Neal M Ashkanasy - Cary L Cooper-Research Companion To Emotion in Organizations-Edward Elgar (2008)

RESEARCH COMPANION TO EMOTION IN
ORGANIZATIONS
NEW HORIZONS IN MANAGEMENT
Series Editor: Cary L. Cooper, CBE, Pro Vice Chancellor (External Relations) and Distinguished
Professor of Organizational Psychology and Health, Lancaster University, UK.
This important series makes a significant contribution to the development of management thought.
This field has expanded dramatically in recent years and the series provides an invaluable forum
for the publication of high quality work in management science, human resource management,
organizational behaviour, marketing, management information systems, operations management,
business ethics, strategic management and international management.
The main emphasis of the series is on the development and application of new original ideas.
International in its approach, it will include some of the best theoretical and empirical work from
both well-established researchers and the new generation of scholars.
Titles in the series include:
Managing Emotions in Mergers and Acquisitions
Verena Kusstatscher and Cary L. Cooper
Employment of Women in Chinese Cultures
Half the Sky
Cherlyn Granrose
Competing Values Leadership
Creating Value in Organizations
Kim S. Cameron, Robert E. Quinn, Jeff DeGraff and Anjan V. Thakor
Research Companion to Working Time and Work Addiction
Edited by Ronald J. Burke
Happy-Performing Managers
The Impact of Affective Wellbeing and Intrinsic Job Satisfaction in the Workplace
Peter J. Hosie, Peter P. Sevastos and Cary L. Cooper
Women in Leadership and Management
Edited by Duncan McTavish and Karen Miller
Appreciative Inquiry and Knowledge Management
A Social Constructionist Perspective
Tojo Thatchenkery and Dilpreet Chowdhry
Research Companion to the Dysfunctional Workplace
Management Challenges and Symptoms
Edited by Janice Langan-Fox, Cary L. Cooper and Richard J. Klimoski
Research Companion to Emotion in Organizations
Edited by Neal M. Ashkanasy and Cary L. Cooper
International Terrorism and Threats to Security
Managerial and Organizational Challenges
Edited by Ronald J. Burke and Cary L. Cooper
Women on Corporate Boards of Directors
International Research and Practice
Edited by Susan Vinnicombe, Val Singh, Ronald J. Burke, Diana Bilimoria and Morten Huse
Handbook of Managerial Behavior and Occupational Health
Edited by Alexander-Stamatios G. Antoniou, Cary L. Cooper, George P. Chrousos, Charles D.
Spielberger and Michael William Eysenck
Research Companion to Emotion
in Organizations
Edited by
Neal M. Ashkanasy
Professor of Management, UQ Business School, University of Queensland,
Australia
and
Cary L. Cooper, CBE

Pro Vice Chancellor (External Relations) and Distinguished Professor of
Organizational Psychology and Health, Lancaster University, UK
NEW HORIZONS IN MANAGEMENT
Edward Elgar
Cheltenham, UK • Northampton, MA, USA
© Neal M. Ashkanasy and Cary L. Cooper 2008
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or
transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical or photocopying, recording, or
otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher.
Published by
Edward Elgar Publishing Limited
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Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc.

William Pratt House
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USA
A catalogue record for this book

is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data
Research companion to emotion in organizations / edited by Neal Ashkanasy, Cary L. Cooper.

p. cm.—(New horizons in management series)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Organizational behavior—Psychological aspects. 2. Work—Psychological aspects. 3.
Emotions—Social aspects. 4. Emotional intelligence. I. Ashkanasy, Neal M., 1945– II. Cooper,
Cary L.
HD58.7.R465 2008
302.35—dc22
2008023174
ISBN 978 1 84542 637 8 (cased)
Printed and bound in Great Britain by MPG Books Ltd, Bodmin, Cornwall
Contents
List of figures viii

List of tables ix
List of contributors x
Acknowledgments xiv
Introduction 1
Neal M. Ashkanasy and Cary L. Cooper
PART I EMOTION AND AFFECT AS WITHIN-PERSON PHENOMENA
1 The structure of affect: history, theory, and implications for emotion research
in organizations 17
Myeong-Gu Seo, Lisa Feldman Barrett and Sirkwoo Jin
2 Emotion and organizational decision making: the roles of negative affect and
anticipated regret in making decisions under escalation situations 45
Carmen K. Ng and Kin Fai Ellick Wong
3 Fear and loathing in the workplace 61
Julie Fitness
4 The case for emotion-induced toxicity: making sense of toxic emotions in the
workplace 73
Sandra A. Lawrence
5 Disappointment and regret 90
Wilco W. van Dijk and Frenk van Harreveld
6 The impact of emotions, moods and other affect-related variables on
creativity, innovation and initiative 103
Johannes Rank and Michael Frese
7 Emotions in and around performance: the thrill of victory, the agony
of defeat 120
Cynthia D. Fisher
8 Affect, satisfaction, and performance 136
Timothy A. Judge and John D. Kammeyer-Mueller
9 Affective influences on employee satisfaction and performance 152
David T. Wagner and Remus Ilies
10 Affect and work motivation 170
Ruth Kanfer and Patrick C. Stubblebine
11 Emotions and counterproductive work behavior 183
Lisa M. Penney and Paul E. Spector
12 Measuring emotion: methodological issues and alternatives 197
Marie T. Dasborough, Marta Sinclair, Rebekah Russell-Bennett and
Alastair Tombs
v
vi Research companion to emotion in organizations
PART II EMOTION AS AN INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCE VARIABLE
13 The use of emotional intelligence in business: resolving varying definitions

and measures and their relationship to work performance 211
Peter J. Jordan
14 Emotional and social intelligence competencies 226
Richard E. Boyatzis
15 Learning to face emotional intelligence: training and workplace applications 245
Catherine S. Daus and Tiffani G. Cage
PART III EMOTIONAL EFFECTS IN DYADIC INTERACTIONS
16 Emotion scripts in organizations: a multi-level model 263

Donald E. Gibson
17 Emotion regulation in the workplace 284
Stéphane Côté, Sue Moon and Christopher T.H. Miners
18 Emotional labour and employee well-being: an integrative review 301
David Holman, David Martinez-Iñigo and Peter Totterdell
19 Not all emotional display rules are created equal: distinguishing between
prescriptive and contextual display rules 316
James M. Diefendorff and Erin M. Richard
20 Doing emotion in service encounters: service agents’ perceptions of emotional
labor and emotional contagion 335
Blake E. Ashforth, Marc A. Tomiuk and Carol T. Kulik
21 Emotions as social entities: interpersonal functions and effects of emotion in
organizations 349
Shlomo Hareli, Anat Rafaeli and Brian Parkinson
22 Affect and justice: current knowledge and future directions 360
Yochi Cohen-Charash and Zinta S. Byrne
23 Emotion in conflict and negotiation: introducing the emotions as social
information (EASI) model 392
Gerben A. Van Kleef
24 The power of presence: strategic response to displayed emotions in
negotiations 405
Shirli Kopelman, Ilan G. Gewurz and Vera Sacharin
PART IV EMOTION AS A GROUP-LEVEL PHENOMENON
25 Kindling fires and extinguishing candles: the wind of mood contagion in

work groups 423
Richard Saavedra
26 Group-level emotional intelligence 441
Vanessa Urch Druskat and Steven B. Wolff
27 Research trends in emotions and leadership 455
Ronald H. Humphrey, Janet B. Kellett, Randall G. Sleeth and
Nathan S. Hartman
Contents vii
28 Leadership, affect, and emotions 465

Daan van Knippenberg, Barbara van Knippenberg, Gerben A. Van Kleef
and Frederic Damen
29 Leadership and emotional expression 476
Debra L. Nelson, Susan Michie and Timothy DeGroot
30 Leaders as emotional managers, across cultures 489
Joyce E. Bono and Laura G. Barron
31 The role of affect in vertical and lateral exchange relationships in teams 499
Herman H.M. Tse and Neal M. Ashkanasy
32 An interactive, process model of emotions and leadership 512
Rebecca J. Reichard and Ronald E. Riggio
PART V ORGANIZATIONAL-LEVEL EMOTION RESEARCH
33 Establishing positive emotional climates to advance organizational

transformation 531
Leslie E. Sekerka and Barbara L. Fredrickson
34 How contrasting emotions can enhance strategic agility 546
Quy Nguyen Huy
35 Contested meanings and emotional dynamics in strategic alliances 561
Rajesh Kumar
36 How to build a healthy emotional culture and avoid a toxic culture 575
Charmine E.J. Härtel
37 An identity-based view of emotional ambivalence and its management in
organizations 589
Lu Wang and Michael G. Pratt
38 Functions of emotion from an organizational perspective 605
Agneta H. Fischer and Antony S.R. Manstead
Index 617
Figures
1.1 Schematic representation of affective space 18

