PEREZ, J.

:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the Decision[1] and Resolution[2] of the Sandiganbayan (SB) in Criminal Case Nos. SB-
12-CRM-0171 and SB-12-CRM-0172 dated 27 February 2014 and 23 May 2014,
respectively, finding petitioner Mayor Amado. Corpuz, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of two (2) counts of Falsification of Public Document under Article 171, paragraph
4 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

The Facts

Petitioner, in his official capacity as the Municipal Mayor of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, was
indicted for two (2) counts of the abovementioned criminal offense. The accusatory
portions of the two (2) separate Informations filed against him before the SB are as
follows:

CRIM. CASE NO. SB-12-CRM-0171

That on 28 October 2009 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Cuyapo, Nueva

Ecija, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
[petitioner], a public officer, being the Municipal Mayor of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, acting
in relation to his office and taking advantage of his official position, did there and then
deliberately, willfully and feloniously, falsify the Certificate of Marriage of Manny
Asuncion and Dina Lumanlan by certifying therein that it was he who solemnized their
marriage when in truth and in fact, he was not the one who solemnized the same but
rather Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., Local Civil Registrar (of) Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, to the
damage and prejudice of the said couple and of public interest.

CRIM. CASE NO. SB-12-CRM-0172

That on 18 December 2009 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Cuyapo, Nueva

Ecija, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
[petitioner], a public officer, being the Municipal Mayor of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, acting
in relation to his office and taking advantage of his official position, did there and then
deliberately, willfully and feloniously, falsify the Certificate of Marriage of Alex Pascual
and Esperanza Arizabal by certifying therein that it was he who solemnized their
marriage when in truth and in fact, he was not the one who solemnized the same but
rather Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., Local Civil Registrar (of) Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, to the
damage and prejudice of the said couple and of public interest.[3]
As petitioner pleaded not guilty to both charges, trial ensued with the prosecution
presenting five (5) witnesses, and the defense presenting three (3) witnesses, inclusive
of documentary evidence admitted therein, in order to resolve the jointly proposed issue
of "who among the parties the complainant on the one hand, [and] the married couples
and the sponsors who attest to the fact that it was the accused who solemnized the said
marriage is telling the truth?"

At the trial, the prosecution presented complainant Arsenio Flores, a retired

government employee who testified that being one of the wedding sponsors of Alex
Pascual and Esperanza Arizabal, he attended and witnessed the actual ceremony of their
wedding which was solemnized by Thelmo Corpuz, Sr., the Municipal Registrar, and not
petitioner, at the Municipal Registrar's Office where it was held; that with the
knowledge that said Municipal Registrar was not authorized to solemnize marriage, he
did not sign as a witness their marriage certificate, and thereafter searched for
documents, including pictures and invitation cards, in order to establish such illegal
acts; that based on the documents he gathered, it was made to appear that petitioner
was the one who solemnized said marriages because of his signature appearing on the
corresponding marriage certificates; and that he could not explain why the subject
marriage certificate was already signed by petitioner when in fact he was not around
during the ceremony, and was immediately given to them on the same day.[4]His
testimony was corroborated by Honorato M. Tolentino, the brother-in-law of Alex
Pascual, who testified that he rendered his services for free as a photographer during
said wedding, and witnessed the actual ceremony, with the observation that it was
Thelmo Corpuz, Sr. who solemnized the same.[5]

As to the marriage ceremony of Manny Asuncion and Dina Lumanlan, Jorge N. Lazaro,
a freelance photographer and pilot, testified that the latter and her mother engaged his
services as a photographer, and even requested his live-in partner, Tessie Atayde, to
stand as one of the principal sponsors; that while taking photos for the event, he
naturally witnessed the actual ceremony which was held at the Senior Citizen Building
(now called Multi-Purpose Building); and that it was Thelmo Corpuz, Sr., the Municipal
Registrar of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, who actually solemnized said marriage.[6]

Lastly, the prosecution presented as rebuttal witness, Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., who
testified that complainant Arsenio Flores filed a case for usurpation of official functions
against him before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in connection with the marriages of
the couples, which he allegedly solemnized; that he changed his plea of NOT GUILTY to
that of GUILTY, in order to have a peace of mind and to reveal the truth that it was
actually him who solemnized said marriages; that it was actually him who was standing
in front of both couples as shown by the pictures presented as evidence; that after
pleading guilty, he immediately filed a Petition for Probation before the same court; that
he did not execute any affidavit of desistance to that effect; and that his son Thelmo
Corpuz III was already separated from the government service, and that in the recent
local elections, the latter sided with the political rival of petitioner.[7] The above
narration was corroborated and attested to by witness Felicisima D. Almonte, Clerk of
Court of the MTC, with the stipulation of the parties on the authenticity and due
execution of its 15 July 2013 Decision. On cross-examination, she affirmed that as part
of the records of the case, that there was a counter-affidavit attached therewith by
Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., but without an affidavit of recantation against his previous
counter-affidavit denying such accusations against him; and that during the last local
election, both Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., and his son, Thelmo Corpuz, Jr., persuaded her to
vote for petitioner's opponent.[8]

In his defense, petitioner himself testified. He insisted that he actually solemnized at his
office the marriage of spouses Pascual and that of spouses Asuncion; that spouses
Asuncion executed a joint affidavit of cohabitation based on Article 34 of the Family
Code making them exempted from securing a marriage license as appearing in their
marriage contract; that complainant Arsenio Flores was not present at the mayor's office
when the wedding of spouses Pascual took place; that in the subject weddings, all
signatures appearing on the marriage certificates were actually signed in his presence;
that as a mayor for eighteen ( 18) years, he knew that the power to solemnize marriage
cannot be delegated; and that he is aware that a case for usurpation of official function
was filed against Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., but has no knowledge about his change of plea.
The above testimonies were further bolstered by no other than the parties themselves of
said marriage ceremonies. Both Alex Y. Pascual and Manny M. Asuncion appeared and
testified that petitioner was indeed the one who solemnized their respective marriage;
that their respective marriage is valid and legal; that both ceremonies were held at the
mayor's office; and that, as reflected in the pictures shown by the prosecution, they
appeared before Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr. only to receive marriage counseling and to be
taught on how to act during the actual ceremony, before they went to the mayor's office
for the actual solemnization by petitioner.[9]

From the foregoing testimonial and documentary evidence, including the stipulations
between the parties, the facts, as taken and appreciated by the SB, are presented as
follows:

At the time material to the Informations, the [petitioner] was the incumbent Mayor of
the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, while Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr. was the Municipal
Civil Registrar until his retirement from the service in 2011.

As set forth on the invitation for the Asuncion-Lumanlan Nuptials, the couple was
united in matrimony on October 28, 2009 at around 9:30 in the morning at Cuyapo
Town Hall, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. Jorge N. Lazaro attended the occasion along with his
live-in partner Tessie Atayde, who was one of the principal sponsors. Lazaro was hired
as photographer for the event and was able to capture the actual ceremony. A marriage
certificate was then issued to Spouses Asuncion, duly signed by the [petitioner] as the
solemnizing officer.

Another wedding which took place at the Municipal Hall of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija on
December 18, 2009 at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning was that of Alex Pascual and
Esperanza Arizabal. Among those present was Arsenio Flores who stood as one of the
principal sponsors. The ceremony was similarly witnessed by Honorato M. Tolentino, a
brother-in-law of the groom who was also hired as photographer for the said wedding.
As proof of the wedding, a marriage certificate bearing the signature of the [petitioner]
as solemnizing officer was thereafter issued to spouses Pascual.

Displeased with what transpired during the wedding ceremony of Alez and Esperanza,
Arsenio Flores came up with a complaint-affidavit, dated February 8, 2010, setting forth
the violations committed by the [petitioner] and that of Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., the
former as mere signatory of the marriage certificates, and the latter acting as the
solemnizing officer on behalf of the mayor. Flores' declaration with respect to the
Pascual-Arizabal nuptial was corroborated by the affidavit, dated March 22, 2010, of
Honorato M. Tolentino, Sr., who covered the said wedding. Flores included in his
affidavit other nuptials specifically that of Manny and Dina which was held on October
28, 2009 and which was also solemnized by Thelma Corpuz, Sr. His statement was
supported by Jorge Lazaro's affidavit, dated March 22, 2010, inclusive of snapshots he
personally took on that day. In view of Thelma O. Corpuz's entry of plea of guilty for two
(2) counts of usurpation of official functions filed against him before the Municipal Trial
Court of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, the court, in its Decision dated July 15, 2013, duly
considered his plea of guilty as a mitigating circumstance, and imposed on him the
straight penalty of one (1) year imprisonment for each case.

DISCUSSION

In his memorandum, the [petitioner] maintains his innocence as he questions the

trustworthiness and reliability of the prosecution's witnesses. According to him, the
presumption of authenticity of public documents, the marriage certificates in these
cases, should prevail over the inconsistent testimonies of the witnesses for the
prosecution that it was not him who officiated these ceremonies. According to him also,
the couples themselves through Alex and Manny, who are definitely in the best position
to attest that it was the [petitioner] himself who solemnized their marriage, did so in
open court and expressed such fact in their Joint Affidavits. Further, the rebuttal
evidence of the prosecution sans the affidavit of recantation of Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr.,
did not alter his previous declaration that he did not solemnize the subject weddings but
the herein [petitioner] who rightfully certified his deed in the marriage certificates. With
these, the defense avers that the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the
[petitioner] beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, the [petitioner] should be
acquitted.

On the other hand, in its memorandum, the prosecution asserts that from the pieces of
evidence presented and the testimonies of its witnesses, it has proven all the elements of
the offense charged based on the quantum of evidence required by law. The accused
clearly committed falsification of public documents by making untruthful statements in
a narration of facts when, by taking advantage of his official function, he certified in the
marriage certificates of spouses Asuncion and spouses Pascual that as the Municipal
Mayor, he personally solemnized their marriage when it was Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., the
Municipal Civil Registrar, who did so on his behalf. Thus, for this false declaration, the
[petitioner] should be held criminally liable.[10]
The Ruling of the Sandiganhayan
In the assailed Decision dated 27 February 2014, the SB found petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the said crimes, the dispositive portion of which is stated
hereunder for ready reference, to wit:

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the Court finds [petitioner] Amado R.
Corpuz, Jr. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for two (2) counts of Falsification of
Public Document, defined and penalized under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised
Penal Code and, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, is hereby sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of four (4) years and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to
eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum, for each count, and to pay a fine of
P5,000.00 for each case, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.[11]
It ruled that with the prosecution's pieces of evidence taken together, all the elements of
the crime of falsification of public documents, by making untruthful statements in a
narration of facts, were adequately established. The SB further explained that being a
local chief executive and duly authorized officer to solemnize marriage, petitioner was
duty-bound to observe his solemn affirmation on the marriage certificates. More so, by
taking advantage of his official position, petitioner certified the particulars of an event,
the subject marriages, despite full knowledge that he did not personally solemnize the
exchange of marital vows of spouses Pascual and spouses Asuncion. In other words,
what he certified was absolutely false and for such reason, petitioner's guilt was
established beyond reasonable doubt. By way of conclusion, the court stressed that in
falsification of public or official documents, it is not necessary that there be present the
idea of gain or intent to injure a third person because in the falsification of public
document, what is being punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction
of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed.[12]

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration thereof and his supplemental thereto were
likewise denied for lack of merit in the 23 May 2014 Resolution.

Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter through a petition for review

on certiorari before this Court asserting the following errors, grounds or arguments:

1. THE SANDIGANBAYAN (RESPONDENT COURT FOR BREVITY) COMMITTED

SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW AND MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN
ACCORD WITH JURISPRUDENCE WHEN WITHOUT ANY JUSTIFICATION IT
ADMITTED MERE PHOTOCOPIES OF PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE, I.E., (1)
INVITATION CARDS AND (2) PICTURES OVER THE OBJECTION OF THE DEFENSE
-

WORSENED BY THE ALLOWANCE OF SECONDARY EVIDENCE (AS A

1.1 NECESSARY CONSEQUENCE IN ITS ADMISSION) WITHOUT COMPLIANCE
WITH THE RUDIMENTS ON SECONDARY EVIDENCE; AND
SERIOUS MISAPPRECIATJON OF FACT UPON ITS FAlLURE AND/OR
OMISSION TO CONSIDER GLARING DISPARITIES BETWEEN PROSECUTION'S
1.2
VERY OWN EVIDENCE, I.E., (SAID) INVITATION CARDS AND ITS OWN
WITNESSES' STATEMENT AS TO THE PLACE OR VENUE OF SOLEMNIZATION
 WHICH ON MATTERS OF CREDIBILITY MORE SO, BY THE SURROUNDING
CIRCUMSTANCES IN HERE, TOUCHES ON THE VERY ISSUE OF
COMPETENCY OF THE WITNESS AND THE STRICT RULE ON ASSESSMENT
OF EVIDENCE AGAINST THE STATE AND'LIBERAL FOR THE ACCUSED. THIS
RULE WAS SADLY IGNORED. WE TAKE THIS TO NOTE AS NO TRIVIAL
ASPECT AS THE RESPONDENT COURT PUT IT.

2. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW AND

MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD WITH CASE LAW WHEN IT
CONSIDERED FACTS NOT OFFERED IN EVIDENCE AND TOTALLY OUT OF THE
RECORDS - HOLDING DEFENSE TWO (2) WITNESSES, THE SPOUSES HUSBANDS,
ALEX PASCUAL, AND MANNY ASUNCION, WERE ALLEGEDLY INDEBTED OF
GRATITUDE TO THE ACCUSED FOR BEING ALLEGEDLY EMPLOYED BY THE
LATTER; HENCE, DEBUNKING CREDIBILITY OF THEIR TESTIMONIES.

3. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR OF

LAW AND MISAPPRECIATION OF FACTS ON MATTERS AND SUBSTANCE SO
MATERIAL POINTING TO THE DEFENSE AS ALLEGEDLY THE ONE WHO SAID
THAT THE BEST PERSONS WHO COULD ATTEST WHO THE SOLEMNIZER WAS IN
THEIR RESPECTIVE WEDDINGS WERE THE COUPLES TliEMSELVES WHICH
CORRECT PRONOUNCEMENT AND ACCURATE OBSERVATION, WAS IN FACT,
MADE BY ONE OF THE HONORABLE JUSTICES, THE HONORABLE RODOLFO
PONFERRADA, IN OPEN COURT NOT THE ACCUSED WHICH OBSERVATION WE
NOT ONLY SUPPORT BUT TREASURE SO MUCH.

4. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR OF

LAW AND MISAPPRECIATION OF FACTS ON MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE WHEN IT
AGAIN MADE ANOTHER PRONOUNCEMENT DECLARING THAT "ACCUSED ONLY
RELIED ON DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY WITHOUT
PRESENTING ANY OTHER EVIDENCE NOT TO DOUBT HIS PERSONAL
APPEARANCE ON THOSE DATES AND THAT HE SIGNED THESE DOCUMENTS
AFTER ACTUALLY SOLEMNIZING THE SAID MARRIAGES."

5. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW AND

MISAPPRECIATION OF FACTS - WHEN IT DECLARED TIIE PRESENCE OF ALL
THE ELEMENTS OF FALSIFICATION UNDER ARTICLE 171 [OF THE] REVISED
PENAL CODE, AGORAVATED BY THE MISAPPLICATION OF THE DICTUM IN ITS
CITED GALEOS VS. PEOPLE.

6. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR OF LAW AND

MISAPPRECIATION OF FACTS WHICH ARE MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN
ACCORD WITH CASE LAW ADOPTING TWO (2) STANDARDS OF APPLICATION OF
LAW OVER TWO (2) OPPOSSING DOCUMENTS, I.E., (1) THE TWO SETS OF
MARRIAGE CERTIFICATES ON ONE HAND, AND (2) THE ADMITTEDLY
FALSIFIED THREE (3) AFFIDAVITS OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES,
HONORATO TOLENTINO, JORGE LAZARO AND THELMO CORPUZ, THEREBY
GROSSLY MISAPPLIED ART. 171 [OF THE] REVISED PENAL CODE AS CITED IN
GALEOS VS. PEOPLE, WHEN IT TURNED DOWN THE TWO (2) CERTIFICATE OF
MARRIAGES IGNORING THE DECIDENDI IN THE CITED CASE - WHILE
CASUALLY DOWNPLAYED THE FALSIFIED 3 WITNESSES AFFIDAVITS, ITS LEGAL
AND NECESSARY CONSEQUENCES.

7. OVER ALL CONSIDERATIONS, THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED THE

MOST SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW AND MISAPPRECIATION OF FACTS
IN CLINGING TO ITS JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION INSTEAD OF ACQUITTAL ON
THE BASIS OF THE OPPOSING EVIDENCE RESPECTIVELY PRESENTED BY THE
PROSECUTION ON ONE HAND - AND - THE DEFENSE ON THE OTHER
HEREAFTER PRESENTED IN GRAPHIC FORM.[13]
It is the contention of petitioner that none of the five (5) witnesses presented by the
prosecution was competent to testify on accused's actual solemnization of and presence
during the subject marriages. Neither did any of the documentary evidence submitted
by the prosecution establish beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner was not the one
who solemnized the same. Thus, in his defense, petitioner believes that he is innocent
considering that he was able to present the husbands of the subject marriages, who
appeared before him during the actual solemnizations, and both testified in his favor,
supported by various documentary evidence, such as the subject marriage certificates,
including the joint affidavit of cohabitation and joint affidavit of confirmation issued by
the couples, and also the counter-affidavit issued by Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., the person
alleged to have actually conducted the said solemnization of the subject marriages; who
initially denied being the one who acted as a solemnizing officer to any marriage
ceremony.

