A Belated Response to Hu Shih and D. T.

Suzuki
Author(s): James D. Sellmann
Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Jan., 1995), pp. 97-104
Published by: University of Hawai'i Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1399511
Accessed: 06/10/2010 03:17

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=uhp.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

University of Hawai'i Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Philosophy
East and West.

http://www.jstor.org
COMMENT AND DISCUSSION

A Belated Response to Hu Shih and D. T. Suzuki JamesD. Sellmann

Inthe April1953 edition of PhilosophyEastand West,Hu Shihand D. T. Universityof Guam

Suzukipublishedtheirdebate on the historyand method of Ch'an (Zen)
Buddhism.'A year later,Van MeterAmes presentedhis responseto their
debate by arguingthat Zen is like pragmatism;he did this to defend Hu
Shih's approach and to "tone down" what he referredto as Suzuki's
"transcendentalism."2 Van Meter Ames analyzed their debate on two
points. he
First, saw it as a split between schools or worldviewswhen he
typified Suzuki as a Buddhist who finds transcendentalismin the Zen
as
masters, opposed Hu, to the pragmatist,who finds naturalismin them.
Second, Ames said that their debate was a matterof "emotionaltone"
concerning "thatsubtle aspect of truthwhich is not so much a matterof
fact as of taste."3He devoted most of his articleto an attackon Suzuki's
work for explicit and implicitcontradictions.
In 1955, ArthurWaley presentedhis short response to the debate.4
Ames had imposed "pragmatism"on Hu;Waley had imposed "religion"
on Suzuki. Ames tried to resolve the debate; Waley saw the two posi-
tions as necessary polarities:"If there were no Hus there would be no
Suzukis."5
In this review, I renew the discussion to show that both Hu's and
Suzuki'srespectivepositions have theirshortcomings,especially in their
criticismsof each other. I will not recapitulatetheir articles. I focus my
argumentson four topics: (1) Ch'an versus Zen, (2) the irrationaland
arational, (3) history and historiography,and (4) knowledge versus
prajna-intuition.

I. Ch'anversusZen-A Case of Equivocation

It is clear that Hu and Suzukiare in disagreement,and it is also clear
what they are disagreeingabout. What Ames, Waley, and I have trouble
grasping is: why are they disagreeing when many of their positions
overlap or depend on each other?Sometimesin a debate one discovers
contradictionsthat, upon careful study and clarification,turnout not to
be real contradictions,or the debate is groundless. Often these mis-
understandingsarise because of a shift in the meaning of a word or PhilosophyEast& West
phrase. In this case the equivocation concerns the meaning of the term Volume45, Number1
"meditation"(Sktdhyana)or ratherthe Chinese "character"ch'an (Jpn January1995
zen). 97-104
When Hu uses the term "Ch'an"(especiallywith a capital "C"),he ? 1995
means the Ch'an Buddhistsect of China, usually that of the T'ang dy- by Universityof
nasty. But Hu also uses the term"ch'an"to mean dhyanaor meditation. Hawaii Press