1.2 Empirical representations of the valence/arousal model 20
1.3 Empirical representations of the NA/PA model 24
2.1 Negative affect–escalation relationships as a function of personal
responsibility derived from coping (a), depressive realism (b), and
cognitive dissonance (c) perspectives 51
2.2 The negative affect–escalation relationships as a function of personal
responsibility revealed in Studies 1, 2, and 3 52
8.1 A conceptual model of affect, satisfaction, and performance 137
11.1 A simplified model of emotional traits, emotions and CWB 186
14.1 Theory of action and job performance: best fit 230
14.2 Levels within the personality structure 232
14.3 Percentage improvement of emotional and social intelligence competencies
from behavioral measurement of different groups of MBA graduates
taking LEAD 240
16.1 Emotion scripts: a multi-level model 264
18.1 A model of emotional labour and its outcomes 302
19.1 Negative feedback loops for prescriptive and contextual emotional
display rules 322
19.2 The circumplex model of emotions with proposed expression management
strategies for contextual display rules 327
23.1 The EASI model 397
26.1 Dimensions of group emotional competence and GEC norms 446
31.1 A proposed model for future research 507
32.1 Interactive, process model of leader and follower emotional interaction 514
33.1 Positive emotional climates and transformative cooperation 538
36.1 Conceptualization of a healthy emotional culture 580
36.2 The emotional learning cycle 582
viii
Tables
1.1 Summary of literature review results according to affect construct, theory,

measure and research area 30
2.1 Summary of the three theoretical perspectives with respect to the negative
affect–responsibility interaction on escalation of commitment 50
5.1 Profit increase for production strategy A and production strategy B for
each possible state of the world 94
13.1 Comparison of models of emotional intelligence used in business 215
14.1 Summary of evidence of divergent validity of ECI-2 clusters 235
14.2 ESCI and EQ-i subscales comparison 237
16.1 Generic emotion scripts 266
16.2 Organizational emotion scripts 277
18.1 Types of emotion regulation strategy 303
19.1 Summary and comparison of prescriptive and contextual display rules 326
22.1 Affect as an antecedent to justice perceptions 364
22.2 Justice as a predictor of affect 374
22.3 Affect as a mediator of reactions to justice 379
22.4 The interaction between justice and affect 383
37.1 Strategies and tactics for managing emotional ambivalence 597
ix
Contributors
Blake E. Ashforth, W.P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University, USA.
Neal M. Ashkanasy, UQ Business School, University of Queensland, Australia.
Lisa Feldman Barrett, Department of Psychology, Boston College, USA.
Laura G. Barron, Department of Psychology, Rice University, USA.
Joyce E. Bono, Department of Human Resources and Industrial Relations, University of

Minnesota, USA.
Richard E. Boyatzis, Weatherhead School of Management, Case Western Reserve

University, USA.
Zinta S. Byrne, Department of Psychology, Colorado State University, USA.
Tiffani G. Cage, Department of Psychology, Saint Louis University, USA.
Yochi Cohen-Charash, Department of Psychology, Baruch College and Graduate Center,

City University of New York, USA.
Cary L. Cooper, Pro Vice Chancellor (External Relations) and Distinguished Professor of
Organizational Psychology and Health, Lancaster University, UK.
Stéphane Côté, Joseph L. Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, Canada.
Frederic Damen, Atos Consulting World Class HR, Utrecht, The Netherlands.
Marie T. Dasborough, Department of Management, University of Miami, USA.
Catherine S. Daus, Department of Psychology, Southern Illinois University Edwardsville,

USA.
Timothy DeGroot, Spears School of Business, Oklahoma State University, USA.
James M. Diefendorff, Department of Psychology, University of Akron, USA.
Vanessa Urch Druskat, Whittemore School of Business and Economics, University of

New Hampshire, USA.
Agneta H. Fischer, Department of Social Psychology, University of Amsterdam, The

Netherlands.
x
Contributors xi
Cynthia D. Fisher, School of Business, Bond University, Australia.
Julie Fitness, Psychology Department, Macquarie University, Australia.
Barbara L. Fredrickson, Department of Psychology, University of North Carolina at

Chapel Hill, USA.
Michael Frese, Department of Psychology, University of Giessen, Germany.
Ilan G. Gewurz, Ross School of Business Executive Education, University of Michigan,

USA.
Donald E. Gibson, Dolan School of Business, Fairfield University, USA.
Shlomo Hareli, Graduate School of Business, University of Haifa, Israel.
Charmine E.J. Härtel, Department of Management, Monash University, Australia.
Nathan S. Hartman, Boler School of Business, John Carroll University, USA.
David Holman, Institute of Work Psychology, University of Sheffield, UK.
Ronald H. Humphrey, School of Business, Virginia Commonwealth University, USA.
Quy Nguyen Huy, INSEAD, France.
Remus Ilies, Eli Broad College of Business and Graduate School of Management.
Michigan State University, USA.
Sirkwoo Jin, Robert H. Smith School of Business, University of Maryland, USA.
Peter J. Jordan, Griffith Business School, Griffith University, Australia.
Timothy A. Judge, Warrington College of Business Administration, University of

Florida, USA.
John D. Kammeyer-Mueller, Warrington College of Business Administration, University

of Florida, USA.
Ruth Kanfer, School of Psychology, Georgia Institute of Technology, USA.
Janet B. Kellett, School of Business, Virginia Commonwealth University, USA.
Shirli Kopelman, Ross School of Business, University of Michigan, USA.
Carol T. Kulik, School of Management, University of South Australia, Australia.

xii Research companion to emotion in organizations
Rajesh Kumar, Business School, University of Nottingham, UK.
Sandra A. Lawrence, Griffith Business School, Griffith University, Australia.
Antony S.R. Manstead, School of Psychology, Cardiff University, UK.
David Martinez-Iñigo, Department of Social Science, University Rey Juan Carlos,

Madrid, Spain.
Susan Michie, School of Business Administration, University of Evansville, USA.
Christopher T.H. Miners, Joseph L. Rotman School of Management, University of

Toronto, Canada.
Sue Moon, Joseph L. Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, Canada.
Debra L. Nelson, Spears School of Business, Oklahoma State University, USA.
Carmen K. Ng, Department of Management of Organizations, Hong Kong University of

Science & Technology, Hong Kong.
Brian Parkinson, Department of Experimental Psychology, Oxford University, UK.
Lisa M. Penney, Department of Psychology, University of Houston, USA.
Michael G. Pratt, Carroll School of Management, Boston College, USA.
Anat Rafaeli, William Davidson Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management,

Technion – Israel Institute of Technology, Israel.
Johannes Rank, School of Management, University of Surrey, UK.
Rebecca J. Reichard, Kravis Leadership Institute, Claremont McKenna College, USA.
Erin M. Richard, Florida Institute of Technology, USA.
Ronald E. Riggio, Kravis Leadership Institute, Claremont McKenna College, USA.
Rebekah Russell-Bennett, School of Advertising, Marketing & Public Relations,

Queensland University of Technology, Australia.
Richard Saavedra, Whittemore School of Business & Economics, University of New

Hampshire, USA.
Vera Sacharin, Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, USA.

Contributors xiii
Leslie E. Sekerka, Departments of Management and Psychology, Menlo College,

Atherton, CA, USA.
Myeong-Gu Seo, Robert H. Smith School of Business, University of Maryland, USA.
Marta Sinclair, Department of International Business and Asian Studies, Griffith

University, Australia.
Randall G. Sleeth, School of Business, Virginia Commonwealth University, USA.
Paul E. Spector, Department of Psychology, University of South Florida, USA.
Patrick C. Stubblebine, Williams College of Business, Xavier University, USA.
Alastair Tombs, UQ Business School, University of Queensland, Australia.
Marc A. Tomiuk, Department of Marketing, École des HEC, Canada.
Peter Totterdell, Institute of Work Psychology, University of Sheffield, UK.
Herman H.M. Tse, Newcastle Graduate School of Business, University of Newcastle,

Australia.
Wilco W. van Dijk, Department of Social Psychology, VU University Amsterdam, The

Netherlands.
Frenk van Harreveld, Department of Social Psychology, University of Amsterdam, The

Netherlands.
Gerben A. Van Kleef, Department of Social Psychology, University of Amsterdam, The

Netherlands.
Barbara van Knippenberg, Department of Psychology, Free University Amsterdam, The

Netherlands.
Daan van Knippenberg, RSM Erasmus University, Rotterdam, The Netherlands.
David T. Wagner, Eli Broad College of Business and Graduate School of Management,
Michigan State University, USA.
Lu Wang, College of Business, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, USA.
Steven B. Wolff, Hay Group, McClelland Center for Research and Innovation, Boston, USA.
Kin Fai Ellick Wong, Department of Management of Organizations, Hong Kong

