GAMING LAW REVIEW AND ECONOMICS
Volume 19, Number 10, 2015
 Mary Ann Liebert, Inc.
DOI: 10.1089/glre.2015.19105
Sports (Betting) Integrity: Detecting Match-Fixing in Soccer
Elihu D. Feustel and Ryan M. Rodenberg
INTRODUCTION
T he need to eradicate match-fixing in sports
is one issue law enforcement, sports leagues,
gamblers, and reputable gaming operators largely
agree on.1 The integrity of sports wagering markets
is at stake. The general integrity of the underlying
sporting events is at stake, too. Accordingly, a
number of industry stakeholders, including sports
governing bodies, gaming regulators, betting in-
dustry entities, and commercial line monitoring
companies, have invested in resources to detect
corruption and manipulation using statistical
models.2 We add to the existing literature3 and
demonstrate how such methods can be used as an
additional tool in the effort to detect match-fixing,
preserve sports’ integrity, and ensure that underly-
ing wagering markets are free of betting fraud.
Indeed, National Basketball Association (NBA)
commissioner Adam Silver recently highlighted
the utility of such efforts in a wide-ranging New
York Times op-ed that has served to increase
media coverage devoted to the prospect of nation-
wide legalized sports wagering in the United
States. In relevant part, Silver posited:
Outside of the United States, sports betting
and other forms of gambling are popular,
widely legal, and subject to regulation. In Eng-
land, for example, a sports bet can be placed
on a smartphone, at a stadium kiosk or even
using a television remote control. In light of
these.trends, the laws on sports betting
should be changed. Congress should adopt a
federal framework that allows states to autho-
Elihu D. Feustel is CEO of Four Monkeys Consulting in South
Bend, Indiana. Ryan M. Rodenberg is an assistant professor of
sports law analytics at Florida State University in Tallahassee,
Florida.
689
Articles
rize betting on professional sports, subject to
strict regulatory requirements and technologi-
cal safeguards. These requirements would in-
clude: mandatory monitoring and reporting
of unusual betting-line movements . (empha-
sis added).4
1
See Ryan M. Rodenberg and Elihu D. Feustel, Forensic Sports
Analytics: Detecting and Predicting Match-Fixing in Tennis, 8
J. Prediction Mkt. 77 (2014).
2
See Ben Van Rompuy, The Role of the Betting Industry, in
Global Corruption Report: Sport (Transparency Interna-
tional ed., 2015). In 2014, an entire professional conference
in Europe focused on the topic. See Enlarged Partial Agreement
on Sport, Seminar on Sports Betting Monitoring and Fraud
Detection Systems, Council of Europe (Dec. 10–11, 2014).
3
See, e.g., Sue Schneider, Integrity Betting Intelligence System,
18 Gaming L. Rev. and Econ. 961 (2014); Adam Hosmer-
Henner, Preventing Game Fixing: Sports Books as Information
Markets, 14 Gaming L. Rev. and Econ. 31 (2010).
4
Adam Silver, Legalize Sports Betting, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14,
2014. In a 2015 ESPN The Magazine cover story, Silver
noted the lack of such measures during a 2007 gambling scan-
dal involving former NBA referee Tim Donaghy: ‘‘[Silver’s]
time overseas coincided with the Donaghy scandal and the rev-
elation, as Silver puts it, ‘of how important it is to have a way of
monitoring irregular activity in our games.’ He adds, ‘None of
the systems we had in place had captured any betting by Dona-
ghy.’’’ See David Purdum, I’m Not Pro Sports Gambling. I’m
Just a Realist, ESPN The Magazine, Feb. 5, 2015, at 57.
