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Safety First: The Airbus Safety Magazine
Safety First: The Airbus Safety Magazine
January 2016
#21
Safety
first
002 Safety First #21 | January 2016
Safety first
Safety first, #21 January, 2016. Safety first
is published by Airbus S.A.S. - 1, rond point
Maurice Bellonte - 31707 Blagnac Cedex/France.
Publisher: Yannick Malinge, Chief Product Safety
Officer, Editor: Corinne Bieder, Director Product
Safety Strategy & Communication.
Concept Design by Airbus Multi Media Support
20152712. Reference: GS 420.0045 Issue 21.
Photos by Airbus, A. Doumenjou, H. Goussé,
P. Pigeyre, A. Tchaikovski, Lindner Fotografie.
This brochure is printed on Stucco.
This paper is produced in factories that are
accredited EMAS and certified ISO 9001-14001,
The Airbus magazine contributing to the enhancement
of the safety of aircraft operations by increasing knowledge
and communication on safety related topics.
editorial
PEFC and FSC CoC. It is produced using pulp
that has been whitened without either chlorine
or acid. The paper is entirely recyclable and is Safety first is published by the Product Safety department. At this time of the year, discussions will start on the safety of
produced from trees grown in sustainable forest It is a source of specialist safety information for the use the year that just ended. Everybody will set the objective to
resources.
The printing inks use organic pigments or
of airlines who fly and maintain Airbus aircraft. It is also do better than last year. And this is good. This very mindset
minerals. There is no use of basic dyes or distributed to other selected organizations and is available is what allowed aviation for reaching today’s safety level.
dangerous metals from the cadmium, lead, on tablets.
mercury or hexavalent chromium group.
When contemplating the future, it is often valuable to look
Material for publication is obtained from multiple sources YANNICK MALINGE at the past. We ourselves went through this exercise and
and includes selected information from the Airbus Flight revisited how the aviation industry got there. We believe
Safety Confidential Reporting System, incident and accident
SVP & Chief that this historical overview can be of interest to others.
investigation reports, system tests and flight tests. Material Product Safety Officer This is why we want to share it not only with the aviation
is also obtained from sources within the airline industry, community but also with the public. Indeed, aviation safety
studies and reports from government agencies and other is relevant to everyone, whether as a passenger, crew-
aviation sources. member, potential traveller, relative of someone flying, or
© Airbus S.A.S. 2016 – All rights reserved. citizen.
Proprietary documents. All articles in Safety first are presented for information
By taking delivery of this Brochure only and are not intended to replace ICAO guidelines, Safety can never be taken for granted. Aviation safety has
(hereafter “Brochure”), you accept on behalf
of your company to comply with the following standards or recommended practices, operator-mandated a fascinating history of which we all together need to write
guidelines: requirements or technical orders. The contents do not the next pages.
No other intellectual property rights are granted supersede any requirements mandated by the State of
by the delivery of this Brochure than the right to
read it, for the sole purpose of information. Registry of the Operator’s aircraft or supersede or amend I hope you will enjoy this video and find it inspiring to further
This Brochure and its content shall
any Airbus type-specific AFM, AMM, FCOM, MMEL enhance safety.
not be modified and its illustrations documentation or any other approved documentation. May I take this opportunity to wish you and your relatives
and photos shall not be reproduced without a very happy and safe New Year.
prior written consent of Airbus.
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licensed to any third party subject to payment. to Airbus. Where Airbus is not the author, the contents of
This Brochure contains sensitive information the article do not necessarily reflect the views of Airbus,
that is correct at the time of going to press.
neither do they indicate Company policy.
This information involves a number of factors that
could change over time, effecting the true public
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Brochure and of the materials it contains, even if
Airbus S.A.S. has been advised of the likelihood Product Safety department (GS)
of such damages. 1, rond point Maurice Bellonte
31707 Blagnac Cedex - France
Fax: +33(0)5 61 93 44 29
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002 Safety First #21 | January 2016
Safety
first #21
PROCEDURES
P06
Control your speed... in cruise
OPERATIONS
P22
Lithium batteries: safe to fly?
P42
Wake Vortices
Flight operations
Maintenance
AIRCRAFT
Engineering P52
A320 Family Aircraft configuration
Ground operations
006 Safety First #21 | January 2016 Safety First #21 | January 2016 007
PROCEDURES
Control your speed... in cruise
in cruise
UNDERSTANDING SPEEDS System descriptions and infor-
mation included in this article
are mainly referring to fly-by-wire
Speed in cruise is often driven by performances aircraft. However, the recommen-
Third article in the “Control your speed” series started in and fuel burn considerations; however, Air Traffic dations for speed management
or weather considerations sometimes intervene remain applicable to all aircraft.
issue #18 of this magazine, our aircraft is now flying in clean and require modifications to the optimum cruise
configuration, travelling in cruise. The main objective is to profile. Whatever the flight crew’s decisions
manage threats to the airspeed and avoid speed excursions. to best optimize their flight, one needs to be
constantly aware of the applicable limits and
maneuvering speeds. To safely manage the
cruise phase within the aircraft certified flight
envelope, some characteristic speeds are
useful references for flight crews to monitor the
aircraft’s actual speed. What speeds exactly
should be monitored? What do these speeds
mean and what happens if they are ignored?
Many speeds are used to certify and reference speeds to safely guide the
fly an aircraft operationally. For every pilots navigation decisions through
flight, the applicable characteristic the cruise phase.
LORRAINE PHILIPPE speeds are computed automatically by
DE BAUDUS CASTAIGNS the aircraft Auto Flight Systems (Flight Our objective is to highlight the
Flight Operations Experimental Test Pilot Management System (FMS), Flight design and operational considerations
Standards and Guidance (FG) and Flight Envelope underlying all recommendations
(FE)) and displayed on the PFD Airbus has issued to flight crews
Safety management
airspeed scale. They are extremely regarding the monitoring of these
useful as target maneuvering and limit speeds in cruise.
Safety First #21 | January 2016 009
PROCEDURES
Control your speed... in cruise
Green Dot was presented already We will see hereafter why pilots should At a given altitude, temperature, weight and thrust, figure 2 shows 2 points
in the previous article dedicated to not routinely fly slower than GD in cruise. of equilibrium where the thrust precisely compensates for the drag (thrust
the climb phase. Nevertheless, it = drag) and stabilized level flight is possible: point 1 (where VC is lower than
is important to have this speed in For this reason, a recap of GD definition GD) and point 2 (where VC is higher than GD). Let’s have a closer look at the
mind during the cruise phase as well, is provided hereafter, as well as the aircraft behaviour if the speed is moving away from these speeds:
because it is a clearly visible reference consequences of flying slower than
speed on the PFD airspeed scale. GD in cruise. • Point 2 is a stable equilibrium: in cruise, when the aircraft flies at this point 2, the
airspeed is stabilized. Small variations of airspeed will naturally be compensated
Green Dot (GD): best lift-to-drag ratio speed for and the aircraft will return to point 2. At point 2, the aircraft flies in the first
regime.
Definition - If a disturbance increases the aircraft’s speed above point 2, then the
drag increases. Consequently, the aircraft will decelerate back to the
GD speed is the engine-out operat- It is represented by a green dot on equilibrium point 2.
ing speed in clean configuration. It the PFD speed scale and displayed - If a disturbance reduces the aircraft’s speed below point 2, then the drag
corresponds to the speed that allows only when the slats / fl aps control decreases. This generates acceleration and the aircraft’s speed will naturally
the highest climb gradient with one lever is in the ‘0’ (CLEAN) position increase back to the equilibrium point 2.
engine inoperative in clean configura- and landing gears are not com-
tion. In all cases (all engines operative), pressed (fig.1). • Point 1 is an unstable equilibrium: at this point, the aircraft flies in the
the GD speed gives an estimate of second regime.
the speed for best lift-to-drag ratio. - If a disturbance increases the aircraft’s speed above point 1, the drag reduces;
GD
therefore the aircraft will continue to accelerate until point 2.
How is GD determined? - If a disturbance reduces the aircraft’s speed below point 1, then the drag
becomes increasingly higher. If no action is taken, the aircraft will be
(fig.1) GD speed is computed by the Auto In cruise: naturally induced into a continuous deceleration.
GD on the PFD speed scale Flight Systems (AFS) and is based To stop the deceleration and be able to accelerate again, two scenarii
on the aircraft weight (thanks to the • Above GD, the drag and thrust are possible:
Zero Fuel Weight (ZFW) inserted in the required to maintain speed increase When speed reduces below point 1 and remains higher than point 3: if
FMS during flight preparation). The GD with the speed maximum thrust available is applied, then the aircraft can accelerate.
formula has been set up so that the When speed reduces below point 3: there is no thrust margin available to
resulting airspeed provides the best lift- • Below GD, the drag and thrust accelerate while maintaining a stabilized level flight. Then the only way to
to-drag ratio for a given altitude, Mach required to maintain speed increase stop the deceleration is to lose altitude in order to accelerate beyond point 3.
number and aircraft weight, in clean with speed decrease (second
configuration with one engine out. regime) (fig.2). To sum up:
• Faster than GD, the aircraft flies in the first regime: it is stable with regards
(fig.2) to speed.
Thrust curves and speed polar
Thrust / Drag • Slower than GD, the aircraft flies in the second regime: it is unstable with
regards to speed.
