Safety

Safely
Unload and Convey
Combustible Dusts
Abhi Bhargava Dust explosions are a major hazard of
REMBE Inc.
unloading and conveying operations. Protect your
facility from explosions with venting panels, flameless
venting systems, and chemical suppression systems.

M
any chemical process industries (CPI) facili- in a way that prevents and/or mitigates combustible dust
ties receive raw materials in bulk quantities in explosions. National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
trucks or railcars. Depending on the distance to Standard 652 (1), Section 9.5, provides guidance on training
the downstream equipment and the nature of the product, and hazard awareness.
the material can be unloaded via open conveyors, such as NFPA Standard 69 (2) defines various prevention
belt conveyors, or enclosed conveyors, such as drag-chain, methods, such as deflagration prevention by reducing the
screw, and pneumatic conveyors. concentration of oxidant or combustible material, and
For example, raw food ingredients like sugar and flour pre-deflagration detection and control of ignition sources.
are almost always transported in enclosed conveyors to These measures can eliminate the requirement for explosion
prevent foreign materials from entering the product stream. protection in certain systems, as well as reduce downtime
Clean­ability and 100% discharge of product are also caused by deflagrations in a protected system. In cases
important in food applications, which makes
pneumatic conveying systems a popular choice, Bucket Elevator
Bucket Associated
especially over shorter distances. Products Elevator Head Dust Collector
like grain and coal are typically transferred by
mechanical conveyors, such as screw conveyors
and drag-chain conveyors.
The unloading process (Figure 1) is par-
ticularly critical because any sparks or ignition
Screening
sources introduced at this point may travel to Truck
and Metering
Unloading
the entire downstream process. To help prevent Equipment
explosions, plant personnel should be trained to
recognize combustible dust explosion risks and
methods to mitigate those risks. Product deliv-
Mechanical
ery protocols for truck drivers and unloading Unloading
Storage Silos
supervisors should be established — even for Conveyors
(Screw Conveyors)
protected systems — to prevent false triggering Receiving
Bin
(i.e., inadvertent over-pressuring, which may Bucket
Elevator Boot
cause explosion vents to rupture or chemical
suppressant to be released, etc.). And, convey- p Figure 1. Many facilities receive feedstock in bulk quantities by truck and use conveyors
ing processes must be designed and operated to transfer material to downstream equipment.

Copyright © 2018 American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) CEP  April 2018  www.aiche.org/cep  59
Safety
where prevention methods will not suffice, explosion protec-
tion systems allow for safer operation and reduce the prob-
ability of deflagration events in downstream equipment.
Explosion prevention methods
The combustible dust explosion pentagon (Figure 2) is a
useful graphic for understanding the risks associated with a
particular process. The pentagon identifies the five elements
necessary to create an explosion: combustible product (fuel),
dispersion of dust, confinement of a dust cloud, ignition
source, and oxygen. The risk of combustible dust explosions
can be eliminated if any one (or more) of the pentagon ele-
ments can be entirely eliminated.
Proper operating procedures and equipment configuration
can reduce or prevent ignition hazards that might otherwise
spread through the conveying system and create a combus-
tible dust explosion risk. For example, allowing trucks to cool
down before starting the unloading process can reduce the
ignition hazards from hot brakes, hot exhaust pipes, etc. All
unloading equipment, including trucks, should be properly
grounded, and a grounding monitoring system should be
installed to protect against static discharges. Magnets, screens,
and sifters should be installed in the unloading process to
remove foreign materials, another common ignition source.
Conveyors have additional potential ignition risks, which can
be reduced by limiting the conveyor’s speed, selecting appro-
priate materials, and using a safety-compliant design (1).
However, it is not always practical (or, in some cases,
even possible) to assuredly eliminate one of the five ele-
ments of the explosion pentagon by mere prevention means,
which is critical to a safe process without explosion protec-
tion. In most processes, explosion protection systems must
be implemented to maintain process efficiency and safety in
a cost-effective manner.
Explosion protection systems
Conveyors differ in their design, so their protection
requirements will vary. Open conveyor belts are considered
to be the least hazard-prone, since the conveyed material
does not typically create a dust cloud and is not in direct
Combustible Dust
(Fuel)
t Figure 2. A pentagon
Dispersion Confinement depicts the five elements
needed to create an
explosion: combustible
Explosion dust (fuel), dispersion
of dust, confinement of
a dust cloud, ignition
Ignition Source Oxygen in Air source (flames, sparks,
(Flames, Sparks, friction, heat, etc.), and
Friction, Heat, etc.) oxygen.
60  www.aiche.org/cep  April 2018  CEP
contact with hot surfaces. Although an open belt conveyor
does not allow an explosion to propagate because it lacks
an enclosure to confine a dust cloud, it can still allow a
smoldering fire to propagate and cause a deflagration in the
downstream equipment. Thus, explosion isolation is required
at the outlet of the conveyor.