Respondents, through its Office of the Special Prosecutor, filed on 28 April 2015 its
Comment[14] to the instant petition, and counters that the SB acted in accord with law
and jurisprudence on the basis of the evidence on record when it found petitioner guilty
of the felonies charged; that petitioner raised questions of fact contrary to Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court; that the equipoise doctrine is inapplicable in the case of petitioner; that
petitioner was correctly convicted of the crimes of falsification of public document since
all the elements to establish the same were proven beyond reasonable doubt; and that
the other issues and arguments raised by petitioner do not constitute reversible error on
the part of the SB.

The Issue

Whether or not petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification
of public documents.

The Ruling of the Court

At the outset, the Constitution presumes a person innocent until proven guilty by proof
beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness ofthe defense's evidence for it has the onus probandi in establishing the guilt
of the accused - ei incumbit probatio qui elicit, non que negat - he who asserts, not he
who denies, must prove.[15]

In other words, the burden of such proof rests with the prosecution, which must rely on
the strength of its case rather than on the weakness of the case for the defense. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral
certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is
indispensable to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.[16]

Worthy to mention that in every criminal onviction, the prosecution is required to prove
two thinss beyond reasonable doubt: first, the fact of the commission of the crime
charged, or the presence of all the elements of the offense; and second, the fact that the
accused was the perpetrator of the crime.[17]

In the instant case, petitioner was charged with violation of Article 171, paragraph 4 of
the RPC, which provides:

ART. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee, or notary or ecclesiastical minister.

- The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed
upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official
position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:

xxxx

4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts; x x x

It bears emphasis that what is punished in falsification of a public document is the
violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as solemnly proclaimed in
it.[18] Generally, the elements of Article 171 are: (1) the offender is a public officer,
employee, or notary public; (2) he takes advantage of his official position; and (3) that
he falsifies a document by committing any of the ways it is done.[19]

Specifically, paragraph 4 of the said Article requires that: (a) the offender makes in a
public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) the offender has a
legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and (c) the facts
narrated by the offender are absolutely false.[20]

In addition to the aforecited elements, it must also be proven that the public officer or
employee had taken advantage of his official position in making the falsification. In
falsification of public document, the offender is considered to have taken advantage of
his official position when (1) he has the duty to make or prepare or otherwise to
intervene in the preparation of a document; or (2) he has the official custody of the
document which he falsifies.[21]

In the case at bench, and as correctly found by the SB, it is undisputed that petitioner
was a public officer, being the Municipal Mayor of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, duly authorized
by law to solemnize marriages, at the time such alleged criminal offense was committed.
Likewise, in issuing marriage certificates, being a public document issued by the
Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, petitioner had the legal duty to prepare said
document, and not only to attest to the truth of what he had given account of but more
importantly, to warrant the truth of the facts narrated by him thereon.[22] Undoubtedly,
these factual circumstances were clearly established since petitioner himself admits the
same. Accordingly; we are now left with one final matter to determine, i.e. whether or
not the facts narrated by petitioner on the subject marriage certificates were absolutely
false. If answered in the affirmative, then petitioner is indeed guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of falsification of public documents. Otherwise, he shall be exonerated.

Relevant thereto, the initial query to be resolved is whose evidence between the
prosecution and defense is credible in order to determine the guilt of the accused in a
criminal action.

For ready reference, we find the necessity of reproducing hereunder the actual pertinent
portion declared by petitioner in his official capacity as a solemnizing officer, common
to the subject marriage certificates, which reads:

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT BEFORE ME, on the date and place above written,
personally appeared the above-mentioned parties, with their mutual consent, lawfully
joined together in marriage which was solemnized by me in the presence of the
witnesses named below, all of legal age.

xxxx

(Signed)
HON. AMADOR. CORPUS, JR.
MUNICIPAL MAYOR
CUYAPO, NUEVA ECIJA[23]
From the above-quoted statement, petitioner categorically expresses that, in both
marriages, all parties (referring to spouses Pascual and spouses Asuncion), personally
appeared before him, as their solemnizing officer, in the presence of other witnesses.

In ruling that petitioner was not the one who solemnized the subject marriages, the SB
relied heavily on the testimonial evidence of the prosecution's witnesses, particularly on
the common fact that they all witnessed an alleged ceremony conducted on said dates
wherein Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., the Municipal Registrar, was the one who acted as the
solemnizing officer, and not petitioner. It further considered the photos and photocopies
of the invitations presented and offered as additional proofs to establish the aforesaid
incidents which show spouses Pascual and spouses Asuncion standing in front of
Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr. Moreover, the testimony of Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., being a
rebuttal evidence to the claims of Alex Y. Pascual and Manny M. Asuncion that it was
petitioner who solemnized their respective marriages, was vastly recognized as
acceptable and damaging to petitioner's defense since the principle of res inter alios
acta (the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or mission of
another) does not apply in this case.

We are not unaware that settled is the rule that factual findings of the SB are conclusive
upon this Court. However, there are exceptions to said rule, to wit: (1) the conclusion is
a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference
made is manifestly an error or founded on a mistake; (3) there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of
fact are premised on a want of evidence and are contradicted by evidence on record; and
(6) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based.[24]

A perusal of the offered and admitted evidence, testimonial and documentary, reveals
some misappreciation of facts of which if considered· may result in a different
conclusion. In other words, there were findings grounded entirely on speculation and/or
premised on want of evidence that are needed to be resolved in the case before us.
Hence, we rule to reverse the SB's ruling of conviction against petitioner.

First, none of the testimonial and documentary evidence offered by the prosecution was
able to dispute the presumption of regularity of an official function and authenticity and
due execution of the public instruments issued by petitioner as the Municipal Mayor,
which may only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. As can be
gleaned from the narration of facts provided by the trial court, there is no showing that
an actual appearance by the concerned parties (spouses Pascual and spouses Asuncion)
before petitioner as their solemnizing officer did not occur or happen. Looking into the
evidence presented, the only patent conclusion that can be derived from the
prosecution's evidence, as admitted by the witnesses for the defense, is that both couples
appeared before. Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., for the sole purpose of recetvmg marriage
counseling and/or marriage rehearsals, nothing more.

Second, as mentioned in the assailed Decision, the SB expressed that the testimonies of
the defense's witnesses appear biased considering that they "owe their current
employment with the accused as these narrations rang no truth and sounded to have
been well-coached;" hence, they found the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses
more credible. Unfortunately, we find this declaration quite odd considering that there
was no iota of evidence to show that both Alex Y. Pascual and. Manny M. Asuncion owe
debts of gratitude to petitioner. Indeed even it is taken as true that the defense witnesses
who are the husbands in the questioned marriages owe their employment to the accused
such fact can rightfully be construed as itself the reason why these witnesses would truly
want their respective·marriages officiated by the accused. As a matter of fact, it was the
prosecution's witnesses who have manifested some tainted credibility in their
testimonies when it was declared, among others, that: (a) all the judicial affidavits were
prepared by the complainant Arsenio A. Flores and were given to them for their
signatures; (b) Thelma Corpuz III, the son of Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., was separated from
the government service, and that in the recent local election, he sided with petitioner's
political rival; and (c) Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr. and his son, Thelmo Corpuz, Jr., persuaded
Felicisima D. Almonte to vote for the petitioner's opponent during the local election.
Clearly therefore, if there were any doubts as to the credibility of the witnesses in this
case, it is those of the prosecution who should be considered guilty of potential political
motivations.
Third, as to the testimony of Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., we do not find the same damaging
on the part of petitioner considering that his admission of conducting his own ceremony
in the capacity of a solemnizing officer simply confirms his criminal liability in the case
of usurpation of authority as his conviction was already pronounced by the MTC. Such
testimony does not necessarily result in the falsity of petitioner's declaration that he
nonetheless conducted his own solemnization of the subject marriages. The fact remains
that, as testified to by Alex Y. Pascual and Manny M. Asuncion, it was petitioner who
solemnized their marriages on said date and at said office.

Fourth, the burden of proof in estabiishing that petitioner made an untruthful statement
in the marriage certificate in order to be convicted of the crime of falsification of public
instrument solely lies on the prosecution.

If only to stress the merit of this petition, we repeat the axioms that the Bill of Rights
guarantees the right of an accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.
In order to overcome the presumption of innocence, the prosecution is required to
adduce against him nothing less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the prosecution
fails to discharge its heavy burden, then it is not only the right of the accused to be freed,
it becomes the Court's constitutional duty to acquit him.[25]

Lastly, considering that the subject public instrument in this case refers to the marriage
certificate, we find it apropos to point out that the validity of marriage cannot be
collaterally attacked since under existing laws and jurisprudence, the same may be
questioned only in a direct action. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention
of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. In declaring that the one who solemnized the
subject marriages had no authority to do so would indirectly result in the declaration
that said marriages are void. This is what our jurisdiction intends to prevent.[26]

By way of reiteration, it is a fundamental rule in criminal procedure that the State

carries the onus probandi in establishing the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable
doubt, as a consequence of the tenet ei incumbit probation, qui dicit, non qui negat,
which means that he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove,[27] and as a means of
respecting the presumption of innocence in favor of the man or woman on the dock for a
crime. Accordingly, the State has the burden of proof to show: (1) the correct
identification of the author of a crime, and (2) the actuality of the commission of the
offense with the participation of the accused. All these facts must be proved by the State
beyond reasonable doubt on the strength of its evidence and without solace from the
weakness of the defense. That the defense the accused puts up may be weak is
inconsequential if, in the first place, the State has failed to discharge the onus of his
identity and culpability. The presumption of innocence dictates that it is for the·
prosecution to demonstrate the guilt and not for the accused to establish
innocence.[28] Indeed, the accused, being presumed innocent, carries no burden of proof
on his or her shoulders.

Furthermore, it has been consistently ruled that "[c]ourts must judge the guilt or
innocence of the accused based on facts and not on mere conjectures, presumptions, or
suspicions."[29] It is iniquitous to base petitioner's guilt on the presumptions of the
prosecution's witnesses for the Court has, time and again, declared that if the
inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more interpretations, one of
which being consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other or others
consistent with his guilt, then the evidence in view of the constitutional presumption of
innocence has not fulfilled the test of moral certainty and is thus insufficient to support
a conviction.[30]

In sum, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution in this case failed to
pass the test of moral certainty necessary to warrant petitioner's conviction. Accusation
is not synonymous with guilt.[31] Not only that, where the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations or interpretations, one of which
is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt,
then the evidence does not meet or hurdle the test of moral certainty required for
conviction.[32] Accordingly, the prosecution failed to establish the elements of
falsification of public documents. With the prosecution having failed to discharge its
burden of establishing petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, this Court is
constrained, as is its bounden duty when reasonable doubt persists, to acquit him.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan in

Criminal Case Nos. SB-12-CRM-0171 and SB-12-CRM-0172 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Petitioner Amado Corpuz, Jr. is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Cesario Ursua vs Court of Appeals

256 SCRA 149 – Statutory Construction – Purpose of a Law
Civil Law – Application of Laws – Interpretation of Laws
In 1989, Cesario Ursua was charged with bribery and dishonesty. His lawyer then asked
him to get a copy of the complaint against him from the Office of the Ombudsman. His
lawyer asked him that because the law firm’s messenger, a certain Oscar Perez, was
unable to go to the Ombudsman.
Before going to the Ombudsman, Ursua talked to Perez. He revealed to him that he
feels uncomfortable asking for a copy of the complaint because he is the respondent in
the said case. Perez then told him than he can go there as “Oscar Perez” so that he
does not have to reveal his true identity.
At the Office of the Ombudsman, Ursua signed the logbook there as “Oscar Perez”.
When he was handed a copy of the complaint, he signed the receipt as “Oscar Perez”.
However, a staff of the Ombudsman was able to learn that he was in fact Cesario
Ursua. The staff then recommended that a criminal case be filed against Ursua.
Eventually, Ursua was sentenced to three years in prison for violating C.A. No. 142, as
amended, otherwise known as “An Act To Regulate The Use Of Aliases”.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cesario Ursua’s conviction is proper.
HELD: No. Ursua should be acquitted. The Supreme Court ruled that a strict application
of C.A. No. 142, as amended, in this case only leads to absurdity – something which
could not have been intended by the lawmakers.
Under C.A. No. 142, as amended, save for some instances, a person is not allowed to
use a name or an alias other than his registered name or that which he was baptized.
Under the law, what makes the use of alias illegal is the fact that it is being used
habitually and publicly in business transactions without prior authorization by competent
authority. In this case, Ursua merely used the name “Oscar Perez” once, it was not
used in a business transaction, the use of the name was with the consent of Oscar
Perez himself, and even if he used a different name, in this instance, he was not even
required to disclose his identity at the Office of the Ombudsman. When he was
requesting a copy of the complaint, he need not disclose his identity because the
complaint is a public record open to the public.
In short, the evils sought to be avoided by the C.A. No. 142 was not brought about when
Ursua used a name other than his name. A strict application of the law is not warranted.
When Ursua used the name of Oscar Perez, no fraud was committed; there was no
crime committed punishable under C.A. No. 142. The purpose of the law is to punish
evils defined therein so when no such evil was produced by Ursua’s act, said law need
not be applied.

PEOPLE vs. ESTRADA

G.R. No. 164368-69
April 2, 2009

FACTS:

An Information for plunder was filed with the Sandiganbayan against

respondent Estrada, among other accused. A separate Information
for illegal use of alias was likewise filed. The Amended Information reads:
“…to conceal the ill-gotten wealth he acquired during his tenure and his true
identity as the President, represents himself as JOSE VELARDE in several
transactions and use and employ the said alias Jose Velarde which is neither
his registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing documents
with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Joseph Estrada’s use of his alias Jose Velarde was not
public despite the presence of Messrs. Aprodicio Laquian and Fernando Chua
on 4 February 2000 (YES, not public)
2. Whether or not Joseph Estrada’s use of his alias Jose Velarde was
allowable under banking rules, despite the clear prohibition under
Commonwealth Act No. 142; (YES, allowable when the act was
committed)
3. Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in
limiting the coverage of the amended Information in Crim. Case No. 26565
to the use of the alias Jose Velarde by respondent Joseph Estrada on
February 4, 2000; (Not limitative [procedural question])
4. Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in
departing from its earlier final finding on the non-applicability of Ursua v.
Court of Appeals and forcing its application to the instant case. (NO)

HELD:

The petition has no merit.

The Law on Illegal Use of Alias and the Ursua Ruling

Ursua definition of an alias: a name or names used by a person or intended

to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions
in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the
first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. There
must be a sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name
(the alias) in addition to his real name, and there must be habituality. The
repeated use of an alias within a single day cannot be deemed habitual, as it
does not amount to a customary practice or use.

Following the doctrine of stare decisis, we are guided by the Ursua ruling
on how the crime punished under CA No. 142 may be committed.
The court found no merit in the argument that the Sandiganbayan erred
when it resurrected the application of Ursua, resulting in the reversal of its
earlier final ruling. First, the cited Sandiganbayan resolution is a mere
interlocutory order. Second, in the earlier motion to quash, the
Sandiganbayan solely looked at the allegations of the Information to
determine the sufficiency of these allegations and did not consider any
evidence aliened.

What is the coverage of the indictment? (Regarding the limitative

coverage)

The court found no merit on the argument of the People that the
Sandiganbayan abused its discretion in limiting the coverage of the amended
Information to Estrada's use of the alias Jose Velarde on February 4, 2000,
considering that there were other transactions covered by the phrase prior
to or subsequent thereto.
The date of the commission of the offense need not be precisely stated in
the complaint or information except when the precise date is a material
ingredient of the offense.

Under this analysis, the several transactions involving the signing of

documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities all had
their reference to February 4, 2000; they were all made on or about or prior
or subsequent to that date, thus plainly implying that all these transactions
took place only on February 4, 2000 or on another single date sometime
before or after February 4, 2000. To be sure, the Information could have
simply said on or about February 4, 2000 to capture all the alternative
approximate dates, so that the phrase sometime prior or subsequent thereto
would effectively be a surplusage that has no meaning separately from the
on or about already expressed. This consequent uselessness of the prior or
subsequent thereto phrase cannot be denied, but it is a direct and necessary
consequence of the use of the OR between the two phrases and the
THERETO that referred back to February 4, 2000 in the second phrase. Of
course, the reading would have been very different (and would have been
clearly in accord with the Peoples present interpretation) had the
Information simply used AND instead of OR to separate the phrases; the
intent to refer to various transactions occurring on various dates and
occasions all proximate to February 4, 2000 could not be
disputed. Unfortunately for the People, the imprecision in the use of
OR is the reality the case has to live with. To act contrary to this
reality would violate Estradas right to be informed of the nature and
cause of accusation against him; the multiple transactions on several
separate days that the People claims would result in surprise and denial of
an opportunity to prepare for Estrada, who has a right to rely on the single
day mentioned in the Information.