University of Science & Technology, Hong Kong.
Acknowledgments
The editors would like to acknowledge the many people who have contributed to the com-
pilation of this volume. First, of course, our wonderful list of authors, who have con-
tributed brilliant chapters – sometimes at late notice – that cover the full domain of this
burgeoning field. But then there are the ‘unsung’ heroes, without whose assistance, the
volume would never have been published. These include our senior research assistants
(Gerry Wood at Lancaster and Kaylene Ascough at Queensland) and the Edward Elgar
team, led by Karen McCarthy and Jennifer Wilcox. Special mention should be made of
the contributions of Marissa Edwards, who has been largely responsible for managing the
editorial process, and Marie Dasborough, who helped to compile the original list of con-
tributors.
xiv
Introduction
Neal M. Ashkanasy and Cary L. Cooper
Studs Terkel (1974), in introducing his acclaimed book, Working: People Talk about What
They Do All Day and How They Feel about What They Do, after interviewing hundreds of
American workers about their job, suggested:
Work is by its very nature, about violence, to the spirit as well as to the body. It is about ulcers,
as well as accidents, about shouting matches as well as fistfights, about nervous breakdowns as
well as kicking the dog around. It is, above all (or beneath all), about daily humiliations. To
survive the day is triumph enough for the walking wounded among the great many of us. (p. xi)
Although this is ostensibly a rather bleak view of work and organizational life, it high-
lights the fact that emotions in most organizations and workplaces run high. And the field
of emotions at work is now a serious topic of concern. Recently, for example, Weiss and
Brief (2001) provided a historical account of what they termed ‘affect at work’, high-
lighting that the precursor to this field of study, in the form of job satisfaction research,
had already by 1996 seen the publication of more than 12 400 studies (Spector, 1996).
Weiss and Brief then guide us through the various theories and paradigms from the 1930s
and onwards from Rexford Hersey (Hersey, 1932) to Weitz (l952) to Herzberg et al. (l959)
to Goleman (1998) and beyond. This is one of the fastest-growing areas of research in
organizational behavior, and one that deserves, with the increasing stress levels and
strained relationships at work, our serious academic attention (see Ashkanasy & Ashton-
James, 2005).
This interest is also reflected in a series of recently published collected volumes (e.g.,
Fineman, 1993, 2000; Ashkanasy et al., 2000, 2002; Payne & Cooper, 2001; Lord et al.,
2002; Härtel et al., 2005) and special issues of journals (e.g., Fisher & Ashkanasy, 2000;
Weiss, 2001, 2002; Fox, 2002; Humphrey, 2002a; Ashkanasy, 2004; Jordan, 2006). In 2003,
moreover, Barsade, Brief, and Spataro declared that an ‘affective revolution’ had taken
place in organizational behavior research.
But why have emotions at work become such a topical area? The enterprise culture of
the 1980s and the ‘flexible workforce’ of the 1990s helped to transform economies in
Western Europe and North America. But, as we were to discover, by the end of these
decades, there was a substantial personal cost for many individual employees. This cost
was captured by a single word – stress. Indeed, stress has found as firm a place in our
vocabulary as laptops, Big Brother, and junk bonds.
These excessive pressures in the workplace have been very costly to business. For
example, the collective cost of stress to US organizations has been estimated at approxi-
mately $150 billion a year. In the UK, stress costs the economy an estimated 5 to 10 per
cent of GNP per annum. In 2006, for example, the Confederation of British Industry
found that workplace stress was the second biggest cause of sickness in the UK economy.
If some of the other stress-related categories are added (poor workplace morale, impact
of long hours, personal problems), it is the most significant bottom-line cost to UK Ltd.
1
2 Research companion to emotion in organizations
By the end of 2004, the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development’s (CIPD)
national survey found that stress at work was the largest source of long-term sickness
absence in the UK.
Since the industrial revolution, every decade has had its unique defining characteristics.
Innovation and challenging the established norms of society epitomized the 1960s; indus-
trial strife and conflict between employer and employee the 1970s; the ‘enterprise culture’,
with its strategic alliances, privatizations and the like, the 1980s; and the short-term con-
tract culture, with its outsourcing and downsizing and long working hours culture, the
1990s.
We are also seeing an Americanization of the workplace spreading throughout the
developed world. This trend toward what is euphemistically called the ‘flexible’ workforce
originated in the UK. Britain led the way in Europe toward privatizing the public sector
in the 1980s. Its workforce was substantially downsized during the recession of the late
1980s and early 1990s; outsourcing many of its corporate functions, it left the recession
behind in the early 1990s, faster than its European counterparts. However, this scenario
of ‘leaner’ organizations, intrinsic job insecurity and a culture of longer working hours is
beginning to have an adverse effect on employee attitudes and behavior, and creating the
charged emotional atmosphere in many workplaces.
A large survey of British managers a few years ago found that these changes – down-
sizing, outsourcing, delayering and the like – led to substantially increased job insecurity,
lowered morale and, most important of all, the erosion of motivation and loyalty. These
changes were perceived to have led to an increase in profitability and productivity, but
decision making was slower and the organization was shown to have lost the right mix of
human resource skills and experience in the process, as well as creating heightened emo-
tions at work (see Worrall & Cooper, 2004, 2006).
More worrying about this trend was the major increase in working hours and the
impact of this on the health and well-being of managers and their families. The survey
found that 81 per cent of executives worked more than 40 hours a week, 32 per cent more
than 50 hours and 10 per cent more than 60 hours. Also, a substantial minority frequently
worked at weekends.
What is so disturbing about this trend toward a ‘long-hours culture’ is the managers’
perception of the damage it is inflicting on them and their families. The survey showed
that 71 per cent of the executives reported that these long hours damaged their health; 86
per cent said that they adversely affected their relationship with their children; 79 per cent
that they damaged their relationship with their partner; and 68 per cent that long hours
reduced their productivity.
Another manifestation is the increasing level of job insecurity. Historically, in many
developed countries, very few white-collar, managerial and professional workers have expe-
rienced high levels of job insecurity. Even blue-collar workers who were laid off were fre-
quently re-employed when times got better. While possession of emotional intelligence may
provide employees with some resilience to deal with this (Jordan et al., 2002), the question
that we have to ask is: can human beings cope with a permanent state of job insecurity?
In the past, the security and continuity of organizational structures also provided train-
ing, development and careers. This substantial decline in perceived job security was
coupled with a huge decline in employee satisfaction in terms of employment security and
a concomitant rise in the emotional atmosphere at work.
Introduction 3
The big questions about the developments are: is the trend toward short-term contracts,
long hours and intrinsically job-insecure workplaces the way forward for us? How will this
affect the health, well-being and emotional stability of employees and of the workplace?
Can organizations continue to demand commitment from employees they don’t commit
to? What will this culture of long hours do to the two-earner family, which is now the
majority family unit in developed countries? In comparative terms, the most developed
economies are doing remarkably well, but the levels of job insecurity and dissatisfaction
are high and growing. Developing and maintaining a ‘feel-good’ factor at work, and in
the economy generally, is not just about the bottom-line factor: profitability. In a civilized
society the feel-good factor should include quality of life issues as well, like hours of work,
family time, manageable workloads, control over one’s career, some sense of job security
and a divide of emotional stability.
The chapters in this Companion

To answer these kinds of questions, we seek in this compendium to provide a wide selec-
tion of review essays from many of the leading scholars working in the field of emotion
and who are actively studying its antecedents and effects in organizational settings. Based
on Ashkanasy’s (2003a) multi-level of emotion in organizational settings, we have struc-
tured this volume into five parts, corresponding to each of the levels identified by
Ashkanasy, as follows:
● Part I Emotion and affect as within-person phenomena This level represents within-
person temporal variations in emotions, behavior, and performance. Chapters in this
part cover the structure and measurement of emotion; the antecedents and conse-
quences of positive and negative emotions; and research on work satisfaction and
performance.
● Part II Emotion as an individual difference variable This includes studies of indi-
vidual differences in emotion. The chapters included here deal with the popular but
controversial construct of emotional intelligence.
● Part III Emotional effects in dyadic interactions This level includes research on
the expression, recognition, and regulation of emotion; emotional labor; social
interactions at work; and negotiation.
● Part IV Emotion as a group-level phenomenon Research at the group level of
analysis includes the effects and propagation of mood and emotion in groups, and
leadership of groups.
● Part V Organizational-level emotion research Topics in this part include organ-
izational climate, culture, and identity, as well as research into organizational
change.
Part I Emotion and affect as within-person phenomena

Weiss and Cropanzano (1996) point out that emotion is inherently ephemeral. Thus, while
researchers have identified that individuals have dispositional predispositions to experi-
ence positive and negative emotion (Watson & Tellegen, 1985), people invariably experi-
ence highs and lows in their (positive and/or negative) emotional states on a day-to-day
and moment-by-moment basis, especially in organizational settings. This is the focus of
the chapters in Part I: the ephemeral nature of positive and negative emotion and affect
at work and the nexus of emotion and performance. (The final chapter in this part dis-
cusses issues of measurement within this context.)
In the opening chapter of Part I, Myeong-Gu Seo, Lisa Feldman Barrett and Sirkwoo
Jin provide an integrative review of the structure of affect in organizational research,
focusing on the valence/arousal and NA/PA models. The authors begin with a historical
and theoretical overview of each model. Next, Seo and his colleagues identify points of
congruence and difference between the models, discuss implications for researchers, and
review how these models have been used in organizational research to date. Overall, the
authors suggest that research into the structure of affect has been compromised by a frag-
mented understanding of the affective experience; the dominant use of certain models
and measures; and a narrow research orientation.
Carmen K. Ng and Kin Fai Ellick Wong next examine (Chapter 2) how emotion
influences decision making in organizational settings, focusing specifically on recent studies
that have explored the effect of negative emotions on making decisions under escalation sit-
uations. The authors begin with a discussion of the emotion and decision making literature,
noting that the majority of research investigating escalation of commitment has investi-
gated cognitive rather than affective determinants. Next, they review the results of their own
studies which suggest that people seek to remove themselves from escalation situations so
as to reduce their negative emotions. They argue further that anticipated regret can exert an
important influence on decision making and provide evidence for its effects in this context.
In Chapter 3, Julie Fitness deals with the potentially negative or harmful consequences
of the experience and expression of negative emotions in organizations. Fitness begins
with a brief discussion of the functionalist perspective to emotions, and continues with a
review of the empirical literature concerning the features and functions of specific nega-
tive emotions, namely, anger, hate, disgust, contempt, and shame. She then considers how
emotional states and dispositions may influence employees’ cognitions and behaviors, and
maintains that researchers should consider the role of power, gender, and injustice in man-
aging emotions in organizations.
Continuing the discussion of negative emotions, in Chapter 4 Sandra A. Lawrence
reviews the nature of emotion-induced toxicity in organizational settings, and the conse-
quences of this phenomenon in employees. Lawrence initially considers the relationship
between organizational justice-related events, negative emotions, and employee outcomes.
Based on evidence from multiple research domains, Lawrence argues that the repeated
suppression of intense negative emotions is responsible for producing ‘toxic’ effects in
employees. She argues against using the term ‘toxic emotions’, and offers alternative
expressions to describe this phenomenon, namely ‘emotion-inducing toxicity’ and ‘toxic
emotional reactions’.
In Chapter 5, Wilco W. van Dijk and Frenk van Harreveld explore the definition and
nature of disappointment and regret, and consider how individuals experience these emo-
tions. Here, they note that although both disappointment and regret arise following an
unwanted outcome, the emotions differ markedly in experiential content, particularly
with respect to action tendencies and motivational goals. Van Dijk and van Harreveld
argue that disappointment and regret arise from different sources of comparison, and
discuss the key role of counterfactual thinking in this context. They conclude by consid-
ering the regulation of these emotions, and make suggestions for some specific
antecedent- and response-focused regulation strategies.
Introduction 5
The focus in Chapter 6 moves to an examination of the influence of affect-related vari-

