Santiago v.

Bautista Test to determine whether a tribunal or board exercises judicial

functions:
Fiscal Autonomy Jurisdiction: Judicial Power 1) there must be specific controversy involving rights of persons
brought before a tribunal for hearing and determination.
FACTS:
2) that the tribunal must have the power and authority to pronounce
Teodoro Santiago, a grade 6 pupil, was adjudged 3rd honor. 2 days
judgment and render a decision.
before his graduation, Ted and his parents sought the invalidation of
3) the tribunal must pertain to that branch of the sovereign which
the ranking of the honor students. They filed a Certiorari case against
belongs to the judiciary (or at least the not the legislative nor the
the principal and teachers who composed the committee on rating
executive)
honors.. Respondents filed a MTD claiming that the action was
It may be said that the exercise of judicial function is to determine
improper, and even assuming it was proper, the question has become
what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to
academic (bc the graduation already proceeded. They also argue
a matter in controversy.
that there was no GADALEJ on the part of the teachers since the
Committee on Ratings is not a tribunal, nor board, exercising judicial
Judicial power is defined:
functions, under Rule 65, certiorari is a remedy against judicial function
• as authority to determine the rights of persons or property.
• authority vested in some court, officer or persons to hear and
ISSUE: WoN judicial function be exercised in this case.
determine when the rights of persons or property or the propriety of
doing an act is the subject matter of adjudication.
RULING:
• The power exercised by courts in hearing and determining cases
A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers. The
before them.
exercise of judicial function is the doing of something in the nature of
• The construction of laws and the adjudication of legal rights.
the action of the court. In order for an action for certiorari to exist,