That notwithstanding, mere days after the National Basketball
Association (NBA) referee scandal broke, NBA general counsel
Rick Buchanan and lawyers for the National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA), Major League Baseball (MLB), National
Hockey League (NHL), and National Football League (NFL)
collectively penned a July 30, 2007 letter to Congress that in-
cluded the following, in relevant part: ‘‘. we have heard the ar-
gument that Internet gambling can actually protect the integrity
of sports because of the alleged capacity to monitor gambling
patterns more closely in a legalized environment. This argu-
ment is generally asserted by those who would profit from le-
galized gambling and the same point was raised in 1992
when [the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act]
was enacted. Congress dismissed it then and should dismiss it
now. The harms caused by government endorsement of sports
betting of sports betting far exceed the alleged benefits.’’ See
153 Cong. Rec. E1684 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 2007) (statement
of Hon. Edolphus Towns of New York).
690
We answer the following question—Can soccer
matches that are likely fixed be identified as poten-
tially corrupt before they are played?
We created a soccer-specific model using the first
ten games of each team’s season as a training set
across various leagues. The model predicted the
probability of a home team win, visiting team
win, or draw for each match. When the implied mar-
ket probability of a result was considerably higher
than the model prediction, the underlying match
was identified as suspicious and, in turn, deserving
of increased scrutiny.
In French Ligue 2, the second-highest level pro-
fessional soccer league in France, the eight most
suspicious matches had results consistent with pos-
sible match-fixing. In Italian Serie B, Italy’s second
division professional league, seven of the eight most
suspicious matches had results consistent with pos-
sible match-fixing. By comparison, both the English
Premier League (EPL) and U.S.-based Major
League Soccer (MLS) had normal results inconsis-
tent with match-fixing, even among the most sus-
pect matches. This method might be used to
identify suspicious (and possibly) fixed matches in
soccer leagues before the matches are played, with
the results helpful in directing subsequent investiga-
tions by sports authorities and law enforcement.
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
Our empirical strategy is comparable to similar
studies investigating sports corruption generally,5
and specific inquiries in soccer,6 tennis,7 chess,8
and sumo wrestling.9 We are motivated by the grow-
ing trend of using analytics to study corruption in
the workplace.10 Specific to soccer, we are also mo-
tivated by the apparent emphasis on match-fixing
by the Fédération Internationale de Football Associ-
ation (FIFA), the governing body for soccer world-
wide.11 While such analytical strategies have
limitations,12 our indirect methods are an important
initial step in detecting cases of possible match-
fixing and helping allocate investigative resources.
Our parsimonious model was created by assign-
ing offensive and defensive ratings for each team
in the four leagues we analyzed—(i) French Ligue
2; (ii) Italian Serie B; (iii) EPL; and (iv) MLS. We
opted to test the second division leagues in France
and Italy because widespread media reports indicate
that both leagues have been recently impacted by
FEUSTEL AND RODENBERG
match-fixing.13 We chose EPL and MLS as robust-
ness checks. By analyzing all four leagues using the
same model, we minimized the risk of deeming oth-
erwise innocuous findings as suspicious.14
The ratings were created based on results of the
current season before the game in question was an-
alyzed. The team’s ratings were then adjusted for
5
See Parimal Bag and Bibhas Saha, Match-Fixing under Com-
petitive Odds, 73 Games and Econ. Behav. 318 (2011); Raul
Caruso, The Basic Economics of Match Fixing in Sport Tourna-
ments, 39 Econ. Analysis and Pol’y 355 (2009); Sean Pat-
rick Griffin, Gaming the Game (2011).
6
See Declan Hill, The Insider’s Guide to Match-Fixing
in Football (2013); James Reade, Detecting Corruption in
Football, in Handbook on the Economics of Professional
Football ( John Goddard and Peter Sloane eds., 2014); James
Reade and Sachiko Akie, Using Forecasting to Detect Corrup-
tion in International Soccer (working paper, 2013); Harrrison
Chase, Corruption in Serie B Soccer, Harv. Sports Ana-
lytics Collective ( July 28, 2015); Guy Ellad, Jeffrey Kantor,
and Alex Krumer, Does the Corruption Perceptions Index Pre-
dict the Outcome of Competitions? Evidence from a Natural
Experiment around the World (working paper, 2015).
7
See Rodenberg and Feustel, supra note 1; Ben Gunn and
Jeff Rees, Environmental Review of Integrity in Pro-
fessional Tennis (2008).
