1. Reyes vs.

Republic (512 SCRA 217)

Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended (Public Land Act), and Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, require that the applicants must prove that the land is alienable and
disposable public land; and that they or through their predecessors in interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945.

2. Republic vs. Sarmiento (518 SCRA 250 )

Applicant Under Act 141 must prove how his title was acquired from State

It is well settled that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the
government, and it is indispensable that the person claiming title to public land should show that his title was acquired from the
State or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law.

3. Limcoma Multi-Purpose Cooperative vs. Republic (527 SCRA 233)

Difference Between Registration Proceedings Under P.D. 1529 and Act 141

Notably, Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree and Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, are original
registration proceedings, against the whole world, and the decree of registration issued for both is conclusive and final. It is
evident from the above-cited provisions that an application for land registration must conform to three requisites: (1) the land is
alienable public land; (2) the applicant's open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation thereof must be
since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and (3) it is under a bona fide claim of ownership.

The laws vary only with respect to their operation. Under the Property Registration Decree, there already exists a title which the
court need only confirm while the Public Land Act works under the presumption that the land applied for still pertains to the
State, and the occupants and possessors merely claim an interest in the land by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous,
open, and notorious possession thereof.

CERTIFICATE OF ALIENABILITY

4. Republic vs. Bibonia (525 SCRA 268)

Land must be alienable and disposable as of time of filing of application for registration of title not necessarily as of June 12,
1945

Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529 is that it merely requires the property sought to be
registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time
the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is
that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State
irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as
alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive
prerogative over the property.

5. Republic vs. Mendoza (519 SCA 203)

Courts cannot inquire into reasons why a land is reclassified into alienable and disposable land

X X X it cannot be gainsaid that the prerogative of classifying public lands pertains to administrative agencies which have been
specially tasked by statutes to do so and that the courts will not interfere on matters which are addressed to the sound
discretion of government and/or quasi-judicial agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under their special
technical knowledge and training. It should be stressed that the function of administering and disposing of lands of the public
domain in the manner prescribed by law is not entrusted to the courts but to executive officials. And as such, courts should
refrain from looking into the underlying reasons or grounds which impelled the classification and declaration of Silot Bay as
timberland and its subsequent release as alienable and disposable land. From the facts of the case, it is evident that the Bureau
of Forestry released Silot Bay as alienable and disposable by virtue of the Memorandum issued by then President Marcos on 16
January 1967 which clearly empowered said bureau to identify and locate the 700,000 hectares of fishpond areas and to release
said areas as alienable and disposable. Hence, the courts, in view of the clear legal directive by which said area was released as
alienable and disposable, will refrain from questioning the wisdom of such classification or declaration.

6. Domingo vs. Landicho (531 SCRA 606)

7. Republic vs. Barandiaran (538 SCRA 705)
Applicant must prove positive act of government that land is alienable and disposable

All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State, and unless it has
been shown that they have been reclassified by the State as alienable or disposable to a private person, they remain part of the
inalienable public domain.
To prove that a land is alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the government, such
as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, or administrative action, investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands
investigator or a legislative act or statute.

8. Republic vs. San Lorenzo (513 SCRA 294)

Certificate of Alienability Is Not Proof of Possession
Second, the acceptance by the courts a quo of the CENRO certificate of alienability and disposability as evidence of possession
since the date of said certificate is patently erroneous. According to the CENRO certification, the subject land was alienable and
disposable public land since June 7, 1938. This certification does not in any way indicate that the respondent and its
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the property as far back as 1938.

Republic vs. Sarmiento (518 SCRA 250 )

Surveyor’s Certification Is Not Proof That Land Is Alienable and Disposable

A mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyor's assertion,
petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared alienable. It is not enough to rely on blue
print copy of the conversion and subdivision plan approved by the DENR Center which bears the notation of the surveyor-
geodetic engineer that "this survey is inside the alienable and disposable area, Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on
January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry."

Republic vs. Barandiaran (538 SCRA 1)

A mere notation on the advance plan to the effect that said properties are alienable and disposable is not the kind of proof
required by law to prove that land is alienable.