The so-called Committee for Rating Honor Students are neither judicial
nor quasi-judicial bodies in the performance of its assigned task. It is
necessary that there be a LAW that gives rise to some specific rights of
persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are
made, and the controversy ensuring there from is brought in turn, to
the tribunal or board clothed with power and authority to determine.
Felipe v. Leuterio
Fiscal Autonomy Jurisdiction: Contest Judges
Facts: On March 12, 1950 an inter-collegiate oratorical competition
was held in Naga City. Felipe was one of the Judges and was the
chairman. Nosce was awarded the first price and Imperial the second
price. Imperial addressed a letter to the Board of Judges protesting
the verdict and alleged that one of the judges committed a
mathematical error on computing the scores. The Board refused to
amend their award, Imperial filed a complaint in court. She asserts
that she should have ranked 3rd place in the vote, which makes her
score 9 or the First place.
Issue: Whether the RTC reverse the decision of the board of judges to
obtain a new award?
Held: Members of the court sometimes are members of the board of
judges in an oratorical contest. But it is UNWRITTEN in the law that in
such contests the decisions of the board of judges be final and cannot
be appealed. The contestants do not have the right to the prizes
because theirs is only a privilege to compete for the prize and did not
become a demandable right. The respondent judge erred in his
reasoning that where there is a wrong there is remedy. To quote “The
flaw in his reasoning lies in the assumption that Imperial suffered
some wrong at the hands of the board of judges. If at all, there
was error on the part of one judge, at most. Error and wrong do not
mean the same thing. "Wrong" as used in the aforesaid legal principle
is the deprivation or violation of a right. As stated before, a
contestant has no right to the prize unless and until he or she is
declared winner by the board of referees or judges. Granting that
Imperial suffered some loss or injury, yet in law there are instances of
"damnum absque injuria". This is one of them. If fraud or malice had
been proven, it would be a different proposition. But then her action
should be directed against the individual judge or judges who
fraudulently or maliciously injured her. Not against the other judges.”
Fortich v. Corona
Fiscal Autonomy Jurisdiction: Finality of Judgement
DOCTRINE: The orderly administration of justice requires that the
judgements/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body must reach a
point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations; a resolution which
substantially modifies a decision after it has attained finality is utterly
void. When an administrative agency's decision becomes final and
executory and no one has seasonably filed a motion for
reconsideration thereto, the said agency has lost its jurisdiction to
re-open the case, more so modify its decision.
FACTS:
On March 29, 1996, the Office of the President (OP) issued a decision
converting a large parcel of land from agricultural land to
agro-industrial/institutional area. Because of this, a group of
farmer-beneficiaries staged a hunger strike in front of the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Compound in Quezon City in October 9,
1997. The strike generated a lot of publicity and even a number of
Presidential Candidates (for the upcoming 1998 elections) intervened
on behalf of the farmers.
Because of this “blackmail”, the OP re-opened the case and through
Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona issued the so-called,
“politically motivated”, “win-win” resolution on November 7,
1997, substantially modifying its 1996 decision after it had become
final and executory.
ISSUE: WON the “win-win” resolution, issued after the original decision
had become final and executory, had any legal effect.
HELD:
No; When the OP issued the Order dated June 23,1997 declaring the
Decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has
seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said Office
had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its Decision.
Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more
authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by
respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion became the basis of
the assailed “Win-Win” Resolution. Section 7 of Administrative Order
No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court mandate
that only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken
from the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion for
reconsideration was permitted to be filed in “exceptionally meritorious
cases,” as provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18,
still the said motion should not have been entertained considering
that the first motion for reconsideration was not seasonably filed,
thereby allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into
finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the President in re-opening the
case and substantially modifying its March 29,1996 Decision which
had already become final and executory, was in gross disregard of
the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative
determinations.
The orderly administration of justice requires that the
judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body must reach a
point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations. The noble
purpose is to write finis to disputes once and for all
Firestone Ceramics v. CA
Fiscal Autonomy Jurisdiction: En Banc
FACTS:
- The case is about the petitioners’ Motion to refer to the Court EN
Banc the consolidated cases in which the Third Division of the court
has decided.
- The cases involve a vast tract of land with an area of 99 hectares
presumably belonging to the republic of the Philippines which was
adjudged to private individuals by a court alleged to be without
jurisdiction.
- The petitioners submitted to the Court en consulta, a motion to the
Court En banc. A pleading entitled, “FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE
COURT EN BANC, EN CONSULTA” was presented but when the same