8
Dylan Loeb McClain, To Detect Cheating in Chess, A Profes-
sor Builds a Better Program, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 2012.
9
Mark Duggan and Steven Levitt, Winning Isn’t Everything:
Corruption in Sumo Wrestling, 95 Am. Econ. Rev. 1594
(2002).
10
Eric Zitzewitz, Forensic Economics, 50 J. Econ. Litera-
ture 731 (2012).
11
Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA),
FIFA Subsidiary Early Warning System and Perform Group
Announce Partnership, FIFA.com (Aug. 19, 2015), <http://www
.fifa.com/about-fifa/news/y=2015/m=8/news=fifa-subsidiary-
ews-and-perform-group-announce-partnership-2671548.html>;
Simon Evans and Brian Homewood, FIFA Team Targets
Match-Fixing, ‘Many’ Cases of Corruption, Reuters (Aug. 21,
2015), <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/08/21/us-soccer-fifa-
ethics-idUSKCN0QQ1IS20150821>.
12
Dan Bernhardt and Steven Heston, Point Shaving in College
Basketball: A Cautionary Tale for Forensic Economics, 48
Econ. Inquiry 14 (2010).
13
Ian Holyman, Ligue 2 Match-Fixing Report Finds Caen-
Nimes ‘Understanding,’ ESPN FC (Mar. 5, 2015); PA Sport,
Nimes Coach Blasts Former Club President Over Match-
Fixing, ESPN FC (Mar. 19, 2015); Associated Press, Nimes
to be Relegated from Ligue 2 After Match-Fixing Probe,
ESPN FC (Mar. 17, 2015); Ben Gladwell, Lazio Say Match-
Fixing Probe Won’t Imperil Champions League Berth, ESPN
FC ( June 3, 2015); Associated Press, Italy Match-Fixing
Probe Sees Over 50 Arrested, More Under Investigation,
ESPN FC (May 19, 2015); Associated Press, Match-Fixing
Arrests Reach 17 in Italy, ESPN FC (Dec. 19, 2011).
14
Indeed, research in this area always carries some risk of false
positives (and false negatives). We attempt to minimize this risk
by only pinpointing the most extreme outliers among the differ-
ent leagues during the four-year time period tested.
SPORTS (BETTING) INTEGRITY
home field advantage. Home field advantage was as-
sumed to be a constant bonus to offense, equal
throughout a season, and assessed using games played
before the game subject to analysis. Projections for a
select game were created by calculating the probabil-
ity of any given score, up to five goals per team, using
a bivariate Poisson distribution model.
In EPL, for example, the model’s Brier Score (a
comparison of projections versus actual results)
was 3.5% worse than the implied probabilities of
the market’s closing prices for the matches.15 We
deemed this reasonable, given that our parsimoni-
ous model did not consider injuries, suspensions,
coaching decisions, weather, or other factors that
can materially affect the odds of different outcomes.
When a sporting event is corrupt, and the outcome
predetermined, such knowledge leaks into a semi-
efficient betting market. The amount of money wa-
gered when an outcome is certain is substantial
enough to significantly move the betting markets.
If corrupt money is being bet, one would see closing
prices that are drastically different from a model’s
theoretical odds, and one would see bets made by
corrupt money win at a significantly higher rate
than the market’s implied odds. This is due to an in-
efficiency in a corrupt market—there is no amount
of money that can be bet that will move a betting op-
tion to an implied win rate of 100%.16
The more a betting market’s closing price differs
from the model price, the more suspicious it is. As
an example of a fair match, consider the 2012
EPL contest between Liverpool and Fulham. The
market’s implied 1 · 2 odds were 51.2% chance
for Liverpool to win, 24% for a draw, and 24.9%
for Fulham to win.17 The model’s 1 · 2 odds were
53.5%, 27.4%, and 19.1%, respectively. The most
‘‘suspicious’’ aspect of the match was the market’s
backing of Fulham, pricing the visitor’s chances of
winning at 5.8% higher than the model. A not-
quite 6% difference in pricing is not very suspicious
from a match-fixing perspective.
