Student: Yafa Elmasri (ID 1168128)

Course: Economic Processes of Local Development

Program: Laura Magistrale in Local Development

Title: A Camp or a Town? Alborj Refugee camp transformed the suburb

(Photo: Part from Alborj camp, part from the suburb area, sees the big Sports Stadium on the far
upper left corner of the photo. Source: Aliqtisadi.ps 2017)

“Spaces of transit and waiting, [the camps] are organized like ‘cities’ yet without
strategic planning as everything is designed not to last. They stabilize and last.”
―Michel Agier. (Agier, 2005)
Abstract:
Several cases of refugee camps last longer than being basic transient settlements. Their
size, their population, their concentration of infrastructures, their socio-occupational
systems and the trading activities they have developed -especially if have existed for a
long time- give them urban features. Yet the durability of these camps depends on other
factors, including the relationship between refugees and the indigenous population, and
the surrounding environment. In any case, These camps do not only influence their
surrounding as an economic urban phenomenon , but even withdrawal or contraction of
humanitarian aid would not automatically mean the closure of camps: because camps
sometimes achieve economic self-sustainability would allow these camps to emerge as
small market towns. Therefore in this paper, I study one camp in particular: Borj
Albarajenah (Borj for short) Palestinian Refugee camp in the capital of Lebanon as an
urban phenomenon that have -through the above reasoning- almost become a town itself
and even altered the Suburb where it is located, transforming it from an elite area to a
popular market area of cheap residency and labor.

1
Methodology:
A brief historical background will be described to show the story behind the construction
of the camps in general and specifically the Alborj camp in the capital, demonstrating the
evolution of these camps and specifically alborj camp from being merely a group of tent
settlements to almost a town. Also the same approach will be used to describe the change
of the surrounding suburb, from an elite area to a popular market of cheap residences and
labor.
Mainly, Quantitative data of Lebanese economy and Beirut in Particular will be taken
from the Lebanese official associations and ministry of economy publications.
Quantitative data of the camp will be extracted from the UNRWA and AUB survey
conducted on socio-economic conditions of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon in 2015, in
addition to economic and population info obtained from Local and international
publications utilized to analyze the conditions of the camp habitants and its change over
time.
A significant part of the study will be based on interviews with camp entities and figures,
focus groups of refugees who experience life in this “town” and past field research that I
have already conducted on camps to reflect on its transformation and expansion, in
addition to interviews to reflect on the transformation of the suburb and not only the
camp. Also, last source will be literature from local Arabic news production and local
community publications, in addition to relevant thesis studies on this topic.

Background on Urban Economy of Beirut, Lebanon:

It is important to stress that the objectives of this paper are modest. Indeed, a detailed
interpretation of the results of any economic or urban change in any part of Lebanon is
currently difficult to provide given the limited quality and time span of the data.
However, Lebanon in general provides a unique case for research because of its
distinctive political economy. Lebanon has the oldest liberal market system in the region
and has constantly opted for laissez-faire economic policies since its independence.
(Gaspard, 2012)
Lebanon's liberal economy is based on competition and private ownership. Services and
banking sectors predominate, representing 70% of the country's gross national product.
Agriculture constitutes 10% and the industrial sector constitutes the remaining 20%. The
Lebanese economy is based primarily on the service sector, which accounts for
approximately 60% of GDP .Major subsectors are commerce, tourism and financial
services. Other components include health care and higher education. (UK essays, 2016) .
In 2017, real GDP growth rate is estimated at 2 percent, unchanged from 2016, with the
main driver being services and tourism in particular. (World Bank, 2017)

In 15 October 2011, the general workers union and others threatened to strike; the
minimum wage was raised by 40% from $133 to $466. Most unions went ahead with the
strike except the general workers union.
As of 2013 World Bank analysis of Quality Life Index, it was estimated that:

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 15% of the Lebanese people live below poverty line ($2,500)
 54% of the Lebanese people live in the moderate middle class ($9,000)
annually. 12% from 1998
 32% of the Lebanese people live in the upper middle class ($15,000 - $27,000)
annually. 19% from 1998
 7% of the Lebanese people live in the highest upper class ($30,000 and above)
annually 1% from 1998