Looking more closely at the exact conditions limiting the altitude where a subsonic aircraft can safely fly at, these
can range from aerodynamic limitations to propulsion and certification limitations.
REC MAX is the upper cruise limit: On Airbus aircraft, the REC MAX is always limited by the The following graph gives an illustrative example of the
service ceiling or the certified ceiling; with the exception above theoretical curves for an A320. This graph is used
REC MAX = Min [Service ceiling; Aerodynamic ceiling; Max certified ceiling] of A319 CJ aircraft and some versions of A340-500/600 by the FMS to determine REC MAX.
aircraft at heavy weights.
The schematic below applies to a heavy aircraft, which has a ceiling lower than the maximum certified one.
Cost Index = 0
33000
32000
MMO/VMO
31000
30000
29000
Crossover FL
MD/VD
28000
27000
Maxspeed in level flight
26000
25000
24000
23000
0.5 0.52 0.54 0.56 0.58 0.6 0.62 0.64 0.66 0.68 0.7 0.72 0.74 0.76 0.78 0.8 0.82 0.84 0.86
Mach
Mach
Stall limit (VS1g): this speed curve lowers with a weight Service curve, corresponding to the propulsion Green Dot
increase. capacity of the aircraft’s engines to maintain + 300ft/
This curve provides a safety maneuver margin against minute at a constant Mach. Buffet (1,3g)
the Stall limit curve. This curve increases with weight decrease and with
At low Mach, it starts at 1.23 x VS1g. static temperature decrease. Vz 300 ft/min
At higher Mach, it corresponds to buffet onset of 1.3g
(corresponding to 40° of bank angle in level flight). Service ceiling (increases with weight decrease or VMO/MMO
This curve lowers with weight increase. temperature decrease).
VMAX level at Max CLB
Aerodynamic ceiling (increases with weight decrease). Maximum speed in level flight (in stable weather
conditions with maximum thrust available in use) Econ speed CI = 0
For a given weight, each aircraft has needs to be a safe margin in relation Aircraft normally fly at an optimal IAS onset shock waves developing
a minimum selectable speed (VLS) and to these lowest and highest speeds, until they reach their optimal climb/ on the wings upper surface.
maximum speed (VMAX) at a particular before the flight envelope protections cruise Mach. This transition between These shock waves significantly
altitude. At the cruise altitude, there activate. airspeed and Mach occurs at a worsen the drag and can alter the
point called the “crossover altitude” aircraft’s controllability. But this
V VLS: Lowest Selectable speed (usually between FL250 and FL300 phenomenon has nothing to do
depending on the aircraft type). with buffet announcing lack of lift
Definition When the aircraft climbs to the to come or an approaching stall.
crossover altitude at a constant Airbus airplanes operated up to
VLS is the lowest selectable speed with VLS is indicated by the top of the amber IAS, Mach increases. The opposite VD/MD are not exposed to the
A/THR engaged. Even if the target line on the PFD speed scale (fig.3). happens when in descent to the so-called high speed buffet.
(fig.3) speed is below VLS, the A/THR will crossover altitude, at a constant
V on the PFD speed scale continue to target VLS. Mach. Then the IAS increases. • At high Indicated AirSpeed (IAS),
At altitudes above the crossover the main threat to the aircraft
How is VLS determined? altitude, pilots will fly a Mach structural integrity lies in the
GD and VLS number instead of an IAS because it dynamic pressure exerted by air on
VLS is a characteristic speed computed Weight (ZFW) inserted in the FMS then becomes the most meaningful the structure. Aircraft controllability
both depend on by the AFS as a function of the aircraft during flight preparation). parameter. remains optimum as long as the
the aircraft weight, weight (dependent on the Zero Fuel Mach number is not too high.
therefore these VLS = 1.23 VS1g when in clean configuration
Different phenomena exist according
to the speed or Mach the aircraft In practice, the aircraft is designed
speeds will be flies at. The aerodynamic world can to be safe up to Mach/speeds well
wrong if the ZFW Where: therefore be split into two areas: low above VMO/MMO. Indeed, according to
and high Mach numbers. certification requirements the aircraft
entered in the FMS VS1g is the stall speed demonstrated by flight tests. must be safe to fly up to the design
is wrong. • At high Mach number, when limit speed/Mach number VD/MD.
Note: the 1.23 factor is applicable to fly-by-wire aircraft (1.3 for the others). accelerating beyond M MO, slight In other words, up to VD/MD, the
vibrations may appear. These are aircraft remains controllable and free
This formula means that VLS is higher since speed brakes extension vibrations due to unsteady early of any flutter.
when the speed brakes are extended, increases VS1g.
AoA
These concepts involve understanding of the maneuver performed by test
the maximum structural speed and pilots to determine these speed and
Mach of the aircraft VD/MD. Mach.
Vα MAX = Vc x √(α-α0)/(αMAX-α0)
VMO/MMO IN A NUTSHELL
Vα PROT = Vc x √(α-α0)/(αPROT-α0)
VMO/MMO is the “never to exceed” speed.
Where:
On the A320 Family, Vα PROT and Vα MAX On A330/A340, A350 and A380
Definition can have different numerical values on Families, Vα PROT and Vα MAX have the
both PFDs because VC comes from same numerical values on both PFDs.
Vα PROT is the speed corresponding to Vα MAX is the maximum Angle-Of-Attack different sources for left and right PFDs.
the maximum Angle-Of-Attack (AOA) speed. It is the speed corresponding
at which Alpha Protection becomes to the maximum Angle-Of-Attack
active. It is only displayed in normal the aircraft can fly at in normal law. A330/A340, A350
law and corresponds to the top of the It corresponds to the top of the solid Data source A320 Family
and A380 Families
black and amber strip along the PFD red strip along the PFD speed scale
speed scale (fig.5). (fig.5). Left PFD: FAC 1, or FAC 2 if not Same value as the one used
V VC available in FAC 1. by the flight controls.
In practice, the AOA value of the
Right PFD: FAC 2, or FAC 1 if not
V Alpha Protection decreases as the α MAX is a function of the Mach number: available in FAC 2.
Mach number increases. When the it decreases when the Mach increases
AOA value of the Alpha Protection (fig.6). Same value used for PFD display as the one used
(fig.5) decreases, the Alpha Protection strip AOA
by the flight controls.
V and V on the PFD speed scale on the PFD moves upward.
Safety First #21 | January 2016 017
PROCEDURES
Control your speed... in cruise
In order to avoid a fluctuating Vα PROT As a result of this filtering, a little delay MANAGING YOUR CRUISE:
and Vα MAX display, AOA and VC values can be observed; therefore during a
are filtered so that fast AOA variations dynamic maneuver, the aircraft may SPEED EXCURSIONS
(for example during turbulence) do enter into a protection law with the
not pollute the PFD speed scale. IAS not yet below the displayed Vα PROT. OPERATIONAL
25 kt
What are the operational implications of flying below Vα PROT? RECOMMENDATIONS
At any time during cruise, the actual threshold would immediately trigger the
AOA is compared to α PROT (or α MAX) in high AOA protection, thus resulting in Understanding how the aircraft’s speed
real time. The difference of AOA is then a nose down pitch rate ordered by the
converted to speed and applied on flight control laws. Further increasing envelope is defined is essential to speed
each PFD: the delta between current the AOA by maintaining full back stick excursion avoidance. Knowing the threats to
(fig.7)
PFD display of the available speed margin
speed and Vα PROT (or Vα MAX) represents would eventually result in reaching the airspeed and the tools at the crew’s disposal
against α and α the actual margin against α PROT α MAX threshold. to tackle them is another part of that goal. This
(or α MAX) (fig.7). When flying in a degraded law, increas-
ing the AOA would directly expose the includes knowing exactly which information
In normal law, on a protected aircraft, aircraft to stall. should be looked at and how, with the aim to
exceeding the AOA value of the α PROT acquire the best possible situational awareness
and be able to avoid an overspeed (i.e. VMO/MMO
exceedance) or a speed decay (i.e. reaching
below VLS), and react wisely in case of an actual
When flying Cruise speeds in a nutshell encounter.
in a degraded law,
increasing the Reading the first section of this article • At lower altitudes (i.e. below the
AOA would directly and understanding how VMO/MMO and
VD/MD are determined highlighted that:
crossover altitude), too large a
speed decay can similarly lead a
expose the aircraft Unknown domain non protected aircraft (i.e. flying
to stall, like on At high altitude, reaching the aircraft’s in a degraded law) to enter a stall.
structural limit Mach number is almost Nevertheless, at low altitude, the
any conventional High speeds impossible (except in a steep dive available envelope is greater and the
aircraft. with maximum thrust); therefore at thrust margin is much higher, thus
high altitude, flying at high Mach providing flight crews a greater ability
number should not be viewed as the to safely control the airspeed and
biggest threat to the safety of flight. recover from a speed decay. On the
Conversely, flying too slow (below other hand, at low altitude, reaching
Green Dot) at high altitude can lead to VMO and VD is possible; therefore high
progressive reductions in speed until speed should be viewed indeed as a
the protections are triggered. Should significant threat to the safety of flight.
