Chapter I: Principles of War

CHAPTER I : PRINCIPLES OF WAR

1. Mil thinkers have studied various campaigns and have attempted to draw imp lessons
from their study, so that future campaigns might be conducted favourably. Various lessons
drawn from all these campaigns have been condensed into a No of basic principles, called
the principles of war.

2. The principles of war may be defined as gen laws or rules adopted or professed as a
guide for action. The principles of war are not rigid dogmas like scientific laws and
mathematical formulae but only rules for guidance. The principles of war, therefore, have
been handed down not for blind adherence but rather to serve as a warning that in
disregarding any one of them we accept risk and confer an advantage on the en. The ten
principles of war which have been universally accepted are as under:-
(a) The selection and maint of Aim.
(b) Conc.
(c) Economy of Effort.
(d) Offensive action.
(e) Surprise.
(f) Co-op.
(g) Security.
(h) Flexibility.
(j) Maint of Morale.
(k) Adm.

3. The aim of this chap is to put across to the offrs the principles of war in brief, before
they start the detailed study of the mil campaign of Yom Kippur. There is a reqmt of
continuously referring to these principles during their study to comprehend the adherence
or neglect of these cardinal rules and how it affected the outcome of war. They should also
ex their minds towards assessing the relevance of these principles in the conditions and op
sits as obtaining in our context today.

4. Selection and Maint of Aim. Ultimate the political aim of any nation at war is to
impose it’s will upon the en. All other objs such as to annihilate the forces, capture their
centres or destroy their industrial bases/instlns are subdy. Every op should have a
bearing upon the same aim. Fulfillment of the aim should be the tgt of cdrs at all level.
Selection of the aim would depend on political , mil and economic considerations. Neutr of
the main force of the en will of course be the main intention. The mil obj has to be in
consonance with the national obj.

5. Conc. According to some there is only one principle of war and that is the Principle of
Conc of Force. This is merely to say that to achieve good conc of forces one must emp most
of the other principles of war. This principle is therefore one of the maj principles of war if
not the most imp. Conc is the method or means by which a cdr achieves superiority at the
pt of decision. The attacker can always conceal his area of main effort and by secretly
massing forces against the selected objs, he can achieve local superiority. The defending
side suffers the disadvantage of having to be strong everywhere. Thus, it is linked with
offensive spirit. History is replete with examples of small armies defeating large ones
through perfect and well timed conc of forces.

6. Economy of Effort. This principle is really the complement if not the foundation of
conc of force. It means the judicial emp of fighting str or the comb potential. It means the
meshing of a cdr’s resources & the aim and maint of a fighting res.

7. Offensive Action. Def action can avert disaster or defeat but it cannot achieve
victory. The principle of offensive action does not, however, mean that a cdr must be on
the offensive all the time. It simply means that in order to achieve the Aim, plg must
provide for a ph of offensive action. It wrests the initiative, raises morale and it is only by
offensive action that a cdr can hope to surprise his en. Offensive action has certain
incidental advantages.

8. Surprise. Surprise has the most powerful and eff influence in war. As applied to war,
it means the process of taking the en at a disadvantage by sudden or unexpected action. It
can be further sub divided into three types:-
(a) Strat Surprise. Strat surprise is achieved before the battle starts by resorting
to certain mvres ,long marches negotiating seemingly impassable regions or by
hitting the en w/o declaring the actual start of hostilities.
(b) Tech Surprise. Tech surprise is surprise which is attained by the emp of new
wpns against which the en has no answer. It can be by discoveries, inventions or
innovations.
(c) Tac Surprise. Tac surprise is surprise achieved on the actual battle-fd by
employing various methods like adoption of new tac doctrines such as the Blitizkreg by
the Germans in World War II. Employing stratagems , feints and mvres which aim at
inducing or forcing an en into an unfavourable posn are also methods of achieving
surprise.

9. Coop. It means eff coop of all comps of the nation to give the best results at the right
hr. It implies:-
(a) Unity of comd at the highest level.
(b) Coord of political and mil auth.
(c) Coop between the armed forces and the civ population.
(d) Coop between the three services (i.e. navy, AF, Army) and their comp
arms/services (i.e. Army, Inf & Arty).
(e) Coop at the strat, op and lac Levels.

10. Security. Security implies security of men, mtrl, resources and plans. The cdr must
be cautious in the plg stg but bold in implementing the plan. It is wrong to associate
security with timidity. Security implies making provisions against any mov of the en which
may prejudice the attainment of the Aim. The principle of security does not prevent a cdr
from taking risks in battle.

11. Flexibility. Literally, Flexibility implies the ability to bend under stress w/o breaking.
The emphasis is, therefore, laid on elimination of rigidity in all spheres viz, plans, org, trg
and exec. The ability of cdr to make quick tac decisions under fluid battle conditions
involving mod of existing plans to achieve the aim, is flexibility.

12. Maint of Morale. Success in war depends more upon morale than on physical
qualities. Sophisticated wpns and unlimited resources cannot compensate for lack of
courage, determination, boldness, confidence and offensive spirit. Morale is non-tangible. It
is a state of mind or spirit of refusal to surrender and admit defeat. High morale depends
on various factors, some of them are given below:-
(a) Success in battle.
(b) Trg and discp.
(c) Faith in the Cause of War, its cdrs, wpn and eqpt.
(d) Std of med care and gen welfare of troops.

13. Adm. Adm is a comd function. This for obvious reasons, is a separate and full time
resp, the principal aim of which is to give the op tps complete liberty of action and to supply
them with all their reqmts for the purpose of war or a particular op. And as success in ops is
as much dependant on the fighting abilities and trg of troops as on their supplies or eqpt,
adm has been made a principle of war and good adm is now indispensable to success.
CHAPTER 2 : TOPO AND TRN
SECTION 1 : ISRAEL

1. Israel is loc on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea. Israel is bounded on the
north by Lebanon, on the northeast by Syria, on the east by Jordan, and on the southwest
by Egypt. Its southernmost tip extends to the Gulf of Aqaba, an arm of the Red Sea.

2. The total area of Israel, based on the frontiers est at the end of the Arab-Israeli War of
1948-1949, is about 20,700 sq km . Areas occupied by Israel as a result of the Six-Day War
included the West Bank (5,860 sq km), the Gaza Strip (378 sq km), the Golan Heights
(1,250 sq km), and East Jerusalem (70 sq km). Because Israel annexed the Golan Heights
and East Jerusalem in 1981, the country officially includes them in total area and population
figs. However Israel stretches north to south to a max length of 420 km , from east to west
it varies from 16 to 115 km.

3. There are five maj geographical regions of Israel. The mtnous Galilee region dominates
the northern sec of Israel, extending east 40 km from a narrow coastal plain across to the
Sea of Galilee (also called Lake Tiberias). Mount Meron (1,208 m) in central Galilee is the
highest pt in Israel. South of Galilee lies the Plain of Esdraelon. The plain runs across Israel
from the vicinity of Haifa on the Mediterranean coast to the Jordan River, which forms
Israel’s eastern border.

4. The coastal plains, containing most of Israel’s large cities, industry, and commerce,
extend 195 km along the Mediterranean Ras En Naqura on the Lebanese Israel border to
Gaza. This region rgs in width from less than 1 km to 30 km . The Judean and Samarian
hills run north and south throughout most of Israel. The Negev is a triangular desert region
in southern Israel extending north from the Gulf of Aqaba to a line connecting the southern
end of the Dead Sea and the Mediterranean, passing to the north of the city of Beersheba.

5. The unnavigable Jordan River forms the northern portion of the borders between Israel
and Jordan and between the West Bank and Jordan. Parts of the Dead Sea lie in Israel,
Jordan, and the West Bank. Other principal rivers are the Yarqon, which runs through Tel
Aviv-Yafo, and the Qishon River, which reaches the Mediterranean Sea near Haifa.

6. Haifa, a natural harbour in the northern part of the country, and Ashdod, an artificial
deepwater port to the south, serve as the main seaports on the Mediterranean. The port of
Eilat on the Gulf of Aqaba provides Israel’s only access to the Red Sea, making it extremely
imp to the country’s shipping interests.

7. Negev desert region. Negev desert region, comprises an area of approx 12,800 sq
km . Geographically the triangle-shaped Negev is divided into four regions: a coastal plain
in the northwest, a central plateau, a mtnous area in the south central portion, and a valley
in the east. The average annual rainfall is less than 254 mm and although the soil in the
north is fertile, irrigation is necessary for agriculture. In 1964, a conduit extending from the
Sea of Galilee (Lake Tiberias) began pumping water into the northwestern region of the
Negev.

SECTION 2 : SINAI PENINSULA

8. Sinai. Sinai peninsula extends 240 by 120 miles is a large inverted triangular wedge of
sandy mtns between the Gulf of Aqaba in the East and Gulf of Suez in the West, br the
continents of Africa and Asia on the one hand and Mediterranean and Red Sea on the other.
It is divided into three distinct regions :-
(a) Northern Region. In the North is a sandy coastal Mediterranean plateau with
its low hills and deep not always passable sand dunes (75-100 ft high) dotted here
and there with brackish wells and oasis. Area roughly from Kantara to Port Said is a
salty marsh, crisscrossed by a No of routes which were constr by Israeli army .
(b) Central Region. E-Tih desert is a gaunt and formidable, largely limestone
escarpment.
(c) Southern Region. Southern Sinai consists of deep wadis (valliys) and high
pinnacles, some as high as 10,000 ft.

9. Mount Sinai. Mount Sinai, or Jabal Mosá (Arabic for “Mtn of Moses”) in theological
tradition is part of a rocky mass that almost fills the Sinai Peninsula of northeastern Egypt,
between the Gulf of Suez and the Gulf of Aqaba. Adjacent to Mount Sinai is Mount Catherine
(Jabal Katrnah), the highest mtn on the Sinai Peninsula.

10. Suez Cnl.
(a) The Suez Cnl is approx 163 km long. It permits direct passage from Europe and
the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean instead of the long voyage around the
Cape of Good Hope in South Africa. The cnl links the Mediterranean Sea at Port Said to
the Red Sea at Suez by connecting a series of lakes ie Lake Manzilah, Lake Timsah,
and the Bitter Lakes. In most places the cnl has only one shipping lane; however,
passing lanes exist at several points.
(b) Suez Cnl borders NW side of Sinai for a distance of 110 miles. The suez cnl
which is 180 to 240 yds wide and 50 to 60 ft deep was described by Gen Dayan as one
of the best A tk ditches available. The East Bank is windy while the West Bank, along
which the sweet water cnl runs, has cultivated belt running parallel to it. The dredged
earth soil was conc along the East Bank in the from of dykes some 18 to 30 ft high.
The tidal eff changes the water level ht from one to six ft a fact of great imp in
carrying out xg ops.

11. Comn.
(a) Along The Bar Lev Line. From the Suez cnl, the desert rises in an undulating
manner, starting at Ras al Sudr in the South and gradually veers off NE wards to E1
Arish. It is in this area that Israelis had deployed bulk of their forces and constr the
following rds :-
(i) Lexicon. Ran parallel to Suez Cnl along its length.
(ii) Arty Rd. Ran parallel to Lexicon, five miles East of it.
(iii) Lateral Rd. Further to the East running from Baluza to Tasa, just West of
the passes.
(b) East of the Bar Lev Line. Four maj rds led back from Bar Lev Line across the
Northern Sinai towards Israeli border, each channeled either by the line of passes or
by rockey out crops and sand seas (Stretches of loose sand across which tks can’t
pass) :-
(i) Northern Route. From Kantara East, skirting marshes, past Romani and
along the coast towards El Arish.
(ii) Central Route. Took off at Suez Cnl bank opposite Ismalia, passed
through Tasa, over the Khatima Pass and on to Abu Ageila and Israeli border
South of Rafah.
(iii) Southern Route. South of Bitter Lakes, over Giddi Pass, towards Israeli
border East of Kusseima.
(iv) Pilgrims Way. Ancient route followed by Egyptian pilgrims voyaging to
Mecca, ran from Port Twefiq over Mitla Pass and Nakhel on to Ras Al Nagev near
the Israeli port of Eilat.

12. Strat Imp of Sinai Peninsula. Israel shares an open border with Egypt and it’s
shipping lane of Gulf of Aqaba is dominated by this peninsula. Other main factors are :-
(a) It provides strat depth to Israel from West/SW.
(b) Acts as a trip wire against any mov in western front.
(c) Domination of Suez cnl ,Gulf of Suez and Gulf of Aqaba.

SECTION 3 : GULF OF AQABA

13. Gulf of Aqaba, is northeastern arm of the Red Sea which separates the Sinai and
Arabian peninsulas. It is a narrow body of water, up to 24 km wide and 160 km long,
occupying a portion of the great geological fault known as the Great Rift Valley. The gulf is
linked to the Red Sea on the south by the Strait of Tiran; at its head in the north are the
port of Al ‘Aqabah, Jordan, and the port of Eilat, Israel.

SECTION 4 : GULF OF SUEZ

14. Gulf of Suez is arm of the Red Sea, northeastern Egypt, between the Sinai Peninsula
and the Egyptian Desert. It has a length of 290 km with a width of 25 to 55 km . At its
northern end, which is the extreme northern end of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Suez is
connected to the Mediterranean Sea by the Suez Cnl.

SECTION 5 : STRAIT OF TIRAN

15. Tiran, Strait of, narrow channel in southwestern Asia, surrounding Tiran Island (Saudi
Arabia), and links the Gulf of Aqaba to the Red Sea. The passage is bordered on the west by
the Sinai Peninsula and on the east by the Saudi Arabian mainland. The Strait of Tiran
provides the only access to the Israeli port of Elat at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba.
SECTION 6 : EGYPT

16. Egypt, a country in northeastern Africa and southwestern Asia. Most of the country
lies in Africa, but the easternmost portion of Egypt, the Sinai Peninsula, is usually
considered part of Asia; it forms the only land br between the two continents. Most of
Egypt’s trn is desert, divided into two unequal parts by the Nile River. The valley and delta
of the Nile are the main centers of habitation. The capital and largest city is Cairo.

17. Egypt is bounded on the north by the Mediterranean Sea; on the east by the Gaza
Strip, Israel, and the Red Sea; on the south by Sudan; and on the west by Libya. The
country has a max length from north to south of 1,105 km and a max width, near the
southern border, of 1,129 km . It has a total area of 997,739 sq km .

18. More than 90 percent of the country consists of desert areas, incl the Libyan Desert
(also known as the Western Desert) in the west, a part of the Sahara, and the Arabian
Desert (also called the Eastern Desert), which borders the Red Sea and the Gulf of Suez, in
the east.

19. Although Egypt has 2,450 km of coastline, two-thirds of which are on the Red Sea,
indentations suitable as harbours are confined to the delta. The Isthmus of Suez, which
connects the Sinai Peninsula with the African mainland, is traversed from the Mediterranean
to the Gulf of Suez by the Suez Cnl.

SECTION 7 : GAZA STRIP

20. Gaza Strip, region in southwestern Asia is bordered on the south by Sinai (Egypt), on
the west by the Mediterranean Sea, and on the north and east by Israel. The area of the
Gaza Strip is 378 sq km ; its shape and size were determined by the armistice agreement
sd/- by Israel and Egypt after the first Arab-Israeli War (1948-1949).

21. The Gaza Strip is a narrow territory extending from the northern Sinai Peninsula into
Israel's Mediterranean coastal plain. The region is largely flat and sandy, with dunes
stretching inland from the coast, particularly in the south. Rainfall diminishes from north to
south, with an average annual accumulation of about 150 to 400 mm . There are a No of
sandy beaches and fishing vills along the region's coastline.

SECTION 8 : SYRIA

22. Syria is loc in southwestern Asia, bounded on the north by Turkey, on the east by
Iraq, on the south by Jordan and Israel, and on the west by Lebanon and the Mediterranean
Sea. Syria has an area of 185,180 sq km. The capital and largest city is Damascus.

23. Syria has an extreme east-to-west distance of about 830 km and an extreme north-
to-south distance of about 740 km. Along the Mediterranean coast, which is 193 km long,
lies a narrow plain extending inland as far as 32 km. Parallel to this plain is the Jabal an
Nuayryah, a narrow rg of mtns and hills, south of which, along the border of Syria and
Lebanon, are the Anti-Lebanon Mtns, the site of Mount Hermon, the highest pt in the
country at 2,814 m.

24. The Anti-Lebanon rg tapers off into a hilly region called the Golan Heights (captured
by Israel in the 1967 Six-Day War) in the southwestern corner of Syria. Much of the rest of
the country consists of a plateau, which is bisected in the northeast by the valley of the
Euphrates River. The plateau area north of the Euphrates is called the plain of Al Jazrah.
The semicircular plateau area in the southeastern is in the Syrian Desert.

25. The Euphrates, the longest river in Syria, flows diagonally across the country from
Turkey in the north to Iraq on the east. The sec longest river, the Orontes, originates in the
Lebanese portion of the Anti-Lebanon Mtns and flows north through western Syria to
Turkey.
26. Golan Hts. The area in the north which came under Israeli control as a result of the
1967 Six Day War and is popularly ref to as the "Golan Heights," is actually composed of
two geologically distinct areas: the Golan Heights proper (approx. 1.070 sq. km.) and the
slopes of the Mt. Hermon rg (approx. 100 sq. km.).

27. While the Mt. Hermon rg is mostly limestone, the Golan Heights proper is mostly
basalt and other types of volcanic rock, forming a plateau that drops off to the west, to the
Jordan River and Lake Kinneret, and to the south, to the Yarmuk River. The plateau is
crossed by a No of seasonal streams, which run through valleys, sometimes very deep, and
flow west into the Jordan or the Lake

28. Comn. The only rd that links Northern Israel to the Golan hts is over the Benat Yakov
br on to Kuientra and Damascus.

29. Strat Imp of Golan Hts.
(a) Dominates the adjoining Israeli territory.
(b) Acts as an impregnable line of def against the Israelis.
(c) Arty Locs /OPs in the Golan hts could bring down hy and accurate fire in the
surrounding plains.
CHAPTER 3 : OVERVIEW OF THE CAMPAIGN

Appendix: A - Chronology of Events

SECTION 9 : INTRO

1. The Yom Kippur War also referred to as Ramadan War or the Oct War, brought about
no significant changes to territorial boundaries. Nevertheless, the war and its aftermath had
far-rg effects on the participant nations and their relations with world superpowers.

SECTION 10 : CAUSES OF WAR

2. The long-standing conflict between Jews and Arabs over control of historic Palestine
had resulted in wars in 1948, 1956, and 1967. The Arab opposition to the Jewish state of
Israel incl neighboring Arab statess and, after 1964, the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO).

3. In the Six-Day War of 1967, Israel gained control of the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip,
previously controlled by Egypt; the Golan Heights, formerly belonging to Syria; and the
West Bank and East Jerusalem, formerly administered by Jordan. Later that yr, the United
Nations (UN) adopted a resolution calling for Israeli withdrawal from these areas in exch for
Arab recog of Israel’s indep and security.

4. However, neither side met these conditions, and cross-border attacks and reprisals
continued. In 1969 Egyptian president Nasser launched the War of Attrition. The conflict
ended with a U.S.-brokered cease-fire in 1970.

5. Neither the US nor Israel believed that Arab forces could challenge Israel’s proven mil
power. The USSR, knew that Egypt was preparing for war, but underestimated Sadat’s
commitment to use a mil option against Israel. Furthermore, neither Washington nor
Moscow were fully aware of the profound differences in policy between the Egyptian and
Syrian ldrs.

6. Despite these differences, mut frustration and impatience with the diplomatic status
quo led Sadat and Assad to plan an attack in collusion. Because the two Arab ldrs were
focused more on their own particular national interests, rather than on other Arab-Israeli
issues such as the future of the West Bank and Jerusalem and the issue of Palestinian
statehood, they omitted Jordan and the PLO from the plg of the war.

SECTION 11 : COURSE OF THE WAR

7. Egypt and Syria launched their attack against Israel on 06 Oct 73. Israeli int sources
had discounted the probability of an Arab aslt, and Israel’s mil was not fully prep for war.
Sadat’s armies quickly crossed the Suez Cnl. In doing so, Egypt overcame the Israeli string
of fortfns along the cnl’s east bank known as the Bar-Lev line.

8. Egypt est strongholds to def its posn. Aware of his army’s ltd firepower, Sadat did not
order an adv across all of the Israeli-held Sinai. Instead, his armies took a small slice of
land along the entire length of the cnl’s east bank. Meanwhile, Syrian forces adv into the
Golan Heights.

9. However, both armies failed to take advantage of their early gains, Israel’s lack of
preparedness, and initial Israeli losses. Lack of coord between Cairo and Damascus,
inhibited addl Arab mil successes.

10. By mid-Oct, Israel had mobilized its troops and launched a series of CAs on both
fronts. Despite severe initial casualties, Israeli forces retook the land that Syria had
captured and pushed past the Syrian border, soon making their way within arty rg of
Damascus. Meanwhile, Israel launched Op Gazelle, a counteroffensive against Egypt,
crossing the Suez Cnl, adv into Egypt, and surrounding Egypt’s Third Army. By the end of
the war, Israeli forces had adv to within 100 km of Cairo and 40 km of Damascus.

SECTION 12 : CEASE-FIRE AND DISENGAGEMENT

11. The precarious state in which the Arab armies found themselves hastened the war’s
conclusion. It also prompted imdt intervention by the US and the Soviet Union. Israel’s
threat to eradicate the Egyptian Third Army prompted U.S. Secy of State Henry Kissinger to
visit Moscow to negotiate a cease-fire resolution with Soviet ldr Leonid Brezhnev.

12. On 22 Oct the UN passed the resolution, which also called for direct negotiations
between the Israelis and Arabs. Israel and Egypt both broke the terms of the cease-fire, and
Israel continued its adv.