At the other end of the spectrum, consider the
2014 French Ligue 2 match of Caen vs. Nimes
that was later identified in media reports as fixed
for a draw.18 The model’s 1 · 2 prices were 64%
for Caen to win, 21.3% for a draw, and 14.7% for
Nimes to win. The market’s closing price finished
at 46%, 42.0%, and 12.1%, respectively. In this
case, the betting markets implied that the likelihood
of a draw was nearly double what the model
predicted—a difference of 20.7%.
691
To test a league for possible fixed matches, the
eight most irregular matches—in terms of pricing
differences between the model and the market—
were selected from the 2011–2014 seasons for
each of the four leagues.19
RESULTS
In EPL, the eight most suspicious matches had an
average implied odds difference of 19.1%. If one
had bet each of these matches, one would have
lost seven of eight bets. Risking $1 on each
wager, one would have lost $6.02. If those matches
were corrupt, one would expect those eight bets to
all (or nearly all) win. This result is a negative find-
ing, suggesting that the matches in EPL were clean.
In MLS, the eight most suspicious matches had
an average implied odds difference of 23.9%. If
one had bet $1 on each of these matches, one
would have won four wagers and lost four wagers,
losing $1.05 on $8 risked. This is an average result,
and does not suggest those matches were corrupt.
Similar to EPL, this is a negative finding for the
MLS matches. In other words, this suggests that
the MLS matches were clean.
In French Ligue 2, all eight suspicious matches
(including the already-flagged Caen-Nimes match)
had an average implied odds difference of 25.6%.
Each match was played near the end of the season,
had a significant impact on a team’s standing (a
team potentially being promoted, or at risk of
15
Related studies have similarly relied on a Brier Score for such
comparisons. See Reade and Akie, supra note 6.
16
It is worth noting that betting markets are sometimes discon-
tinued if it appears the underlying match is corrupt.
17
There are two common ways to bet on soccer. The first way,
often referred to as 1 · 2 odds, allows wagers on one of three
outcomes without regard to total goals scored or goal differen-
tial: (i) the home team wins; (ii) the match results in a draw (or
tie); or (iii) the visiting team wins. The second common way to
wager on soccer is the Asian handicap system, a topic beyond
the scope of this article.
18
See Holyman, supra note 13.
19
The eight suspicious outlier matches for each league during
the four year time period (an amount equal to less than one per-
cent of all games played) were selected among those matches
occurring after each team had played at least 30 matches in a
given season. Each league has a different number of matches
per season—(i) English Premier League (EPL) and French
Ligue 2 have about 380 matches per season; (ii) Italian Serie
B has about 462 matches per season; and (iii) Major League
Soccer (MLS) has about 323 matches per season.
692 FEUSTEL AND RODENBERG

Table 1. French Ligue 2 Suspicious Matches

Win Year Home Visitor Home Vis Played Mod 1 Mod X Mod 2 1 X 2
2.4 2011 Le Havre Vannes 3 4 35 0.710 0.249 0.041 0.425 0.297 0.278
1.4 2011 Istres Metz 2 3 35 0.465 0.354 0.181 0.294 0.310 0.397
0.3 2011 AC Ajaccio Istres 2 0 36 0.538 0.317 0.145 0.752 0.170 0.078
0.3 2011 Nimes AC Ajaccio 1 2 37 0.341 0.366 0.293 0.094 0.186 0.719
0.5 2012 Lens Istres 1 0 36 0.405 0.297 0.298 0.620 0.249 0.131
0.7 2014 Auxerre Le Havre 2 1 35 0.326 0.344 0.330 0.563 0.267 0.170
1.3 2014 Arles-Avignon Auxerre 0 2 36 0.557 0.330 0.113 0.303 0.291 0.406
1.3 2014 Caen Nimes 1 1 36 0.640 0.213 0.147 0.460 0.420 0.121

relegation), and had a result consistent with possible
match-fixing.20 In all eight suspicious matches, the
team benefiting from the apparent fix was either
poised to be promoted or in danger of being rele-
gated. An insider betting $1 on each of these
matches would have won $8.26 on $8 risked. This
finding suggests that some or all of the eight
matches were likely fixed. See Table 1 above.