was brought into attention on March 7, 2000, the Third Division had not
yet acted on the subject motions to refer the cases to the Banc.
However, the court warned the Third Division that their decision on the
matter would just be tentative.
- March 8, 2000, the Third Division Voted 4-1 to deny the petitioners
motion to transfer the matter to En Banc. March 14, 2000, the court
deliberated on the consulta and thereafter, voted 9-5 to accept the
cases for the en banc finding that the case entitled are of sufficient
importance to merit its attention. Evidently, the action of the court
under the premises is an exercise of Residual Power.
- Untenable is the contention of Justice Panganiban that the Chief
Justice and the 8 Associate Justices who voted to treat these
consolidated cases as En banc have not yet given any reason for
such action. The only reason by the court is that it is decisively clear
that these consolidated cases have been found to be of sufficient
importance to merit the attention and disposition of the entire Court
en banc.
REASONING:
- The action of the court simply means that the nature of the case calls
for en banc session and consideration. It was merely guided by well
studied finding of the majority that indeed, subject cases are of
sufficient importance meriting the action and decision of the whole
court.
- The following cases can be treated as an en banc cases:
1. Cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, executive order, or
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question;
2. Criminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the death
penalty;
3. Cases raising novel questions of law
4. Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;
5. Cases involving decisions, resolutions or orders of the Civil Service
Commission, Commission on Elections, and Commission on Audit
6. Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge,
officer or employee of the judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either
the suspension of any of them for a period of more than one (1) year
or a fine exceeding P10,000.00 or both
7. Cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the court en banc
or in division may be modified or reversed
8. Cases assigned to a division which in the opinion of at least three (3)
members thereof merit the attention of the court en banc and are
acceptable to a majority of the actual membership of the court en
banc; and
9. All other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its actual
membership may deem of sufficient importance to merit its attention.
- Reliance by Justice Panganiban on the Sumilao case where the
Second Division voted 2-2 is misplaced. The court ruled that the
stalemate resulting from the said voting constituted a denial for
motion for reconsideration. And in the present case, the motions for
reconsideration of the petitioners are pending and unresolved.
- The case will be heard and oral arguments will be heard.
DeLima vs Guerrero
Fiscal Autonomy Jurisdiction: Hierarchy of Courts
Issues:
Procedural Issues:
A Whether or not petitioner is excused from compliance with the
doctrine on hierarchy of courts considering that the petition should
first be filed with the Court of Appeals.
B. Whether or not the pendency of the Motion to Quash the
Information before the trial court renders the instant petition
premature.
C. Whether or not petitioner, in filing the present petition, violated the
rule against forum shopping given the pendency of the Motion to
Quash the Information before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa
City in Criminal Case No. 17-165 and the Petition for Certiorari filed
before the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No. 149097, assailing the
preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ Panel.
Substantive Issues:
A. Whether the Regional Trial Court or the Sandiganbayan has the
jurisdiction over the violation of Republic Act No. 9165 averred in the
assailed Information.
B. Whether or not the respondent gravely abused her discretion in
finding probable cause to issue the Warrant of Arrest against
petitioner.
C. Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Status Quo Ante Order in the interim until the instant
petition is resolved or until the trial court rules on the Motion to Quash.
Ruling
It is immediately clear that petitioner De Lima did not sign the
Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping and Affidavit of
Merit in front of the notary public. Such clear breach of notarial
protocol is highly censurable36 as Section 6, Rule II of the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice requires the affiant, petitioner De Lima in this case,
to sign the instrument or document in the presence of the notary De
Lima failed to sign the Verification and Certification against Forum
Shopping in the presence of the notary, she has likewise failed to
properly swear under oath the contents thereof, thereby rendering
false and null the jurat and invalidating the Verification and
Certification against Forum Shopping. Without the presence of the
notary upon the signing of the Verification and Certification against
Forum Shopping, there is no assurance that the petitioner swore under
oath that the allegations in the petition have been made in good
faith or are true and correct, and not merely speculative.
PETITIONER DISREGARDED THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS
the rule on hierarchy of courts is an important component of the THE PRESENT PETITION IS PREMATURE
orderly administration of justice and not imposed merely for whimsical
and arbitrary reasons. well-defined exceptions to the doctrine on Granting a writ of prohibition enjoining and prohibiting respondent

hierarchy of courts. Immediate resort to this Court may be allowed judge from conducting further proceedings until and unless the

when any of the following grounds are present: (1) when genuine Motion to Quash is resolved with finality; Issuing a Status Quo Ante

issues of constitutionality are raised that must be addressed Order restoring the parties to the status prior to the issuance of the

immediately; (2) when the case involves transcendental importance; Order and Warrant of Arrest, both dated