13. Brezhnev, viewing an Egyptian defeat as potentially destabilizing to Sadat’s govt,
implied in comns with U.S. president Richard Nixon that Israel’s failure to halt mil actions
would prompt a Soviet response, incl intervention to preserve the Third Army. In response,
Kissinger asked for and recd Nixon’s permission to put American troops on a nuc alert. Both
the Soviets and the Americans almost imdt stepped back from a confrontation. A final
cease-fire took effect on Oct 25.

14. Israel’s desire to have its PW returned, combined with the precarious existence of the
Egyptian Third Army, hastened mil talks between Israel and Egypt. Kissinger, desiring
greater American participation, arng a Middle East peace conf with the US and the Soviet
Union as co chairs, to continue the negotiations. The conf convened in Geneva, Switzerland,
on Dec 21. Although Jordan participated, Syria declined to attend, and the PLO was not
invited. After two days of public posturing, the conf was suspended and failed to reconvene.

15. During the next two years, Kissinger used a negotiating technique called “shuttle
diplomacy,” flying back and forth between the Arab capitals and Israel and actg as a
mediator. This technique yielded the first Egyptian-Israeli mil disengagement agreement,
calling for Israel’s withdrawal back across the Suez Cnl and the restoration in Jan 1974 of a
UN peacekeeping force in the Cnl Z.

16. In May 1974, Syria and Israel, with Kissinger’s help, concluded a disengagement
agreement by which Israel returned Syrian territory captured in the 1973 war, along with
the town of Al Qunayirah in the Golan region. It also est a UN buffer Z between Israeli and
Syrian forces in the Golan. A sec Egyptian-Israeli agreement was concluded in Sep 1975.

SECTION 13 : CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR

17. The war had many far-reaching effects on the wider Arab-Israeli conflict. Both sides
claimed victory. The Arab forces shattered the myth of Israel’s invincibility that had
persisted since the 1967 war. Meanwhile, despite significant early losses, Israel had
successfully regrouped in a matter of days, pushing the Arab forces back beyond the 1967
borders.

18. While the war did not affect Syria’s close alignment with the Soviet Union and strong
opposition to the US and Israel, it initiated drastic changes in Egypt’s foreign relations.
Kissinger’s newly developing relationship with Sadat reduced Soviet influence over Egypt
and brought the country closer to the US.

19. Each successful agreement also generated trust between Israel and Egypt. Both of
these devps est the foundation for the U.S.-brokered Camp David Accords in 1978, which
led to a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1979. However, Egypt’s improved
relations with the US and Israel also led to its separation and isolation from inter-Arab
affairs in the 1980s.

20. The 1973 war also marked the first successful use of oil as a political wpn in the Arab-
Israeli conflict. From Oct 1973 to Nov 1974, the oil-producing Arab countries maint an
embargo on oil exports to Western nations friendly to Israel.

21. Finally, the war caused internal problems in Israel. The Israeli mil’s lack of readiness
called into question the capabilities of the country’s ldrs. The results of an ensuing
investigation were highly critical of the mil, prompting the resignations of Israeli PM Golda
Meir and COS, Moshe Dayan.
CHAPTER – 4 : GENESIS OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

SECTION 14 : HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

GEN

1. According to a tradition, accepted both by Arabs and Jews, have sprung from a
common heritage. The rivalry of Arabs and Jews is that of brothers as both belong to the
Semitic race and their languages echo each other. The source of eternal strife between the
Arabs and the Jews is over the possession of Palestine as both claim it as their home.

2. The Jews were driven out of Palestine with the emergence of Christianity and remained
scattered since then, all over the world. They were isolated in separate communities often
despised, victimised and persecuted. However, Jews played an imp role in many countries
in the fd of art, literature, science and med. Indeed the early nineteenth century seemed to
find Jews emancipated all over Europe except Russia. Eminent Jews were respected and
honoured by non-Jewish communities.

THE ZIONIST MOV

3. However, in the early 1870s’ the spirit of medieval intolerance returned specially in
Germany and Russia. The revival of persecution towards the end of the nineteenth century
led to a new devp in the Jewish thought. In 1881 a Jewish physician from Odesaa published
a brochure asserting that the only way the Jews could restore their dignity was to recreate
the Palestine national home.

4. In 1986, Theodor Herzl wrote the book ‘Dar Judenstadt’ which inspired the Zionist
Mov. Under Herzl, the first Zionist conf was held in 1897 and defined as its obj ‘the
securing for Jewish people a home in Palestine guided by the public law’. In recog for the
contribution of Jews in World War 1, PM Lord Balfour, on behalf of British Govt, made a
declaration in Nov 1917 stating “His Majesty’s Govt views with favour, the est in Palestine of
a ‘National Home’ for the Jewish People”. At the San Remo conf in Apr 1920 the Palestine
Mandate was awarded to the British Govt.

THE ARAB ATTITUDE

5. The ‘Balfour Declaration’ came to the Arabs as a rude shock. There existed considerable
deg of similarity in customs and attitudes of Muslim Arabs and small Jewish community in
Palestine. Only the possibility of being deprived of their land and country, which the Balfour
Declaration suggested, marked the beginning of an anti-Jewish attitude.

6. Anti-Jewish riots erupted annually from 1921 onwards. Jewish immigration and
purchase of land by them was strongly protested against by the Palestinians. The Arabs
realised that if the rate of immigration contd, the Jews would over-take them numerically in
near future.

FMN OF STATE OF ISRAEL

7. The Nazi atrocities in Germany and in rest of Europe resulted in a mass scale exodus of
Jews to Palestine.

8. At the end of Sec World War ‘The Jewish Agency’ asked for the fmn of a Jewish State.
On 25 Feb 1947, the British Govt announced its decision to submit the Palestine problem to
UN.

9. The United Nations Spl Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) set up on 15 May 1947,
recommended the termination of British Mandate, while advising the partition of Palestine
into a Arab State, a Jewish State and a spl international regime for Jerusalem. On 29 May
1947, United Nations partition plan was offered and adopted with a majority vote. The Jews
accepted the plan but Palestinian Arabs and the Arab states turned it down.

10. On 15 May 1948, the British quit Palestine and returned their Mandate to the United
Nations. On the same day in front of 36 pol reps, Ben Gurion proclaimed the est of Jewish
state. The first rd of fighting began with the creation of Israel and the state began its fight
for survival.
SECTION 15 : THE EARLIER WARS

THE 1948 WAR
The Arab Attack

11. The creation of the state of Israel was followed imdt by a gen Arab attack and the
conflict ensued. The bal of forces is thought to have been some 20,000 Jews (incl women)
under Lt Col Dayan against 35,000 comb and irregular tps belonging to seven Arab states.

12. The Arabs Launched a three-pronged attack on Israel as under :-
(a) The Arab Legion besieged Jerusalem on 18 May.
(b) A small Iraqi contingent mov into North Palestine.
(c) Egyptians made a thrust along the Gaza Strip.

Ten Days Offensive By Israel

13. After four weeks of critical fighting, the Israelis launched what is known as ‘Ten Days
Offensive”, achieving the following: -
(a) Successfully broke the siege of Jerusalem on 11 Jun and prevented Arab Legion
from driving wedge from the region of Tulkram to the sea.
(b) Drove the Egyptians back into Nagev Desert.
(c) Cleared Galilee of guers.
(d) Captured the Port of Eliat at the head of Gulf of Aqaba.
(e) Captured approx 3000 sq mils of territory.

Armistice

14. It was not until 28 Nov 1948 that Israel accepted the United Nations armistice
resolution though there was a further ten days fighting in the Negev Desert against Egypt in
Feb 1949. As a result of Arab-Israeli war, the Jews defeated the Arab attempt to drive them
out of Palestine.

THE 1956 WAR

Background

15. The worst Legacy of 1948-49 war was the problem of Palestinian Arab refugees
numbering approx 900,000, who had been rendered homeless and lived in Gaza, Syria and
Jordan and other neighboring states. Israel refused to take these refugees back, however
willing to pay compensation for their settlement in Arab countries. Arabs, however, rejected
this and were determined to eliminate Israel from Arab scene and resettle the Palestinian
refugees there, with est of Arab Govt.

16. Egypt devp Fedayeen bases in the Gaza strip for launching raids into Israel. Steady
incr in scope and intensity of these raids coupled with Israeli reprisal raids, mtd the tension
gradually in the area. Both sides got engaged in a arms race with Egypt procuring arms
from USSR and Israel from France. Egypt also blocked the straits of Tiran to Israeli
shipping.

17. Suez Crisis. In Jul 1956, president Nasser nationalised the Suez Cnl and took over
its cont. Israel in conjunction with Britain and France, who were determined to wrest the
cont of cnl took its chance and initiated secret mob on 25 Oct 56.

Israeli War Aims

18. Israel had clear-cut war aims and prosecuted the war strictly in conformity with them.
They were: -
(a) Destr of max possible Egyptian forces to neutr the armed Egyptian threat from
south.
(b) End Fedayeen terrorism from the Gaza strip.
(c) Capture max territory in the Sinai Peninsula and use it for political bargaining
with Egypt.
(d) Gain cont of Sharm El Sheikh near the Southern tip of Sinai peninsula with a
view to break the Egyptian blockade of Gulf of Aqaba (the primary aim).

Conduct of Ops

19. On 29 Oct 1956, Israel launched a four ph op using three axes of adv. The ptrs were
used in conjunc with the adv colns based on armr and mot inf to capture key cens in depth.
Anglo-French AF attacked Egyptian tgts and by 02 Nov the Egyptian AF ceased to exist.

20. The offensive went through like a blitzkrieg. Maj Gen Moshe Dayan, the Israeli COS
himself led decisive attacks. By 5 Nov, in less then nine days, the campaign was over with
Israelis achiving a convincing victory.

Outcome

21. Following was the outcome:-
(a) One third of the Egyptian Army was destroyed.
(b) Israeli forces gained cont over Sinai Desert and captured Sharm EI Sheikh.
(c) Gaza strip was captured.
(d) British occupied Port Said.

Aftermath

22. Ceasefire was brought about on 06 Nov 56. World opinion strongly criticised the
action of Israel, Britain and France. Under strong UN pressure, the withdrawal of Anglo-
French and Israeli forces from Egyptian territory was effected in Mar 1957. The Suez Cnl,
which was blocked during the war with sunken ships, was re-opened in Mar 1957.

THE 1967 WAR

Background

23. Prolonged political tension contd to build up between Arabs and Jews as posns
adopted by both sides on the settlement of Palestinian refugees seemed as they were in
early fifties.

Devps Leading to The Six Day War

24. From mil pt of view, the imp devps which went on to trigger the 1967 war were :-
(a) Egyptian tp concs in Sinai as a counter measure to the Israeli threat of invasion
of Syria.
(b) Def pact between Egypt, Jordan and Iraq, which was termed as ‘Death Kiss’ by
Israelis.
(c) Blockade of Gulf of Aqaba by Egypt to Israeli shipping.
(d) President Nasser’s order for pull out of UN observers.

Israeli Strat

25. The Israeli strat for the war was based on the following: -
(a) Pre-emptive Strike
(b) Attainment of total Air superiority.

(c) Surprise.
(d) Fighting on only one front at a time.

Conduct of ops

26. At 0700h on 05 Jun 67, Israel launched a massive pre-emptive air strike over all Arab
air fds. The Arabs were taken completely by surprise. Ten Egyptian airfds were hit
simultaneously and after a quick turn rd another six airfds were hit and destroyed. The
grnd ops proceeded speedily.

27. Sinai Front. Adv was undertaken along three axes:-
(a) A fast mov along the coastal rd captured the Gaza Strip.
(b) In the center, the Mitla pass was captured and the entire Egyptian forces still op
to its North were trapped.
(c) Further South, Sharm El Sheikh was also captured.

28. Jordanian Front. On the Jordanian Front, after an initial strong resistance from the
Jordanian Army, Israel managed to capture Jerusalem and the entire West Bank of
Jordan R.

29. Syrian Front. After completing the ops elsewhere, the Israelis launched a carefully
planned attack to capture Golan Heights. The well-fortified and strengthened Syrian grns
could not hold on against the attack and Golan Heights fell to Israel.

Out Come

30. At the end of the six-day war, Israel found herself with her territories multiplied giving
her a strat depth. She had captured the Golan Heights, extended her borders to the East
upto Jordan R and had secured the entire Sinai Desert.
CHAPTER-5 : SIX YEARS AFTER THE SIX DAY WAR

SECTION 16 : GEN

1. The Arab- Israeli war of 1967 completely changed the strat sit between the Arabs and
Israel. The defacto 1949 borders placed Israel in a very precarious mil sit. There was no
strat depth and no place for a sec line of def. The very nature of Israel’s borders meant
danger.

2. The Gaza strip held by the Egyptians since 1948 and the Jordanian forces loc in
Kalkiliya and the hills around looked upon Tel Aviv and its satl cities accommodating 40
percent of Israeli population. The Syrian Golan Hts on the North dominated greater part of
Israeli Northern plain. They couldn’t afford to allow the Arabs to strike the first blow.

3. But the war of 67 for the first time freed Israel from this worry and provided them with
depth. Possession of Golan Hts, West Bank and Sinai infused new confidence and changed
the thinking of Israeli mil and Political ldrs. For the first time their own population centres
were far removed from the dangers. On the other hand, maj cities of their adversaries were
now threatened and within easy reach Israel. The Suez Cnl on the Egyptian front now
provided addl assurance. The Israelis thought that all these factors will weigh very heavily
against renewal of hostilities by the Arabs.

SECTION 17 : EFFECT OF THE SIX DAY WAR

Gen

4. The Israeli victory of 1967 was a marked turning pt in Arab – Israeli affairs as it
changed the sit in West Asia significantly, for No of reasons other than the extent of Arab
defeat. It acted as a catalyst in the Arab World and gave rise to the complete eval of the
mil postures.

Effect on Israelis

5. Strat Advantage. The depth afforded by the territories taken by Israelis gave the
country for the first time in the history a strat option with following advantages: -
(a) Sinai Peninsula offered a desert barrier of some 150 miles depth. It was now to
be the Egyptian citizens who could be affected by the war and not Israelis.
(b) Favourable sit now existed along Jordanian front with holy city of Jerusalem
united and far removed from Jordanian arty. Jordan could not mount a maj attack on
Israel without carrying out opposed river xg and then fighting across easily defensible
40 miles stretch of Judean Desert.
(c) Even on the Syrian front the Israeli forces had a ltd deg of depth.

6. The Israeli GS could now ex an option by launching a pre-emptive attack if the war
seemed imminent or allow en the first strike and thereby utilizing the depth provided by
Sinai desert to mvre, conc and launch CA. Electronic warning time available to Israel
against en air attacks had now incr to sixteen mins instead of four previously.
7. Bar Lev Line Def. During the 68 clashes, Israel discovered that the Egyptians could
across Suez Cnl at any place all along its length. Hence in Nov 68 they decided to create a
def sys in Sinai to overcome the problems of Def of that sect. An inter service team under
Maj Gen Avraham (Bren) Adan was given this task, which finished on 15 Mar 69. The fortfns
were only one element-in what was later known as Bar Lev line. The details of Bar Lev Line
defs will be discussed in subsequent chapters.
Effect on Egyptians and Arabs

8. Defeat lowered the morale of Egyptians to new depths. The Egyptians drew lessons
from every defeat and began to reconstruct their forces with Soviet sp and financed by oil
rich Arab countries.

9. In Nov 68, Egyptians launched a maj War of Attrition with hy arty attacks, catching
Israeli forces unprepared and comparatively unprotected. The Israeli reaction by cdo ops
convinced Nasser that Egypt yet was unprepared, and postponed the ops to Mar 1969
Reorg Steps by Nasser

10. As the Arabs morale sank to new depths after the 1967 defeat, President Nasser took
a No of steps to reorg the Egyptian armed forces. The reorg was not ltd to eqpt alone, but
much thought was also given to the quality of manpower and motivation of tps. Offrs were
encouraged to study Hebrew and learn about their adversary. Large Nos were sent on
courses and offrs in mid thirties were promoted to the rk of Lt col. During the same period,
the USSR equipped the Egyptian army to be able to face the Israelis.

11. President Nasser planned a three phased pgme :-
(a) Build up of def services and generate unity amongst the Arabs.
(b) Active deterrence (war of attrition) to incl destruction of Bar Lev line, extensive
ops in depth followed by full-scale ops for securing East Bank.
(c) Coord all out offensive on both Northern and Southern front of Israel
SECTION 18 : WAR OF ATTRITION BY EGYPTIANS

12. Reasons For The ‘War of Attrition’. These were as follows:-
(a) Resolve to Continue War Against Israel. Even though Arabs were
defeated badly in 67 war, their plans for continuing confrontation never
ceased.
(b) Start of Attrition Favoured Arabs. The Egyptians appre that Israelis
economy and manpower sit was not capable of sustaining a war of long duration.
(c) Constr of Bar Lev Line. It was a maj consideration for the Egyptians to
commence the war Egyptians saw in its constr the creation of a permt, impregnable
Israeli presence, which would only perpetuate status quo and limit drastically the
prospect of changing the sit along the cnl.

13. Seq of Events.
(a) Egyptian Action. On 08 Mar 69 the Egyptians began a violent arty

bombardment of Israeli posns on the Bar Lev Line which contd till 09 Mar. The pattern
contd during Mar-Apr, and from 19 Apr, Cdo raids were also launched across the cnl.
(b) Israeli Reaction. The Israeli response was prompt and characteristic, ie, arty
bombardment of industrial and civ tgts across the cnl and along the Gulf of Suez. By
Jul, Israelis decided to commit Air Power. The initiative passed to Israelis and the ‘War
of Attrition’ became the war of counter attrition. The Israeli raids on Egyptian SAM-2
sites, climaxing in Oct 69, followed this, reducing the Egyptian AD capability to near
zero. Deep penetration raids by IAF and Cdo activities contd till the end of Apr 70.
(c) Nasser’s Secret Visit to Moscow. Nasser demanded and obtained a No of

SAM-3 Byts with Russian pers to man them, incl 80 Soviet acs with pilots and four MG
25 acs . With the Egyptian air space protected, the fighting took a new ferocious turn.
In reprisal action to Egyptian stepped-up raids, Israelis launched massive air raids. In
early Jun, Israelis let loose their day bombardment of Port Said flying 400 sorties in a
day and effectively isolating it.

14. Devps following War of Attrition. During 1970, Roger’s plan was floated and
President Nasser announced his acceptance in Jul and Israeli govt a month later. On 07 Aug
70, ceasfire came into effect and continued to be obs (though not w/o infringement) until
the outbreak of hostilities in Oct 73.

15. Lessons Learnt. Lessons brought home by both sides were :-
(a) Egyptians.
(i) Vulnerability to Israeli AF. It became clear that there was a urgent
reqmt for re-dply of their SAM sys.
(ii) Strat Advantage Gained. War of Attrition ended with strat advantage for
Egyptians, because of the build up of SAM sites and grnd forces in the cnl
Z.
(iii) Need for Activating Eastern Front. Necessity for coord of both Eastern
and Western fronts was felt.
(b) Israelis.
(i) Problem of SAMs. For Israelis the war ended with many question marks
about the SAM deterrence.
(ii) Hy Cas. Being a long war, it had been a war of nerves in terms of cas and
affecting the morale.
(iii) Str of the Bar Lev Line. Following the war of Attrition, to give depth to
the first line of defs a sec line was constr eight to twelve kms to the rear to give
overhead protection to the tks, arty, HQ and some key instls.

Sadat Decides on War

16. Inevitability of War. From the time President Sadat took office after Nasser’s death
on 28 sep 70 he knew that he would have to fight one day, as it was his inheritance from
Nasser. Knowing that Egyptians would never fight, the Israelis believed that they could
never be surprised.

17. Sadat Decides To Go Alone. The reasons which prompted Sadat to make a decision
in favour of war were :-
(a) Soviet Restraint to Sup Wpns to Egypt. Mr Brezhnev decision of avoiding
super power confrontation did not encourage him. Realising that the super powers will
use every effort to restrain him, he decided to have a go at it alone. This in turn led to
the expulsion of Soviet advisors in Jul 72 as their presence did not allow Mr Sadat a
free mvre and caused resentment in Egyptian army due to their rough and arrogant
behaviour.
(b) Internal Pressures and Discontentment. Sadat well understood that after
six yrs of last defeat Egyptian soldiers on Suez cnl and students wanted action and
ideas of war began to crystallize in Sadat’s mind in early 72.
(c) Stalemate in the Peace Negotiations. It was difficult to believe that

negotiations will lead to any peaceful settlement, as the plans for peace hinged on to
the concessions by Israel and there was no indications of any spirit of accn by Israeli
govt. It was clear that stalemate (no peace no war) suited the super powers.
(d) Activation of International Community. Sometime in summer 72., President

Sadat decided in favour of offensive action to activate international community
particularly the super powers. He made his decision of a ltd war in case of failure of
diplomacy.

18. Beginning of Flow of Soviet Mil Aid. Russians were due to renew an agreement
with Egypt in Mar 73 for the continuance of enjoying certain facilities for their fleet in the
Mediterranean Sea, hence they agreed to sup the much needed arms to Egypt after a visit
by Gen Ahmed Ismail, the new def minister, to Moscow.
CHAPTER 6 : CAUSES OF YOM KIPPUR WAR

SECTION 19 : GEN

1. Between 1967 and 73, all the diplomatic initiatives taken by USA and UN failed. The
Arabs came to the conclusion that there was no other alt to the Jewish-Arab problems,
but the Arabs were not sure of their str till the beginning of 1973 and were hesitant to start
a full scale war.