Republic vs. Consunji (533 SCRA 269)

Republic vs. Barandiaran (538 SCRA 705)
Buenaventura vs. Republic (517 SCRA 271)
Certification from the Government/DENR that land is alienable and disposable is sufficient to prove its status as such.

The certification from the DENR that the land subject of the application is within the alienable and disposable project, is sufficient
to establish the true nature and character of the subject properties. Similarly, it enjoys a presumption of regularity in the
absence of contradictory evidence.

APPLICATION
9. Herce, Jr. vs. Municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna (512 SCRA 332, 333)
The Court may order the striking out of one or more parcels or the severance of the application for registration of title which
refers to more than one parcel of land

An application for land registration may include two or more parcels of land, but the court may at any time order an application
to be amended by striking out one or more of the parcels or order a severance of the application.

DEATH OF AN APPLICANT DURING PENDENCY OF

APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE
10. Domingo vs. Landicho ((531 SCRA 606)
The Court must order the substitution of heirs of an applicant who died during pendency of the land registration case

When a party dies in an action that survives and no order is issued by the court for the appearance of the legal representative or
of the heirs of the deceased in substitution of the deceased, and as a matter of fact no substitution has ever been effected, the
proceedings held by the court without such legal representatives or heirs and the judgment rendered after such trial are null and
void because the court acquired no jurisdiction over the person of the legal representative or of the heirs upon whom the trial
and judgment would be binding. Unlike, however, jurisdiction over the subject matter which is conferred by law, jurisdiction over
the person of the parties to the case may, however, be waived either expressly or impliedly.

INITIAL HEARING
11. Republic vs. San Lorenzo (513 SCRA 294)
Initial Hearing Beyond the 90-Day Period

The duty and the power to set the hearing date lie with the land registration court. After an applicant has filed his application,
the law requires the issuance of a court order setting the initial hearing date. The notice of initial hearing is a court document.
The notice of initial hearing is signed by the judge and copy of the notice is mailed by the clerk of court to the LRA [Land
Registration Authority]. This involves a process to which the party applicant absolutely has no participation. X X X Respondent
should not be faulted if the initial hearing that was conducted on September 23, 1995 was outside the 90-day period set forth
under Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, and (b) that respondent might have substantially complied with the
requirement thereunder relating to the registration of the subject land." Hence, on the issue of jurisdiction, we find for the
respondent, in that its application for registration was rightfully given due course by the MTCC.

PUBLICATION
12. Hrs. of Regalado vs. Republic (516 SCRA 38)
Technical Description of Smaller Lots Sought to Be Registered Must Be Published

If what is sought to be registered are sublots of a bigger lot, the publication must contain the technical descriptions of the
smaller lots since the adjoining owners of the mother lot are not the adjoining owners of the smaller lots.

EVIDENCE OF POSSESSION
A. TAX DECLARATIONS
13. Republic vs. Consunji (533 SCRA 269)
Even if earliest tax declarations do not date back to 1945, still if there is credible testimony, court will grant petition for
registration.

The fact that the earliest tax declarations of the lots were for the year 1955 will not mitigate against respondent. In Recto v.
Republic (440 SCRA 79) it was held that:

. . . the belated declaration of the lot for tax purposes does not necessarily mean that possession by the previous owners thereof
did not commence in 1945 or earlier. As long as the testimony supporting possession for the required period is credible, the
court will grant the petition for registration.

14. Hrs. of Marina Regalado vs. Republic (516 SCRA 38)

Delayed declaration for tax purpose negates claim of continuous, exclusive and uninterrupted possession as owner

While it is a good indication of possession in the concept of owner, delayed declaration of property for tax purposes negates a
claim of continuous, exclusive, and interrupted possession in the concept of an owner.

15. Republic vs. Sta. Ana Burgos (523 SCRA 309)

16. Buenaventura vs. Republic (517 SCRA 271)
Tax declarations especially dating back to 1948 or 1945 are good indicia of ownership

As a rule, tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are
good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not
in his actual or constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The
voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only one's sincere and honest desire to obtain
title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to
contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens one's bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.

17. Republic vs. Barandiaran (538 SCRA 1)

Tax receipts and declarations when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property become evidence of ownership
acquired by prescription.