(3) when the case is novel; (4) when the constitutional issues raised are
February 23, 201 7, thereby recall inf both processes and restoring
better decided by this Court; (5) when time is of the essence; ( 6)
petitioner to her liberty and freedom
when the subject of review involves acts of a constitutional organ; (7)
when there is no other plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the
In the palpable absence of a ruling on the Motion to Quash -- which
ordinary course of law; (8) when the petition includes questions that
puts the jurisdiction of the lower court in issue -- there is no controversy
may affect public welfare, public policy, or demanded by the
for this Court to resolve; there is simply no final judgment or order of
broader interest of justice; (9) when the order complained of was a
the lower court to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm. As per the
patent nullity; and
block letter provision of the Constitution, this Court cannot exercise its
jurisdiction in a vacuum nor issue a definitive ruling on mere
(10) when the appeal was considered as an inappropriate remedy.
suppositions.
Unfortunately, none of these exceptions were sufficiently established
in the present petition so as to convince this court to brush aside the
Caguioa Dissent
rules on the hierarchy of courts. This Court cannot thus allow a
precedent allowing public officers assailing the finding of probable In this case, unfortunately, the Constitution is deemed no match to the
cause for the issuance of arrest warrants to be brought directly to this absence of a specific procedural rule that a motion to quash should
Court, bypassing the appellate court, without any compelling reason. be ruled upon simultaneously with the determination of probable
cause - even if the Information indicting the accused is void on its face
and the very jurisdiction of the criminal court is being questioned. The
majority of the Court has succeeded, by its Decision, to make the
Constitution subservient to the rules of procedure. They now allow for
the deprivation of an individual's liberty while waiting for the correct
and legally sufficient Information to be filed and approved by the
criminal court.
The message is clear and unmistakable: Arrest first; resolve the motion
to quash and amend the Information later; then proceed to trial;
finally, acquit after ten years or so. It does not matter if the accused is
to languish in detention. Never mind the accused's constitutional right
to be presumed innocent, to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him and not to be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law. Never mind if the Information is
void for containing mere conclusions of law, for failing to identify and
quantify the specific dangerous drug which is the object or corpus
delicti of the alleged RA 9165 violation, and for not alleging all the
facts needed to establish the elements of the offense charged. Never
mind if previously this same Court has ruled that such a void
Information warrants the acquittal of the accused.
And when the accused is finally acquitted, then the Constitution can
finally be invoked to justify the acquittal - his constitutional rights can
then belatedly be declared to have been violated. In the end, years
down the road, the Constitution would then be given its due
importance. But TODAY, to the majority, the Constitution can wait.
Carpio Dissent
petitioner is assailing the RTC's acquisition of jurisdiction to try the
charge against her on two fronts. In assailing the trial court's finding of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the
resulting issuance thereof, she is questioning the validity of the grounds
on which she was brought before the R TC for trial. In insisting that the
trial court resolve her motion to quash, she is saying that its resolution
thereof will lead it to the conclusion that the offense with which she is
charged is not one that it is authorized by law to take cognizance of.
Considering that the warrant of arrest has already been implemented
and that she has already been brought into custody, it cannot be said
that the instant petition is entirely premature. Her alleged
"unmistakable admission that the RTC has yet to rule on her Motion to
Quash and the existence of the RTC's authority to rule on the said
motion"155relates to only one of the aspects of the trial court's assailed
jurisdiction.
As regards the alleged failure of petitioner to move for reconsideration
of the Orders dated 23 February 2017 and 24 February 2017 before
filing the instant petition for certiorari, it is my opinion that her situation
falls under the recognized exceptions.
Forum shopping was not willful and deliberate.
While petitioner may have indeed committed forum shopping when
she filed the instant petition before this Court raising essentially the
same arguments that she raised in her pending motion to quash
before the RTC. However, I am of the view that her act of forum
shopping was not willful and deliberate
We have occasions159 to rule that when forum shopping is not willful
and deliberate, the subsequent case shall be dismissed without
prejudice on the ground of either litis pendentia or res
judicata. However, we have also ruled in certain cases that the newer
action is not necessarily the one that should be dismissed.
In this case, in determining the action or the relief that should be
dismissed, I believe that the motion to quash filed by petitioner before
the R TC should be the one disregarded by this Court. The instant
petition for certiorari is the appropriate vehicle to settle the issue of
whether it is the R TC or the Sandiganbayan that should try and hear
the charge against petitioner.
Consing v. Court of Appeals
Deliberation: Certification Requirement
Fast facts
Merlin Consing (pet) sold a house and lot to Caridad Santos. Provided
in their contract of sale were particular terms of payment in which the
purchase price shall be paid (installment basis, plus interest). In the
process, Santos defaulted in her payments. Consing demanded for
her payment and had planned to resort to court litigation. Santos
expressed her willingness to settle her obligation. However, this is upon
the condition that the Consings comply with all the laws and
regulations on subdivision and after payment to her damages as a
consequence of the use of a portion of her lot as a subdivision road. In
response, the Consings submitted a revised subdivision plan.
Contention c/o Consing
CA did not comply with the certification requirement.
Purpose of certification requirement
• To ensure that all court decisions are reached after consultation with
members of the court en banc or division, as the case may be
• To ensure that the decision is rendered by a court as a whole, not
merely by a member of the same
• To ensure that decisions are arrived only after deliberation,
exchange of ideas, and concurrence of majority vote
Issue: WON Court erred in arriving to its conclusion without meeting
certification requirement
Held & Ratio
The certification is a new provision introduced by the framers of the
1987 Constitution. Its purpose is to ensure the implementation of the
constitutional requirement that decisions of the Supreme Court and
lower collegiate courts, such as the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan
and Court of Tax Appeals, are reached after consultation with the
members of the court sitting en banc or in a division before the case is
assigned to a member thereof for decision-writing. The decision is thus
rendered by the court as a body and not merely by a member
thereof [I Record of the Constitutional Commission 498-500], This is in
keeping with the very nature of a collegial body which arrives at its
decisions only after deliberation, the exchange of views and ideas,
and the concurrence of the required majority vote.
The absence, however, of the certification would not necessarily
mean that the case submitted for decision had not been reached in
consultation before being assigned to one member for the writing of
the opinion of the Court since the regular performance of official duty
is presumed [Sec. 5 (m) of Rule 131, Rules of Court]. The lack of
certification at the end of the decision would only serve as evidence
of failure to observe the certification requirement and may be basis
for holding the official responsible for the omission to account therefor
[See I Record of the Constitutional Commission 460]. Such absence of
certification would not have the effect of invalidating the decision.
In Re: Production of Court Records and Documents and the
Attendance of Court officials and employees as witnesses under the
subpoenas of February 10, 2012 and the various letters for the
Impeachment Prosecution Panel dated January 19 and 25, 2012
Sobrang haba but looks like it covers what ma’am wants, read last!
Possible Take away, hopefully it lang kailangan
The following are privileged documents or communications, and are
not subject to disclosure:
(1) Court actions such as the result of the raffle of cases and the
actions taken by the Court on each case included in the agenda of
the Court’s session on acts done material to pending cases, except