Housekeeping measures must be in place for open belt
conveyors because they are prone to spillage, which can lead
to secondary dust explosions. Secondary dust explosions
occur after an initial explosion stirs up dust that has accu-
mulated on surfaces near the conveyor. When the accumu-
lated dust becomes airborne, it also ignites. It is important
to note that secondary explosions are much more severe
because of their higher initial pressures and availability of
thermal energy. An often-cited example of a secondary dust
explosion is the Imperial Sugar Co. incident that occurred
on Feb. 7, 2008, in Georgia, which caused 14 fatalities and
injured 36 people (3).
Explosion venting devices. Enclosed conveying systems
typically require explosion venting devices such as explo-
sion venting panels or flameless venting systems, depending
on several factors, including:
• material characteristics, e.g., particle size, moisture
level, dusting propensity
• conveyor type and speed, e.g., metal-to-metal contact,
internal bearings
• interconnected plant equipment
• zoning, e.g., electrical hazard classifications such as
Class 2, Div. 1, etc.
• ignition risk assessment (dust hazard analysis)
[Editor’s note: For a discussion of dust hazard analysis, see
Murphy, M. R., CEP, Apr. 2016, pp. 28–32.]
Explosion venting panels (Figure 3) are among the most
cost-effective ways of relieving pressure during an explo-
sion. These panels are designed to open at a set pressure,
which takes into consideration the dust properties as well
as the cross-sectional area, total length, and strength of the
associated conveyor. The panels act as the weak point in the
system to relieve the pressure and prevent structural dam-
age to the equipment. If the explosion flames and pressure
cannot be directed toward a safe area, a flameless venting or
chemical suppression system must be used.
Flameless venting systems are a cost-effective, passive
solution consisting of a vent panel surrounded by a metal
mesh (Figure 4). The mesh allows for pressure relief while
capturing the heat and flames from the explosion event.
Advantages of flameless venting systems include minimal
maintenance requirements and low cost of ownership.
Explosion venting panels are most commonly used for
outdoor applications, whereas flameless vents are used for
both indoor and outdoor applications.
Even with explosion venting devices, flames and pres-
Copyright © 2018 American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE)
 t Figure 3.
Explosion venting
panels, such as these
(indicated by the yellow
ovals) on a bucket
elevator, relieve
pressure to prevent
structural damage to
equipment.
sure can propagate to upstream and downstream equipment.
Therefore, explosion isolation may also be required.
Explosion isolation: Material chokes. The mass of bulk
solids or powders contained in an enclosed mechanical con-
veyor or rotary airlock can provide a tortuous path through
which gas and flames have to pass, thus isolating an explo-
sion. This mass of product is referred to as a material choke.
Therefore, under certain conditions, enclosed conveyors can
be used for explosion isolation. NFPA 69 (2), Section 12.2.4,
covers the use of material chokes for the isolation of solids-
processing equipment.
It is important to note that the reliability of a material
choke varies based on several factors. For a screw conveyor,
the orientation and speed of the conveyor, the flowability
and burning index (BI) of the product, and other design
constraints must be taken into account. It is also important to
note that material chokes are only suitable for dusty products.
Any such isolation methods, as well as any explosion protec-
tion systems in general, must be approved by the authority
responsible for enforcing any applicable codes or standards.
In other situations, such as interconnected enclosures or
conveyors handling chunkier products, rotary airlocks must be
used as material chokes. Where material chokes are not pos-
sible, chemical suppression must be used to provide isolation.
Explosion isolation: Chemical suppression. Chemical
suppression systems employ pressure detectors or infrared
sensors to identify flames and explosions. When an explo-
sion occurs, within a few milliseconds, the suppression sys-
tem triggers the release of a chemical agent that extinguishes
the explosion.
Copyright © 2018 American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE)
u Figure 4. A flameless
venting system, such
as this one installed
on a bucket elevator,
consists of a vent panel
surrounded by a metal
mesh that allows for
pressure relief while
capturing the heat and
flames of an explosion.
Chemical suppression systems require regular mainte-
nance and inspections by authorized personnel, which can
increase the cost of ownership of such systems. On the other
hand, passive protection devices, such as explosion venting
panels and flameless venting systems, require minimal main-
tenance, and inspections can be performed by trained plant
personnel. In addition, replacement costs for an explosion
panel are significantly lower than those of active systems.
Protecting downstream equipment
Many facilities use the conveyors discussed previously
to discharge product from a truck in bulk. Product is then
transferred into bucket elevators (Figures 3 and 4), one of
the most common ignition sources.
Bucket elevators. Reference 4 describes work by Kauff-
man that emphasized the essential role played by bucket
elevators in 14 carefully investigated grain dust explosions
in the U.S. Five of the explosions originated in the bucket
elevator. In six other accidents, bucket elevators amplified
and propagated the explosion, although the combustion
process did not originate there. In only three of the 14 cases
was a bucket elevator not involved.