ables on creativity, innovation and initiative. Authors Johannes Rank and Michael Frese
first consider the effect of positive and negative affect on these three processes, noting that
while researchers have found generally a positive relationship between positive affect and
creativity, studies investigating the role of negative affect have obtained mixed results.
Next, Rank and Frese consider the impact of discrete emotions on these processes, includ-
ing a discussion of the role of self-conscious emotions. The authors conclude with a dis-
cussion of several individual- and group-level variables relevant in this context, including
emotional intelligence, emotion control and affective tone.
In the following three chapters of Part I, the focus moves to the nexus of emotion and
performance. In Chapter 7, Cynthia D. Fisher explores the nature of the person–task–
performance transaction, arguing that researchers should consider the nature of the task
and task performance as immediate antecedents of affect and emotion in the workplace.
Fisher considers how task characteristics shape participants’ emotions; how employees’
perceived performance may influence their affective responses; and discusses the specific
emotions that may arise before, during, and after performance. She also considers the
individual differences and characteristics of the work environment that may influence how
individuals respond affectively to perceived performance.
In Chapter 8, Timothy A. Judge and John D. Kammeyer-Mueller review the literature
concerning the relationship between affect, satisfaction, and performance, and present a
conceptual model to demonstrate these linkages. Their model has five paths: Path A rep-
resents the effect of affective traits on affective states; Path B represents the effect of
affective traits on work outcomes, including satisfaction and performance; Path C repre-
sents the effect of affective states on work outcomes; Path D represents the effect of situ-
ational factors on affective states; and Path E represents the effect of emotion regulation
processes. The authors review each path separately and offer suggestions for future
research.
This theme is continued in Chapter 9, by David T. Wagner and Remus Ilies. These
authors adopt Weiss and Cropanzano’s (1996) Affective Events Theory to explain the link
between affect and these organizational outcomes. In addition, they review the evidence
linking trait and state affect, respectively, to satisfaction; and examine how affect relates
to task performance, customer service performance, team performance, organizational
citizenship behaviors, counterproductive work behavior, and creativity. The authors con-
sider the potential mechanisms underlying the relationship between affect and perfor-
mance, focusing in particular on motivation, goal setting and self-efficacy.
The next two chapters deal with particular aspects of emotion and performance. In
Chapter 10, Ruth Kanfer and Patrick C. Stubblebine review theory and research into the
relationship between affect and work motivation processes. The authors begin with a
summary of contemporary approaches to motivation, including a detailed review of
explicit and implicit motivation systems. Their subsequent discussion of the role of affect
and emotions in this context focuses on three major issues: (1) the structure of affect and
emotions; (2) how affect and emotions influence explicit work motivation processes; and
(3) the relationship between work events, affect, emotions and their outcomes. They con-
clude by suggesting three key themes to guide future research in this area: affect-driven
motivation processes; motivational signatures of discrete emotions; and social and tem-
poral influences on affective reactions to work events.
Lisa M. Penney and Paul E. Spector focus in Chapter 11 more specifically on the rela-
tionship between emotions and counterproductive work behavior (CWB). Drawing on
cognitive appraisal theories of emotion, the authors present a model of CWB that inte-
grates and simplifies previous models presented to date. Penney and Spector suggest that
environmental conditions elicit events that individuals may perceive as stressful, which
give rise to negative emotions and ultimately CWB. These negative emotions are consid-
ered to play a critical mediating role between perceived events and CWB. Individual
differences are also implicated in the model. The authors then review the evidence from
workplace studies that supports their model, and provide a discussion of the role of
emotion regulation in the relationship between emotion and CWB.
In the final chapter of Part I (Chapter 12), Marie T. Dasborough, Marta Sinclair,
Rebekah Russell-Bennett and Alastair Tombs discuss measurement of emotion, and offer
a critical evaluation of several popular emotion measures. Dasborough and her colleagues
initially consider some key questions concerning the definition of emotion and the conse-
quences for self-report measurement, before turning their attention to specific measures.
Here, they review verbal and visual self-report measures of emotion and discuss some of
the problems associated with each. They also discuss alternatives to self-report measures,
such as physiological measures, neurobiological measures and behavioral observation,
noting that these are also accompanied by particular challenges. The authors conclude
with recommendations for researchers measuring emotions in organizational settings.
Part II Emotion as an individual difference variable

Part II authors deal with a contemporary and controversial individual difference variable:
emotional intelligence (EI). While debate on the EI construct continues today (e.g., see
Spector, 2005), there are many advocates who argue that it is important in organizational
settings (e.g., Goleman, 1998; Ashkanasy & Daus, 2005). The three chapters in this part
all deal with different aspects of EI and its application in organizational settings.
In the opening chapter (Chapter 13), Peter J. Jordan focuses on how emotional intelli-
gence has been used in business settings, and evaluates the extent to which empirical evi-
dence supports the view that EI contributes to work performance. Jordan reports the
various definitions and measures of EI that have been used in business settings and the
extent to which these measures are associated with performance, concluding that no single
method or measure to date has captured the essence of EI. He suggests that a multi-
method approach using self-report and behavioral evidence seems to be the most promis-
ing method for measuring the EI construct.
Richard E. Boyatzis in Chapter 14 reviews the competency or behavioral approach to
emotional and social intelligence. In an initial literature review, Boyatzis offers criteria for
labeling a concept as an ‘intelligence’, considers individual performance in the context of
a basic contingency theory, and then discusses competencies in the context of personal-
ity. Next, the author reviews Boyatzis and Goleman’s model of emotional and social intel-
ligence, and discusses measures of emotional and social intelligence. He argues further
that it is possible to identify tipping points for outstanding performance, and presents
research that suggests that individuals can develop their emotional and social intelligence
competencies using training programs and education.
Finally, in Chapter 15, Catherine S. Daus and Tiffani G. Cage review the literature on
emotional intelligence training in organizations, based on Mayer, Salovey and Caruso’s
Introduction 7
(1999, 2000) four-branch ability model of emotional intelligence. Daus and Cage consider
both general and specific EI training that has been offered with respect to each branch.
They recommend that researchers focus their efforts on developing empirically sound pro-
grams based on the ability model of EI, and argue that trainers should conduct an
emotion-focused needs assessment with respect to organizational, job and person-level
needs prior to training. Finally, the authors offer recommendations about the types of
tools that could be used when conducting the assessment, and how to use the needs assess-
ment to develop content for training.
Part III Emotional effects in dyadic interactions