where a party litigant requests information on the result of the raffle of
the case, pursuant to Rule 7, Section 3 of the IRSC;
(2) Court deliberations or the deliberations of the Members in
court sessions on cases and matters pending before the Court;
(3) Court records which are “predecisional” and “deliberative” in
nature, in particular, documents and other communications which
are part of or related to the deliberative process, i.e., notes, drafts,
research papers, internal discussions, internal memoranda, records
of internal deliberations, and similar papers.
(4) Confidential Information secured by justices, judges, court
officials and employees in the course of their official functions,
mentioned in (2) and (3) above, are privileged even after their term of
office.
(5) Records of cases that are still pending for decision are
privileged materials that cannot be disclosed, except only for
pleadings, orders and resolutions that have been made available by
the court to the general public.
(6) The principle of comity or inter-departmental courtesy
demands that the highest officials of each department be exempt
from the compulsory processes of the other departments.
(7) These privileges belong to the Supreme Court as an institution,
not to any justice or judge in his or her individual capacity. Since the
Court is higher than the individual justices or judges, no sitting or retired
justice or judge, not even the Chief Justice, may claim exception
without the consent of the Court.
Facts:
During the impeachment proceedings against Chief Justice
Corona, the prosecution Panel manifested in a COMPLIANCE that it
would present about 100 witnesses which included Justices of the
Supreme Court, and Court officials and employees who will testify on
matters internal to the Court and almost a thousand documents
Letters were sent to the SC asking for the examination of records,
and the issuance of certified true copies of the rollos and the Agenda
and Minutes of the Deliberations of various cases decided by the SC
for purposes of the -Impeachment Complaint. Subpoena Ad
Testificandum et Duces TecumAnd Subpoena Ad Testificandum were
also issued against Clerks of Court of the SC.
In light of the subpoenas served, the urgent need for a court
ruling and based on the Constitution, the pertinent laws and of the
Court’s rules and policies, we shall now determine how the Court will
comply with the subpoenas and the letters of the Prosecution
Impeachment Panel.
Issue during discussion: What is Judicial Privilege?
In fine, there are Philippine laws, rules and jurisprudence prohibiting
the revelation of confidential or “secret” information that causes
damage to public interest even in judicial and other proceedings
such as the sui generis impeachment trial. As far as the Court is
concerned, its Members and officials involved in all proceedings are
duty-bound to observe the privileged communication and
confidentiality rules if the integrity of the administration of justice were
to be preserved – i.e., not even Members of the Court, on their own
and without the consent of the Supreme Court, can testify on matters
covered by the prohibitions and exclusions, particularly with respect
to matters pending resolution before the Supreme Court.
Sub-issues: Whether or not Court Records are considered Confidential
or priviliged.
As to Court Deliberations:
In the Judiciary, privileges against disclosure of official records
“create a hierarchy of rights that protect certain confidential
relationships over and above the public’s evidentiary need” or “right
to every man’s evidence.” Accordingly, certain information contained
in the records of cases before the Supreme Court are considered
confidential and are exempt from disclosure. To reiterate, the need
arises from the dictates of the integrity of the Court’s decision-making
function which may be affected by the disclosure of information.
The Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (IRSC) prohibits the
disclosure of
(1) the result of the raffle of cases,
(2) the actions taken by the Court on each case included in the
agenda of the Court’s session,
(3) the deliberations of the Members in court sessions on cases and
matters pending before it.
Rule 7, Section 3 of the IRSC10 declares that the results of the
raffle of cases shall only be available to the parties and their counsels,
unless the cases involve bar matters, administrative cases and criminal
cases involving the penalty of life imprisonment, which are treated
with strict confidentiality and where the raffle results are not disclosed
even to the parties themselves.
Rule 10, Section 2 of the IRSC provides that the actions taken in
each case in the Court’s agenda, which are noted by the Chief
Justice or the Division Chairman, are also to be treated with strict
confidentiality. Only after the official release of the resolution
embodying the Court action may that action be made available to
the public. A resolution is considered officially released once the
envelope containing its final copy, addressed to the parties, has been
transmitted to the process server for personal service or to the mailing
section of the Judicial Records Office.
Court deliberations are traditionally recognized as
privileged communication. Section 2, Rule 10 of the
IRSC provides:
Section 2. Confidentiality of court sessions. – Court
sessions are executive in character, with only the
Members of the Court present. Court deliberations are
confidential and shall not be disclosed to outside
parties, except as may be provided herein or as
authorized by the Court. [emphasis ours]
Justice Abad discussed the rationale for the rule in his concurring
opinion to the Court Resolution in Arroyo v. De Lima13 (TRO on Watch
List Order case): the rules on confidentiality will enable the Members of
the Court to “freely discuss the issues without fear of criticism for
holding unpopular positions” or fear of humiliation for one’s
comments. The privilege against disclosure of these kinds of
information/communication is known as deliberative process
privilege, involving as it does the deliberative process of reaching a
decision. “Written advice from a variety of individuals is an important
element of the government’s decision-making process and that the
interchange of advice could be stifled if courts forced the government
to disclose those recommendations;” the privilege is intended “to
prevent the ‘chilling’ of deliberative communications.”
 The privilege is not exclusive to the Judiciary. We have in passing
recognized the claim of this privilege by the two other branches of
government in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority17 (speaking through
J. Carpio) when the Court declared that
[t]he information x x x like internal deliberations of the
Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or
executive sessions of either house of Congress, are
recognized as confidential. This kind of information
cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of
government. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas
and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and
pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the
independence of decision-making of those tasked to
exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power.18
(emphases ours)
Justice Brion noted this fact in his Separate Concurring Opinion in Neri
v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations:19
Significantly, this type of privilege is not for the
Executive to enjoy alone. All the great branches of
government are entitled to this treatment for their own
decision and policy making conversations and
correspondence. It is unthinkable that the disclosure of
internal debates and deliberations of the Supreme
Court or the executive sessions of either Houses of
Congress can be compelled at will by outside parties.
[emphasis ours]
Thus, a Senator may invoke legislative privilege when he or she is
questioned outside the Senate about information gathered during an
executive session of the Senate’s legislative inquiry in aid of legislation.
In the same manner, a justice of the court or a judge may invoke
judicial privilege in the Senate sitting as an Impeachment Court, for
proceedings in the performance of his or her own judicial functions.
What applies to magistrates applies with equal force to court officials
and employees who are privy to these deliberations. They may
likewise claim exemption when asked about this privileged
information.
While Section 2, Rule 10 of the IRSC cited above speaks only of
the confidentiality of court deliberations, it is understood that the rule
extends to documents and other communications which are part of or
are related to the deliberative process. The deliberative process
privilege protects from disclosure documents reflecting advisory judge uses in preparing a decision, resolution, or order
opinions, recommendations and deliberations that are component shall remain confidential. [emphases ours]
parts of the process for formulating governmental decisions and
policies. Obviously, the privilege may also be claimed by other court To qualify for protection under the deliberative process privilege,