The issues of publicity, and the application of CA No. 142, R.A. No.
1405,
and R.A. No. 9160

The rule in the law of libel that mere communication to a third person is
publicity does not apply to violations of CA No. 142. The use of the alias, to
be considered public, must be made openly, or in an open manner or
place, or to cause it to become generally known, in other words, the
intent to publicly use the alias must be manifest.

The enactment of R.A. No. 9160 clearly manifests that prior to its
enactment, numbered accounts or anonymous accounts were permitted
banking transactions, whether they be allowed by law or by a mere banking
regulation. To be sure, an indictment against Estrada using this relatively
recent law cannot be maintained without violating the constitutional
prohibition on the enactment and use of ex post facto laws.

REVELINA LIMSON, PETITIONER, VS. EUGENIO JUAN GONZALEZ,

RESPONDENT.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:
Under review is the decision promulgated on July 31, 2003,[1] whereby the Court of
Appeals dismissed petitioner Revelina Limson's petition for certiorari assailing the
denial by the Secretary of Justice of her petition for review vis-à-vis the adverse
resolutions of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City (OCP) of her
charges for falsification and illegal use of aliases against respondent Eugenio Juan
Gonzalez.

Antecedents

The antecedents as found by the CA are as follows:

On or about December 1, 1997, Limson filed a criminal charge against Gonzalez for
falsification, before the Prosecutor's Office of Mandaluyong City.

The charge for [sic] falsification of [sic] Limson is based on Limson's assertion that in
the records of the Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC), a certain 'EUGENIO
GONZALEZ' is registered as an architect and that Gonzalez, who uses, among others,
the name 'EUGENIO JUAN GONZALEZ', and who pretends to be said architect.
Registered [sic] with the PRC, is an impostor and therefore, guilty [sic] of falsification x
x x."

Gonzalez filed his Counter-Affidavit, wherein he explained in detail that his full name is
EUGENIO (first given name) JUAN (second given name) GONZALEZ (father's family
name) y REGALADO (mother's family name). He alleges that in his youth, while he was
still in grade school and high school, he used the name EUGENIO GONZALEZ y
REGALADO and/or EUGENIO GONZALEZ and that thereafter, he transferred to the
University of Santo Tomas and therein took up architecture and that upon
commencement of his professional practice in 1943, he made use of his second name,
JUAN. Consequently, in his professional practice, he has identified himself as much as
possible as Arch. Eugenio Juan Gonzalez, because the surname GONZALEZ was and is
still, a very common surname throughout the Philippines and he wanted to distinguish
himself with his second given name, JUAN, after his first given name, EUGENIO.
Gonzalez supposed [sic] his allegations with various supporting documents x x x.
After receiving pertinent Affidavits and evidentiary documents from Limson and
Gonzalez, respectively, the Prosecutor dismissed the criminal charge against Gonzalez,
finding that indeed EUGENIO JUAN R. GONZALES [sic] is the architect registered in
the PRC. Said Resolution was issued on March 30, 1998 x x x.

Limson elevated the Resolution of the Prosecutor x x x to the Secretary of Justice. Before
the Secretary of Justice, she utilized the basic arguments she had raised before the
Prosecutor's Office, with slight variations, in assailing said adverse Resolution of the
Prosecutor.

After Opposition by Gonzalez, the Secretary of Justice dismissed the appeal of Limson.
The Secretary of Justice affirmed and even expanded the findings of the Prosecutor x x
x.

Not content with said Resolution of the Secretary of Justice, Limson filed a motion for
reconsideration therefrom; which, after Opposition by Gonzalez, was dismissed by the
Secretary of Justice, on September 15, 2000 x x x. Said dismissal was with finality.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, on or about September 25, 2000, Limson filed a new
letter complaint against Gonzalez, with the Secretary of Justice. She alleged the same
basic facts, evidence, and charges, as already resolved by the Prosecutor and affirmed
with finality, by the Secretary of Justice; but adding the accusation that because
Gonzalez used various combinations of his name, in different signature, on the [sic]
different occasions, Gonzalez had also violated Republic Act No. 6085 (the Anti-Alias
Law). Limson, in said letter complaint of September 25, 2000, suppressed from the
Secretary of Justice, the extant before-mentioned Resolutions, already decreed and
adverse to her.

The Secretary of Justice referred this letter complaint of Limson x x x to the Prosecutor's
Office of Mandaluyong City for investigation.

This new investigation was docketed as I.S. No. 01-44001-B and assigned to Honorable
Susante J. Tobias x x x.

After submission of Affidavits, Counter-Affidavits and other pertinent pleadings, and

evidences [sic], by the respective parties, before the Prosecutor, the Prosecutor rendered
a Resolution, dismissing the new complaint x x x which Resolution reads as follows:

'After a careful evaluation of the letter complaint of Revelina Limson dated September
25, 2000 addressed to the Secretary of Justice and endorsed to this Office x x x and the
evidence adduced by the contending parties, we find the issues raised in the aforesaid
letter to be a rehashed (sic) of a previous complaint filed by the same complainant which
has already been long resolved with finality by this Office and the Department of Justice
more particularly under I.S. No. 97-11929.

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the instant case be considered

closed and dismissed.'
Not content with said Resolution x x x, Limson filed a motion for reconsideration;
[sic]which was again opposed by Gonzalez and which was denied by the Prosecutor x x
x.

Not agreeable to said Resolution x x x, Limson filed a Petition for Review with the
Secretary of Justice x x x, to which x x x Gonzalez filed an Answer/Opposition x x x.

The Secretary of Justice denied said Petition for Review of Limson, on April 3, 2002 x x
x as follows:

'Section 12, in relation to Section 7, of Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000,
provides that the Secretary of Justice may, motu propio, dismiss outright the petition if
there is no showing of any reversible error in the assailed resolution or when issued [sic]
raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration. We carefully examined the
petition and its attachments and we found no such error committed by the prosecutor
that would justify the reversal of the assailed resolution which is in accord with the
evidence and law on the matter.

Moreover, there was no showing that a copy of the petition was furnished the
Prosecution Office concerned pursuant to Section 5 of said Department Circular.[2]
Although Limson sought the reconsideration of the adverse resolution of April 3, 2002,
the Secretary of Justice denied her motion for reconsideration on October 15, 2002.

Decision of the CA

Limson assailed on certiorari the adverse resolutions of the Secretary of Justice in the
CA, claiming that the Secretary of Justice had thereby committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for misappreciating her evidence
establishing her charges of falsification and violation of the Anti-Alias Law against
respondent.

On July 31, 2003, the CA promulgated its assailed decision dismissing the petition
for certiorari, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing discussions, the instant Petition is

perforce DENIED. Accordingly, the Resolutions subject of this petition
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.[3]
On January 30, 2004, the CA denied Limson's motion for reconsideration.

Issues

In her petition for review, Limson avers the following errors, namely:
 I

THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DO NOT

CONFORM TO THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD. MOREOVER, THERE WAS A
MISAPPRECIATION AND/OR MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS AND THE
HONORABLE COURT FAILED TO NOTICE CERTAIN RELEVANT POINTS WHICH IF
CONSIDERED WOULD JUSTIFY A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION

II

THE CONCLUSION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS A FINDING BASED ON

SPECULATION AND/OR SURMISE AND THE INFERENCES MADE WERE
MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN.[4]
Limson insists that the names "Eugenio Gonzalez" and "Eugenio Juan Gonzalez y
Regalado" did not refer to one and the same individual; and that respondent was not a
registered architect contrary to his claim. According to her, there were material
discrepancies between the graduation photograph of respondent taken in 1941 when he
earned his degree in Architecture from the University of Sto. Tomas, Manila,[5] and
another photograph of him taken for his driver's license in 1996,[6] arguing that the
person in the latter photograph was not the same individual depicted in the 1941
photograph. She submits documents showing that respondent used aliases from birth,
and passed himself off as such persons when in fact he was not. She prays that the
decision of the CA be set aside, and that the proper criminal cases for falsification of
public document and illegal use of alias be filed against respondent

In his comment,[7] respondent counters that the petition for review should be denied
due course for presenting only factual issues; that the factual findings of the OCP, the
Secretary of Justice, and the CA should remain undisturbed; that he did not commit any
falsification; that he did not use any aliases; that his use of conflicting names was the
product of erroneous entry, inadvertence, and innocent mistake on the part of other
people; that Limson was motivated by malice and ill will, and her charges were the
product of prevarication; and that he was a distinguished architect and a respected
member of the community and society.

Ruling of the Court

The appeal has no merit.

To start with, the petition for review of Limson projects issues of fact. It urges the Court
to undo the findings of fact of the OCP, the Secretary of Justice and the CA on the basis
of the documents submitted with her petition. But the Court is not a trier of facts, and
cannot analyze and weigh evidence. Indeed, Section 1 of Rule 45, Rules of
Court explicitly requires the petition for review on certiorari to raise only questions of
law, which must be distinctly set forth. Accordingly, the petition for review of Limson is
outrightly rejected for this reason.
Secondly, Limson appears to stress that the CA erred in concluding that the Secretary of
Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of the evidence
submitted to the OCP. She would now have us reverse the CA.

We cannot reverse the CA. We find that the conclusion of the CA about the Secretary of
Justice not committing grave abuse of discretion was fully warranted. Based on the
antecedents earlier rendered here, Limson did not persuasively demonstrate to the CA
how the Secretary of Justice had been gravely wrong in upholding the dismissal by the
OCP of her charges against respondent. In contrast, the assailed resolutions of the
Secretary of Justice were quite exhaustive in their exposition of the reasons for the
dismissal of the charges. And, even assuming that the Secretary of Justice thereby erred,
she should have shown to the CA that either arbitrariness or capriciousness or
whimsicality had tainted the error. Yet, she tendered no such showing. She should be
reminded, indeed, that grave abuse of discretion meant either that the judicial or quasi-
judicial power was exercised by the Secretary of Justice in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the Secretary of Justice
evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law, such as when the Secretary of Justice, while exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial powers, acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction.[8]

Thirdly, the discrepancy between photographs supposedly taken in 1941 and in 1996 of
respondent did not support Limson's allegation of grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the Secretary of Justice. It is really absurd to expect respondent, the individual
depicted on the photographs, to look the same after 55 long years.

And, fourthly, on the issue of the alleged use of illegal aliases, the Court observes that
respondent's aliases involved the names "Eugenio Gonzalez", "Eugenio Gonzales",
"Eugenio Juan Gonzalez", "Eugenio Juan Gonzalez y Regalado", "Eugenio C.R.
Gonzalez", "Eugenio J. Gonzalez", and per Limson "Eugenio Juan Robles Gonzalez." But
these names contained his true names, albeit at times joined with an erroneous middle
or second name, or a misspelled family name in one instance. The records disclose that
the erroneous middle or second names, or the misspelling of the family name resulted
from error or inadvertence left unchecked and unrectified over time. What is significant,
however, is that such names were not fictitious names within the purview of the Anti-
Alias Law; and that such names were not different from each other. Considering that he
was not also shown to have used the names for unscrupulous purposes, or to deceive or
confuse the public, the dismissal of the charge against him was justified in fact and in
law.

An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and
habitually, usually in business transactions, in addition to the real name by which he
was registered at birth or baptized the first time, or to the substitute name authorized by
a competent authority; a man's name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is
commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him, but sometimes
a man is known by several different names and these are known as aliases.[9] An alias is
thus a name that is different from the individual's true name, and does not refer to a
name that is not different from his true name.

In Ursua v. Court of Appeals,[10] the Court tendered an enlightening discourse on the

history and objective of our law on aliases that is worth including here, viz:

Time and again we have decreed that statutes are to be construed in the light of the
purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a
statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be
construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. The court may consider the
spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity,
contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.

For a clear understanding of the purpose of C.A. No. 142 as amended, which was
allegedly violated by petitioner, and the surrounding circumstances under which the law
was enacted, the pertinent provisions thereof, its amendments and related statutes are
herein cited. C.A. No.142, which was approved on 7 November 1936, and before its
amendment by R. A. No. 6085, is entitled An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases. It
provides as follows:

Section 1. Except as a pseudonym for literary purposes, no person shall use any name
different from the one with which he was christened or by which he has been known
since his childhood, or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a
competent court. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two
surnames.

Section 2. Any person desiring to use an alias or aliases shall apply for authority therefor
in proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of
name. Separate proceedings shall be had for each alias, and each new petition shall set
forth the original name and the alias or aliases for the use of which judicial authority has
been obtained, specifying the proceedings and the date on which such authority was
granted. Judicial authorities for the use of aliases shall be recorded in the proper civil
register x x x.
The above law was subsequently amended by R. A. No. 6085, approved on 4 August
1969. As amended, C.A. No. 142 now reads:

Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other
entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally
accepted practice, no person shall use any name different from the one with which he
was registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry or with which he was
baptized for the first time, or in case of an alien, with which he was registered in the
bureau of immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been
authorized by a competent court: Provided, That persons whose births have not been
registered in any local civil registry and who have not been baptized, have one year from
the approval of this act within which to register their names in the civil registry of their
residence. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames.
Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor in
proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name
and no person shall be allowed to secure such judicial authority for more than one alias.
The petition for an alias shall set forth the person's baptismal and family name and the
name recorded in the civil registry, if different, his immigrant's name, if an alien, and his
pseudonym, if he has such names other than his original or real name, specifying the
reason or reasons for the desired alias. The judicial authority for the use of alias, the
Christian name and the alien immigrant's name shall be recorded in the proper local
civil registry, and no person shall use any name or names other than his original or real
name unless the same is or are duly recorded in the proper local civil registry.
The objective and purpose of C. A. No. 142 have their origin and basis in Act No. 3883,
An Act to Regulate the Use in Business Transactions of Names other than True Names,
Prescribing the Duties of the Director of the Bureau of Commerce And Industry in its
Enforcement, Providing Penalties for Violations thereof, and for other purposes, which
was approved on 14 November 1931 and amended by Act No. 4147, approved on 28
November 1934. The pertinent provisions of Act No. 3883 as amended follow Section 1.
It shall be unlawful for any person to use or sign, on any written or printed receipt
including receipt for tax or business or any written or printed contract not verified by a
notary public or on any written or printed evidence of any agreement or business
transactions, any name used in connection with his business other than his true name,
or keep conspicuously exhibited in plain view in or at the place where his business is
conducted, if he is engaged in a business, any sign announcing a firm name or business
name or style without first registering such other name, or such firm name, or business
name or style in the Bureau of Commerce together with his true name and that of any
other person having a joint or common interest with him in such contract agreement,
business transaction, or business x x x.

For a bit of history, the enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended was made
primarily to curb the common practice among the Chinese of adopting
scores of different names and aliases which created tremendous confusion
in the field of trade. Such a practice almost bordered on the crime of
using fictitious names which for obvious reasons could not be successfully
maintained against the Chinese who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they
possessed a thousand and one names. CA. No. 142 thus penalized the act of
using an alias name, unless such alias was duly authorized by proper
judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil register.

In Yu Kheng Chiau v. Republic the Court had occasion to explain the meaning, concept
and ill effects of the use of an alias within the purview of C.A. No. 142 when we ruled

There can hardly be any doubt that petitioner's use of alias 'Kheng Chiau Young' in
addition to his real name 'Yu Cheng Chiau' would add to more confusion. That he is
known in his business, as manager of the Robert Reid, Inc., by the former name, is not
sufficient reason to allow him its use. After all, petitioner admitted that he is known to
his associates by both names. In fact, the Anselmo Trinidad, Inc., of which he is a
customer, knows him by his real name. Neither would the fact that he had encountered
certain difficulties in his transactions with government offices which required him to
explain why he bore two names, justify the grant of his petition, for petitioner could
easily avoid said difficulties by simply using and sticking only to his real name 'Yu Cheng
Chiau.'

The fact that petitioner intends to reside permanently in the Philippines, as shown by
his having filed a petition for naturalization in Branch V of the abovementioned court,
argues the more against the grant of his petition, because if naturalized as a Filipino
citizen, there would then be no necessity for his further using said alias, as it would be
contrary to the usual Filipino way and practice of using only one name in ordinary as
well as business transactions. And, as the lower court correctly observed, if he believes
(after he is naturalized) that it would be better for him to write his name following the
Occidental method, 'he can easily file a petition for change of name, so that in lieu of the
name 'Yu Kheng Chian,' he can, abandoning the same, ask for authority to adopt the
name 'Kheng Chiau Young.' (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review
on certiorari; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on July 31, 2003;
and ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

Atty. Susan M. Aquino vs. Hon. Ernesto D. Acosta

A.M. No. CTA-01-1. April 2, 2002

Facts: On November 21, 2000, she reported for work after her vacation in
the U.S., bringing gifts for the three judges of the CTA, including
respondent. In the afternoon of the same day, he entered her room and
greeted her by shaking her hand. Suddenly, he pulled her towards him and
kissed her on her cheek.

On December 28, 2000, while respondent was on official leave, he called

complainant by phone, saying he will get something in her office. Shortly
thereafter, he entered her room, shook her hand and greeted her, "Merry
Christmas." Thereupon, he embraced her and kissed her. She was able to
free herself by slightly pushing him away.

On the first working day in January, 2001, respondent phoned complainant,

asking if she could see him in his chambers in order to discuss some
matters. When complainant arrived there, respondent tried to kiss her but
she was able to evade his sexual attempt.