Lebanon’s population according to CIA is 6,229,794 (July 2017 est.) whose majority
lives in the capital BEIRUT: 2.226 million (CIA, 2017) . Dubbed “Paris of the East,” The
Beirut Governorate area covers 6.9 square miles (18 square kilometers), and the city's
metropolitan area covers 26 square miles (67 square kilometers). Beirut’s rapid growth
over the last century is tied to its economic role as a location of transit for goods, notably
to Damascus, and its port, which plays a vital role in its economic life (Fawaz,
1964).Looking at the work force, around 38 per cent of the residents of Beirut are
currently working, a rate slightly higher than the country’s average (CIA, 2017). This
difference reflects the higher rate of involvement of women in the economy (22 per cent
in Beirut, 14.7 per cent in Lebanon). (Mona Fawaz, 2013)
Beirut is divided into 12 quarters : Achrafieh , Dar Mreisse , Bachoura , Mazraa,
Medawar, Minet El Hosn , Moussaitbeh , Port ,Ras Beirut ,Remeil , Saifi , Zuqaq al-Blat.
Check the map attached as Annex 1 to show the 12 quarters of Beirut according to Beirut
Municipality.
These quarters are divided into 59 sectors (Beirut Municipality, 2008 archived)
Southern suburban districts to Beirut include Chiyah, Ghobeiry , Haret Hreik, Burj al
Barajneh, Laylake-Mreijeh, Hay al Sillum and Hadath. Eastern suburbs include Burj
Hammoud, Sin el Fil, Dekwane ,Mkalles, and Hazmiyeh .
Two of the twelve official Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon are located in the
southern suburbs of Beirut: Bourj el-Barajneh and Shatila camps. There is also one within
its municipal boundaries: Mar Elias. Of the fifteen unregistered or unofficial refugee
camps, Sabra, which lies adjacent to Shatila, is also located in southern Beirut suburb
(Shafie, 2010) . To locate the camps on the map of Beirut, check the map attached as
Annex 2.

Background on Palestinian Refugee camps in Lebanon

Palestinian refugee camps are the future of all camps that are “born each day in the
world” (Agier, 2005) With more than 70 years of existence, Palestinian refugee camps in
the Middle East are the best places to study urban phenomenon. One third of the five
million Palestinian refugees in the World, more than 1.5 million, live in 58 registered
camps across the Middle East. These camps were initially erected as temporary spaces to
settle Palestinians who were forced to leave their homeland in 1948. Formation of these
camps materialized under complicated socio-political circumstances. The space of the
Palestinian refugee camp have been studied across multiple disciplines where in some
cases they are considered as informal settlements embodying conditions that are usually

3
associated with informality, in turn informality itself often re-produces even more critical
socio-economic factors. Therefore, for Agier, camps are “laboratories which still
unconceived forms of urbanism are germinating” (Agier, 2005)
According to UNRWA records, the number of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon registered
with the UNRWA in June 2006 was 406,342 (about 10% of the population of Lebanon at
that time ). Check Annex 3 for the locations and distributions of Palestinian camps in
Lebanon.

The specific camp understudy: Basic info about the Borj Camp

 Built 1948 by the Red Cross

 Size is one kilometer square
 Population : estimated around 25,000 thousand
 Seven schools
 One health centre
 Active ageing house
 One Job counseling and placement centre
 Demographic profile: side chart(UNRWA, 2012)

The environment of this camp: the Southern Suburb of Beirut

In order to study and understand the articulations of the refugee camp to its environment,
it is first relevant to analyze its surroundings.
As seen in Map of annexes 2 and 3, three refugee camps are located in the urban area of
Beirut: Mar Elias, inside the boundaries of Beirut-municipality, Shatila and Borj
Barajneh, in the southern suburbs of Beirut.
The southern suburbs originally developed around the capital and the agro-industrial
flatlands of Hadath. The first urban planning projects regarding the development of the
southern suburbs of Beirut date back to the period of the French mandate (1920-1943)
and proposed the creation of a new town. For René Danger, the French urban planner
assigned to this task (1931-1932), the creation of a new town carried a spatial meaning
where his master plan consisted in the creation of a garden city. (Habib, 2012) So this
area became somehow a garden city where elite Lebanese families such as OUN (family
of the President of the Lebanese Republic) and ALAMA (family of Lebanese celebrities)
originated and resided up until the 70s.