officials and employees when asked to act on these documents and the agency must show that the document is both (1) predecisional

other communications. and (2) deliberative.

The Code of Conduct for Court Personnel in fact provides that A document is “predecisional” under the deliberative process

access shall be denied with respect to information or records relating privilege if it precedes, in temporal sequence, the decision to which it

to drafts of decisions, rulings, orders, or internal memoranda or internal relates. In other words, communications are considered predecisional

reports. In the 2007 Resolution on Access to Justice for the Poor if they were made in the attempt to reach a final conclusion.

Project, the Court excluded the same information and records from
A material is “deliberative,” on the other hand, if it reflects the
the public by classifying them as confidential:
giveand- take of the consultative process. The key question in

Article 1. Definition of Terms. determining whether the material is deliberative in nature is whether
disclosure of the information would discourage candid discussion
2. Confidential information generally refers to within the agency. If the disclosure of the information would expose
information not yet made a matter of public record the government’s decision making process in a way that discourages
relating to pending cases, such as notes, drafts, candid discussion among the decision-makers (thereby undermining
research papers, internal discussion, internal the courts’ ability to perform their functions), the information is
memoranda, records of internal deliberations, and deemed privileged.
similar papers. Even after the decision, resolution, or
order is made public, such information that a justice or Court records which are “predecisional” and “deliberative” in
nature are thus protected and cannot be the subject of a subpoena if
judicial privilege is to be preserved. The privilege in general insulates
the Judiciary from an improper intrusion into the functions of the
judicial branch and shields justices, judges, and court officials and
employees from public scrutiny or the pressure of public opinion that
would impair a judge’s ability to render impartial decisions. The
deliberative process can be impaired by undue exposure of the
decision-making process to public scrutiny before or even after the
decision is made, as discussed below.
Additionally, two other grounds may be cited for denying access
to court records, as well as preventing members of the bench, from
being subjected to compulsory process:
(1) the disqualification by reason of privileged communication and
(2) the pendency of an action or matter.
The prohibition against disclosure of confidential information is
required to be observed by members of the Court under the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. Section 9,
Canon 4 (Propriety) states:
Section 9. Confidential information acquired by judges
in their judicial capacity shall not be used or disclosed
for any other purpose related to their judicial duties.
[emphasis ours]
This rule of judicial ethics complements the rule of evidence that
disqualifies public officials from testifying on information they acquire
in confidence in the course of their duties:
Rules of Court, Rule 130, Section 24. Disqualification by
reason of privileged communication. – The following
persons cannot testify as to matters learned in
confidence in the following cases:
xxxx
(e) A public officer cannot be examined during his
term of office or afterwards, as to communications
made to him in official confidence, when the court
finds that the public interest would suffer by the
disclosure. [emphasis ours]
Under the law, therefore, the Members of the Court may not be
compelled to testify in the impeachment proceedings against the
Chief Justice or other Members of the Court about information they
acquired in the performance of their official function of adjudication,
such as information on how deliberations were conducted or the
material inputs that the justices used in decision-making, because the
end-result would be the disclosure of confidential information that
could subject them to criminal prosecution. Such act violates judicial
privilege (or the equivalent of executive privilege) as it pertains to the
exercise of the constitutional mandate of adjudication.
Jurisprudence implies that justices and judges may not be
subject to any compulsory process in relation to the performance of
their adjudicatory functions. In Senate of the Philippines v. Exec. Sec.
Ermita,31 the Court declared that
members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from
[the Congress’] power of inquiry [in aid of legislation].
Unlike the Presidency, judicial power is vested in a
collegial body; hence, each member thereof is
exempt on the basis not only of separation of powers
but also on the fiscal autonomy and the constitutional
independence of the judiciary.
This ruling was dictated in no small measure by the principle of comity
mentioned above. Inter-departmental courtesy demands that the
highest levels of each department be exempt from the compulsory
processes of the other departments on matters related to the functions
and duties of their office.
With respect to Court officials and employees, the same rules on
confidentiality that apply to justices and judges apply to them. They
are barred from disclosing (1) the result of the raffle of cases, (2) the
actions taken by the Court on each case included in the agenda of
the Court’s session, and (3) the deliberations of the Members in court
sessions on cases and matters pending before it. They are subject as
well to the disqualification by reason of privileged communication
and the sub judice rule. As stated above, these rules extend to
documents and other communications which cannot be disclosed.
These privileges, incidentally, belong to the Judiciary and are for
the Supreme Court (as the representative and entity speaking for the
Judiciary), and not for the individual justice, judge, or court official or
employees to waive. Thus, every proposed waiver must be referred to
the Supreme Court for its consideration and approval.
In fine, there are Philippine laws, rules and jurisprudence
prohibiting the revelation of confidential or “secret” information that
causes damage to public interest even in judicial and other
proceedings such as the sui generis impeachment trial. As far as the
Court is concerned, its Members and officials involved in all
proceedings are duty-bound to observe the privileged
communication and confidentiality rules if the integrity of the
administration of justice were to be preserved – i.e., not even
Members of the Court, on their own and without the consent of the
Supreme Court, can testify on matters covered by the prohibitions and
exclusions, particularly with respect to matters pending resolution
before the Supreme Court.
To state the rule differently, Justices of the Court cannot be
compelled to testify on matters relating to the internal deliberations
and actions of the Court, in the exercise of their adjudicatory functions
and duties. This is to be differentiated from a situation where the
testimony is on a matter which is external to their adjudicatory
functions and duties.
As to Court Records:
As a penultimate point, witnesses need not be summoned to
testify on matters of public record. These are the records that a
government unit is required by law to keep or which it is compelled to
keep in the discharge of duties imposed by law. A record is a public
record within the purview of a statute providing that books and
records required by law to be kept by a clerk may be received in
evidence in any court if it is a record which a public officer is required
to keep and if it is filled in such a manner that it is subject to public
inspection. Under the Rules of Court, the rule on public records is
embodied in Section 44, Rule 130.
To restate the rule, entries in official records may be presented
without the necessity of presenting in court the officer or person who
made the entries. Entries in public or official books or records may be
proved by the production of the books or records themselves or by a
copy certified by the legal keeper thereof. These records, however,
may be presented and marked in evidence only where they are not
excluded by reasons of privilege and the other reasons discussed
above.
The reasons for this rule are necessity and trustworthiness.
Necessity consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the
official’s attendance as a witness to testify to the innumerable
transactions in the course of his duty. A public officer is excused from
appearing in court in order that public business may not be
interrupted, hampered or delayed. Where there is no exception for
official statements, hosts of officials would be found devoting the
greater part of their time attending as witnesses in court, delivering
their deposition before an officer. Trustworthiness is a reason because
of the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty. The
law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it presumes
that they will discharge their several trusts with accuracy and fidelity;
and therefore, whatever acts they do in the discharge of their public
duty may be given in evidence and shall be taken to be true under
such a degree of caution as the nature and circumstances of each
case may appear to require. Thus, “[t]he trustworthiness of public
documents and the value given to the entries made therein could be
grounded on: 1) the sense of official duty in the preparation of the
statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of
that duty, 3) the routine and disinterested origin of most such
statements, and 4) the publicity of record which makes more likely the
prior exposure of such errors as might have occurred.”
As a last point and mainly for purposes of stress, the privileges
discussed above that apply to justices and judges apply mutatis
mutandis to court officials and employees with respect to their official
functions. If the intent only is for them to identify and certify to the
existence and genuineness of documents within their custody or
control that are not otherwise confidential or privileged under the
above discussed rules, their presence before the Impeachment Court
can be and should be excused where certified copies of these
non-privileged and non-confidential documents can be provided.
Cruz v. DENR
Voting
FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition
and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the
constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371,
otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA)
and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail
certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these
amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands
of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources
therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
HELD:
The Supreme Court deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right
they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the to alienate the same.
same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruz’s
petition was dismissed and the constitutionality of the IPRA law was Miguel v. JCT Group
sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include public domain –
Requirement for Decision
somehow against the regalian doctrine.

