Wesleyan University

Schopenhauer's View of History: A Note

Author(s): Harry J. Ausmus
Source: History and Theory, Vol. 15, No. 2 (May, 1976), pp. 141-145
Published by: Wiley for Wesleyan University
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 SCHOPENHAUER'S VIEW OF HISTORY: A NOTE

HARRY J. AUSMUS

Schopenhauer'sview of history is sometimes depicted as the result of professional

jealousy over the popularity of Hegel's philosophy.' Paul Gottfried has claimed
that because of his "war"againstHegel, Schopenhauerchanged his position on the
nature of history between the writing of Volume I of Die Welt als Wille und
Vorstellungin 1817 and the writing of Volume II almost twenty years later. In
Volume I, Schopenhauer is represented as having characterized historians as
practitionersof science no less than mathematicians;whereas,in Volume II, history
was degraded "from being science to mere 'knowing' (Wissen)." Gottfried thus
concluded that Schopenhauer"armedhis shafts against a hated rival, then against
the rival's system of thought, and finally against the root assumptionsfrom which
that system sprang, i.e., the ideas of historicalprogressand the rational nature of
reality."2I believe such interpretationsare wrong and that Schopenhauer'sunder-
standingof history has some positive aspects.
Of course Schopenhauerdid engage in vituperativeand scurrilousattacks upon
Hegel, whom he considereda "charlatan."And certainly the assault upon Hegel's
philosophyincreasedin vehemenceas Schopenhauergrew older and as Hegelianism
became more popular. However, one cannot conclude that Schopenhauer changed
his position on the nature of history concomitantly with his increasing charges
of Hegelian fraud. In Volume I, Schopenhauerdoes not say history is as much
of a science as mathematics:
In the essay On the Principle of SufficientReason, #51, I have shown how
in the different sciences the main guiding line is one form or another of
this principle; in fact, the most appropriate classification of the sciences
might perhaps be made in accordance therewith. But, as I have said, every
explanation given in accordance with this guiding line is merely relative.
It explainsthings in referenceto one another,but it always leaves unexplained
something that it presupposes.In mathematics, for example, this is space
and time; in mechanics, physics, and chemistry, it is matter, qualities,
original forces, laws of nature; in botany and zoology, it is the difference
of species and life itself; in history, it is the human race with all of its
characteristicsof thought and will. In all these it is the principle of sufficient
reason in the form appropriatefor application in each case.3
1. As by Paul Gottfried in "Arthur Schopenhauer as a Critic of History," Jozurnal of
the History of Ideas 36 (April-June, 1975), 331-338.
2. Ibid., 334-336.
3. Arthur Schopenhauer, Sfimtliche Werke, ed. Arthur Hiibscher (Wiesbaden, 1948),
II, 91. I give the translation of E. F. J. Payne, The World as Will and Representation
(New York, 1958), I, 81. Interestingly, a similar view is also expressed by Schopenhaller
in Vol. II, 128 of the Payne translation, which will be cited hereafter.

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142 HARRY J. AUSMUS

In short, the disciplines of history and mathematics are sciences (Wissenschaften)

insofar as they both rely upon the principle of sufficient reason. But this is not
to say that history is "as much" a science as mathematics. Later Schopenhauer
remarks that "History follows the thread of events; it is pragmatic in so far as it
deduces them according to the law of motivation"4 which is the fourth form of
the principle of sufficient reason. The question becomes: what, for Schopenhauer,
is not explicable by the principle of sufficient reason? And the answer, quite sim-
ply, is everything, except the Will itself.
The second question which arises is what Schopenhauer means by science
(Wissenschaft). This, too, he makes explicit in Volume I:
only the person who sets himself the task of obtaining a complete knowledge
in the abstract about some species of objects aspires to science. Only by
a concept can he single out this species; therefore at the head of every
science there is a concept through which the part is thought from the sum-
total of things, and of which that science promises a complete knowledge
in the abstract. . . . This path to knowledge which it [i.e., science] follows,
namely that from the general to the particular, distinguishes it from ordinary
rational knowledge [Wissen]. Systematic form is therefore an essential and
characteristic feature of science.5
Accordingly, history deals only with particulars, and in this regard presupposes
the principle of sufficient reason and the law of motivation. It deals with uni-
versals only insofar as it constructs arbitrarily assigned names to given periods of
history, such as the Renaissance or the Enlightenment. Or, as Schopenhauer
wrote: "History . . . has really none [i.e., universals] at all, for the universal in
it consists merely in the survey of the principal periods. From these, however,
the particular events cannot be deduced; they are subordinate to them only
according to time, and are coordinate with them according to the concept."6 Not
surprisingly, Schopenhauer employs in Volume I almost the identical words which
Gottfried cited from the second volume: "Therefore, history, strictly speaking, is
rational knowledge [Wissen] certainly, but not a science [Wissenschaft]."7 On the
other hand, and on the same page, Schopenhauer said that "mathematics is in
every respect a science."8 iBecause history presupposes the principle of sufficient
reason, it is in this regard a science; but, in that it does not subordinate par-
ticulars to universals, it is methodologically not a science.
The conclusion from this analysis is quite clear: Schopenhauer's view of history
was held early in life and not born out of his rivalry with Hegel -though this,
admittedly, did color his understanding of history. Furthermore Schopenhauer did
not totally denigrate the study of history. It is true that he was critical of
history both as a methodology and as an ontology, and he criticized the prom-
ulgators of the idea of progess as "bad Christians" and "modern Pelagians."
Nevertheless he believed that there was a positive value to be derived from the
discipline of history. For example, he held that the task of history is to rescue