SECTION 20 : CAUSES

2. Freezing of Cease-fire. The rptd extn of cease fire of Jul 70 after the war of Attrition
was creating a fear in the Egyptian’s mind that the cease fire may freeze into defacto
borders, hence reqmt of some mil action to re-activate CFL was called for.

3. Credibility of President Sadat. President Sadat had declared 1971 as the yr of
decision and again he declared the same in 1972. These rptd declarations, followed by
inaction were eroding president Sadat’s credibility and increasing his domestic problems.

4. Failure of Roger’s Plan and Dr Jarring’s Msn. After rptd attempts by Dr Jarring,
the msn was wound up in 71. And finally in 1972, UN Secy Gen Kurt Waldheim declared
that it was not possible to reactivate the Dr Jarring’s msn. This was a turning pt in the rd
to war.

5. Provision of Msls and Ac by USSR. Till Jan 73 USSR refused to provide MiG-23 ac
and grnd msls, which could reach Israeli cities from Cnl Z. This deal came off after Gen
Ismail’s Moscow visit and visit of high level USSR mil delegation to Cairo in Jan 73.
Availability of scud msls with a rg of 180 miles, MiG-23 ac and SAM msls fulfilled the last
reqmt of Egyptians ie it provided them with an umbrella against Israeli AF and a threat
wpn against Israeli cities in case they bomb the population centers in Egypt.

6. President Sadat’s Dismissal of Soviet Advisors. The presence of Russian advisors
was proving a hindrance and feelings against the Russians were running high in Egyptian
Army . The Russians were virtually in control of seven airfds. Sadat’s PM Dr Aziz Sidqi went
to Moscow to resolve the issue but he come back cutting short his visit on 15 Jul 72 w/o any
agreement. President Sadat thereafter ordered all Russian advisors to go back on 17 Jul.
This strengthened his posn remarkably well at home and with the Army.

President Sadat Decides

7. Egyptian Def Min and Cdr in Chief Gen Ismail met President Nixon on after his visit to
Moscow but from the talks it appeared that USA had no desire to pressurise Israel. In Mar
73, USA announced that 48 more phantom jet ac would be supplied to Israel. This was a
blow to any hope the Egyptians still had in peaceful soln. Towards the end of Mar 73 ,
President Sadat gave an interview to Newsweek in which he rptd that negotiations have
finally failed and that the war was necessary. He further said “ if we don’t take over the
case in our own hands, there will be no mov. Every door I have opened has been slammed
in my face”. In this concluding remarks he said “everything in this country is now being mob
in earnest for resumption of the battle which is now inevitable”. For the first time Sadat
was openly prophesising war in earnest but nobody believed him.

Why Israel Failed to Guess ?

8. The main reasons for the failure of Israeli int services to forecast the Oct war were :
-
(a) Shifting of Int forces. Since last four yrs Israeli Int services, had been conc
on hitting the Palestinian guer. To keep tr of the guerrillas, they had to withdraw a
considerable portion of their political Int agents from Syria and Egypt, which had its
effect on flow of info.
(b) Total Underestimation of Arab Capacity. The Israeli int agencies and the mil
machine thought that after their defeat in 67, the Arabs were totally incapable of
waging a war with Israel. They surmised, that the Arabs could only wage terrorism.
(c) Total lack of Activity From Beginning of 73. Total lack of activity along Suez
and Golan hts from late 72 onwards was interpreted by Israel as ssa further sign of
Arab weakness. The Israelis thought that their vigorous actions against terrorists
have stamped out the border raids.
(d) Rptd mob and demos by Egyptians conditioned the Israelis to Egyptian mobs as
routine. The last mob was also thought of as a routine.
(e) Israeli int had earlier predicted, that Egyptians could be ready for war earliest by
1975 and NB. They thought they will not have a credible AD before 1975 and in the
absence of AD, they knew, the Arabs could not start a war.
(f) Israeli Gen Staff had forecasted a war in May 73 and int agencies did not think it
was a possibility and it came to be true. Israeli mob in May 73 had cost the nation $
11million. When the Egyptian mob again took place in Sep, the Israeli mil again
wanted to mob, but the int agencies again differed and the COS couldn’t risk another
mob under such a sit arose.
(g) The eyeball-to-eyeball dply of Egyptians didn’t give clear indications of preps for
attack. The Egyptians were thus able to conc their attacking forces behind the already
dply forces.

SECTION 21 : CONCLUSION

9. It was seen that during 73 the Egyptians reached a diplomatic dead end and they said
there was no alt to war and thus break the deadlock. The CFL was freezing into a defacto
bdy and the Arabs couldn’t afford such a sit. The provision of scud msls, Mig-23 ac and
sufficient no of SAM and A tk msls from Jan 73 onwards fulfilled the necessary conditions for
war. Delay would have been fatal to Arab cause.

10. Failure of Israeli int to forecast the war was mainly the failure to guess the intentions
of the Arabs, because of preconceived ideas about Arab capabilities. The facts were there in
plenty but their interpretation was faulty. Even the American int agencies like CIA were
deceived about the intentions of Arabs.
CHAPTER 7 : PREP FOR WAR

Gen

1. On 28 Sep 1970, President Naseer died and Anwar Sadat became the new Egyptian
Ldr. During this period the Russian caution and inclination to keep détente, made Egyptians
to reject Soviet attitude and commence prep for the War from 14 Nov 72 onwards.

2. Sadat’s Intial Apch.
(a) He tried to pursue the Roger’s peace plan of Dec 69, which specified Israeli
withdrawal from the occupied territories in return of Arab assurance of a lasting peace,
but it failed.
(b) He continued the process of acquiring more mil hardware from Soviet Union.
(c) Initiate a peaceful path to persuade Israel to partial withdrawal wherein the
Egyptians would clear and reopen the Suez cnl.

3. None of the initiatives succeeded. Discontent in Egypt grew. Throughout 1971, the ‘Yr
of Decision’, Sadat gave instrs that mil reforms and reorg are reqd but things could
crystallize only by Feb 1972.

Aims of The War

4. Political. As decided at Cairo summit on 10 Sep 73, the war was to be aimed for a
final solution to the confrontation with Israel by sparking a crisis into which the superpowers
would inevitably be involved and attempt to seek a solution.

5. Mil. The mil obj of Arabs was to recapture parts of Syria and Egypt occupied by
Israel. However, this was to be achieved in ph. So the imdt mil objs were as follows :-
(a) Syria. To make good its ltd losses on Golan Heights.
(b) Egypt. Recapture a slice of Sinai along the East Bank of Suez Cnl. In other
words “undertake a ltd offensive to est a br H cross the cnl”.
(c) Jordan. Hussein’s task was to pose merely the threat of third front and protect
Southern flk of Syria.

Plan For Ops

6. The plan of ops decided for the Arab forces was as follows :-
(a) Attack across a wide frontage across the Suez Cnl, in str. While simultaneously
launching attack on Golan hts from Syria to regain whole of Golan Plateau incl the
western escarpments and gain a foothold on the west bank of the upper Jordan R.
Jordan was to pose fmns along the Israel-Jordan Border to tie down Israeli forces and
also secure Syrian southern bdy.
(b) It was decided that Egypt must strike first, with a massive attack both in scope
and intensity. The attack across Suez was, therefore, to be a massive one and
launched along its entire length. Egyptians were to attempt a combination of opposed
cnl xg on a wide front. The whole invading force was to conduct ops on some 150 km
front w/o armr until brs were built for armr to cross.
(c) Est of five div size br Hs expanding to upto 8-10 miles. Dply of THTs ahead of br
H to thwart Israeli CA. Speady breaching op a sand escarpment on Eastbank and
launching of brs. Adv to the three passes that were upto 35 miles fom the cnl based
on prog of ops.
(d) Great thought was given to the depth of br H leaving the option of expl upto the
passes or limiting it to 15-20 km, (the extent of SAM cover). No loop holes were left
for the characteristic threat from Israeli armr.
(e) There was to be a complete coord between Egypt, Syria and Jordan, with other
Arab nations being treated as res.
(f) The attack was planned for either in the month of May or during later half of
Sep/Oct.
(g) Apply political pressure on Israel to agree to concessions acceptable to Arab

countries to incl evac from occupied territories.
(h) Incase superpowers failed to intervene then, continue to fight spread-out Israeli
forces for weeks, until they were exhausted and agreed to Arab conditions. This they
called the “Meat Grinder Tac”.

SECTION 22 : EGYPT

Op Spark

7. The initial plan formulated was that the op will be undertaken by Egypt alone and
comprise of two parts :-
(a) Part 1. Mil op to seek ltd gains, to spark off an international crisis in which the
super powers will join to reach a decision.
(b) Part 2. Political action undertaken to force Israel to accept concessions
acceptable to Arabs.

8. However, subsequently the plan got mod and other Arab allies joined in and finally the
whole op was codenamed Op badr which was launched on 06 Oct 73.

Prep by Egypt

9. Rectg. Selection of only the best and fittest was ensured. Selection was from the
educated urban population, thus, facilitating trg in modern wpns, vehs and eqpt.

10. Acqn of Mil Hardware. Soviet union was the main provider of mil eqpt. However,
the eqpt was def in nature and qty was inadequate for war. Sadat continuously persuaded
the Soviet Union for addl armt.

11. Mod of Mil Eqpt. In Jul 72, Sadat expelled the Soviet pers manning AD wpns and
other soviet eqpt. Some 40,000 people left Egypt, after that the Egyptian carried out mod
of tks and other eqpt to enhance their rg and effectiveness.

12. Offrs Mgt. Many Sr and incompetent offrs were removed. Political influence was
totally nullified by elimination of politically minded offrs. Offrs were encouraged to study
the Israelis, to learn all about them and even to spk Hebrew.

13. Prep Specific to the Offensive.
(a) Sup of Oil. The reqmt of oil for the war was discussed with other Arab
countries. Saudi Arabia, Algeria provided unspecified qty of oil reqd for the campaign.
However, Libya provided oil only when war broke out and only for the duration of the
war.
(b) Motivation. Prep got underway to change the psy of the soldiers and offrs from
‘Trench Fever’ or def mentality to the offensive spirit.
(c) Leadership. Efforts were made to replace the old, lazy, incompetent offfrs with
young, energetic and hardworking offrs. From Jan 71, many soldiers who had done
well in action were also promoted from rks.
(d) Offensive Spirit. Drive was undertaken to infuse offensive spirit in the men, to
encourage them to undertake msns with “calculated risks”. This quality gen gets
curbed in armies traditionally brought up on caution and def.
(e) Standardization of Eqpt and Amn. On 21 Mar 1973, Gen Shazli issued
‘Directive No 41’. It laid down the exact task of every soldier and laid down precise
scale of wpn, amn, eqpt, ration, water and other items to be carried by each indl.
(f) Focussed Trg. Based on the Directive issued, rigorous trg was carried out to
train everyone on one particular task in battle, rather than they being jack of many
trades.
(g) Study of the Suez Cnl. A detailed study was carried out from Cnl Auth records
regarding tidal behaviour, current speed and seasonal hydrographical disturbances.
This was essential to determine the precise day and time of xg, nature of brs, ferries
and xg expedients.
(h) Selection of Trg Area. ‘El Ballah Loop’ was selected as the trg area where
both banks were in Egyptian possession. It had similar water currents and speed to
that of Suez cnl. Here men practiced vigorously in aslt boats the ops of xg the cnl and
br tasks. Trg was also carried out on similar models.
(j) Breaching the Sand Bank on East Bank. Improvisation was made to
overcome the time reqmt of 12 hr for breaching the sand bank with conventional
means. ‘Water pumps’ were tried and 348 experiments were carried out to ensure
that a gap could be water blasted in the sand rainpart within four to five hr.
(k) Prep of West bank.

(i) Constr of large sand banks on west bank to achieve some cover from 60 ft
high watch tower of Bar Lev Line def.
(ii) Constr of concrete slipways to enable vehs to enter the water at 50 yards
interval.
(iii) Constr of huge horseshoe shaped sand banks at intended xg pts higher
than and overlooking Israeli sand rampart. It had a tr along the length of the
horse shoe near the rim for tks to take posn and the sides sloping to grnd at the
rear end to enable tks to reach the tr.
(l) Neutr of “Secret Wpn” of Isreal.

(i) Secret wpn consisted of 39 large tks along the length of the cnl containing
200 gallons of oil and a pipe descending to the water to carry the oil. The oil
would be released in water and set afire to incinerate the attackers.
(ii) All these wpns were neutralized during ni 05/06 Oct by Egyptian Rangers
and Frogmen.

Egyptian Mob and Conc

14. The armed forces were placed in a ‘State of Alert’. The annual mvres known as “Tahir
23”, scheduled between 01 to 07 Oct were carried out. However, bde sized forces mov
toward cnl but only one bn returned westwards by evening, remaining two remained under
cover near the waterway.

15. Guns, hy eqpt and amn was mov at ni and hidden by day.

16. Various deception measures were under taken.

17. In the evening of 05 Oct , trucks and trlrs carrying br eqpt mov fwd to the cnl, SAMs
were brought fwd within 4 miles of it. FROG tac msls were placed in their pads.

18. Spl clo were issued to tps.

19. Water level in Sweet water Cnl was lowered to prevent flooding in case of Israeli
Bombardment hitting any bank.

Surprise and Deception

20. The various actions by the Arabs towards achieving surprise and deception are listed
out in the subsequent paras.

21. Political.
(a) After 1972, President Sadat and Gen Ismail deliberately acted in a manner that
would go on to encourage this sense of false security, like, repeatedly highlighting the
issue of 1971 being the ‘ Yr of Decision ’ when virtually no decision was taken.
(b) Schonau Incident. Two gunmen from Syrian terrorist gp ’Saiqa’ held up
some hostages and demanded closure of the Jewish refugee route through Schonau
Castle. This angered Israel, and all prep of Egypt thereafter was viewed as def prep by
them to counter Isreaeli attack.

22. Strat.
(a) All activities pertaining to prep, mov and dply were being carried out under the
cover plan of a maj ex.
(b) Def Posture. Raising of ramparts on the Egyptian side of Suez Cnl, laying of
mines, and improvement of def posns were all depicted as if the Egyptians were
improving their def posture. Syrians dply was also made to appear def orientated.
(c) Expulsion of Soviet advisors by the Egyptians made Israelis believe that Arabs
had no intention of imdt offensive.
(d) Haj Pilgrimage. In Sep 73, just a month before the planned offensive there
was an announcement for the army, seeking a list of offrs and men who wished to
perform Haj pilgrimage to Mecca .
(e) Selection of 06 Oct as the ‘Y’ day because it was a moon–lit ni, during which
the tide in Suez Cnl was most suitable for ops and it was the day of Yom Kippur
for Israelis and Tenth day of Ramadan for the Arabs (the day of fasting). Israelis
assumed that Arabs will not engage in mil ops on this day and Arabs expected Israeli
alertness at its lowest levels due to Yom Kippur.
(f) Repetitive Mob Schemes. Egyptian carried out 22 mob scheme in 1973.
Twenty third mob scheme carried out for actual war was ignored by Israelis as a
routine affair.
(g) Security. Very high std of security was maint at all levels. Apart from the plg
staff, def ministers of Egypt, Syria and Jordan, barely half dozen people knew the date
of ‘Y’ Day. The bde cdrs knew it only by 0800 hr on 06 Oct whereas the coys learnt
about the attack only at 1230 hr.

23. Tac.
(a) All Activities Made to Appear Routine. All activities undertaken by the Arabs
were made to appear as routine repetitions. The usual war like posturing and cycles
of autumn mvres were conducted. Egyptian soldiers were seen swimming in Suez Cnl
and mov about w/o helmets even on the morning of ‘Y’ Day. The civ air and sea tfc
was stopped only at 1340 hr , 06 Oct.
(b) Mov of Br Eqpt. Mov fwd of cnl xg eqpt was delayed as much as possible. Spl
crates were made for some of the br eqpt so that no one could detect that the huge
trucks carrying them belonged to the Corps of Engrs. Deep pits were dug in to hide
the eqpt when it arr in the vicinity of cnl by ni.
(c) Progressive Dply. In the north, under the garb of an ex, Gen Ismail sent a bde
in the morning to the waterfront and brought back only a bn at ni making the ex
appear more conclusive.

Egyptian Orbat

24. Str of the Army. The COS was Lt Gen Saad el Shazli. The str of the army was
estimated to be about 2,60,000. It was org as under :-
(a) 3 X Armd divs with 250 tks each.
(b) 3 X Mech divs.
(c) 5 X Inf divs. (Each div had three integral tk bns and integral sp and lgs units).
(d) 2 X Para bdes and 20 X Ranger units.
(e) 16 X Arty bdes.
(f) Tks approx 1700 (mostly T-54 / T-55 incl 100 X T-62 and 75 X PT-76). APCs
(approx 1200) and 150 X SP guns.
(g) 4500 X Guns of all types.
(h) No of SAMS, FROG Msls, RPG-7. There were about 70 X SAM-2, 50 X SAM-3 Lr
sites.

SECTION 23 : SYRIA

25. Assad was elected President of Syria on 12 Mar 1971. He went through domestic
political turmoil and conflicts with Israel. Initially Syria did not show any inclination to join in
the Egypt Offensive. Only in Jan 73, did President Assad express a definite interest in Op
Spark and it’s scope was widened to incl Syria.

Role Of Syria

26. To launch offensive into Israel to rec the territories lost in 1967.

Prep by Syria

27. On 22 May 1973, Gen Ismail issued Federated Gen Directive to both Egyptian and
Syrian Armed Forces for the strat offensive. In Jun, further directives were issued
dealing with res on each front and with mob plans . Maj Gen Bahieddin Mohd Nofal, an
Egyptian offr was appt as LO to ensure smooth co-op between the two plg gps.

28. From 24 to 30 Sep, Syrian tps began a slow build up against Golan front by
withdrawing from Jordanian borders. Reservists were recalled on 02 Oct. All three Mech divs
began to conc near the CFL in a ‘Def Posture’.

29. During ni 04/05 Oct, the three Mech divs near the CFL changed to offensive posture.
Both Armd divs mov fwd to Katna and Kiswe. Entire SAM Sys was manned. The sec line of
def was apparently unoccupied in view of the offensive dply.

Syrian ORBAT

30. The Syrian Army comprised of the following :-
(a) 2 X Armd divs.
(b) 3 X Mech divs .
(c) 7 X Arty Regts.
(d) 1 X Para Bde.
(e) 1 X Spl Forces Bde.
(f) Maj Wpn and Eqpt.

(i) 800 X tks, and SP Guns, 500 other A vehs.
(ii) 50 - 60 X Btys of SAMs.
(iii) 800 Guns all types.

SECTION 24 : JORDAN

31. During the 1967 war, Jordan had lost heavily. It was also troubled by Palestinian
Fedayeens. The country continued to battle against the IS problems as well as the menace
of the Palestinian Fedayeens. Till early 1973, Jordan remained diplomatically isolated from
some Arab countries because of attitude of King Hussein towards Palestinian Fedayeens.

32. During the course of their plg, both Sadat and Assad, realized the advantages of
involving Jordan in Op badr, to apply pressure against Israel from a third front. They
started to make political mvres to convince King Hussein.

33. King Hussein visited Cairo on 10 Sep 73 to attend Arab Summit mtg and there he
was told of the broad outline of Op Spark and Op badr. It was agreed that Jordan will coop
and mob tps toward Jordan R to alarm Israelis and force them to commit some of their
fmns.

Jordanian ORBAT

34. The Jordanian Army Comprised of :-
(a) 1 X Armd div, 1 X Mech div and 1 X Inf div.
(b) 3 X Arty regts, an indep inf bde and Royal Guards Armd Unit.
(c) Maj Wpns and Eqpt.

(i) 140 X British Centurion tks.
(ii) 190 X American M 47s, M 48s, M 60 tks.
(iii) 550 X Lt Armd Vehs.
(iv) 200 X Guns (all types).
(v) 200 X M42 SP AA guns.

SECTION 25 : ISRAEL

Gen

35. From the past Israeli experience against Arabs, the IDF adopted offensive strat based
on initiative, mob fire power and absolute confidence coupled with sense of superiority
almost amounting to arrogance. Armr was the predominant arm with hy reliance on AF to
sp the land battles. Israeli higher comd was fully confident of getting at least 72 hr EW of
impending Egyptian attack, and would carryout complete mob to effectively deal with the
threat.

36. Concepts.
(a) Initiative and Offensive Spirit. Deep thrusts entailing conc emp of armr to
hit depth objs w/o securing flks or axes.
(b) Inf - Tk Coop. Armr and Inf as a prac were gp together down to sub unit level
to derive max comb power. However, after 1967 war there was reluctance to have inf
integral to armd fmn as gen feeling began to prevail that inf hindered and slowed
down the ops of armd fmn basically due to slower pace of APCs.
(c) Close Air Sp. Hy reliance was placed on close air sp, even to the extent of
compensating for arty fire sp, w/o due regard to the constantly thickening AD cover of
the Egyptians.
(d) Leadership. Unorthodox tacs and ingenuity of mil leadership at all levels.

Israeli Understanding of Arabs

37. The following assumptions of Israelis about Arab capabilities played a significant role
in the war :-
(a) They conveniently assumed that Arabs did not have the capability to strike, thus
interpreted all Arab mov as prep for def battle.
(b) They appre that GW and terrorism were real dangers rather than Arab
conventional attack, thus accordingly deployed their int resources.
(c) On ejection of Russian and Czech advisors and techs by Egypt, in Jul 72, they
assumed Arabs could not handle sophisticated eqpt.
(d) They were over confident of their own capabilities and American sp.
(e) They underestimated the Arabs in the level of edn of tps, technology and
integrity, unity among the Arabs and the sprit of nationalism amonst them.
(f) They did not believe that friendship between Syria and Egypt would last.
(g) They assumed that they will always have the initiative. Thus, they based their
plans on a war of about one week, before UN/ superpower intervention would take
place. Their strat was to rapidly thrust as far fwd as possible into Arab territory, so
that they would hold advantageous posn at the time of cease fire.
(h) They presumed that Arabs will not launch attack in the month of Ramadan which
was from 26 Sep to 26 Oct.
(j) Even when late indicators indicated the impending war, they argued that the
Arab attack should have been launched during Jewish New Yr holiday ‘Rosh Hashanah’
i.e. 28 - 29 Sep.