The nine chapters in Part III deal with the manner in which emotion is regulated and com-
municated to others in dyadic interactions and social situations. Traditionally encapsu-
lated in the idea of emotional labor (Hochschild, 1983), the field has now expanded into
understanding the nature of emotional regulation and the processes of emotional control
in negotiation.
Chapter 16 opens Part III. Here, Donald E. Gibson presents a multi-level model of
emotion scripts in organizations. Specifically, an emotion script refers to an individual’s
knowledge of emotion episodes and the prototypical sequence of events characterizing
particular emotions. Gibson argues that scripts can emerge at multiple levels, from neuro-
logical to the organization, group and individual level. The model includes five types of
scripts, each of which corresponds to a particular level: (1) biological; (2) cognitive; (3)
social; (4) relational; and (5) organizational. These scripts range with respect to context
and script specificity, with biological scripts considered the general foundation on which
succeeding, progressively complex scripts build and operate. After providing a compre-
hensive review of the model, Gibson concludes with suggestions for future research.
In the following chapter (Chapter 17), Stéphane Côté, Sue Moon and Christopher T.H.
Miners review the literature concerning emotion regulation in the workplace. They
present a definition of emotion regulation and focus initially on three major dimensions
of regulation: its forms, directions, and the regulation of discrete emotions. Next, they
review the evidence for the consequences of emotion regulation for two specific work out-
comes, namely, work strain and job performance. Following this discussion, Côté and his
colleagues turn their attention to the potential mechanisms linking emotion regulation to
work outcomes, and consider the role of emotional dissonance, personal control, effort,
facial feedback, and social interaction. They conclude with suggestions for future
research, including understanding the mechanisms underlying regulation, studying mod-
eration effects, and identifying wise versus unwise regulation.
Moving on to consideration of emotional labor, David Holman, David Martinez-Iñigo
and Peter Totterdell offer in Chapter 18 an integrative review, emphasizing understand-
ing the positive and negative effects of emotional labor on employee well-being. The
authors present a process model of emotional labor involving multiple components,
including antecedents (e.g., affective events, emotion rules and dissonance), regulation
processes, task performance (i.e., emotion displays), customer reactions, resources and
consequences. The authors use this model to illustrate how emotional labor affects
employee well-being, and offer a discussion of how individual and contextual factors may
influence this process. In conclusion they summarize the strengths of the emotional labor
research to date, and suggest directions for future studies in this area.
In Chapter 19, James M. Diefendorff and Erin M. Richard also review the literature
surrounding emotional display rules and contrast two major conceptualizations:
prescriptive versus contextual display rules. While prescriptive display rules govern
employees’ emotional displays across many interactions, contextual display rules are more
flexible and depend on the situation at a given moment. Building on Diefendorff and
Gosserand (2003), the authors propose a complex model describing the relationship
between these conceptualizations. Here, they argue that display rules function at two
levels in the performance goal hierarchy, such that contextual display rules serve as sub-
goals that are initiated in order to achieve higher-order prescriptive display rules. The
authors also provide a discussion of the role of felt emotions and interaction targets in
shaping contextual display rules, and offer suggestions for future studies.
In Chapter 20, Blake E. Ashforth, Marc A. Tomiuk and Carol T. Kulik focus on emo-
tional labor and emotional contagion, and specifically examine how service agents per-
ceive the role of emotion in service encounters. Here, they report the results of a
qualitative study with 105 service agents from a variety of occupations. Among many
reported findings, the authors note that employees often engaged in emotional labor
proactively to regulate clients’ emotions and behaviors, and that emotional labor is not
always effortful and appears to become easier over time. Furthermore, they found that
service agents were generally aware when emotional contagion was occurring, and some
tried to suppress or create contagion as desired.
Chapter 21 is the first of two chapters that deal with the broader issue of social inter-
actions at work. In this chapter, Shlomo Hareli, Anat Rafaeli and Brian Parkinson con-
sider the interpersonal functions and effects of emotion. Specifically, the authors argue
that emotions can shape and structure emerging patterns of social interactions in organ-
izations, and that exposure to others’ emotions influences observers in many ways.
Following a brief literature review, Hareli and his co-authors explore how emotions expe-
rienced by individuals affect those who perceive the emotions, specifically in the context
of organizational achievements, customer complaints, and negotiations. Finally, they
discuss determinants of the nature of interpersonal reactions to different emotions and
differential effects of certain emotions, and argue that the informational meanings asso-
ciated with emotions exert an important influence here.
Chapter 22 is the second chapter on the topic of social interactions. Authors Yochi
Cohen-Charash and Zinta S. Byrne review the evidence for the relationship between affect
and perceived (in)justice in organizational settings. They review research examining state
affect (i.e., moods and emotions) and trait affect (i.e., positive and negative affectivity) as
a predictor, moderator and mediator of justice perceptions. The authors also review
research examining justice perceptions as the predictor, moderator and mediator of
affective reactions to events, noting that the relationship between affect and justice is
complex, and that moderating and mediating variables appear to play an important role.
They conclude with a list of specific suggestions for future research, including the need to
resolve some of the conflicting findings identified in the literature and the need for more
cross-cultural research.
The final two chapters in Part III deal with emotion in negotiation and conflict resolu-
tion. In Chapter 23, Gerben A. Van Kleef reviews the current state of research in this field,
focussing in particular on studies examining discrete emotions. Next, in an effort to rec-
oncile some of the inconsistent findings, he introduces a new model of the interpersonal
Introduction 9
effects of emotions in conflict and negotiation: the Emotions As Social Information

(EASI) model. The model suggests that emotions may shape interpersonal interactions
through two paths: an informational-strategic path and an affective-reactions path. Van
Kleef argues further that how people respond in negotiation situations depends on the
comparative motivational strength of the two routes. Here, he suggests that two sets of
moderators may play a role, namely individuals’ information-processing tendencies and
social–relational influences, such as status relations and organizational or cultural norms
governing the expression of emotion.
Chapter 24 is the final chapter in Part III. In it, Shirli Kopelman, Ilan G. Gewurz and
Vera Sacharin focus on the strategic response to displayed emotions in the negotiation
process. Following a literature review, the authors describe studies that have investigated
tactics for strategically responding to emotional displays. They note that a shortcoming
of the research to date is its failure to explain why strategies are likely to work in some sit-
uations and not others. Specifically, Kopelman and her colleagues argue that researchers
have neglected to explore the internal reality of the individual using the negotiation tactic.
Here, they argue that the responding negotiator must balance the attention paid to their
own internal state and the needs and behaviors of other parties. Ultimately, they suggest
that a negotiator’s ‘authentic presence’ determines the success or failure of strategic
responses to emotional displays.
Part IV Emotion as a group-level phenomenon

Emotions research in the context of groups and group leadership is burgeoning (e.g., see
Humphrey, 2002b), and this is reflected in Part IV, especially the topic of leadership,
which is the focus of six of the eight chapters.
In the opening chapter of Part IV (Chapter 25), Richard Saavedra provides an overall
picture of the role of emotion and mood in group settings and uses the metaphor of fire
or flame to describe major features of the emotional contagion process. Drawing heavily
on neurological and physiological evidence, Saavedra reviews the mechanisms underlying
emotion generation and transfer across individuals. He focuses specifically on how con-
tagion emerges in groups and its behavioral consequences. Additionally, he discusses the
role of emotional suppression in this context; how facial expression and body movements
can convey emotion; individual differences in susceptibility to contagion; how anxiety and
depression influence emotional responses; and how laughter and humor can help to
enhance mood, cohesion, creativity and performance in groups.
In Chapter 26, Vanessa Urch Druskat and Steven B. Wolff examine emotional intelli-
gence as a group phenomenon and describe how the awareness and management of
emotion can facilitate group effectiveness. The authors begin with a definition of emo-
tional intelligence and discuss its relevance in the team environment. Specifically, they
argue that emotional intelligence exists as a group-level norm about how individuals
should behave in a team. They describe how norms emerge and present nine emotional
competence norms and associated dimensions, which they argue ultimately lead to group
social capital. Overall, the authors maintain that organizations should develop the emo-
tional intelligence of their group members and facilitate the development of appropriate
norms in order to build trust, efficacy, identity and networks within and between groups.
The remaining six chapters in Part IV deal specifically with emotions and leadership.
In Chapter 27, Ronald H. Humphrey, Janet B. Kellett, Randall G. Sleeth and Nathan S.
Hartman provide a broad overview of recent trends in this area. The authors focus on
several key issues that represent promising trends, namely the relationship between emo-
tions and core leadership traits and competencies, how leaders influence affective events
in the workplace, and the link between emotion and important leader behaviors (e.g.,
empathy). They also consider how emotions relate to ethical leader behavior. Humphrey
and his colleagues identify fertile topics for future research throughout their discussion.
These include the relationship between emotions and cognitive intelligence, and the role
of emotions in shared leadership and authentic leadership.
In Chapter 28, Daan and Barbara van Knippenberg, together with co-authors Gerben
A. Van Kleef and Frederic Damen, observe that the empirical research in this area has
focused on three issues: (1) the influence of leader affect on leader effectiveness; (2) how
leaders can influence followers’ affect, and in turn their attitudes and behavior; and (3)
leaders’ ability to manage their own and others’ affective states. The authors note that
many issues remain unresolved and identify areas for future research, including the
effectiveness of positive versus negative displays of leader affect, and how follower affect
may influence leader responses and effectiveness.
Debra L. Nelson, Susan Michie and Timothy DeGroot examine in more detail in
Chapter 29 the nature and process of leader expression of emotion and its possible effects
on followers. To begin, the authors review the literature on emotional expressivity and its
functions and effects in organizations. Next, the authors focus specifically on the role of
nonverbal cues (e.g., facial expressions) and vocal cues (e.g., vocal intensity) in leaders’
expressions of emotions. Their suggestions for future research include investigating a
broader range of discrete emotions in leader emotional expression, examining how vocal
and nonverbal cues are used to communicate emotions, and gender differences.
In Chapter 30, Joyce E. Bono and Laura G. Barron shift the spotlight to the role of
emotional management in the leadership process. In their initial review of the literature,
the authors focus on two key issues: (1) whether transformational and charismatic leaders
differ emotionally from leaders who do not exhibit these behaviors; and (2) how leaders’
emotional expressions influence their followers and members of work groups. They
contend further that leaders’ emotions may shape their employees’ emotions through two
mechanisms: (a) primitive contagion; and (b) the tactical use of emotions to indicate
success and failure, and to emphasize the importance of verbal communications. Next,
they compare cross-cultural differences in the meaning and interpretation of leaders’
emotional displays. Here, Bono and Barron suggest that US managers are likely to make
more deliberate use of their emotions than do Japanese managers, and that this difference
can be attributed to cultural differences in assertiveness.
Moving on now to the leader–team nexus, Herman H.M. Tse and Neal M. Ashkanasy
identify and discuss in Chapter 31 the implications of affect in ‘vertical’ supervisor–
subordinate exchange relationships and ‘lateral’ team–member exchange relationships in
teams. Adopting Social Exchange Theory (Blau, 1964) and Affective Events Theory
(Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996) as unifying frameworks, Tse and Ashkanasy propose a
model outlining the role of affect in facilitating vertical and lateral exchange relationships
among supervisors, subordinates and co-workers in teams. Specifically, the authors argue
that the dyadic relationship between supervisors and subordinates determines subordi-
nates’ perceptions about relationship development with other team members, and indi-
viduals’ affect is conceptualized as a mechanism linking LMX and TMX together.
Introduction 11
In the final chapter of Part IV (Chapter 32), Rebecca J. Reichard and Ronald E. Riggio
present a process model of the emotional exchange between leaders and followers. Their
approach is based on the view that leadership is an interactive engagement between
leaders and followers, and involves a bidirectional relationship. Specifically, the authors
argue that an ongoing process of leader emotional awareness, experience and regulation
influences the follower via the leader’s emotional expression and the follower’s emotional
sensitivity. The follower, in turn, engages in processes of awareness, experience and regu-
lation. Subsequently, the follower’s emotional expression and the leader’s emotional sen-
sitivity influences the leader’s awareness, experience and regulation. Other important
elements of the model include the perception and attribution processes of both leaders
and followers and the emotional context of the situation. Ultimately, these processes lead
to leader–follower relationship quality and an emotional climate.
Part V Organizational-level emotion research