It is settled that tax receipts and declarations of ownership for tax purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership; they
only become evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property.

TRACING CLOTH/SURVEY PLAN

18. Republic vs. Munoz (536 SCRA 108)

Original tracing cloth plan may be dispensed with if there is duly certified blue print copy of tracing cloth with technical
description

19. In the case of Recto vs. Republic (440 SCRA 79)

, the Supreme Court held that a duly certified blue print copy of the tracing cloth with the technical description is sufficient
compliance and the submission of the survey plan on tracing cloth may be dispensed with.

20. Dolino vs. Court of Appeals (401 SCRA 695)

DENR officials may be compelled to conduct a survey of land subject of an application for registration of title notwithstanding the
PP No. 932 which DENR says has withdrawn subject lot from entry, sale, disposition and settlement.

A survey of the land subject of an application for registration is an essential requirement for without the lot being surveyed, an
applicant would not be able to initiate proper land registration proceedings. The DENR may be compelled to conduct a survey
and inspection of lots subject of application for registration for this would not automatically result in the adjudication of lots to
the applicants if the land is not alienable and disposable and if they have not possessed it for the length of time and manner
required by law.
JUDGMENT
21. Ting vs. Hrs. of Lirio (518 SCRA 336)
Final and executory judgment in land registration case need not be enforced by motion or an action under Sec 6 of Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court

22. Sta. Ana v. Menla, et al. (111 Phil. 947, 951 (1961)
enunciates the raison d'etre why Section 6, Rule 39 does not apply in land registration proceedings, viz:

We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the above assignment, except in so far as it supports his
theory that after a decision in a land registration case has become final, it may not be enforced after the lapse of a period of 10
years, except by another proceeding to enforce the judgment or decision. Authority for this theory is the provision in the Rules
of Court to the effect that judgment may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five years but within 10 years, by an
action (Sec. 6, Rule 39.) This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a
land registration case. This is so because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as
against the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes
the decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact;
in land registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be established. After the ownership
has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except
when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.

Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a judgment
in a civil action, except the proceedings to place the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a land
registration case, unless the adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final without any further action, upon the
expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal.

23. Republic vs. Nillas (512 SCRA 286)

Failure of administrative authorities to issue decree cannot oust prevailing party from ownership of land

The provision lays down the procedure that interposes between the rendition of the judgment and the issuance of the certificate
of title. No obligation whatsoever is imposed by Section 39 on the prevailing applicant or oppositor even as a precondition to the
issuance of the title. The obligations provided in the Section are levied on the land court (that is to issue an order directing the
Land Registration Commissioner to issue in turn the corresponding decree of registration), its clerk of court (that is to transmit
copies of the judgment and the order to the Commissioner), and the Land Registration Commissioner (that is to cause the
preparation of the decree of registration and the transmittal thereof to the Register of Deeds). All these obligations are
ministerial on the officers charged with their performance and thus generally beyond discretion of amendment or review.

The failure on the part of the administrative authorities to do their part in the issuance of the decree of registration cannot oust
the prevailing party from ownership of the land. Neither the failure of such applicant to follow up with said authorities can. The
ultimate goal of our land registration system is geared towards the final and definitive determination of real property ownership
in the country, and the imposition of an additional burden on the owner after the judgment in the land registration case had
attained finality would simply frustrate such goal.

ESTOPPEL AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT

24. Hrs. of Regalado vs. Republic (516 SCRA 38)

The failure of the Republic to file any opposition or answer to the application for registration, despite receipt of notice thereof,
did not deprive its right to appeal the RTC decision.

25. Barstowe Philippines Corporation vs. Republic (519 SCRA 238)

26. Republic vs. Mendoza (519 SCRA 203)
Exception to rule that estoppel does not lie vs. government

The general rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents. However, like all
general rules, this is also subject to exceptions, viz:

"Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not be invoked except in rare and unusual circumstances, and may
not be invoked where they would operate to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to protect the public. They must
be applied with circumspection and should be applied only in those special cases where the interests of justice clearly require it.
Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to deal dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must not play an
ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations . . . the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against
public authorities as well as against private individuals."
xxx xxx xxx
It is only fair and reasonable to apply the equitable principle of estoppel by laches against the government to avoid an injustice
to the innocent purchasers for value.
Likewise time-settled is the doctrine that where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title,
acquire rights over the property, courts cannot disregard such rights and order the cancellation of the certificate. Such
cancellation would impair public confidence in the certificate of title, for everyone dealing with property registered under the
Torrens system would have to inquire in every instance whether the title has been regularly issued or not. This would be
contrary to the very purpose of the law, which is to stabilize land titles. Verily, all persons dealing with registered land may
safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor, and the law or the courts do not oblige, them to go behind
the certificate in order to investigate again the true condition of the property. They are only charged with notice of the lions and
encumbrances on the property that are noted on the certificate.

27. Estate of Late Jesus Yujuico vs. Republic (537 SCRA 513)
Estoppel may lie against the Government if it did not act to contest title for unreasonable length of time

Subject to its limitations, the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities when the lot is alienated
to innocent purchasers for value and the government did not undertake any act to contest the title for an unreasonable length of
time.

ISSUANCE OF A DECREE
28. Hrs. of Tama Tan Buto vs. Luy (528 SCRA 522)
Petition for Review of Decree must be filed within 1 year from issuance of decree otherwise title becomes indefeasible

When the petition for review of decree is filed after the expiration of one (1) year from the issuance of the decree of registration,
the certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears
thereon. The certificate of title that was issued attained the status of indefeasibility one year after its issuance. The aggrieved
party cannot defeat title previously issued by subsequently filing an application for registration of land previous registered.

See also Esguerra vs. Trinidad (518 SCRA 186)

29. Ingusan vs. Hrs. of Aureliano Reyes (513 SCRA 315)

When an original certificate of title is secured fraudulently and in breach of trust, a direct attack on the title is a petition for
review of decree of registration under Sec. 32 of P.D. 1529.

30. Hrs. of Maximo Labanon vs. Hrs. of Constancio Labanon (530 SCRA 97)
If petition for review of decree is not possible, there are other remedies for reconveyance of property to rightful owner

Contrary to petitioners' interpretation, Sec. 32 of P.D. 1529 does not totally deprive a party of any remedy to recover the
property fraudulently registered in the name of another. Section 32 of PD 1529 merely precludes the reopening of the
registration proceedings for titles covered by the Torrens System, but does not foreclose other remedies for the reconveyance of
the property to its rightful owner. As elaborated in Heirs of Clemente Ermac v. Heirs of Vicente Ermac (403 SCRA 291, 297):

While it is true that Section 32 of PD 1529 provides that the decree of registration becomes incontrovertible after a year, it does
not altogether deprive an aggrieved party of a remedy in law. The acceptability of the Torrens System would be impaired, if it is
utilized to perpetuate fraud against the real owners. 7

A more succinct explanation is found in Vda. De Recinto v. Inciong (77 SCRA 196, 201.) thus:

The mere possession of a certificate of title under the Torrens system does not necessarily make the possessor a true owner of
all the property described therein for he does not by virtue of said certificate alone become the owner of the land illegally
included. It is evident from the records that the petitioner owns the portion in question and therefore the area should be
conveyed to her. The remedy of the land owner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name
is, after one year from the date of the decree, not to set aside the decree, but, respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no
longer open to review, to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if the property has passed
into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages.

31. Manotok Realty Inc. vs. CLT Realty Devt. Corp.

[G.R. No. 123346. December 14, 2007.]
It is from date of issuance of a title when the decree of registration is transcribed that a certificate of title is to take effect
With the plain language of the law as mooring, this Court in two vintage and sound rulings made it plain that the original
certificate of title is issued on the date the decree of registration is transcribed. In the first ruling, it was held that there is a
marked distinction between the entry of the decree and the entry of the certificate of title; the entry of the decree is made by
the chief clerk of the land registration and the entry of the certificate of title is made by the register of deeds. (Antiporda v.
Mapa, 55 Phil. 89, 91 (1930). Such difference is highlighted by Sec. 31 of Act No. 496 as it provides that the certificate of title is
issued in pursuance of the decree of registration. In the second, it was stressed that what stands as the certificate of the title is
the transcript of the decree of registration made by the registrar of deeds in the registry. (PNB v. Tan, 51 Phil. 317, 321 (1927))

Otherwise stated, what is actually issued by the register of deeds is the certificate of title itself, not the decree of registration, as
he is precisely the recipient from the land registration office of the decree for transcription to the certificate as well as the
transcriber no less. Since what is now acknowledged as the authentic OCT No. 994 indicates that it was received for
transcription by the Register of Deeds of Rizal on 3 May 1917, it is that date that is the date of registration since that was when
he was able to transcribe the decree in the registration book, such entry made in the book being the original certificate of title.
(See Act No. 496, Sec. 41.) Moreover, it is only after the transcription of the decree by the register of deeds that the certificate
of title is to take effect..

RES JUDICATA
32. Hrs. Tama Tan Buto vs. Luy (528 SCRA 522)

A previous final and executory judgment awarding the lot in favor of a party bars the losing party from later filing an application
for registration of title covering the same lot.

RECONSTITUTION OF TITLES
33. Hrs. of Venturanza vs. Republic (528 SCRA 238)

A court has no jurisdiction to order the reconstitution of title over land which was never registered. The records of the Register
of Deeds of Camarines Sur, do not show how the land covered by TCT No. 140 supposedly in the name of Florencio Mora was
registered. A land may be considered as not having been originally registered if there is no decree number, original certificate of
title number or LRC Record.

34. Barstowe Philippines Corporation vs. Republic (519 SCRA 148)

Judicially reconstituted titles are superior to administratively reconstituted titles.

Reconstituted titles shall have the same validity and legal effect as the originals thereof" unless the reconstitution was made
extrajudicially. In contrast to the judicial reconstitution of a lost certificate of title which is in rem, the administrative
reconstitution is essentially ex-parte and without notice. The reconstituted certificates of title do not share the same indefeasible
character of the original certificates of title for the following reason —

The nature of a reconstituted Transfer Certificate Of Title of registered land is similar to that of a second Owner's Duplicate
Transfer Certificate Of Title. Both are issued, after the proper proceedings, on the representation of the registered owner that
the original of the said TCT or the original of the Owner's Duplicate TCT, respectively, was lost and could not be located or found
despite diligent efforts exerted for that purpose. Both, therefore, are subsequent copies of the originals thereof. A cursory
examination of these subsequent copies would show that they are not the originals. Anyone dealing with such copies are put on
notice of such fact and thus warned to be extra-careful. .

REVERSION BY THE GOVERNMENT

35. Hrs. of Venturanza vs. Republic (528 SCRA 238)

The Government can file reversion proceedings to recover inalienable lands of public domain even if in hands of innocent
purchasers for value.

It is, thus, safe to conclude that the land subject of TCT No. 2574 could not have been registered in the name of petitioners or
their predecessors-in-interest for the simple reason that under the Constitution, timberlands, which are part of the public
domain, cannot be alienated. A certificate of title covering inalienable lands of the public domain is void and can be cancelled in
whosever hand said title may be found. Thus, we have ruled that a certificate of title is void when it covers property of the public
domain classified as forest or timber and mineral lands. And any title issued on non-disposable lands even if in the hands of
alleged innocent purchaser for value, shall be cancelled.

36. Estate of the Late Jesus Yujuico vs. Republic (537 SCRA 513)
Action for reversion which seeks to cancel a judgment of the RTC awarding lot to an applicant should be filed before Court of
Appeals under Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure

While CA No. 141 did not specify whether judicial confirmation of titles by a land registration court can be subject of a reversion
suit, the government availed of such remedy by filing actions with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to cancel titles and decrees
granted in land registration applications, but the situation changed on 14 August 1981 upon the effectivity of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129 which gave the Intermediate Appellate Court the exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments
of Regional Trial Courts. When the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure became effective on 1 July 1997, it incorporated Rule 47 on
annulment of judgments or final orders and resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts. Effective 1 July 1997, any action for
reversion of public land instituted by the Government was already covered by Rule 47 and the same should be filed with the
Court of Appeals, not the Regional Trial Court.