In Italian Serie B, the eight most suspicious
matches had an average implied odds difference
of 38.5%. Seven of the eight suspicious matches
had a result consistent with possible match-fixing
related to the prospect of promotion or relegation.21
In such matches, the contest was near the end of the
season and the team benefiting from a fixed result
was either poised to be promoted or in danger of
being relegated. An insider betting $1 on each of
these eight matches would have won $5.50 on $8
risked. This finding raises an inference that a major-
ity of the eight matches were probably fixed. See
Table 2 below.
DISCUSSION
A bivariate Poisson distribution model for scor-
ing can set approximate odds for soccer results,
but has less information than bettors. For example,
if the model predicted that EPL team Liverpool
would win 50% of the time, many factors could
make the actual probability higher or lower, and
the model would not account for those other factors.
For example, Liverpool was resting several key
players (or an important player was serving a sus-
pension), the actual probability would be consider-
ably lower, and the betting markets would reflect
this. That notwithstanding, no matter what factors
were affecting the game, both teams presumably
are trying to win, and situational factors may only
adjust the odds gradually.
Betting markets in soccer are semi-efficient.22 If
a bookmaker offers the option to bet on Liverpool
with an implied probability of 50% to win, and
the actual probability is 60%, bettors will bet on
Liverpool with a positive expectation. As bets
come in, bookmakers adjust the odds until Liver-
pool backers no longer think they have an advan-
tage. After commissions, one might expect bets to
dry up when the implied probability is adjusted to
58% (an event with a 60% chance of happening
might no longer be profitable after commissions,
if the payout were at a 58% implied odds and a
2% commission). On a non-corrupt match, the im-
plied odds of the final closing prices will be very ac-
curate. If the closing price on a group of 1,000
games suggests a favorite will win 60% of the
time, such favorites will win very close to 60% of
the games. If a situational factor changes the actual
odds, those factors are accurately reflected in the
closing price.
If a match is corrupt, and the result is predeter-
mined before the game begins, the actual probabil-
ity of that result is 1.0 (or close to it, depending on
how well the fix is executed). This change in the im-
plied probability is always greater than the change
caused by injuries or other situational factors,
20
Unlike American professional sports leagues, where member-
ship in the league is largely static from year to year, European
soccer leagues follow the promotion-relegation model. In such
a model, teams that finish at the bottom of the season’s stand-
ings are relegated to the next lower division. Being relegated
from a second-tier league to the third-tier league has consider-
able financial and prestige implications. Conversely, teams that
finish at the top of the season’s standings are promoted to the
next higher division, a lucrative move.
21
The eighth match, which resulted in a draw, had no promotion
or relegation implications.
22
For a detailed discussion of soccer betting market efficiency,
see John Goddard, The Efficiency of Soccer Betting Markets, in
The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Gambling
(Leighton Vaughan-Williams and Donald Siegel eds., 2013).
SPORTS (BETTING) INTEGRITY 693

Table 2. Italian Serie B League Suspicious Matches

Win Year Home Visitor Home Vis Played Mod 1 Mod X Mod 2 1 X 2
0.45 2011 Siena Torino 2 2 38 0.658 0.248 0.094 0.200 0.657 0.143
0.63 2011 Ascoli Siena 3 2 39 0.212 0.308 0.479 0.586 0.243 0.171
-1.00 2011 AlbinoLeffe Atalanta 2 3 39 0.228 0.269 0.503 0.558 0.291 0.151
0.34 2011 Crotone Grosseto 0 0 40 0.459 0.311 0.230 0.166 0.713 0.122
0.28 2011 Sassuolo Reggina 3 2 41 0.355 0.375 0.270 0.742 0.165 0.093
0.37 2011 AlbinoLeffe Siena 1 0 41 0.229 0.249 0.522 0.694 0.165 0.141
0.63 2013 Verona Empoli 0 0 42 0.531 0.254 0.215 0.196 0.586 0.218
0.68 2013 Novara Lanciano 1 1 41 0.649 0.216 0.135 0.190 0.567 0.244

where the outcome is never 100% certain. For this
reason, ranking matches by difference in implied
odds (closing market prices versus the model) will
identify corrupt matches, if they exist, as more sus-
picious than matches where there are situational
factors unaccounted for in the model.