For several years, Glorious Sun Garment Manufacturing Company (or

No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution.
Glorious Sun) was a garment exporter until it folded up in October
Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the
1994. Thereafter, De Soliel [sic][5] Apparel Manufacturing Corporation
ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral
[or De Soleil] and American Inter-Fashion Corporation (or AIFC) took
domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral
over Glorious Suns manufacturing plant, facilities and equipment and
domains remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to
absorbed its employees, including the [petitioners].
the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains
merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the
In July 1990, De Soleil ceased business operations, effectively
resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these
terminating [petitioners] employment.
resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale
development and exploitation. In April 1993, [petitioners] filed complaints for illegal dismissal and
payment of backwages and other monetary claims before the
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of
National Labor Relations Commission (or NLRC) Arbitration Branch
the lands of the public domain. They are private lands and belong to
against De Soleil, AIFC, PCGG, Glorious Sun, JCT, Nemesio Co and
the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title that
Vicente Cuevas III (or Cuevas). The cases were eventually
existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the
consolidated.
right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral
On May 26, 1993, JCT and Cuevas x x x filed a motion to dismiss
founded on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action
because of the absence of [an] employer-employee relationship
between them and [petitioners].
Without resolving the motion to dismiss, Labor Arbiter Vladimir P.L.
Sampang rendered a decision Declaring [De Soleil, AIFC, PCGG,
Glorious Sun, JCT, Nemesio Co and Cuevas] jointly and severally guilty
of illegal dismissal and to pay complainants backwages, separation
pay, service incentive leave pay, 13 th month pay, unpaid salaries as
computed by the Research and Information Unit
CA reversed the Decision of the NLRC and remanded the case to the
labor arbiter for further proceedings. The appellate court ruled that
the circumstances presented factual questions whose resolution had
to precede that of the issue of whether private respondents were
liable to petitioners. It found no factual basis for the ruling that JCT had
become the employer of petitioners after the cessation of operations
of Glorious Sun. Similarly, the Decisions of the NLRC and the labor
arbiter failed to explain the reason for holding Cuevas solidarily liable
with AIF, De Soleil and JCT.
Issue: W/N Labor Arbiter is liable for a grave abuse of disgression
Decision:
In the present factual milieu, the labor arbiter and the NLRC gravely
abused their discretion when they ruled in favor of herein petitioners
without determining the existence of an employer-employee
relationship between them and respondents. The Decisions were silent
on why JCT and Cuevas were held liable.
the Decision of the labor arbiter is a patent nullity, because it failed to
state the factual and legal bases for its conclusions. The facts and the
law on which decisions are based must be clearly and distinctly
expressed.[14] The failure of the labor arbiter and the NLRC to express
the basis for their Decisions was an evasion of their constitutional duty,
an evasion that constituted grave abuse of discretion.
Nunal v. CA
Requirement to Decision
Sometime in December 1974, after trial and hearing, the then Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial court) rendered its judgment in favor
of private respondents and ordered the partition of the property of the
late Frank C. Lyon and Mary Ekstrom Lyon. The order of partition was

affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in July 1982 then remanded to On January 1987, the lower court issued the assailed order directing

the lower court and two years later, a writ of execution was issued by the inclusion of Mary Lyon Martin as co-owner with a share in the

the latter. partition of the property

On July 17, 1984, Mary Lyon Martin, daughter of the late Frank C. Lyon The petitioner filed an appeal before the CA assailing the decision of

and Mary Ekstrom Lyon, assisted by her counsel filed a motion to the lower court whether or not the trial court may order the inclusion of

quash the order of execution with preliminary injunction. In her motion, Mary L. Martin as co-heir entitled to participate in the partition of the

she contends that not being a party to the above-entitled case her property considering that she was neither a party plaintiff nor a party

rights, interests, ownership and participation over the land should not defendant in Civil Case No. 872 for partition and accounting of the

be affected by a judgment in the said case; that the order of aforesaid property and that the decision rendered in said case has

execution is unenforceable insofar as her share, right, ownership and long become final and executory.

participation is concerned, said share not having been brought within

the Jurisdiction of the court a quo. She further invokes Section 12, Rule ISSUE:

69 of the Rules of Court.

Whether or not the proper remedy to enforce a right of an excluded

heir to a final and executory judgment of partition is a motion to quash Furthermore, "any amendment or alteration which substantially affects

said judgment? a final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction,

including the entire proceedings held for that purpose."

HELD:

The Court held in the negative. The Court said that when a final In the case at bar, the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 872

judgment becomes executory, it thereby becomes immutable and has become final and executory. Thus, upon its finality, the trial judge

unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, lost his jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, any modification that

even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be he would make, as in this case, the inclusion of Mary Lyon Martin

an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the would be in excess of his authority.

modification is attempted to be made by the Court rendering it or by

the highest Court of land. The only recognized exceptions are the The remedy of Mary Lyon Martin is to file an independent suit against

correction of clerical errors or the making of so-called nunc pro tunc the parties in Civil Case No. 872 and all other heirs for her share in the

entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and, of course, where subject property, in order that all the parties in interest can prove their

the judgment is void." respective claims.