Operational speeds Flight Tests this speed reduction take place in a
degraded law, it could lead to a loss This chapter offers pilots background The biggest
of control due to stall. At and near the knowledge of available prevention threat to the safety
performance altitude limit of the aircraft, means in order to properly manage
the range of available speeds between the main threats to the airspeed, and of flight both at
Green Dot and MMO will be small. Speed eventually prevent an overspeed or a high and low
decay at high altitude must be avoided speed decay thanks to anticipation and
as a result. use of dedicated procedures.
altitude relates to
speed decay.
Low speeds
How to anticipate a speed excursion
Clearly flight crews are expected to be ones. In most cases, speed excursion
Unknown domain able to rapidly scan the essential and situations are due to rapid wind and
relevant parameters, in every situation, temperature variations/evolutions.
in every flight phase, including dynamic
Safety First #21 | January 2016 019
PROCEDURES
Control your speed... in cruise
Gaining a good awareness of weather If the speed decreases further, then vibrations. Buffet is a clear sign of an
the Angle-Of-Attack (AOA) must be approaching stall or even of the stall
Weather is an important factor that The first key to preventing speed increased in order to increase the lift itself depending on its severity: it is
influences aircraft performances. Be it a excursion events is gaining awareness coefficient CL, which keeps the forces created by airflow separation and is a
local flight or a long haul flight, decisions of the available weather predictions balanced. However, it is not possible function of AOA (fig.8).
based on weather can dramatically along the forecasted route. to indefinitely increase the AOA.
affect the safety of the flight. As it turns Before take-off, the weather briefing • At buffet initiation, the pilot starts
out, the first external threat to airspeed has to be as complete as possible. As per basic aerodynamic rules, the lift to feel airflow separation on wings
comes from weather disturbances, Pilots should check weather reports at coefficient CL increases linearly with the upper surface.
such as turbulent areas that can lead alternate and destination airports and, AOA up to a point where the airflow
to significant speed changes. depending on the weather context, separates from the upper wing surface. • The buffet onset corresponds by
Common sense generally makes this information needs to be updated If the AOA continues to increase, the definition to 1.3g (corresponding to
pilots avoid those areas; however, they in flight as often as necessary. Weather point of airflow separation is unstable 40° of bank angle in level flight).
sometimes end up in a situation where information can be communicated and rapidly fluctuates back and forth.
some solid turbulence is encountered, either by the Air Traffic Controllers or Consequently, the pressure distribution • The “deterrent buffet” is so strong
when dodging thunderstorms for by the other crews flying in the area. along the wing profile changes that any pilot will feel he/she needs
example. At this point, the airspeed Once airborne, the weather radar constantly and also changes the lift’s to leave these buffet conditions. It
begins to fluctuate, thus making speed is one powerful tool to help the position and magnitude. This effect is corresponds to one of the definitions
exceedance or speed decay more likely. crew make sound weather related called buffeting and is evidenced by of stall.
Such situations need to be planned decisions to avoid adverse weather
ahead and as far as possible, avoided and turbulence areas.
through regular scanning of weather
conditions and flight path adaptation.
On aircraft with no failure, and the order to maintain altitude, and the
A/THR engaged or the MAX CLB thrust pitch angle and the thrust values
applied in manual mode, a continuous increase. Without sufficient thrust
speed decay during cruise phase may margin, the flight crew may notice
be due to: that aircraft speed decays, but the
• A large and continuous increase in REC MAX FL is not modified.
tailwind or decrease in headwind, in
addition to an increase in the Outside The flight crew must be aware that
Air Temperature (OAT), that results in at high altitude, the thrust margin
a decrease of the REC MAX FL, or (difference between the thrust in use
and the maximum available thrust) is
• A large or prolonged downdraft, limited. The maximum available thrust
The nearer the when the flight crew flies (parallel
and) downwind in a mountainous
decreases when there is an increase
in altitude and/or outside temperature.
(fig.8)
aircraft is to the area, due to orographic waves. The The REC MAX FL indicated in the FMS
AOA effect on lift
REC MAX FL, the downdraft may have a negative decreases when the OAT increases.
vertical speed of more than 500 ft/ The nearer the aircraft is to the REC
smaller the thrust min. Therefore, if the aircraft is in a MAX FL, the smaller the thrust margin.
margin. downdraft, the aircraft must climb in
When the AOA reaches a maximum
value, the separation point moves fur-
These conditions should be avoided
thanks to anticipation and regular scan-
Stall is not
Preventing a speed decay: detecting ther forward on the wing upper surface ning of both the weather conditions a pitch issue and
the phenomenon and almost total flow separation of the along the flown route, and of the speed can happen at any
upper surface of the wing is achieved: trend on the PFD. Nevertheless, these
At any altitude, decreasing the speed signs of a significant speed decay in this phenomenon leads to a significant conditions might be approached unin- pitch. Stalling
too much will certainly lower the aircraft’s order to be able to recover. loss of lift, referred to as a stall. Inci- tentionally. As soon as any stall indication is only an AOA
level of energy and decrease margins for
maneuvering, thus potentially leading
When speed decreases, pilots should
be attentive to their speed trend vector
dentally, stall is not a pitch issue and
can happen at any pitch value.
is recognized – be it the aural warning
“STALL + CRICKET” or buffet – the
issue.
to a loss of control due to stall with as displayed on the PFD and take aircraft’s trajectory becomes difficult to
an aircraft flying in a degraded law. It action if an unfavourable speed trend control and the “Stall recovery” proce-
is important to understand and detect develops in order to remain above GD. dure must be applied immediately.
Safety First #21 | January 2016 021
PROCEDURES
Control your speed... in cruise
Lithium batteries:
visible cases of cell phones or laptops self-igniting and burning.
Likewise, several events have occurred on aircraft, ranging from
localized and limited fires to large, uncontrolled in-flight fires
safe to fly?
resulting in hull losses and fatalities.
The air industry has become more aware of the specific
characteristics of Lithium batteries and the associated risks can
now be mitigated. Procedures have been developed to address
Today, Lithium batteries play a barely visible, yet essential the risks for Lithium batteries being part of the aircraft design,
role in both our daily life and aviation alike. Manufactured and those belonging to passengers or crews carry-on items, or indeed
procedures linked to the shipping of Lithium batteries as cargo.
handled correctly, Lithium batteries are safe. But production
failures, mishandling, or not being aware of their specific
characteristics can have serious repercussions.
LITHIUM BATTERIES:
A POWERFUL AND VERSATILE
TECHNOLOGY, ASSOCIATED
WITH A COMMON RISK
Lithium is the metal with the lowest den- intrinsic risk is the same for all applica-
sity, but with the greatest electrochemi- tions, different solutions and procedures
cal potential and energy-to-weight ratio, exist to mitigate this common risk
meaning that is has excellent energy depending on where and how the Lith-
CHRISTINE BEZARD IAN GOODWIN PEIMANN PAUL ROHRBACH storage capacity. These large energy ium battery is used (i.e. part of the aircraft
Head of Human Factors Director Flight Safety - TOFIGHI-NIAKI Fire Protection - density and low weight characteristics design, transported as cargo or in pas-
& Ergonomics in design - Safety Enhancement Flight Safety Project leader Lithium make it an ideal material to act as a sengers and crews luggage and PED).
power source for any application where This section will highlight the benefits of
Safety advisor Enhancement - batteries as cargo
weight is an issue, aircraft applications this new technology irrespective of its
Flight Operations being a natural candidate. use in applications, and describe the
and Training Support While the technology used and the associated risk of “thermal runaway”.
Safety First #21 | January 2016 025
OPERATIONS
Lithium batteries: safe to fly?
16,000
Consumption t Li-contained
14,000
Batteries
12,000
10,000
Different technologies
8,000
Glass Direct
The term “Lithium battery” actually refers to a family of batteries that can be
6,000
Alloy & Other
Other divided into two categories:
4,000
Ceramics Glazing
2,000
Primary: Lithium-metal, non-rechargeable batteries (fig.4)
Lithium-metal batteries
0
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
These include coin or cylindrical Lithium-metal batteries have a higher
Year
batteries used in calculators, digital specific energy compared to all other
cameras and emergency (back-up) batteries, as well as low weight and a
Batteries Air Conditioning Al Process Add Ceramics Glazing Glass Direct applications for example (fig.4). long shelf and operating life.
Lubricants Pharmaceuticals Polymer Process Synthetic rubber Alloy & Other
Today, Lithium batteries are progres- The Lithium battery market is extremely Key current applications for this type of The advantages of the Lithium-ion
sively replacing previous technology dynamic and expanding fast, with batteries are in powering cell phones, or Lithium-polymer battery are its
batteries – e.g. Nickel-Cadmium, a growing application as the power laptops or other hand held electronic ability to be recharged in addition to (fig.5)
Lead-acid – and can be found in most source for a wide range of electric vehi- devices, as well as electric/hybrid cars its higher energy density and lighter Lithium-ion / Lithium-polymer batteries
of electronic and autonomous electric cles. In fact, no level off is foreseen in and power stores (fig.5). weight compared to nickel-cadmium
systems or equipment. Development the coming years. In 2014, 5.5 billion and nickel-metal hybrid batteries.
and applications are evolving with Lithium-ion batteries were produced
latest uses including ultrathin (down to (fig.2).
0.5 mm) and flexible technologies.
(fig.2)
Worldwide batteries production (Source:
Christophe PILLOT, Avicenne Energy)
Safety First #21 | January 2016 027
OPERATIONS
Lithium batteries: safe to fly?