97
 With this distinction in mind, Hu's statementthat Shen-hui started"a
new Ch'anwhich renouncesch'an itselfand is thereforeno ch'an at all"
(p. 7) is made clear. This is no Ch'an paradoxor contradiction.Hu sim-
ply means that the Ch'an school of Shen-huirejectedsittingmeditation
(Chintso-ch'an,Jpnzazen), and this is not meditation(ch'an, dhyana).
Suzuki's use of the term "Zen" is not as consistent as Hu's. De-
pending on the context, Suzuki means various things by "Zen." Van
MeterAmes points out that for Suzuki:"Zen is life," that is, "everything
that goes into the make-upof life" (p. 20). And Waley has shown Suzu-
ki'sZen to be "like ... religiousexperience"(p. 75). Suzukidoes use the
term "Zen"to referto the school of Buddhismthat developed in T'ang
China, but he often uses it to mean other things as well. Sometimesthe
term "Zen" functions as Suzuki'smantraor as his "one word" (yi chu
tzu), which neither affirmsnor denies. In his response to Hu, Suzuki
clearly states that he is not talkingabout the historicalZen school. Su-
zuki wants to discuss "Zen as Zen apartfrom its historicalsettings....
Zen in itself,or Zen as each of us lives it in his innermost."
The problemlies in Hu using Ch'an (Zen)to mean the T'angschool
of Buddhism,and Suzuki using Zen (Ch'an)to mean the enlightenment
experience or the emptinessfromwhich life swells. Hu is discussingthe
historyof Ch'an;Suzuki is discussingthe religiophilosophicsignificance
of the Zen experience. They are discussingtwo differentmatters.Thus, I
contend that because of their differentusages of "Ch'an,"they are not
debating or talkingwith each other; ratherthey are talking in opposite
directions. Because of their disparity,they do not actually rebut each
other.
They accuse each other of holding positionswhich they do not ac-
tually hold. Forexample, Hu accuses Suzukiof saying that one cannot
understandthe history of Ch'an-when in fact Suzuki is not talking
about historybut about the Zen experience. Suzuki accuses Hu of not
being qualifiedto discuss Zen in-itself,but this is not Hu's project. Hu
wants to discuss the historyof the Ch'anschool, not the Zen experience.
Suzuki appearsto be saying that if he were Hu's Zen master,then he
would not give Hu the Mind-seal.
Suzuki's proposal that Hu is unqualifiedto discuss Zen in-itself is
based on his distinctionbetween two differenttypes of mentality:one
that understandsZen and one that does not. Van MeterAmes holds that
this distinction"is an intellectualistic-conceptualdichotomy foreign to
Zen" (p. 20). Fromthe perspectiveof the Zen experience, Ames would
be correct,for the Zen experience would not hold such a distinction-
we all have Buddha-nature withinus. Butare not the Zen traditionand its
many schools based on the distinctionbetween the enlightenedand the
nonenlightened, between the one who "understands,"has prajni-in-
East&West tuition, or lives Zen and the one who does not? Suzuki has not com-
Philosophy

98
mittedan errorin holding this distinction.But does he have the rightto
rebutHu this way? Isn'tSuzukicommittingthe fallacy of arguingagainst
the man ad hominem?Hu does not have to be enlightenedto discussthe
historyof Ch'an (Zen).One can discuss the historyof a numberof reli-
gious traditionswithout being a member of them, let alone a con-
summatemember.Hu's and Suzuki'soriginalmisunderstandingof what
the other means by Ch'an (Zen)generatesother confusions.

II.The Irrationaland the Arational

Hubeginshisarticleby expressingdisappointmentwithSuzukiand his
disciples for stressingthe idea thatZen is illogical, irrational,and beyond
our intellectualunderstanding.Hu claims that since one can discuss and
understandthe historyof Ch'an in China, it is thereforeunderstandable.
Thereare two problemshere. First,Hu is committinga categoryerror
in that he confuses what is said about Zen with what Zen is. In other
words,just because one can have a rationaldiscussionof somethingand
come to have an understandingof it, it does not follow that the thing
discussed and understood is itself rational.One can discuss mob be-
haviorand come to an understandingof it, but this does not make such
behavior rational.Second, Hu criticizes Suzuki for the wrong reason;
that is, his attackon Suzuki does not get at the root of the problem of
describingZen as illogical or irrational.It seems to me that describing
Zen as illogical or irrationalis a misunderstandingnot of Zen, but of the
natureof the illogical and the irrational.
The problemas I see it is "Whatsense does it make to speak of the
logic of the illogical,"just as in ethics it does not make sense to speak of
the moralityof immorality?The immoral,like the illogical, is everything
opposed to the moral,or logical. However, Suzukiand others do speak
of Buddhistphilosophy and logic, Zen philosophy and logic, or prajna
logic. If Zen is "illogical," it would make no sense to speak of "Zen
logic" because thatwould be a logic of the illogical,which would not be
a logic in any sense. AlthoughZen is opposed to conventionalmodes of
thoughtor is antilogical,this does not make it illogical or irrational.Fol-
lowing ToshihikoIzutsu,I would describeZen as alogical.6 Inthis sense
one could have a metaleveldiscussionof the "logic" of the alogical. The
"logic" of the alogical would be a metalogic. This is the case with Zen.
Zen is definitely antiphilosophicaland antilogical; however, one can
discuss the metaphilosophyor metalogic of the aphilosophicalor alog-
ical approachof Zen. Both Hu and Suzuki have misrepresented"Zen,"
for it is neitherlogical nor illogical, but alogical.
Because of their misunderstanding,Hu is claiming that one can
understandthe historyof the Zen school; Suzukiis claimingthatthe Zen
experience is beyond the ken of human understanding.As Waley
pointed out, both of them take their positionsto unnecessaryextremes. JamesD. Sellmann