Weeks later, after the Senate approved the proposed bill expanding the
jurisdiction of the CTA, while complainant and her companions were
congratulating and kissing each other, respondent suddenly placed his arms
around her shoulders and kissed her.

In the morning of February 14, 2001, respondent called complainant,

requesting her to go to his office. She then asked Ruby Lanuza, a clerk in
the Records Section, to accompany her. Fortunately, when they reached his
chambers, respondent had left.

The last incident happened the next day. At around 8:30 a.m., respondent
called complainant and asked her to see him in his office to discuss the
Senate bill on the CTA. She again requested Ruby to accompany her. The
latter agreed but suggested that they should act as if they met by accident
in respondents office. Ruby then approached the secretarys table which was
separated from respondents office by a transparent glass. For her part,
complainant sat in front of respondent's table and asked him what he
wanted to know about the Senate bill. Respondent seemed to be at a loss for
words and kept glancing at Ruby who was searching for something at the
secretary's desk. Forthwith, respondent approached Ruby, asked her what
she was looking for and stepped out of the office. When he returned, Ruby
said she found what she was looking for and left. Respondent then
approached complainant saying, me gusto akong gawin sa iyo kahapon pa.
Thereupon, he tried to grab her. Complainant instinctively raised her hands
to protect herself but respondent held her arms tightly, pulled her towards
him and kissed her. She pushed him away, then slumped on a chair
trembling. Meantime, respondent sat on his chair and covered his face with
his hands. Thereafter, complainant left crying and locked herself inside a
comfort room. After that incident, respondent went to her office and tossed
a note stating, sorry, it wont happen again.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Acosta is guilty of sexually harassment.

Held: No, Judge Acosta is not guilty of sexual harassment. He is exonerated

of the charges against him and is advised to be more circumspect in his
deportment.

Rationale: “A mere casual buss on the cheek is not a sexual conduct or favor
and does not fall within the purview of sexual harassment under R.A. No.
7877. Section 3 (a) thereof provides, to wit:
'Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training - related Sexual Harassment Defined. -
Work, education or training-related sexual harassment is committed by an
employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher,
instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having
authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work or training
or education environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any
sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or
requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said Act.

a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is

committed when:

1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the

employment, re-employment or continued employment of said individual, or
in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions,
promotions or privileges; or the refusal to grant sexual favor results in
limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which in anyway would
discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect said employees;

2) The above acts would impair the employee's right or privileges under
existing labor laws; or

3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive

environment for the employee.'

"Clearly, under the foregoing provisions, the elements of sexual harassment

are as follows:

1) The employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer,

teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person has
authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another;

2) The authority, influence or moral ascendancy exists in a working

environment;

3) The employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer,

teacher, instructor, professor, coach, or any other person having authority,
influence or moral ascendancy makes a demand, request or requirement of a
sexual favor.”

Indeed, from the records on hand, there is no showing that respondent

judge demanded, requested or required any sexual favor from complainant
in exchange for favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotion or
privileges specified under Section 3 of R.A. 7877. Nor did he, by his
actuations, violate the Canons of Judicial Ethics or the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

DIGITEL TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILIPPINES, INC.,

VS

MARIQUIT SORIANO
492 SCRA 704 (2006)

Forced resignation must be sufficiently established by substantial, concrete and

credible evidence.

Mariquit Soriano (Soriano) was hired as Director of Marketing

by Digitel Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (Digitel). Soriano worked under Vice
President for Business Division Eric J. Severino (Severino) and Senior Executive Vice
President Johnson Robert L. Go (Go). Following a professional dispute against Severino
and Go, Soriano filed a resignation letter which was accepted by her superiors.

After her resignation, Soriano filed a suit for illegal termination alleging that she was
forced to resign due to professional and sexual harassment. She alleged that her
superiors are preventing her former colleagues in testifying to the sexual harassment.
She produced an affidavit by one of the persons involved with Digitel stating that the
employees of the company were being forced not to testify against Go and Severino. In
defense, Go and Severino provided witnesses that testified that the acts alleged by
Soriano din not happen.

The Labor Arbiter held that Mariquit voluntarily resigned, thus dismissing the
complaint. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter. The Court
of Appeals reversed the decision of NLRC. Hence,this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Soriano was forced to resign, due to professional and
sexual harassment, thus amounting to constructive dismissal.
HELD:
Soriano’s own allegation, although they are so detailed, appear incredible if not
downright puny. An analysis of her statements shows that her own conclusion that she
was being sexually and professionally harassed was on the basis of her own
suppositions, conjectures, and surmises.

She could not satisfactorily explain her allegation that she was consistently
professionally harassed by respondent Severino. The latter’s alleged words: “How come
you claim you know so much yet nothing ever gets done in your department?” do not
jurisprudentially constitute nor clearly establish “professional harassment.” Aside from
these words, the complainant could only venture to allege instances in general and
vague terms. As to the facts allegedly constituting “sexual harassment” advanced by Go
and Severino, after an objective analysis over their assertions as stated in their
respective counter-affidavits and further considering the other supporting documents
attached to the respondents’ pleadings, it is found that these far out weigh the Soriano’s
own evidence

A reading of the affidavit of the witness, who was never an employee nor present at the
party of Digitel, reveals, however, that she merely “concluded” that the employees
of Digitel were instructed or harassed not to testify in favor of Soriano when they failed
to meet one Matet Ruiz, a Digitel employee “who kept avoiding to meet with such
tendency to threaten resignation every time higher management would refuse
her demand to transfer subordinates who had administrative differences with her, we
therefore have no doubt that complainant voluntarily resigned when respondent
Severino refused to heed her demandthat Ms. Arnedo and Ms. Inductivo, her
subordinates, be transferred to other departments. We also have no doubt that such
resignation does not constitute constructive dismissal, much less an illegal one.

Domingo vs. Rayala (596 SCRA 90)

Domingo vs. Rayala
546 Scra 90

Facts:
Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Domingo), then Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC, filed
a Complaint for sexual harassment against Rayala, the chairman of NLRC.
She alleged that Rayala called her in his office and touched her shoulder, part of her
neck then tickled her ears. Rayala argued that his acts does not constitute sexual
harassment because for it to exist, there must be a demand, request or requirement
of sexual favor.

Issue:
Whether or not Rayala commit sexual harassment.

Rulings:
Yes.
The law penalizing sexual harassment in our jurisdiction is RA 7877. Section 3 thereof
defines work-related sexual harassment in this wise:
Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. – Work,
education or training-related sexual harassment is committed by an employer,
manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach,
trainor, or any other person who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy
over another in a work or training or education environment, demands, requests or
otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the
demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said Act.
(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed
when:
(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-
employment or continued employment of said individual, or in granting said individual
favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal
to grant the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the employee
which in a way would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect said employee;
. (2) The above acts would impair the employee’s rights or privileges under existing
labor laws; or
. (3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
environment for the employee.

even if we were to test Rayala’s acts strictly by the standards set in Section 3, RA
7877, he would still be administratively liable. It is true that this provision calls for a
“demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor.” But it is not necessary that the
demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a categorical oral
or written statement. It may be discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the
offender. Holding and squeezing Domingo’s shoulders, running his fingers across her
neck and tickling her ear, having inappropriate conversations with her, giving her
money allegedly for school expenses with a promise of future privileges, and making
statements with unmistakable sexual overtones – all these acts of Rayala resound with
deafening clarity the unspoken request for a sexual favor.

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

When the evidence fails to establish all the elements of the crime, the verdict must be
one of acquittal of the accused. This basic legal precept applies in this criminal litigation
for rape.

Factual Antecedents

Juan Richard Tionloc y Marquez (appellant) appeals the September 26, 2013
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 05452 which affirmed
with modification the February 15, 2012 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 37, in Criminal Case No. 08-264453. The RTC found appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed against "AAA"[3]under
paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The designation of the
crime in the Information against appellant is rape by sexual assault under paragraph 2,
Article 266-A of the RPC. However, the accusatory portion of the Information charges
appellant with rape through sexual intercourse under paragraph 1(b), Article 266-A, to
wit:

That on or about September 29, 2008 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring and confederating with one whose true name, real identity and
present whereabouts are still unknown and mutually helping each other, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd design and by means of force and
intimidation, commit sexual abuse upon the person of "AAA" by then and there making
her drink liquor which made her dizzy and drunk, depriving her of reason or otherwise
unconsciousness, bringing her to a room and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of
her, against her will.

Contrary to law.[4]
When arraigned, appellant pleaded "not guilty." Elvis James Meneses (Meneses) was
involved in the commission of the crime but could not be prosecuted due to his
minority. He was only 14 years old at the time of the incident.

Version of the Prosecution

"AAA" testified that at around 9:30 p.m. of September 29, 2008, she was having a
drinking session with appellant and Meneses in the house of appellant. After some time,
she felt dizzy so she took a nap. At around 11:00 p.m., she was roused from her sleep by
Meneses who was mounting her and inserting his penis into her vagina. She felt pain but
could only cry in silence for fear that the knife which they used to cut hotdog and now
lying on top of a table nearby would be used to kill her if she resisted. Meneses left after
raping her. While still feeling dizzy, afraid and shivering, appellant approached her and
asked if he could also have sex with her. When she did not reply appellant mounted and
raped her. Appellant stopped only when she tried to reposition her body. "AAA" then left
appellant's house and immediately returned to the house she shared with her live-in
partner.

The following day, "AAA" reported the incident to the police. She also underwent a
medical examination and the results revealed two lacerations in her hymen.

Version of the Defense

Appellant denied raping "AAA." He claimed that on that fateful night, he was having a
drinking session with his cousin, Gerry Tionloc. After a while, Meneses and "AAA"
arrived and joined in their drinking session. Meneses and "AAA" then went inside his
bedroom and continued drinking while he went out of the house to buy food. When he
returned and entered his bedroom, he saw Meneses and "AAA" having sex. They asked
him to leave, so he went to the kitchen. Meneses then came out of the bedroom followed
by "AAA" who was holding a bottle of "rugby," which she brought home with her.
Appellant contended that nothing more happened that night. Meneses corroborated his
version of the incident.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its Decision[5] dated February 15,2012, the RTC clarified that appellant is charged
with rape through sexual intercourse under paragraph 1, Article 266-A of the RPC based
on the allegations in the Information and not with rape by sexual assault under
paragraph 2 of the same provision of law, as the designation in the Information
suggests. The RTC stressed that this is consistent with the legal precept that it is the
allegations or recital in the Information that determine the nature of the crime
committed. Thus, the RTC ruled that appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
rape through sexual intercourse against "AAA." It held that the prosecution successfully
established the crime through the testimony of "AAA," which was credible, natural,
convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Juan Richard Tionloc y Marquez GUlLTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape punishable under paragraph 1 of Article
266-A of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to pay the private complainant Php50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and Php50,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.[6]
Appellant appealed the RTC's Decision arguing that discrepancies in the sworn
statement of "AAA" and her testimony diminished her credibility. Appellant contended
that "AAA" alleged in her sworn statement that: (1) appellant held her hands while
Meneses was on top of her; and (2) she slept after Meneses raped her and awakened
only when he was on top of her. However, "AAA" did not mention these allegations
during her direct examination. Appellant maintained that "AAA" failed to refute his
assertions that her aunt and uncle fabricated the charges against him for having
previous affairs with two of her cousin.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision[7] dated September 26, 2013, the CA ruled that discrepancies between the
affidavit and testimony of "AAA" did not impair her credibility since the former is
taken ex parte and is often incomplete or inaccurate for lack or absence of searching
inquiries by the investigating officer. The inconsistencies even preclude the possibility
that the testimony given was rehearsed. Moreover, the CA held that a rape victim like
"AAA" is not expected to make an errorless recollection of the incident, so humiliating
and painful that she might even try to obliterate it from her memory. The CA gave scant
consideration to the appellant's claim of ill motive of the aunt and uncle of"AAA," as well
as his denial of raping her which cannot overcome her positive, candid and categorical
testimony that he was the rapist. The CA therefore affirmed the Decision of the RTC
with modification that interest at the rate of 6% per annum is imposed on all damages
awarded from the date of finality of the CA's Decision until fully paid. The dispositive
portion of the CA's Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated 15

February 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region. Manila,
Branch 37, in Crim. Case No. 08-264453 finding accused-appellant Juan Richard
Tionloc y Marquez guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape under
paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay Php50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and another Php50,000.00 as moral damages in favor of private complainant
AAA is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that interest at the rate of 6% per annum is
imposed on all damages awarded from the date of finality of this judgment until fully
paid.

SO ORDERED.[8]
Still insisting on his innocence, appellant comes to this Court through this appeal.

Assignment of Error

Appellant adopts the same assignment of error he raised before the CA, viz.:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT

GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.[9]
Appellant asserts that he should be acquitted of rape since the prosecution was not able
to establish the required quantum of evidence in order to overcome the presumption of
innocence.

Our Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

The Facts Recited In The Information Determine the Crime Charged.

It is apparent that there is a discrepancy in the designation of the crime in the

Information (rape by sexual assault under paragraph 2 of Article 266-A of the RPC) and
the recital in the Information (rape through sexual intercourse under paragraph 1 of the
same provision of law). However, this discrepancy does not violate appellant's right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. As ruled correctly by
the RTC, the allegations in the Information charged appellant with rape through sexual
intercourse under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the RPC and said allegations or recital
in the Information determine the nature of the crime committed. "[T]he character of the
crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the Information nor from the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, but by the recital of
the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information."[10]
The Use Of Force, Threat or Intimidation Causes Fear on the Part of the Rape Victim.

Be that as it may, the prosecution had to overcome the presumption of innocence of

appellant by presenting evidence that would establish the elements of rape by sexual
intercourse under paragraph 1, Article 266-A of the RPC, to wit: (1) the offender is a
man; (2) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; (3) such act was accomplished
by using force, threat or intimidation. "In rape cases alleged to have been committed by
force, threat or intimidation, it is imperative for the prosecution to establish that the
element of voluntariness on the part of the victim be absolutely lacking. The prosecution
must prove that force or intimidation was actually employed by accused upon his victim
to achieve his end. Failure to do so is fatal to its cause."[11]

Force, as an element of rape, must be sufficient to consummate the purposes which the
accused had in mind. On the other hand, intimidation must produce fear that if the
victim does not yield to the bestial demands of the accused, something would happen to
her at that moment or even thereafter as when she is threatened with death if she
reports the incident.[12] "Intimidation includes the moral kind as the fear caused by
threatening the girl with a knife or pistol."[13]

It this case, the prosecution established that appellant was an 18-year old man who had
sexual intercourse with "AAA," a woman who was 24 years old during the incident.
However, there was no evidence to prove that appellant used force, threat or
intimidation during his sexual congress with "AAA." She testified that appellant and
Meneses are her good friends. Thus, she frequented the house of appellant. At around
7:00p.m. of September 29, 2008, she again went to the house of appellant and chatted
with him and Meneses while drinking liquor. From that time up to about 11 p.m. when
she took a nap, there is no showing that appellant or Meneses forced, threatened or
intimidated her.

As to how appellant and Meneses had sexual intercourse with her, "AAA" merely
testified as follows:

Q - Madam Witness, you said that it was Elvis James who raped you first.
And then after he left this Juan Richard Tionloc [accused] approached you and
asked if you can do it?
A - Yes, Ma'am; he asked me but I did not answer because I was still shivering.
Q - And then what else happened after that?
A - That is it; he was the one who did it.[14]
No allegation whatsoever was made by "AAA" that Meneses or appellant employed
force, threat or intimidation against her. No claim was ever made that appellant
physically overpowered, or used or threatened to use a weapon against, or uttered
threatening words to "AAA." While "AAA" feared for her life since a knife lying on the
table nearby could be utilized to kill her if she resisted, her fear was a mere product of
her own imagination. There was no evidence that the knife was placed nearby precisely
to threaten or intimidate her. We cannot even ascertain whether said knife can be used
as a weapon or an effective tool to intimidate a person because it was neither presented
nor described in court. These findings are clear from the following testimony of "AAA:"

While Elvis James was inserting his penis to [sic] your vagina, what are [sic] you
Q-
doing?
A - I was crying, Ma'am.
Q - You did not shout for help?
A - I did not because I was afraid, Ma'am.
Q - Why were you afraid, madam witness?
Because there was a knife inside the room which we used in cutting the hotdog and
A - then [I] did not shout anymore because I was afraid that they might stab me,
Ma'am.[15]
Even assuming in the nil possibility that Meneses was able to force or instill fear in
"AAA's" mind, it should be noted that he was already gone when appellant asked "AAA"
for a sexual favor. In other words, the source of the feigned force, threat or intimidation
was no longer present when appellant casually asked his friend, "AAA," if she "can do it"
one more time. "AAA" did not respond either in the affirmative or in the negative.

Resistance Should be Made Before the Rape is Consummated.

