept of the identity of perceptible things is a
mere "fiction." Precisely because we have no legitimate concept of perceptible
things or their identity ("legitimate" vis-g~-visconcept-empiricism), H u m e him-
self speaks in this connection of "illusion" and "deception." Hence Hegel's
subtitle.
3.5. The next important point to notice about the philosophical reception
of this issue in Germany is that, because Kant concerned himself with percep-
tual synthesis while disregarding Hume's challenge to the a posteriori deriva-
tion or definition of the concept of the identity of perceptible things, the
attention of post-Kantian German philosophers was directed to perceptual
synthesis, but not to the concept of the identity of perceptible things. Skepti-
cism about the external world was widespread in Germany after Kant's first
Critique because many philosophers were unconvinced that Kant had ade-
quately answered Hume's skepticism about causality and outer objects. The
term Tduschung (deception) was frequently used in this connection. In 1792 G.
E. Schulze defended Hume's skepticism against Kant and his followers.V
Schulze stressed the general problem of the "deceptiveness [Triiglichkeit] and
unreliability of all sensory knowledge" and he summarized Hume's criticisms
of causality and induction.~ 2 Now Schulze did not use the term Tduschung in
this connection, nor did he discuss Hume's section, "Of scepticism with regard

3~Aenesidemus, oder Ueber die Fundamente der yon Herrn Prof. Reinhold in Jena gelieferten Eleraen-
tar-Philosophie, ed. A. Liebert (Berlin: Reuther and Reichard, 1911 ).
s~Ibid., 179; summary of Hume's skepticism: 83-89.
 HEGEL AND HUME ON PERCEPTION XO7

to t h e s e n s e s . " H o w e v e r , h e d i d stress a c l o s e l y r e l a t e d p r o b l e m , n a m e l y , t h e
issue (if n o t t h e t e r m ) o f t h e s y n t h e s i s o f s e n s o r y i n t u i t i o n s in R e i n h o l d ' s
p h i l o s o p h y . 3 3 I t is w e l l k n o w n t h a t H e g e l s t u d i e d b o t h R e i n h o l d a n d S c h u l z e
t h o r o u g h l y ; s u r e l y b o t h o f t h e m c a l l e d his a t t e n t i o n to t h e issue o f p e r c e p t u a l
synthesis.34 T h e t o p i c o f p e r c e p t u a l s y n t h e s i s is closely a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e
t o p i c o f t h e c o n c e p t o f t h e i d e n t i t y o f p e r c e p t i b l e t h i n g s . T h i s t o p i c was also
e m p h a s i z e d b y S o l o m o n M a i m o n , i n s o f a r as h e f o r m u l a t e d t h e c o n n e c t i o n
b e t w e e n d e c e p t i o n (he u s e s t h e t e r m Tduschung), p e r c e p t u a l s y n t h e s i s , a n d
s k e p t i c i s m a b o u t o u t e r o b j e c t s , a c o n n e c t i o n w h i c h is also f o u n d in H u m e - - a t
l e a s t in p o s t - K a n t i a n r e t r o s p e c t . H o w e v e r , M a i m o n , like his c o n t e m p o r a r i e s ,
disregarded Hume's problem about the concept of the identity of perceptible
t h i n g s . M a i m o n ' s " p s y c h o l o g i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n " o f K a n t ' s p r i n c i p l e s o n l y at-
t e m p t e d to r e v a l i d a t e H u m e a n p r i n c i p l e s o f p s y c h o l o g i c a l association.35
3.6. I n t h e Differenzschrift (18Ol) H e g e l c r i t i c i z e d t h e w e a k n e s s o f R e i n -
h o l d ' s c o n c e p t o f s y n t h e s i s a n d in t h e " S k e p t i c i s m " e s s a y o f 18o2 H e g e l g e n e r -
a l i z e d t h e p r o b l e m . 3 6 H o w e v e r , i n s t e a d o f l o s i n g H u m e ' s p r o b l e m in this
g e n e r a l i z a t i o n , H e g e l u s e d this g e n e r a l i z a t i o n to s h a r p e n t h e p r o b l e m . I t is
i m p o r t a n t to n o t e t h a t H e g e l a l r e a d y sees t h a t t h e f a m i l i a r p r o b l e m o f c a u s a l

aaAlready in his table of contents one finds: "Critique of the proofs provided in [Reinhold's]
Philosophy of the Elements that the stuff of representations must consist in a manifold, but that
their form must consist in a unity. (P. 316-329)" (Aenesidemus, xvi).
s4In the Differenzschrift Hegel wrote the following about Reinhold's concept of synthesis: "On
[Reinhold's] principle the synthesis of course comes out. It [synthesis] is expressed with a popular
word as an application, and in this impoverished form, from which the synthesis of two absolute
opposites would not gain much, it does not conform to [Reinhold's view] that the first theme of
philosophy must be something comprehensible. For even the merest synthesis of application
contains a transition of unity into the manifold, a unification of thought and matter, and thus it
contains a supposed incomprehensibility. In order to synthesize them, thought and matter must
not be absolutely opposed. Instead they must originally posited as one, and hence we would be
back to that tiresome identity of subject and object, of transcendental intuition, of speculative
[intellektuelen] thought" (GW IV 88. lo-x9; The Difference Between Fichte's and ScheUing's System of
Philosophy, ed. and trans. H. S. Harris and W. Cerf [Albany: SUNY, 1977]. This translation
contains the pagination from GW).
asV. Verra, ed., Gesammelte Werke (Hildesheim: Olms, x965), IV 73- See Achim Engstler,
Untersuchungen zum Idealismus Salomon Maimons (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstadt: Frommann-Holzboog,
t99o), 198-2o 4. One can assume that Hegel was familiar with Maimon's writings. Fichte and
Schelling valued Maimon very highly and surely drew Hegel's attention to his writings. See
R. Lauth and H. Jacob, eds., J. G. Fichte--C,esamtausgabe (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann
Holzboog, 1965), 1,2, pp. 1o9, a6t.24-262.4, 28o note, 368.25-369.2; I, 3, pp. 189.14-191.2o;
F. W. J. Schelling, Historisch-Kritische Ausgabe, I,l, p. 267; 1,2, pp. 76.11, 137.25-27, 151.1o-12;
and Wolfgang Bonsiepen, "Salomon Maimons Kant-Rezeption--Ausgangspunkt ft~r Hegels
Kant-Kritik?" Allgemeine Zeitschriflfiir Philosophie 7 (1982): 37-44.
36 GW IV 88. lO- 19, 2o7" 15- 25, 234'2 l-235.11 ; "Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy,
Exposition of Its Different Modifications and Comparison to the Latest Form with the Ancient
One" (H. S. Harris, tr., in G. di Giovanni and H. S. Harris, eds. and trs., Between Kant and Hegel,
Albany: SUNY, 1985), 323, 351-52.
108 JOURNAL OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 36:1 JANUARY 1998
r e l a t i o n s a m o n g p h y s i c a l s u b s t a n c e s is r e c a p i t u l a t e d as a p r o b l e m c o n c e r n i n g
the representative relation among "sensations, perceptions, sensory represen-
t a t i o n s , o r w h a t e v e r h e [sc. K a n t ] w a n t s [to call them]."37 T h e m a i n p o i n t is
t h a t , o n H u m e ' s v i e w as o n K a n t ' s t h e r e l a t a o f a s u p p o s e d c a u s a l r e l a t i o n , o r
analogously our sensory representations of that relation, "which succeed one
a n o t h e r o r [stand] n e x t to o n e a n o t h e r " a r e o r i g i n a l l y " o f t h e m s e l v e s a l t o -
g e t h e r i n d i f f e r e n t to e a c h o t h e r . " T h a t h o l d s o f H u m e a n " o b j e c t s , " w h i c h a r e
s u p p o s e d to b e i n d i f f e r e n t l y e i t h e r o u t e r t h i n g s o r s e n s o r y i m p r e s s i o n s , a n d it
h o l d s as well o f K a n t i a n s e n s a t i o n s (Empfindungen): in p r i n c i p l e t h e y a r e c o m -
p l e t e l y i n d e p e n d e n t o f e a c h other.38 I n o r d e r to solve t h e p r o b l e m o f c a u s a l
r e l a t i o n s , as w e l l as to solve t h e p r o b l e m i n d i c a t e d h e r e (if n o t n a m e d in t h e s e
terms) of perceptual synthesis, Hegel already recognizes that their relata must
b e r e c o n c e i v e d in f u n d a m e n t a l l y d i f f e r e n t t e r m s .
F u r t h e r m o r e , H e g e l c o n c e r n e d h i m s e l f in this s a m e m a n u s c r i p t w i t h t h e
c l o s e l y r e l a t e d issue o f t h e c o n c e p t o f t h e i d e n t i t y o f p e r c e p t i b l e things.39 I n
this c o n n e c t i o n H e g e l e x p r e s s l y s t r e s s e s t h e n u m e r i c a l u n i t y o f a p e r c e p t i b l e
o b j e c t as a s u b j e c t o f p r e d i c a t i o n a l o n g w i t h t h e p l u r a l i t y o f its p r o p e r t i e s .
A l r e a d y in this m a n u s c r i p t H e g e l is c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e p r o b l e m o f t h e i d e n -
tity o f p e r c e p t i b l e t h i n g s as a s e m a n t i c , e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l , as well as m e t a p h y s i c a l
p r o b l e m . I n this r e g a r d H e g e l a l r e a d y c o n c e r n e d h i m s e l f w i t h t h e n u m e r i c a l
i d e n t i t y o f a p e r c e p t i b l e t h i n g a n d t h e p l u r a l i t y o f its p r o p e r t i e s , o r a l t e r n a -
tively t h e p l u r a l i t y o f t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l s e n s a t i o n s o r p e r c e p t i o n s . 4 o I n this w a y