One main intrinsic risk to tackle: the thermal Cathode Electrolyte Anode
runaway current current
collector collector
As with every new technology, poorly manufactured, they can suffer
Lithium batteries offer a number of stability issues and be subject to
advantages, but they also come what is called a “thermal runaway”.
with limitations. Although previous This phenomenon is well recognized
batteries technologies were not risk- now, and it can be mitigated providing
free, Lithium based batteries have awareness and prevention actions are
a larger electrochemical potential; taken.
Lithium therefore if damaged, mishandled or
batteries can Cathode Anode
A self-ignited and highly propagative phenomenon Passivating
be both a source
Layer
of fire through In case of internal degradation or Both the primary and secondary types of
self-ignition and damage, a battery cell rapidly releases
its stored energy (potential and chemical)
batteries are capable of self-ignition and
thermal runaway. And once this process
Separator
thermal runaway, through a very energetic venting reaction, is initiated, it easily can propagate
and a cause which in turn can generate smoke, because it generates sufficient heat to
flammable gas, heat (up to 600°C and induce adjacent batteries into the same
of fire by igniting 1000°C locally), fire, explosion, or a spray thermal runaway state.
surrounding of flammable electrolyte. The amount of Lithium batteries can be both a source
Abuse
condition
Thermal Runaway
FIRE
energy released is directly related to the of fire through self-ignition and thermal
flammable electrochemical energy stored and the runaway, and a cause of fire by igniting
+
EXPLOSION
material. type of battery (chemic and design). surrounding flammable material. Exothermic reaction and pressure built up
Internal degradation:
breakdown of the thin Breakdown
passivating layer in the electrolyte Internal damages:
INSIGHT INTO THE THERMAL RUNAWAY PHENOMENON releasing flammable short circuits between
hydrocarbon gases the electrodes
DISCHARGE CHARGE
V
External Heating
In-service experience
FAA tests show that even a small hazardous materials, therefore par- Lithium
number of overheating batteries emit ticular care and consideration must
gases that can cause explosions and be taken to ensure safe operations in batteries
ELT 21 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 fires that cannot be prevented by relation to use and transport of Lithium are classified
traditional fire suppression systems. batteries (or devices containing
In view of the possible consequences, Lithium batteries) when in an aircraft
as hazardous
Lithium batteries are classified as environment. materials.
Cordless devices
20 4 8 9 (fig.7)
12
21 2 5 10 Consequences of Lithium batteries
19 7
18 20 16 thermal runaway
14
19 1 3 6 11 13
17 15
CVR/DFDR 18
are subject to runaway or a fire starts with securing common sense precautions, such
the batteries that form part of the aircraft as using only the Original Equipment
strict development design. In this respect, the Lithium Manufacturer (OEM) parts. The use
and integration batteries embedded in the aircraft design of counterfeit or non-authorized parts 1 3 6 11
are subject to strict development and increases the risk of fire and explosion.
requirements, integration requirements, complying with Consequently, complying with the
complying with the highest safety standards. The intrinsic Airbus Parts Catalogue and exclusi-
the highest safety risk of this new generation of Lithium vely using Airbus or OEM catalogue Cordless devices
based batteries is acknowledged at all references for spare batteries is key.
standards. levels of the aircraft design phase, as Similarly, before installing spare
19
early as from the inception of the pro- batteries in Buyer Furnished Equipment
duct and its systems. It is then mitigated (BFE) or in aircraft, operators should
thanks to acceptability justification ensure the parts are genuine spare 19 1 3 6 11
based on each battery location, and a parts, that they have been stored and
17 15
thorough review of installation, ensur- handled appropriately and present no
ing that no heat source and hazardous mark of overheat or damage.
material or fluids are in the vicinity.
impact of different characteristics of tems are not capable of containing What the regulations say
the batteries (e.g. chemistry, state of these accumulated gases.
charge, size), cargo compartments
types and loading configurations make
The passive protection standards are
designed to withstand heat sources for
In the light of the risks identified, in
January 2015, the ICAO Dangerous
non-rechargeable and rechargeable
batteries alike. At time of publication
Primary
it very difficult to define a quantity up to 5 minutes and are not resistant Goods Panel took the position to ban of this article, these discussions are (non-rechargeable)
limitation that could be recommended against the characteristics of a Lithium the carriage of Lithium-metal batteries on-going. At their last meeting in Lithium-metal
at aircraft level, for all operational battery fire. The temperature, duration of all types, as cargo on passenger October 2015, the ICAO Dangerous
situations. Tests have demonstrated and intensity of such a fire will quickly aircraft. Goods Panel (DGP) proposed a 30% batteries are
that some configurations, involving only overwhelm the passive protections. State of Charge (SoC) limit as an interim forbidden for
one item of the regulated packaging In addition, the quantity and continuing However, whilst this was an important measure aiming to reduce the risk of fire
size, has the potential to lead to production of smoke produced is development, Lithium-metal batteries propagation to adjacent batteries and
transportation
significant damage of an aircraft. likely to overwhelm the passive and only account for a small proportion of thereby improve aviation safety. aboard passenger-
Irrespective of the size of the shipment,
active smoke barriers that protect the
occupied compartments.
all Lithium batteries carried annually as
air cargo. Consequently, research into
At the same time, discussions in
ICAO are focussing on establishing
carrying aircraft.
research into the impact of both Lith- the impact of a Lithium-ion batteries appropriate packaging and shipping
ium-metal and Lithium-ion batteries With these findings, the aviation fire has continued. As already noted, requirements to ensure safer shipment
Today’s cargo fire has demonstrated that the existing industry came to the conclusion that this research has demonstrated that of Lithium-ion batteries. Airbus is also
cargo compartment fire suppression today’s cargo compartments, which Lithium-ion batteries themselves involved in the Civil Aviation Safety
compartments do systems – namely Halon 1301 (class are certified to US CFR Part 25.857 and represent a significant threat due to the Team (CAST) investigating overall
not demonstrate C) or oxygen starvation (class E) – are EASA CS 25.857, do not demonstrate fact that the existing cargo compartment approaches from the battery itself to
resistance to unable to stop a thermal runaway
and prevent propagation to adjacent
resistance to a fire involving Lithium-
metal and Lithium-ion batteries. For
fire suppression functions are ineffective
against a Lithium-ion battery fire.
a combination of packaging / container
and the aircraft itself.
a fire involving cells. If a thermal runaway is initiated, this reason, the inability to contain a The importance of correct trans-
Lithium-metal heat and flammable gases coming Lithium battery fire for sufficient time As a result, regulatory authorities are port and shipping of Lithium batte-
from the degradation of the hydro- to secure safe flight and landing of the now heading towards a larger ban on ries therefore becomes key, and
and Lithium-ion carbon electrolyte will be emitted. aircraft, is an identified risk to the air Lithium battery shipments as cargo on the involvement of the shipper and
batteries. The existing fire protection cargo sys- transport industry. passenger planes that would include operator is crucial.
What shippers and operators can do: risk assessment and best practices
1. Check the latest industry available cable regulations (ICAO and/or local
information and guidance regulations)
• Overall capability of the aircraft and
Air transport of Lithium batteries is its systems
controlled by international and local • Segregation possibilities of Lithium
regulations. If transporting Lithium batteries from other flammable/
batteries, operators need to first explosive dangerous goods.
check the latest instructions for the Cameras Spare batteries Laptops Tablets, MP3
safe transport of dangerous goods 3. Ensure safe packaging and
by air, be they provided through shipping
Airworthiness Authorities or local
regulations, and/or the ICAO. Local and/or international regulations
provide the applicable set of rules 2 4 5 7 10 12
2. Perform a risk assessment that need to be complied with
when transporting Lithium batteries.
In the end, the responsibility for the Attention should be given to:
safe carriage of dangerous goods Cordless devices
(including Lithium batteries) lies • Training and awareness of employ-
with the shipper and operator. It is ees regarding: 20 4
12
recommended that if carriage of - The aircraft limitations against a 2 5 10
20 16 7
dangerous goods is pursued, then Lithium battery fire and existing
a safety risk assessment of cargo mitigation means. 14
operations should be performed to - Regulations, handling procedures,
determine if battery shipments can the dangers of mishandling, and
be handled safely. methods to identify Lithium battery
With respect to Lithium batteries, shipments.
guidelines for the assessment should • Packaging:
16 14
consider factors such as: - Clearly identify shipments of
Lithium batteries by information on Cell Phones
• The quantity and density of Lithium airway bills and other documents.
battery shipment - Make sure that the packaging is
• The type of Lithium batteries to be correctly labelled and identified
shipped as dangerous goods according
• Who the supplier/shipper of Lithium to ICAO technical instructions.
batteries is and their quality control - Do not ship damaged packages.
• The identification and notification of • Cargo loading: segregate any
all shipments of Lithium batteries Lithium battery shipments from
(also Section II Lithium batteries) other dangerous goods that present
• Accepting only Lithium battery a fire hazard (flammable and explo-
shipments that comply with appli- sive goods).