Later on, appellant went on top of "AAA" without saying anything or uttering
threatening words. For her part, "AAA" neither intimated any form of resistance nor
expressed any word of rejection to appellant's advances. It was only when she felt
something painful minutes during their sexual intercourse that "AAA" tried to
move. Thus:

During the intercourse that was about few minutes and when I felt the pain that was
A-
the time when I tried to move.
Q - When you tried to move, what else happened?
A - When I tried to move he released himself.
Q - And then what happened?
A - He went out of the room.[16]
Three things are thus clear from the testimony of "AAA:" first, appellant never employed
the slightest force, threat or intimidation against her; second, "AAA" never gave the
slightest hint of rejection when appellant asked her to have sex with him; and, third,
appellant did not act with force since he readily desisted when "AAA" felt the slightest
pain and tried to move during their sexual congress.

"AAA" could have resisted right from the start. But she did not, and chose not to
utter a word or make any sign of rejection of appellant's sexual advances. It was only in
the middle of their sexual congress when "AAA" tried to move which can hardly be
considered as an unequivocal manifestation of her refusal or rejection of appellant's
sexual advances.

In People v. Amogis,[17] this Court held that resistance must be manifested and
tenacious. A mere attempt to resist is not the resistance required and expected of a
woman defending her virtue, honor and chastity. And granting that it was sufficient,
"AAA" should have done it earlier or the moment appellant's evil design became
manifest. In other words, it would be unfair to convict a man of rape committed against
a woman who, after giving him the impression thru her unexplainable silence of
her tacit consent and allowing him to have sexual contact with her, changed her mind in
the middle and charged him with rape.

The Age Gap Between the Victim and Appellant Negates Force, Threat or Intimidation.

"AAA's" state of"shivering" could not have been produced by force, threat or
intimidation. She insinuates that she fell into that condition after Meneses had sexual
intercourse with her. However, their age gap negates force, threat or intimidation; he
was only 14 while "AAA" was already 24, not to mention that they were friends. In
addition, per "AAA's" own declaration, Meneses and appellant did not also utter
threatening words or perform any act of intimidation against her.

Drunkeness Should Have Deprived the Victim of Her Will Power to Give her Consent.

The fact that "AAA" was tipsy or drunk at that time cannot be held against the appellant.
There is authority to the effect that "where consent is induced by the administration of
drugs or liquor, which incites her passion but does not deprive her of her will power, the
accused is not guilty of rape."[18]

Here, and as narrated by "AAA" on the witness stand, appellant and Meneses were her
friends. Thus, as usual, she voluntarily went with them to the house of appellant and
chatted with them while drinking liquor for about four hours. And while "AAA" got dizzy
and was "shivering," the prosecution failed to show that she was completely deprived of
her will power.

"AAA's" degree of dizziness or "shivering" was not that grave as she portrays it to be.
"AAA" is used to consuming liquor.[19] And if it is true that the gravity of her "shivering"
at that time rendered her immobile such that she could not move her head to signal her
rejection of appellant's indecent proposal or to whisper to him her refusal, then she
would have been likewise unable to stand up and walk home immediately after the
alleged rape.

It has been ruled repeatedly that in criminal litigation, the evidence of the prosecution
must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the
defense. The burden of proof rests on the State. Thus, the failure of the prosecution to
discharge its burden of evidence in this case entitles appellant to an acquittal.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The September 26, 2013 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.R.-H.C. No. 05452 affirming with modification the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 37, in Criminal Case No. 08-
264453 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Juan Richard Tionloc y
Marquez is ACQUITTED due to insufficiency of evidence. His
immediate RELEASE from detention is hereby ORDERED, unless he is being held for
another lawful cause. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City for immediate implementation, who is then
directed to report to this Court the action he has taken within five days from receipt
hereof.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JOSEPH ORILLA, appellant.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before this Court for automatic review is the Decision [1] dated 7 May 2001 of the
Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Branch 54, Alaminos City, Province of
Pangasinan. Remilyn Orilla, the 15-year old sister of appellant Joseph Orilla (appellant),
accused appellant of raping her twice. The criminal cases were docketed as Criminal
Cases Nos. 3219-A and 3220-A. The trial court found appellant guilty of only one crime
of qualified rape and imposed on him the death penalty in Criminal Case No. 3219-A.
Instead of dismissing the second case, Criminal Case No. 3220-A, the trial court
considered it as a qualifying circumstance for the purpose of imposing the death penalty
in Criminal Case No. 3219-A.

The Charge

The Amended Informations for Criminal Case Nos. 3219-A and 3220-A are
identical. The allegations read:

That on or about the dawn of September 12, 1996 at Brgy. Masidem, municipality of Bani,
province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-accused, by means of force or intimidation, armed with a knife, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with REMILYN R.
ORILLA, younger sister of accused against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.[2]

Arraignment and Plea

On 3 January 1997, appellant assisted by his counsel de officio, pleaded not guilty
to the two charges.[3]

The Trial
 Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented three witnesses: (1) Remilyn, the complainant and sister
of the appellant, (2) SPO1 Clarence de Vera, a member of the Philippine National
Police of Bani, Pangasinan, who entered in the police blotter the complaint of Remilyn,
and (3) Dr. Lynette Valencerina-Caburnay (Dr. Valencerina-Caburnay), a resident
physician of the Western Pangasinan District Hospital, who conducted the medico-legal
examination of Remilyn.
The prosecutions version of the rapes as summarized by the Solicitor General is as
follows:

On September 12, 1996, around 3:00 oclock in the morning, fifteen-year old Remilyn Orilla was
sound asleep inside one of the rooms of their house located at Masidem, Bani, Pangasinan when
she was suddenly awakened by a heavy weight pressing on her body and found appellant Joseph
Orilla on top of her. (p. 18, TSN, April 15, 1997)

Remilyn Orilla noticed that she was naked from waist down (pp. 17-18, ibid). Appellant
continuously pinned down Remilyn Orillas body with his own. She struggled to free herself from
appellant but her efforts proved futile. (p. 7, TSN, April 15, 1997)

Appellant held both hands of Remilyn Orilla with one hand holding a knife with his other hand.
He then forced Remilyn Orillas legs apart and inserted his penis into her vagina. Remilyn Orilla
felt pain. She also felt some warm matter enter her vagina (p. 8, ibid.). Appellant remained on
top of Remilyn Orilla and, after a few minutes, she again felt the same substance enter her vagina
(ibid.). With a knife pointed at her, Remilyn Orilla was powerless. Appellant warned her not to
make a noise. Frightened, Remilyn Orilla just kept silent. (pp. 8-9, 18-19, ibid.)

Around 9:00 oclock in the morning of that same day, Remilyn Orilla reported to her sister,
Evelyn Catabay, what appellant did to her. Immediately, they went to the Municipal Hall of Bani
to report the incident. Unfortunately, the investigator assigned that day was absent. (p. 22, ibid.)

On September 19, 1996, around 2:30 in the afternoon, Remilyn Orilla arrived at the Bani Police
Station, Bani, Pangasinan and executed her sworn statement relative to the incident in question.
She recounted the incident to SPO1 Clarence P. de Vera who entered the same in the Police
Blotter (p. 2, TSN, June 11, 1997).

Later, or around 3:30 in the afternoon, Remilyn Orilla and her sister went to the Western
Pangasinan District Hospital in Alaminos, Pangasinan. Remilyn Orilla was examined by Dr.
Lynette D. Valencerina whose findings are contained in the Medico-Legal Certificate dated
September 20, 1996 (Exhibit A) which she issued:

MENSTRUAL HISTORY: Menarche at age 13 years old, occurring monthly, of 3-7 days
duration, consuming around 2 napkins per day not accompanied by hypoglycemia.

LMP August 9-14, 1996

PMP July 12-16, 1996

INTERNAL EXAMINATION: With old hymenal laceration at 3, 6 and 9 oclock position

vaginal introitous admits 2 fingers with ease, Cervix close, uterus small;

(-) adnexeal mass/tenderness

(+) whitish vaginal discharge

Pregnancy Test negative

Negative for the presence of spermatozoa

(p. 8, Record)

Accordingly, appellant was arrested. However, he escaped while detained at the provincial jail.
After a month of hiding, appellant was re-arrested. (pp. 12-13, TSN, September 28, 1999).

On the other hand, Remilyn Orilla is now under the care of the Department of Social Welfare
and Development. (p. 12, TSN, April 15, 1997).[4]

Version of the Defense

The defense presented three witnesses: (1) appellant, (2) Crispin Orilla (Crispin),
brother of appellant and Remilyn, and (3) Beverly Cabuburac (Beverly), sister of
appellant and Remilyn.
Appellant and Remilyn are siblings. Remilyn is the youngest in a brood of nine. The
parents of appellant and Remilyn are already dead. Remilyn was then staying in a
house commonly owned by the siblings in Barangay Masidem, Bani, Pangasinan.
Adjacent to Remilyns house is the house of appellant where he and his own family
lived.
Appellant claimed that from 2 August 1996 to 14 September 1996, he was in Sitio
Olo, Barangay Masidem, Bani, Pangasinan rushing the work on the dikes of a fishpond.
He was not able to go home to his house in Barangay Masidem on 12 September 1996,
the date the crimes charged allegedly occurred.
Appellants house in Barangay Masidem is five to six meters away from the house of
Remilyn. However, the place where appellant was staying in Sitio Olo is two kilometers
away from Barangay Masidem. One can negotiate the distance between Sitio Olo and
Barangay Masidem by walking. However, one must cross a river before reaching
Barangay Masidem. A motorboat service is available to cross the river and the ride can
last for an hour. Crossing the river on foot will take about three hours.
Appellant worked in the fishpond of Lindel Onofre who is married to another sister of
appellant. At the time appellant was working in the fishpond, his companion was his
brother, Reneboy Orilla (Reneboy). The persons left in appellants house while he was in
Sitio Olo were his wife, five children and his wifes grandmother. When appellant left
Barangay Masidem on 2 August 1996 for Sitio Olo, the persons who were with Remilyn
in her house were Crispin, Beverly and her three children.
Appellant described Remilyn as matampuhin or emotional. Remilyn was always
frowning and sometimes she would be happy. When Remilyn would get irritable she
would just leave the house for weeks without telling appellant or their other siblings
where she was going. Appellant claimed that he had a good relationship with Remilyn
although he would sometimes scold her because she would leave the house without
permission. Appellant does not know why Remilyn accused him of rape. Appellant
assumed that it was because he often scolded Remilyn.
Crispin testified that on 11 September 1996, he and his sister Beverly and her
husband slept in the living room of their house while Remilyn slept in the small room
with Beverlys daughter. The next day, 12 September 1996, Crispin woke up around
5:00 a.m. and noticed that Remilyn was still asleep. During that time, his brother Joseph
was working in Barangay Ulo, Bani, Pangasinan.
Beverly testified that on 11 September 1996, she was in Masidem with her children
and her siblings, Crispin, Reneboy, and Remilyn. At 6:00 a.m. of the next day, she,
together with her husband and children, left for Manila. She denied having any
knowledge that her brother Joseph raped their sister Remilyn.

The Trial Courts Judgment

The trial court ruled that Remilyn positively identified appellant as the one who
raped her. True, no electric light or kerosene lamp lit the room where the rape took
place. However, since it was already 3:00 a.m., a ray of light from the eastern horizon
enabled Remilyn to recognize appellant. When appellant threatened and ordered
Remilyn not to shout, or else he would kill her, Remilyn was able to recognize
appellants voice. The trial court concluded that even if appellant attacked Remilyn
during the darkest portion of the night,[5] appellants voice alone could have made it
known to Remilyn that her attacker was appellant, her own brother.
The trial court rejected appellants defense of alibi. One can negotiate the distance
between Sitio Olo and Barangay Masidem by riding passenger jeepneys and tricycles
and by riding a motorboat to cross the river. Appellant failed to demonstrate that it was
physically impossible for him to have access to the place where the crime happened.
The trial court gave credence to Remilyns testimony because her testimony was
very natural and convincing.[6] In contrast, the testimony of the defense witnesses failed
to convince the trial court. Defense witness Crispins demeanor in court prompted the
trial court to remark that he appeared crafty, cunning, unfair and unreliable.[7] Beverlys
testimony failed to support appellants alibi because she testified that she left Barangay
Masidem on 12 September 1996 and she learned of the rape only on her return
sometime in January of 1997.
The trial court held that the presence of old lacerations at 3, 6 and 9 oclock vaginal
positions indicates that Remilyn had previous sexual experience contrary to Remilyns
claim that the rape was her first sexual experience. The trial court nonetheless ruled
that a woman who is unchaste or impure could still be raped.
Thus, the trial court held appellant guilty of qualified rape in Criminal Case No.
3219-A. The trial court ruled that since Remilyn was only 15 years old at the time
appellant raped her, the death penalty must be imposed on appellant, the victims
brother. Appellant committed only one count of rape because while appellant ejaculated
twice in Remilyns vagina, the first and second ejaculations occurred during one single
body connection.[8] The trial court considered Criminal Case No. 3220-A involving the
second count of rape as a qualifying circumstance for the purpose of imposing the
death penalty in Criminal Case No. 3219-A.
The judgment of the trial court reads:

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered, finding

the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE in Criminal Case No.
3219-A and considering that the offended party is under 18 years of age, and the offender is the
brother of the victim (relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree) the accused is
therefore sentenced to suffer the SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH by lethal injection but in
the event that upon automatic review by the Honorable Supreme Court, that the penalty of Death
is not imposed but that of Reclusion Perpetua, this Honorable Court recommends that accused
should not be granted pardon within the period of thirty (30) years and that he is further
condemned to pay in favor of the offended party in the sum of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P100,000.00) as civil indemnity.

That Criminal Case No. 3220-A is considered merely as a qualifying circumstance in the
imposition of the death penalty, as the Court submits the view that there is only one crime of
rape committed although there were two ejaculations done on the person of the offended party.

The Provincial Warden of the Province of Pangasinan at Lingayen is ordered to commit the
living body of the accused to the National Penitentiary at Muntinlupa City within a period of
three (3) days from receipt of this Decision considering that in the past the accused have (sic)
tendency to escape his Jailer.

IT IS SO ORDERED.[9]

The Issues

Appellant submits for our review the following assignment of errors:

I

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE
CRIME CHARGED DESPITE COMPLAINANTS DUBIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF
APPELLANT AS THE PERPETRATOR OF THE ALLEGED RAPE.
 II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING APPELLANTS DEFENSE

OF ALIBI DESPITE COMPLAINANTS DOUBTFUL IDENTIFICATION OF APPELLANT
AS THE AUTHOR OF THE CRIME CHARGED.

III

ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT APPELLANT IS GUILTY, THE TRIAL COURT

GRAVELY ERRED IN CONSIDERING CRIMINAL CASE NO. 3220-A AS A QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE IN THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY AGAINST THE
APPELLANT IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 3219-A, SINCE THE CONSIDERATION OF SUCH
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE IS WITHOUT ANY LEGAL BASIS.

IV

ASSUMING ARGUENDO, THAT APPELLANT IS GUILTY, THE TRIAL COURT

GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING ON HIM THE DEATH PENALTY, DESPITE THE FACT
THAT THE INFROMATION NEVER ALLEGED THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
COMPLAINANTS AGE, AND THE EXACT DEGREE OF CONSANGUINITY ANENT THE
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF RELATIONSHIP.[10]