99
 Hu goes too far with his rationalismin claiming that the kung-an(Jpn
koan)has a rationalmeaning(p. 77). On this point, Suzuki'scriticismof
Hu is well taken; Hu, like a Zen novice, attemptsa rationalexplanation
of the k6an and misses the point. Suzuki goes too far in considering
himselfa "sinner"for makinghistoricalsense out of Zen, "forapartfrom
the mundane (the world of history)there is no transcendental(Zen-ex-
perience)"(Waley, p. 78).
III.Historyand Historiography
FollowingSuzuki'sown testimony,both Ames and Waley discuss his
problemwith history.However,they do not attemptto reconcile it. Ames
would agree with Suzukithat he and Hu are "sinners"if they use history
to dispel misunderstandingwhen history cannot have the final word.
Ames only attemptsto solve the problemfor Hu by claimingthat Hu, like
any pragmatist,can have the "pure experience" of Zen (p. 20). Waley
points out Suzuki'sshortcomingsas a historian,and he goes on to claim
that Suzuki's"attitudethat Zen is 'above historicalfacts' (is not) reallya
Zen attitude"(p. 76). Waley wants to reconcile the problemby showing
that it is Suzuki'spersonalbias againsthistorythat leads him to makethis
distinction,such that Suzukiand Hu become necessarypolar opposites
like the mundane and the transcendent,the infiniteand the finite, the
historicaland the transhistorical.
I think that I can resolve the problemfor Suzuki by drawinga dis-
tinction between "history"and "historiography." Commonlywhen one
of
speaks history, one usually means historiography,that is, the art and
science of writinghistory.It is importantto keep in the mind the philo-
sophical concept of history as a culturaltraditionby which a people
understandand interpretthemselves. "History"in this sense is a rich
concept; it is not the mere objective study of events in the past; it is the
living traditionof a people. Historyis alive, and in this sense the "his-
torian"is anyone who contributesto the living understandingor self-re-
alization of a people. Historiography,on the other hand, contributesto
history,but the negative qualities are ascribed to it. For example, the
simple objectivityor objectification,a concern only for the past and the
dead and so on, which Suzuki ascribes to "history,"can be seen as
characterizingthe narrowinterpretationof "historiography," the scien-
tific academic disciplineof history.Inthe followingquote fromsection 4,
it appearsthat Suzuki is not againstthe concept of historyas the living
traditionof a people, but ratherhe is opposing the sterileactivityof the
academic historiographer:
I say, "Zen Lives."Historyshuns anythingliving,for the living man does not
like to be groupedwith the past, with the dead. He is altogethertoo much
alive forthe historian,who is used to diggingup old, decayed thingsfromthe
PhilosophyEast& West grave.(Studiesin Zen, pp. 153-154)