Isreali Def in Sinai

38. Bar Lev Line Def.
(a) The Israelis had planned to fight a def battle based on Bar Lev Line defs, while
the main defs were loc in the High Grnd area, some 50 Km in depth
(b) The Bar Lev Line defs were considered invincible, even though large gaps
existed. The concept of fighting envisaged rft of the ‘Bar Lev Line’ and a sharp
reaction by armr held in depth areas, in 8 to12 hr time. The Israeli appre that the
Egyptian engrs will require 24h to build brs and their hy eqpt and armr would not be
able to cross the cnl before 18hr enabling complete mob in 48h to 72h.
(c) Layout of ‘Fort’.

(i) The Cnl def consisted of about 26 ‘Forts’, along the whole length of cnl.
Each ‘Fort’ was self contained post, designed to hold upto approx 15 to 20 pers
(though some up to even 80-120); having 6-8 tk bays and even gun pits in
some.
(ii) There was a 60 ft high sand bank on the eastern bank with its fwd slope on
the cnl. This slope was mined and booby trapped. The gradient was 45 degs, not
negotiable be amph vehs.
(iii) The outer fence was covered by A pers mines and wire entaglement. A
three storied structure, all underground, formed the strong pt. The top storey
was the op floor containing A tk wpns and MMGs, the middle contained amn and
sups and the bottom had living qtrs (electrified and air conditioned). Overhead
protection of steel beams, stone and concrete, capable of withstanding the
heaviest arty and ariel bombardment was provided.
(iv) Oil storage tks had been constr under most of the strong pts, with ppl for
releasing oil in the cnl. This oil was to be ignited at a moment’s notice by
switching on electrical mechanicm. The entry to a strong pt was only from the
rear. Trs existed from the fwd strong pts to those in the sec line.

39. The Sec Line Def. The sec line of strong pts was similarly constr as the fwd line,
approx 300 to 500 m away, on another sand rampart. It held armr, arty, rfts and HQs. It
had 240 ‘Pads’ of concrete for SP guns/tks. Of these 30 were always occupied.

40. Sp Arms and CPs. Local armr res were loc at suitable interval, along this rd. The
role of arty was to break up any inf xg of the cnl, while tks were to take c/o those who
succeeded in xg the cnl. Six CPs were sited ahead of Khatmia ridge. The main Comd HQ
was at Bir Gifgafa.

41. Rds. A black top rd ran parallel to the cnl behind the strong pts for the whole length
of the Bar Lev Line. The arty rd ran parallel about 6-8 km behind the cnl. Some distance
behind the sec line def another North-South rd had been specially constr for the mov of hy
arty places, it was also called ‘Sup Rd’ or the ‘Lateral Rd’.

42. Main Defs. These were loc on the High Grnd, some 50 Km in depth, covering the
four routes, leading East wards and were based on the line Mitla Pass-Giddi Pass-Bir
Gifgafa-Bir Salmana (half way between Port Said & El Arish).

Dply of Forces in Sinai

43. GOC Southern Comd controlled ops in Sinai from his peace time HQ in Beersheba.
The Comd had eight bdes deployed South of the border in Sinai, these could get in action in
eight hr. Three addl bdes were made available as rft. More than 20 bdes were expected to
be available on mob in the Sinai. On 06 Oct, there were 8000 tps, 300 tks and 70 SP guns
in the Sinai. The dply of forces was as under :-
(a) Bar Lev Line. One bde, sp by one armd bde along 170 Km frontage. Bulk of
the armr, however, was held back 8-10 Km behind the cnl line, though some tks were
loc in the strong pts themselves. (In actual fact when the war broke out on 6 Oct at
1400hr, the line was held by only 436 men with 3 tks on the water front and 7 x arty
btys in the line. 70 guns followed later.
(b) Armr. One bde was in close sp of the Bar Lev Def. One bde was dply along Sup
rd to launch CA at selected places. One bde was dply further in depth to be eff in 2 hr
time at the selected place. One bde was covering the three passes. There were three
addl bde in depth beyond Khatmia ridge.

Change of Comd in Southern Sect

44. On 15 Jul, Maj Gen Shmuel Gonen took over the Southern Comd replacing Maj Gen
Ariel Sharon. Gonen was the overall cdr of the theatre, while Maj Gen Avraham Mandler
was cdr of the armd forces in the Sinai.

Israeli Reaction to Warnings

45. Warning was recd at 0400hr, 06 Oct from Abba Eban who was in New York, it
mentioned indications of attack late in the AN.

46. The deception measure in r/o Schonau Castle led Israel to believe that all actions
being taken by Egypt were def actions against impending Israeli attack on Arabs.

47. At 1000h, US ambassador warned Israel against premptive air strike on Arabs.

48. Ae recce of Syrian front confirmed offensive posturing of the three divs, but H hr was
assumed to be 1800h. Warning did not percolate down to jr ldrs till mins before launching of
attack.

49. Full mob was reluctantly not ordered till late in the AN, because there had been three
mob since 1967 war which had proved costly and disruptive to Israel economy, therefore
the govt was hesitant to issue orders unless it was very sure of the Egyptian attack. There
were also other faulty presumptions about Arabs as discussed earlier which played a role in
decision making at the higher level.

Israeli Orbat

50. IDF in 1973 was estimated to have 30,000 regs and 85,000 conscripts. After mob
the IDF str could rise to 3,00,000 in 72h. Israeli army was divided into Northern, Central
and Southern comds resp for Syria-Lebanon, Jordan and Egyptian fronts respectively.
(a) Israeli Army. It was org into 37 bdes on full mob. These were comb teams org
as per tasks. It comprised of armr, inf, and arty comps.
(b) Approx 1700 tks (400 Pattons, 250 up gunned Centurions, 200 up gunned
Shermans, 100 up gunned T 54/55, 150 American M60 and 60 vintage Centurions and
Shermans) and 300 other AFVS.
(c) 1000 x Half trs ( M-2, M-3).
(d) A tk wpns incl LAW, SS10,SS11 and 3.5 in RL.
CHAPTER – 8 : OP BADR

Intro

1. The Egyptian offensive op to est Br Hs across the Suez Cnl was code named ‘Op badr’.
It was a difficult and a complicated op as it entailed an attack across a formidable water
obst, en bank of which was heavily fortified. It was not just a normal opposed water obst
xg op but a multipronged offensive involving xg at a No of pts over 100 km frontage.

Gen Plan

2. First Wave. Egyptians chose to cross first wave of inf under cover of smk. Leading
tps were to cross the stretch of water, scramble up the loose sandy surface and make for
the sec line of Bar Lev defs, w/o bothering for strong pts. (To achieve this, leading inf
waves were divided into self contained teams. Each pl was sp by its own sp sec of 10-12
men carrying RPG 7 and ATGMs). These tps organized THTs to counter Israeli armr threat
till induction of their own armr in the br H.

3. Sec Wave. Sec wave after xg over the cnl was to fan out right and left towards the
Israeli strong pts and contain them. It contained engrs with pumps to water blast gaps in
the sand rampart.

4. No of Br Hs. Five div size br Hs were planned. Each br Hs was to be 8 km by 5 km till
arr of armr and arty ,when it was to be enlarged to 16 Km by 8 Km.

Egyptian Forces

5. Sec and Third Egyptian Armies were earmarked for the offensive across the Suez Cnl
with First Egyptian Army in res. The inter fmn bdy between the two armies ran through
Great Bitter Lake but was not clearly defined.

6. First Army. It was GHQ res. It had 3 Mech Div and 6 Mech Div.

7. Sec Army. It was commanded by Maj Gen Mohd Saad el-Din Maamun and had five
divs. Its AOR was from Port Said to the Great Bitter Lake. It had 18 Inf Div , 2 Inf Div and
16 Inf Div whose task were to est a Div size Br H each (20 Km deep). 21 Armd Div & 23
Mech Div were in res & meant for breakout ops.

8. Third Army. It was commanded by Maj Gen Abdel Moneim Mwassil and had three
divs. Its AOR was from Great Bitter Lake to Post Suez and task was to est two br Hs, (20
km deep) in the area of resp. It had 7 Inf Div and 19 Inf Div whose task were to est a Div
size Br H each. 4 Armd Div was in res and meant for break out ops.

9. Rangers. They were emp to delay and destroy Israeli Tks . The were to penetrate
upto seven miles. Infilt upto the passes and also tgt Bir Gifgafa, oil wells, comn centers . All
pls op beyond 20 km were under direct comd of the GHQ.

10. AD. To counter superiority of the IAF, the entire AD sys was centralized under Cdr AD
Comd. To achieve complete air def of the area, no air corridors were left except for the first
strike. AD was based on the following layout :-
(a) Static SAM 2 and SAM 3 were deployed on the west Bank to provide high and
med cover, over a territorial cone, with its base on the CnL and apex at Cairo.
(b) Mob SAM 6 and ptbl SAM 7 were provided for protection against low level
attacks.
(c) Well sited Schilkas and AA Guns boosted SAM def.
(d) Some MIG sqns were also earmarked for air def of depth areas.

Fire sp

11. Fire plan envisaged the following :-
(a) Air. 200 acs were to be emp to bomb tgts East of Suez Cnl upto the Line of
High Grnd at H Hr. The tgts were Comd and Cont centers, rdrs,airfds, AD btys.
(b) Arty. One of the massive arty covering fire was planned by way of 53 mins of
continuous arty barrage in which 3000 tons of war H were to be del. 11,000 shells
were to be fired in the first min alone. 2000 arty pieces gp into 135 arty bns were to
be emp to sp the attack along the entire front. In addn approx 1900 pieces of direct
firing wpns were to neutralize the strong pts.

Engr Sp Plan

12. Br the cnl. Ten brs, two per assaulting div were planned. Two confronting problems
were, breaching the high sand banks and br of the water gaps. These were planned to be
overcome as follows :-
(a) Breaching of Sand banks. It was a greater problem than br of the water obst.
Average width of reinforced sand banks was 7m and ht 18m. Normal method of
explosive and dozers would have taken too long (12-18 h). A new method was
evolved. Melting of sand walls by water jets and powerful hoses was planned. Hosing
ops were to start as the first wave got across. Rafts were to be crossed under arty
and smk cover and firmly anchored on the far bank to provide stable op platforms.
Weeks of prac had shown that the gaps could be created in 3 to 5h.
(b) Br. Adequate qty of British Bailley type br, Russian PMP brs and latest TPP brs
of Soviet origin were reported to have been made available for constr of ten brs.
These were mod to be compatible with each other, thus facilitating easy ferrying,
launching and repair/replacement. Ten Dummy brs were also planned to absorb the
Israeli air attack.

13. Rafts. Besides constr of ten brs, 50 rafts were planned to be op imdt after the xg of
initial wave. These were to ease build up and avoid congestion.

SECTION 26 : DAY ONE - SAT, 06 OCT 1973

Egyptian Offensive

14. Fire Aslt.
(a) At 1400 Hr on 06 Oct, 240 Egyptian planes crossed the cnl. Their msn to strike
three airfds in Sinai, hit SAM btys, Israeli CPs, rdr stns, med arty posns, adm centers
and the strong pt of Budapest.
(b) Simultaneously, arty opened up along the entire front. A bde of FROG SSM
launched its wpns. The tks mov to the prep ramps and fired pt blank at Israeli strong
pts. Over 3000 tons of destruction mtrl was launched against handful of fortfns in a
barrage of 53 mins.

15. Xg of THTs. At the same time Rangers and inf tk hunting teams (THTs) crossed the
Suez Cnl, mined the apchs to the ramps, prep A tk obst and lay in wait for the adv of Israeli
res armr. They carried Sagger, Snapper and RPG-7 and crossed over in inflatable boats.
They were across and on the sec rampart in 30 mins just before the Israeli CA forces.

16. Xg of Inf and Engr. At 1420 hr , when the planes had just returned, the first wave
of 8000 aslt inf in 1000 inflatable boats crossed the Suez Cnl. First wave of attacking inf incl
the beach party and were tasked to est a toehold on the east bank as also to cont the mov
of boats. Following this, inf units trained to capture strong pts went in to action alongwith
60 engr teams with their water pumps. They est themselves 2-3 Km in depth, by last lt, 06
Oct. By 1930 hr maj portion of the divs was across. In all there were 12 waves, ldg at an
average interval of 15 mins.

17. Spl ops. A Mech Bde undertook xg of Great Bitter Lake in amph vehs. On successful,
unopposed xg one bn mov to Mitla Pass and another bn mov to Giddi Pass.
Simultaneously, the Rangers were launched in depth, behind the en lines for harassment
ops with the aim to secure the passes.

18. Comd & Cont of SF. All forces West of the line Ras Sudar, Tasa-Baluza were under
comd Sec and Third Egyptian Armies. All forces East of this line and beyond 20 km from the
cnl incl cdo forces, which had landed at Sudar, Mitla and Giddi, were under comd GHQ.

Israeli Def Battle

19. Confusion Prevails. When the battle was joined there was a great confusion in the
Israeli camp due to the incorrect use of codewords, incorrect fixing of map coordinates.
There was lack of coord in fire sp. The rds were jammed due to unregulated tfc in both
directions. There was paucity of tk tptrs. Eqpt was still moth-balled. CA were launched in
reckless manner w/o tac, fire sp and w/o inf comp. The evac of cas to Bir Gifgafa also added
to confusion due to rumours and stories of Egyptian aslt as del by these casualties.

20. CA. The Israelis launched their CA within 30 mins but were reckless and relied only
on speed with total disregard to minor tac and fire sp. Thus, were easy prey to the waiting
Rangers. Total 14 coy sized CA were launched, all were beaten back with hy cas.

21. There was confusing and inaccurate reporting. Subsequently, the three bdes were
equally divided with Gaby in North, Amnon in Centre and Dan in the South.

SECTION 27 : DAY TWO - SUN, 07 OCT 1973

Egyptians

22. During ni 06/07 Oct, Egyptians worked on 10 brs. By 07 Oct last lt , Egyptians were
well org to face CA as all inf divs and integral armr had crossed over. Further adv and
expansion of br Hs was undertaken. The three br H in the North were merged into two and
the two br H in the South were merged into one, they expanded to the depth of about seven
miles and at places overlooked the Arty rd. Ph I of xg was completed between 06 oct and 09
Oct.

23. At 1350 hr, forces contacted Mitla pass and after a brief fighting fell back to the br H
sites. Rangers were involved in fighting at Baluza, near Kantara, at Subha Hill, opposite
Ismailia and opposite Deversoir.

24. The forces of 25 Indep Armd Bde and 2 Indep Armd Bde crossed over during the ni
06/07 Oct, through the areas of El Shatt in the South and Ismailia respectively.

Israelis

25. CA. Bn sized CA were launched at Kantara and in area Lake Timsah. Both failed and
Israelis suffered hy losses. Albert’s bde lost two third of its tks. Desperate requests were
made for air sp.

26. Visits. Moshe Dayan and Gen Elazar visited the battle field. There was discussion on
withdrawing to the line of passes, but Elazar insisted on holding on and launching CAs. Due
to the intensity of battle the comd and cont structure was mod as under :-
(a) Northern Sect. Maj Gen Avraham (Bren) Aden assumed comd at 0800 hr on
07 Oct. Gaby’s Bde was placed under comd Maj Gen Adan.
(b) Central Sect. It was placed under Maj Gen Ariel Sharon at 1300 hr on 07 Oct.
Amnon’s Bde contd fighting at Firdan, cross-rds and Chinese Farm, suffering hy losses,
it was placed under comd Maj Gen Sharon.
(c) Southern Sect. It was placed under comd Maj Gen Albert Mandler, who was till
then overall cdr of all armd forces in the sect. Dan’s Bde was placed under comd Maj
Gen Mandler .

27. Rft. After 1200 hr, rft started to arr in the sect. Adan had two armd bdes, Sharon
had three armd bdes , Mandler had two armd bdes and Gonen retained one para bde mtd
on half trs as res.

28. Offensive Plan. Elazar visited Khaseiba and a plan was evolved to defeat the
Egyptians as under :-
(a) Adan’s bdes to cut through from North through the Second Army’s br Hs.
Sharon’s bdes were res.
(b) If Adan was successful, Sharon will mov south through the Third Army’s brH.
(c) Mandler’s bdes were to launch sp and diversionary attacks.

SECTION 28 : DAY THREE - MON, 08 OCT 1973

Egyptians

29. By 08 Oct evening, all inf divs with addl tk bdes had firmly est on the Eastern Bank.
Efforts to widen the br H contd. 6 Mech Div of GHQ res was ready for launch.

30. Egyptians gained the initial advantage by virtue of having achieved complete
surprise. Successful initial xg was accomplished at the cost of a few hundred cas. They
captured two more forts in the areas of Kantara and El Farden. Egyptians were to lose the
advantage gradually due to their failure to expl it, primarily due to the lack of far sighted
plg.

Israelis

31. Israelis commenced their attack in the morning at 0800 hr. Adan’s bdes spread out
between Tasa and Baluza along the Sup rd. The bdes mov too far to the East, away from
bulk of en forces. Therefore, instead of rolling down from the Northern flk, the attack
developed frontally from East to West. Adan’s northern bde ran into ambush near Kantara
and the central bde ran into trouble near El Ferdan. Tks lost were about 20. By then, at
1100 hr , Sharon had been ordered to mov South as per plan.

32. At 1000 Hr, Adan was ordered to capture three brs near El Ballah, El Farden and
Kantara. One bn of the Northern bde identified as 190B Bn commanded by Lt Col Asaf
Yagouri, was left behind at Kantara and the rest of the bdes mov towards El Farden. This bn
erroneously judged the fwd line of Egyptian 2 Inf Div and charged eastwards into El Farden
def . It was a disaster and more than 50 tks were lost.

33. Adan’s bde suffered yet another defeat near Great Bitter Lake (For Matzmed) and lost
about 20 tks. At 1400 hr, Sharon was asked to mov back to help Adan at Ismailia and El
Farden, he refused. In the south, attacks launched by Mandler’s bdes also failed. In the last
three days of war, more than 400 tks were lost by Israel.

34. In the evening, at the Southern Comd HQ Gen Gonen proposed the policy to conserve
forces, hold the en and build up addl str, as his comd could not afford another day of similar
fighting. Decisive blow was to be planned for, only when full str of the force had been
reconstituted, on arr of the res.

Reasons for Hy Losses of Israelis

35. Armd Forces Op W/O Arty and Inf Sp. Concepts of armd attacks w/o close inf and
arty sp, which had entered Israeli thinking during the 1967 war proved dangerous and
expensive.

36. Frontal Attacks. Initial error made by Gen Adan’s bde cdrs by not rolling up the
Egyptian br H from North to South but from East to West, led to the attack being frontal.
These head on attacks proved too costly.

37. Piecemeal Attacks. Principle of conc of force was sacrificed and instead the CA force
was launched piecemeal. Had two Israeli divs attacked with necessary fire sp from the flks,
there would have been reasonable chance of Israelis succeeding in rolling up the Egyptian
br Hs.

38. The tks did not have HE amn to engage the THTs, they also lacked better msls eg
TOW.

SECTION 29 : DAY FOUR - TUE, 09 OCT 1973

Egyptians

39. The next ph which started on 09 Oct was devoted entirely to waging def war and
causing max possible damage to the en. Egyptian attack on Gaby’s Bde was repulsed with
the help of Gen Bren’s Div. Egyptians contd to pour massive res of armr and hy eqpt on the
Eastern Bank.

40. Egyptian forces adv to the mouth of Mitla Pass to occupy the southernmost Israeli
Comd Post.

41. Egyptian devp a pattern in their attacks which was appre even by the Israelis for their
courage and bravado. However, soon it was understood by the Israelis and countered. The
pattern can be summarized as under :-
(a) Egyptian inf crawled at ni, to within 2 Km of Israeli units.
(b) Attacks would invariably be preceeded with conc of arty barrage lasting half an
hr, concluding with five mins of rapid conc of phosphorescent amn.
(c) This was followed by the adv of tks with inf interspersed. The dug in inf which
had crawled the ni previous, would then join the attacking force as it reached their
line, and then leapfrog fwd, from one line to another, with the prog of attack.

Israelis

42. In the overall scenario, the Israelis shifted their priority to the Northern front in their
bid to throw out the Syrians from the Golan Heights. However, the Southern comd contd to
fight a containing battle. Simultaneously the Israeli army in Sinai was reinforced with the
aim of launching deliberate CA to throw back the Egyptians.

43. Sharon’s Div CA with two bdes, in order to recapture Machsir and Televizia against
Gen Gonen’s order and suffered hy tk losses. Probe by Amnon’s Bde and div recce elements
along the Great Bitter Lake and Chinese Farm revealed the bdy between Egyptian sec and
Third Army, which was confirmed to be the soft under belly of the Egyptian offensive.

44. Change of Comd in Sinai. A dismal atmosphere was created by the relationship
between Gen Gonen and Gen Sharon, which was prejudicial to the efficient conduct of
campaign. Therefore, Gen Chaim Bar Lev was ordered to take over the comd of Sinai sect.
He was sent to the front as ‘rep of the GS’ thus he became the de facto cdr, while Gonen
remained nominally as GOC.