The Courts Ruling

Appellant is guilty of rape as charged in Criminal Case No. 3219-A but the proper
penalty is reclusion perpetua, not death. Since appellant committed only one count of
rape, Criminal Case No. 3220-A must be dismissed.
Appellant insists that it was impossible for Remilyn to have identified the person
who raped her because the room where the crime took place was pitch black, as it had
no window and no source of light. Appellant asks the Court to take judicial notice of the
fact that on 12 September 1996, a Thursday, the approximate time of sunrise in the
Philippines was at 5:45 a.m., or a good two hours and forty-five minutes from 3:00 a.m.
Appellant argues that if the rape took place at 3:00 a.m., then there could have been no
early morning sunlight to aid Remilyn in identifying appellant.
We are not persuaded. Crispin, the brother of Remilyn and appellant and a witness
for the defense, testified that the wall of the house where the rape happened was made
of buri[11] and the flooring of the house was made of splitted (sic) bamboo. [12] Buri is a
leaf that is dried and woven together to form panels used as walls in the construction of
houses. A panel of buri is not compact as it has small holes in it allowing light to filter
through the woven material. The slats on the floor and the elevation of the floor from the
ground by two feet[13] also make it possible for light to pass through the floor.
While the approximate time of sunrise in the Philippines on 12 September 1996 was
at 5:45 a.m. and not at 3:00 a.m., what is controlling is Remilyns declaration that the
horizon coming from the east enabled her to identify appellant. Remilyn categorically
declared that there was a little light, sir, that is why I recognized him. [14] Remilyns
declaration that there was a little light is consistent with her statement that the room was
not fully illuminated but the amount of light that sneaked through her room was sufficient
to enable her to recognize her own brother.
The time mentioned by Remilyn, that is 3:00 a.m., is at most an estimate. We must
bear in mind that appellant roused Remilyn from sleep when he forced himself on her.
Remilyn could not have known the exact time as appellants act abruptly and rudely
awakened her. Remilyns estimate of the time while not precise tends to strengthen the
impression that her testimony is unrehearsed. Moreover, no one expects rape victims to
remember with precision every detail of the crime. A mis-estimation of time is too
immaterial to discredit the testimony of a witness especially where time is not an
essential element or has no substantial bearing on the fact of the commission of the
offense.[15] What is decisive in a rape charge is the complainants positive identification
of the accused as the malefactor.[16]
Appellant insists that the trial court erred in declaring that Remilyn identified him
through his voice. Appellant maintains that Remilyn was not able to identify him at all.
Appellants contention is without basis. Remilyns testimony is as follows:
Q: And during the time that the accused was on top of you, what did you do, if
any?
A: I cannot move and fight because he threatened me not to shout, sir.
Q: And what was the word of the accused when he threatened you?
A: He told me not to shout and move and according to him he will kill me, sir.
PROS. RABINA:
Q: And because of those threatened words of the accused you mean to inform
the Honorable Court that you did not shout for help?
A: No, sir, because I was afraid.[17]
Based on the foregoing testimony, there was nothing to prevent the trial court from
properly concluding that Remilyn identified appellant through voice recognition. A
persons voice is an acceptable means of identification where there is proof that the
witness and the accused knew each other personally and closely for a number of
years.[18] Appellant is no stranger to Remilyn for she had known him with much
familiarity. Appellant is Remilyns own brother. Thus, when appellant threatened Remilyn
not to shout and move, or else he would kill her, the trial court logically inferred that
Remilyn recognized appellant through his voice.
We have thoroughly examined the transcript of the testimonies of the witnesses and
we agree with the trial courts assessment of the credibility of the witnesses. The trial
court was meticulous in judging the witnesses credibility. The trial court even took note
of the witnesses demeanor in court. Unless appellant can show that the trial court
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight or
substance that would otherwise affect the result of the case, the Court will not disturb
the trial courts findings on appeal.[19] None of the grounds to overturn the trial courts
ruling on the witnesses credibility is present in this case.
Remilyns narration of how appellant ravished her meets the test of credibility. When
a woman says that the accused raped her, in effect, she says all that is necessary to
show that the accused raped her, and if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the
court may convict the accused on that basis.[20]
Remilyn had no reason to fabricate the serious charges against her own brother
whose life could hang in the balance in case he is found guilty of qualified rape. With the
filing of the criminal cases, Remilyn had to face the ire of her other siblings, two of
whom have even testified against her. Remilyn is now under the custody of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development in Lingayen, Pangasinan. An
incestuous sexual assault is a psycho-social deviance that inflicts a stigma, not only on
the victim but also on their whole family.[21] Even in ordinary rape cases, the sole
testimony of a credible victim may seal the fate of the rapist.[22]
Appellant failed to establish convincingly his alibi. The distance between Sitio Olo,
where appellant claimed he was, and Barangay Masidem, where the rape happened, is
only two kilometers. Appellant himself admitted that public vehicles were available to
transport passengers from Sitio Olo to Barangay Masidem, including a motorboat that
could ferry the passengers to Barrio Masidem in just about an hour. It was not physically
impossible for appellant to have gone to Barangay Masidem on the day he committed
the rape. None of his witnesses could even corroborate his alibi.
Appellants alibi and denial cannot prevail over Remilyns positive and categorical
testimony. Alibi is an inherently weak defense and courts must receive it with caution
because one can easily fabricate an alibi.[23] For alibi to prosper, it is not enough that the
accused show he was at some other place at the time of the commission of the
crime.[24] The accused must prove by clear and convincing evidence that it was
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission.[25] Appellant failed to do this. Moreover, appellants escape from detention
does not help his cause since escape is evidence of guilt.[26]
We must correct the trial courts opinion that prior to the rape, Remilyn already had
past sexual experience because her hymen had healed lacerations. The trial court
reached this conclusion despite Remilyns assertion that she had no sexual experience
at all before the rape and despite the absence of such a finding by Dr. Valencerina-
Caburnay, the medico- legal who examined Remilyn.
Dr. Valencerina-Caburnay conducted Remilyns physical examination on 19
September 1996 or seven days after the rape. Dr. Valencerina-Caburnay was not
certain what exactly caused the healed lacerations. Dr. Valencerina-Caburnay testified
that an object, probably a penis, could have caused the lacerations, or even a fall could
have caused them.[27] Dr.Valencerina-Caburnay did not attribute the healed lacerations
to a sexual experience prior to the rape.
The presence of old lacerations per se does not imply that the lacerations were the
result of previous sexual experience and not by the rape.[28] Thus, the trial court had no
basis in ruling that Remilyn was no longer a virgin when appellant raped her. The trial
court must be careful not to cast aspersions on the reputation of a woman, especially so
when she is still a minor.
The absence of fresh lacerations in Remilyns hymen does not prove that appellant
did not rape her. A freshly broken hymen is not an essential element of rape and healed
lacerations do not negate rape.[29] In addition, a medical examination and a medical
certificate are merely corroborative and are not indispensable to the prosecution of a
rape case.[30] The credible disclosure of a minor that the accused raped her is the most
important proof of the sexual abuse.[31]
The gravamen of the crime of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman against her
[32]
will. Remilyns straightforward narration on how appellant forcibly ravished her proves
beyond reasonable doubt that appellant is guilty of the crime of rape as charged in
Criminal Case No. 3219-A. However, appellant committed only one count of rape.
Remilyns own account of the rape proves this, thus:
Q: And after accused pointed you (sic) knife, can you tell the Court what else
did he do after that?
A: He had sexual intercourse with me to (sic) times at the same time, sir.
COURT:
Q: Two times at the same time?
WITNESS
A: Yes, sir.
PROS. RABINA:
Q: And when he had sexual intercourse with you for two times as you said on
that same day, what was your feeling when he inserted his penis into your
vagina?
A: It is painful, sir, and I felt some warm matter to my vagina.
Q: And can you tell the Honorable Court how long was the accused stayed (sic)
on top of you before he ejaculated into your vagina?
A: About thirty (30) minutes, sir.
xxx
Q: Now, you said that the accused was on top of you for at least a period of
thirty minutes, do you mean to inform the Honorable Court that the two
sexual intercourse that he allegedly committed on your person, he stayed
on top of you for a period of thirty minutes, is that what you mean?
Q: And for the first time that he ejaculated a warm substance inside your
vagina, did accused get out on top of you?
A: No, sir.
COURT:
 Q: You mean to tell the Court that it is a case of double shoot in the sense
that after ejaculating he is still on top of you but then after that he did
it again while he was still on top of your body?
WITNESS:
A: Yes, sir.[33]
Remilyn testified that appellants penis penetrated her genitalia. At that point,
appellant had already consummated the rape. The mere introduction of the penis into
the labia majora of the victims genitalia engenders the crime of rape. [34] Hence, it is the
touching or entry of the penis into the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum
of the victims genitalia that consummates rape.[35]
Appellant ejaculated twice during the time that he consummated the rape. Appellant
did not withdraw his penis to insert it again into the vagina or to touch the labia majora
or the labia minora when he ejaculated the second time. It is not the number of times
that appellant ejaculated but the penetration or touching that determines the
consummation of the sexual act.[36] Thus, appellant committed only one count of rape.
The trial court erred when it did not dismiss outright Criminal Case No. 3220-A and
instead considered it as a qualifying circumstance for the purpose of imposing the death
penalty in Criminal Case No. 3219-A. In short, the trial court considered the second
ejaculation by the accused as a qualifying circumstance to raise the penalty to death.
This has no basis in law.
Article 335[37] of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act
No. 7659[38] (RA 7659) was the law then applicable at the time of the rape. RA 7659
provides for the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the carnal knowledge of a woman
procured through force or intimidation and without any other attendant circumstance.
The death penalty is imposed if the victim is under eighteen years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim. When the information specifically alleges the twin qualifying circumstances of
relationship and minority of the victim, and the prosecution proves the same in court, the
imposable penalty is no longer reclusion perpetua but death.[39]
The trial court convicted appellant of qualified rape in Criminal Case No. 3219-A
because appellant is Remilyns brother and she was a minor being only 15 years old at
the time that appellant raped her. A reading of the Amended Information, however, does
not justify the elevation of the crime of simple rape to qualified rape.
The prosecution went through the trouble of amending the Information to allege that
Remilyn is the younger sister of appellant to emphasize the qualified nature of the rape.
However, the Amended Information did not allege Remilyns minor age. The
prosecutions failure to allege specifically Remilyns minor age prevents the
transformation of the crime to its qualified form.
The facts stated in the body of the information determine the crime of which the
accused stands charged and for which he must be tried.[40] The information must allege
every element of the offense to enable the accused to prepare properly for his
defense.[41] The law assumes that the accused has no independent knowledge of the
facts that constitute the offense.[42] Since the Amended Information failed to inform
appellant that the prosecution was accusing him of qualified rape, the court can convict
appellant only for simple rape and the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua and not
death.
The Solicitor General concedes that the trial court erred in imposing the death
penalty based on the twin circumstances of relationship and minority considering that
the Amended Information failed to allege specifically Remilyns age. What justifies the
imposition of the death penalty, the Solicitor General argues, is the fact that appellant
used a knife in committing the rape and appellant perpetrated the rape against his own
sister. According to the Solicitor General, Article 335 as amended by RA 7659 provides
that the use of a deadly weapon in the commission of rape results in the imposition of
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Applying Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code, the presence of an aggravating circumstance warrants the imposition of the
higher penalty of death. The Solicitor General points out that relationship in this case is
an aggravating circumstance based on Article 15[43] of the Revised Penal Code as
applied in People v. Baldino.[44]
Appellant on the other hand argues that the allegation in the Amended Information
that he was armed with a knife does not comply with Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of
the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The allegation in the Amended
Information that the accused was armed with a knife is not in any way equivalent to use
of a deadly weapon. The knife could simply be a butter knife, a harmless knife.
Appellant opines that the Amended Information should have stated that accused was
armed with a deadly knife, which is a deadly weapon.
We have held in several cases that the allegation armed with a knife is sufficient to
inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him.[45] The prosecution also
proved during the trial appellants use of a deadly weapon. Remilyn testified that she
was not able to shout because appellant pointed an eight-inch kitchen knife at her
throat.[46]
We, however, do not agree with the Solicitor Generals opinion that relationship
should be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance for the purpose of imposing the
death penalty. People v. Baldino, the case invoked by the Solicitor General,
appreciated relationship as an aggravating circumstance but only for the purpose of
assessing exemplary damages against the accused and not for the purpose of imposing
the death penalty. Two recent cases, People v. Sagarino[47] and People v.
Umbaa,[48] squarely address the issue raised by the Solicitor General.
In People v. Sagarino[49] and People v. Umbaa,[50] the information specifically
alleged the use of a deadly weapon and the prosecution proved the same. The
information also specifically alleged relationship between the accused and the victim,
and the prosecution proved the same: son and mother in People v. Sagarino, and
father and daughter in People v. Umbaa. However, these two cases did not impose the
death penalty. People v. Umbaa repeated our explanation in People v. Sagarino. We
quote this pertinent portion in People v. Umbaa:
We agree with appellant that People vs. Sagarino finds application in the case at bar. We there
stated:

We now come to the propriety of the penalties imposed on appellant. Section 11 of Republic Act
7659, which amended article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, imposes the penalty of reclusion
perpetua when the rape was committed with force and intimidation. But the imposable penalty
becomes reclusion perpetua to death whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly
weapon. Such is the situation in Criminal Case Nos. 98-551 and 98-552 because the use of a
knife or a bladed weapon by appellant in the consummation of the two rapes has been alleged
and proved.

However, we are unable to sustain the death penalty imposed on appellant in both cases. As
provided in Section 8 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, effective December 1,
2000, but applicable to these cases now, the complaint or information must not only state the
designation of the offense given by statute and aver the acts or omissions constituting the
offense, but also specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. But here the informations
against appellant in both cases show no specification of circumstances that aggravate the
offenses charged. Note that the close relationship between the victim and the offender (mother
and son) is alleged, but nothing is stated in the informations concerning pertinent circumstances
(such as disregard of the filial respect due the victim by reason of her age, sex and rank) that
could aggravate the crimes and justify imposing the death sentence. Thus, absent any
aggravating circumstance specifically alleged and proved in the two rape cases, the penalty
imposable on appellant for each offense is not death but only the lesser penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code states the specific aggravating/qualifying
circumstances. Other than the use of a deadly weapon, which is already taken into account to
raise the penalty to reclusion perpetua to death, not one of these circumstances was alleged or
proved in the case at bar. Hence, the penalty imposable is only reclusion perpetua. (Emphasis
ours)

The circumstances pertinent to the relationship mentioned in People v.

Sagarino and People v. Umbaa must be alleged in the information and duly proven in
the trial. In the present case, the Amended Information did not allege the circumstances
pertinent to the relationship of appellant and Remilyn and the prosecution did not prove
these circumstances during the trial.
The circumstances pertinent to the relationship cited in People v.
Sagarino and People v. Umbaa are aggravating circumstances listed in paragraph 3 of
Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code enumerates
the aggravating circumstances. Unlike mitigating circumstances under Article 13 of the
Revised Penal Code, Article 14 does not include circumstances similar in nature or
analogous to those mentioned in paragraphs 1 to 21 of Article 14. The term aggravating
circumstances is strictly construed, not only because what is involved is a criminal
statute, but also because its application could result in the imposition of the death
penalty. The list of aggravating circumstances in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is
thus exclusive[51] for the purpose of raising a crime to its qualified form.
 Article 14 does not include relationship as an aggravating circumstance.
Relationship is an alternative circumstance under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code:

Art. 15. Their concept. --Alternative circumstances are those which must be taken into
consideration as aggravating or mitigating according to the nature and effects of the crime and
other conditions attending its commission. They are relationship, intoxication, and degree of
instruction and education of the offender.

The alternative circumstance of relationship shall be taken into consideration when the offended
party is the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural, or adopted brother or sister, or
relative by affinity in the same degree of the offender.

Alternative circumstances are those which must be taken into consideration as

aggravating or mitigating according to the nature and effects of the crime and other
conditions attending its commission. Based on a strict interpretation, alternative
circumstances are thus not aggravating circumstances per se.
The Revised Penal Code is silent as to when relationship is mitigating and when it is
aggravating.[52] Jurisprudence considers relationship as an aggravating circumstance in
crimes against chastity.[53] However, rape is no longer a crime against chastity for it is
now classified as a crime against persons.[54] The determination of whether an
alternative circumstance is aggravating or not to warrant the death penalty cannot be
left on a case-by-case basis. The law must declare unequivocally an attendant
circumstance as qualifying to warrant the imposition of the death penalty. The
Constitution expressly provides that the death penalty may only be imposed for crimes
defined as heinous by Congress.[55] Any attendant circumstance that qualifies a crime
as heinous must be expressly so prescribed by Congress.
When the accused commits rape with the use of a deadly weapon, the penalty is
not death but the range of two indivisible penalties of reclusion perpetua to death. To
determine the proper penalty, we apply Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. It
provides that:

ART. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. In all cases in which the law
prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.

In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the
following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:

1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating
circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied.

xxx

Article 63 states that the greater penalty, which is death, will be applied when in the
commission of rape there is present one aggravating circumstance. We hold that the
aggravating circumstance that is sufficient to warrant the imposition of the graver
penalty of death must be that specifically enumerated in Article 14 of the Revised Penal
Code. Since it is only relationship that is alleged and proven in this case, and it is not an
aggravating circumstance per se, the proper penalty is the lower penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
Even for the purpose of awarding exemplary damages, there was lingering doubt
whether the alternative circumstance of relationship should be considered an
aggravating circumstance to justify such an award. People v. Catubig[56] settled the
lingering doubt in this manner:

The attendance of aggravating circumstances in the perpetration of the crime serves to increase
the penalty (the criminal liability aspect), as well as to justify an award of exemplary or
corrective damages (the civil liability aspect), moored on the greater perversity of the offender
manifested in the commission of the felony such as may be shown by (1) the motivating power
itself, (2) the place of commission, (3) the means and ways employed, (4) the time, or (5) the
personal circumstances of the offender or the offended party or both. There are various types of
aggravating circumstances, among them, the ordinary and the qualifying. Relationship is an
alternative circumstance under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code.

Art. 15. Their concept. --Alternative circumstances are those which must be taken into
consideration as aggravating or mitigating according to the nature and effects of the crime and
other conditions attending its commission. They are relationship, intoxication, and degree of
instruction and education of the offender.

The alternative circumstance of relationship shall be taken into consideration when the offended
party is the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural, or adopted brother or sister, or
relative by affinity in the same degree of the offender.

As a rule, relationship is held to be aggravating in crimes against chastity, such as rape and acts
of lasciviousness, whether the offender is a higher or a lower degree relative of the offended
party.

Under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
the death penalty is to be imposed in rape cases when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of
age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. The
Court has since held that the circumstances enumerated by the amendatory law are to be
regarded as special qualifying (aggravating) circumstances. Somehow doubts linger on whether
relationship may then be considered to warrant an award for exemplary damages where it is used
to qualify rape as a heinous crime, thereby becoming an element thereof, as would subject the
offender to the penalty of death. Heretofore, the Court has not categorically laid down a specific
rule, preferring instead to treat the issue on a case to case basis.