37 Cf Hegel'sJena "Logik" manuscript, GWVI I 5o. 12-51.1; TheJena System, op. cit., 53.
38Kantians may dislike this comparison between Hume and Kant. Notice I refer to Kantian
"sensations" rather than "intuitions." Because empirical intuitions are subject to the forms of
space and time, they have some relations. Kantian sensations, however, are independent even of
this kind of synthesis (KdrVA28-29/B44 , Prol. w IV 3o6). The real point of Hegel's concern,
however, is the contents of sensations, because they reflect qualities of perceived objects. That
Hegel is right about the mutual independence of the contents of sensations, even in Kant's view,
follows as a corollary from the basically identical view shared by Hume and Kant regarding--in
Kant's terms--the transcendental affinity of the manifold of empirical intuition. On this topic, see
my article, "Affinity, Idealism, and Naturalism: The Stability of Cinnabar and the Possibility of
Experience," Kant-Studien 88 (1997): 139-89.
39GWVII 94-xo3, TheJena System, op. cit., 97-1o7.
40"The simplicity of the this is what makes it, as absolute being, and as absolute certainty in
ordinary knowledge, valid as absolute truth. [In ordinary knowledge the simple this is absolute
truth.] It is the concept of infinite determinateness; the pure this immediately dissolves into
nothing. This is not this empty; instead it is the reflection in itself, the determinateness as totality,
whose form just is the this, the numerically one. But as totality it has a content, it is the unity that
retains itself in the opposed and the opposed is, as was shown, the determinateness as plurality,
but as a completedplurality, as absolute determinateness. But the determinateness is not completed [the
properties are not completed], for these many are properties, they are reflected within them-
selves, and--as many for themselves--they have unity outside themselves; thus they are simply
not all [the properties are mutually indifferent]" (GWVII 98.~6-99.9, 99.e9-31; TheJena System,
op. cit., lo 3. I have placed Hegel's marginal notes in brackets).
 HEGEL AND HUME ON PERCEPTION 10 9
h e p r e p a r e d h i m s e l f f o r the m u c h c l e a r e r a n d m o r e t h o r o u g h analysis o f the
c o n c e p t o f the i d e n t i t y o f p e r c e p t i b l e t h i n g s in the " P e r c e p t i o n " c h a p t e r o f the
Phenomenology.

Five f u r t h e r p o i n t s r e g a r d i n g the setting o f H e g e l ' s p r o b l e m s s h o w t h a t H e g e l

m u s t a n d d i d c o n c e r n h i m s e l f with H u m e ' s e p i s t e m o l o g y , i n c l u d i n g the episte-
mological analysis u n d e r t a k e n in " O f Scepticism in r e g a r d o f the senses."
4.x. As H e n r y H a r r i s has s h o w n , H e g e l c a m e across the g e n e r a l skeptical
p r o b l e m o f o u t e r t h i n g s a l r e a d y in the F r a n k f u r t f r a g m e n t "Glauben ist die
Art.'41 T h r o u g h his p o l e m i c David H u m e (iber den Glauben ( x 7 8 5 ) J a c o b i in-
f o r m e d H e g e l a b o u t H a m a n n ' s fideist a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f H u m e ' s skepticism.42
A c c o r d i n g to H a m a n n , H u m e h a d s h o w n t h a t o u r b e l i e f in o u t e r t h i n g s is
rationally n e i t h e r p r o v a b l e n o r r e f u t a b l e - - j u s t like o u r b e l i e f in G o d (accord-
ing to H a m a n n andJacobi).43 C o n s e q u e n t l y , H e g e l r e c o g n i z e d empiricist skep-
ticism with r e g a r d to o u t e r t h i n g s as the f u l c r u m o n w h i c h faith hoists itself
above reason.44 I n o r d e r to d e f e n d the cognitive claims o f p h i l o s o p h y H e g e l
m u s t t h o r o u g h l y r e f u t e empiricist skepticism.
4.2. T h e a t t e m p t to u n d e r s t a n d the identity o f a t h i n g in t e r m s o f the
c o n c e p t s o f u n i t y a n d plurality has a l o n g history, well k n o w n to H e g e l , n o t
o n l y in Plato (Theatetus, Timaeus), b u t a l r e a d y in E m p e d o c l e s . I n his " L e c t u r e s
o n the H i s t o r y o f P h i l o s o p h y " H e g e l objected, n o t o n l y to E m p e d o c l e s , b u t
also to his m o d e r n f o l l o w e r s - - r e c a l l H e g e l ' s c o m m e n t s o n R e i n h o l d , a n d
p e r h a p s also o n H u m e a n d K a n t - - t h a t t h e y always stress alternatively a n d
sequentially the u n i t y o r the plurality o f a thing, b u t fail to c o m b i n e these two
aspects o f a thing.45 I n his lectures H e g e l stressed a p o i n t w h i c h w e n t u n n o -

41Hegels theologischeJugendschriften, H. Nohl, ed. (Tfibingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck],

19o7), 38~-85 . A translation appears in H. S. Harris, Hegel's Development: Toward the Sunlight,
z77o-z8oz (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 5x~-15 .
4*Jacobi's book was published in 1785 in Breslau by Loewe. Harris identifies Jacobi as the
mediator between Hamann and Hegel in Hegel's Development: Night Thoughts (]ena I8ox-18o6)
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, t983), x1 note.
4sJ. G. Hamann, Sokratische Denkwiirdigkeiten w (Amsterdam, t759; Nadler, ed., Sdmtliche
Werke, Wien: Herder, 195o), II 73.~1-74.5; Hamann's Socratic Memorabilia, J. C. O'Ftaherty, tr.
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, t 967), t67-69.
~Harris, Hegel'sDevelopment, 31~.
4s "This is the nature of synthesizing representation in general, this is the common thought-
lessness, to seize now unity, then on plurality and not to bring both thoughts together; the one is
preserved [aufgehoben]and also is not one . . . . Empedocles's concept of synthesis is still held valid
even in this day" (E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel, eds., G. W. F. Hegel: Werke in 2o Biinde
[Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, x97 l; abbreviated "MM"], XVIII, 353). This remark is not found in
Hegel's lectures from tg25/a6, but there Hegel said: "But against this it is to be noted, that there
simply is no unification without division, and no division without unification. Distinguishing
unifies the one and the division. It is very important to know that these two opposed determina-
1 10 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 36:1 J A N U A R Y 1998