Raising passengers awareness before boarding Mitigating the risks posed by Lithium batteries:
summary
Recommendations have been • C onsider the quantity carried by
developed with respect to what can individuals. Whilst there is no limit Lithium battery thermal runaways can • E nsure that loads conform with
or cannot be carried in passenger on the number of PEDs or spare be caused by design / manufacturing ICAO / IATA labelling, packaging and
baggage. ICAO and IATA regulated and batteries, below a specified size quality / integration shortcomings handling recommendations.
recommended general requirements (normally 100 Watt-hour) that a or by inadequate compliance with a
with regards to carrying and managing passenger or crew member may number of basic rules. The following • Ensure compliance to the Airbus
what is carried in passenger baggage carry, but they must be for personal principles should be adhered to in Parts Catalogue when replacing
is that: use. order to minimize the risk of Lithium batteries.
battery fires and explosions:
• Batteries carried should have been The key however is making both the • Ensure that ground, flight and cabin
appropriately tested (e.g. should customer facing representatives and • Ensure that Lithium cells/batteries crews are trained and passengers
be manufactured by the original the passenger themselves aware of shipped comply to international are aware of Lithium batteries spe-
manufacturer). the risks presented by the incorrect standards. cificities.
carriage of Lithium batteries, and
• PEDs containing Lithium batteries making sure that they know the regu-
should be carried in carry-on lations. To increase the awareness
baggage. to the travelling public, posters and HOW TO MANAGE THE
Lithium battery pamphlets can be a
• Spare batteries (i.e. those not con- useful option and are widely used by CONSEQUENCES OF A LITHIUM
tained in a PED), regardless of size, air carriers and authorities around the
MUST be in carry-on baggage. They world alike. As an example, FAA have BATTERY FIRE
are forbidden in checked baggage issued Safety Alerts for Operators
and should be appropriately pro- (SAFO) number 15010, which deals
tected against short circuit, e.g. by with “Carriage of Spare Lithium
leaving the batteries in its original Batteries in Carry-on and Checked As detailed previously, proactive action fire is essential. The key principles to Halon can
retail packaging. Baggage”. by making passengers and airline safely and efficiently tackling a Lithium
personnel aware of the risks posed battery fire, whether it is in the cabin of suppress open
Raising passengers awareness on-board by Lithium batteries is preferable than flight deck, being: flames, but it
reacting to a fire caused by a Lithium • Keep people away from the fire
A key aspect to mitigating the risk subsequent crushing of PEDs during battery. Therefore knowing what to do • Minimize risks of fire propagation
is ineffective in
is making the owner, namely the adjustment of the seat can lead to in the unlikely event of a Lithium battery • Apply specific firefighting principles. addressing the
passenger, aware of the risks inherent overheat and thermal runaway. source of fire. Use
to Lithium batteries being used in Making passengers aware of this Apply specific firefighting principles of water is the best
an aircraft environment. Make sure inherent risk can help reduce this
passengers are aware of what is scenario. For example, including a option to allow
allowed in the terms of Lithium note in the pre-flight briefing to ensure Classical firefighting procedures and fire Halon can suppress open flames, but
batteries in carry-on baggage, and the that in case a PED is lost, then the seat extinguishing means are not efficient to it is ineffective in addressing the source
cooling and limit
requirement for correct storage, but is not moved until the component is stop a lithium battery fire. of fire. Use of water is the best option to the propagation to
also impact of a PED getting trapped
in the movable seat mechanism.
retrieved is an option. Likewise, making
cabin and flight crew aware of this
allow cooling and limit the propagation
to adjacent cells.
adjacent cells.
potential failure mode is key to quick
Due to their small size, PEDs can easily and efficient action when addressing Once a lithium battery cell has ignited
be trapped in seat mechanisms. The a fire caused by a PED. then the effort must concentrate on
cooling the surrounding cells by use of
water (or other non-alcoholic liquid) and
preventing deterioration of the situation
to avoid any fire propagation to the
INFORMATION adjacent battery cells.
Cabin crew procedures a Lithium battery powered device may of Halon and liquid to tackle the fire,
be at the origin of the fire. and makes reference to the other two
Isolate the source of fire Therefore the overhead bin smoke/ cabin crew procedures to address a
fi re procedure now covers the use Lithium battery fire.
In the cabin, Reacting to a Lithium battery fire in the a device that is emitting smoke.
(fig.9)
cabin starts with isolating the source Prevent propagation by ensuring
do not try to pick of fire. Indeed, a smoking battery may that no fl ammable material (fl uids, Overhead bin smoke/ fire CCOM
up and attempt to explode at any time, due to the highly gas, devices) are near the smoking
procedure
This procedure (fig.8) proposes the merse the device in a suitable con-
use of Halon to extinguish open tainer (such as a waste bin, or stand-
ABNORMAL/EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
flames, and water (or a non-alcoholic ard galley container) to secure against
FIRE PROTECTION
liquid) to cool the device down. thermal runaway (refer to the third
A330/A340
(fig.8) The recommendation
CABIN CREW OPERATING MANUAL is then to im- step below).
Lithium battery fire CCOM procedure
LITHIUM BATTERY FIRE
Ident.: 09-020-00015205.0001001 / 28 JAN 14
Criteria: LR
Applicable to: ALL
The roles of the firefighter, assistant firefighter and communicator must be distributed according to
the basic firefighting procedure.
In the case of PED or spare lithium battery fire in the cabin or when notified by the flight crew:
If there are flames:
FIREFIGHTING EQUIPMENT.............................................................................................. TAKE
Consider the use of a PBE and fire gloves.
HALON EXTINGUISHER..........................................................................................DISCHARGE
Halon extinguisher must be discharged to suppress the flames prior to cool down the PED or
the Spare lithium battery.
When the flames are suppressed or If there are no flames:
ON PED or spare lithium battery.........................POUR WATER OR NON-ALCOHOLIC LIQUID
The PED or Spare lithium batteries must be cooled down by pouring water or non-alcoholic
Liquids
STORAGE PROCEDURE AFTER A LITHIUM BATTERY FIRE ...................................... APPLY
WARNING ‐ Do not attempt to pick up and move a smoking or burning device
‐ Do not cover the device or use ice to cool down the device. Ice or other
materials insulate the device increasing the likelihood that additional battery
cells will ignite.
‐ Do not use fire resistant burn bags to isolate burning lithium type batteries.
Transferring a burning appliance into a burn bag may be extremely hazardous.
END OF PROC
Lithium battery fires may sometimes not occurred in service, the procedure
easily be identified, and considering the for fire in the overhead compartment
specific cases when fires have actually (fig.9) now considers as a base that
Safety First #21 | January 2016 041
OPERATIONS
Lithium batteries: safe to fly?
Storage procedure after a Lithium battery fire • Once there are no more open flames: aimed at the device is sufficient to cool
- If it is not possible to remove the it and mitigate the consequences of
As referenced in the first step above, subject it to regular monitoring. burning/heating device from flight the thermal runaway.
this procedure (fig.10) is called at the The lavatory is proposed as it contains deck, pour water or non-alcoholic - If it is possible to move the device:
end of the two previous procedures. a means of smoke detection, but is liquid on the device to cool it down. transfer it to the cabin and use the
Once the fire has been contained also a location that can secure the Be aware of possible explosion. Cabin Crew Lithium battery procedures
and the device can be safely moved, device away from
ABNORMAL/EMERGENCY the passengers and
PROCEDURES Tests completed by Airbus have con- to secure it, by immersion in water or
this procedure recommends to place provides waterproof
FIRE PROTECTION
floor designed firmed that a small quantity of water non-alcoholic liquid.
receptacle where the burning/heating to receive water in case of turbulent
A330/A340
device was
CABIN CREW immersed
OPERATING MANUALin a lavatory and conditions. (fig.11)
Smoke/fire from Lithium battery QRH
(fig.10) procedure
STORAGE PROCEDURE AFTER A LITHIUM BATTERY FIRE
Storage after a Lithium battery fire CCOM
procedure Ident.: 09-020-00015206.0001001 / 28 JAN 14
Criteria: LR
Applicable to: ALL
- - - - - - Low pressure
- - - - - -
+ + + + +
+ + + + +
High pressure
Wake Vortices
All aircraft generate wake vortices,
also known as wake turbulence, which
continue to be evident far behind the
generating aircraft. Another aircraft
crossing this wake may feel a sharp and
brief turbulence which can be strong
under some circumstances. Let’s review
the specific characteristics of wake What are the characteristics of wake vortices?
vortices’ and how pilots should react CLAUDE LELAIE Size: The active part of a vortex has a magnitude, in cruise, it could be 1000 ft
in case of an encounter to ensure the Former Head very small radius, not more than a few
meters. However, there is a lot of energy
below and behind the generating aircraft
at a range of around 15 NM. Then,
of Flight Test
safety of the flight. due to the high rotation speed of the air. when far away from the generator, the
rate of descent becomes very small. In
Descent rate: In calm air, a wake approach, the descent is usually limited
vortex descends slowly. As an order of to around 700 ft.