In the 1950s, and particularly during the tenure of President Camille Chamoun (1952-
1958), planning was very much a tool aimed at and instrumental to an ideology
promoting an independent and liberal country formed by a society of hierarchical classes
(Verdeil, 2010).
This is how, with the aim of creating “luxurious suburbs”, various large infrastructures
either government-funded (most importantly the International Airport of Beirut, the
Camille Chamoun City Sports Stadium) either privately-funded (the luxurious Golf Club)
were implemented in the southern suburb (Note : “The Southern Suburb” is the collective

4
name used in Lebanon for all southern suburbs as one area). Master plans of high
standing residential developments were also designed by private large developers.

The arrival of Palestinian Refugees and establishment of Alborj refugee camp:

Usually the notion of a suburb is being an elite area, however, this ideology of an elitist
society in the southern suburbs contrasted with the reality of attempts of popular
appropriation (Verdeil, 2010). In fact, the global development of the suburbs followed
another path: The elite suburb was mainly a garden city, which as a project required
labor: gardeners, farmers, maintenance and other low skilled workers. In 1948 Palestinian
refugees coming from the northern Palestinian villages arrived to Lebanon. Being mostly
villagers and low skilled laborers with only basic education, they have worked in the
southern suburb as gardeners, farmers and laborers who took care of the gardens, houses
and olive and orange fields. Having limited resources, Palestinian refugees erected tents
around the borders of the suburb area close to their places of work.
In addition , the new developments established by both the government and private
companies in that suburb such as the stadium and the golf club required big numbers of
laborers , which attracted even bigger numbers of Palestinian refugees to work on these
projects and settle in that area. The labor market that the development projects had
produced created an unforeseen shift in mobility and settlement of this income seeking
minority. This duality between the aim to modernity and the reality of poverty is a long-
standing legacy that influences the design of new urban development projects (Verdeil,
2010) . The tents housed the Palestinian workers from the nearby infrastructures (i.e. the
International Airport of Beirut, the Camille Chamoun City Stadium, and the Golf Club)
for while and were seen as a temporary residency that will end with the end of the
construction work or with the end of the Palestinian Israeli war.

In 1949 UN Resolution 302 established the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). In 1950 UNRWA began operations
(UNRWA, 2012). In 1953, it was decided to exchange the tents with semi-permanent
shelters. Land was rented directly from the Religious sector of the Lebanese government
to the UNRWA on a contract of 99 years to establish the camps, and thus very humble
residential sites began to develop. When Borj Camp began overpopulating, Shatila camp
was founded as an auxiliary to handle the increased congestion. Thus, as opposed to
expected short stay, the suburbs witnessed the official temporary settlement of Palestine
refugee camps. To have a view of the evolution of the camp structures from tents to
building from 1948 to this time, check UNRWA representation attached as Annex 4.

5
The expansion of the Camp into the surrounding: metamorphosis of the suburb:
In the context of a development policy initiated by President Fouad Chehab (1958-1964),
many public schools, infrastructures and various networks serving the illegal areas were
implemented in the beginning of the 1960s (Verdeil, 2010). Even with the existence of
adequate zoning laws established in the 1950s and the 1960s, these were bypassed or
ignored due to corruption in the system, and green spaces in the southern suburbs were
rarely protected.