4. Ibid., I, 184.
5. Ibid., I, 62. (Italics mine.)
6. Ibid., I, 63.
-7. Idem.
8. Idem.

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 SCHOPENHAUER'S VIEW OF HISTORY 143

the past "from the general shipwreck of the world."9 As such, history is a most
honorable discipline in that it is to the human race what the faculty of reason is
to the individual.'0 The historian's task is to keep alive the collective experiences
of humankind, and in so doing the historian serves to remind us of our sickness.
Without a knowledge of history, man is as stupid and unreflecting as an animal,
but by virtue of this knowledge man can recognize that he himself is part of the
totality of the world. Thus, for Schopenhauer, as with Hegel, the microcosm
reflects the macrocosm, and the individual in his own consciousness reflects the
entire history of his race." Every action of every individual and the corresponding
motivation of that action is not without historical significance, because "in and
through all, the Idea of mankind unfolds itself more and more."'12The collective
actions of peoples and their motivations, which are generally the same everywhere,
combine to make the history of the nation: "Only through history does a nation
become completely conscious of itself."'13Accordingly, the historian has the moral
responsibility of perpetuating the rational self-consciousness of his nation and of
the human race. This does not mean that the scope of the historian is delimited
by any kind of chauvinism, for history "has the past deeds of men as a whole as
its problem and the law of motivation as organon."'14 And that historian is best
who has a deep insight into the nature of man, who can sympathetically imagine
the motivations of his characters, and who can apprehend "history through
artistic eyes."'15
Schopenhauer held that there were two kinds of history. The history of politics
and institutions is a "tale of woe," consisting of the evil deeds of men, constant
struggles and wars -a record of agony, fraud, and "horrible murder en masse."
The history of literature and art is more pleasing and serene, although it too is
a constant history of error. Using a musical idiom, Schopenhauer asserted that
the "fundamental bass" of both kinds of history was the history of philosophy:
"Hence philosophy, rightly understood, is a material force of the most powerful
kind, though very slow in its working. The philosophy of a period is thus the
fundamental bass of its history."'16 A prerequisite therefore for being a good
historian is knowing the history of philosophy. From this perspective the historian
becomes an "inverted prophet" who fills in the paratactic gaps of the collective
memory."'17 To fulfill this task the historian does not merely collect data and
place them in chronological order, but places a moral judgment on that about
which he is writing by demonstrating in his histories what man has always been
by nature, regardless of race, creed, color, or geographical location. In so doing,
the historian avoids the false assumption that what "is" is what "ought" to be,
and more appropriately adopts the position of calling into question the party,

9. Schopenhauer, "On Some Forms of Literature" in Essays of Sclhopeniialuer, ed.

T. Bailey Saunders (New York, n-d.), 59.
10. World as Will and Representation, transl. Payne, II, 445.
11. Ibid., II, 443.
12. Ibid., I, 230.
13. Ibid., II, 445.
14. Ibid., I, 28.
15. Ibid., I, 244.
16. Essays of Schopenzhauer, ed. Saunders, 60.
17. World as Will anid Representation, transl. Payne, I, 345.