Part V deals with emotions at the organizational level of analysis. This is the least
researched facet of emotions in organizations to date, but arguably with the greatest
potential. The six chapters in Part V cover the role of organizational culture, climate and
identity, as well as emotions in strategic management and organizational change. The
section is rounded out with another look at a multi-level view of emotion in organizations.
In the opening chapter (Chapter 33), Leslie E. Sekerka and Barbara L. Fredrickson
explain how positive emotional climates can help to build and sustain transformation in
organizations. They begin with a discussion of a particular form of organizational change,
namely transformative cooperation, and consider how positive emotions contribute to this
phenomenon. The authors review studies emphasizing the benefits of positive emotions in
organizations, focusing specifically on broaden-and-build theory. They propose that organ-
izations can initiate transformative cooperation with strength-based inquiry, and continue
this through a process of broadening and building. Central to this idea is that positive emo-
tions will lead to a positive climate, which will lead to increased organizational identification
and relational strength, which in turn will influence organizational growth, performance,
and community development.
In Chapter 34, Quy Nguyen Huy argues against the generally negative view of emotion
in the strategy literature, proposing conditions under which it can improve an organiza-
tion’s dynamic capability. He suggests specific emotion management routines that facili-
tate strategic agility and elicit distinct affective responses, which in turn prime two
strategic processes: (1) reducing the cost of strategic change; and (2) organizational learn-
ing. Furthermore, Huy discusses how managing contrasting emotions at the individual
level differs from managing patterns of contrasting emotions in organizations. He argues
further that employees’ contrasting emotional states such as fear and pride can reduce
their resistance to strategic change, and how dissatisfaction and perceived safety in work
interactions can enhance organizational learning. Finally, Huy provides recommenda-
tions for future researchers, including using a range of measurement tools to study emo-
tions in organizational settings and triangulation of methods.
Rajesh Kumar focuses in Chapter 35 on the role of emotions in the development of
strategic alliances. He suggests specific antecedents and consequences of emotions at the
formation, operation and outcome stages of alliance development, paying particular
attention to how the presence of negative emotions may influence interactions at each
stage and future stages. Additionally, Kumar considers some of the methodological chal-
lenges of studying emotions, with a particular focus on the difficulties associated with
alliance settings. For example, he notes that alliances and their associated emotional
dynamic are evolving phenomena, and interpretations of emotions may change over time.
Here, he argues that qualitative methods may enable researchers to obtain new perspec-
tives and insights into the phenomena.
Moving now to considerations of emotions and culture, Charmine E.J. Härtel in
Chapter 36 focuses specifically on the notion of an emotional culture. She argues that
organizational culture plays an important role in determining the affective events that
occur in the workplace and also influences how employees interpret and respond to these
events. Furthermore, culture fulfills an emotional need for the individual and also func-
tions as a regulatory tool of emotions. Next, Härtel describes the defining features and
emotions of a healthy versus toxic culture. Specifically, she compares the characteristics
of an extremely individualistic culture, an extremely collectivist culture and a healthy
culture, and considers the likely emotional experiences of employees in each context.
Finally, Härtel discusses the benefits of cultivating a healthy emotional culture at work,
and emphasizes the role of a positive emotional learning cycle in achieving this goal.
In Chapter 37, Lu Wang and Michael G. Pratt focus on emotional ambivalence in organi-
zations. They argue that identity can help to integrate and extend previous conceptualizations
of ambivalence, and discuss two identity-related sources of emotional ambivalence in orga-
nizations: (1) when individual-level organizational and non-organizational identities are in
conflict; and (2) when two collective-level organizational identities collide. Furthermore, the
authors suggest that human resource management practices, as well as structural changes
designed to manage organizational identities, can be adopted to manage employees’ emo-
tional ambivalence in their relationships with their organizations. They conclude with
specific suggestions for future research arising from their discussions in the chapter.
Chapter 38 is the final chapter in this volume. In it, Agneta H. Fischer and Antony S.R.
Manstead revisit the topic of emotions and their function across multiple levels of orga-
nizational analysis. The authors suggest that emotions can be conceptualized at four levels
in the workplace: individual, interpersonal, group and organizational. In contrast to tra-
ditional views of emotions as individual reactions to events, however, Fischer and
Manstead argue that organizations can elicit, shape and regulate emotions. They argue
further that organizational emotions fulfill two functions: (1) they enhance commitment,
cooperation and establish organizational boundaries; and (2) they motivate performance
and competition among employees. The authors conclude with a discussion of the role of
emotion in organizational culture, and discuss in particular how negative emotions can
be managed effectively.
Conclusions
The 38 chapters in this Companion offer a wide overview of the major research trends in
studies of emotion and affect in organizations. As is immediately evident from the content
of these chapters, emotions and affect are indeed pervasive phenomena across all levels of
organizational behavior (OB). Indeed, it is really amazing to us that it has taken so long for
the penny to drop, and for OB scholars to at last recognize how important the study of
emotion is to this discipline. In this respect, it is heartening to see that leading OB textbooks
such as Robbins and Judge (2007) now include a stand-alone chapter ‘Moods and emotion’.
Introduction 13
The question remains, however, as to exactly why this should be so. The answer to this
question can be found in Damasio’s (1994) description of his patient Elliot, who suffers
from a brain lesion that precludes experiences of emotion. Although Elliot has a high IQ
based on the standard tests, he is totally incapable of making even simple decisions and
is an invalid. This case demonstrates that, without access to emotional information,
human beings are incapable of functioning normally. By the same token, organizations –
which after all always comprise human beings – are unable to function normally without
emotions. In this respect, Ashkanasy (2003b) notes that it is the biological primacy of
emotions that makes them so all-pervasive. Human thought processes are inextricably
linked to emotional states, whether or not we know it (e.g., see Bargh & Chartrand, 1999).
In conclusion, and returning to our opening points, it should now be abundantly clear
to the readers of this Companion that emotions and affect constitute an essential element
of our understanding of organizational life. Today’s organizations are increasingly under
pressure to perform more with less, and their human denizens are coming under increas-
ing levels of stress as they struggle to cope with the pace of change. As such, and as
Ashkanasy et al. (2004) have posited, understanding and managing emotions in organ-
izational settings may be the keys to organizational effectiveness in the 21st century.
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PART I
EMOTION AND AFFECT AS

WITHIN-PERSON
PHENOMENA
1 The structure of affect: history, theory, and
implications for emotion research in organizations
Myeong-Gu Seo, Lisa Feldman Barrett and Sirkwoo Jin
Introduction
At the dawn of the 21st century, emotion has emerged as a central topic of scientific
inquiry about the human condition. Fields with broadly differing epistemological frame-
works (e.g., cultural anthropology, philosophy, social psychology, cognitive science, and
cognitive and behavioral neuroscience) all study something called ‘emotion’. This pro-
liferation of scientific inquiry on the nature of emotion has spilled over into the field of
organizational behavior, witnessing an unprecedented and accelerated increase in interest
in various aspects of emotions in organization over the past decades (e.g., Ashkanasy
et al., 2000; Fineman, 2000; Fisher & Ashkanasy, 2000; Brief & Weiss, 2002). Nevertheless,
the problem of how to understand the structure of human affective experience has
remained unresolved (see, Cropanzano et al., 2003). Questions of structure are funda-
mental to the question of what emotions are and how they should be defined, because
structure indicates the basic building blocks of emotional life that supports an inductive
science of emotion. To the extent that affective experiences can be reliably assessed and
understood, they can be incorporated into our theorizing and research on all the topics
that interest us as scholars.
Since the time of Wundt (1924), researchers have relied on dimensional models of
affect to ground the scientific investigation of emotion. Dimensional models assume
that emotions such as anger, sadness, fear and so on, share a common set of more basic
psychological properties that are defined by two dimensions. Various dimensional
models of affect have been proposed (e.g., Russell, 1980; Watson & Tellegen, 1985;
Thayer, 1989; Larsen & Diener, 1992; Cacioppo et al., 1999; Reich et al., 2003), but most
of the research to date has focused on two: the valence/arousal dimensions associated
with the circumplex model of affect (Russell, 1980; Barrett & Russell, 1998; Remington
et al., 2000; for a review, see Russell & Barrett, 1999) and the negative activation
(NA)/positive activation (PA) dimensions associated with a simple structure model of
affect (Watson & Tellegen, 1985; Tellegen et al., 1999; for a review, see Watson et al.,
1999). A schematic representation of the affective space with both dimension sets is pre-
sented in Figure 1.1.
Both the valence/arousal and the NA/PA models appear in subdisciplines of the psy-
chological literature, have considerable support for their validity, and agree that discrete
emotions share more fundamental psychological properties, but each reflects a different
theory about the important descriptive properties and causal processes associated with
emotion. In the last several years, there has been much debate over which model is more
fundamental (Larsen & Diener, 1992; Parkinson et al., 1996; Barrett & Russell, 1998;
Cacioppo et al., 1999; Russell & Barrett, 1999; Watson et al., 1999), with little in the way
of a resolution. Resolving this debate is crucial if our knowledge about affective
17
HIGH
AROUSAL
HIGH/NA HIGH/PA
Activation
Tension 7 Elation
6 8
90º
GENERAL
Displeasure 5 1 Pleasure POSITIVE
VALENCE
180º
4 2
Lethargy 3 Serenity
Deactivation
LOW/PA LOW/NA
LOW
AROUSAL
Source: Barrett and Russell (1998). © American Psychological Association.
Figure 1.1 Schematic representation of affective space
phenomena is to develop and move forward. Before a complete resolution emerges,

however, scholars in various disciplines including organizational behavior are constantly
facing a challenging question of how to understand and use these alternative models of
affective structure to best investigate the particular affective phenomena of interest and
also how to best advance the scientific understanding of affective experience in the field
as a whole.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide some answers to this question with respect
to its relevance for research on emotion in organizations. This chapter consists of three
sections. First, we provide the historical and theoretical background of the valence/
arousal and NA/PA models. Second, we review the literature on emotion in organiza-
tions. In particular, we critically examine how organizational scholars have used the two
models of affective structure in conceptualizing, measuring and analyzing affective
experience in organization. Finally, we discuss implications for future research direc-
tions.
The structure of affect 19
Two models of affect structure: history and theory
The valence/arousal circumplex model of affect

The circumplex model focuses on two dimensions of affective phenomena: valence and
arousal (Russell, 1980; Barrett & Russell, 1998; Russell & Barrett, 1999). Valence refers to
the hedonic quality (pleasure or displeasure) associated with affective phenomena.
Arousal (or activation) refers to felt activation associated with affective phenomena. All
affective stimuli (i.e., emotions such as anger, sadness and fear, as well as non-emotional
affective states like fatigue, sleepiness and placidity) can be defined as combinations of
these two independent dimensions. Empirical representations of the affective circumplex
are presented in Figure 1.2.
The valence/arousal model has a long history in psychology. It has theoretical roots in
work by Wundt (1912 [1924]), who attempted to classify affective experiences along three
dimensions (i.e., pleasant–unpleasant, calm–excited, relaxation–tension), in work by
Woodworth (1938), who similarly attempted to classify facial expressions of emotions,
and in work by Schlosberg (1941, 1952, 1954), who proposed a circular structure of
emotion defined by a similar three dimensions (i.e., pleasantness–unpleasantness, atten-
tion–rejection and sleep–tension). It is also consistent with the semantic differential work
by Osgood (Osgood et al., 1957), who demonstrated that there are three major compo-
nents of meaning in natural language (evaluation, activity and potency). Russell (1980)
consolidated and elaborated on this earlier work with the notion that the circular struc-
ture of emotion was actually a circumplex.
The valence/arousal circumplex model is highly robust and has been identified for a
range of affective stimuli. Valence/arousal structures have been found in judgments of
emotion language. Circumplex structures have been reliably derived from similarity
ratings for different sets of affect terms (Block, 1957; Bush, 1973; Russell, 1980; Feldman,
1995a; Barrett & Fossum, 2001; Barrett, 2004) that index emotion language in many cul-
tures (Russell, 1983, 1991; for a review, see Russell, 1991). Circumplex structures have
been identified in perceptions of facially expressed emotion (e.g., Schlosberg, 1952, 1954;
Abelson & Sermat, 1962; Shepard, 1962; Cliff & Young, 1968; Fillenbaum & Rapaport,
1971; Dittmann, 1972; Green & Cliff, 1975; Russell et al., 1989a) in participants of
different ages (Russell & Ridgeway, 1983; Russell & Bullock, 1985). Circumplex structures
have been established in self-reports of affective states (Russell, 1978, 1980; Russell &
Steiger, 1982; Reisenzein, 1994; Feldman, 1995a, 1995b; Barrett, 1998, 2004; Barrett &
Russell, 1998).
In general terms, a circumplex structure is a multi-purpose, mathematical formalism for
representing the mental structure of a group of stimuli through the geometry of the circle
(Guttman, 1957). A circumplex lacks simple structure, such that items or stimuli are dis-
tributed around the two dimensions and fail to cluster together in particular parts of the
affective space. A circumplex is usually roughly circular in shape with elements equally
spaced from one another, but neither of these features is necessary for a structure to be
circumplex. When ratings of items or objects produce a circumplex configuration, it indi-
cates that the items are heterogeneous (made up of multiple components) and can be dis-
tinguished from one another (for a recent discussion, see Barrett, 2004). Evidence suggests
that although the valence/arousal model can exist independently of a circumplex forma-
tion (e.g., Reisenzein, 1994; Lang et al., 1998), emotion-related items usually conform to
(a) (b)
2 2
Nervous Surprised Excited
Aroused Alert Lively
1 Peppy 1 Nervous Aroused Cheerful
Afraid
Enthusiastic
Disappointed Fearful Pleased

Happy
0 0
Sad Disappointed
Satisfied Relaxed
Quiet
–1 –1 Unhappy
Sluggish Still Calm
Relaxed Bored Idle Still
Sleepy Calm Dull
–2 –2
–2 –1 0 1 2 –2 –1 0 1 2
(c) (d)
7 7
Enthusiastic Excited
Aroused
6 6 Aroused
Nervous Peppy Lively
Nervous Alert
Surprised Happy Cheerful
5 5 Fearful
Anxious Pleased
Satisfied
4 4 Disappointed
Disappointed
Unhappy
3 3
Sad Relaxed
Still Relaxed Bored Idle
Quiet Calm Still Calm
2 2 Dull
Sleepy
Sluggish
1 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Note: Valence is the horizontal axis and arousal is the vertical axis.
Sources: (a) was derived from similarity ratings taken from Feldman (1995a). (b) was derived from similarity
ratings taken from participants in Barrett and Fossum (2001). (Both figures appear in Barrett and Fossum,
2001.) (c) and (d) were derived from direct semantic ratings.
Figure 1.2 Empirical representations of the valence/arousal model
a circumplex configuration when the theoretically defined space is sampled in a represen-

tative way (Yik et al., 1999; Remington et al., 2000).
The circumplex, as Guttman (1957) conceived it, was defined solely in terms of ordinal
relationships and so, alone, does not allow a quantitative analysis of the properties that
the items or objects share – it merely depicts their nonparametric relatedness in geomet-
ric space. To understand what properties are being represented, it is necessary to embed
the circumplex within a Euclidean space of two dimensions (Shepard, 1978). The dimen-
sions represent the salient psychological attributes or features that ground the mental
structure of those items or objects (Davison, 1983). On this view, then, valence and
arousal dimensions represent core features of affective representations.
When derived from similarity ratings of emotion-related language or of facially
expressed emotion, the circumplex dimensions represent conceptual knowledge con-
tained in emotion-related concepts.1 Specifically, valence and arousal represent the core
affective features of pleasure/displeasure and activation/deactivation that define both
non-emotional affective concepts such as fatigue, sleepiness and placidity, and emotion
concepts such as anger, sadness and fear. The valence and arousal dimensions represent
necessary, but not sufficient, semantic components of emotion concepts. Emotion terms
and their related facial expressions array along valence and arousal dimensions because
these two properties represent basic elements of emotion concepts. In addition to these
basic semantic components, emotion representations contain other elements of emotion
knowledge that differentiate discrete emotions such as fear, anger and sadness. According
to this view, the valence/arousal circumplex is like a very primitive representation or cog-
nitive map of affective space. This cognitive map, anchored by the valence and arousal
dimensions, is virtually always recovered in multidimensional scaling analyses of similar-
ity ratings of affective stimuli.
When derived from correlations between self-reported affective states, circumplex
dimensions represent core affective feelings: the most elementary consciously accessible
affective feelings of pleasure versus displeasure, or activation versus sleep (as well as their
neurophysiological counterpart; Russell & Barrett, 1999; Barrett, 2006), either as they
apply to non-emotional affective states such as fatigue, sleepiness and placidity or to emo-
tional episodes such as anger, sadness and fear. Emotional episodes (that is, short-lived
emotional responses that are inherently tied to an object) contain core affective feelings
of valence and arousal because these two properties represent elemental components of
phenomenal affective experience. In addition to these basic phenomenal components,
emotional episodes contain other elements that distinguish them from one another (the
typical object, behavior, relational theme associated with each emotion) (Russell &
Barrett, 1999; Russell, 2003; Barrett, 2006). In this view, the valence/arousal circumplex
is a very basic map of the descriptive or phenomenal features of felt experience.
Idiographic studies of the circumplex model have demonstrated individual variability in
the importance of the two dimensions for emotional experience (Feldman, 1995b; Barrett,
1998, 2004).
Recent formulations of the circumplex model have discussed the biological underpin-
nings the circumplex model of affect (Barrett, 2006; Barrett et al., 2007; Duncan &
Barrett, in press). Valence and arousal are psychological properties that are thought to
derive from a constant stream of transient alterations in an organism’s neurophysiologi-
cal and somatovisceral state that represent its immediate relationship to the flow of chang-
ing events (Russell & Barrett, 1999; Russell, 2003; Barrett, 2006); in a sense, they are a
neurophysiologic barometer of the individual’s relationship to an environment at a given
point in time. To the extent that an object or event changes a person’s ‘internal milieu’, it
can be said to have affective meaning – these changes are what we mean when we say that
a person has an affective reaction to an object or stimulus. They are the means by which
information about the external world is translated into an internal code or representation
(Nauta, 1971; Damasio, 1999; Ongur & Price, 2000). If core affect is a neurophysiologic
barometer that sums up the individual’s relationship to the environment at a given point
in time, then self-reported feelings are the barometer readings. Feelings of core affect
provide a common metric for comparing qualitatively different events (Cabanac, 2002).
The neural circuitry that establishes valence and arousal is designed to translate sensory
information from the external environment into an internal, meaningful representation
that can be used to safely navigate the world. A widely distributed circuitry accomplishes
this function, by binding sensory and somatovisceral information to create a valenced,
mental representation of external objects (e.g., facial expressions, foods, etc.). The func-
tion of this circuitry is to link sensory information about a stimulus with a representation
of how the stimulus affects the person’s internal (somatovisceral) state (Ongur & Price,
2000; Ghashghaei & Barbas, 2002; Barbas et al., 2003; Ongur et al., 2003; Kringelbach &
Rolls, 2004), This circuitry involves areas of the brain that are traditionally considered to
be ‘affective’ (e.g., amygdala and ventral striatum), along with anterior portions of the
cortex that have traditionally been considered cognitive (e.g., orbitofrontal cortex ven-
tromedial prefrontal cortex, and anterior cingulate cortex). These anterior cortical areas
do not appear to simply regulate the amygdala, but rather appear integral to computing
the value of an object and guiding visceral and motor responses accordingly. By virtue of
its broad, distributed connectivity, this circuitry modulates sensory processes both
directly (via direct projections to the sensory cortex) and indirectly (via projections to the
thalamus and brainstem). Through this modulation, this core affective system plays a
crucial role in all levels of cognitive processing, determining what we are conscious of,
how we use and understand language, and what content is encoded and retrieved in
memory (for a discussion, see Duncan & Barrett, in press).
The NA/PA affect model