ticed by the Greeks, but which was especially emphasized by Hume, a point
which gave Hume's skepticism special importance for Hegel: Through his
critique of causality and induction Hume, far more than any other empiricist,
"purified the opposition between the sensible and the universal and expressed
it more sharply," indeed to the point of depriving the sensible of all universal-
ity, and thus H u m e had "annulled [aufgehoben]the objectivity of the determina-
tions of thought [Denkbestimmungen],their being in and for themselves.'46 In
this connection Hegel states directly that necessity and universality are only
examples of the determinations of thought attacked by Hume.47 This is to say
that Hegel recognized H u m e had contested other concepts or universals ("de-
terminations of thought") in addition to universality and necessity. Only
H u m e had carefully examined, not only the applicability, but moreover the
very content of the concept of the identity of perceptible things, and had
rejected it as a mere "fiction" of our imagination. Unlike Hume, the other
ancient and modern treatments of this problem simply overlooked the key
question about perception: H o w - - o n the basis of what concept of a thing--
are we able to bring together various specific sensations or perceptions and
relate them to some one single object instead of to another?48 That is precisely

tions are identical and distinct. Identity and nonidentity are such determinations of thought, but
they cannot be separated. Aristotle's complaint [about Empedocles] thus lies in the nature of the
thing. But Empedocles was completely unaware of it" (P. Garniron and W. Jaeschke, eds.,
Vorlesungen tiber die Geschichteder Philosophic [Hamburg: Meiner, t989], Tell 2, 84.291-85.299;
Lectures on the Philosophy of History, E. S. Haldane and E. Simson, trs. [London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, New York: Humanities Press, 1955], 3 vols., I, 317).
46MM XX, 276, 281, cf. 336-37 (quoted in the next note).
4~"Synthetic j u d g m e n t s apriori are nothing but a connection of the opposed [terms] through
themselves or the absolute concept, that is, relations among distinct determinations, connections
which are not given through experience, such as cause and effect and so on; they are determina-
tions of thought. Hume already showed that they are not [found] in experience" (MM XX, 3 3 6 -
37; Haldane and Simson, III, 43o).
4SThis also holds of Plato's Theatetus, which may of course have been a model both for H u m e
and for Hegel. This question also has great currency in contemporary neurophysiology of percep-
tion as the so-called "binding problem," namely: How do we determine (or sense) that it is one and
the same thing or event (instead of different things or events) which stimulate different receptors in
the retina, or which stimulate different receptors in different sensory modalities? Whatever an-
swers this question is a necessary precondition of conscious experience. See Semir Zeki, A Vision of
the Brain (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 32 t - 24, 349. This is to say, this question is a general one about
how our perceptual system integrates sensations or perceptions. This question is not specific to sen-
sationism (see below, w though it is more obvious within sensationist accounts of perception.
Hegel is right to turn to Hume, rather than Berkeley, about this issue, because Berkeley doesn't
share Hume's strict concept-empiricism and Berkeley adopts a nominalist view about ~substance,"
which simply dismisses the notion that perceptible things are unitary amidst their diverse proper-
ties. See A Treatiseconcerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, Rev. G. N. Wright, ed., in The Works
of GeorgeBerkeley,D.D., Bishop of Cloyne (London: Tegg, 1843), vol. I, Pt. I, w167 49. Berkeley's dis-
tinction between "ideas" and ~notions" indicates his dissent from strict concept-empiricism; this is a
point Berkeley took pains to clarify in the second edition of the Principles (cf. esp. I w167 89, x42).
 HEGEL AND HUME ON PERCEPTION 111
the m a i n q u e s t i o n in H e g e l ' s c h a p t e r o n " P e r c e p t i o n " in t h e Phenomenology,
a n d c a r e f u l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f H e g e l ' s analysis shows t h a t precisely H u m e ' s
rejection o f the c o n c e p t o f the i d e n t i t y o f p e r c e p t i b l e t h i n g s is the m a i n topic
o f H e g e l ' s discussion.49 B e c a u s e H u m e is a w a r e o f this question, as well as o f
the possibility o f d e c e p t i o n a b o u t the v e r y existence o f o u t e r t h i n g s t h a t it
involves (if i n d e e d t h e c o n c e p t o f i d e n t i t y is a "fiction"), H u m e c o u n t s , in
H e g e l ' s view, as the historical r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f p e r c e p t u a l consciousness,
which, as the o b s e r v e d f o r m o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s e x a m i n e d in H e g e l ' s c h a p t e r , is
likewise c o n s c i o u s o f this possibility o f deception.5o
4.3. H e g e l m u s t a n s w e r H u m e ' s rejection o f the c o n c e p t o f the i d e n t i t y o f
p e r c e p t i b l e t h i n g s in o r d e r to c a r r y t h r o u g h his e x a m i n a t i o n a n d d e f e n s e o f
the "actuality" o f o u r k n o w l e d g e . I n the Encyclopedia (w a n d Zusatz) H e g e l
expressly f o r m u l a t e s a crucial fallacy u n d e r l y i n g the w h o l e m o d e r n (as well as
current) epistemological debate between empiricism and rationalism about
skepticism a n d relativism, n a m e l y , the uncritical a s s u m p t i o n t h a t o n l y a pas-
sive k i n d o f c o g n i t i o n can be r e c o n c i l e d with realism, a n d c o n v e r s e l y t h a t a n y
sort o f active c o g n i t i o n inevitably leads e i t h e r to skepticism o r to relativism,
b e c a u s e a n y cognitive activity m u s t (re)create the s u p p o s e d objects o f o u r
k n o w l e d g e a n d t h u s o b s c u r e r a t h e r t h a n reveal w h a t t h e y truly are. H e g e l , f o r
the first a n d a l m o s t the o n l y time in the h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y , e x p r e s s l y
i n t e n d e d to c o m b i n e realism a b o u t the objects o f k n o w l e d g e with a n activist
a c c o u n t o f k n o w l e d g e . s l H e g e l was a l r e a d y a w a r e o f this issue in 18o 1A 8o~, as
is s h o w n by his criticism o f R e i n h o l d in the Differenzschrift a n d by his I n t r o d u c -
tion to the Critical Journal of Philosophy.5* T h i s s a m e issue is a n n o u n c e d at the

49G 73.39-74.1 t/M 7o. In this connection Hegel stresses that perceptual consciousness is ~a
connection [Beziehen]of the diverse moments of its apprehension [Auffassens] to one another" (G
74.8-9/M 7o).
5oG 74.4/M 7o.
5~Enz. w and Zusatz. For discussion of this important passage see my essay, "Harris, Hegel,
and the Truth about Truth," in G. Browning, ed., The Phenoraenology of Spirit: A Reappraisal
(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997) , 23-~ 9. For discussion of this general point, see HER, passim. Imagine
for a moment how wildly misunderstood Hegel's epistemology must be by anyone, whether friend
or foe, who fails to recognize that Hegel challenged such a fundamental dichotomy as this, and
especially by those who implicitly or explicitly assume the validity of this dichotomy1 Kant at-
tempted to defend an "empirical realism" on the basis of his "transcendental idealism." His
idealism, however, holds that the objects of empirical knowledge are transformed by our forms of
intuition (space and time). This involves too much skepticism and subjectivism for Hegel, who
sought to defend realism pure and simple, namely, the view that the objects of empirical knowl-
edge exist and have characteristics regardless of what we may think or say about them. (For
discussion, see HER chs. l, 3, to, 11.)
5, See Hegel's Differenzschrift (GW IV 85.13-86.9) and "l]ber das Wesen der philosophischen
Kritik fiberhaupt, und ihr Verh:iltniss zum gegenw~irtigen Zustand der Philosophie insbe-
sondere" (GW IV 118.10--20); "On the Essence of Philosophical Criticism Generally, and Its
Relationship to the Present State of Philosophy" (H. S. Harris, tr., in BetweenKant and Hegel, 276 ).
112 J O U R N A L OF THE H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 36:1 J A N U A R Y 1998

beginning of the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit by the metaphors