Explosions often originate in bucket elevators because
conveying can create an explosible dust cloud inside the
housing. The confined dust cloud can easily be ignited to
cause deflagration.
Bearings are a major source of heat, and if the bear-
ings are not mounted externally, temperature monitoring is
required. If there is no system to ensure proper belt align-
ment, a belt alignment monitor is also required. To pro-
tect the equipment in the event of an explosion, the head
and boot section of the bucket elevator (Figure 1) can be
protected with explosion venting panels, flameless venting
systems, or chemical suppression systems.
Properly protected bucket elevators must be isolated
from connected equipment, such as an associated dust col-
lector, silo, trough auger, etc.
Aspiration lines. Aspiration lines for bucket elevators
and associated dust collectors must be taken into consider-
ation as well. Inlet isolation flap valves (Figure 5, next page)
(2, Section 12.2.3) provide only one-way isolation in the
CEP  April 2018  www.aiche.org/cep  61
Safety
t Figure 5. (Top) Under
normal conditions, the
flap of this one-way
inlet isolation device
is open to allow flow
into the protected
process equipment.
(Bottom) In the event
of an explosion in the
process equipment, the
flap closes to prevent
the flames and pressure
from propagating.
direction opposite flow to the dust collector, so any aspira-
tion lines must be individually isolated by means of a pinch
valve (2, Section 11.4.1.6) or another suitable means that
provides two-way isolation.
Dust collectors. A dust collector can be protected by
standard means such as venting panels, flameless venting,
or a chemical suppression system. For new installations, it
is prudent to select an outdoor location where an explosion
can be vented safely with an explosion panel. If venting
by means of an explosion panel is not feasible, a deflector
(Figure 6), flameless venting, or chemical suppression must
be considered. The dust collector must then be properly iso-
lated by means of an inlet isolation flap valve, pinch valve,
or chemical suppression.
Trough augers. A trough auger contains material only
in the lower portion of the trough; the upper cross-section
contains no product, thereby creating an enclosed space in
which a dust cloud can form. Trough augers located indoors
require flameless venting systems or chemical suppression.
Ductwork. Another means of explosion isolation that is
not often considered involves venting of the ductwork. For
large-diameter ducts (more than 40 in.) that connect two
enclosures, such as a cyclone and a dust collector, tradi-
tional isolation methods are typically not cost-effective. In
these cases, the connected enclosures as well as the inter­
t Figure 6. Explosions
should be vented to an
outdoor location. If that cannot
be done safely, a deflector can
be installed to direct the flame
and pressure upward.
62  www.aiche.org/cep  April 2018  CEP
Literature Cited
1. National Fire Protection Association, “Standard on the
Fundamentals of Combustible Dust,” NFPA 652, NFPA,
Quincy, MA (2016).
2. National Fire Protection Association, “Standard on
Explosion Prevention Systems,” NFPA 69, NFPA,
Quincy, MA (2014).
3. Vorderbrueggen, J., “Imperial Sugar Refinery Com-
bustible Dust Explosion Investigation,” presented at the
AIChE Spring Meeting and Global Congress on Process
Safety, www.aiche.org/academy/videos/conference-
presentations/imperial-sugar-refinery-combustible-dust-
explosion-investigation, San Antonio, TX (Mar. 2010).
4. Eckhoff, R. K., “Dust Explosions in the Process Indus-
tries,” 3rd ed., Gulf Professional Publishing, Houston,
TX (2003).
5. National Fire Protection Association, “Prevention
of Fire and Dust Explosions from the Manufacturing,
Processing, and Handling of Combustible Particulate
Solids,” NFPA 654, Appendix E — Deflagration Propa-
gation Isolation Methods, NFPA, Quincy, MA (2017).
Additional Resources
Murphy, M. R., “Making Sense of Combustible-Dust
Hazard Analysis,” Chemical Engineering Progress,
112 (4), pp. 28–32 (Apr. 2016).
Perry, J., et al., “Addressing Combustible Dust Hazards,”
Chemical Engineering Progress, 107 (5), pp. 36–41
(May 2011).
connecting ductwork can be vented with panels. Under this
protection arrangement, an explosion will travel to either
enclosure, but the pressure will be relieved throughout the
process, including the ductwork (5).
Closing thoughts
The likelihood of combustible dust explosions can be
reduced by using preventive means such as lowering the
conveying speeds, reducing the concentration of dust below
the minimum explosible concentration (MEC), blanketing
with inert gas, etc. But it is important to remember that all
of these methods reduce process efficiency or increase the
operational costs of the process (or both). The explosion
protection systems discussed here improve process effi-
ciency and can significantly reduce the hazardous effects of
human errors. CEP
ABHI BHARGAVA is a sales engineer with REMBE Inc. and spends much
of his time on the road, working with clients’ processes to identify
combustible dust risks and comprehensive solutions. He has previous
experience in dry bulk processing, and he holds an MS in mechanical
engineering from North Carolina State Univ.
Copyright © 2018 American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE)