THE PHILIPPINES:

AS A STATE
CASE: PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, AKBAYAN PARTY-LIST REP. RISA
HONTIVEROS, PROF. HARRY C. ROQUE, JR., AND UNIVERSITY OF THE
PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW STUDENTS, ALITHEA BARBARA ACAS,
VOLTAIRE ALFERES, CZARINA MAY ALTEZ, FRANCIS ALVIN ASILO,
SHERYL BALOT, RUBY AMOR BARRACA, JOSE JAVIER BAUTISTA,
ROMINA BERNARDO, VALERIE PAGASA BUENAVENTURA, EDAN MARRI
CAÑETE, VANN ALLEN DELA CRUZ, RENE DELORINO, PAULYN MAY
DUMAN, SHARON ESCOTO, RODRIGO FAJARDO III, GIRLIE FERRER,
RAOULLE OSEN FERRER, CARLA REGINA GREPO, ANNA MARIE CECILIA
GO, IRISH KAY KALAW, MARY ANN JOY LEE, MARIA LUISA
MANALAYSAY, MIGUEL RAFAEL MUSNGI, MICHAEL OCAMPO, JAKLYN
HANNA PINEDA, WILLIAM RAGAMAT, MARICAR RAMOS, ENRIK FORT
REVILLAS, JAMES MARK TERRY RIDON, JOHANN FRANTZ RIVERA IV,
CHRISTIAN RIVERO, DIANNE MARIE ROA, NICHOLAS SANTIZO, MELISSA
CHRISTINA SANTOS, CRISTINE MAE TABING, VANESSA ANNE TORNO,
MARIA ESTER VANGUARDIA, and MARCELINO VELOSO III, Petitioners, vs.
HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HON. ROLANDO ANDAYA, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, HON. DIONY VENTURA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE NATIONAL MAPPING & RESOURCE
INFORMATION AUTHORITY, and HON. HILARIO DAVIDE, JR., IN HIS
CAPACITY AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE UNITED NATIONS, Respondents.
TOPIC: Archipelagic Doctrine
FACTS:
Congress enacted R.A. 9522 to comply with the terms of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the Philippines ratified on February 27, 1984.
Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend, among
others, that the law decreased the national territory of the Philippines. Some of their particular
arguments are as follows:
(1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine
state’s sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying the
terms of the Treaty of Paris and ancillary treaties.
(2) RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all
vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security,
contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in
violation of relevant constitutional provisions.
 (3) RA 9522’s treatmentof the KIG as “regime of islands” not only results in the loss of a large
maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.
Hence, petitioners files action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 95221 (RA 9522) adjusting the country’s archipelagic
baselines and classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the contentions of Magallona et al are tenable.
RULING: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself is not a
means to acquire, or lose, territory.
The treaty and the baseline law has nothing to do with the acquisition, enlargement, or diminution
of the Philippine territory. What controls when it comes to acquisition or loss of territory is the
international law principle on occupation, accretion, cession and prescription and NOT the
execution of multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply
with the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves.
The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact it increased it. Under the old law
amended by RA 9522 (RA 3046), we adhered with the rectangular lines enclosing the Philippines.
The area that it covered was 440,994 square nautical miles (sq. na. mi.). But under 9522, and with
the inclusion of the exclusive economic zone, the extent of our maritime was increased to 586,210
sq. na. mi.
If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international community of the scope of the maritime
space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights.
Anent their particular contentions:
a. The law did not abandon the Sabah claim. This is evident on the provision of Section 2 of
RA 9522:
“Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine
Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the
baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North
Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and
sovereignty.”
b. UNCLOS may term our waters as “archipelagic waters” and that we may term it as our
“internal waters”, but the bottom line is that our country exercises sovereignty over these
waters and UNCLOS itself recognizes that. However, due to our observance of
international law, we allow the exercise of others of their right of innocent passage. No
modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that
is exercised in accordance with customary international law without risking retaliatory
measures from the international community.
 c. The classification of the KIG (or the Spratly’s), as well as the Scarborough Shoal, as a
regime of islands did not diminish our maritime area. Under UNCLOS and under the
baselines law, since they are regimes of islands, they generate their own maritime zones –
in short, they are not to be enclosed within the baselines of the main archipelago (which is
the Philippine Island group). This is because if we do that, then we will be enclosing a
larger area which would already depart from the provisions of UNCLOS – that the
demarcation should follow the natural contour of the archipelago.

Nevertheless, we still continue to lay claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal through
effective occupation.
CASE: MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners, vs.
The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a.
FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER, respondents.
TOPIC: Modes of acquiring citizenship
FACTS:
Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his certificate of
candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng
Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the 2004 national elections. In his certificate of candidacy,
FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be
"Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth
to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on 9 January 2004, a petition (SPA 04-003)
before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to
cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in
his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth,
according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American,
and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.
Granting, Fornier asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have
transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother.
Fornier based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ on two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe
contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and,
(2) even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after
the birth of FPJ. On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003 for lack of merit. 3
days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was
denied on 6 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc.
Fornier assailed the decision of the COMELEC before the Supreme Court conformably
with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition likewise
prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution
that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions. The other petitions,
later consolidated with GR 161824, would include GR 161434 and GR 161634, both challenging
the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of
the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve
the basic issue on the case.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Poe was a Filipino
citizen.
RULING: NO. Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe as a Filipino
Citizen.
 The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law on respondent’s
birth, provided that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of
the Philippines."
Tracing respondent’s paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced by the latter’s
death certificate was identified as a Filipino Citizen. His citizenship was also drawn from the
presumption that having died in 1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo would have been born in 1870. In
the absence of any other evidence, Lorenzo’s place of residence upon his death in 1954 was
presumed to be the place of residence prior his death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited
from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. Being so,
Lorenzo’s citizenship would have extended to his son, Allan – respondent’s father.
Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allan’s son to Bessie, though an American
citizen, was a Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as evidenced by the respondent’s birth
certificate. The 1935 Constitution on citizenship did not make a distinction on the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of the child, thus, the allegation of bigamous marriage and the allegation that
respondent was born only before the assailed marriage had no bearing on respondent’s citizenship
in view of the established paternal filiation evidenced by the public documents presented.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ
is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his
favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in
his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
CASE: MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM and LAU YUEN
YEUNG, petitioners-appellants, vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION,
respondent-appellee.
G.R. No. L-21289 October 4, 1971
TOPIC: Mode of acquiring Filipino citizenship
FACTS:
Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant on
8 February 1961. In the interrogation made in connection with her application for a temporary
visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon,
Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great grand
uncle, Lau Ching Ping. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961 for a
period of one month.
On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to
undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on
or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in
his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative might properly
allow.
After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to
13 February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias
Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the
Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate
deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction. At the
hearing which took place one and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted that Lau Yuen
Yeung could not write and speak either English or Tagalog, except for a few words. She could not
name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not know the names
of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law. As a result, the Court of First Instance of Manila denied
the prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a
Filipino citizen.
RULING:
Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native
born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen
of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien
who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment
he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the
disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the
naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of
an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go
through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it
should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege.
This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature
intended to treat them differently. As the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural,
stand today, there is no such procedure (a substitute for naturalization proceeding to enable the
alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship settled and established
so that she may not have to be called upon to prove it everytime she has to perform an act or enter
into a transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos), but such is no proof
that the citizenship is not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of
citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the situation obtains even as to native-born
Filipinos.
Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or
administrative case. Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein
as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out
again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a
Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo
Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.
CASE: CIRILO R. VALLES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
ROSALIND YBASCO LOPEZ, respondents.
TOPIC: Modes of acquiring Filipino citizenship; Jus sanguinis
FACTS:
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father and an
Australian mother. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the
Philippines, where she later married a Filipino and has since then participated in the electoral
process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well.
In the May 1998 elections, she ran for governor but Valles filed a petition for her
disqualification as candidate on the ground that she is an Australian.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Rosalind is an Australian or a Filipino

HELD: The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis.
Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the
place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or
citizenship on the basis of place of birth.
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and
at that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by
which the United States governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and
the Philippine Autonomy Act of Aug. 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on
April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens.
Private respondent’s father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on Jan. 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte.
Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a
Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth,
Telesforo’s daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of
the Philippines.
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle of jus
sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship.
So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship,
was subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private
respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father.
The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship.
If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim
Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.
CASE: ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents.
G.R. No. 142840 May 7, 2001
TOPIC: Mode of acquiring Filipino citizenship
FACTS:
The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the
constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representative
unless he is a natural-born citizen."
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of
Filipino parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the consent
of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he
lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which
Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose
his citizenship by, among other, “rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces
of a foreign country.”
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by
his naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630
[(An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such
Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of the
United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the 2nd District of
Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who was then running for
reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent
HRET claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is not a
natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz
the duly elected Representative in the said election.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.
RULING: YES.
Natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citezenship." On the other hand, naturalized
citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under
Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed
the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.11 To be naturalized,
an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications12 and none of the disqualification.
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner
provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen:
(1) by naturalization,
(2) by repatriation, and
(3) by direct act of Congress.
Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a
mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth
Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine
citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63.16 Under this law, a former Filipino citizen
who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications and none of the
disqualification mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their
citizenship due to:
(1) desertion of the armed forces;
(2) services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
(3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,
(4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
(5) political economic necessity.
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of
the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the
Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the
Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship
under R.A. No. 2630.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the
same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision,
respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status
which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of
repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine
citizenship.
CASE: ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner, vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.
G.R. Nos. 92191-92 July 30, 1991
TOPIC: Mode of acquiring Filipino citizenship
FACTS:
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The HRET declared that respondent Jose
Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting
purposes.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was
held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative
district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private
respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the
second district of Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the
following grounds:
1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural-born Filipino citizen in contemplation of Section 6,
Article VI in relation to Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV of the 1987 Constitution.
RULING: YES.
The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word residence
which regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile. The domicile of origin of the private
respondent, which was the domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang, Samar. Contrary to the
petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned said domicile; it remained fixed therein
even up to the present. Hence, the residency of respondent Ong has sufficiently proved.
Even assuming that the private respondent does not own any property in Samar, the
Supreme Court in the case of De los Reyes v. Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held that it is not
required that a person should have a house in order to establish his residence and domicile. It is
enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of a friend or relative.
To require the private respondent to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress
would be tantamount to a property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate
meet the age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements. Nowhere is it required by the
Constitution that the candidate should also own property in order to be qualified to run.
CASE: BALGAMELO CABILING MA, FELIX CABILING MA, JR., AND VALERIANO
CABILING MA, Petitioners, vs. COMMISSIONER ALIPIO F. FERNANDEZ, JR.,
ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER ARTHEL B. CARONOÑGAN, ASSOCIATE
COMMISSIONER JOSE DL. CABOCHAN, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER
TEODORO B. DELARMENTE AND ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER FRANKLIN
Z. LITTAUA, in their capacities as Chairman and Members of the Board of
Commissioners (Bureau of Immigration), and MAT G. CATRAL, Respondents.
G.R. No. 183133 July 26, 2010
TOPIC: Modes of acquiring Philippine citizenship
FACTS:
Should children born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father,
who executed an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and took their oath of allegiance to
the government upon reaching the age of majority, but who failed to immediately file the
documents of election with the nearest civil registry, be considered foreign nationals subject to
deportation as undocumented aliens for failure to obtain alien certificates of registration?
Positioned upon the facts of this case, the question is translated into the inquiry whether or
not the omission negates their rights to Filipino citizenship as children of a Filipino mother, and
erase the years lived and spent as Filipinos.
The resolution of these questions would significantly mark a difference in the lives of
herein petitioners. The petitioners herein were born of a naturalized Filipino father and a natural-
born Filipino mother. They were all raised, have resided and lived their whole lives in this country.
During their age of minority, they secured from the Bureau of Immigration their Alien Certificates
of Registration (ACRs).
Immediately upon reaching the age of twenty-one, they claimed Philippine citizenship.
Having taken their oath of allegiance as Philippine citizens, petitioners, however, failed to have
the necessary documents registered in the civil registry as required under Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 625.
ISSUE/S:
Whether late registration of the acquired Filipino citizenship in the Civil Registry encumbers
persons to become naturalized citizens of the Philippines.
RULING: No.
Petitioners complied with the first and second requirements upon reaching the age of
majority. It was only the registration of the documents of election with the civil registry that was
belatedly done. The SC ruled that under the facts peculiar to the petitioners, the right to elect
Philippine citizenship has not been lost and they should be allowed to complete the statutory
requirements for such election.
 The actual exercise of Philippine citizenship, for over half a century by the herein
petitioners, is actual notice to the Philippine public which is equivalent to formal registration of
the election of Philippine citizenship.
WHEREFORE, the Decision Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE.
CASE: MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners, vs.
COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO Respondents.
G.R. No. 221697
TOPIC: Foundlings; Citizenship
FACTS:
In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and that her residence up to day before May 9, 2016 would
be 10 years and 11 months counted from May 24, 2005.
Grace Poe was born in 1968, found as newborn infant in Jaro, Iloilo and was legally
adopted by RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (FPJ) and JESUS SONORA POE (SUSAN ROCES)
in 1974. She immigrated to the US in 1991 after her marriage to Theodore Llamanzares who was
then based at the US. Grace Poe then became a naturalized American citizen in 2001.
On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines due to his father’s deteriorating medical
condition, who then eventually demice on February 3, 2005. She then quitted her job in the US to
be with her grieving mother and finally went home for good to the Philippines on MAY 24, 2005.
On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her
Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine
Passport.
In 2010, before assuming her post as appointes Chairperson of the MTRCB, she renounced
her American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirements as to Reacquistion of Filipino
Citizenship. From then on, she stopped using her American passport.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground
particularly among others, that she cannot be considered a natural born Filipino citizen since she
was a FOUNDLING and that her bioligical parents cannot be proved as Filipinos. The Comelec
en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is in want of citizenship and residence
requirements and that she committed misrepresentation in her COC.
On CERTIORARI, the SUPREME COURT, reversed the ruling and held a vote of 9-6 that
POE is qualified as candidate for Presidency.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Grace Poe- Llamanzares is a natural- born Filipino citizen.
RULING: YES. Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares may be considered a natural-
born Filipino.

Supreme Court ruled that a foundling is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines as there is
no restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings as they are already impliedly
so recognized. There are also no provisions in the Constitution with intent or language permitting
discrimination against foundlings as the three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal
protection of the laws.
The presumption of a natural-born citizenship of the foundlings stems from the
presumption that their parents are nationals of the Philippines. Adopting the legal principles of
international laws from 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961 Convention on stateliness is rational
and reasonable and consistent in the Philippine Constitution’s regime of Jus saguinis.
There is high probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos, as being shown in her physical
features which are typical of Filipinos, aside from the fact that she was found as an infant in Jaro,
Iloilo, a municipality wherein there is 99% probability that residents there are Filipinos,
consequently providing 99% chance that Poe’s biological parents are Filipinos. Said probability
and circumstantial evidence are admissible under Rule 128, Sec 4 of the Rules on Evidence.
CASE: JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL
R. LEE, respondents.
G.R. No. 120295 June 28, 1996
TOPIC: Loss of citizenship
FACTS:
Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on
January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988. the League of
Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter (hereafter, League), represented by its President, Salvador
Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the Commission on Elections a
petition for the annulment of Frivaldo
In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United
States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American
citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos
Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative defenses but the respondent
Commission on Elections decided instead by its Order of January 20, 1988, to set the case for
hearing on the merits. His motion for reconsideration was denied in another Order dated February
21, 1988. He then came to this Court in a petition for certiorari and prohibition to ask that the said
orders be set aside on the ground that they had been rendered with grave abuse of discretion.
Pending resolution of the petition, we issued a temporary order against the hearing on the
merits scheduled by the COMELEC and at the same time required comments from the respondents.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.
RULING: NO.
Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among
other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for
suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid repatriation. He
claims that by actively participating in the local elections, he automatically forfeited American
citizenship under the laws of the United States of America. The Court stated that that the alleged
forfeiture was between him and the US. If he really wanted to drop his American citizenship, he
could do so in accordance with CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD 725. Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.
Supreme Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in
this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by
the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public
office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for
elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through
the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this
case, that the candidate was qualified.
Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If
a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this
country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.
CASE: JOEVANIE ARELLANO TABASA, Petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION and DEPORTATION and WILSON SOLUREN,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 125793 August 29, 2006
TOPIC: Reacquisition of Philippine citizenship; RA 8171
FACTS:
Citizenship is a priceless possession. Former U.S. Chief Justice Earl Warren fittingly
emphasized its crowning value when he wrote that "it is man’s basic right for it is nothing less
than to have rights." 1 When a person loses citizenship, therefore, the State sees to it that its
reacquisition may only be granted if the former citizen fully satisfies all conditions and complies
with the applicable law. Without doubt, repatriation is not to be granted simply based on the
vagaries of the former Filipino citizen.
Petitioner Joevanie Tabasa was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. When he was
seven years old, petitioner acquired American citizenship after his father became a naturalized
citizen of the United States.
When Petitioner came to the Philippines as a “balikbayan”, he was arrested and detained
by an agent of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) and thereafter, investigated. It
was found out as reported by the US embassy that petitioner’s passport has been revoked
because he is the subject of an outstanding federal warrant of arrest. He was subsequently
ordered to be deported back to the US. Petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition alleging that he
had acquired Filipino citizenship by repatriation in accordance with Republic Act No. 8171 (RA
8171), and that because he is now a Filipino citizen, he cannot be deported or detained by the
respondent Bureau.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not he has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 8171 and therefore, is
not an undocumented alien subject to deportation.
RULING: NO.
Petitioner is not qualified to avail himself of repatriation under RA 8171. The only person
entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 is either a Filipino woman who lost her Philippine
citizenship by marriage to an alien, or a natural-born Filipino, including his minor children who
lost Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity.
Petitioner was already 35 years old when he filed for repatriation. The act cannot be
applied in his case because he is no longer a minor at the time of his repatriation in 1996. The
privilege under RA 8171 only belongs to children who are of minor age at the time of filing of
the petition for repatriation.
To reiterate, the only persons entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 are the following:
a. Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and
b. Natural-born Filipinos including their minor children who lost their Philippine
citizenship on account of political or economic necessity.
CASE: ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and
the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
G.R. No. 135083 May 26, 1999
TOPIC: Dual Citizenship; Dual allegiance
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-Mayor
of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.
Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number of votes.
However, his proclamation was suspended due to the pending petition for disqualification filed
by Ernesto Mercado on the ground that he was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United
States.
From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen.
The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate for said
elective position.
However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of
the respondent was reversed. Respondent was held to have renounced his US citizenship when
he attained the age of majority and registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995
and 1998.
Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on August 31,
1998.
Thus the present petition.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or Not private respondent is qualified to hold office as Vice-Mayor.
RULING: YES.
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance.
The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of
two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For
instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which
adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli.
Private respondent is considered as a dual citizen because he is born of Filipino parents but was
born in San Francisco, USA. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part,
is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the
following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
 (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the
principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their
fathers’ country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are considered
citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine
citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship
is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition.
By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent
elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. The filing of
such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing
any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen.
By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a
permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the
Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so
without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are
concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said
before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippine, when
considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education,
practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no
doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
CASE: NESTOR A. JACOT, petitioner, vs. ROGEN T. DAL and COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondents.
G.R. No. 179848 November 27, 2008
TOPIC: Dual citizenship; Dual allegiance
FACTS:
Petitioner Jacot assails Comelec Resolution affirming his disqualification from running
for the position of Vice-Mayor for failure to comply the citizenship requirement. Petitioner was a
natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized U.S citizen. Petitioner sought
to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under R.A No. 9225.
Six months after, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy. Respondent Dal filed a
Petition for Disqualification before the COMELEC against petitioner arguing that the latter
failed to renounce his US citizenship, as required under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225
for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws. When the local
and national elections were held petitioner garnered the highest number of votes for the position
of Vice Mayor.
Thereafter, COMELEC finally issued its Resolution disqualifying the petitioner.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was dismissed for lack of merit.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not petitioner has validly comply the citizenship requirement as required by law for
persons seeking public office.
RULING: NO.
It bears to emphasize that the oath of allegiance is a general requirement for all those who
wish to run as candidates in Philippine elections; while the renunciation of foreign citizenship is
an additional requisite only for those who have retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship
under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek elective public posts, considering their special
circumstance of having more than one citizenship.
R.A 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who are already
naturalized citizens of a foreign country, must take the following oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines to reacquire or retain their Philippine citizenship. It specifically
provides that public office in the Philippines should meet the Constitutional requirements and
existing laws.
At the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer
an oath. Filipinos reacquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No.
9225 should not only take their oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, but also to
explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in the
Philippines.
 A candidate in Philippine elections must only have one citizenship, that is, Philippine
citizenship. This the petitioner fails to do.
A candidate who failed to comply with the election requirements applicable to dual
citizens and received the highest number of votes for an elective position does not dispense with,
or amount to a waiver of, the citizenship requirement. The will of the people as expressed
through the ballot cannot cure the ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed that the
candidate was qualified. The rules on citizenship qualifications of a candidate must be strictly
applied. The application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a
matter of popularity.
The appeal was DISMISSED. Comelec Resolution was AFFIRMED and petitioner was
DISQUALIFIED.
CASE: THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, represented by the
Treasurer of the Philippine Islands, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EL MONTE DE PIEDAD
Y CAJA DE AHORRAS DE MANILA, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-9959 December 13, 1916
TOPIC: Doctrine of Parens Patriae
FACTS:
A devastating earthquake took place in the Philippines sometimes in 1863. Contributions
amounting to $400,000 were collected during the Spanish regime for the relief of the victims of
an earthquake. Out of the aid, $80,000.00 was left untouched. The Monte de Piedad, a charitable
institution, in need for more working capital, petitioned the Governor-General for the transfer of
$80,000 as a loan.
In June 1893, the Department of Finance called upon the Monte de Piedad to return the
$80,000. The respondent bank declined to comply with this order upon the ground that only the
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and not the Department of Finance had the right to
order the reimbursement.
On account of various petitions of the persons, the Philippine Islands, through the
Attorney-General, bring suit against the Monte de Piedad for a recover of the $80,000, together
with interest, for the benefit of those persons or their heirs. After due trial, judgment was entered
in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $80,000 gold or its equivalent in Philippine currency,
together with legal interest from February 28, 1912, and the costs of the cause.
The defendant appealed. One of the assignment of errors made by the defendant was to
question the competence of the plaintiff (government) to bring the action, contending that the
suit could be instituted only by the intended beneficiaries themselves or by their heirs.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint against the
respondent bank for the reimbursement of the money of the intended beneficiaries?
RULING: YES.
The Supreme Court upheld the right of the Government to file the case as parens patriae
in representation of the legitimate claimants. The legislature or government of the State, as
parens patriae, has the right to enforce all charities of public nature, by virtue of its general
superintending authority over the public interests, where no other person is entrusted with it.
This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State,
whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature. It is a most beneficient
functions, and often necessary to be exercised in the interest of humanity, and for the prevention
of injury to those who cannot protect themselves. The beneficiaries of charities, who are often in
capable of vindicating their rights, and justly look for protection to the sovereign authority,
acting as parens patriae.
 They show that this beneficient functions has not ceased to exist under the change of
government from a monarchy to a republic; but that it now resides in the legislative department,
ready to be called into exercise whenever required for the purposes of justice and right, and is a
clearly capable of being exercised in cases of charities as in any other cases whatever.
CASE: WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA and ANNA DOMINIQUE COSETENG, as members of
the Philippine Senate and as taxpayers; GREGORIO ANDOLANA and JOKER
ARROYO as members of the House of Representatives and as taxpayers; NICANOR
P. PERLAS and HORACIO R. MORALES, both as taxpayers; CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION, NATIONAL ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM ASSOCIATION, CENTER
FOR ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES, LIKAS-KAYANG
KAUNLARAN FOUNDATION, INC., PHILIPPINE RURAL RECONSTRUCTION
MOVEMENT, DEMOKRATIKONG KILUSAN NG MAGBUBUKID NG
PILIPINAS, INC., and PHILIPPINE PEASANT INSTITUTE, in representation of
various taxpayers and as non-governmental organizations, petitioners, vs.
EDGARDO ANGARA, ALBERTO ROMULO, LETICIA RAMOS-SHAHANI,
HEHERSON ALVAREZ, AGAPITO AQUINO, RODOLFO BIAZON, NEPTALI
GONZALES, ERNESTO HERRERA, JOSE LINA, GLORIA. MACAPAGAL-
ARROYO, ORLANDO MERCADO, BLAS OPLE, JOHN OSMEÑA, SANTANINA
RASUL, RAMON REVILLA, RAUL ROCO, FRANCISCO TATAD and FREDDIE
WEBB, in their respective capacities as members of the Philippine Senate who
concurred in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization; SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his
capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management; CARIDAD VALDEHUESA, in
her capacity as National Treasurer; RIZALINO NAVARRO, in his capacity as
Secretary of Trade and Industry; ROBERTO SEBASTIAN, in his capacity as
Secretary of Agriculture; ROBERTO DE OCAMPO, in his capacity as Secretary of
Finance; ROBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs; and
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, respondents.
TOPIC: Theory of auto-limitation
FACTS:
This is a case petition by Sen. Wigberto Tanada, together with other lawmakers, taxpayers,
and various NGO’s to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
Agreement.
Petitioners believe that this will be detrimental to the growth of our National Economy and
against to the “Filipino First” policy. The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its
major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and
industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty
associated with exporting and more investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as
reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a “free market” espoused by
WTO.
Petitioners also contends that it is in conflict with the provisions of our constitution, since
the said Agreement is an assault on the sovereign powers of the Philippines because it meant that
Congress could not pass legislation that would be good for national interest and general welfare if
such legislation would not conform to the WTO Agreement.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement unduly limit, restrict or impair the exercise of
legislative power by Congress.
RULING:
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By
their voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater
benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals, live
with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly
agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise absolute rights.
As shown by the foregoing treaties Philippines has entered, a portion of sovereignty may
be waived without violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines “adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to
the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.”
In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution “adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of
peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations. By the doctrine of
incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which
are considered to be automatically part of our own laws. A state which has contracted valid
international obligations is bound to make in its legislations such modifications as may be
necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.
Paragraph 1, Article 34 of the General Provisions and Basic Principles of the Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) may intrudes on the power of
the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedures. With regard
to Infringement of a design patent, WTO members shall be free to determine the appropriate
method of implementing the provisions of TRIPS within their own internal systems and processes.
CASE: THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, duly represented by GOVERNOR
JESUS SACDALAN and/or VICE-GOVERNOR EMMANUEL PIÑOL, for and in
his own behalf, petitioners, vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP), represented by
SEC. RODOLFO GARCIA, ATTY. LEAH ARMAMENTO, ATTY. SEDFREY
CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN and/or GEN. HERMOGENES
ESPERON, JR., the latter in his capacity as the present and duly-appointed
Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) or the so-called Office of the
Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, respondents.
G.R. No. 183591 October 14, 2008
TOPIC: Bangsamoro Juridical Entity
FACTS:
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in line with the government‘s policy of pursuing peace
negotiations with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), asked Prime Minister Mahathir
Mohammad to convince the MILF to continue negotiating with the government. MILF, thereafter,
convened its Central Committee and decided to meet with the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines (GRP). Formal peace talks were held in Libya which resulted to the crafting of the
GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) which consists of three (3)
aspects:
a.) security aspect;
b.) rehabilitation aspect; and
c.) ancestral domain aspect.
Various negotiations were held which led to the finalization of the Memorandum of Agreement
on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). The said memorandum was set to be signed last August 5,
2008. In its body, it grants ―the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and
Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro to the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE). The latter, in
addition, has the freedom to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relation with foreign
countries. ―The sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total production
pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE.
The MOA-AD further provides for the extent of the territory of the Bangsamoro. It describes
it as ―the land mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, including
the aerial domain and the atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan
geographic region. With regard to governance, on the other hand, a shared responsibility and
authority between the Central Government and BJE was provided. The relationship was described
as ―associative.
With the formulation of the MOA-AD, petitioners aver that the negotiation and finalization of
the MOA-AD violates constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation, as mandated
by Executive Order No. 3, and right to information. They further contend that it violates the
Constitution and laws. Hence, the filing of the petition.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the contents of the MOA-AD violated the Constitution and the laws.
RULING: YES.
Association as the type of relationship governing between the parties. The parties
manifested that in crafting the MOA-AD, the term association was adapted from the international
law. In international law, association happens when two states of equal power voluntarily establish
durable links i.e. the one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other,
principal, while maintaining its international status as state; free association is a middle ground
between integration and independence.
The MOA-AD contains many provisions that are consistent with the international
definition of association which fairly would deduced that the agreement vest into the BJE a status
of an associated state, or at any rate, a status closely approximating it. The court vehemently
objects because the principle of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.
On the recognition of the BJE entity as a state. The concept implies power beyond what
the Constitution can grant to a local government; even the ARMM do not have such recognition;
and the fact is such concept implies recognition of the associated entity as a state. There is nothing
in the law that contemplate any state within the jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much
less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for
independence.
The court disagrees with the respondent that the MOA-AD merely expands the ARMM.
BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo
Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to
enter into relations with other states. As such the MOA-AD clearly runs counter to the national
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.
On the expansion of the territory of the BJE. The territory included in the BJE includes
those areas who voted in the plebiscite for them to become part of the ARMM. The stipulation of
the respondents in the MOA-AD that these areas need not participate in the plebiscite is in contrary
to the express provision of the Constitution. The law states that that "[t]he creation of the
autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the
constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and
geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region."
Clearly, assuming that the BJE is just an expansion of the ARMM, it would still run afoul
the wordings of the law since those included in its territory are areas which voted in its inclusion
to the ARMM and not to the BJE.
On the powers vested in the BJE as an entity. The respondents contend that the powers
vested to the BJE in the MOA-AD shall be within sub-paragraph 9 of sec 20, art. 10 of the
constitution and that a mere passage of a law is necessary in order to vest in the BJE powers
included in the agreement. The Court was not persuaded. SC ruled that such conferment calls for
amendment of the Constitution; otherwise new legislation will not concur with the Constitution.
Take for instance the treaty making power vested to the BJE in the MOA-AD. The
Constitution is clear that only the President has the sole organ and is the country’s sole
representative with foreign nation. Should the BJE be granted with the authority to negotiate with
other states, the former provision must be amended consequently?
Section 22 must also be amended—the provision of the law that promotes national unity
and development. Because clearly, associative arrangement of the MOA-AD does not epitomize
national unity but rather, of semblance of unity. The associative ties between the BJE and the
national government, the act of placing a portion of Philippine territory in a status which, in
international practice, has generally been a preparation for independence, is certainly not
conducive to national unity.
CASE: WILLIAM F. PERALTA, petitioner, vs.THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS,
respondent.
TOPIC: Effect of Belligerent occupation
FACTS:
William Peralta was prosecuted for the crime of robbery and was sentenced to life
imprisonment as defined and penalized by Act No. 65 of the National Assembly of the Republic
of the Philippines. The petition for habeas corpus is based on the contention that the Court of
Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created by Ordinance No. 7 was a political
instrumentality of the military forces of Japan and which is repugnant to the aims of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines for it does not afford fair trial and impairs the constitutional
rights of the accused.
The features of the summary procedure adopted by Ordinance No. 7, assailed by the
petitioner and the Solicitor General as impairing the constitutional rights of an accused are: that
court may interrogate the accused and witnesses before trial in order to clarify the points in dispute;
that the refusal of the accused to answer the questions may be considered unfavorable to him; that
if from the facts admitted at the preliminary interrogatory it appears that the defendant is guilty,
he may be immediately convicted; and that the sentence of the sentence of the court is not
appealable, except in case of death penalty which cannot be executed unless and until reviewed
and affirmed by a special division of the Supreme Court composed of three Justices.
No objection can be set up to the legality of its provisions in the light of the precepts of our
Commonwealth Constitution relating to the rights of accused under that Constitution, because the
latter was not in force during the period of the Japanese military occupation, as we have already
stated. Nor may said Constitution be applied upon its revival at the time of the re-occupation of
the Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminium because "a constitution should operate
prospectively only, unless the words employed show a clear intention that it should have a
retrospective effect" (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, seventh edition, page 97, and cases
quoted and cited in the footnote), especially as regards laws of procedure applied to cases already
terminated completely.
ISSUE/S:
By principle of postliminy, did the punitive sentence cease to be valid from the time of the
restoration of the Commonwealth?
RULING:
There is no room for doubt to the validity of Ordinance No. 7 since the criminal jurisdiction
established by the invader is drawn entirely from the law martial as defined in the usages of nations.
It is merely a governmental agency. The sentence rendered, likewise, is good and valid since it
was within the power and competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate Act No. 65. All
judgments of political complexion of the courts during Japanese regime ceased to be valid upon
reoccupation of the Islands, as such, the sentence which convicted the petitioner of a crime of a
political complexion must be considered as having ceased to be valid.
It may not be amiss to say in this connection that it is not necessary and proper to invoke
the proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur declaring null and void all laws, among them Act
No. 65, of the so-called Republic of the Philippines under which petitioner was convicted, in order
to give retroactive effect to the nullification of said penal act and invalidate sentence rendered
against petitioner under said law, a sentence which, before the proclamation, had already become
null and of no effect.
CASE: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. GUILLERMO P.
VILLASOR, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I, THE
PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL, THE SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY, and
THE SHERIFF OF THE CITY OF MANILA, THE CLERK OF COURT, Court of
First Instance of Cebu, P. J. KIENER CO., LTD., GAVINO UNCHUAN, AND
INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. L-30671 November 28, 1973
TOPIC: Sovereign immunity
FACTS:
The case was filed by the Republic of the Philippines requesting to nullify the ruling of
The Court of First Instance in Cebu in garnishing the public funds allocated for the Arm Forces of
the Philippines.
A decision was rendered in Special Proceedings in favor of respondents P. J. Kiener Co.,
Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction Corporation, and against the petitioner
herein, confirming the arbitration award in the amount of P1,712,396.40, subject of Special
Proceedings. The respondent Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, issued an Order declaring the said
decision final and executory, directing the Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City and Manila to
execute the said decision.
The corresponding Alia Writ of Execution was issued. On the strength of the
aforementioned Alias Writ of Execution, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal served Notices of
Garnishment with several Banks. The funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on deposit
with Philippine Veterans Bank and PNB are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for the
payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military and civilian personnel and for
maintenance and operations of the AFP.
Petitioner, filed prohibition proceedings against respondent Judge Villasor for acting in
excess of jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting
the issuance of a Writ of Execution against the properties of the AFP, hence the notices and
garnishment are null and void.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the state can be sued without its consent.
RULING: NO.
It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of
sovereignty that the state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent.
A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on
the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes
the law on which the right depends.
 A continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as against
the inconvenience that may cause private parties, the loss of government efficiency and the
obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions are far greater is such a fundamental
principle were abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted.
The provision of Sec 3 Article XVI declares that “the State may not be sued without its
consent”. This provision is merely a recognition of the sovereign character of the State and express
an affirmation of the unwritten rule insulating it from the jurisdiction of the courts of justice.
Another justification is the practical consideration that the demands and inconveniences of
litigation will divert time and resources of the State from the more pressing matters demanding its
attention, to the prejudice of the public welfare.
CASE: WENCESLAO VlNZONS TAN, THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, APOLONIO
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES JOSE Y.
FELICIANO, respondents-appelllees, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY,
APOLONIO RIVERA, THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND N ATURAL
RESOURCES JOSE Y. FELICIANO, respon dents-appellees,RAVAGO
COMMERCIAL CO., JORGE LAO HAPPICK and ATANACIO MALLARI,
intervenors.
G.R. No. L- 24548 October 27, 1983
TOPIC: State immunity
FACTS:
On April 15, 1963, Petitioner Wenceslao Tan won the bidding for the license of logging
operations on a public forest land in Olongapo.
On May 30, 1963, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Benjamin M. Gozon
promulgated Order no. 46 which gives the power to the Director of Forestry to grant (a) new
ordinary timber licenses where the area covered thereby is not more than 3,000 hectares each; and
(b) the extension of ordinary timber licenses for areas not exceeding 3,000 hectares.
On December 19, 1963 General memorandum Order No. 60 was issued by the acting
secretary, revoking the authority delegated to the Director of Forestry which incidentally was the
same date the license for petitioner was signed.
Acting on claims of irregularity, the license for the petitioner was revoked.
The RTC dismissed the complaint, hence the petitioner raised it directly to the Court.
ISSUE/S:
1) Whether or not the license is void ab initio.
2) Whether or not the Director of Forestry gravely abused its discretion in revoking the
license.
RULING:
FIRST ISSUE: YES.
The release of the license on January 6, 1964, gives rise to the impression that it was ante-
dated to December 19, 1963 on which date the authority of the Director of Forestry was revoked.
While the timber license might have been signed on December 19, 1963 it was released only on
January 6, 1964. Before its release, no right is acquired by the licensee. As pointed out by the trial
court, the Director of Forestry had no longer any authority to release the license on January 6,
1964. Therefore, petitioner-appellant had not acquired any legal right under such void license.
SECOND ISSUE: NO.
 A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a
contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can
be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this cease.
CASE: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellee, vs. PABLO FELICIANO
and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents-appellants.
G.R. No. 70853 March 12, 1987
TOPICS: State immunity
FACTS:
The appeal was filed by 86 settlers of Barrio of Salvacion, representing the Republic of the
Philippines to dismiss the complaint filed by Feliciano, on the ground that the Republic of the
Philippines cannot be sued without its consent.
Prior to this appeal, respondent Pablo Feliciano filed a complaint with the Court of First
Instance against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, for the
recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land consisting of four lots. The trial court
rendered a decision declaring Lot No. 1 to be the private property of Feliciano and the rest of the
property, Lots 2, 3 and 4, reverted to the public domain.
The trial court reopened the case due to the filing of a motion to intervene and to set aside
the decision of the trial court by 86 settlers, alleging that they had been in possession of the land
for more than 20 years under claim of ownership. The trial court ordered the settlers to present
their evidence but they did not appear at the day of presentation of evidence. Feliciano, on the
other hand, presented additional evidence. Thereafter, the case was submitted for decision and the
trial court ruled in favor of Feliciano.
The settlers immediately filed a motion for reconsideration. The case was reopened to
allow them to present their evidence. But before this motion was acted upon, Feliciano filed a
motion for execution with the Appellate Court but it was denied.
The settlers filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Republic of the Philippines
cannot be sued without its consent and hence the action cannot prosper. The motion was opposed
by Feliciano.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the state can be sued for recovery and possession of a parcel of land.
RULING: NO.
The doctrine of non-suability of the State has proper application in this case. The plaintiff
has impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as defendant in an action for recovery of ownership
and possession of a parcel of land, bringing the State to court just like any private person who is
claimed to be usurping a piece of property. A suit for the recovery of property is not an action in
rem, but an action in personam.
It is an action directed against a specific party or parties, and any judgment therein binds
only such party or parties. The complaint filed by plaintiff, the private respondent herein, is
directed against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, a
governmental agency created by Republic Act No. 3844.
The complaint is clearly a suit against the State, which under settled jurisprudence is not
permitted, except upon a showing that the State has consented to be sued, either expressly or by
implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. There is no such
showing in the instant case. Worse, the complaint itself fails to allege the existence of such consent.
CASE: DALE SANDERS, AND A.S. MOREAU, JR, petitioners, vs. HON. REGINO T.
VERIDIANO II, as Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court of First Instance of Zambales,
Olongapo City, ANTHONY M. ROSSI and RALPH L. WYERS, respondents.
G.R. No. L-46930 June 10, 1988
TOPIC: State immunity
FACTS:
Petitioner Sanders was then the special services director of the U.S. Naval Station
(NAVSTA) in Olongapo City. Petitioner Moreau was the commanding officer of the Subic Naval
Base, which includes the said station. Private respondents were American citizens with permanent
address in the Phil and were both game room attendants of the NAVSTA.
Herein respondents were then advised that there employment was changed from permanent
full time to permanent part-time. They filed a case of the US Dept. of Defense then was gave a
recommendation for their reinstatement. The controversy of the case was when Sanders sent a
letter to Moreau that he disagrees with the recommendation. Because of the letters private
respondents filed a case with CFI of Zambales, the plaintiffs claim that the letters contains libelous
content and has caused them the prejudgment of the grievance proceedings.
The lower court ruled that the defendants acted maliciously and in bad faith. Motion to lift
the default order and motion for reconsideration of the denial on the motion to dismiss which was
subsequently denied by the respondent court.
Petition for certiorari, prohibition and preliminary injunction
ISSUE/S:
1) Whether or not the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction.
2) Whether or not petitioners were acting officially or only in their private capacities when
they did the acts where they are sued for damages.
RULING:
FIRST ISSUE:
Since the facts lead to that the petitioners are acting in the discharge of their official duties,
the petitioners are being sued as gov’t. Officials of USA. If the trial will proceed damages will not
be on the petitioner’s personal capacity but of the petitioner’s principal. The USA government.
thus making the action a suit against that government without its consent. The government of the
United States has not given its consent to be sued for the official acts of the petitioners, who cannot
satisfy any judgment that may be rendered against them
SECOND ISSUE:
It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are sued by
are acts in the discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as director of the special services
department of NAVSTA had supervision of its personnel and matters relating to their work and
employment. As for Moreau, what he is claimed to have done was write the Chief of Naval
Personnel for concurrence with the conversion of the private respondent’s type of employment
even before the grievance proceedings had even commenced.
CASE: E. MERRITT, plaintiff-appellant, vs. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-11154 March 21, 1916
TOPIC: State immunity
FACTS:
The case is an appeal by both parties from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city
of Manila in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P14,741, together with the costs of the cause.
Prior to this appeal, Plaintiff E. Meritt, a contractor, had a collision with the General Hospital
Ambulance which turned suddenly and unexpectedly without having sounded any whistle or horn.
Merrit was severely injured. His condition had undergone depreciation and his efficiency as a
contractor was affected. The plaintiff is seeking a certain amount for permanent injuries and the
loss of wages during he was incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. In order for Merritt to
recover damages, he sought to sue the government which later authorized the plaintiff to bring suit
against the GPI and authorizing the Attorney- General to appear in said suit.
On this appeal, Counsel for the plaintiff insists that the trial court erred:
 “in limiting the general damages which the plaintiff suffered to P5,000, instead of P25,000
as claimed in the complaint,” and
 “in limiting the time when plaintiff was entirely disabled to two months and twenty-one
days and fixing the damage accordingly in the sum of P2,666, instead of P6,000 as claimed
by plaintiff in his complaint.”
On the other hand, the Attorney-General on behalf of the defendant urges that the trial court
erred:
 in finding that the collision between the plaintiff’s motorcycle and the ambulance of the
General Hospital was due to the negligence of the chauffeur, who is an alleged agent or
employee of the Government;
 in holding that the Government of the Philippine Islands is liable for the damages sustained
by the plaintiff as a result of the collision, even if it be true that the collision was due to the
negligence of the chauffeur; and
 in rendering judgment against the defendant for the sum of P14,741.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the Government is legally liable to the plaintiff by allowing a lawsuit to commence
against it.
RULING: NO.
By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby
concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to
any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a pre-existing liability
and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.
In the case at bar, the ambulance driver was not a special agent nor was a government
officer acting as a special agent. Hence, there can be no liability from the government. As stated
by Justice Story of United States “The Government does not undertake to guarantee to any person
the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since that would involve it in all its
operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the
public interest.”
CASE: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FREDERICK M. SMOUSE AND YVONNE
REEVES, petitioners, vs. HON. ELIODORO B. GUINTO, Presiding Judge, Branch
LVII, Regional Trial Court, Angeles City, ROBERTO T. VALENCIA,
EMERENCIANA C. TANGLAO, AND PABLO C. DEL PILAR, respondents.
G.R. No. 76607 February 26, 1990
FACTS:
The case involves the doctrine of state immunity. The United States of America was not
impleaded in the case at bar but has moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in effect suits
against it to which it has not consented.
The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air Base
in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the said base.
Among those who submitted their bids were private respondents Roberto T. Valencia,
Emerenciana C. Tanglao, and Pablo C. del Pilar.
The Bidding was won by Ramon Dizon over the objection of the private respondents who
claimed that he had made a bid for 4 facilities, including the Civil Engineering Area which was
not included in the invitation to bid.
The private respondents filed a complaint in the court below to compel Philippine Area
Exchange (PHAX) and the individual petitioners to cancel the award to Dizon, to conduct a
rebidding for the barbershop concessions and to allow the private respondents by a writ of
preliminary injunction to continue operating the concessions pending litigation.
The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition for preliminary
injunction on the ground that the action was in effect a suit against USA which had not waived its
non-suability, but trial court denied the application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the petitioners were immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done
by them in the performance of their official duties.
RULING:
The court finds the barbershops subject to the concessions granted by the US government
to be commercial enterprises operated by private persons. They are not agencies of the United
States Armed Forces nor are their facilities demandable as a matter of right by the American
servicemen. These establishments provide for the grooming needs of their customers. This being
the case, the petitioners cannot plead any immunity from the complaint filed by the private
respondents in the court below.
Petitioners states they have acted in the discharge of their official functions as officers or
agents of the United States. They are sought to be held answerable for personal torts in which the
United States itself is not involved. If found liable, they and they alone must satisfy the judgment.
 The Court would have directly resolved the claims against the defendants, except for the
paucity of the record in the case at hand. The evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of
the barbershop concessions is not before the Court. The respondent court will have to receive that
evidence first, so it can later determine on the basis thereof if the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief
they seek. Accordingly, this case must also be remanded to the court below for further proceedings.