100
 ClearlySuzukiis not discussingthe philosophicalconcept of history,
and I doubt many historians,academic or otherwise, would agree with
Suzuki'sdescriptionof history-it is an emotionaldescriptionthat makes
the studyof historysound like grave robbing.Ifwe can accept the philo-
sophical concept of historyas "living history,"then "livingZen" could
not be distinguishedfrom the "living history"of Zen. There can be no
timeless Zen, or if there is such an independenttimeless Zen, then it is
nothingmore than an empty termthat has been reified.This is similarto
Waley's point that there is no transcendentZen without the mundane
historyof it.
In his essay "Zen and Buddhism,"Abe Masao approaches the
problemof the historicityand the ahistoricityof Zen Buddhismfrom a
differentangle.7 First,Abe pointsout thatZen both is and is not a formof
Buddhism.Thatis, it is a formof Buddhismin that there is a "traditional
Zen sect" that, historicallyspeaking,developed duringthe sixth century
in China and spread to Japan.On the other hand, Zen is not a formof
Buddhismin that it is the fundamentalnatureor basic source fromwhich
the differentformsof Buddhismarise (p. 235). In contrastingthe Buddha
and the Christ,Abe pointsout a fundamentalparadoxor formof identity
throughcontradiction,which clearly illustratesthe codependence of the
historicityand the ahistoricityof Zen. Abe contends that
Whatis essentialto Buddhismis notSiddhartha's
historical
existence,butthe
Dharmahe realized.Thischaracteristicof Buddhismis clearlyexpressedin
the well-knownpassage,"Regardless of the appearanceof the Tathagata
(Sakyamuni Buddha)in thisworld,the Dharmais alwayspresent."(P.237).
This is the ahistoricalnatureof Buddhism-Dharma or Zen in-itself.This
does not mean that the historicalBuddha,Siddhartha,does not have a
special position in Buddhism.As Abe argues:"It may be said that he is
the firstpersonwho awakenedto the Dharmaand who therebybecame
the Buddha"(p. 237). In this sense, Dharmaor Zen in-itselfis historical
in that without the historicalBuddha'senlightenment,or at least some
historicalBuddha'senlightenment,the Dharmawould not be taught,or,
more fundamentally,it would never be experienced at all. Althoughthe
Dharmais ahistorical,existingapartfrom historicalpeople, nevertheless
it is only historicalpeople who can experience the Dharma.Thus, the
Dharmais always expressed in and throughhistory.We experience the
timeless fromour time-boundperspective.
The Dharmaor Zen in-itselfis the living historyof Buddhism-the
enlightenmentor Zen experience. This position is implicit in Suzuki's
response to the extent that he is partof the living historyof Zen which
bases itself on Hui Neng's experience that meditation(dhyana, ch'an,
zen) is one and the same with prajnfa(enlightenedwisdom). On this
point Suzuki is well aware of his historicalanalysisand debt to Hu as a JamesD. Sellmann

101
 (living)historian.When Suzukiclaims thatHu does not deal with Zen in-
itself or the living ahistoricalZen, Suzuki is attackingHu for the wrong
reason. Itwas never Hu's projectto discuss Zen in-itselfdistinctfrom its
history.

IV. Knowledgeversus Prajna-lntuition

A good portionof Suzuki'sresponse to Hu is centered on his criti-
cism of Hu's translationof chih as "knowledge"as opposed to Suzuki's
translationas "prajna-intuition." This may be Suzuki'sstrongestcriticism
againstHu, though it is groundedhistoricallyin his interpretation
of chih
in Hui Neng and his disciple Shen-hui. It is interestingto note that
Soothill's Dictionaryof Chinese BuddhistTermsgives "knowledge"or
"to know"as the basic translationof bothformsof chih, and it is takento
be a translationof the Sanskritvijfidna-relative discriminatoryknowl-
edge. Prajfna is usuallyrenderedinto Chineseas po-ju. One mustkeep in
mind that Hui Neng was illiterateand not aware of the finer aspects of
the translationof BuddhistSanskritterms. It is common in Chinese for
one termto be used with both positiveand negativeconnotations,where
the difference in meaning is carried by the context. In Hui Neng's
teachings, chih should be understoodas prajnaand not vijnafna;it is not
discriminatoryknowledge, but ratherit is the wisdom of enlightenment,
prajfna-intuition.Forthisreason,Suzukiis rightto criticizeHu'stranslation.
Thisdifferencein translationis not just a matterof "emotionaltone,"
as Van MeterAmes would have it, for Hu is clearly makinga translation
errorand generatinga misunderstandingby not clarifyingthe basic vij-
nana/prajnfa distinctionthat is so fundamentalto Buddhism.It is also the
basis for the distinction between the enlightened and the non-
enlightened.This helps to explain why Ames misinterpretsSuzuki'sdis-
tinction of the two types of mentalities.Hu's mistranslationof chih as
"knowledge"is not only evidence of his lack of understandingof Zen in-
itself,as Suzukiwould have it, but it also reflectshis incomplete under-
standingof the historicalvalue and meaning of Hui Neng's reformsbe-
cause Hu misrepresentsHui Neng'steachingson prajnaby interpretingit
to be vijnana.Itis this misunderstanding on Hu's partwhich leads him to
his excessive rationalisticinterpretationof Zen, especially of the k6an
and the mondo.
Hu's misunderstandingof chih in Ch'an also leads him to charac-
terize the Ch'anmethodof teaching in rationaland intellectual(vijnana)
terms.Thus, as Suzukipoints out, Hu misinterpretspu shou p'o (do not
tell outwardly)to mean "neverto tell plainly,"as if the life experienceor
the enlightenment experience could be accurately described by the
teacherwho holds back for the sake of the students'learningexperience.
As Suzukicriticizes:"I wish he would rememberthat there is something
&
East
Philosophy West in the nature of prajna-intuitionwhich eludes every attempt at in-