The Borj camp was booming, population has increased greatly from around 2,611
habitats in the 50s to around 18,000 habitats in the 70s (check graph representing the
growth in population of the camp from 1952 to 1982 attached as Annex 5). By 1974, and
due to this increase in population , two “new camps” were known as de facto Palestinian
camps in the city, even if they were neither registered not recognized by UNRWA.
Also, Areas around the camp grew more populated by the lower classes that came in
search of employment opportunities in the construction of infrastructure or nearby city
projects due to location near the capital. They migrant workers of various nationalities:
Syrian , Kurds, and the highly marginalized Lebanese Dom (typically referred to with the
derogatory term “Gypsies”).Even mobile sales carts , shacks and temporary structures
started being built around the camps illegally on privately owned land by Lebanese or
migrants (Mona Fawaz, 2013). In addition, attracted by the potential for cheap labor, the
growing industrial sector of the 1960s located its new small factories by these growing
slums in the suburb. In 1974, around 40 per cent of the workforce living in the Beirut
suburbs was employed in the industrial sector, and in 1980, most of these workers, that is
around 60 per cent of the industrial workforce, was concentrated within the Lebanese
capital (Nasr, 1974). In other words: Development projects attracted cheap labor, cheap
labor by turn attracted random illegal markets and industrial entities to the suburb.
During the civil war years (1975-1990) things got worse for the elitist suburb who was
suffering a decline in the level of upper class urban features. Massive internal migrations
from the southern and internal areas of Lebanon to Beirut led to urban sprawl and
extensive random urbanization , often without any urban planning or connection to the
water and electricity networks (MoFA and MoE, 2002) thus transforming the old green
gardens of Borj Barajneh, Haret Hraik, and Ghobeiry in an urban continuum. Check
Annex 6 for reference on the massive growth of buildings including settlements in the
southern suburb in compared to Beirut.

How did this happen? The migrants fled the civil war, the poorest among them generally
settled alongside Palestinian refugees and other low-income populations on the southern
and eastern peripheries of municipal Beirut, where accommodation was less expensive.
Beirut saw enormous growth during this period of time, from about 300,000 in 1950 to
1.2 million in around 1975.These illegal settlements, which are still partly characterizing
the urban space of the southern suburb, progressively formed what was to be called the
“belt of misery” of Beirut. A great part of this belt being constituted by Palestinian
camps, the southern suburb that was once a garden city, became to be seen more under

6
the political angle as particularly dangerous surroundings, than under the policy angle as
an urban economic problem (Verdeil, 2010) .

Where does the Public Policy stand in this case ?

Back in the end of 1951, when the influx of new refugees from other camps started, the
population of the camp reached 2,811 inhabitants just in the span of 2 years; this led the
Lebanese government to issue in 1952 a law prohibiting internal migration from camp to
camp without authorization from the proper Lebanese authorities (Habib, 2012) but this
still could not control the expansion. Therefore the government has issued a law to
prevent any entry of construction material of any type into the camps and the surrounding
illegal settlements, to prevent further building or expansion. However paradoxically, the
camps were never affected by development urban policies and the Lebanese authorities
considered them as extra-territorial entities (Verdeil, 2010). Hence, the plan of
transforming the southern suburbs into a laboratory of urban modernity and bourgeoisie
was quickly hindered by the development of a rebellious territoriality produced by
poverty and forced migrations. Tempted to deny the illegal settlements but also obliged to
recognize them, the proposals for the redevelopment of the suburbs during the civil war
years showed a denial on the part of the State who wanted to exclude this area from the
urban reality, thus ignoring that “territory related variables are determinants of local
development” (Gualerzi, 2006). Instead, Dysfunction problems, illegal constructions,
barriers to growth and development were only mentioned to justify projects of demolition
and relocation.
During this same period, the parliament voted a law aimed at legalizing building
violations by the payment of fines; the southern suburbs were already largely concerned
by these violations. This new law also covered the illegal settlements: according to the
law, these buildings were to be destroyed without compensation, thereby denying the
extent and severity of the housing problem in the Lebanese capital.
In 1983, the Directorate General of Urban Planning began a study on the development of
the southern suburbs. The resulting strategic plan will never be implemented. Neither will
be the strategic plan for the Beirut Metropolitan Area developed in 1986.

The suburb today: the popular market of Beirut

The southern suburb is now no longer just an area distinct from the city, but they also
detached itself from the eastern suburbs of Beirut. The southern suburbs progressively
became the only suburbs with their own identity established on the change of social and
economic practices. As Mona Harb (Harb, 2003)recalls in Lebanon, dahiye is not only
the mere Arabic translation of ‘the suburb’, the representation of the territory; in Lebanon
the term dahiye also embodies social (poor Lebanese population and Palestine refugees),
spatial (distinct space delimited by major highways and characterized by important urban
centers as well as illegal settlements), and economic (important presence of shops, banks,
and small industries that allow some self-sufficiency, black market of work for illegal
immigrants). Hence the term dahiye gives a pejorative dimension to the suburbs, a space
seen as illegal in its urban development and perceived as a political threat and economic
burden. Today, the Palestinian camps of Shatila and Borj Barajneh and the illegal
settlements constitute nearly 40% of the suburb’s territory (Harb, 2003). Today, the