SECTION 30 : DAY FIVE - WED, 10 OCT 1973

Egyptians

45. Egyptians captured three more forts in the Area of Ismailia. They also conducted a
press tour to the fwd areas along the cnl. Gen Shazli again proposed unsuccessfully to mov
to the passes as five of the six CPs were captured and it was the right time before the en
could consolidate.

Israelis

46. Gen Bar Lev Takes Over. Gen Bar Lev took over the Southern Comd on 10 Oct.
Gen Bar Lev on his visit to the div sects found the Egyptians were pressing all along the line
to take cont of the Arty Rd and Israeli armr was causing havoc in return. Gen Bar Lev too
had problems with Gen Sharon and even proposed his removal to Moshe Dayan. However
the matter was shelved due to political reasons.

47. Plg for Offensive Commences.
(a) Preferred Option. It was universally felt in the Israeli higher circles that the
only way out to unbalance Egyptian was to cross the Suez Cnl and devp a war of
mvre. A CA across the cnl had always been a cardinal element in the Israeli mil
doctrine. Over the yrs eqpt was prep and placed along various pts astride the cnl
which were org as prospective xg sites. Indirect apch was preferred to a direct one, in
pushing back the Egyptians.
(b) Necessary Constr for Xg. Necessary constr and prep were made in the area of
Kantara and Deversoir. Pre-fabricated hy br eqpt was mov into Sinai and spl straight
rds had been constr for towing these brs. ‘Yard’ an area of 150 m by 700 m with high
sand walls had been constr for launching cnl xg ops in Deversoir area.
(c) Plg for Xg Begins. As Israeli str specially in tps incr, Southern comd began to
plan for attack across the Suez Cnl in the area of Deversoir as it had been identified as
bdy between sec and third army and was thinly held. Bar lev accepted the plan of 2
divs attack. On the ni 9/10 Oct pre constr br was mov down from Tasa to Yukon (West
of Deversoir) for the final assy.

SECTION 31 : DAY SIX - THU, 11 OCT 1973

Egyptians

48. By 11 Oct, the ph of waging def war and inflicting max possible losses on the en was
over. Egyptians now planned to launch a maj attack on Israelis and simultaneously push
down towards Ras Sudar and Sharam el Sheikh. Plg commenced of Egyptian attack for the
capture of Bir Gifgafa.

Israelis

49. A fourth armd div was formed and placed under direct comd of Gen Gonen, another
was formed and placed under comd of Maj Gen Israel Tal. Due to hy cas in the three
existing divs, they were reconstituted as Op Gps as under :-
(a) Adan’s Div. It was designated as 131 Op Gp, with four armd bdes.
(b) Sharon’s Div. It was designated as 45 Op Gp, with five armd bdes.
(c) Mandler’s Div. It was designated as 252 Op Gp, with four armd bdes.

50. Plg of Op Gazelle Continues. Area of Deversoir was selected as a xg place for the
following reasons :-
(a) One flk of the xg force was protected by Great Bitter Lake.
(b) West Bank Area opposte this pt of xg was far more conducive to the battle of
mvre than the area opposite Kantara.
(c) This area constituted inter fmn bdy between sec and third Egyptian Army and
lighter opposition has been identified by the recce units on 09 Oct.

SECTION 32 : DAY SEVEN - FRI , 12 OCT 1973

Egyptians

51. Egyptian higher comd decided to cross its armr on to the East Bank with the aim of
launching a maj offensive to widen the br H. 4 Armd Div and 21 armd Div commenced the
xg of Suez Cnl on 12 Oct.

Israelis

52. At 1000 hr, Sharon again attempts a CA with coy of tks and APCs on Katib el-Kheil.
Attack was repulsed and hy cas incurred by the Israelis. Also, at Kantara tk clashes took
place with hy damages to Israel.

53. Gen Bar Lev presented his plans of proposed xg at the GHQ. Alts available to Israelis
were :-
(a) Launch a maj attack against Egyptian br H with a view to push them back across
the cnl.
(b) Undertake cnl xg ops imdt.
(c) Await the anticipated Egyptian attack. (The Egyptian attack was anticipated on
11/12 Oct as according to the Soviet mil doctrine breakout ops should be undertaken
six to seven days after the est of initial br H).

54. Problem arose regarding decision making in r/o the offensive. Both Moshe Dayan and
Elazar tried to put the onus of decision making on the other. Thus, the matter was ref to the
premier and the war cabinet.

55. As Bar Lev was presenting his plans for the Suez xg, intrep was recd indicating xg of
Egyptian armr on to Eastern Bank into their br H. The proposed xg was postponed by the
COS until the maj tk battle had been fought. Israelis now planned to draw out max armr
from the West Bank into the br H and ensure its annihilation.

56. However, orders for prep of the offensive was given and Adan’s div was earmarked for
the xg.

SECTION 33 : DAY EIGHT - SAT , 13 OCT 1973

Egyptians

57. At 0730 hr, Gen Saad, GOC sec Army died of heart attack. The new incumbent took
ch only on the 15 Oct. By then maj setback had already been suffered by them.

58. Egyptians began their probing attacks all along the line of br H, with aim of capturing
the comn center of Refidim (Bir Gifgafa). At 0600 hr, Tej Salam Fort at the North end of
Great Bitter Lake, known as Matzmed to the Israelis, was captured. Only Fort Tewfik held
out , but it also surrendered by 1230 hr.

Israelis

59. Prep for Op Gazelle continued. To counter the likely Egyptian attack, the Israeli plan
was as under :-
(a) Egyptian attack along the Mediterranean coast and Gulf of Suez was to be held
by armd fmns. The IAF was to take on the Egyptian armd fmns once they were out of
their SAM cover.
(b) If the Egyptians launched frontal attack along the central and Southern sects it
was to be held by Gen Albert’s and Gen Sharon’s Divs. However, if the thrust contd
to devp towards Refidim, Gen Bren’s Div was to attack from the flk. Thus, one of the
bde of Bren’s Div was earmarked for mov down to Western entrance to Khatmia Pass.

60. Gen Albert Mandler, on his way to attend the plg conf brought down his heptr in full
view of the Egyptians. He also passed his loc on radio in the open. He was killed in the next
30 sec. Brig Kalman Megan took over the Div Cdr.

SECTION 34 : DAY NINE - SUN, 14 OCT 1973

Egyptian Attack

61. At 0615 hr, the air attack commenced. At 0630 hr , behind a hy arty barrage, at a line
of screens 5000 yds away the Egyptian forces were launched on three main thrusts and No
of subdy thrusts. These were as under :-
(a) Northern Sect. Two armd bdes adv from area of Kantara with the obj of
reaching Rumani. Cdos were heliported in marshland area to cover the flk.
(b) Central Sect. Four Armd bdes broke out of the Br H along the central route
leading from Ismailia towards Khatmia Pass for Bir Gifgafa. Facing them was
Sharon’sDiv.
(c) Southern Sect. Two tk bdes attempted to breakout eastwards, towards Mitla
Pass. Facing them was Magen’s Div.
(d) Subdy Thrusts. One mech bde mov towards the Giddi Pass and three bdes
mov towards Ras Sudar Valley along the coast of Gulf of Suez.

62. In the battle it was twelve Egyptian Armd bdes against four armd divs ofIsrael. Thus
began one of the largest tk battles in the history with 2000 tks locked up in battle along
entire front. Egyptian main thrust was aimed towards EL Tasa and Bir Gifgafa.

Israelis

63. Israelis had carefully prep for the battle. Israelis faced the attack as under :-
(a) Northern Sect. Bren’s force succeeded in checking the attack by 1000 hr.
Israelis CA and re-est contact with strong pt at Budapest.
(b) Central Sect. There were two main tk clashes, first near the Chinese Farms in
which Egyptian tk bde had been destroyed suffering 93 tk losses against 3 of Israelis.
In the sec, Egyptian Armd Div ranged against Sharon’s forces and by the end of day’s
battle incurred a total loss of 110 tks.
(c) Southern Sect. Egyptian effort of deep Southerly flanking mov to reach Mitla
pass from South came up against Israeli forces and was halted.
(d) Subdy Thrusts. The forces adv towards Giddi Pass were halted half way near
Jebel Shaifa . The other mov towards Ras Sudar Valley turned North and tried to mov
through Moses Springs to Giddi Pass. It was caught on a flk by the Israelis and were
annihilated. Israeli AF entered the battle and with in 2 h some 60 tks and large no of
APCs were destroyed.

Assessment

64. Egyptians. Their attacks failed. Not a single adv regd success. Egyptians suffered
very hy cas from air, ATGMS and Israeli armr. By evening, Gen Ismail orderd his forces to
fall back to the Br Hs. Egyptians forces lacked imagination. 200 Egyptian tks were lost in
fighting and another 50 during withdrawl. The Egyptians were surprised by the Israeli tks
and ATGMs on all axes. Their attack could not cross the Sup Rd which was their inter obj.

65. Israelis. Result of this maj battle raised Israeli morale. Their losses were only 60 tks
against 250 suffered by the Egyptians. Israelis tfr three mech and one armd bde on the ni
14/15 Oct from Golan front to Sinai, after they had successfully thrown back the Syrians
from the Golan Heights. The forces maint contact with the Egyptians , mov fwd their guns
and carried out hy bombardment of cnl line def and AD guns on the west bank. They were
now prep for their offensive across the cnl. The day was undoubtedly a turning pt for the
Israelis.

Justification for Delay in Egyptian Attack

66. Gen Ismail’s cautiousness during the first week of war came under great criticism and
cost Arabs their likely victory. Gen Ismail was hesitant of facing Israeli armr w/o SAM cover.

67. However, Gen Ismail def himself by giving following reasons :-
(a) From the dply of forces, the Egyptian aim was ltd to the est a ltd br Hs across
the Suez Cnl and not to capture Sinai.
(b) Safety and protection of Egyptian tps was a paramount factor in the plg of ops.
Hence the adv of forces was restd to the limits of SAM cover.
(c) A deliberate pause had been planned after the est of initial br H to study the
Israeli reaction and re-eval of the sit. It was hoped that international intervention
would take place within a week.

Causes for Hy Egyptian Casualties

68. The Israelis completely abandoned their Gung Ho tac and switched to conventional
ones. They allowed the Egyptians to mov out of their AD cover and then ‘Killed’ them by
emp of their air power. Their tks adopted shoot and scoot tac to the max benefit.

69. The Israelis made liberal use of atk msls incl TOW , issued the day prior. The Israeli
tks fought as coys now, they ex strict fire cont and picked up their tgts accurately.

70. On 14 Oct, the Israelis had their mechinf, mors and atk wpns with the ldg tks. Now,
the tks also had HE amn which effectively broke the inf fmns.

71. Disadvantages of Egyptian Tks.
(a) The Egyptian T-54 and T-55 tks could dip their guns only 4 deg below the
horizontal line and hence had to expose their under belly by coming up the sand
dunes to engage the tgts. Israeli Pattons could dip their guns 10 deg below the
horizontal, enjoying the advantage of shooting from behind the sand dunes and thus
presenting small silhouettes.
(b) Egyptian tks could only fire AP shells where as Israeli tks could fire APDS, HE
and HEAT amn in addn to AP shell.

SECTION 35 : TOWARDS THE END - 15-17 OCT 1973

72. As per anticipation of Gen Ismail, the Isaelis attacked the br H with nine bdes. These
series of attacks were all along the front and the Great Bitter Lake. All these attacks were
repulsed between 15 to 17 Oct.

73. Op badr, a spectacular Egyptian initial success was now losing the momentum of
attack and the Israeli mood was upswing ready to take battle into the Egyptian territory.
CHAPTER – 9 : BATTLE ON SYRIAN FRONT

Historical Perspective

1. Syria has an area of about 72,000 sq miles. It had a history of political turmoil after its
independence. The Feb 1966 coup brought the Army to power under President Hafez Al
Assad. It shares its borders with Lebanon and Israel in the west and Jordan in the South.

2. The Golan hts area on the Syrian Israeli border had been captured and occupied by the
Israelis during the “Six day war” in Jun 67.

SECTION 36 : GOLAN HEIGHTS

3. Topo In Brief.
(a) It extends from the lower slopes of Mt Hermon in the north to the northern bank
of Yarmuk river near the Jordanian border.
(b) From north to south the dist across the plateau is about 55 km (at Kuneitra).
(c) Slopes on the eastern side are gentler.
(d) Comn. The only rd that links northern Israel to the Golan hts is over the Benat
Yakov br, on to Kuneitra and Damascus.

4. Strat Imp of Golan Hts.
(a) Dominates the adjoining Israeli territories by obsn.
(b) Acts as an impregnable line of def against the Israelis.
(c) Arty locs/OPs is the Golan hts could bring down hy and accurate fire is the
surrounding plains.

SECTION 37 : CFL –1967

5. It ran from a pt on the Syrian Lebanon border north of Baniyas (on the slopes of Mt
Hermon) south - eastwards to a few Km east of Kuneitra, then in a gen southerly dirn to
West of Boutemiye and onwards to the Yarmuk river. The CFL also called the “Purple Line”
was manned by the UN observers. A no man’s land varying half to one mile in width existed
between Syria and Israel.

Threat Perception to Israel

6. The central sector was the most strongly held. The greatest threat from Syrians lay
along the axis Ahmediya-Khushniye because an en attack aimed at Kuneitra and then
astride the rd to the Yakov br presented, the shortest apch to northern Israel.

7. From the pt of view of Israelis offensive def strat also, this sector was the most obvious
spring bd, for a pre-emptive offensive aimed at encircling Damascus from the south and
east.

Israeli Concept of Def

8. The Israeli concept on the def of Golan hts was to hold the defs initially with a small
force. Massive close air sp was to be emp to hold Syrian offensive in a bid to gain time for
mob of res. Overall plan was based on the following assumptions: -
(a) Ability to gain adv warning of impending Syrian offensive.
(b) Capability to mob res in time.
(c) Capability to face Syrian attack inspite of adverse one is to three numerical ratio.

9. Israeli Appre. Israelis had appre that in case of Syrian offensive, the main attack was
likely to devp along Kuneitra-Banot Yakov br axis as it would open Syrian axis of maint for
their further ops into Israel. Israeli views were strengthened by the fact that most of the
Syrian hy arty was dply along this axis. The Rafid axis, was considered as secy apch by Gen
Hofi, the GOC Northern Sect. However Maj Gen Raful Etyan differed in his views and
expected Syrian offensive along Rafid opening. Subsequent events, however, were to prove
him right.

10. Israeli Def Lines. Israelis had three lines of defs in the Golan heights Sect. These
were :-
(a) First Line of Def. Followed the alignment from north of Kuneitra to west of
Rafid. A strong pt housed a two storey underground structure for men living and
storage for ration, amn and eqpt. Fire bays were built on top, which were flushed
with the grnd.
(b) Sec Line of Defs. This was 3-5 km in depth of the first, following the aligment
of hts East of Jordan R and passing through Nafekh and Khusniye.
(c) Third Line of Def. Behind the sec line of def, tks with inf, A tk guns and ATGMs
were gp into def locs along the Jordan R, forming third line of defs. Mount Hermon was
converted into a strong fortress. A rdr stn was housed in it and it was def by a coy of
spl forces. It provided good obsn both inside Syria, Lebanon and Israel.

11. Israeli Comd Set Up.
(a) The Israeli Northern Comd was resp for the Syrian Front. Maj Gen Isaac Hofi was
the Cdr of Northern Sect with his HQ at Nafekh. Gen Hofi had under him Maj Gen Dan
Lanner and Maj Gen Raphul Eytan, both as cdrs designate of ugdhas (ugdah is a div
size TF ) which could be formed on mob, prior to the commencement of hostilities.
(b) In all, Israelis had the capability of fielding approx 12 bdes for the ops on the
Syrian Front. In the normal `no war – no peace’ posture the Israelis had dply Barak
Bde (a reg armd bde) to man the def of the Syrian Front, along the `Purple Line’. The
Barak Bde was a highly competent fmn and fully familiarized with the trn.

SECTION 38 : SYRIAN DEF LINES

12. Syrians had also org their defs based on three parallel def lines. These were : -
(a) First Line of Def. It ran parallel to the `Purple Line’ at a distance varying from
three to five km. It provided series of screens or adv posns to the main defs in the
depth.
(b) Sec Line of Def. The sec line of def ran approx 15 km East of the First line
starting from Mount Hermon, passing through Sassa down to Lasim. It had well prep
def based on features with natural def potential.
(c) Third Line of Def. It ran 10-15 km East of the ‘Sec Line of Def ’ starting from
NW of Damascus running SE towards Mesmiye.

SECTION 39 : FORCE LEVEL

13. Syrian Armed Forces. Ever since its failure against Israelis during 67 war, the
Syrian Army commanded little respect and had a political, rather than professional
reputation. However, President Assad in two years prior to the 73 war did a great deal to
improve the quality of armed forces. A great deal of attn was paid to the trg, morale and
offr ldrship. Syrian drew apt lessons from their defeat in 67 war and applied them in
following aspects :-
(a) Devp highly conc A tk def sys from CFL (Purple Line) to Damascus, based on
ATGMs, tks and RCL guns.
(b) Carried out large scale offensive ex which were in fact dress rehearsals for the
1973 offensive.
(c) Spl emphasis was laid on trg pertaining to br, constr of A tk ditches, obst
breaching and break out ops.

14. Str of The Syrian Armed Forces.
(a) Army. Syrian army was primarily equipped by the Russians and comprised of :-
(i) Two armd divs (An armd div had approx 250 tks).
(ii) Three inf divs (Each inf div had two inf bdes, one tk bde and one mech
bde). Two of the inf divs were converted to mech divs by Sep 73.
(iii) Five indep inf bdes (incl two cdo bdes).
(iv) Seven Arty bdes.
(v) Twelve btys of SAM 2 and SAM 3. SAM 6 and SAM 7 replaced SAM 2 and
SAM 3 by Sep 73.
(b) AF. Consisted of the following acs: -

(i) MIG 17 - 80
(ii) SU 7 - 30
(iii) MIG 21 - 200
(c) The above force level does not incl reorg and new raisings, following the receipt
of large qty of sophisticated arms and eqpt from Russia. The AF also acquired an extra
sqn of SU 7s and a sqn of the variable wg Sukhoi by Sep73.

SECTION 40 : SYRIAN OFFENSIVE

Gen

15. After their convincing victory over Syria in 1967 the Israelis held the Syrian armed
forces in low esteem. It was considered to be a political army with mediocre professional
skills. President Assad stressed on improving the quality of his armed forces during the
previous two yrs. Thanks to his efforts a high tech std had been achieved and ldrship
improved considerably.
Aim

16. To recapture the Golan hts.

The Offensive Plans

17. After considering a number of options and weighing the pros and cons, the Syrian
high comd decided on a frontal aslt across the Golan Plateau. The attack was to be launched
from three sectors, each axis deploying a mech inf div, reinforced by a bde of armr.

SECTION 41 : DPLY OF FORCES

18. Northern Sector.
(a) Force. 7 (Mech) Inf Div (Brig Abrash).
(b) Task. To attack west and south-west from the area of Ahmediye and aim to
make for the lip of the Golan plateau, keeping north of the main rd. The right flk of 7
Div was to be protected by an indep bde mov parallel to it along Mt Hermon’s lower
slopes.

19. Central Sector
(a) Force. 9 (Mech) Inf Div (Col Hassan Turkmani).
(b) Task. To attack from area west of Tel EI Harrar, overrun Kafr Noffakh and
make for the Benat Yakov br. This Div was to op on the main rd and south of it.

20. Southern Sector.
(a) Force. 5 (Mech) Inf Div (Brig Mustafa Sharba).
(b) Task. To attack from the area of Rafid south-westwards towards Lake Tiberias.

21. Capture of Mount Hermon. A spl cdo TF.

22. Res. 3 Armd Div and 1 Armd Div were held in res to sp Northern and Southern
thrusts respectively.

Syrian Tac

23. Salient aspects of Syrian tac are as enumerated below: -
(a) Offensive spear headed by mech div.
(b) Armr allotted to mech div to enable aslt being lead by tks with inf in APC
following close behind.
(c) Syrian armr was org in gps of 7-10 tks, each gp accompanied by 2-3 APCs
carrying inf.
(d) Covering fire was provided by an arty barrage.

SECTION 42 : SURPRISE, SECURITY AND DECEPTION

24. Achieving surprise was an imp factor in the Syrian Plg for offensive. Measures taken
to achieve surprise and ensure tight security were as under :-
(a) Surprise. Steps taken were: -

(i) Complete secrecy was maint, till the last moment about the timings of H
Hr.
(ii) Sub unit cdrs were info about the timing of H hr an hour before the
commencement of the offensive.
(iii) Level of secrecy can be estimated from the fact that Syrian strat partner
Iraq also came to know about the offensive through a radio broadcast.
(iv) Recce of the en disposns was very carefully planned.
(v) All movs were carried out during the H of darkness. Normal activity contd
during the daytime. Cam and Concealment was of a high std.
(b) Deception. Measures taken to deceive the Israelis were: -

(i) Syrians Propagated that the reasons for the emergency dply of forces were
in anticipation to the expected Israeli attack. Syrians openly declared that should
the Israely attack materialize, the Syrian forces would CA. Similar cover story
was painted for the `Moroccan Expeditionary Forces’.
(ii) Routine activity contd on the front line.
(c) Security. To ensure high std of security, Syrians undertook the following:-
(i) Sealed the area of ops to unauth pers.
(ii) All OOs were written in hand.
(iii) Higher cdrs and offrs mov w/o badges of rk, in the front line.

SECTION 43 : ISRAELI PREP FOR BATTLE

25. Athough the Israelis did get a lot of hints of the impending offensive, their traditional
tinge of contempt for the Syrian force prevented them from taking alarm at these devps.