of knowledge as an instrument or a medium.53
Hegel's epistemology is distinguished from the skeptical tradition, as well
as from the skeptical underpinnings of modern philosophy from Descartes to
Kant and his successors, precisely by his attempt to show that our basic concep-
tual categories are not only subjectively but also objectively valid--"objectively
valid" in the sense that they hold of things which exist and have characteristics
regardless of what we say or think about them--even though we construct
these conceptions a priori. Exactly how we refer our a priori constructed con-
ceptions to the actual structure of the world and thereby assess, revise, and
justify them is a crucial and complex matter which I have analyzed in detail
elsewhere.54 Here I can only mention, e.g., that Hegel aims to show in "Per-
ception," not only with H u m e that the concept of the identity of perceptible
things cannot be reduced to or defined in terms of the concepts of unity and
plurality, but also against H u m e that this concept is no mere a priori "fiction,"
but instead that it is objectively valid, even though it can only be used in an
active kind of cognition. Moreover, Hegel proposes to demonstrate this objec-
tive validity without espousing any kind of transcendental idealism cure Criti-
cal skepticism about "things in themselves."55 Only by revalidating the objec-
tive validity of our basic conceptual categories can Hegel develop philosophy
beyond philo sophia to genuine scientific (systematic) knowledge, and only thus
can he restore the priority of reason over faith, whether fideism or Kantian
practical faith.56 Both kinds of faith are based on deep skepticism, though of
different kinds. Hamann's, Hume's, and also Kant's skepticisms all highlight
the fact that Hegel's attempt to justify the objective validity of our basic con-
ceptual categories is absolutely fundamental to his aim in the Phenomenology to
justify his claim that philosophy not only aspires to but achieves absolute
knowledge, " n a m e l y . . . the actual knowledge of what truly is."57 The sub-

53 G 53.1-54.2o/M 46-47; see HER, 4-6.

54See HER, chs. 7, 8. This is the main point of Hegel's "concept-pragmatism," though I did
not use this term in HER.
55For discussion of the skeptical side of the Critical philosophy, see HER, 38-39 and my
article "Noumenal Causality Reconsidered: Affection, Agency, and Meaning in Kant," Canadian
Journal of Philosophy 27 (1997): 2o9-46.
56Hegel states his intention to take philosophy beyond love of wisdom (philo sophia) to actual
science in the Preface to the Phenomenology (GI 1.24-28/M3); his intention thus to supersede faith
is expressed already in the Frankfurt fragment "Glauben ist die Art" (see above, w ).
57Introduction, G 53.2/M 46. Hegel's realist use of the term "das Absolute" is not idiosyn-
cratic. This term is used in the same sense, e.g., by T e t e n s ~ h i m s e l f unquestionably a realist. See
Philosophische Versuche fiber die menschliche Natur und ihre Entwicklung, vol. I (Leipzig: M. G. Weid-
manns Erben und Reich, 1777; W. Uebele, ed., Berlin: Reuther und Reichard, 1913), x85-88.
Also see HER, esp. chs. t, ~o, 11.
 HEGEL AND H U M E ON P E R C E P T I O N 113

questions r e g a r d i n g the c o n t e n t a n d the objective validity o f the concept o f the

identity o f perceptible things are especially i m p o r t a n t in the second and third
phases o f Hegel's analysis in "Perception"; Hegel stresses the subquestion
r e g a r d i n g the activity o f o u r cognition t h r o u g h o u t his analysis.
4.4. H u m e ' s analysis o f the c o n c e p t o f the identity of perceptible things in
" O f Scepticism with r e g a r d to the senses" is absolutely crucial for the assess-
m e n t o f concept-empiricism, because H u m e in fact shows that the c o n c e p t o f a
physical object ( H u m e speaks o f "body" in general) c a n n o t be derived f r o m or
defined in terms o f logical conjunctions o f (names of) e l e m e n t a r y sensory
experiences or impressions. (This, in a word, is why he must take recourse to
"fictions.") In addition, H u m e in fact (if unintentionally) shows that the con-
cept o f the identity o f perceptible things c a n n o t be r e d u c e d to merely quantita-
tive concepts. T h o s e are two main results o f Hegel's analysis in "Perception."
T h e third, closely related, result is that h u m a n knowledge is not passive, but
active. This thesis is also partly c o n f i r m e d by H u m e , insofar as he r e p e a t e d l y
must introduce conceptual ~fictions," which we p r o d u c e a n d must p r o d u c e
(by innate psychological "propensities") in o r d e r to have a belief in o u t e r
things at all. T h e s e three theses are absolutely central to Hegel's analysis in
"Perception," a n d p r i o r to H e g e l they are only f o u n d in H u m e , indeed, only
in " O f Scepticism with r e g a r d to the senses." Hegel's c o n t e m p o r a r i e s did not
follow H u m e ' s analysis so deeply. T h e y contested the applicability o f the con-
cept o f a thing or (analogously) o f substance as a substratum for properties,
but they did not c o n c e r n themselves with either the c o n t e n t (definition) or the
derivation o f the c o n c e p t o f the identity o f a perceptible thing.58
4.5. Considering some key features o f Kant's view o f sensations a n d their
role in p e r c e p t i o n helps to highlight some i m p o r t a n t features o f p e r c e p t u a l
synthesis, features which are i m p o r t a n t to Hegel and help to show the i m p o r -
tance to him o f H u m e ' s examination o f the concept o f identity. Kant rejected
two o f Locke's central theses c o n c e r n i n g perception, first, that sensations
caused in us by o u t e r events or objects either are or can be treated as pictures
o f objects, and second, that there is a g e n u i n e question w h e t h e r these sensory
representations c o r r e s p o n d or fail to c o r r e s p o n d to the objects which suppos-
edly cause them. Consequently, o n Kant's view, no object can be r e p r e s e n t e d
at all, either correctly or incorrectly, without the use o f a priori functions o f
j u d g m e n t . Rolf G e o r g e has shown that Kant held a certain kind o f "sensa-

5sFor example, Fichte--who apparently knew only Hume's first Enquio--(rightly) noted that
"Maimon merely doubted the applicability of the law of causality; on his principles he could have
doubted the applicability of all a pr/or/laws.--Like Hume" (C,esaramtausgabe, I, 3, 19o.2o- 29). This
point about modern discussions of substance is corroborated in detail by Robert Stern in Hegel,
Kant and the Structure of the Object (London: Routledge, 199o). See also H H W w
 ~4 J O U R N A L OF THE HISTORY OF P H I L O S O P H Y 36:1 JANUARY ~998
t i o n i s m . ' s 9 K a n t e x p r e s s e d this d o c t r i n e c l e a r l y in his d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n
s e n s a t i o n s a n d e m p i r i c a l i n t u i t i o n s , co A c c o r d i n g to this d o c t r i n e , s e n s a t i o n s
a r e ( n o r m a l l y ) c a u s e d b y o b j e c t s o r e v e n t s in o u r e n v i r o n m e n t , a l t h o u g h this
c a u s a l r e l a t i o n d o e s n o t suffice f o r s e n s a t i o n s to r e p r e s e n t o b j e c t s (or e v e n t s ) .
Consequently we must (re)construct our representations of outer objects or
e v e n t s , w h e r e s o m e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f o u r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s a r e d u e to t h e o b -
jects we perceive, while other characteristics derive from our synthesizing
c o g n i t i v e f u n c t i o n s . T h i s d o c t r i n e is f u n d a m e n t a l to K a n t ' s e p i s t e m o l o g y , i n s o -
f a r as it a l o n e p r o v i d e s t h e c o n t e x t f o r K a n t ' s f u n d a m e n t a l q u e s t i o n , f o r m u -
l a t e d in his f a m o u s l e t t e r to H e r z . ~
A c c o r d i n g to K a n t , t h e s y n t h e s i s b y w h i c h a l o n e e m p i r i c a l s e n s a t i o n s c o m e
to r e p r e s e n t o b j e c t s m u s t b e a f u n c t i o n o f t h e k i n d s o f j u d g m e n t o f w h i c h w e
a r e c a p a b l e , s i m p l y b e c a u s e t h e r e is n o o t h e r p o s s i b l e s o u r c e o f s u c h s y n t h e s e s .
I n t h e " M e t a p h y s i c a l D e d u c t i o n " o f t h e C a t e g o r i e s K a n t p u r p o r t s to s h o w t h a t
o u r b a s i c k i n d s o f l o g i c a l j u d g m e n t s i n d i c a t e o u r basic k i n d s o f c o g n i t i v e
j u d g m e n t s . I f t h e r e w e r e a v a l i d T a b l e o f (logical) J u d g m e n t s , it w o u l d b e
q u i t e p l a u s i b l e to s h a r e K a n t ' s a s s u m p t i o n t h a t this T a b l e o f J u d g m e n t s m u s t
g r o u n d a n a n a l o g o u s T a b l e o f C a t e g o r i e s . 62 F o r p r e s e n t p u r p o s e s t h e i m p o r -
t a n t p o i n t is t h a t , o n K a n t ' s view, s e n s a t i o n s o n l y b e c o m e c o m p o n e n t s o f a c t u a l
p e r c e p t i o n s a n d o n l y r e p r e s e n t o b j e c t s i n s o f a r as t h e y a r e i n t e g r a t e d - -
synthesized--by cognitive judgments based on our conceptual Categories.
T h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c w e a k n e s s o f s e n s a t i o n i s t t h e o r i e s o f p e r c e p t i o n lies in
the lack of a convincing explanation of the origin and nature of the synthesiz-