In People vs. Fundano, People vs. Ramos, People vs. Medina, People vs. Dimapilis, People vs.
Calayca, People vs. Tabion, People vs. Bayona, People vs. Bayya, and People vs. Nuez, along
with still other cases, the Court has almost invariably appreciated relationship as an ordinary
aggravating circumstance in simple rape and thereby imposed exemplary damages upon the
offender whether or not the offense has been committed prior to or after the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 7659. Exceptionally, as in People vs. Decena, People vs. Perez, and People vs.
Ambray, the Court has denied the award of exemplary damages following the effectivity of that
law. In qualified rape cases, such as in People vs. Magdato, People vs. Arizapa, and People vs.
Alicante, the Court decreed the payment of exemplary damages to the offended party but it did
not so do as in People vs. Alba, People vs. Mengote, and People vs. Maglente.

It may be time for the Court to abandon its pro hac vice stance and provide, for the guidance of
the bar and the bench, a kind of standard on the matter.

Also known as punitive or vindictive damages, exemplary or corrective damages are intended to
serve as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton
invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. These
terms are generally, but not always, used interchangeably. In common law, there is preference in
the use of exemplary damages when the award is to account for injury to feelings and for the
sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a person as a result of an injury that has been
maliciously and wantonly inflicted, the theory being that there should be compensation for the
hurt caused by the highly reprehensible conduct of the defendant - associated with such
circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross negligence or recklessness, oppression,
insult or fraud or gross fraud- that intensifies the injury. The terms punitive or vindictive
damages are often used to refer to those species of damages that may be awarded against a
person to punish him for his outrageous conduct. In either case, these damages are intended in
good measure to deter the wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in the future.

The term aggravating circumstances used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified
otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense has a
two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the
private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the
prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of additional damages to the
victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of
the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its
commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of
damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers
thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private
offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is
qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a
distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil,
liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of
exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code. (Emphasis
supplied)

In People v. Catubig, we held that the alternative circumstance of relationship

serves as basis for an award of exemplary damages because the term aggravating
circumstances must be understood in its broad or generic sense. However, this
interpretation is only applicable to the civil aspect, not the criminal aspect of rape,
which involves the imposition of the proper penalty. When the penalty to be imposed on
the accused is teetering between reclusion perpetua and death, the term aggravating
circumstance in Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code must be understood in the
strictest sense. The aggravating circumstance that would spell the difference between
life and death for the accused must be that specifically listed in Article 14 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Death is an irrevocable penalty. Thus, the rule on strict interpretation of criminal
statutes applies with greater force when the law defines the offense as a heinous crime
punishable by death.
However, we resort to the strict interpretation of the term aggravating circumstance
only for the purpose of imposing the death penalty. When the penalty to be imposed is a
range of penalties where the maximum penalty is death and the appreciation of an
aggravating circumstance would call for the imposition of the maximum penalty, which is
death, the term aggravating circumstance must be strictly construed. The aggravating
circumstance sufficient to justify the imposition of the death penalty must not only be
duly alleged and proven it must be one of those enumerated in Article 14 of the Revised
Penal Code or that specified by law. In all other cases where the maximum penalty is
not death, the term aggravating circumstance must be interpreted in its broad or generic
sense so as to include the alternative circumstances under Article 15 of the Revised
Penal Code.
We cannot consider dwelling as a generic aggravating circumstance because the
Amended Information did not allege dwelling. The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which applies retroactively in this case, now explicitly mandates that the
information must state in ordinary and concise language the qualifying and aggravating
circumstances.[57] When the law or rules specify certain circumstances that can
aggravate an offense or qualify an offense to warrant a greater penalty, the information
must allege such circumstances and the prosecution must prove the same to justify the
imposition of the increased penalty.[58]
Relationship in this case serves to justify the award of exemplary damages to
Remilyn of P25,000.[59] Remilyn is also entitled to P50,000 moral damages and P50,000
civil indemnity. Case law requires the automatic award of moral damages to a rape
victim without need of proof because from the nature of the crime it can be assumed
that she has suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award. [60] Such award is
separate and distinct from civil indemnity, which case law also automatically awards
upon proof of the commission of the crime by the offender.[61]
The trial court was so revolted by the perversity of appellants crime that it was
moved to include this proposal in the dispositive portion of its decision:

xxx in the event that upon automatic review by the Honorable Supreme Court, that the penalty of
Death is not imposed but that of Reclusion Perpetua, this Honorable Court recommends that
accused should not be granted pardon within the period of thirty (30) years.
 Incestuous rape is indeed reprehensible. It deserves our full condemnation.
However, the recommendation by the trial court is improper.[62] It is the Presidents
prerogative whether or not to grant a pardon subject to the limitations imposed by the
Constitution.[63]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region,
Branch 54, Alaminos City, Pangasinan, is AFFIRMED insofar as it finds appellant
Joseph Orilla GUILTY of one count of rape in Criminal Case No. 3219-A with the
MODIFICATION that the death sentence imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua, and
the amount of civil indemnity is reduced to P50,000. In addition, appellant is further
ordered to pay Remilyn Orilla P50,000 moral damages and P25,000 exemplary
damages. Criminal Case No. 3220-A is dismissed. The provision recommending the
disqualification of appellant from executive clemency is deleted. Costs de oficio.

The People of the Philippines Vs. Jhun Villalon y Ordono; G.R. No. 215198; November 9, 2016
DECISION

PERALTA, J.:***

This case seeks to reverse and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1] dated
June 30, 2014 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05471. The CA upheld the Decision[2] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Agoo, La Union, Branch 32, dated February 29, 2012 in
Family Court Case No. A-1021, which found accused-appellant Jhun Villalon y Ordono
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.

An Information was filed charging Villalon of raping AAA,[3] which reads:

That on or about the 17th day of April 2010, in the Municipality of Aringay, Province of La
Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, by means of force, coercion and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have carnal knowledge with his cousin AAA, a minor child 14 years of age,
against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]

Upon arraignment on June 14, 2011, Villalon pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
Thus, trial on the merits ensued.

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:

Jhun Villalon was charged with raping his cousin, AAA. AAA testified that she was born
on February 2, 1996 and that her cousin (their mothers are sisters) raped her on April
17, 2010 when she was merely 14 years old. At 7:30 a.m. of that date, Villalon went to
AAA’s house in San Benito Norte, Aringay, La Union. He invited AAA to gather
mangoes in the mountain, which was 2-3 kilometers away. AAA then left with Villalon
with her mother’s knowledge. After harvesting mangoes, Villalon asked AAA to go to the
higher part of the mountain. Thereafter, Villalon invited his cousin to have sexual
intercourse with him so she could experience it. AAA then felt like ciying because she
could not understand why her cousin would say that. She became nervous and wanted
to leave but Villalon held her hands and removed her lower garments. She struggled to
free herself, but Villalon overpowered her. He laid her down on the ground and started
kissing her. AAA tried to avoid Villalon’s kisses and to wriggle out of his embrace, but he
placed himself on top of her and was able to fulfill his bestial desires. He then
threatened AAA not to tell anybody.

AAA tried to hide the incident but after a month, she could no longer contain the
nightmares caused by the abuse so she told her mother, BBB. Hence, BBB
accompanied her daughter to the barangay captain to report the incident. When
confronted, Villalon became angry and refused to cooperate,so BBB and AAA went to
the police station. The physician who examined the victim found multiple healed
hymenal lacerations and an infection which could have been caused by sexual
intercourse.

When the case was already in court, Villalon’s mother and wife allegedly brought AAA
and BBB to the office of the defense counsel to sign an affidavit of desistance. AAA
refused to sign the affidavit so she ran and hid at the market. When their relatives found
her, they brought her back to the office to sign the affidavit. After signing, BBB was
instructed to submit it to the Prosecutor’s office, where she learned that the
consequence of the affidavit would be the dismissal of the case. BBB then changed her
mind and left with the affidavit.

For his part, Villalon asserted that it was on April 10, 2010 that he invited AAA’s brother
to gather mangoes in the mountain but AAA volunteered to go with him. When they
finished at 9:00 a.m., they immediately proceeded to Caba to sell the fruits. On April 17,
2010, however, when the rape was supposedly committed, he just stayed at home all
day with his wife. He was shocked when three (3) weeks later, he learned that he was
being charged with rape. He, likewise, refused to settle at the barangay because he did
nothing wrong.

On February 29, 2012, the RTC convicted Villalon in Family Court Case No. A-1021 and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to pay AAA P75,000.00
as civil indemnity and P75,000.00 as moral damages, thus:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Jhun Villalon y Ordono GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape, and hereby [sentences] him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay [AAA] the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P75,000.00 as
moral damages.
SO ORDERED.[5]

Therefore, Villalon elevated the case to the CA. On June 30, 2014, the CA affirmed the
RTC Decision, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.[6]

Villalon now comes before the Court, insisting that the prosecution failed to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He presents the following errors:

I.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT

DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH FORCE, VIOLENCE,
THREAT AND INTIMIDATION AS ELEMENTS OF RAPE.
II.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT

DESPITE THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT’S LACK OF CREDIBILITY.
The appeal is devoid of merit.

The Court finds that the prosecution has successfully proved Villalon’s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Even if AAA did not shout for help, such could not and would not
diminish her credibility. It must be emphasized that there is no standard form of reaction
for a woman, much more a minor, when confronted with a horrifying experience such as
sexual assault. The actions of children who have undergone traumatic experience
should not be judged by the norms of behavior expected from adults when placed under
similar circumstances. People react differently to emotional stress and rape victims are
no different from them.[7]

Also, Villalon’s alibi must necessarily fall. Physical impossibility pertains to the distance
between the place where the accused was during the commission of the crime and the
place where the crime was actually committed, as well as the facility of access between
the two places.[8] Here, Villalon resided some twenty (20) meters away from AAA’s
house, which was about two to three (2-3) kilometers away from the place where the
incident transpired. Thus, there was no physical impossibility for Villalon’s presence at
the scene of the crime. His allegation that he was just at home on April 17, 2010 with his
wife is, likewise, self-serving and remains uncorroborated by any evidence. His wife did
not even testify to support said claim.
Regarding the affidavit of desistance, it must be stressed that, as a rule, it is viewed with
suspicion and reservation. It has been regarded as exceedingly unreliable, because it
can easily be secured from a poor and ignorant witness, usually through intimidation or
for monetary consideration, and attains no probative value in light of the alleged affiant’s
testimony to the contrary. Moreover, there is always the probability that it would later on
be repudiated, and criminal prosecution would thus be interminable.[9] BBB has
explained that they were merely forced by their relatives into signing the affidavit and
that she had not fully understood the effects of signing said affidavit, until the secretary
of the prosecutor finally explained to her its contents, which were all written in English.
Thus, they chose to leave and decided to pursue the case.

Indeed, AAA testified in a candid, vivid, and straightforward manner, and remained firm
and unswerving even on cross-examination. It has been consistently held that when it
comes to credibility of witnesses, the findings of a trial court on such matter will not be
disturbed unless the lower court had clearly misinterpreted certain facts. The credibility
of the witnesses is best addressed by the trial court, it being in a better position to
decide such question, having heard them and observed their demeanor, conduct, and
attitude under grueling examination. These are the most significant factors in evaluating
the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting
testimonies. Through its observations during the entire proceedings, the trial court can
be expected to determine, with reasonable discretion, whose testimony to accept and
which witness to believe. Verily, findings of the trial court on such matters will not be
disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight have been
overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted so as to materially affect the disposition
of the case. Also, where there is no evidence that the witnesses of the prosecution were
influenced by ill motive, as in this case, it is presumed that they were not so actuated
and their testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.[10] As to the amount of damages,
however, the accused should be ordered to pay another P75,000.00 as exemplary
damages based on recent jurisprudence.[11]

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court DENIES the petition

and AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the Decision dated June 30, 2014 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05471 finding accused-appellant Jhun Villalon y
Ordono guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape. The Court sentences
Villalon to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay AAA the amount of
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and another P75,000.00
as exemplary damages, all with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annumfrom
the finality of this judgment until fully paid.

People of the Philippines Vs. Eduardo Marmol y Bauso, Jr.; G.R. No. 217379; November 23,
2016
DECISION

PEREZ, J.:
Before us for review is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, Eleventh Division, in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05657 dated 21 May 2014, which dismissed the appeal of appellant
and affirmed with modification the Consolidated Decision [2] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 124, in Criminal Case Nos. C-70217 and C-70859,
which found appellant Eduardo Marmol y Bauso, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Rape through Sexual Assault and Qualified Rape.

In line with the ruling of this court in People v. Cabalquinto,[3] the real name and identity
of the rape victim, as well as the members of her immediate family, are not disclosed.
The rape victim shall herein be referred to as AAA, and her mother as BBB.

Appellant was charged with two (2) counts of rape as follows:

CRIMINAL CASE No. C-70217

That on or about the 22nd day of February, 2004 in Caloocan City, Metro-Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the father
of one [AAA], a minor, 12 years of age, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
succeed in sexually abusing said [AAA], by then and there inserting his finger into the genital
organ of the latter, against her will and without her consent, which act and condition is
prejudicial to the development of the said child.[4]
CRIMINAL CASE No. C-70859

That on or about the 9th of February, 2004 in Caloocan City, Metro-Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the
legitimate father of one [AAA], a minor, 12 years of age, with lewd design and by means of
force and intimidation employed upon the latter, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously lie and have sexual intercourse with said [AAA], against the latter’s will and without
her consent, which act and condition is prejudicial to the development of the said minor victim.[5]
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to all the charges. Joint trial on the
merits ensued.

The prosecution presented AAA, her mother, BBB, SPO1 Isabel Barasi-Gracilla, Dr.
Mamerto Bernabe. Jr. (Dr. Bernabe) and Dr. Deborah Saguin (Dr. Saguin) as
witnesses.

The prosecution established that AAA is the daughter of BBB and appellant, born on 21
February 1992; and was twelve years (12) years old at the time of the commission of
the crimes, all evidenced by her Birth Certificate.[6] On 9 February 2004, AAA had been
alone in their house from school when her father arrived. After taking a bath, appellant
dragged AAA to the room, laid her on the bed, removed her undergarments, placed
himself on top of her and had carnal knowledge of her. AAA could not scream in protest,
cowered into silence by appellant’s threat to kill AAA’s mother if her ordeal comes to
fore.[7]
Then again on 22 February 2004, AAA had been sleeping with her mother and siblings
in the living room when woken by the sensation of appellant lying down next to her and
inserting his finger into her female part. When BBB herself awoked, appellant
immediately withdrew his finger and tried to pull AAA’s brother toward her to hide what
he had done. BBB removed the blanket covering and saw that appellant’s pants had
been unzipped and AAA’s panties had been lowered exposing her female organ. Thus it
was unravelled that appellant had been doing unspeakable acts to AAA for some time.
This appellant vehemently denied and with knife on hand, appellant prevented AAA and
BB from leaving the house.[8]

Once AAA and BBB have reported the incidents to the police, AAA was subjected to a
physical examination by Dr. Bernabe. Said examination revealed that AAA was in a
non-virgin state physically and that there were no external signs of application of any
form of trauma on the genital area. The labia majora or the outer lips of the female
genital area or the reproductive external structures were slightly open and were
erythematous or reddish due to a possible recent trauma to the area. The labia
minora was slightly thickened. Attenuated hymen with shallow healed laceration at 6
o’clock position meant there was injury at the lower portion of the hymen. The laceration
or injury of the hymen could have been caused by the introduction or penetration of a
blunt instrument in the vaginal canal. These findings were embodied in a Medico Legal
Report dated 23 February 2004 which Dr. Bernabe identified in court. Dr. Bernabe
further testified that the physical and genital examination corroborated the verbal
interview of the victim.[9]

AAA claimed she had been impregnated as a result of her father’s incestuous act. On
13 October 2004, AAA was safely delivered of a son by Dr. Saguin at the Jose Reyes
Memorial Medical Center.

Appellant, for his part, denied the rape charges. He asserted that he had been out of the
house on 9 February 2004; and on 22 February 2004, he had just arrived home from
visiting his friend. He countered that AAA had been mauled by BBB to coerce her to
testify against him.[10]

On 15 May 2012, appellant was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts
of rape. The dispositive portion of the RTC Consolidated Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused (a) in Crim. Case No. c-
70217 GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape (thru insertion of the finger under
paragraph 2, Article 266-A, of the Revised Penal Code) of a minor below 18 years of age and
hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of EIGHT (8) YEARS of Prision
Mayor, as minimum, to EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum.
Accused is likewise directed to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of ONE
HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P150,000.00); (b) in Crim. Case No. C-70859,
GUILTY of the crime of Rape (committed through carnal knowledge under Article 266-A
paragraph 1 [d]) of a minor daughter below 12 years of age, and hereby sentences him to suffer
the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. Accused is likewise directed to indemnify the private
complainant in the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P150,000.00)[11]

On intermediate review, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision affirming
with modification the trial court’s judgment, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The
assailed May 15, 2012 Consolidated Decision is MODIFIED as follows:

1) in Crim. Case No. C-70217, for the crime of rape by sexual assault:

a) the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty is reduced to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months;

b) accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay AAA:

i. P30.000.00 as civil indemnity;

ii. P30,000.00 as moral damages; and

iii. P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

2) in Crim Case No. C-70859, for the crime of rape through carnal knowledge, accused-appellant
is ORDERED to pay AAA:

a) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity;

b) P75,000.00 as moral damages; and

c) P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.[12]

Appellant filed the instant a peal. In a Resolution[13] dated 22 June 2015, appellant and
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) were asked to file their respective
supplemental briefs if they so desired. Both parties no longer filed supplemental briefs.