7
suburb is known among the Lebanese public as the destination for cheap markets and
illegal products and labor services that could be exchanged at lower rates.
A UNDP project document on development project for Beirut’s southern suburb states
that “the suburb is an overpopulated area of around 1 million habitats today”; and states
that “the rapid expansion of the suburb left the residents with dire socio-economic
conditions and no proper access to public services”. (UNDP, 2011)

The camp even creates a parallel real-estate market:

The camp’s proximity to the city of Beirut and its low rents have created an unexpected
rental housing market that constitutes an important and steady source of income for many
families, which attracted even more lower class populations to the camp and the suburb .
The empty small apartments rented were either built for the sole purpose of renting,
either left empty by families that immigrated or went to settle in the city. These
apartments are rented to other refugees from the camp, from other camps, foreign migrant
workers, researchers and volunteers and range between 70€ and 200€ per month. In Borj
Barajneh area, the foreign migrant workers include Syrians (between 3,000 and 7,000),
Sri Lankans (between 200 and 300), and Bangladeshis (between 200 and 300).Low
income Lebanese families rent or buy housing just outside the camp nearby .with these
low rates of rent, population is attracted to settle more in and around the camp, and
creating a parallel market of property, thus lowering the overall rate of rent in the entire
suburb.

Emergence of the camp as a new form of the town (economic autonomy)

Palestine refugees are categorized as “stateless” foreigners; hence, and with no
consideration of their particular refugee condition, they cannot exercise professions
restricted to Lebanese citizens, they cannot be members of Lebanese professional
associations, and finally they cannot exercise professions that require a work permit
(Committee for Employment of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, 2010)
Banned from exercising most professions, the Palestine refugees have five main sources
of income:
1) employment with UNRWA
2) allowances from relatives working abroad;
3) employment in Palestinian associations or organizations;
4) employment in agriculture and Lebanese companies in the black market
5) and employment in shops, enterprises or private offices within the refugee camps
(Committee for Employment of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, 2010)

The first 4 options are somehow limited in availability, knowing that they require certain
privileges (for example: Working at UNRWA requires high qualifications, or having a
relative that works abroad requires particular opportunities…). Therefore the camp
habitats have grown their own self employment possibilities which serve two purposes:

1- Increase income and employment opportunities for Palestinian and migrants in the
camp

8
2- Decrease dependency on areas external to the camp or outside the suburb, and
increase camp self sufficiency, knowing that refugee mobility is rather difficult.
This orientation led the camp residents to establish small shops under their houses , a
public fruits and vegetables market, all skills shops (carpentry , blacksmith, shoe repair ),
butcher shops , pharmacies, health centers , non-profit organizations and even some small
scale factories for clothing , handbags , and food products . For further info on their work
distribution of Palestinian refugees please check chart of annex 7. There is even one
Cinder block factory that was built to hinder the effect of the law issued to ban entry of
construction material.
Today , there are fifteen centers in Borj Barajneh that provide relief services such as
nurseries, day care facilities, social activities for children and young women, active
ageing houses, a job counseling center. Moreover, several Palestinian doctors have their
clinics inside the camp.
Inside the camp, refugees have access to several types of shops and services:
engine workshops, five stationeries, libraries, clothing shops, forty grocery shops (around
eight per neighborhood), butchers, thirty hairdressers for men and eleven for women,
internet cafes, computer shops, pharmacies, bakeries, house furniture shops, a public
market, snacks, hardware shops, and gift shops (check Photo of the shops take from the
camp , attached as annex 8 ) . No banks are implemented within the camp.
We could say that the durability of the camp over 70 years have allowed it to develop
some type of self dependency in a way that it can now sustain itself even if foreign aid
has paused, it might even continue expanding by crawling further into the suburb and
other parts of the city if remained neglected by the development policy, until it gains
more features as a “town” rather than just a “camp”.