26. Indications of Impending Offensive. Some obvious indicators of the build up
were :-
(a) Israeli tps in Northern sector could see lines of tks formed up in area of
Ahmediye, North of the main rd.
(b) Before dawn on 06 Oct 73, noise of mov of tks and APC from assy A to short of
the CFL could be heard by Israeli sentries on the Golan slopes.

27. Redply of Israelis Forces. The only readjustment of forces was the mov of 7 Armd
Bde to reinforce Northern Comd. The Barak Bde was holding the entire Israeli def line with
both its bns dply.

SECTION 44 : PRELIM OPS - CAPTURE OF MOUNT HERMON

28. Strat Imp of Mount Hermon. With a ht of approx 6600 ft it had the following
obvious advantages.
(a) Provided a bird’s eye view of the adjacent territories of Syria and Lebanon.
(b) Ideal site for rdr stn and housing sensitive electronic eqpt.

29. Force Level. Gen a sec str comprising of one offr and thirteen ORs def the fortress.
On the “Yom Kippur Day” a total of 55 pers, incl int pers to man rdr eqpt and service pers
for its maint were stationed there.

30. Exec of Ops. This was a Cdo action carried out in the following manner.
(a) About 1100hr on 06 Oct 73 four MI 8 heptrs took off from an air fd at Damascus
carrying crack cdos.
(b) They circled wide to the North apch main fortress from behind to gain surprise.
(c) At 1345h, the Syrian arty started shelling the Israeli posn at Mt Hermon.
(d) At 1445h three out of the four MI 8 arr at Mount Hermon and discharged their
tps. One heptr was a cas.
(e) Personnal manning post were caught in their slippers playing.
(f) After a hand-to-hand fight the fortress was captured in less than half an hr.
(g) Subsequently a Moroccan contingent was pushed up to secure the lower slope of
the apch to Mount Hermon.

SECTION 45 : MAIN SYRIAN OFFENSIVE : 06 OCT 73

31. The H hr was 1500h (1400h Israeli std Time) on 06 Oct 73 the Syrian armr attacked
behind a hy curtain of arty fire that lasted 90 min.

32. Doctrine. Syrians followed the Soviet doctrine of leading the attack with colns of tks
in massed fmns. Mech and inf bdes were to secure the initial ft hold on the First Israeli Line
of Def to enable the armd bdes of mech inf divs to pass through.

Initial Success By Syrian Forces

33. 7 Div. Syrian 7 Div forming the Northern arm was pitched against Israeli 7 Armd Bde
under Col Avigdor. Syrians attacked in waves in an effort to get past the anti tk ditch of
Israeli defs. However they suffered hy cas and withdrew at 0300h 07 Oct. They lost approx
80 tk.

34. 9 Div. It was pitted against Barak Bde but was numerically ten times that of Israeli
force level. Since the Syrians succeeded in making a dent in the central sector they
sidestepped 3 Armd Div from Katana to reinforce success. 3 Armd Div alongwith 1 Armd
Div were pushed through the opening between Tel Kudre and Refid to expl the Syrian break
through.

35. 5 Div. It attacked from south of Refid in SW dirn towards El Al. By first lt 07 Oct 73
the elements of 5 Div were near Ramet Megshimim and El Al, over looking the sea of
Galilee.

SECTION 46 : HOLDING ACTION BY ISRAELIS

36. The sheer ferocity of the Syrian attack eventually rolled the Israelis back on all three
sectors with maj gains in the Central sector. Since the Golan plateau extends only approx
18 miles from East to West and the reservists had not yet arr at the units, the Israelis were
left with the only option to stand and fight where they were till reservers could be built up
to launch a CA.

37. 7 Armd Bde. Cdr Brig Eytan. It was resp for def of entire Northern sect of Golan
heights. Aided with ATGMs, it succeeded in halting the adv of the Syrian 78 Tk Bde North of
Natokh Sassa rd.

38. Barak Bde. It bore the brunt of the 9 Syrian Div and suffered hy losses. By a rough
estimates it was reduced to just about 15 tks by the ni of 06 Oct 73.

Prog of Ops

39. 07 Oct 73.
(a) Syrian 7 Inf Div and 3 Armd Div launched two attacks against the 7 Armd Bde.
(b) First attack was launched at 0800 h between Booster and Hermonit with the aim
to breakout towards Wasset. The Israeli 7 armd bde dply at Red Ridge fired at the
Syrian tks. It was beaten back and by 1300h Syrians withdrew.
(c) Sec attack was launched at 2200h sp by hy arty shelling. However finally the
Syrians withdrew leaving 130 tks in the valley of Tears (area between Hermonit and
Tel EI Booster)
(d) 1 Syrian Armd Div reached Tel Abu Nazir.
(e) Col Ben Shaom, Cdr Barak Bde killed while withdrawing to Nafekh.
(f) 1 Syrian Div reached within five miles of the Yakov br.
(g) 5 Syrian Div reached a km short of EL Al with one Bde about six km short of Arik
Br, They did not mov further due to following reason :-
(i) No opposition on such a vital axis was interpreted as a trap set up by the
en.
(ii) Stuck to copy book style battle and did not strive to expl success.
(h) At 2200 h Israeli 79 Armd Bde under Col Ori are the first rft to arrive. Cleared
area around Nefekh by ni 0700h.
(j) Israeli res 17 Bde and 19 Bde effectively checked Syrian adv towards Jorden R
and El Al respectively.
(k) Israeli AF successfully bombed Jordan valley and Golan ridges but in the process
suffered hy cas i.e 30 sky hawks and 10 Phantoms to the SAM 6 msls.

40. 08 Oct 73.
(a) The res began to arr in the central sector.
(b) Syria launched a massive attack on ni 08 Oct, which lasted for three hr. However
the attack was beaten back by the Israeli 7 Armd Bde.
(c) Leading Bde of Syrian 1 Armd Div managed to get past Laner’s forces and
reached Snobar, just ten mins drive from Jordan R.
(d) Syrian 5 Div fought the whole day against a part of Peled’s Div and suffered
heavily.
(e) Gen Raful Eytun had been made the cdr of all Israeli forces North of Yakov-
Kuneitra rd. 7 Armd Bde contd to face the Syrian on-slaught and was left with just 40
tks. It fought brilliantly and succeeded in halting the onslaugh of a force ten times it
size.
(f) Laner’s Div waged a bitter battle against the Syrian forces in Nafekh and Yehudia
areas. 79 Bde managed to check the Syrian deepest penetration in Snobar area
where the Syrians had almost got to the Yakov Br. Laner’s Div had succeeded in
checking the Syrian adv in the central sect and inflicted hy damage on Syrian armr.
(g) Peled’s Div was pressed into action in the Southern sect and commenced its CAs
against the Syrian 5 Div.

SECTION 47 : ISRAELI COUNTER OFFENSIVE

Gen

41. The Israelis offensive def strat always allotted first priority to the Egyptian front.
However, the premise of this Israeli strat was the initiative with Israelis from the start.
Thrown entirely on the def, Israeli High Comd had to make a decision to switch strat priority
from the Southern to Northern front, entailing considerable disruption in the mob plan.
Ingenuity of Israeli GS, however, met the challenge. Barely 48 h after the commencement
of Syrian offensive, the orders for a maj Israeli counter offensive had been issued.

Aim

42. To throw the Syrians back on the ‘Purple Line’.

Prog of Ops

43. 11 Oct.
(a) The Israelis held an almost continuous line east of the CFL in the Central sector,
running roughly north and south of Ahmediye.
(b) The Israeli mil rabbinate accorded permission to the armed forces to continue
fighting.
(c) Israeli navy struck a No of tgts on the Syrian coast between Latakia and Tartus.
(d) Israeli AF strafed Syrian cites and the Golan heights.
(e) Estimated Cas.

(i) Syrian.
(aa) 8 Patrot boats.
(ab) 11 acs.
(ii) Israeli.
(aa) 8 Ptl boats.
(ab) 87 ac (as claimed by Syria).

44. 12 Oct 73.
(a) Israeli adv towards Damascus continued on a narrow front astride the rd.
(b) Syria pockets of resistance kept harassing Israeli colns.
(c) Syrians withdrew systematically to their sec line of def just east of Sassa about
40 Km from Damascus.

45. 13 Oct 73.
(a) The Israelis had brought up two armd Ugdahs and an inf bde for the proposed
storming of the Syrian def line.
(b) However this plan was dropped for the following reasons :-
(i) Adv on a narrow front towards Damascus would creat a dangerous salient
at Sassa.
(ii) A more promising alt in the form of a gap between the 7 Div astride the
main rd and the 5 Div in the south.

SECTION 48 : IRAQ AND JORDAN JOIN THE WAR

Iraqi Force Level

46. The total force level of Iraqi army was :-
(a) Two Armd divs (plus a third under raising).
(b) Two mtn divs.
(c) Four inf divs.
(d) One para bde.

47. Eqpt Profile.
(a) Armd div equipped with Russian T-54 & T-55 tks.
(b) Third Armd div under raising, likely to get T-62s.

48. Force dply on borders. Due to its dispute with Iran and the Kurdish tribes the
following force level was dply at the northern border:-
(a) Two mtn bdes.
(b) One armd div.
(c) One Inf div.

49. Force level Sent to Syria. After diplomatic moves to secure the safety of its borders
the force level sent to Syria is as enumerated below : -
(a) Two Armd Divs.
(b) AF – 26 Sukhois and 14 MIG 21s.

Ops By Iraqi Forces

50. The ops were conducted as follows (Ref Appx C):-
(a) On 11 Oct 73, 12 Armd Bde conc at Sanamein.
(b) It was mov from Sanamein to the first def line to plug the gap between the 7 Div
and 5 Div.
(c) Israelis desp strong mob coln towards Harrar and Sanamein.
(d) 12 Armd Bde was attacked on its vulnerable left flk by Israeli armd coln,
consisting of about 100-120 tks.
(e) Iraqi wh left to face the threat and a furious tk battle followed but Iraqis lost out
due to following reasons: -
(i) Tired after unprecedented mov over 1000 Km in two days.
(ii) No time for rest, reorg and repair of eqpt.
(iii) Outside the SAM AD cover of Syria.
(iv) Russian tks out gunned by Israeli tks.
(v) SS-11 and TOW msl outranged the Iraqi Cobra anti tk msl.
(f) Leading elements of 6 Armd Bde arr on ni 11/12 Oct to rescue the 12 Armd Bde,
forming a comp bde.
(g) This comp bde was tasked to hold a sector north of Tel al Harrar to south of
Sassa.
(h) On 17 Oct 73 a Iraqi Mtn bde reached the battle front.
(j) On 19 Oct 73 a third Iraqi tk bde (of 6 Armd Div ) arr along with the 6 Armd
Div.

Problems Faced By Iraqi Forces

51. Shortage of Tk tptr.
(a) Two armd divs with approx 300 tks, plus APC of mech inf reqd to be tptd across
1000 Km.
(b) Total availability of three tk tptr coys totalling about 270 veh incl certain un-
roadworthy.
(c) Jordan refused to permit use of the route through Jordan from Rutbah.
(d) The Problem was resolved as follows: -

(i) Certain Tk Tpts loaned by Jordan.
(ii) Some tks started mov on trs (to be ferried later en route).
(iii) APC tptd by civ hy load carriers.

52. Comd and Cont. Org of Jt Arab Comd reqd all Arab forces sp Egypt and Syria to op
under the comd of the Egyptian and Syrian GHQ. For a contingent as large as that of Iraq
such an arng caused resentment.

53. Lack of Sr Offrs.
(a) Iraqi army lacked sr offrs mainly because of insecurity of tenure in the higher
rks, due to prevalent political conditions.
(b) Due to lack of experienced sr cdrs it is reported that the divs earmarked to mov
first into battle were commanded by Brigs, Lt Cols and even Majs.

SECTION 49 : FORCE LEVEL OF JORDANIAN ARMY

54. The overall force level available was :-
(a) Two inf divs.
(b) One armd div.
(c) One indep inf bde.
(d) One Saudi Arabian bde.
(e) One Armd div and a mech div under raising.
(f) Rft from Saudi Arabia could amount to another inf bde and two armd regts loc at
Tebuk.
(g) AF - Two sqns of Hunters and two of F-104 Star fighter.

55. The most they could be expected to do, as far as the overall Arab plan was
concerned, was to tie down Israeli forces along the Jordan river and to act as a deterrent to
a possible Israeli strike at Syria, south of lake Tiberias through Jordanian territory.

56. The disposn of these forces was as follows :
(a) 1st and 2nd Inf div occupied deliberate def posns covering the apchs from Israel
to Jordan across the river Jordan. 1 Div in the area of Irbid and Ajlun and 2 Div in the
area across the main Jerusalem-Amman rd.
(b) In depth was the 3 Armd Div around Mafraq. 4 Mech Div was being raised in
Amman. 5 Armd Div was being raised at Zarqa, just north of Amman. Both were still
in “skeleton” stg amounting to not much more then a bde each.
(c) The southern sector, stretching from south of the Dead Sea to the port of Aqaba,
was covered by the 11 Saudi Inf Bde strung out from Kerak to Maan and the 4
Jordanian Indep Inf Bde between Maan and Aqaba.

57. Ops by the Jordanian Forces. (Ref Appx C)
(a) On 06 Oct 73, forces placed on alert.
(b) On 07 Oct 73, total mob ordered.

(c) During ni 11/12 Oct 73, 40 Armd Bde of 3 Armd div (Two tk bns) ordered to
mov to the Syrian front.
(d) On 13 Oct 73, fmn arr at Shaikh Meskine just in time to plug the gap between
the Iraqis at the Sanamein sector and the Boutimiya axis.
(e) Susequently Jordan sent in 92 Armd Bde and finally the rest of 3 Armd div,
which loc itself at Sheikh Meskine.
(f) The Jordanians held their positions and the def line was maint.
(g) Israelis began to tfr forces towards the Sinai area.
(h) Rfts from Saudi Arabia and Moroccans kept pouring in.

58. Problem Faced.
(a) A mut agreed upon call sign for the armd fmn wireless net had not been alloted.
(b) Since the Iraqis were not info about the Jordanian tks (Centurians which were
also possessed by the Israelis but not by the Iraqi-Syrian forces) they shot up five
Jordanian tks by mistake.

Combined Syrian-Iraqi-Jordanian Offensive

59. Although details of ops during this period have not yet been revealed it is learnt that
on 16 Oct a Div Sized Force (DSF) offensive was mtd by a combined Syrian –Iraqi-Jordanian
force from the area of Tel el Harrar, aimed at cutting the Israeli L of C west of Kuneitra. The
plan was for the Jordanian bde to spearhead the aslt and breakthrough on a narrow front.

Problems Confronted in Jt Ops

60. Problems in Jt ops conducted by the Arab forces were :-
(a) Lack of coord of fire plan resulting in Jordanian forces running into an Iraqi arty
barrage.
(b) Lack of IFF, lead to a flt of Syrian MIGs strafing the Jordanians by mistake.

The First Cease Fire : 22 Oct 73

61. Both Syria and Iraq refused to ack the cease fire and resolved to continue the war
against Israel although w/o any substantial gains.

Capture of Mount Hermon : 21-22 Oct 73

62. At 1400h, on 21 Oct, a para force was heli lifted for the capture of Syrian Hermon. By
0330h, on 22 Oct, Syrian Hermon was in the hands of Israelis. Golani bde captured Israeli
Hermon by 1000h, on 22 Oct against very hy odds, suffering approx 51 dead and 100
wounded.

Application of Principles of War.

63. The principles of war that were applied or ignored during this offensive on the Syrian
front are :
(a) Surprise.
(i) It was not a complete surprise because Israel had put her forces on alert
partially. They had mob the 7th Tks Bde to battle loc. Surprise was only to the
extent that the Israeli res were not fully mob as per mob schemes.
(ii) The selection of “Yom Kippur Day” was also very scientific and helped in
achieving partial success.
(b) Conc of Force.

(i) Syrian 5 Div fritted away its str by mov South and not conc towards main
axis.
(ii) The massed use of mech forces helped flood the Israeli forces and it was
pure qty which overwhelmed the Israeli forces in the initial period of the battle.
(c) Maint of Momentum. Inspite of suffering serious losses the Syrian’s continued
to adv, during the ni and day. This was due to their firm determination to achieve
their obj. Res forces were kept suitably placed to expl success.
(d) Flexibility. Israelis showed tremendous offensive def to beat back the Syrian
attack at strat, op and tac levels.
(e) Offensive Action. Israelis adopted tacs of offensive def to beat back the Syrian
attack at Strat, Op and tac lerds.
CHAPTER 10 : OP GAZELLE

SECTION 50 : GEN

1. A plan for xg the Suez cnl existed with Israelis for a long time. As GOC Southern
Comd ,Gen Sharon had ample opportunity of plg and preparing for this task . He had even
pre selected the site for the xg. By an extraordinary coincidence, this site Lay within the
“gap” in Egypt’s West bank defs. Fortunately for the Israelis, it was situated in one of the
areas, where Bar Lev defs were most difficult to cross, which forced Egyptians to abandon
this site in favour of another site.

2. Results of 14 Oct gave Gen Bar Lev assurance against two maj worries:-
(a) Vulnerability of xg ops to sec Egyptian Army CAs .
(b) Reaction of Egyptian GHQ res during consolidation stg of br H ops.

3. A No of factors led to the Israeli decision to cross the suez cnl. These were:-
(a) Success in gigantic Armr battle on 14 Oct.
(b) Assurance by USA for mil mtrl as well as sharing of info regarding thinly held
gap on both sides of cnl.
(c) Existence of well rehearsed plan for such an op.
(d) Realizing that cease fire was in offing the Israeli high comd was not keen to
loose time .

Aim

4. Political. To Acquire part of Egyptians territory on the west bank so as to use it as
leverage in the political bargaining after declaration of ceasefire.

5. Mil. To est br H on the West Bank and cont territory upto the cnl rd with a view to
contain or even cut off Egyptian Third Army.

Force Level

6. Egypt.
(a) East Bank. Egyptian Sec Army’s flk, which extended between Lake Timash and
Great Bitter Lake, was manned by a bde ex 16 Div. Egyptian Third Army’s left flk
extended upto Northern shore of Great Bitter Lake and was held by 7 Div. A 25 Km
gap which existed between the two armies was patrolled by armd colns.
(b) West Bank. Home Bank of the Lakes was def by well trained Kuwaiti Bde and
Palestine National Gd (Not well equipped). Adequate armr res were NA as the res
armd div had crossed over to the East Bank on 14 Oct for the offensive.

7. Israeli. Israeli counter-offensive force for the cnl xg and est of br H comprised of
approx three divs, with tasks as under :-
(a) Maj Gen Sharon’s Div to secure a corridor on the Eastern Bank and est initial ft-
hold on the West Bank.
(b) A TF of over div str incl ptrs under Maj Gen Bren was earmarked for effecting the
xg and est br H on the West Bank.
(c) 3 Armd bdes and an arty bde under Maj Gen Magen were to undertake
consolidation and enlargement of by H.

SECTION 51 : ISRAELI PLAN

8. Israelis planned to carry out the op in two parts :-
(a) Part I. Securing a corridor on the Eastern Bank through the Egyptian br H to
incl Chinese Farm area and Missouri strong pt.
(b) Part II. Effect xg across the Suez Cnl and est of br H.

9. Part I. Gen Sharon, who was given the task of securing a corridor across the Egyptian
br H in the area of Deversoir and secure initial ft hold on the West Bank, planned to
carryout the task in three ph :-
(a) Ph I. Armed Bde under Tuvia was to launch a feint attack from North of El Tasa
towards Sec Egyptian Army defs on 15 Oct at 1700h, in a bid to divert and pin down
Egyptian forces at Televizia and Hamtul.
(b) Ph II. Another armd bde gp under Amnon was to make a wide Southernly
sweep swinging West through the gap in the Egyptian defs and hit the Cnl rd. Ph II
was to commence at 1800h, 15 Oct.
(c) Ph III. After hitting the cnl rd South of the xg site Amnon’s Bde was to divide
itself into three gps and undertake the following :-
(i) Gp ‘A’. Capture Israeli fortfn at Matzmed and secure the xg site.
(ii) Gp ‘B’. Mov NE and clear Akavish rd to enable mov fwd of xg force.
(iii) Gp ‘C’. Push Northwards to contain the corridor in the direction of Chinese
Farm.

10. Part II. Xg of cnl and est of initial br H by Para Bde (under comd Gen Sharon) and
Gen Aden’s Div at 2300h on 16 Oct, was to be ph 4 of the ops. Gen Magen’s Div was
earmarked to consolidate and enlarge the br H.

Comments on the Israeli Plan

11. The whole plan was rather bold and complicated. Salient aspects, however were :-
(a) The plan was anchored on one basic assumption that aslt br across the Suez
Cnl would be ready by first lt, 16 Oct.
(b) Part I of the plan had to be exec entirely in the h of darkness.
(c) Timings were very optimistic as xg of the Suez Cnl at 2300 h by the ptrs meant
that Amnon’s Armd Bde just had 5h to accomplish the following :-
(i) Cover an apch route of approx 30 Km through the sand
dunes.
(ii) Fight a ni battle to secure a corridor to the xg site.
(iii) Link up with engr TF and then guide xg force to the xg site.

SECTION 52 : CONDUCT

15 OCT 73

Part 1

12. Ph I. Ph I was launched at 1700h on 15 Oct as planned. Tuvia’s Bde attacked
Televizia and Hamutal. Bde was successful in drawing out Egyptian 16 Inf Div and 21 Armd
Div in the direction of Tasa-Ismalia rd and diverting the Egyptian attn to the Northern sect.