Safety First #21 | January 2016 045
OPERATIONS
Wake Vortices
The decay However, depending on weather between aircraft needs to be so large. would have been a bit stronger behind significant separations and dramatically The ICAO
is much faster in conditions the descent rate may
vary signifi cantly and may even be Ground effect: When the aircraft
a Heavy. It is also common to have, in
the initial approach phase, encounters at
limit the traffic on all airports and airways
without significantly improving safety. separations
ground effect. very small. One of the key factors is close to the ground, less than a distances well above the ICAO minimum It is also to be noted that statistics show have not been
affecting this descent is the variation wingspan, the two vortices tend to drift separations. The ICAO separations have that the probability of injury to passengers
of the temperature with the altitude. out from the centre line, each towards not been set to avoid all encounters but and crew is about five times greater in
set to avoid all
A temperature inversion limits the rate its own side, at a speed of around 2 to prevent unsafe encounters. Avoiding turbulence due to weather, than with a encounters but
of descent. to 3 kt. It is this phenomenon, when
associated with a light crosswind
all encounters would require very wake vortex encounter. to prevent unsafe
Decay rate: One important parameter component that tends to “hold” the How does it feel to encounter a wake vortex? encounters.
of a wake vortex is the decay of its “into wind” vortex roughly on the
strength with time. The decay rate centreline, whilst the “downwind” In most cases the effect of the vortex is of the vortex, it will be subjected to
varies slightly from one aircraft type to vortex moves away. mainly felt in roll. We will consider here the full strength of the vortex and roll
another. Unfortunately, in calm air, due the case of an aircraft entering laterally in the same direction as the vortex, to
to low external interference, it is rather Due to this phenomenon, the decay is in a vortex, which is the most frequent the left (fig.2). This is the main rolling
low and this is why the separation much faster in ground effect. situation. Let’s assume that a follower motion that creates the strongest roll
aircraft is entering the right vortex of the acceleration.
Parameters affecting the wake vortex leader aircraft from its right side. Seen
from behind, this vortex is rotating anti- As a conclusion, the typical signature of
Aircraft weight: Wake vortex strength It has also been demonstrated that clockwise. When the left wing of the a severe encounter is an initial small roll in
increases with the weight of the aircraft. aircraft having a high inboard loading follower first enters the vortex, there one direction followed by a much more
This is why today the ICAO aircraft (higher deflection of the flaps close to is on this wing a local angle of attack significant roll in the other sense.
classification is based on the MTOW. the fuselage as an example) have a increase and therefore the lift becomes
However, such an approach is a faster decay of their vortices. higher than on the right wing. The initial When in cruise, this roll motion may be
simplification as other parameters also roll motion is therefore to the right. associated with significant load factor
affect the strength at the separation Weather conditions: The weather Then, when the aircraft is in the middle variations.
distance. conditions play a major role in wake
vortex development and decay. In the
Calm weather Wing characteristics: The wing shape case of heavy turbulence, a vortex will
(fig.2)
Aircraft behaviour in a wake vortex
creates the most and the load distribution affect the wake dissipate very quickly and there is no risk encounter (The aircraft bank angle is
The authorized separations are such when in ground effect, as explained A large deflection of the rudder creates accident has already occurred for this
that the severity of the encounters does above, the decay is much faster and a very important lateral acceleration reason. Some recent aircraft types are
not create an unsafe control situation. the worldwide experience during many that may well surprise the pilot. It could protected thanks to their fly-by-wire
When the aircraft is not in ground years shows that the bank angle lead to a reaction with a deflection to systems, but anyway, any use of the
effect, the order of magnitude of the achieved is much lower and does not the other side. This could then give rise rudder does not reduce the severity of
bank angle for a severe encounter lead to a risk of touching the ground to very large forces on the fin that may the encounter nor does it improve the
on the approach is around 20°. But with the wingtip. exceed the structural resistance. An ease of recovery. Therefore:
Duration of an encounter
DO NOT USE THE RUDDER
A severe encounter, as described with the flight mechanics equations, it
above, where the trajectories of both has been demonstrated during Airbus Lateral offset
aircraft have an angle around 10 flight tests that the stabilization of a
degrees, typically lasts around 4 to 6 large aircraft inside a vortex can only If two aircraft are flying exactly on the not a guarantee that an encounter will
seconds. be obtained by voluntarily establishing same track, one being 1000 ft below be avoided (except if the vortices are
a large sideslip angle. As airliners do the other, in the same or opposite clearly visible by contrails).
It is not possible to remain for a long not and should not fly with large sideslip direction, and if there is no cross wind,
time in a severe vortex as the rotating angles, they cannot remain in a vortex. there is a risk of encounter with a vortex In case of cross wind, if the two aircraft
airflow on the wing and on the fin, Therefore, a vortex cannot be the cause for the lower aircraft. In this case, it is are flying exactly on the same track,
eject the aircraft from the vortex. In line of long duration turbulence. possible to reduce the risk by using a the wind will move the vortices out of
lateral offset. the track of the lower aircraft whilst
Operational procedures they are descending. In this situation,
However, most of the time, it is difficult to if a lateral offset is decided for other
General procedure increases know whether the other aircraft is flying reasons than wake vortex avoidance,
with or without a small relative offset an offset upwind by the follower is to be
Considering the way the vortex is clearly show that pilot action does not due to the lack of angular precision preferred, since a downwind one may
acting on the aircraft as explained improve the situation. of the TCAS. Therefore, this offset is potentially create an encounter.
previously, if the pilot reacts at the first
roll motion, to the right in the example In addition, in-flight incidents have Final approach
given, he will correct by rolling to the demonstrated that the pilot inputs
left. When in the core of the vortex, the may exacerbate the unusual attitude During the final approach, it has is already, today, the main cause
main roll motion to the left will then be situation with rapid roll control reversals sometimes been suggested to of accidents and such a technique
amplified by this initial piloting action. carried out in an “out of phase” manner. maintain a trajectory slightly above the would only increase that risk.
The result will be a final bank angle glide slope. This is not a satisfactory
greater than if the pilot would not have In the case of a severe encounter procedure for transport aircraft for As a conclusion, a transport aircraft
moved the controls. the autopilot may disconnect auto- several reasons: should not deviate from the standard
matically, but in all other cases, it will approach slope to avoid a risk
This has also been demonstrated be able to counter properly the roll • When established in descent on the of encounter. However, for light
during the Airbus flight tests. Most of and pitch motions generated by the standard approach slope, as the aircraft, with low approach speed,
the encounters have been performed vortex. vortex is descending, there is little approaching on a long runway, it is
stick free, but several hundred were risk of encountering the vortices of an acceptable procedure to perform
carried out with the pilot trying to For these reasons, the best procedure the previous aircraft, except possibly a high approach and a long landing,
minimize the bank angle. The results in case of encounter is: when reaching the area of the ground targeting a touch down point after
effect. However, this possibility has that of the previous aircraft.
not led to an unsafe situation (no
accident in ground effect recorded It is to be noted that, when on an
RELEASE THE CONTROLS on transport aircraft with standard approach, there is no risk of encounter
Do not voluntarily disconnect the autopilot separations). with the vortices of an aircraft taking-off
If the autopilot is disconnected, before any reaction, wait for a reasonable on the same runway as a vortex will only
stabilization of the aircraft, then: • If the aircraft is flown too high above move backward due to the wind effect.
• Roll wings level. the threshold to avoid a possible Such a vortex will have a very limited
• Re-establish the initial cruise level or the standard climb or descent encounter, it will lead to a long landing strength, and in the case of a strong
trajectory. and therefore significantly increase headwind may even be dissipated
the risk of runway excursion. It is completely. However, with crossing
well known that runway excursion runways, depending on their geometry,
Safety First #21 | January 2016 049
OPERATIONS
Wake Vortices
and with inappropriate procedures, it another runway. Pilots on the approach Other rules: The ICAO rules are used from A to F, A being the larger aircraft
may be possible that, very close to the need to maintain a general vigilance worldwide except in two Countries, category. The principle is to divide
ground, a landing aircraft enters the and awareness, especially with calm USA and UK. These two Countries the Heavies and the Medium each in
vortex of an aircraft which took-off on wind conditions. apply a different classification with 2 categories. As an example, today,
different weight limits and separations. the separations between Heavies
Departure are established for the worst case
RECAT (Re-categorization). that is the smaller Heavy behind the
During the take-off phase, other obtain a minimum radar separation, bigger. However, if this bigger Heavy
than time separation, no avoidance depending on the departure tra- Principles of the re-categorization: follows the smallest, common sense
procedure is applicable as the jectory and long experience has The target of the re-categorization is indicates that a reduction of separation
manoeuvre is dictated by characteristic demonstrated an acceptable level of to reduce the separations on approach is possible without any impact on
speeds V1, Vr, V2, determined by the safety. and for departure between some the safety level (fig.3). Similarly, the
weight, the weather conditions and aircraft pairs, without degradation of separation may be reduced between
the runway. The time separations For a light aircraft taking-off from the safety levels, in order to improve two big Heavies or two small Heavies.
given for some aircraft types ensure a long runway behind a transport the landing capacity of a given runway The same principles apply to the
that possible encounters after take- aircraft, it is recommended to choose or runway couple. Medium category. The target is that
off remain controllable. When no time the departure point in order to achieve no situation should be worse than (fig.3)
separation is given by ICAO rules, the a trajectory well above the preceding The first step is called RECAT 1. All that which exists today with ICAO Toward a reduction of aircraft separation
separation is decided by the ATC to aircraft. the aircraft are placed in 6 categories separations. minima to aircraft categories
Separations
If this is safe...
ICAO rules
Follower
S H M L
RECAT 1 FAA: The FAA decided to reclassify the aircraft by MTOW and
S 6 NM 7 NM 8 NM wingspan. The RECAT FAA is implemented on several US airports.