102
tellectualizationand rejects all plain speaking, so called" (Studies in
Zen, p. 159). Hu compounds his misinterpretation by citing Chu Hsi, the
Sung dynasty synthesizer of Neo-Confucianism,to back up his inter-
pretationof Ch'an'steaching method. Oddly enough, Hu also seeks his
Ch'an example of pu shou p'o from the Sung Ch'an master Fa-yen (d.
1104). His case could be strengthenedif he could find examples within
the context of T'angChina-that is, if he would stay withinthe historical
limits of his article. Hu, then, rationalizesthe alogical nature of Zen
statementsas eccentric and only seemingly meaningless. Finally, Hu
sees the period of travelingon foot, the life of a monk, in protoscientific
terms, as illustratedby Chu Hsi. Hu overlooks the very paradoxof this
"method," namely that the disciple is travelingabout looking for what
cannot be found, tryingto learn from variousteachers what cannot be
taught,tryingto hearthat one, essentialteaching or word that cannot be
spoken.
At times their debate lapses into personal attacks on integrityand
scholastic ability, and it is difficultto believe that they maintainedtheir
friendshipafterwards.In the end, they both must accept full responsi-
bility for the confusion they have generated.Hu is the instigatorof it by
not understandingthat,for Suzuki,the term"Zen"is in no way confined
to the coincidence that it also refersto the "traditionalZen sect." Suzuki
keeps the fires burningby accusing Hu of misrepresentingZen in-itself,
somethingHu never proposedto do. AlthoughSuzuki'sargumentwould
benefitfroma philosophicalunderstandingof "history,"neverthelesshis
criticismsof Hu'soverly rationalisticinterpretation of Zen are well made.
Finally, we see that neither Hu's nor Suzuki's position can be nar-
rowly confined to only one side of a for
dualism, example rationalversus
irrational,historyversus religious experience, and so on. Standingon
their shoulders, we discover that the historicityand the ahistoricityof
Zen, or the religiousexperience, is a basic paradoxof the temporality
and the atemporalityof life and of experience. This displays the meta-
ontology of the enlightenmentexperience: fundamentallyit is simulta-
neouslytimelessor atemporal,and yet experientiallyit is only discovered
by the time-boundpeople who live and die. Fromthe Zen perspective,
Hu's, Suzuki's,Ames', Waley's, and my own respectivediscussionsfall
shortin that none of them presentsthat "one expression"thattrulyopens
the way of ZEN.

Notes

1 - Hu Shih, "Ch'an(Zen)BuddhismInChina, ItsHistoryand Method,"

PhilosophyEastand West3 (1953): 3-24; and D. T. Suzuki,"Zen:A
Replyto Hu Shih," Ibid.,pp. 25-46. A summaryof Hu's articleand
all of Suzuki'sreplyare reprintedin Studiesin Zen, ed. D. T. Suzuki JamesD. Sellmann

103
 (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1978), pp. 129-164. My citations of
Suzuki are from this reprint.
2 - Van Meter Ames, "Zen and Pragmatism," Philosophy East and West
4 (1954): 19-33.
3 -Ibid., p. 19.
4 - Arthur Waley, "History and Religion," Philosophy East and West 5
(1955): 75-78.
5 - Ibid., p. 78.
6 - Toshihiko Izutsu, Toward a Philosophy of Zen Buddhism (Tehran:
Imperial IranianAcademy of Philosophy, 1977), pp. 156ff.
7 - Abe Masao, "Zen and Buddhism," Journal of Chinese Philosophy 3
(1976): 235-253.

PhilosophyEast& West

104