59Rolf George, "Kant's Sensationism," Synthese 47 (t 981 ): 229-55, esp. 230, 246. The origins
of sensationism are found in Malebranche; it was developed as an explicit theory by Condillac,
and it was espoused by Reid and the Scottish School, Tetens, Kant, Fichte, Schopenhauer, W. v.
Humboldt, Alexander Hamilton, and also by Dietrich Tiedemann, Karl Franz yon Irwing, Chris-
tian Lossius, Ernst Plamer, and Christian Thomasius. See, in addition to Rolf George: Manfred
Kuehn, Scottish Common Sense in Germany, z768-18oo (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's
University Press, x987), 45, 26o-6a; Lorenz Krfiger, Der Begriff des Empirismus (Berlin: de
Gruyter, 1973), w and Lothar Kreimendahl's Introduction to the translation of Condillac's
Abhandlung fiber die Empfindungen (Hamburg: Meiner, 1983).
c'~ KdrVB44, III 56.~6-29; A32o/B376-77, III ~49.36-25 o. 14,
6'X t3o.6-8; cf. L. W. Beck, ed. and tr., Kant Selections (New York: Macmillan, x988), 81. In
the first Critique Kant formulates the question as follows: ~Now how do we come to posit an object
for these representations, or ascribe to them, in addition to their subjective reality as modifica-
tions [of the mind], some kind of objective reality?" (A197,,'B~42, III 172.21 - 23). Whoever inter-
prets Kant's theory of perception in the first Critique in terms of the "judgments of perception"
described in the Prolegomena will completely misunderstand the main questions about perceptual
synthesis addressed by Kant, along with the significance, both for Hume and for Hegel, of the
issue of the nature and content of the concept of the identity of perceptible things.
62On the vexed topic of the completeness of Kant's Table of Judgments, see Michael Wolff's
excellent study, Die Vollsti~ndigkeit des kantischen Urteilstafd (Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 1995).
On the relation between Kant's Table of Judgments and Table of Categories, see Robert Howell,
Kant's TranscendentalDeduaion (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1992), ch. 1o.
 HEGEL AND H U M E ON P E R C E P T I O N 115

ing functions which integrate sensations into perceptions o f objects.63 Kant

tried to solve this p r o b l e m with his Tables o f J u d g m e n t s and Categories.
Already at the beginning o f his study o f Kant's epistemology, Hegel had grave
doubts a b o u t the adequacy o f Kant's Tables and (as m e n t i o n e d above) by
1801A80~ H e g e l had d e v e l o p e d a p o w e r f u l internal critique o f Kant's tran-
scendental idealism which showed that Kant's sharp distinction between a
priori and a posteriori concepts must be rejected.64 Now Hegel also espoused
sensationism.65 A f t e r rejecting Kant's view o f o u r synthetic cognitive j u d g -
ments, Hegel had to develop a new view o f the synthetic functions o f p e r c e p -
tual j u d g m e n t .
H u m e ' s examination o f the c o n c e p t o f identity takes on special interest in
this connection. H u m e , o f course, was no sensationist. In H u m e ' s view sensory
impressions are objects o f conscious awareness; sensations o f the sensationist
variety are not. H o w e v e r , like the sensationists, H u m e holds that sensory
impressions are caused by objects in o u r e n v i r o n m e n t - - a l t h o u g h he c a n n o t
s u p p o r t this view philosophically. H o w e v e r , H u m e ' s a t t e m p t to explain the
common-sense belief in the persisting and m i n d - i n d e p e n d e n t existence o f
o u t e r things on the basis o f sensory impressions in fact addresses the key
p r o b l e m facing sensationism: H o w are we able to bring specific series o f
impressions (or sensations) together, in o r d e r to relate them to some one
specific object which (supposedly) caused them? W h a t kind o f concept o f the
object is p r e s u p p o s e d by such "bringing t o g e t h e r " o f sensations, i.e., what
concept guides p e r c e p t u a l synthesis? T h e fact that Hegel devoted such atten-
tion to Kant's doctrine o f p e r c e p t u a l synthesis, and m o r e o v e r that he ex-
pressly e x a m i n e d Kant's view o f synthesis in close connection with H u m e ' s
discussion " O f Scepticism with r e g a r d to the senses," shows b e y o n d d o u b t that
H u m e ' s influence on Hegel's e p i s t e m o l o g y - - b o t h directly and as conveyed
t h r o u g h K a n t m i s very i m p o r t a n t indeed. Precisely because H u m e was the
sole m o d e r n p h i l o s o p h e r b e f o r e Hegel who seriously e x a m i n e d the origin,
nature, a n d c o n t e n t o f the c o n c e p t o f the identity o f perceptible things, it is
not at all surprising that Hegel would pay close attention to H u m e ' s examina-
tion o f this question in " O f Scepticism with r e g a r d to the senses." T h e techni-
cal issues in philosophical psychology about sensations as analyzed by sensa-
tionism are not, o f course, a p p r o p r i a t e to Hegel's t r e a t m e n t o f "Perception" in
the Phenomenology. Nevertheless, the m o r e general question about the c o n c e p t

6sCf. George, "Kant's Sensationism," z37-38.

64See the first two essays referred to in note x5 above.
65See Willem deVries, Hegel's Theoryof MentalActivity (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988),
ch. 11. DeVries d o e s n o t use the term "sensationism." However, this is precisely the kind of view
that results from Hegel's attempt to mediate between "symbolist"and "representational" theories
of thought, as deVries very nicely explains.
i 16 JOURNAL OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 36: i JANUARY 1 9 9 8

o f t h e i d e n t i t y o f p e r c e p t i b l e t h i n g s c e r t a i n l y is a p p r o p r i a t e to " P e r c e p t i o n " i n
t h e Phenomenology.

I t u r n n o w to s o m e m a i n p o i n t s o f H u m e ' s a n a l y s i s o f i d e n t i t y , b e g i n n i n g w i t h
a m o r e g e n e r a l p o i n t a b o u t h i s v i e w o f s u b s t a n c e . 66 H u m e , o f c o u r s e , c o n s i d -
ered perceptible objects in connection with the concept of substance and the
p l u r a l i t y o f a t h i n g ' s p r o p e r t i e s . N e a r t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e Treatise h e s t a t e s :

We have t h e r e f o r e n o idea of substance, distinct from that o f a collection o f particular

qualities, n o r have we any o t h e r m e a n i n g w h e n we either talk or reason c o n c e r n i n g it.
T h e idea o f a s u b s t a n c e . . , is n o t h i n g b u t a collection o f simple ideas, that are
u n i t e d by the i m a g i n a t i o n , a n d have a p a r t i c u l a r n a m e assigned to them, by which we
are able to recall, either to ourselves or others, that collection. 67

Very similar, if not identical, accounts of the concept of substance can be

found throughout modern philosophy. Now Hume does not discuss the con-
c e p t o f s u b s t a n c e i n " O f S c e p t i c i s m w i t h r e g a r d to t h e s e n s e s , " b u t it is c e r -
t a i n l y r e l e v a n t to t h e i s s u e s r a i s e d t h e r e . H u m e o f t e n r e p e a t s , i n c l u d i n g i n this
s e c t i o n (I.iv w t h a t it is "a g r o s s i l l u s i o n to s u p p o s e , t h a t o u r r e s e m b l i n g
p e r c e p t i o n s a r e n u m e r i c a l l y t h e s a m e ; a n d 'tis t h i s i l l u s i o n , w h i c h l e a d s u s i n t o