H 4 NM 5 NM 6 NM RECAT 1 EU: It appeared that the RECAT FAA approach was giving few benefits
Leader to the European airports due to the differences in the airlines fleets on both sides
M 5 NM of the Atlantic. A RECAT EU was therefore developed. It takes into consideration
not only the strength of the wake vortex of the leader aircraft, but also the
L resistance of the follower. The encounter tests performed by Airbus allowed
validating some models used for the computations.
Safety First #21 | January 2016 051
OPERATIONS
Wake Vortices
Follower
Super Upper Lower Upper Lower
Light
Heavy Heavy Heavy Medium Medium
Super Heavy 3 NM 4 NM 5 NM 5 NM 6 NM 8 NM
Upper Heavy 3 NM 4 NM 4 NM 5 NM 7 NM
Lower Heavy 3 NM 3 NM 4 NM 6 NM
Leader
Upper Medium 5 NM
Lower Medium 4 NM
Light 3 NM
RECAT 2 and RECAT 3: The RECAT 2 is also called “pair-wise”, with a separation
that takes into consideration the leader and the follower types, possibly by
groups of aircraft. It will be implemented in the coming years.
The separations are not meant to avoid all encounters but to prevent
unsafe ones. In very calm air, wake vortices encounters may lead to
strong turbulence with significant bank angle and possibly some load
factor when at high altitude.
Remember: Release the Controls and DO NOT use Rudder.
052 Safety First #21 | January 2016 Safety First #21 | January 2016 053
AIRCRAFT
A320 Family Aircraft configuration
configuration
not only hardware Part Numbers (PN), but also software PN and
their combinations. This evolution calls for a change in mind
sets and practices to properly manage FLS and data loadable
computers configurations and in turn, the aircraft configuration.
SOFTWARE HAVE THEIR OWN PART TOO! This article will highlight the underlying safety aspects of an
incorrect use of FLS and review how to best prevent it.
With the introduction of a data loading function on A320
Family aircraft Flight Control and Auto Flight computers,
managing the aircraft configuration entered a new dimension. FIELD LOADABLE SOFTWARE:
Flying a certified aircraft now requires understanding not only WHAT IS IT ABOUT?
hardware Part Numbers, but also less immediately visible
operational software ones. Field Loadable Software (FLS) standards. Updating the standard
associated with Data Loadable Units of a FLS can thus be done without
(DLU), were originally introduced to removing the hardware itself from
facilitate the evolution of standards aircraft. Indeed, it simply consists
and the management of spares. in uploading the new version of the
To do so, these computers provide operational software from a media
an upgraded hardware that can disk to the same hardware, either
accommodate different versions of directly on-board or using a portable
operational software, i.e. different data loader.
On the
Are all A320 Family aircraft concerned? existing A320
Field Loadable Software started to hardware without using the aircraft Family fleet, some
be introduced progressively on the data loading function. In that case, the aircraft have FLS,
A320 Family around six years ago. hardware needs to be fitted upstream
UWE EGGERLING ALEXANDRE LAGU
In practice, on the existing fleet, some in a repair shop, with the adequate others don’t.
Senior Director Safety Flight control systems aircraft have it (either from delivery operational software version. The DLU Yet, all aircraft
Engineering and Senior engineer or via Service Bulletin), others don’t. loaded with the relevant Field Loadable
Maintenance However, even the non-equipped Software standard then behaves as a
can accommodate
aircraft can accommodate a DLU non-loadable computer. DLUs.
Safety First #21 | January 2016 055
AIRCRAFT
A320 Family Aircraft configuration
Sharklet aircraft include a new Load losing this LAF function, thus exposing
Alleviation Function (LAF) that allows the wing to non-anticipated and studied
to limit wing loads. This function is loads. If the consequences cannot
key to ensure that wing loads remain be detected immediately, such non-
within certification requirements. certified configuration leads to structural
Fitting a Sharklet aircraft with a pre- loads and ultimately structural fatigue
Sharklet ELAC (ELevator and Aileron that have not been studied as such,
Computer) and/or SEC (Spoiler & but could ultimately result in safety
Elevator Computer) standard leads to concerns.
In order to reduce the likelihood of tail with ABS system whereas it does not
strikes or hard landings, new ELAC have the function.
standards were developed with an
improved transition flare law to ground Similarly, ROPS (Runway Overrun
law. Flying with an aircraft supposed Protection System) is only available
to be fitted with these new computers with the latest loadable FAC (Flight
and actually fitted with an ELAC Augmentation Computer) standard.
standard prior to these improvements Installing an older software on a
leads to a situation where pilots believe ROPS-capable aircraft would lead
they benefit from these improvements to loose this safety enhancement
whereas they actually don’t. It is like function and the crew would not be
driving a car believing it is equipped aware of it.
Safety First #21 | January 2016 057
AIRCRAFT
A320 Family Aircraft configuration
Case 3: Improper surfaces control and unexpected aircraft behavior configuration at all time. Prevention starts with a
good awareness of the most common factors that
On Sharklet aircraft, in case Sharklet capable and non-Sharklet capable FLS can contribute to having a DLU loaded with an
are mistakenly mixed (knowing that this is a non-allowed and non-certified undesirable operational software.
configuration), the behaviour and control of the aircraft might be impaired.
Depending on the type of DLU concerned, possible consequences are:
The investigation into reported events of step requested in the AMM installation
• Mix of Sharklet capable and non- -L
eft and right Aileron surfaces syn- improper operational software uploaded and uploading tasks.
Sharklet capable ELAC/SEC chronisation not properly applied into Data Loadable Units highlighted a
Spoiler, Aileron and/or Elevator Sur- as expected (might lead to Air- variety of initial contributing factors. Being convinced of having installed
face actuator orders and monitoring craft unexpected behaviour). Yet, they all have in common a major the correct FLS standard although not
provided by each ELAC/SEC might step being overlooked in the computer having it, can in turn come from different
be different from one actuator to •M ix of Sharklet capable and non- removal/installation AMM procedure: reasons, such as:
CAUTION
This equipment
the other (as controlled by different Sharklet capable FAC operational software identification requires field
loadable software.
units). Installing a non-Sharklet capable through a LRU IDENTIFICATION check • not having realized that the DLUs Ensure correct
This may result in: FAC on a Sharklet aircraft may lead (LRU stands for Line Replaceable Unit)! consist of two distinct parts, namely software is loaded.
Refer to AMM
- Force fighting in case of elevator to erroneous characteristic speeds a hardware one and a software one,
double pressurisation (might lead computation, which, in turn, may When operating FLS, strict adherence bearing 2 distinct Part Numbers and 2
to structural defect and/or Aircraft affect safety margins against the to all of the steps detailed in the AMM FINs (Functional Item Number),
unexpected behaviour) stall speed. removal/installation tasks, and the LRU
IDENTIFICATION step in particular, • being excessively confident in the
These cases are not an exhaustive list of the safety related consequences that is the foundation of a good aircraft shop that delivers the parts to be
Unexplored may result from an erroneous combination of a DLU hardware loaded with the
undesirable operational software standard. Some of the effects described are
configuration management. installed (the DLU received from the
shop might not be loaded with the
safety related potential effects based on a purely theoretical analysis since these configurations In more detail, investigation results relevant operational software, i.e. the
consequences does have never been tested. However, unexplored safety related consequences highlighted that installing a DLU one that matches the actual aircraft
does not mean no safety consequences! loaded with inappropriate software configuration),
not mean no safety often results from the combination of
consequences. With this in mind, the key question is: how to avoid installing a Data Loadable being convinced to have the correct • relying on the spot on an old habit
Unit with an inadequate FLS standard? computer although not having it, and where a quick external glance
not taking the time to perform the at physical parts and their labels
procedure correctly, especially the was sufficient to tell the computer
DID YOU KNOW operational software identification standard.
Further
Zone(s): 120enhancing prevention…
27-93-08-03C-EQUIPMENT INSTL
Concerning the parts managed by the induces difficulties to ensure that the
shop,B.the disconnection between the computer delivered is loaded with
Make sure that this(these) circuit breaker(s) is(are) closed:
FIG - IT PART NUMBER
EM
NOMENCLATURE FIN
ACCESS/PANEL
UNIT PER ASSY
hardware and the operational software the appropriate operational software The 03C
in-depth analysis of.SCREW
01 NAS1102-3-8 reported events allowed for better understanding
008 where
0
for DLUs alsoPANELimplied switchingDESIGNATION from a version. FIN LOCATION problems originated from,
03C 02 NAS1726-3E .NUT
and thus for devising ways forward. 016
49VU FLIGHT CONTROLS/ELAC1/NORM/ 15CE1 B11
unique computer FIN SPLY integrating both 0
the hardware
49VU
49VU
and software parts, to two In any case,
FLIGHT CONTROLS/FCDC1/SPLY
AUTO FLT/MCDU/1
an ultimate
20CE1
11CA1
B10
B01
safety barrier was As of today, the available
03C 03 NAS1096-3-10
0
prevention
.SCREW
aircraft configuration. 008
This advice is
distinct FINs
105VUcorresponding respectivelySPLYdeveloped
FLT CTL/ELAC1/STBY and A01
16CE1 included into the AMM measures include:
03C 04 AN960-10L .WASHER provided on the understanding
008 that
to the hardware PN and the operational to prevent the installation of improper
** ON A/C 001-049
0
03C 05 F0003058200000 .RACK
an ISI 2CE1X,
is not2CE2X
an approved
002
instruc-
software 121VU
PN. In some airlines though, the operational
AUTO FLT/MCDU/2 software
11CA2 N20 onto the aircraft: • The
0B improvement of the IPC to tion; therefore once a configuration
spare parts
** ONsupply chain
A/C 001-049, management operational software identification via
101-199 include explicit content
Spare ABS1699-06
and reinforce
.RACK ASSY
is identified by this means, the IPC
tool remained
121VU
121VU
unchanged and does not LRU IDENTIFICATION
FLIGHT CONTROLS/FCDC2/SPLY
FLIGHT CONTROLS/ELAC2/NORM/
20CE2
15CE2
Q20
R20
action and cross awareness
Part on FLS (fig.2). must be checked in order to confirm
accommodate two different FINs for a check of that information with the PN
SPLY ** ON A/C USED WITH F0003058200000 that it is a certified one indeed.
single FLS** ONcomputer.