13. Ph II. Amnon’s Armd Bde Gp was launched at 1800h, under the deception cover, as
planned. The bde after covering a distance of 30 Km reached the Cnl rd at ‘Y’ junc and
split into three gps as planned, though behind schedule. Subsequent events were, as
under :-
(a) Matzmed strong pt was captured as planned.
(b) B and C Gps mov NE and North confronting stiff opposition and suffering very hy
losses. B Gp successfuly opened Akavish El Tasa rd but the xg force found it blocked
again and had to fight its way out to the Chinese Farm
(c) At 2315h, C Gp withdrew under hy pressure. Area between the cnl and Missouri
strong pt was a scene of hy tk destruction. Amnon’s Bde failed to open Tirtur rd.

Part 2

14. Para Bde Gp. The Bde under Col Matt commenced adv at 1630h w/o boats and
reached El Tasa at 1900h. At 2100h the boats were given to the bde. The Bde came under
hy fire, on nearing Akavish – Tirtur rd, where its tk coy was wiped out. By mid-ni the Bde
was near the br marshalling yd.

15. In spite of grand confusion, a force of 20 tks and 7 APCs under Col Haim crossed over
to the West Bank by mid ni.

16 OCT 73

Sharon’s Div

16. Amnon’s Bde. Amnon’s Bde succeeded in capturing the cross rd area, though
suffering hy cas by using attrition and nibbling tacs, instead of resorting to traditional Israeli
storming technique. However, the Egyptian thrust from North of Chinese Farm area forced
Amnon to withdraw to the Lakekan strong pt.

17. Matt’s Para Bde. At 0030h on 16 Oct, the Bde aslt gp reached pre-selected xg site.
At 0135h, first wave crossed the cnl. By 0800h, Matt’s force was holding a br H extending
three miles northwards from Great Bitter Lake. 30 tks and 2000 men incl Gen Sharon’s Tac
HQ were across the cnl on the West Bank by 0930 h.

18. Prefabricated aslt br had been damaged in the process of being towed to the br site.
By dawn 16 Oct, br H had not been est and even the Tirtur and Lexicon rds leading to the br
site had not been cleared.

19. Expl by Gen Sharon. Gen Sharon decided to expl success irrespective of the aslt br
being launched. Gen Sharon, realized that his small force had very ltd def potential against
Egyptian CA: therefore planned to use it in offensive fashion by splitting it into small gps
and sending them out on raids. These small raiding parties claimed to have destroyed six
SAM sites, thus creating a gap in the AD cover over the area. This gap was later used by
the Israeli acs to sp the br H battles effectively.

Bren’s Div

20. Bren’s Div had been conc in Tasa ready to expl success of the cnl xg op. One of the
bn of the Div was emp in the area of Chinese Farm to relieve pressure on Amnon’s Bde. On
ni 16/17 Oct, the Div was engaged in clearing the Akavish and Tirtur rds to relieve pressure
on the ptrs who were holding the narrow corridor leading to Israeli br H, on the West Bank.

Egyptian Reaction

21. Egyptian forces launched attack from North as well as from the South to cut off the
corridor .Suprisingly, Egyptians did not react to Israeli xg till 16 Oct, primarily because of
the confused reporting by their int agencies. Egyptian reaction to the Israeli corridor, from
North of Bitter lake was uncoordinated and piecemeal.

17 OCT 73

Egyptian Counter Measures

22. Egyptian Reaction to Israeli Xg. The Israeli xg was first reported on 16 Oct and
was estimated by the Egyptian High Comd to be not more than a recce unit comprising of a
few amph vehs, presumed to have crossed, over the Great Bitter Lake. No action was taken
against the br H for nearly 18 hrs. On 17 Oct the Egyptians commenced hy shelling on
Israeli br H.

23. Egyptian CA Against Israeli Corridor. A two pronged attack from North and South
was launched by Egyptian Sec and Third Armies.
(a) Northern Prong. 16 Inf Div and 21 Armd Div of 2 Egyptian Army launched two maj
attacks against Bren’s force in the area of Tirtur-Akavish. Both attacks were beaten back
successfully by Israeli forces with 14 Egyptian Armd Bde suffering hy losses.
(b) Southern Prong. 25 Armd bde ex 3 Egyptian Army comprising of 90 tks, was
launched from South in conjunction with ops of Egyptian Sec Army. Bren’s Div successfully
ambushed 25 Armd bde in the area of Great Bitter Lake. By 1730h, the battle was over
with Egyptian losing 86 tks against the loss of 4 tks by Israelis.

Bren’s Div

24. The rds to the xg site were opened by 0200h and aslt br was ready at 1600h 17 Oct.
Gen Bren’s Div was ordered to prep for the xg on the ni of 17 Oct. The Div commenced xg
at 2100h.

18 OCT 73

Mod of Plans by Israelis

25. Israelis who had initially planned only a southernly sweep on the West Bk, mod their
plans as under :-
(a) Sharon’s Div to push northwards towards Ismailia.
(b) Gen Bren’s and Gen Magen’s Divs to push South-wards
and cut off Egyptian Third Army.

Sharon’s Div

26. The Div cleared Chinese Farm area on 18 Oct. The pre-constr br was ferried fwd by
the engrs and was op on the ni 18/19 Oct.

Bren’s Div

27. The Div completed the cnl xg op by 18 Oct morning. The Div was divided into three
colns of bde each based on armr and ptrs and given the task to sweep southwards along the
Great Bitter Lake. The Div contacted the formidable Egyptian Posn at Geneifa by the last lt,
18 Oct.

Egyptian CA

28. Egyptians began launching coord CAs against the Israeli forces on the west Bank.
President Sadat who was initially reluctant to pull back armr from the Eastern Bank, agreed
to do so keeping in view the gravity of the developing sit

19OCT 73

Magen’s Div

29. On 19 Oct the Div mov through Bren’s Div and headed West towards Maktsera. The
Div further adv towards Cairo-Suez rd, mov West of Bren’s Div but almost parallel to it.

Bren’s Div

30. Fayid air fd was captured by Bren’s Div Strengthening the Israeli br H. The Div had
invested Genefia Hills and fighting contd for its capture.

Sharon’s Div

31. Sharon’s Div began to cross over to the West Bank on 19 Oct. The div was ordered
to adv Northwards. Egyptian posn at Orcha was captured rendering the en defs in the area
untenable.

Egyptian Reaction

32. Egyptians withdrew 22 Tk Bde ex 6 Mech Div to reinforce the West Bank. 4 Armd Div
was engaged in checking the Southward Israeli adv.

20-21 OCT 73

Bren’s Div

33. The Div was fighting hard against desperate Egyptian 4 Armd Div. On 21 Oct the
leading bde under Natke was just one mile North of Sarag (Main Suez-Cairo rd) and cont it
by fire. Thus from mid day 21 oct the Egyptian Third Army was virtually cut off from its
rear HQ and main sup base.

Magen’s Div

34. The Div overcame Egyptian strong posn at Mitznefet on 20 Oct and leaned on to Asor
rd by 21 Oct.

Sharon’s Div

35. The Div’s leading bde under Tuvia was on the out skirts of Ismailia by 21 Oct. Gen
Sharon had difference of opinion with the higher HQ as he was more keen to cut off 2
Egyptian Army, by making wide flanking hooks than to tfr forces on the Eastern Bank to sp
attacks on Egyptian strong pts at Missouri.

Soviet Advise for Cease Fire

36. Seeing the Egyptian reverses and tightening noose around Egyptian Third Army, USSR
advised the Egyptians to bid for imdt cease fire, before the Arabs suffered a total collapse.

22 OCT 73

Sharon’s Div

37. Sharon’s Div adv along the sweet water cnl towards Ismailia with a sense of urgency
in view of the likely cease-fire. Gen Sharon was all set to capture Ismailia, though his Div’s
adv was being strongly resisted by the
Egyptian Cdos.

Bren’s Div

38. Gen Bren launched his div in a pincer mov with the aim of clearing the shores of Little
Bitter Lake and capturing Lituf. By the evening one of his bde had contacted Lituf.

First Cease Fire

39. First cease fire came into effect at 1852h on 22 Oct. However , fighting broke out on
the front of Egyptian Third Army as the trapped Egyptians tried to break out of the cordon.

Egyptian Third Army Cut Off

40. Egyptian Third Army fighting desperately along Asor and Sarag rds found itself cut off
when first cease fire came into effect. Bren’s Div had cut off the Cairo-Suez rd at Mile 109.

23 OCT 73

Bren’s Div

41. As the fighting broke out with the violation of cease fire, Bren’s Div was asked to
tighten the noose by encircling Port Suez. The Div commenced adv on a seven mile
frontage with two bdes up. At 1500h, outer defs of Suez were attacked. Momentum of
Israeli armr shook up the Egyptian defs, with Bren’s force storming southwards and cutting
off Suez completely from Egyptian Third Army.

Magen’s Army

42. Magen’s Div was ordered to adv along the rt flk of Bren’s Div and head for port
Adabiah. By evening the Div contacted the slopes of Mt Ataka, which dominated Adabiah.
Around mid ni the main defs of Adabiah were contacted by the leading bde.

24 OCT 73

Bren’s div

43. The Div occupied the oil refinery at Suez. Port Suez was fully encircled.

Sec Cease Fire

44. When the sec cease fire came into effect on 24 Oct, the sit on the West Bank was as
under :-
(a) Sharon’s Div was on the out skirts of Isamailia, threatening to cut off
Ismailia-Cairo rd.
(b) Bren’s Div had cut off Suez and Magen’s Div had occupied Adabiah thus
completely sealing off the Egyptian Third Army.
(c) Israeli forces were in occupation of 1600 sq Km area on the West Bank.

SECTION 53 : COMMENTS

45. The success of ‘Op GAZELLE’ put Israelis in a very strong bargaining posn as they
successfully cut off Egyptian Third Army and occupied 1600 sq miles of Egyptian territory.
The plg and conduct was a tac genius.

46. The factors which assisted Israelis in achieving success and contributed to Egyptian
disaster are as under:-
(a) Offensive Action. The op was a classic example of offensive action. Its plg
was bold and exec ruthless.
(b) Surprise. Israelis managed to completely surprise the Egyptians regarding
their intention and str of xg force.
(c) Ill Defined Inter Fmn Bdy. Hazy inter fmn bdy between Egyptian Sec and
third Armies proved to be a soft spot, which was fully exploited by Israelis.
(d) Faulty Passage of Info. Faulty passage of info and confused reporting by
Egyptians resulted in inaccurate eval and slow reaction.
CHAPTER – 11 : AIR AND NAVAL OPS

SECTION 54 : AIR OPS

Gen

1. The 1973 war differed from the previous wars in a No of ways which are as
enumerated below :-
(a) Israelis were not able to fight the land battle under conditions of absolute air
supremacy.
(b) Israeli AF denied opportunity of launching a pre-emptive strike.
(c) The Arab nations had a better msl cover in the form of SAMs.
(d) Israelis could not achieve overall superiority.
(e) Lack of capacity to provide conditions for deep and spectacular armoured
sweep.

Egyptian Concept of Ops

2. Egyptians were convinced by the Russian philosophy of bldg a good AD cover in the
form of SAM msl systems, as against initial belief that it was imperative to have the capacity
to strike at Israeli bases in depth.

Tac Adopted by Arab Forces

3. Some of the tac adopted by the Arab forces on grnd to tilt the bal in their favour are as
described below :-
(a) Since the Israeli pilots were capable of flying very low to avoid detection by rdr
and msl screens, the Egyptians went in for ZU-23 multi barreled AD, conventional
guns.
(b) Israeli fighter fmns carried only one ECM eqpt (providing cover to the other ac)
thus Egyptian pilots were trained to fly into Israeli attacking fmns from below to split
them and deprive at least one half of this cover, so that SAM msls could engage them
piece-meal.
(c) Arabs recognising the superiority of the Israeli eqpt imposed restrictive
measures on air ops against Israelis. The Egyptian AF was kept well dispersed on
airfds in the Nile Delta and Aswan.
(d) There were reports, that in some air engagements, Syrian pilots after having
exhausted their amn flew their ac KamiKazi fashion into Israeli fighter which although
foolhardy proved to be an eff tac under such circumstances.
(e) Since Syrians had less MIG 21s and more qty of MIG 17s, they adopted a tac of
flying a fmn pattern of two MIG 21s trailed by two MIG 17s in loose ech starboard fmn
when attempting interception ops.
(f) Op instr for their AF were drawn on the following lines :-

(i) To launch a surprise offensive against Israeli fwd positions, rdr and comn
installations, in sp of the main land offensive.
(ii) To compel the Israelis to spread their air effort over two fronts, and on as
broad a front as possible in each sector, in order to reduce their capacity to
inflict damage.
(iii) To deny the Israeli AF tactical air superiority, in combination with SAM
sites and grnd anti-ac fire.
(iv) To sp grnd ops, keeping within own msl cover except in emergency sit.

Eqpt Profile And Comd Str of Arab & Israeli AD Sys

4. Egyptian Comd Structure. The Egyptian AF and the AD Service were indep services
but subordinated to and controlled by a Mil Comd Centre under the COS. Even with this high
level coord between AD and AF,the risk of SAMs shooting down their own ac could not
completely be eliminated.

5. Syrian AD Comd Str. Unlike in the Egyptian armed forces, the Syrian AD sys was
controlled by the AF. This perhaps resulted in a closer though less sophisticated coord of
msl def and fighter ac.

6. AD Sys.
(a) Egyptian. Before the commencement of 1973 war, concept of AD comd was
introduced. AF and AD were placed under the ‘Mil Comd’ to function directly under
the COAS, to ensure better coord. Arab ‘AD System’ consisted of :-
(i) SAMs.
(aa) SAM 2. Rg 50,000 m. Comparatively static.
(ab) SAM 3. Rg 30,000m.. Comparatively mob.
(ac) SAM 6. Rg 22,000m. A highly mob msl which was mtd on a tk
chassis.
(ad) SAM 7. It was a ptble msl, very eff against low flg acs.
(ii) AA Guns. Schilka 23/4 was the main AA gun, which was of Russian origin.
(iii) Dply. A total of 150 btys of SAM 2, 3 and 6 were dply, of which 50 btys
were dply along the Suez Cnl.
(b) Israeli. Israelis were over confident because of their concept of pre-emptive
strike, as best form of def. Main reliance was on air power. ECM had not been
worked out to a deg which could effectively counter Egyptian anti ac msls. Israeli AD
Sys was based on :-
(i) HAWK msls.
(ii) AA Guns (20mm, 30mm and 40 mm).

Prelim Ops and Softening of Tgts

7. The pre H hr offensive strike against Israeli positions in Sinai was carried out by SU-7s
and mod MIG-21 (J)s and is believed to have been very eff

8. Prog of Air Ops.
(a) Egyptian fighters attacked tgts such as fwd comd positions, rdr and comn
centres, grnd-to-air Hawk msl bases and other vital installations up to 60 km in depth.
(b) The AF provided sp for naval and cdo ops off the Sinai coast and the Gulf of
Suez.
(c) After the Cnl crossing offensive had been launched, the Egyptian AF was used
sparingly.
(d) No serious attempt was made to launch intercept on msns against Israeli ac that
tried to attack the brHs and brs.
(e) AD cover against these sorties was provided almost entirely by SAMs.
(f) Large Nos of ac, which kept low to avoid being hit by the SAM-2s and SAM-3s,
were shot down by SAM 6s, SAM 7s and anti-ac btys.
(g) Since the Egyptian brH did not extend beyond the rg of the SAM-2 and SAM-3
cover, the AF was not greatly used in the sp role during the first week of the war.
(h) On 14 Oct, when the Egyptian army mov out into an offensive beyond the SAM
cover, the AF did mount ops in sp but lost several ac to Israeli air action.
(j) Two Iraqi TU-16s are reported to have attempted to break through the Israeli AD
cover to attack Tel Aviv though w/o much success.
(k) Arab heptrs was used both for lifting cdos into the Sinai desert and for the
Deversoir battle.There were very hy losses in the cdo ops,mainly because of lack of
adequate fighter cover.
(l) On the northern front, the Syrian AF, though also used almost entirely in the def
role, displayed a much greater commitment to battle from the start.
(m) It is believed that for a short period the Israeli AF, in order to conserve its high
performance ac, switched to slower types such as super Mysteres, Vautours and
Ouragons, particulary when sp their own tps after the Israeli counter-offensive was
launched.
(n) The Israeli AF later resorted to saturation bombing, at times attacking msl sites
with fmns of two or three sqns at one time. However even this method was not always
commensurately successful because of the dovetailing of SAM 6s among the SAM 2s
and 3s.
(o) On the Northern Nile Delta sector, Israeli ac succeeded in forcing a corridor
through the Egyptian AD cover between Port Said and Damietta, from the northern
Mediterranean coast.

Lessons Learnt

9. The superior AF of Israelis was neutr by an integrated and extensive AD sys of Arabs,
based on SAMs. Air warfare became a highly complicated affair, yet IAF maint superiority,
proving that msls had not rendered an ac obsolete. Following conclusions could be drawn :-
(a) Imp of Arty. The Israeli belief that lack of arty could be compensated by
superior air power proved to be costly, especially with the effective SAM AD cover est
by the Arab countries.
(b) Mob Msl Platform. SAMs should be based increasingly, on highly mob

platform, such as SAM 6.
(c) Anti Msl Wpns. Addl impetus to the devp of anti msl wpns, new stand off wpns
and in turn devp of def sys for them, is envisaged.
(d) New Concepts on Ac in War. Role of ac in war and new strat on its emp
would have to be evolved. Air powers will not be as influential as they had
been, and will influence the battle fd to a lesser deg.
(e) Future Role of AF. Proliferation of it and ptbl msl lrs in the front line would
mean that close sp will be an exception to the rule in future, with AF being obliged to
conc on isolating the battle fd and maint supremacy in the air by destroying forces in
the vicinty of the battle fd.
(f) Counter ECMs. With sophisticated counter ECMs, AD can be neutr and therefore
air power will continue to retain an upper hand.
(g) Improvement in Comd Sys. Definite necessity of improved sys of comd, to

coord the effort of air power and AD sys felt to reduce cas from own msls, the Grey
area being IFF.

SECTION 55 : THE WAR AT SEA

Gen

10. When the war broke out, Egypt possessed the largest and most bal navy in the region
comprising of submarines, frigates, destroyers and msl boats. The Syrians had primarily msl
boats as their naval compliment. The Israeli Navy relied mainly on msl boats with Gabriel
msl mtd on them. The war saw almost continuous naval ops by both sides,though it was
mainly the smaller vessels such as msl and ptl boats which saw most of the action. The
Egyptian navy was the first to strike.

Egyptian Offensive

11. Some of the imp events which took place on the sea front were :
(a) Egyptian coastal btys loc at Port Said and Port Suez gave sp fire to the crossing
tps while msl boats struck at Romani to silence the Israeli hy arty loc there.
(b) The strong pt at Ras Barun, further north, which contained a powerful rdr stn to
tr shipping mov at the entrance to the Suez Cnl at Port Said, was also attacked by msl
boats and the rdr reportedly destroyed.
(c) Gulf of Suez based msl boats, sp cdo ops against Ras al Sudar and Ras Abu
Ruidies. At Baleim, the frogmen were used to destroy oil refinery eqpt.
(d) On 8 Oct, the Egyptian Navy fought a spirited action against Israelis and shelled
subsequently Sharam Al Sheikh and posts on the Gulf of Suez.
(e) Maj success was achieved during sec raid at the oil instlns at Baleim. Mines
were laid here for the first time.
(f) Mediterranean fleet was given the offensive tasks at Alexandaria to keep the
harb and apchs to it open. Submarines there claimed to have sunk two merchant
navy ships.
(g) A maj op undertaken by the Red Sea fleet was the blockade (contraband control)
est in the Bab al Mandab Strait at the entrance to the Red Sea. Two destroyers were
stationed off Aden and two submarines op in the area north of the Strait. The normal
Israeli tfc through the Strait was about 18 ships monthly. No vessel was allowed to
pass through till the blockade was lifted in Nov.

Israeli Offensive

12. The Israeli navy was also active throughout the war, mostly in the Mediterranean, off
the Syrian coast. It scored a maj success on 11 Oct when the navy sp by the AF succesfully
attacked the Syrian ports of Latakia and Tartus and shelled oil storage tks at Banias, which
were left blazing. In these ops, heptrs carrying msls were reported to have been used.

13. Lessons Learnt. These small scale naval engagements, brought home some
pertinent lessons :-
(a) Small ships equipped with sophisticated instrument and msl are essential for
coasted def.
(b) More conc on quality rather than qty of wpns sys is expected in future. Msl
power is more imp than tonnage and also works out cheaper.
(c) Conventional navies are likely to be confined to super powers, whose navies
have to op in the open seas.
CHAPTER – 13 : LESSONS LEARNT

Gen

1. This war was unique in many aspects, such as No of tks used in such confined places,
variety of wpns used and also the eqpt attrition rate. This war was the most imp
conventional war fought since World War II in terms of forces, wpns & eqpt used. Hence it
is very important that we draw useful lessons from it.

SECTION 56 : STRAT LESSONS

2. Maint of Aim. Aim must be formulated before the war and should be maint till the
end. The Egyptians had very clear mil aim in the ph 1 of their battle, however, subsequently
after 14 Oct they went beyond their aim w/o adequate prep and suffered hy cas of men and
mtrl.

3. Assessment of En Capability. This war conclusively proves that one should never
underrate the en. The Israeli attitude towards Arabs was one of contempt. The Israelis
never believed that the Arabs could attack. In spite of clear indications of Arab build up, the
Israelis disregarded all facts because of prejudice and were
surprised.

4. Surprise and Deception. Well executed deception plan is essential for achieving
surprise. Egyptian carried out 22 mob scheme in 1973. Twenty third mob scheme carried
out for actual war was ignored by Israelis as a routine affair. These rptd mob by Egyptians
played very important part in masking the Arab intentions.