66For detailed discussion of Hume's analysis, see Norman Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of
David Hume (London: Macmillan, 1964) , ch. 2~; Robert P. Wolff, "Hume's Theory of Mental
Activity," rpt. in V. Chappell, ed., Hume: A Collection of CriticalEssays (New York: Anchor, t966),
99-128; and Barry Stroud, Hume (London: Routledge, 1977), ch. 5- Kenneth A. Richman con-
tends that Hume's empiricism can account for our natural belief in the continuing existence of
external objects consistently ("Empiricism, Natural Belief, and the New Hume," History of Philoso-
phy Quarterly x2 [1995]: 425-41). Richman's account is seriously flawed in several regards; the
most important can be put briefly. Richman defines Hume's empiricism as follows: "Hume's
theory [of ideas derived via natural dispositions] is a form of empiricism because it involves the
claim that our perceptions are all either experiences (impressions) or derived from experiences"
(4~8; cir. 43 o, 43~). By this definition of "empiricism," the early Plato (Socrates), Descartes, and
Kant are all empiricists! The early Plato would be an "empiricisC because the (slightly) unequal
sticks he perceives suggest to him the form of absolute equality (Phaedo 74B7-C5); Descartes
would be an ~empiricist" because his examination of the complete change in sensory qualities
displayed by the melting and vaporizing wax occasions his concept of substance and the intuition
of his mind of the substance of the wax itself (Meditations on First Philosophy, Meditation 2, in
C. Adam and P. Tannery, eds~, Oeuvres de Descartes [revised edition, Paris: Vrin, 1964-76], VII,
3o-31; J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch, trs., The Philosophical Writings of Descartes
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984], II, 2o-2 x); and Kant would be an "empiricist"
because, although he contends that knowledge does not all arise out of experience, he grants that
it all begins with experience (Critique of Pure Reason, W. Pluhar, tr. [Indianapolis: Hackett, t996],
B t). Richman's egregiously loose characterization of ~empiricism" disregards the fact that
concept-empiricism defines the distinction between a prior/and a posteriori concepts, and fails to
grasp the significance of this contrast within debates between empiricists and rationalists in
modern (and recent) philosophy.
67 Treatise, I.i.6: a6.
 HEGEL AND HUME ON PERCEPTION Xl 7

the o p i n i o n , t h a t these p e r c e p t i o n s are u n i n t e r r u p t e d , a n d are still existent,

even w h e n t h e y are n o t p r e s e n t to the senses.-68 I n " O f Scepticism with r e g a r d
to the senses" H u m e o n l y e x a m i n e d the d i a c h r o n i c a s p e c t o f the c o n c e p t o f
identity. H o w e v e r , in the b r i e f s u b s e q u e n t section, " O f the a n c i e n t p h i l o s o -
p h y , " H u m e r e c o g n i z e s t h a t the basic c o n t r a d i c t i o n within the c o n c e p t o f
i d e n t i t y a p p e a r s also in the s y n c h r o n i c aspect o f the i d e n t i t y o f t h i n g s b e c a u s e
the m a i n c o n t r a d i c t i o n lies in the o p p o s i t i o n o f the u n i t y o f a t h i n g with the
p l u r a l i t y o f its p r o p e r t i e s :

'Tis confest by the most judicious philosophers, that our ideas of bodies are nothing
but collections form'd by the mind of the ideas of the several distinct sensible qualities,
of which objects are compos'd, and which we find to have a constant union with each
other. But however these qualities may in themselves be entirely distinct, 'tis certain we
commonly regard the compound, which they form, as ONE thing, and as continuing
the SAMV.u n d e r very considerable alterations. The acknowledg'd composition is evi-
dently contrary to this suppos'd simplicity, and the variation to the identity. 69

T h e s o u r c e o f the "contradictions"7o H u m e identifies is this: I f the t h i n g o r if a

s u b s t a n c e w e r e in fact "simple," it w o u l d be u n i t a r y b u t it c o u l d h a v e n o
i n t e r n a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n . H o w e v e r , w i t h o u t i n t e r n a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n it c a n n o t
have a n y plurality o f p r o p e r t i e s . R e c o u r s e to "simplicity" o f this sort stems
f r o m H u m e ' s p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t the i d e n t i t y o f things can be u n d e r s t o o d solely
in t e r m s o f the q u a n t i t a t i v e c o n c e p t s o f u n i t y a n d plurality. Given c o n c e p t -
e m p i r i c i s m , c o m p l e x c o n c e p t s c a n be u n d e r s t o o d o n l y as logical c o n j u n c t i o n s
o f simple c o n c e p t s (or ideas). Quantitatively, " u n i t y " is a simple; pluralities are
c o m p l e x e s , n o t units. H e n c e H u m e m u s t a s s u m e t h a t a g e n u i n e l y u n i t a r y
t h i n g is also simple. H e n c e n o t h i n g can be b o t h g e n u i n e l y u n i t a r y a n d have a
plurality o f characteristics o r p r o p e r t i e s . 7 '
I n " O f Scepticism with r e g a r d to the senses" H u m e n o t e s t h a t the c o n c e p t
o f i d e n t i t y is distinct f r o m the c o n c e p t s o f u n i t y a n d plurality a n d t h a t it can
n e i t h e r be d e r i v e d f r o m n o r d e f i n e d in t e r m s o f these latter. A c c o r d i n g to
H u m e , the c o n c u r r e n t p e r c e p t i o n o f an u n c h a n g i n g i m p r e s s i o n a n d o f at least
two o t h e r successive i m p r e s s i o n s causes us to p r o d u c e the "fiction" t h a t the

68 Treatise, I.iv.~: 2x 7.
69 Treatise, I.iv.3: ~x9.
7OIbid.
7, This, in a word, shows why empiricism received a boost in this century from the develop-
ment of set theory, which allowed, e.g., Russell and Carnap to dispense with ~unities" of this sort
and replace the ordinary notion of a thing with a logical construction of sense-data. This, how-
ever, leads to a replacement, not an analysis, of common-sense realism. Hegel's discussion in
"Perception" is restricted to common-sense realism about the objects of perception; indeed, it is
restricted to the concept of the identity of such things, and hence can and does focus on Hume's
attempt to explain that concept. As mentioned earlier, Hegel examines the evidence for or
justification of the claim that there are such things in "Self-Consciousness."
118 JOURNAL OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 36:1 JANUARY 1998
first (unchanging) i m p r e s s i o n is an u n c h a n g i n g object.72 Every u n c h a n g i n g
object gives us only the c o n c e p t o f unity.7s H o w e v e r , by m e a n s o f the alto-
g e t h e r c o m m o n "fiction" o f the imagination that an u n c h a n g i n g object p a r -
takes in the c h a n g e s o f coexisting b u t c h a n g e a b l e objects (by persisting
t h r o u g h the s a m e p e r i o d o f time as their changes), we can consider a single
object in c o n n e c t i o n with two distinct times.74 I f we attend to the distinct times,
w e ' r e given the c o n c e p t o f the plurality in connection with s o m e o n e thing.
H u m e concludes: " H e r e t h e n is an idea, which is a m e d i u m betwixt unity a n d
n u m b e r ; or m o r e p r o p e r l y speaking, is either o f t h e m , a c c o r d i n g to the view,
in which we take it: A n d this idea we call that o f identity.'75 T h i s passage
shows h o w H u m e a t t e m p t s to construct a c o n c e p t o f identity f r o m the quantita-
tive concepts o f unity a n d plurality, a n d how he recognized, at least implicitly,
that the c o n c e p t o f identity c a n n o t be r e d u c e d to or d e f i n e d in t e r m s o f t h e m .
T h i s result was so i m p o r t a n t to h i m that he r e p e a t e d it twice more.76 T h i s
m a i n result o f H u m e ' s analysis is, we shall see, absolutely f u n d a m e n t a l for
H e g e l ' s analysis o f "Perception."
T h i s is n o t all. It is f u n d a m e n t a l for p e r c e p t u a l consciousness's third a n d
final strategy that the plurality o f the p r o p e r t i e s o f a perceptible thing is only
a p p a r e n t to c o n s c i o u s n e s s - - a n d is only ascribable to the t h i n g - - i n the thing's
relation to o t h e r things. Similarly, in H u m e ' s view o f time, the plurality o f
m o m e n t s t h r o u g h which a single object e n d u r e s is only a p p a r e n t in the thing's
relation to o t h e r (changing) things. A c c o r d i n g to H u m e , if we a t t e n d in p a r -
ticular to the persistence o f an object t h r o u g h a c h a n g e o f time, the object
gives us the idea o f unity.77 O n H u m e ' s view o f time, an u n c h a n g i n g object is
literally timeless.78 Consequently, such an object, at least temporally, m u s t be
simply unitary. T h a t is, the s u p p o s e d series o f m o m e n t s t h r o u g h which the
u n c h a n g i n g object passes c a n n o t be r e c o g n i z e d in the object itself. T a k e n in
isolation, an u n c h a n g i n g object is simply unitary; only in relation to o t h e r

I.ii.5: 65; I.iv.2: 2oo-2ol.