A/C 101-199 This limitation displayed on the media disk (fig.1). • The03Cimprovement
05 NAS1102-06-6 of ..SCREW
the ISI (In-Ser- 004
5
121VU AUTO FLT/MCDU/2 11CA2 N19 vice
03CInformation)
05 ASNA2168-01documentation
..LATCH as a • The introduction in the002Field Loada-
** ON A/C 001-049, 101-199 support
6 for your fleet management. ble Software training on A320 Family
(fig.1) 4. Procedure This document
** ON A/C 051-100 offers a good over- aircraft, of more details on the rec-
Preventing the installation of an improper Subtask 27-93-00-280-052-A
view of
03C 06 existing certifi.SCREW
NAS1100-06-7 ed configura- ommended uploading 016 procedure,
ELAC operational software onto the A. Do a check of the reference of the software loaded in the ELAC 0
aircraft thanks to the AMM tions
03C by explicitly explaining
07 MS21042L06 .NUT the hard- as well as a reminder of
016these DLUs
NOTE: This procedure is for the ELAC1. For the ELAC2, use the indications between the parentheses.
ware
0
PN & operational software PN specificity compared to earlier stand-
03C 08 ASNA2397-6L .WASHER 016
(1) Do the procedure to get access to the SYSTEM REPORT/TEST F/CTL page combination
0 compatibility with the ards of computers.
(Ref. AMM TASK 31-32-00-860-006) . 03C 09 E0165D01A27 .CONNECTOR-RECEPTACLE 2CE1A, 2CE2A 002
0
(fig.2)
ACTION RESULT
03C 10 3945129100 .ELAC-ELEVATOR AILERON COM- 2CE1, 2CE2 002
1.Push the line key adjacent to the EFCS 1(2) in- · The EFCS 1(2) menu page comes into view. 3 PUTER
dication.
ELAC B-DL HARDWARE HAS P/ The IPC raises awareness on FLS
2.Push the line key adjacent to the LRU IDENTI- · The LRU IDENTIFICATION page comes into N 3945129100. IT IS USED FOR
FICATION indication. view. DATA-LOADABLE HARDWARE
PART NUMBER WITHOUT ANY
(2) Make sure that the P/N of the ELAC shown on the LRU IDENTIFICATION page is the same as the P/ INFORMATION REGARDING
N on the media disk. THE OPERATIONAL SOFTWARE
Operational (a) If the P/N of the ELAC shown on the LRU IDENTIFICATION page is different from the P/N on the
media disk, replace the ELAC.
LOADED.
DATA-LOADABLE ELAC PN
software
3945129100 INTERCHANGEAB-
NOTE: If the two ELACs were not loaded with the same software, make sure that the configura- ILITY AND MIXABILITY CONDI-
TIONS
identification (LRU
tion of the ELAC1/ELAC2 is a permitted configuration.
DEPEND ON THE OPERATIONAL
SOFTWARE LOADED.
IDENTIFICATION)
5. Close-up
SEE 27-93-34-01A 001K FOR DET
Subtask 27-93-00-860-063-A
However, performing this check of the a quick look at the DLU hardware can improving the visual identification of DLUs and thus, reminding the need to
configurations. software reference between the one only tell part of the story. check the operational software PN.
For those who have already experienced losing one of their favourite
functionalities on their computer, smartphone or tablet because a new
version of operating system had been developed and not yet updated
on it, it is an unpleasant experience. When it comes to a Flight Control or
Auto Flight computer loaded with a wrong operational software version,
it can be far worse since it can affect safety. No doubt it is worth the very
limited time and effort of a LRU IDENTIFICATION!
060 Safety First #21 | January 2016
ARTICLES PUBLISHED • What is Stall? How a Pilot Should • A380: Flutter Tests • A320 Family: Evolution of Ground
IN PREVIOUS React in Front of a Stall Situation
• Minimum Control Speed Tests
• Operational Landing Distances:
A New Standard for In-flight Landing
Spoiler Logic
• Incorrect Pitch Trim Setting at Take-Off
‘SAFETY FIRST’ ISSUES on A380
• Radio Altimeter Erroneous Values
Distance Assessment
• Go Around Handling
• Technical Flight Familiarization
• Oxygen Safety
• Automatic NAV Engagement at Go • A320: Landing Gear Downlock
Around • Situation Awareness and Decision Making
July 2015 January 2015 July 2014 • The Runway Overrun Prevention • Airbus AP/FD TCAS Mode: A New • A320: Runway Overrun
System Step Towards Safety Improvement • FCTL Check after EFCS Reset on Ground
• The Take-Off Securing Function • Braking System Cross Connections • A320: Possible Consequence of VMO/
• Control your speed... during climb • Tidy cockpit for safe flight • Control your speed... at take-off • Computer Mixability: • Upset Recovery Training Aid, Revision 2 MMO Exceedance
• Lateral runway excursions upon landing • Landing on contaminated runways • Safe operations with composite aircraft An Important Function • Fuel Pumps Left in OFF Position • A320: Prevention of Tailstrikes
• Fuel monitoring on A320 Family aircraft • Understanding weight & balance • Learning from the evidence • Fuel Spills During Refueling Operations • A320: Avoiding Dual Bleed Loss • Low Fuel Situation Awareness
• Hight-altitude manual flying • Wind shear: an invisible enemy to pilots? • A320 Family cargo Containers/ pallets • Rudder Pedal Jam
movement • Why do Certain AMM Tasks Require
• Parts Departing from Aircraft (PDA) Equipment Resets?
• Slide/raft Improvement
• Cabin Attendant Falling through the
Issue 17 Issue 16 Issue 15 Avionics Bay Access Panel in Cockpit
• Airbus Brake Testing • Performance Based Navigation: • The Golden Rules for Pilots moving December 2007 June 2007 December 2006
• Hard Landing, a Case Study for Crews RNP and RNP AR Approaches from PNF to PM
and Maintenance Personnel • Atlantic Airways: Introduction • Airbus Crosswind Development and
• Aircraft Protection during Washing and of RNP AR 0.1 Operations Certification • New CFIT Event During Non Precision • Operations Engineering Bulletin • Dual Side Stick Inputs
Painting • Flight Crews and De-Icing Personnel • The SMOKE/FUMES/AVNCS SMOKE Approach Reminder Function • Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer Damage
• Flight Data Analysis (FDA), a Predictive – Working together in Temporary Procedure • A320: Tail Strike at Take-Off? • Avoiding High Speed Rejected Take-Offs • Pitot Probes Obstruction on Ground
Tool for Safety Management System Teamwork for safe Skies • Post-Maintenance Foreign Objects • Unreliable Speed Due to EGT Limit Exceedance • A340: Thrust Reverser Unlocked
(SMS) • Low Speed Rejected Take-Off upon Damage (FOD) Prevention • Compliance to Operational Procedures • Do you Know your ATC/TCAS Panel? • Residual Cabin Pressure
• Flying a Go-Around, Managing Energy Engine Failure • Corrosion: • The Future Air Navigation • Managing Hailstorms • Cabin Operations Briefing Notes
• Late Changes before Departure A Potential Safety Issue System FANS B • Introducing the Maintenance Briefing Notes • Hypoxia: An Invisible Enemy
• A320: Dual hydraulic Loss
• Terrain Awareness and Warning Systems
Issue 14 Issue 13 Issue 12 Operations Based on GPS Data
• Thrust Reverser Selection means • A320 Family / A330 Prevention and • Airbus New Operational September 2005 January 2005
Full-Stop Handling of Dual Bleed Loss Landing Distances
• Transient Loss of Communication due • The Fuel Penalty Factor • The Go Around Procedure
to Jammed Push-To-Talk A320 and • The Airbus TCAS Alert Prevention • The Circling Approach • Tailpipe or Engine Fire • Go Arounds in Addis-Ababa due to VOR
A330/A340 Families (TCAP) • VMU Tests on A380 • Managing Severe Turbulence Reception Problems
• A380: Development of the Flight • A380: Development of the Flight • Automatic Landings • Airbus Pilot Transition (ATP) • The Importance of the Pre-flight Flight
Controls - Part 2 Controls - Part 1 in Daily Operation • Runway Excursions at Take-Off Control Check
• Preventing Fan Cowl Door Loss • Facing the Reality of everyday • A320: In-flight Thrust Reverser Deployment
• Do not forget that you are not alone in Maintenance Operations • Airbus Flight Safety Manager Handbook
Maintenance • Flight Operations Briefing Notes