5. Op Preparedness.
(a) Equipping the Forces. A detailed SWOT analysis of the en should be carried
out before induction of any new wpn sys. The wpn sys should be capable of
neutralising en’s str and capable of exploiting his weaknesses. Selection of SAM & A
tk msls by Egyptians is a good eg. These wpns acted as FM and helped the Arabs to
effectively neutralize, AF and tk forces of Israel.
(b) Manning of Defs. Sufficient str must be available to ward off surprise attacks
before the res available are committed.

6. Int Mgmt. The war has few lessons for the int community also. These are :-
(a) There was a reqmt of a svl sys to verify the info collected by various int
agencies.
(b) Eval and interpretation of available int about en’s intentions is more imp than
mere collection of facts. Israelis flawed in this aspect during Op BADR, whereas
Egyptians failed during Op GAZELLE.

7. Emp of Air.
(a) Under Utilisation. Air was not used to its full potential by both sides ie. for
battle fd air interdiction or for shaping the battle fd.
(b) Air for BAS. Israel thought that they can achieve every thing by BAS &
neglected to devp their arty. When the war started, they learnt how costly it is to use
air power as arty. In spite of paying hy price, the results were not satisfactory.
Hence the lesson is not to use air as a substitute for arty fire sp. Also, BAS in a highly
devp AD environment were proved to be very costly.
(c) AD Control Measures. The Arabs achieved a viable air def against the Israeli
AF by integrating SAM of different types and AD guns (ZSU-23). But they failed to
evolve suitable control measures to prevent fratricide. This aspect of the problem
must be studied & measures devised to prevent loss of own ac due to friendly fire.
(d) Disruption of Rear Areas. Both Israelis and Egyptians employed inf/Cdo

teams equipped with ptbl lt A tk msls to cause large scale confusion & destr in en rear
areas. Such teams should be used more freely than ac for destr in rear areas in dense
AD environment.

8. Security of Plans. Very high std of security was maint at all levels by the Arabs.
Apart from the plg staff, def ministers of Egypt, Syria and Jordan, barely half dozen people
knew the date of ‘Y’ Day. The bde cdrs knew it only by 0800 hr on 06 Oct whereas the coys
learnt about the attack only at 1230 hr.

9. Contingency Plg. Inadequate contingency plans catering for Arab offensive in Sinai
and in the North created confusion at all levels in the Israeli hierarchy, in the initial stg of
the war. Thus, detailed contingency plans should be worked out and rehearsals should be
carried out to validate them.

SECTION 57 : OP LESSONS

10. Overrating of Obst Potential. Suez cnl was supposed to be an impassable obst.
Nobody believed that the Egyptians were capable of xg the cnl in the face of Bar-Lev line
with high sand ramparts. But the Egyptian ops proved that most formidable obsts can be
overcome and very easy solutions can be evolved, like Egyptian’s use of high-powered
water pumps for demolishing sand ramparts.

11. Use of HB Forces. Capture of Mount Hermon by Syrians and later by Israeli
paratroopers proved that these forces are FMs and have a wide canvas for emp.

12. Timely Flow of Info. Slackness or negligence by Egyptian units/fmns in passing the
info of Israeli cnl xg ops to higher HQ and the long chain of comd, resulted in delayed
reponse by them , thus facilitating success of the Israelis.

13. Demarcation of AOR. It is essential that AOR should be clearly assigned between
neighboring fmns. Lack of clarity can cause loss of a battle as was shown in Israeli xg of cnl
in Deversoir Area, which was the bdy between the Second and Third Egyptian Armies.

14. Role of Armr. Mech warfare is based on the concept of mvre to achieve conc of force
at the pt of decision. Head on clashes between the tks are not the raison d’etre of armd fmn
battles. In conformation to essential characteristic of mob in executing deep sweeps to turn
flks, dominance of tks is not easily challenged by ATGMs.

15. Armr : The Cutting Edge. It has been proved beyond doubt that when correctly
emp, armr continues to enjoy a definite edge in tankable country. It can be best emp, as
composite teams of inf, armr and arty. Op GAZELLE, has amply proved that given air, arty
and inf sp and room for mvre, tk is still a dominant factor. Hence, even if the armr tacs
have to be altered, it is safe to assert, that classic role of armr is still applicable.

16. Significance of Arty. Based on success in the previous wars, Israelis became
overconfident and dependent on AF and armr, they neglected arty and inf. This was fully
expl by Egyptians who immobilized both Israeli acs and tks in the initial stgs of the battle.
The Israeli armr received very weak arty sp. The Egyptian arty played a great role incl
battle fd ill.

17. Balanced Task Force. War taught the incisive lesson that grnd forces should be self
reliant and have adequate integral fire sp in terms of arty and A tk wpns. AF should be left
to maint air superiority and armr be let free to deal with en armr.

18. Reqmt of AD(SP). Main lesson learnt by both,the Israelis and the Egyptians was
that , there was an inescapable reqmt of AD(SP). Without this sp the punch of the armr
thrust was blunted by air .

SECTION 58 : TAC LESSONS

19. Follow-on Sp Ops. The Syrians gen bypassed the Israeli fortfn and did not attempt
to capture them even on the sec & third day of the battle. These fortfns played imp part
and kept on passing info about the en movs and also acted as FACs. The lesson is that the
strong pts once by passed in the initial ph of the battle must be reduced quickly or else they
will become blistering wounds.

20. Inf - Tk Coop. Inf tk coop was evident in the armr battles and spec when they were
pitched against ATGMs and prepared defs. Armr and inf should op as composite teams
which could be armr/inf predominant, depending upon the trn, opposn and A tk threat. Inf
has to be integrated and given matching mob and A tk wpns.

21. Ni-Fighting Capability. Israel greatly suffered due to their over reliance on tks and
acs, which were not suitably equipped for fighting at ni. Whereas, Arabs fully expl all the
modern technological advancement to achieve eff ni fighting capability.

20. Israeli CA. Initially, the Israelis followed the Gung Ho Tac and relied heavily on
speed. They lacked inf component, close arty fire sp and air sp. Thus, they suffered hy cas
at the hands of THTs. After 13 Oct, they improved upon these aspects. Hence, CA should be
carefully planned and coord to ensure success.

21. Egyptian Attack Pattern. Egyptian devp a pattern in their attacks which was appre
even by the Israelis for their courage and bravado. However, soon it became predictable
and the Israelis countered it. Therefore, their is a reqmt to avoid predictability in conduct of
ops.

SECTION 59 : MISC LESSONS

Man Mgmt and Motivation

22. Offrs Mgmt. Egyptians pruned their offrs cadre by removing many incompetent and
politically minded offrs. Offrs were encouraged to study the Israelis, to learn all about them
and even to spk Hebrew. This had a great influence in devp confidence in the men and
raising the morale of the army.

23. Motivation. In Egypt, drive was undertaken to infuse offensive spirit in the men, to
encourage them to undertake msns with “calculated risks”. Prep got underway to change
the psy of the soldiers and offrs from ‘Trench Fever’ or def mentality to the offensive spirit.
This made a marked difference in the conduct of ops by them.

Trg

24. The Egyptians laid spl emphasis on trg during their prep for war , which led to
incredible success in battle.

25. The highlight being focused trg based on the directive issued, rigorous trg in the ‘El
Ballah Loop’ where men practiced cnl xg in aslt boats and br tasks. Trg was also carried out
on models similar to actual obst. This reiterates the significance of op oriented trg in near
real conditions.

SECTION 60 : OP LGS

26. Foresight. Intensity of war took Israeli lgs staff by surprise. The expdr of amn was
inordinately high and rate of loss of acs and tks was alarming. Israeli staff tables of amn
and eqpt needed drastic revision. This shows lack of foresight in plg.

27. Tn and Comn Netwk.
(a) Israeli faced problem of tpt and rd space to mov to the Golan and Sinai Fronts.
(b) Their armr had to mov on trs due to lack of tk tptrs.
(c) Main sup routes were crowded. Rail route, which lead to Sinai, was not devp
and its rails instead were utilised for def constr wk.
(d) Depending on civ tpt proved dangerous and half their amn was stranded
between depots and firing lines.
(e) There is an inescapable requirement to have well developed rd and railway

network and a well oiled Op lgs plan.

28. Replenishment. The Arabs had a uninterrupted sup from the Soviet Union
throughout the ops, where as Israel recd their sup of 20,000 tons from the US between 14
Oct and 14 Nov 73. This provisioning changed the course of the battle. Therefore, any
nation going to war must be adequately stocked for the duration of ops.

29. Eqpt Wastage Rate. This war witnessed unprecedented wastage of eqpt, such high
intensity of war calls for reappraisal on No of fronts as follows :-
(a) Revision of war wastage rates.
(b) Rethinking on lgs arngs to supply the forces deployed in fd.
(c) Loc of deps and repair units to cater for above sit/contingency.

SECTION 61 : CONCLUSION

30. The Yom Kippur war has lessons for all the three services. Imdtly after the war
people thought that the advent of msls has sounded the death bell for both ac and armr,
but a close scrutiny of the facts does not sp this theory, but certainly, the msls will have
profound affect on their emp.
CHAPTER 12 : CEASE FIRE AND DISENGAGEMENT

Gen
1. The superpowers never wanted a war in the middle east. But, when the war
commenced both USA and the USSR provided all the sp to Israel and Egypt. Both the
superpowers wanted an early end to the conflict, but, they took time in resolving the
differences.

2. Both US and the Soviet Union had different views towards the end of the conflict. Their
pt of view was as given below :-
(a) US. They wanted the cease fire on the basis of return to the 1967 line. A
proposal that seemed preposterous to the Arabs.
(b) USSR. They supported the Egyptian demand, that the cease fire should be
based on the total withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories ie. UN Resolution
242.

The Intervention

3. On 12 Oct, Kissinger suggested that Britain should present the UNSC with a proposal
that both US and The Soviet Union would sp. They asked the British ambassador in Cairo to
apch President Sadat for the cease fire , but the answer still remained no.

4. On 13 Oct, Kissinger persuaded the israeli foreign minister Abba Eban, to agree to a
phased withdrawl of Israel from Sinai. The Americans and Russians also had a discussion
on policing the de-militarized zone and opening of the Suez cnl with international aid.

5. By 14 Oct, the battle had it’s toll on the Israeli lgs backup and had broken the
backbone of Israeli economy. This forced Israel to agree for discussion with Egypt on cease
fire. However, Egypt refused the proposal in disregard of Soviet advise.

6. In order to bring Egypt to the discussion table, Israel decided to go ahead with Op
Gazelle. By 16 Oct, Sharon had achieved considerable success in his offensive. Now, the
Israeli premier adopted a harder line regarding the cease-fire negotiations and were back to
their pre-war demands and also involved the question of Israeli prisoners.

7. On 16 Oct, the Soviet prime minister Kosygin visited Egypt. They discussed the pros
and cons of the Israeli offensive. He tried to convince the President of the gravity of the sit ,
but in vain.

8. Based on the intrep that the Soviet airborne forces were on standby for intervention
incase Cairo was threatened, Dr Kissinger left for Moscow for talks. There it was decided
that US and USSR would submit a joint resolution for cease-fire.

9. UN Resolution 338 of 22 Oct 1973. It called for an end to hostilities followed by
imdt peace negotiations on the basis of Resolution 242 of 1967. Both Egypt and Israel
accepted it, however, Syria, Iraq, Libya and PLO did not. It was agreed that an Egypt-Israeli
cease-fire would be mutually operative even if others did not accept it. The resolution was
to come into effect from 0652 hr on 22 Oct.

10. On 23 Oct, fighting continued. The Israeli forces were approx 100 km from Cairo and
had three Egyptian airfields under cont. On the same day, UNSC passed another resolution
referring to the previous one of 22 Oct. It stated the following:-
(a) Confirms it’s decision on the imdt cessation of all kinds of firing and all mil
action and urges that the forces of the two sides be returned to the posns they
occupied at the moment the cease-fire became effective.
(b) Requests the Gen Secy to take measures for imdt desp of UN observers to
supervise the observance of the cease-fire between the forces of Israel and Egypt,
using for this purpose the pers of the UN.

11. On 24 Oct, with total disregard to the UN Resolution Israeli forces continued their adv
towards Suez town, which was repulsed. The Egyptians alleged that the Isaeli forces
prevented UN observers from reaching their locs. Thus, they called the USA and the USSR
to send tps to police the cease-fire line. This nearly precipitated into a maj confrontation
between the superpowers.

12. On 25 and 26 Oct, sporadic confrontations continued, however, on 27 Oct both fronts
were reported quiet. It was agreed that mil reps of both the countries would meet the next
day to discuss implementation of the cease-fire.
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

DATE GEN EGYPT SYRIA ISRAEL
21 Nov 1917 The Balfour declaration.
29 Nov 1947 UN passes resolution on
partition of palestine.
15 May 1948 (a) Britain quits
palestine
(b) Ben Gurion
proclaims est of Jewish
State.
15 May 1948 First Arab-Israel War.
- Mar 1949 (Six day war)
29 Oct – 06 Sec Arab-Israel War.
Nov 1956 Britain and France join
Israel against Egypt.
05–10Jun 1967 Third Arab-Israel War.
Mar 1969- War of Attrition.
Aug 1970
07 Aug 1970 Cease fire.
28 Sep 1970 Nasser’s death and
Sadat’s succession.
21 Jan 1973 Gen Ismail made C-
in-C of the armies of
“Federation of Arab
Republics”.
22/23 Aug 1973 Egyptian and Syrian Def
delegations meet at
Alexandria to discuss
the invasion plan.
26 Sep 1973 Moshe Dayan
inspects
tps on Golan
Heights.


28 Sep 1973 ‘Schonau Castle’
Incident in Austria
by Syrian terrorist
gp ‘Saiqa’.
02 Oct 1973 President Sadat
declares to the War
council that count down
on Arab invasion had
begun.
03 Oct 1973 Syrians told of D
day and H Hr.
04 Oct 1973 Israeli army put
on full alert.
04/05 Oct 1973 Israel convinced
war imminent
but unaware of D
Day and H Hr.
05/06 Oct 1973 § Guns, SAMs,Tks
mov
along the
Waterfront on ni
05/06 Oct.
06 OCT 1973 : OP BADR COMMENCES
1100 h 4 MI 8 heptrs with

Cdos launched for
attack on Mt
Hermon.
1400h § Egypt and Syria
attack Israel.
§ Air strike
commenced.
1405h § Approx 200 acs
(H Hr) strike
Israel.
§ 8000 tps in 1000
aslt
boats cross Suez.

1420h § First wave cross the
cnl.

1500h § First fortress of § Mt Hermon
Bar Lev Line captured by
captured. Syrians

1830h § Approx 80
breaches on Eastern
Bank made by water
jets.
1930h § Maj Portion of the
Egyptian divs was
across the cnl.
§ Rangers mov
towards
passes
Ni 06/07 Oct § First fmn of the § Launched 14
1973 Egyptian armies est coy sized CAs, all
on the Eastern failed.
Bank. § Israel orders
§ 10 brs and 50 withdra wal of all
ferries est. tps manning the
Bar Lev Line
fortfns.

07 OCT 1973 ONWARDS
7/8 Oct 1973 § Egyptian halt their § Syrian tks
adv and consolidate. continue adv
§ Kantara captured Towards Rafid, El
by Egyptians. Al, Kuneitra and
Majdal Shams.
8/9 Oct 1973 Two more forts Sit in Golan § 0800hr, CA

captured Heights stabilized launched.
and Syrian adv § Hy tk cas,
halted. suffered by
all three divs.
§ All CAs fail.
§ Hy loss at
ambush
Near El Farden.
9 Oct 1973 § Two armies of § CA launched at
Egypt Machsiv and
fully est East of Televizia both
Suez 10-12 km in failed.
depth. § Gap in
§ Forces adv Egyptian Forces
towards Mitla pass. iden in Area
Deversoir.
§ Gen Bar Lev
Earmarked For
Sinai Sect.
9/10 Oct 1973 § Three more forts Syrians pushed § Gen Bar Lev
captured near back to East of takes
Ismailia. 1967 CFL. Over as rep of
the GS.
§ Plg for
Offensive Across
the cnl
commences.

11 Oct 1973 § Plg commences § 12 Armd Bde of § Israeli hold a
for capture of Bir Iraq conc at continuous line
Gifgafa. Sanamein. east of CFL in
§ One Iraqi inf and Golan Front.
one armd bde § Israeli Navy
committed on the stuck No of tgts
Syrian front. on Syrian Coast.
§ Jordanian forces § The three divs
join in. in Sinai
reconstituted as
op Gps with addl
armd bde.
DATE Gen EGYPT SYRIA ISRAEL

12/13 Oct 1973 § 4 Armd Div and Syrians withdrew § Israeli CAs
21 Armd Div start systematically to launched
xg the cnl. sec line of def. Against Egyptian
§ Gen Saad dies. br Hs.
§ Egyptians start § CA at Katib el-
probing attacks all Kheil,
along the br H. failed.
§ Gen Bar Lev
presents plans
for proposed
offensive.
§ Gen Mandler
dies.
§ Prep for Op
GAZELLE
continues.
14/15 Oct 1973 § Egyptian affort to § Attacks halted
break-out beaten by Israelis.
back. § Nine bde sized
§ Attacks launched CAs Launched
in all three sects, for over next three
capture of Bir days.
Gifgafa through the
passes.
§ Hy cas suffered.
§ CAs repulsed.
15/16 Oct 1973 § Israel launches
counter-offensive
in the Deversoir
area between the
Egyptian Sec and
Third Armies (Op
GAZELLE).
§ First Israeli
force on
west of cnl.
DATE Gen EGYPT SYRIA ISRAEL

17 Oct 1973 A Iraqi Mtn Bde reached § Israelis
the battle front. reinforce their
tps on the
western bank of
Suez and
manage to est br
H.
§ Battle for
corridor to
cnl continues.
18/21 Oct 1973 Sadat agrees to § Br over cnl
cease fire. secure.
§ Gen Sharon
adv towards the
city of Ismailia.
Gen Bren and
Gen Magen adv
South towards
port of Suez and
cutting of supply
routes of
Egyptian Third
Army.
20 Oct 1973
21 Oct 1973 Kissingar reaches Israelis recapture
USSR Mount Hermon
on ni 21/22 Oct.
22 Oct 1973 UN Resolution 338 Egypt accepts cease Kissinger visits
passed. It called for fire but not w/o Israel.
cease fire, operative infringements.
from 0652 h but Israel
and Syria refuse to
accept and contd
fighting.
24 Oct 1973 USSR threatens Israel accepts
Sep 1974 unilateral action. cease fire. Sinai
agreement sd/-.

Chapter I: Principles of War

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Chapter I: Principles of War

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CHAPTER I : PRINCIPLES OF WAR

(a) The selection and maint of Aim.

(c) Economy of Effort.

(d) Offensive action.

(j) Maint of Morale.

(a) Unity of comd at the highest level.

(b) Coord of political and mil auth.

(e) Coop at the strat, op and lac Levels.

(a) Success in battle.

(b) Trg and discp.

(d) Std of med care and gen welfare of troops.

CHAPTER 2 : TOPO AND TRN

SECTION 2 : SINAI PENINSULA

(a) It provides strat depth to Israel from West/SW.

(b) Acts as a trip wire against any mov in western front.

(c) Domination of Suez cnl ,Gulf of Suez and Gulf of Aqaba.

(a) Dominates the adjoining Israeli territory.

(b) Acts as an impregnable line of def against the Israelis.

CHAPTER 3 : OVERVIEW OF THE CAMPAIGN

SECTION 15 : THE EARLIER WARS

(a) The Arab Legion besieged Jerusalem on 18 May.

(b) A small Iraqi contingent mov into North Palestine.

(c) Egyptians made a thrust along the Gaza Strip.

(b) Drove the Egyptians back into Nagev Desert.

(c) Cleared Galilee of guers.

(d) Captured the Port of Eliat at the head of Gulf of Aqaba.

(e) Captured approx 3000 sq mils of territory.

(b) End Fedayeen terrorism from the Gaza strip.

(a) One third of the Egyptian Army was destroyed.

(c) Gaza strip was captured.

(d) British occupied Port Said.

(c) Blockade of Gulf of Aqaba by Egypt to Israeli shipping.

(d) President Nasser’s order for pull out of UN observers.

(a) Pre-emptive Strike

(b) Attainment of total Air superiority.

(d) Fighting on only one front at a time.

(c) Further South, Sharm El Sheikh was also captured.

CHAPTER-5 : SIX YEARS AFTER THE SIX DAY WAR

SECTION 17 : EFFECT OF THE SIX DAY WAR

Effect on Egyptians and Arabs

Reorg Steps by Nasser

SECTION 18 : WAR OF ATTRITION BY EGYPTIANS

12. Reasons For The ‘War of Attrition’. These were as follows:-

(a) Egyptian Action. On 08 Mar 69 the Egyptians began a violent arty

(c) Nasser’s Secret Visit to Moscow. Nasser demanded and obtained a No of

Sadat Decides on War

(c) Stalemate in the Peace Negotiations. It was difficult to believe that

(d) Activation of International Community. Sometime in summer 72., President

CHAPTER 6 : CAUSES OF YOM KIPPUR WAR

CHAPTER 7 : PREP FOR WAR

(a) Syria. To make good its ltd losses on Golan Heights.

(g) Apply political pressure on Israel to agree to concessions acceptable to Arab

(k) Prep of West bank.

(l) Neutr of “Secret Wpn” of Isreal.

(a) 3 X Armd divs with 250 tks each.

(b) 3 X Mech divs.

(d) 2 X Para bdes and 20 X Ranger units.