7, Treatise,
73Treatise,I.iv.2: 2oo.
I.iv.2: 2oo-2ol.
74 Treatise,
I.iv.2: 2ox.
75 Treatise,
76By observing an unchanging object through a period of time "we make a difference,
betwixt the idea meant by the word, object, and that meant by itself, without going the length of
number, and at the same time without restraining ourselves to a strict and absolute unity." He
then summarizes: "Thus the principle of individuation is nothing but the invariableness and
unintermptedness of any object, thro' a suppos'd variation of time, by which the mind can trace it in
the different periods of its existence, without any break of the view, and without being oblig'd to
form the idea of multiplicity or number" (Treatise, I.iv.2: 2ol).
77Treatise, I.iv.~: ~ol.
78Treatise, I.ii.3: 37-39"
 HEGEL AND HUME ON PERCEPTION 11 9
changing objects does an u n c h a n g i n g object a p p e a r to display a t e m p o r a l
plurality.
T h e view a d o p t e d by the observed p e r c e p t u a l consciousness in its third a n d
final phase is an exact synchronic analog to H u m e ' s diachronic model o f the
identity o f perceptible things. Perceptual consciousness presupposes that iden-
tity and numerical unity are the same.79 This is to say, p e r c e p t u a l consciousness
conceives self-identity in strictly numerical terms and uses this numerical con-
ccption o f identity as its criterion o f truth. Given this conception o f identity and
this criterion o f truth, p e r c e p t u a l consciousness must avoid the c o n t r a d i c t i o n - -
and u n d e r these assumptions it is a c o n t r a d i c t i o n - - b e t w e e n the unity o f a thing
and the plurality o f its perceived properties. 8~ Consciousness's third a n d most
sophisticated stratcg T for resolving or avoiding this contradiction consists in
distinguishing the d i f f e r e n t aspects o f the perceived thing, r e f e r r i n g t h e m to
d i f f e r e n t perspectives, and acknowledging them only u n d e r those d i f f e r e n t
perspectives. In o r d e r to kccp these aspects o f the perceived thing distinct,
perceptual consciousness "must t h e r e f o r e say, that the thing, insofaras it is for
itself, is not for a n o t h e r . "8' T h a t is to say, what a thing essentially is, it is
i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f and a p a r t f r o m any relation to o t h e r things. H o w e v e r , by this
stage p e r c e p t u a l consciousness has also e x p e r i e n c e d that the perceived thing
does display two aspects, as a multitude o f p r o p e r t i e s and as a particular unity.8~
In its third phase p e r c e p t u a l consciousness regards these two aspects only in
distinct perspectives. It regards the isolated thing as "self-identical" a n d it re-
gards the plurality o f its p r o p e r t i e s only in the thing's relation to o t h e r things.S3
Perceptual consciousness thus preserves both its conception o f the identity o f
perceptible things as simple numerical unity and also its e x p e r i e n c e o f the
ineliminable plurality o f the thing's p r o p e r t i e s by distinguishing these two as-
pects and r e f e r r i n g t h e m to d i f f e r e n t "objccts," namely, to the isolated thing or
to the thing only in its relations to o t h e r things. Accordingly, the perceived
thing is, for itself, a unity, a n d the opposite m o m e n t , the plurality o f its p r o p -
erties, is p r e s e r v e d both outside the (isolated) thing and outside o f conscious-
ness itself.84 H e g e l states: " T h e thing is thus i n d e e d self-identical in a n d for

79G 71"9-16, 74.6-Ix, 76.~6-27, 77.1-5, 77.~I/M 67, 7o, 73, 74; cf. HHWw
80G 77.~ 1-~3/M 74.
s, G 77.a3-24/M 74.
s, G 77.24-~7/M 74; cf. G 76.4- 23,/M7~-73 .
8s G 77.~7-31/M 74-75.
84G 77.29-3a/M 75. In its second phase, perceptual consciousnesssought to take responsibil-
ity itself for one or the other of these two aspects of the thing, but (for reasons which cannot be
detailed here; see HHW w those strategies failed. Perceptual consciousness came to recognize
that both of these moments must somehow be ascribed to the perceived thing. That gave rise to its
third phase.
120 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 36: I JANUARY 1998
itself; but this unity with itself is disturbed by o t h e r things; thus the unity o f the
thing is retained.'S5 This strategy preserves H u m e ' s view that each object gives
us the idea o f unity, a n d transfers H u m e ' s diachronic view, that we can only
recognize the identity o f a thing t h r o u g h the c o n c u r r e n t change o f o t h e r things,
to the synchronic identity o f a thing with r e g a r d to the plurality o f its properties,
by ascribing this plurality o f p r o p e r t i e s to it only with r e g a r d to the thing's
relations to o t h e r things. Because, on H u m e ' s view o f time, a single u n c h a n g i n g
object is literally timeless, the single object in and f o r itself is (temporally)
simple. Only in r e g a r d to the changes u n d e r g o n e by o t h e r things can we
r e p r e s e n t D t h r o u g h a " f i c t i o n ' D t h e unchanging, temporally simple thing as
"participating" temporally in those changes in o t h e r things. H u m e ' s view is an
exact diachronic analog to the synchronic view a d o p t e d by p e r c e p t u a l con-
sciousness in its third phase, according to which an object, taken in isolation, is a
simple, unitary "one," which w h e n taken in relation to o t h e r things displays an
a p p a r e n t plurality o f properties.
Hegel's a r g u m e n t against this view is very complex and can only be summa-
rized here, but this suffices to see how Hegel's conclusion relates to H u m e . s6 In
its third phase the observed p e r c e p t u a l consciousness maintains that, insofar as
a perceived thing is for itself, it is a "simple determinateness," that is, it is some
one specific thing; b u t ifisofar as the thing has a manifold constitution
(Beschaffenheit), it is "for" or related to o t h e r things. Only the first aspect is
essential to the thing; the second aspect, although necessary, is inessential.87 In
this way p e r c e p t u a l consciousness retains the simple numerical unity o f the
thing, a n d its o p p o s e d aspect, i.e., its manifold o f properties, is p r e s e r v e d
outside the essence o f the thing and also outside o f consciousness itself, ss
T h r o u g h his p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l examination o f this view Hegel p u r p o r t s to
show that the p e r c e i v e d thing is the true and that it has being u n t o itself.89 T h e
perceived thing is distinct f r o m o t h e r things, not because it has the simple
determinateness o f being f o r itself; it is distinct f r o m o t h e r things d u e to its
constitution. T h i n g s themselves are thus essentially manifold in their constitu-
tion; they are mutually distinct because o f their necessary and thus essential
plurality o f properties.9o In this way perceptual consciousness recognizes that

ss G 77.~9-31/M 75. Notice that Hegel says that the identity of the thing is disturbed, not that
it is destroyed, by other things.
SaThis is to say, I must pass over here almost the entirety of Hegel's detailed critique of
perceptual consciousness, and I cannot discuss the issue of particularity and universality. This is,
of course, an important issue in Hegel's analysis, but it requires very extensive and detailed
treatment which is not possible here. See HHW w1671-14.
sTcf. G 78.7-t3/M 75.
ssCf. G 77.3t-32/M 75-
sgCf. G 76.14/M 73.
g~ G 76.9- I~/M 73.
 HEGEL AND HUME ON PERCEPTION 121

the manifold constitution, that is, the plurality o f properties, is as essential to the
thing as its unitary being for itself.9t Consequently, the essence o f the thing as a
unitary being for itself lies in its c o m p l e m e n t , in the manifold constitution o f its
properties.92 On this basis H e g e l draws the following conclusion:
In this way the last insofar, which separated the being for itself from the being for
others, falls away. Instead the object/s in one and the same regard the opposite of itself,," it is
for itself insofar as it is for another, and it is for another insofar as it is for itself. The object is
for itself, it is reflected into itself, it is one. But this being for itself, this reflection into
itself, this being one, is posited in one unity with its opposite, with its being for an other.
Consequently this being for itself (etc.) is posited only as sublated.9s