Through various urban practices, the refugee camps are becoming strongly connected to
their urban environment of the suburb around them. In fact, economic activities and
UNRWA services (shopping, banking, health care, education), daily mobility (to go to
work/school, to visit friends/ family) and the increasing presence of international
migrants (Syrians, Bangladeshis, Sri-Lankans, and Sudanese settling in the camps for
their cheap rents and accessibility to the main cities) constantly redefine the edges of the
camps, making them more porous. These various urban practices “continually transgress
the boundaries of the camps” (Dorai, 2008) and tend to create ties between the refugee
camps, their immediate urban environment and its economic activities, even making the
camp a center of economic activity by itself.

Here is an analysis of basic Borj camp info extracted from an EU funded survey: (AUB-
UNRWA, 2015)
 Average household size at 4.5 members
 Extreme poverty has halved since 2010
 Similar to findings in 2010, employment and the type of jobs refugees are
engaged in are extremely important predictors of poverty. The precarious nature
and low pay of jobs that Palestine refugees typically hold in Lebanon continues to
impose a negative burden on their livelihoods. Most of the employed refugee
population occupies low-skilled jobs and elementary occupations (about 60 per

9
 cent), and these categories have the highest number of poor and extremely poor
individuals. As expected, poverty decreases as the status of employment moves
into higher skilled professions, but still all professions display poverty rates above
50 per cent. The 60 per cent prevalence of low-skilled jobs reflects the low pay
and precarious work conditions Palestine refugees still experience in the country
 The main source of income is self-employment, whereby 41 per cent of
respondents stated it to be as their source of household income.

Conclusion
In search for a comprehensive solution, Palestinian and Lebanese authorities still oppose
any permanent integration of the refugees into the Lebanese society through
naturalization. The naturalization of the Palestinians and their assimilation to the
Lebanese society would firstly recognize the legitimacy of the State of Israel and
secondly shake up the demographic and the economic balance of the country, both
actions that the Lebanese state won’t be undertaking in the near future according to a
2012 report issued by the Ministry of Environment (MoFA and MoE, 2002)
However, in an article published in the Middle East Report n°244, Khalidi and Riskedahl
(Mohammad Alkhalidi, 2007)underline that: “While the vast majority of refugees
themselves insist on their right of return to Palestine, most also say that this should not
preclude their ability to enjoy basic human rights in Lebanon. Indeed, many argue that it
is only if their civil rights are granted that they can be empowered as a community to
demand redress in the context of a regional settlement”.
In conclusion, it seems that despite the spatial and legal practices used by the Lebanese
authorities to isolate the Palestine refugees, they however manage, through their socio-
spatial practices, to render Borj Barajneh’s borders porous, open up the space of the
camp, and call for a reinterpretation of the role of the camp on a local scale. Therefore, a
true development strategy must aim to empower the camps towards organized autonomy
and not impose restriction attempts, otherwise camps will manage to expand in
unforeseen ways that reshape the planned economic growth every time.
In the end, let me quote the French-Palestinian sociologist Sari Hanafi who declares that
empowerment can only be achieved by:
[…] “engaging in a serious process based on the following elements: allowing the
Palestinian refugees to have full access to the labor market, including liberal professions
; allowing the Palestinians the possibility to possess land and property ; establishing an
elected popular committee in each camp, a quasi-municipality, to be in charge of the
camp administration ; establishing joint Palestinian-Lebanese police centers in each
camp ; and, finally, the ending of the space of exception status of the camps by submitting
the camps to the full Lebanese laws”. (Hanafi, 2010)

The end

10
Annex 1 –

Map of the 12 quarters of Beirut (Beirut Municipality, 2008 archived)

Annex 2 –

Source: Google map – Locations of Palestinian settlements in Beirut (arranged in size :

Borj Albarajenah , Shatila and Mar Elias camps)

11
Annex 3-

Demography of the Palestine refugee camps in Lebanon, Source: (UNRWA, 2012)

12
Annex 4-

From displacement to confinement and densification, 42 years of urban processes

Source: adapted from UNRWA (2010)

Annex 5-

Evolution of the population in Borj Barajneh between 1952 and 1982 Source: (Habib,
2012)

13
Annex 6-

Number of buildings constructed in Beirut and its suburbs from 1950 to 1995 Source:
(MoFA and MoE, 2002)

Annex 7-

Palestinian workers by sector of employment: Source (Committee for Employment of

Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, 2010)

14
Annex 8 –

15
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