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144 HARRY J. AUSMUS

the state, the church, the world, and stands in judgment of these because the
"world is a place that ought not to be."
In order to arrive at the proper perspective on the relationship of philosophy
and history in Schopenhauer's thought, it is necessary to recall that for Schopen-
hauer, as well as for Hegel, religion is the basis of social consciousness.18 Given
his basic and most fundamental premise that man is an animal inetaphysicum, he
maintained that metaphysics takes place on two levels of intellectualization:
religion and philosophy. Religion says sensu allegorico what philosophy says sensu
proprio: "Philosophy is related to religions as a straight line is to several curves
running near it: for it expresses sensu proprio, and consequently reaches directly,
that which religions show under disguises, and reach in roundabout ways."19
Philosophy, in short, is religion without myth, while religion is the basis of every
society: "You see, then, how closely connected a common faith is with the social
order and the constitution of every State. Faith is everywhere the support of the
laws and the constitution, the foundation, therefore, of the social fabric, which
could hardly hold together at all if religion did not lend weight to the authority
of government and the dignity of the ruler."20
If religion is the basis of society, then history will be nothing more than the
varied manifestations of that religious basis. The names, dates, and places may
differ, but essentially all human actions remain unchanged. It is in this context
that Schopenhauer's remark about reading only Herodotus must be understood,
for, according to Schopenhauer, and in contrast to the believers in the idea of
progress, the motto of history should be: Eadem, sed aliter (the same, but other-
wise).21 In this manner, Schopenhauer held to what is commonly called the secu-
larization process of history, understood not as a "secular" process but as a
"~religious"movement, in which, as both Hegel and Nietzsche agreed, formal reli-
gious language is gradually being transformed into a newer vocabulary which is
no less religious.22 For this reason, Schopenhauer can accuse the believers in
progress of being "modern Pelagians" and as such "bad Christians."23 Although
Schopenhauer did not use the word "secularization," he spoke of the transition
to an "heterogeneous age," an age in which the State has become the substitute
for the Medieval Church, in which the task formerly held by theology must be
taken over by philosophy, which has the purpose of preserving the great truths

18. I shall not here deal extensively with Schopenhauer'scomplete view of the nature
of religion, having done so in my article "Schopenhauerand Christianity: A Preliminary
Investigation,"Illinois Quarterly 36 (1974), 26-42.
19. World as Will and Representation, transl. Payne, II, 629.
20. Schopenhauer, "Religion: A Dialogue" in Essays, ed. Saunders, 28.
21. World as Will and Representation, transl. Payne, II, 444.
22. As Hegel wrote: "Freedom is itself its own object of attainment and the sole
purpose of Spirit. It is the ultimate purpose toward which all world history has
continually aimed. . . . This final aim is God's purpose with the world. But God is the
absolutely perfect Being and can, therefore, will nothing but Himself, His own will.
The nature of His own will, His own nature, is what we here call the Idea of freedom.
Thus we translate the language of religion into that of philosophy." (Italics mine.) Hegel,
Reason in History, transl. Robert S. Hartman (New York, 1953), 25. As Nietzsche
wrote: "we are still living in the Middle Ages, and history is still a disguised theology."
Nietzsche, The Use and A buse of History, transl. Adrian Collins, 2nd ed. (New' York'
1957), 49.
23. World as Will and Representation, transl. Payne, II, 444.

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 SCHOPENHAUER S VIEW OF HISTORY 145

of the ancient religions.24 In which case, history is like a kaleidoscope, containing

the same pieces of glass but with differingformations.
Given some of the similarities between Hegel and Schopenhauer, one can
neverthelessunderstandhow - as Gottfried has correctly pointed out - Schopen-
hauer came to criticize Hegel's subtle metaphysicaljustificationfor the idea of
progress, and why Schopenhaueropposed the historicizing of the idea of God
based upon the teleological argument. It should be emphasized that Schopenhauer
rejectedHegel's position from the standpointof a radical existentialityreminiscent
of Kierkegaard's.The past and the future, for Schopenhauer,exist only in the
imagination,while the present alone "is that which always exists and stands firm
and immovable."25Consequently,Schopenhauerbelieved that Hegel's philosophy
of history could readily be dismissed by pointing out that "a whole eternity, in
other words, an endless time, has already elapsed up to the present moment, and
therefore everything that can or should become must have become already.'"26
Sarcastically,therefore, Schopenhauerasserted that, if the idea of progress were
true, it is a pity the human race did not start sooner- we would have already
arrived!
Southern ConnecticutState College

24. Ibid., II, 629.

25. Ibid., I, 279.
26. Ibid., I, 273f.

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