In French Ligue 2, each team plays every other
team twice: once at home and once on the road.
For purposes of league standings, a team earns
three points for a win and one point for a draw. At
the end of a season, the top three finishers (with
ties broken by goal differential) are promoted to
French Ligue 1, the country’s top league. The low-
est finishing teams are demoted to Championnat
National, the equivalent of a third division. There
is a considerable difference in prestige and team
value/payouts after a promotion or relegation.
Caen-Nimes was publicly identified as a corrupt
match in 2014.23 In French Ligue 2, three of the
eight possibly fixed matches identified were in
2014. In addition to the Caen-Nimes match, two
of the last three Auxerre matches were flagged.
With three games remaining in the 2014 season
for each team, Auxerre had a model probability of
32.6% to win over La Havre. The market closing
price inferred a probability of Auxerre winning at
56.3%, or nearly 24% higher. Auxerre won the
match by a 2–1 score. Auxerre then visited Arles-
Avignon, where the model estimated the probability
of an Auxerre win at 11.3%. The market closing
price inferred a win rate of 40.61%, nearly four
times the model price. Auxerre won 2–0.
Auxerre’s opponents in both suspicious matches
were neither at risk of relegation nor in range of pro-
motion. In the league standings, Le Havre finished
with 48 points and Arles-Avignon finished with 46
points. Both teams could lose a match to Auxerre
at no outwardly evident cost. At that time, the
2014 league standings among teams in danger of
relegation were as set forth below in Table 3, below.
If Auxerre did not gain ground in the last three
games, it would have been relegated. But Auxerre
displaced Chatearoux by virtue of the results in its
36th and 37th games, both of which were flagged
as suspicious in our model. If Auxerre had lost
both of those games (or lost one and tied the
other), it would have finished below Chateauroux
and likely been relegated.
One must consider alternative explanations to
match-fixing.24 For example, would Auxerre try
harder, knowing it was at risk of relegation?
Could that be a situational factor that would actually
increase the real probability of them winning? If this
occurred, and the market were semi-efficient, the
closing prices of these apparently corrupt matches
would still be predictive. Auxerre would be more
likely to win, and the other seven apparently corrupt
results would be more likely also. But how likely is
it that all eight of the most suspicious results would
occur? The probability of this occurring based on
the predictive model was 0.0000034. The probabil-
ity based on the implied market probability was

Table 3. French Ligue 2 Late Season Standings 23

See Holyman, supra note 13. The 2011 Siena-Ascoli match was
previously identified as corrupt, too. See David Purdum, Match-
Team Win Draw Loss Points Fixing Epidemic: What a Sportsbook Trader in UK Sees When
Chateauroux 10 10 15 40 the Fix Is In, BettingTalk.com (Dec. 6, 2013), <http://www
Laval 9 11 15 38 .bettingtalk.com/match-fixing-epidemic-uk-sportsbook-trader-
Auxerre 8 12 15 36 sees-fix/>.
24
Istres 9 9 17 36 Indeed, in any transparent match-fixing inquiry, all alterna-
CA Bastia 4 11 21 23 tive explanations must be considered before any conclusive de-
termination is made.
694
0.0036. So, it seems unlikely that teams trying
harder is the explanation for these results. Addition-
ally, other teams at risk of relegation (notably Cha-
teauroux, Laval, and Istres) would try harder too.
However, matches involving those other teams at
risk of relegation were not flagged as suspicious—
meaning that the risk of relegation did not drasti-
cally change the implied market probability of
those teams winning, and those late-season games
were not fixed in an outwardly obvious way. If a
team plays better when facing relegation, the im-
plied market odds for all four such teams should
have gone up significantly. But this did not happen:
only the implied market odds for Auxerre increased.