 The indictment charged YAO and Roxas of having mutually

Yao v. CA and in conspiracy sold fluorescent lamp starters which have the

Requirement for Decision General Electric (GE) logo, design and containers, making them

appear as genuine GE fluorescent lamp starters; and inducing the

FACTS
public to believe them as such.. Both accused pleaded not guilty. The

MeTC acquitted Roxas but convicted YAO. In acquitting Roxas, the

George Yao’s legal dilemma commenced when the
trial court declared that the prosecution failed to prove that he was
Philippine Electrical Manufacturing Company (PEMCO) noticed the
still one of the Board of Directors at the time the goods were seized.
proliferation locally of General Electric (GE) lamp starters. As the only

local subsidiary of GE-USA, Remandaman was able to purchase from

YAO filed a motion for reconsideration, which the MeTC
TCC fifty (50) pieces of fluorescent lamp starters with the GE logo and
denied. He then appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
design. Assessing that these products were counterfeit, PEMCO
City (RTC). Judge Adoracion Angeles rendered a one-page Decision
applied for the issuance of a search warrant. This was issued by the
which affirmed in toto the MeTC decision.
MeTC, Branch 49, Caloocan City. Eight boxes, each containing 15,630

starters, were thereafter seized from the TCC warehouse in Caloocan YAO filed a motion for reconsideration and assailed the

City. decision as violative of Section 2, Rule 20 of the Rules of Court. The

RTC denied the motion for reconsideration as devoid of merit and ISSUES

reiterated that the findings of the trial court are entitled to great
Whether or not Yao was denied due process?
weight on appeal and should not be disturbed on appeal unless for

strong and cogent reasons.

RULINGS

YAO appealed to the Court of Appeals by filing a notice of

Yes he was. The decision of the RTC affirming the conviction
appeal. The Court of Appeals granted YAO an extension of twenty (20)
of YAO transgressed Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, which
days to file the Appellant's Brief. However, the Court of Appeals
states:
promulgated a Resolution declaring that the decision of RTC has long

become final and executory and ordering the records of the case SECTION 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court

remanded to said court for the proper execution of judgment. without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law

on which it is based.
YAO filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Entry of Judgment

contending that the resolution did not specifically dismiss the appeal The Court finds that the RTC decision at bar miserably failed

but the Court of Appeals denied the Urgent Motion to Set Aside the to meet them and, therefore, fell short of the constitutional injunction.

Entry of Judgment for lack of merit. The RTC decision achieved nothing and attempted at nothing, not
even at a simple summation of facts which could easily be done. The entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if

Court cannot consider or affirm said RTC decision as a memorandum permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed.

decision because it failed to comply with the measures of validity. It

While he indeed resorted to the wrong mode of appeal and
merely affirmed in toto the MeTC decision without saying more. A
his right to appeal is statutory, it is still an essential part of the judicial
decision or resolution, especially one resolving an appeal, should
system that courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a
directly meet the issues for resolution; otherwise, the appeal would be
party of the prerogative, but instead afford every party-litigant the
pointless.
amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his case,

Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article freed from the constraints of technicalities.

VIII of the Constitution is indisputably a paramount component of due

A party-litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to
process and fair play. It is likewise demanded by the due process
establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to
clause of the Constitution. The parties to litigation should be informed
lose life, liberty, honor or property on mere technicalities. The Court
of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal
withhold legal approbation on the RTC decision at bar for its palpable
reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The losing party is
failure to comply with the constitutional and legal mandates thereby
denying YAO of his day in court and reminding also all magistrates to The case at bar is a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of

heed the demand of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution. the SC’s decision dismissing the former’s petition and declaring the

establishment of the respondent PET as constitutional.

Macalintal v. Comelec

Petitioner argues that PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec 4,

Period for deciding cases (can’t find it in this case though… kahit sa Art VII of the Constitution does not provide for the creation of the PET,

orig) and it violates Sec 12, Art VIII of the Constitution.

Facts: Par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: “The The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is on firm

Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests footing on the basis of the grant of authority to the Supreme Court to

relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or be the sole judge of all election contests for the President or

Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.” Vice-President under par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution.

Sec 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: The Members of the Issue:

Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be

Whether or not PET is constitutional.
designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative

functions. Whether or not PET exercises quasi-judicial power.

Held: by law.” The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes

characterize the resolution of electoral contests as essentially an

Yes. The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional
exercise of judicial power. When the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a
Commission to a Presidential Electoral Tribunal, with Fr. Joaquin Bernas
presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is
categorically declaring that in crafting the last paragraph of Sec. 4,
essentially a judicial power.
Art VII of the 1987 Constitution, they “constitutionalized what was

statutory.” Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the same The COMELEC, HRET and SET are not, strictly and literally speaking,

Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary courts of law. Although not courts of law, they are, nonetheless,

implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in essence, an

of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and exercise of judicial power, because of the explicit constitutional

vice-presidential elections contests includes the means necessary to empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC)

carry it into effect. and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals)

of the Constitution.
No. The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article

VIII of the Constitution which provides that the power “shall be vested

in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established