The appeal lacks merit.

Rape is committed as follows:

Article 266-A. Rape; When and How committed. – Rape is committed –

1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:

a. Through force, threat or intimidation;

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d. When the woman is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.

2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice,
or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

Article 266-B. Penalties – Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua.

xxxx

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:

1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.

xxxx

Rape under paragraph 2 of the next preceding article shall be punished by prision mayor.

xxxx

Reclusion temporal shall be imposed if the rape is committed with any of the ten
aggravating/qualifying circumstances mentioned in this article.

Rape can be committed either through sexual intercourse or sexual assault. Rape under
paragraph 1 of the above-cited article is rape through sexual intercourse; often
denominated as “organ rape” or “penile rape,” carnal knowledge is its central element
and must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. It must be attended by any of the
circumstances enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (d) of paragraph 1.[14] Rape is
qualified when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.[15] The
elements of qualified rape are: (1) sexual congress; (2) with a woman; (3) done by force
and without consent; (4) the victim is under eighteen years of age at the time of the
rape; and (5) the offender is a parent (whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted) of the
victim.[16]

Rape under paragraph 2 of Article 266-A is commonly known as rape by sexual assault.
Under any of the attendant circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1, the perpetrator
commits this kind of rape by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal
orifice, or any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person. It is
also called “instrument or object rape,” also “gender-free rape.”[17]

In rape cases, primordial is the credibility of the victim’s testimony because the accused
may be convicted solely on said testimony provided it is credible, natural, convincing
and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. [18]

It is also well-settled that the trial court’s findings on the credibility of witnesses and of
their testimonies are entitled to the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal,
in the absence of any clear showing that the court overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of the case. This is because the trial court,
having seen and heard the witnesses themselves, and observed their behavior and
manner of testifying, is in a better position to decide the question of credibility. [19]

The trial court lent full credence to AAA’s clear, spontaneous and categorical testimony
that appellant had raped her on at least two (2) occasions. It is evident from the extant
records that appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA, his twelve (12)-year old daughter,
through force, threat or intimidation on 09 February 2004; and sexually assaulted her
also through force, threat or intimidation on 22 February 2004.

The Court finds no reason to disbelieve AAA’s testimony which both the trial and
appellate courts found credible and straightforward. Testimonies of child victims are
given full weight land credit, for when a woman or a girl-child says that she has been
raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed committed.
Youth and maturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.[20]

Moreover, to this Court’s mind, there can be no greater source of fear or intimidation
than your own father – one who, generally, has exercised authority over your person
since birth. This Court has recognized the moral ascendancy and influence the father
has over his child. When a father rapes his daughter, violence and intimidation supplant
such moral ascendancy and influence. The rapist father can easily subjugate his
daughter’s will, allowing him to coerce the child to do his every bidding. [21]
AAA’s testimony was corroborated by the findings of Dr. Bernabe showing that AAA had
lacerations on her female anatomy. Hymenal lacerations, whether healed or fresh, are
the best evidence of forcible defloration. When the consistent and straightforward
testimony of a rape victim is consistent with medical findings, there is sufficient basis to
warrant a conclusion that the essential requisites of carnal knowledge have been
established.[22]

The Court finds unmeritorious appellant’s defense of denial. Aside from being weak, it is
self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law, if not substantiated by clear and
convincing proof as in the case at bar, and hence cannot prevail over AAA’s clear
narration of facts and positive identification of appellant. Corollarily, alibi is the weakest
of all defenses for it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove. For alibi to prosper,
appellant must likewise prove that it was physically impossible for him to be present at
the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.[23]

More importantly, it is highly inconceivable for a daughter like AAA to impute against her
own father a crime as serious and despicable as incest rape, unless the imputation was
the plain truth. In fact, it takes a certain amount of psychological depravity for a young
woman to concoct a story that would put her own father to jail for the rest of his
remaining life and drag the rest of the family including herself to a lifetime of
shame.[24] Filipino children have great respect and reverence for their elders. For this
reason, great weight is given to an accusation a child directs against a close relative,
especially the father. A rape victim’s testimony against her father goes against the grain
of Filipino culture as it yields unspeakable trauma and social stigma on the child and the
entire family.[25]

The Court is also not convinced by appellant’s proposition that ill motives of BBB
prompted the filing of the charges against him. Ill-motives become inconsequential
where there are affirmative or categorical declarations establishing appellant’s
accountability for the felony. Not a few persons convicted of rape have attributed the
charges against them to family feuds, resentment or revenge, however, these have
never swayed us from giving full credence to the testimony of a complainant for rape,
especially a minor, AAA in the case at bar, who remained steadfast and unyielding that
she had been sexually abused. It would take a certain degree of perversity on the part
of a parent, especially a mother, to concoct a false charge of rape and then use her
daughter as an instrument to settle her grudge.[26]

The Court gives scant consideration to appellant’s assertion that the incongruency of
AAA’s gestation period with the alleged date of the commission of the rape by sexual
intercourse casts doubts on the truth of AAA’s allegations. It bears underscoring that
impregnation is not an element of rape.[27] AAA’s pregnancy and resultant childbirth are
irrelevant in determining whether or not she was raped. Whether the child AAA bore had
been sired by appellant or by some other individual is of no moment. Of prime
importance is that appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA against the latter’s will or
without her consent and such fact was testified to in a truthful manner. [28]
All told, appellant’s guilt of the crimes charged was established beyond reasonable
doubt.

In Criminal Case No. C-70217, under Article 266-B, the penalty for rape by sexual
assault is prision mayor. The penalty is increased to reclusion temporal if the rape is
committed by any of the ten (10) aggravating/qualifying circumstances mentioned in the
article. The courts properly appreciated the circumstances of minority and relationship.
AAA was twelve (12) years old at the time of the rape incident and appellant is her
father. Thus, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal which ranges from twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the penalty next lower in degree is prision mayor which ranges from six (6) years and
one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Hence, the Court affirms the penalty of eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, imposed by the appellate court upon
appellant.[29] The Court of Appeals also correctly awarded the amounts of P30,000.00
as civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages in line with prevailing jurisprudence.[30]

In Criminal Case No. C-70859, the courts also fittingly considered the minority of AAA
and her relationship with appellant, circumstances that increase the severity of the
penalty from reclusion perpetua to death. The passage of Republic Act No. 9346,
however debars the imposition of the death penalty without declassifying the crime of
qualified rape as heinous. Thus, the penalty was aptly reduced from death penalty
to reclusion perpetua. In view of Republic Act No. 9346, appellant is not eligible for
parole.[31]

The award of damages on the other hand should be modified and increased as follows:
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages, and P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.[32]

Further, all the amount of damages awarded should earn interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this judgment until said amounts are fully
paid.[33]

WHEREFORE, premises considered; the Decision dated 21 May 2-14 of the Court of
Appeals, Eleventh Division, in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05657, finding appellant Eduardo
Marmol y Bauso, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Rape through
Sexual Assault and Qualified Rape in Criminal Cases Nos. C-70217 and C-70859 is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. In Criminal Case No. C-70859, appellant is
not eligible for parole. Appellant is also ORDERED to pay the private offended party as
follows: P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages, and
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.

He is FURTHER ordered to pay interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of six
percent (6%) per annumfrom the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

EDGAR JUMAWAN, Accused-Appellant.

G.R. No. 187495 April 21, 2014

PONENTE: Reyes

TOPIC: Marital rape

FACTS:

Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK, were married and have four children.

On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit, alleging that her

husband, the accused-appellant, raped her at 3 :00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at their
residence in Cagayan de Oro City, and that on December 12, 1998, the accused-
appellant boxed her shoulder for refusing to have sex with him.

As to the charge of rape according to KKK, conjugal intimacy did not really
cause marital problems between her and the accused-appellant. It was, in fact, both
frequent and fulfilling. He treated her well and she, of course, responded with equal
degree of enthusiasm. However, in 1997, he started to be brutal in bed. He would
immediately remove her panties and, sans any foreplay, insert her penis in her vagina.
His abridged method of lovemaking was physically painful for her so she would resist
his sexual ambush but he would threaten her into submission.

One night, in the spouse’s bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the
matrimonial bed but she did not lie thereon with the accused-appellant and instead,
rested separately in a cot near the bed. Her reclusive behavior prompted him to ask
angrily: “Why are you lying on the cot?”, and to instantaneously order: “You transfer
here to our bed.”

KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache
and abdominal pain due to her forthcoming menstruation. Her reasons did not appease
him and he got angrier. He rose from the bed, lifted the cot and threw it against the wall
causing KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up from where she fell, took her
pillow and transferred to the bed.
 The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his
desire to copulate with her by tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely declined by
warding off his hand and reiterating that she was not feeling well.

The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried
to resist by holding on to her panties, he pulled them down so forcefully they tore on the
sides. KKK stayed defiant by refusing to bend her legs.

The accused-appellant then raised KKK’s daster,41 stretched her legs apart and
rested his own legs on them. She tried to wrestle him away but he held her hands and
succeeded in penetrating her. As he was carrying out his carnal desires, KKK continued
to protest by desperately shouting: “Don ‘t do that to me because I’m not feeling well.”

Accused raised the defense of denial and alleged that KKK merely fabricated
the rape charges as her revenge because he took over the control and management of
their businesses, and to cover up her extra-marital affairs.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there can be a marital rape.

HELD:

YES. The Supreme Court held that husbands do not have property rights over
their wives’ bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage, if
not consensual, is rape.

Violation of equal protection clause

The Court ruled that to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital
rape cases in terms of the elements that constitute the crime and in the rules for their
proof, infringes on the equal protection clause.

The Court found that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between
marital rape and non-marital rape. The various rationales which have been asserted in
defense of the exemption are either based upon archaic notions about the consent and
property rights incident to marriage or are simply unable to withstand even the slightest
scrutiny.

The Court declared the marital exemption for rape in the New York statute to
be unconstitutional.
 Said exemption states that a husband was endowed with absolute immunity
from prosecution for the rape of his wife. The privilege was personal and pertained to
him alone. He had the marital right to rape his wife but he will be liable when he aids or
abets another person in raping her.

Moreover, Section 1 of RA 8353 penalizes the crime without regard to the

rapist’s legal relationship with his victim.

Implied consent theory untenable

The Court also ruled against the application of implied consent theory which
was raised by the accused. The accused argued that consent to copulation is presumed
between cohabiting husband and wife unless the contrary is proved.

According to the Court, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual

violence, exists within marriage. A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or
against her will commits sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party
to the CEDAW and its accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as rape
under R.A. No. 8353.

BRION, J.:
We review the appeal, filed by appellant Jose Dalan, assailing the decision[1] of the Court
of Appeals (CA) dated January 31, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04279. The CA affirmed
the Judgment[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 64, Abatan, Buguias,
Benguet, which found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts
of statutory rape.

In its Judgment dated December 3, 2009, the RTC convicted the appellant of two counts
of statutory rape. It ruled that the prosecution was able to prove that the appellant
inserted his penis in AAA's vagina on two occasions, namely, in December 2006 and on
March 3, 2007. It added that AAA's testimony was corroborated by the medical findings
of Dr. Sabrina Florendo. The RTC further explained that AAA's mental retardation
cannot disqualify her as a witness, since she capably narrated the details of the sexual
abuses committed against her by the appellant in 2006 and 2007.

Accordingly, the RTC sentenced the appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and to indemnify the victim the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
and P50,000.00 as moral damages, both for each count of statutory rape.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. The CA ruled that AAA positively
identified the appellant as the person who raped her on two occasions. According to the
CA, AAA was consistent in her recollection of the details of the crime. It also added that
AAA's moderate mental retardation was sufficiently established by the prosecution's
evidence. Finally, the RTC found the appellant's uncorroborated denial and alibi to be
unmeritorious.

Our Ruling

We deny the appeal, but modify the designation of the crime committed and the
awarded indemnities.

For the charge of rape to prosper, the prosecution must prove that (1) the offender had
carnal knowledge of a woman, and (2) he accomplished such act through force or
intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when
she was under 12 years of age or was demented.[3] Carnal knowledge of a woman who is
a mental retardate is rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended. Proof of force or intimidation is not necessary, as a mental retardate
is not capable of giving consent to a sexual act. What need to be proven are the facts of
sexual congress between the accused and the victim, and the mental retardation of the
latter.[4]

In the present case, the prosecution established the elements of rape under Article 266-
A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. First, AAA positively identified the appellant
as the person who inserted his penis in her vagina in December 2006 and in March
2007; she never wavered in this identification. Significantly, AAA's claim of sexual
intercourse had been corroborated by the medical findings and testimony of Dr.
Florendo who testified that the marked attenuated hymen at 6 o'clock position was most
probably caused by an erect penis, while the absent hymen at the 4, 5 and 7 o'clock
positions could be caused by repeated sexual experience.

Second, the prosecution satisfactorily established the mental condition of the victim. Dr.
Ekid conducted a battery of tests to determine the mental age, social maturity and
emotional condition of AAA. During trial, Dr. Ekid explained each test, and how she
arrived at her conclusions. Accordingly, she found AAA to be suffering from moderate
retardation, with a mental age of a person four (4) years and seven (7) months old.

As the lower courts did, we are unpersuaded by the appellant's alibi that he was at a
farm in Ca-ew, Bulalacao, during the two rapes. Aside from being uncorroborated, we
point out that Ca-ew was just five (5) minutes away from the scene of the rape. In short,
the appellant miserably failed to show that it was physically impossible for him to be at
the places where AAA had been sexually abused.

The Crime Committed

Article 266-A paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides:

Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. - Rape is committed -

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:

a) Through force, threat or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented,
d)
even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present; x x x
In the present case, the Information alleged that the victim was "xxx a minor, being
seventeen (17) years of age, or below eighteen (18) years old at the time of the
commission of the crime, but mentally retarded with a mental age that equates to a child
of four (4) years and seven (7) months," and this circumstance had been proven during
trial. The RTC, however, equated AAA's mental retardation with dementia. It is settled
that carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape as she is in the same
class as a woman deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious.[5] Our ruling in People v.
Monticalvo[6] on this point is instructive:

The term "deprived of reason" has been construed to encompass those suffering from
mental abnormality, deficiency or retardation. The term "demented," on the other hand,
means having dementia, which Webster defines as mental deterioration; also madness,
insanity. Dementia has also been defined in Black's Law Dictionary as a "form of mental
disorder in which cognitive and intellectual functions of the mind are prominently
affected; xxx total recovery not possible since cerebral disease is involved." Thus, a
mental retardate can be classified as a person "deprived of reason," not one who is
"demented" and carnal knowledge of a mental retardate is considered rape
under subparagraph (b), not subparagraph (d) of Article 266-A(I) of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. [Emphasis in the original]
Aside from erroneously equating AAA's mental retardation with dementia, the RTC
further justified its conviction of the appellant of statutory rape on account of the
victim's mental age.

The gravamen of the offense of statutory rape, as provided for in Article 266-A,
paragraph 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is the carnal knowledge of a
woman below 12 years old. To convict an accused of the crime of statutory rape, the
prosecution must prove: first, the age of the complainant; second, the identity of the
accused; and last but not the least, the carnal knowledge between the accused and the
complainant.[7]

In the present case, it is not disputed that AAA was already 17 years old when she was
raped. In People v. Butiong,[8] we held that carnal knowledge of a female mental
retardate with the mental age below 12 years of age is considered as rape of a woman
deprived of reason, thus:

It should no longer be debatable that rape of a mental retardate falls under paragraph
1(b), of Article 266-A, x x x, because the provision refers to a rape of a female "deprived
of reason," a phrase that refers to mental abnormality, deficiency or retardation.
We are not unaware that there have been cases[9] where the Court stated that sexual
intercourse with a mental retardate constitutes statutory rape. Nonetheless, the Court in
these cases affirmed the accused's conviction for simple rape despite a finding that the
victim was a mental retardate with a mental age of a person less than 12 years old.

Based on these discussions, we hold that the term statutory rape should only be
confined to situations where the victim of rape is a person less than 12 years of age. If
the victim of rape is a person with mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation, the
crime committed is simple rape under Article 266-A, paragraph (1)(b) as she is
considered "deprived of reason" notwithstanding that her mental age is equivalent to
that of a person under 12. In short, carnal knowledge with a mental retardate whose
mental age is that of a person below 12 years, while akin to statutory rape under Article
266-A, paragraph 1(d), should still be designated as simple rape under paragraph 1(b).
At any rate, proof of force, threat or intimidation is dispensed with in both statutory
rape and rape with a person who is deprived of reason.

With respect to the awarded indemnities, we further direct the appellant to pay the
victim P30,000.00 as exemplary damages to set a public example and to protect hapless
individuals from sexual molestation. We also impose a 6% interest on all the monetary
awards for damages to be reckoned from the date of finality of this decision until fully
paid.[10]

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the CA decision dated January 31, 2012 in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04279 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

the appellant is found guilty of simple rape under Article 266- A(1)(b) of the
(a)
Revised Penal Code, as amended;
(b) he is further ordered to pay AAA P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
he is ordered to pay interest, at the rate of 6% per annum on the award of civil
(c) indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages from finality of judgment until
fully paid.