Hegel emphasizes that the thing is "the opposite o f itself" because it is a single
object, and likewise it is for o t h e r things (and for consciousness) only because it
unifies a plurality o f p r o p e r t i e s within itself.94 T h e main point here is that these
two aspects o f the thing, "in one a n d the same r e g a r d " are "posited in o n e
unity.'95 Hegel's result stands in express opposition to Hume's. Recall that
H u m e r e a c h e d the " m o r e p r o p e r l y " f o r m u l a t e d conclusion that the concept o f
identity "is either o f them [i.e., unity or plurality], according to the view, in
which we take it. "96 T h u s despite his insight that the concept o f identity must
s o m e h o w combine both unity a n d plurality, H u m e retains a strictly quantitative
conception o f this c o n c e p t and he attempts to the very e n d to avoid the n u m e r i -
cal contradiction between the unity o f a thing and the plurality o f its p r o p e r t i e s
by distinguishing various perspectives in which to emphasize one or the o t h e r
subconcept or aspect. Hegel's analysis o f p e r c e p t u a l consciousness p u r p o r t s to
show that these strictly quantitative conceptions o f unity and plurality are neces-
sary but not sufficient for constructing the c o n c e p t o f the identity o f perceptible
things. T h e p r o b l e m facing p e r c e p t u a l consciousness is this. At the outset per-
ceptual consciousness has only the three necessary partial concepts o f a per-
ceptible thing, namely, its being unitary, its being a m e d i u m for properties, a n d
its m a n y properties.97 However, it does not have a unified, integrated c o n c e p t
o f a perceptible thing. Perceptual consciousness rightly assumes that its crite-
rion o f self-identity is and must be numerical identity.98 However, t h r o u g h his
diachronic analysis H u m e in fact demonstrates exactly the same point that
H e g e l d e e p e n s and reconfirms t h r o u g h his synchronic analysis, namely, what

9, Cf. G 78.35-79.1/M 76.

9~Cf. G 78.29-3o/M 76.
9sG 79.3- lo/M 76.
94G 79.5-8/M 76.
95G 79.4-5, 8-9/M 76.
96 Treatise, I.iv.2: ~ol.
97G 73.x8-23/M 69.
98G 71"9-16, 74.6-tl, 76.~6-~7, 77.1-5, 77-21/M67, 7o, 73, 74; cf. HHWw
122 JOURNAL OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 36: I JANUARY a998
results when one attempts to c o m p r e h e n d an internally complex thing without
having an adequate, integrated concept of that kind of thing, or when one uses
only the strictly quantitative concepts of unity and plurality. Without a properly
integrated concept o f the thing one can grasp neither the thing's identity n o r its
distinction f r o m other things. T h e concept of the identity of perceptible things
requires an integrated concept of the internally complex thing, along with the
quantitative concepts of unity and plurality. Hegel shows this by demonstrating
that neither can the unity of the thing be u n d e r s t o o d without the plurality of its
properties, nor can the plurality o f its properties be u n d e r s t o o d without the
unity of the thing. Both aspects of a perceptible thing are integrated in one
unity in any regard in which the perceptible object can be considered. In an
adequate concept of a perceptible thing both aspects "are posited only as
sublated."99 T h a t is the positive, indeed "speculative," result of Hegel's determi-
nate negation of H u m e ' s view of identity? ~176
This also provides the basic point of Hegel's claim that the concept o f
identity of perceptible things contains an objectively valid contradiction. Mi-
chael Wolff has shown that Hegel's view of "dialectical" contradictions neither
denies nor violates the law of noncontradiction. Instead, Hegel holds that
certain important truths can only (or at least can best) be expressed by using
what appears to be a formal contradiction. '~ In the case at hand, it can
a p p e a r - - a s it did to H u m e , a n d as it must to a concept-empiricistmthat the
two partial concepts contained in the concept of the identity of perceptible
things, namely, unity and plurality, contradict each other. In the case of per-
ceptible things a n d the relation between things and properties, this is not the
case. On the contrary, both aspects are i n t e r d e p e n d e n t ; there are no unitary
things without a plurality o f properties and there are no properties without
unitary things o f which they are properties. I n d e e d , Hegel's point could now
be expressed using a biconditional statement: Something is a perceptible thing
if and only if it unifies a plurality of p r o p e r t i e s - - a n d vice versa, if one will:
Something is a plurality Of properties if and only if they are unified in some
one thing. An adequate concept of perceptible things integrates the two quan-
titatively opposed partial concepts, "unity" a n d "plurality." Only with such an
integrated concept of perceptible things can one grasp their identity? ~

99 G 79.8-9/M76.
,ooOn Hegel's view of determinate negation, see HER, t t 9- 28 and ch. 7. O n Hegel's view of
speculation, see Michael Wolff, "Die ,Momente' des Logischen und der ,Anfang' der Logik in
Hegels philosophischer Wissenschaft,"in H. F. Fulda and R.-P. Horstmann, eds., Skeptizismus und
Spekulatives Denken in der Philosophie Hegels (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1996), 226-43.
~olMichael Wolff, Der Begriff des Widerspruchs. Eine Studie zur Dialektik Kants und Hegels
(K6nigstein/Ts.: Hain, 1981), 35--36.
,o~For further discussion, see H H W w167 x5.2, 18.
 HEGEL AND HUME ON PERCEPTION 12 3
Finally, two i m p o r t a n t and related points about the activity involved in
cognition follow directly. First, we can perceive things only if we integrate the
various sensations they cause in us; that is one cognitive activity on o u r part.
Second, to integrate sensations or perceptions of things we must use a (rela-
tively) a priori c o n c e p t i o n - - a conception which cannot be defined or derived
in accordance with concept-empiricism, and this is a conception we must our-
selves produce in o r d e r to perceive any outer thing. This is a second cognitive
activity on our part. Both of these cognitive activities are, obviously, compati-
ble with common-sense realism about the objects of perception.

In sum, Hegel argues in "Perception" by reductio ad absurdum that the relation

"thing-property" cannot be r e d u c e d to the relation "one-many" or, analo-
gously, to the relation "whole-part" (which would involve the same quantita-
tive difficulties). Only in H u m e does one find the explicit attempt to avoid an
apparent numerical contradiction within the concept of the identity of percep-
tible things by distinguishing "perspectives" in which to regard the thing. This
attempt is f u n d a m e n t a l to the third a n d final phase of Hegel's analysis of
perceptual consciousness, although neither the position nor the philosopher
to which or to w h o m Hegel thereby refers have been previously identified?~
Examining the course of Hegel's a r g u m e n t in context shows, I believe, that
Hegel reached his results t h r o u g h an exacting reconsideration of a crucial
section f r o m H u m e ' s Treatise, " O f Scepticism with regard to the senses.'X~

University of New Hampshire

~O3The editors o f the critical edition of Hegel's Phenomenologyprovide no such references. I

have also found none in the commentaries and secondary literature. I would, of course, be
grateful for further references.
1o41 gratefully acknowledge that this article is based on research which was supported by a
generous fellowship from the Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung of the Federal Republic of
Germany. Hans-Friedrich Fulda kindly supported my fellowship in Heidelberg and provided
many stimulating suggestions.