All eight flagged matches in our French Ligue 2
analysis had a similar pattern. Namely, a team
needed points to be promoted or to avoid relegation,
and the fixed result would not hurt its opponent. All
eight matches resulted in an outcome consistent
with the suspicious wagering.
In Italian Serie B, our results were similar. Seven
out of eight suspicious outcomes occurred, and six
flagged matches (including a false positive) had pat-
terns similar to French Ligue 2—where the suspi-
cious matches favored a team at risk of relegation
or poised for promotion, and did not affect the
other team. The other two matches involved
draws, which did not benefit either team. If such
matches were fixed, it was likely for wagering pur-
poses, not for relegation/promotion reasons, which
likely motivated the other possibly corrupt matches.
In 2015, the scope of Serie B match-fixing became
so great that the league pushed the start of its season
back two weeks following the arrest of seven indi-
viduals accused of committing ‘‘fraud in sporting
competition.’’25
CONCLUSION
We present a unique way to help preserve the in-
tegrity of sports generally and wagering markets
specifically. In a sub-set of late-season matches,
we identified vast differences between inferred
probabilities from market prices and a predictive
model. If there are large differences, and the differ-
ences are outcome predictive (as in French Ligue 2
and Italian Serie B), this method identifies likely
fixed matches before the match is played. Less
than one percent of the total number of matches
fell into this outlier category. This method can
FEUSTEL AND RODENBERG
also be used to rule out this type of match-fixing,
as our lack of findings in connection with EPL
and MLS demonstrate. No late season matches in
EPL or MLS were suggestive of match-fixing.
Our findings, consistent with other soccer-
specific quantitative studies,26 also highlight the in-
stitutional factors in sports league governance and
structure that can lend themselves to match-fixing
concerns. The promotion/relegation model common
in European soccer and elsewhere can sometimes
result in asymmetric incentives among teams in
late season games. One team may have a strong pe-
cuniary incentive to seek promotion (or avoid rele-
gation) in a given game, while their opponent may
have little incentive to win such game. Match-fixing
may result. This type of ‘‘organic’’ corruption is dis-
tinguishable from match-fixing orchestrated by
third parties who may bribe players, coaches, team
executives, or referees to fix a match and, in turn,
wager heavily on it.27
Finally, it important to note that our findings are
not conclusive. Indirect analytical techniques of the
type here have limitations. They are not a complete
substitute for traditional investigatory techniques
involving interviews, document review, forensic ac-
counting, court testimony, polygraphs, wiretaps,
subpoenas, and search warrants. However, such
methods can be used as a starting point for investi-
gating sports corruption, detecting match-fixing that
bleeds over into the wagering markets, and helping
preserve the integrity of sports wagering markets.28
25
Associated Press, Serie B Kickoff Pushed Back 2 Weeks
due to Match-Fixing Case, Wash. Times, July 8, 2015;
BBC, Catania President ‘Paid £71,000 to Fix Five Matches,’
BBC Sport ( June 29, 2015), <http://www.bbc.com/sport/0/
football/33318946>.
26
See supra note 6.
27
Hill, supra note 6, elaborated on this point: ‘‘This should be
clear: gambling fixes are organised by gamblers; arrangement
fixes are organised, mostly, by team officials. However . the
two types have begun to merge, so that if a team official
knows that they will lose certain games, they will then seek
to profit maximize on the gambling market.’’
28
Reade and Akie, supra note 6, concurred: ‘‘[a] method of
detecting strange betting patterns . may well be an important
tool as footballing authorities seek to address the problem of
match-fixing and other corrupt outcomes in the game.’’ Hill,
supra note 6 agreed: ‘‘A number of leagues have already put
into place systems or companies to watch the price of odds
on the sports events under the jurisdiction to give warning of
any potential fixing . it by no means is a definitive answer
as to whether matches have been fixed; however, it is an excel-
lent first step.’’