Although the valence/arousal model of affect has a long history in the psychological lit-
erature, the negative activation and positive activation model is currently dominant for
measuring affective experience across most subdisciplines of psychology. Originally called
‘negative affect’ and ‘positive affect’, NA and PA dimensions recently underwent a name
change (Watson et al., 1999) to avoid conceptual confusions that were rampant in the psy-
chological literature (for a discussion, see Barrett & Russell, 1998). NA and PA dimen-
sions are typically derived by orthogonally rotating the valence and arousal dimensions
to simple structure using the varimax criterion (e.g., Zevon & Tellegen, 1982; Watson et
al., 1984; Watson & Tellegen, 1985), although oblique rotations give similar results
(Watson, 1988b). A varimax rotation orients factors toward large clusters of variables,
thereby trying to come as close as possible to a simple structure solution (i.e., items load
on one factor but not on the other). As a result, the NA/PA model has affect terms clus-
tering together in particular portions of the affective space in a way that is more consis-
tent with a simple structure than with a circumplex configuration (Watson & Tellegen,
1985, p. 221). Unlike the valence/arousal circumplex model which has been identified in
an array of affective stimuli, solely the NA/PA model has been identified in analyses of
self-report ratings of mood (e.g., Watson & Tellegen, 1985; Watson, 1988a; Meyer &
Shack, 1989; Watson & Clark, 1997).
Although they can be thought of as rotational variants in cross-sectional analyses of

self-reported affect, the NA and PA dimensions are conceptually distinct from valence
and arousal. Whereas valence and arousal are each bipolar, NA and PA are defined as
‘descriptively bipolar, but affectively unipolar’ dimensions of affective experience (Zevon
& Tellegen, 1982; Watson & Tellegen, 1985). Descriptively, the NA dimension is anchored
by a cluster of negatively valenced, high-arousal emotions on one end (e.g., nervous,
angry), and by positively valenced, low-arousal emotions on the other (e.g., calm,
relaxed). Similarly, the PA dimension is anchored by a cluster of positively valenced, high-
arousal emotions on one end (e.g., enthusiastic, excited), and by negatively valenced, low-
arousal emotions on the other (e.g., tired, bored). NA and PA dimensions are thought to
be affectively unipolar, however, in that the low-arousal ends of each dimension are meant
to refer to the absence of affective feeling (Zevon & Tellegen, 1982). As a result, the self-
report measure built to assess measure NA and PA dimensions (Positive and Negative
Affect Schedule), captures only high-end dimension markers (i.e., octants 6 and 8 in
Figure 1.1) (Watson et al., 1988).
The PANAS scales can be thought of as defining the descriptive aspects of the model:
the NA dimension represents the experience of negative high activation, affects such as
nervousness, guilt and anger, whereas the PA dimension represents the experience of pos-
itive high activation, affect such as excitement or enthusiasm (Watson & Clark, 1997).
Empirical representations of the NA/PA model are presented in Figure 1.3. All four
graphs were derived from exploratory factor analyses of self-report ratings taken from
two samples of undergraduate students at Penn State University. Figures 1.3a and b rep-
resent analyses of anchors taken from the high NA and high PA octants of affective space
(octants 6 and 8); Figure 1.3a represents the analysis of PANAS items, and Figure 1.3b
represents the analysis of items selected from Larsen & Diener (1992). Figures 1.3c and d
represent the NA/PA model derived from exploratory factor analyses of those same self-
report samples using all octants of the affective space.
The NA/PA model of affect has been linked to five different literatures, each of which
is related to the theoretical underpinnings of the model. First, NA and PA dimensions
have a history in empirical evidence suggesting that positive and negative affects are inde-
pendent (e.g., Bradburn, 1969; Zevon & Tellegen, 1982; Warr et al., 1983; Diener &
Emmons, 1984).2 Recent evidence suggests that NA and PA dimensions appear uncorre-
lated because of measurement error (Russell & Carroll, 1999). Once measurement error
is corrected, the two dimensions are moderately negatively correlated (latent correlation
around –0.54; Green et al., 1993; Barrett & Russell, 1998).
Second, the NA/PA model of affect also has its roots firmly in personality theory
(Tellegen, 1985; Watson et al., 1988). NA and PA dimensions are thought to reflect ‘real,
universal, and fundamentally different processes’ (Watson & Tellegen, 1985, p. 232) that
are linked to the affective components of extraversion and neuroticism (McCrae & Costa,
1991; Watson & Clark, 1992), as well as to biobehavioral systems that mediate goal-
directed approach and avoidance systems more generally (Tellegen, 1985; Carver & White,
1994; Watson et al., 1999). According to Watson & Tellegen, 1985; Tellegen, 1985; Watson,
1988a, 1988b), NA and PA dimensions represent individual differences in the susceptibil-
ity to certain affective states (also see Watson & Clark, 1984, 1992; Meyer & Shack, 1989;
Watson et al., 1992; Carver & White, 1994). NA is defined as a sensitivity to negative or
punishment cues in the environment and is associated with a pervasive predisposition to
(a) (b)
1 1
0.5 0.5
0 0
–0.5 –0.5
–1 –1
–1 –0.5 0 0.5 1 –1 –0.5 0 0.5 1
(c) (d)
1 1
0.5 0.5
0 0
–0.5 –0.5
–1 –1
–1 –0.5 0 0.5 1 –1 –0.5 0 0.5 1
Key:
Adjectives from octants 6 and 8.
Adjectives from entire affect space.
Note: PA is the horizontal axis and NA is the vertical axis.
Figure 1.3 Empirical representations of the NA/PA model
experience negative emotions; those who experience high levels of one negative affect (e.g.,
anger) are likely to experience others (e.g., fear). PA is defined as a sensitivity to positive or
pleasure cues in the environment and is associated with a predisposition to experience pos-
itive emotions, a general sense of well-being and competence, and effective interpersonal
engagement; those who experience one positive affect (e.g., joy) are likely to experience
others (e.g., excitement or enthusiasm). It is these sensitivities that are thought to produce
the NA/PA structure in self-reports of affect.
Third, the two dimensions have also been referred to as different types or systems of
subjective energy (Thayer, 1989). PA has been interpreted as the tendency to experience
energetic arousal, whereas NA has been interpreted as the tendency to experience tense
arousal (ibid.).
Most recently, the NA/PA model of affect has been linked to the literature on evalua-
tive processing that stems from attitudes research (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994; Cacioppo
et al., 1997, 1999). According to the evaluative space model, computations of the affective
significance of a stimulus (i.e., evaluative processing) are derived from combining two
independent processes associated with appetitive and aversive (or positive and negative)
motivational systems. Based on this view, evaluative space is bivariate, such that the net
response of an individual, either toward or away from the stimulus, can be derived from
configuring aversive and appetitive motivational systems in a reciprocal fashion (one
system activated, the other deactivated), an uncoupled fashion (activation of only one
system), or coactive fashion (both systems activated) to produce an affective response to
the stimulus. The evaluative space model has been linked to the NA/PA model of affect
in part because NA and PA have been previously defined as the subjective components of
more general approach and avoidance motivational systems as noted above. Moreover,
the apparent independence of NA and PA dimensions based on observed (but not latent)
correlations between NA and PA scales has been taken as evidence for the evaluative space
model (Cacioppo et al., 1997, 1999).
Finally, review articles on the bivalent structure of affect (e.g., Cacioppo et al., 1997,
1999; Reich et al., 2003) typically cite three lines of evidence to support a parallel pro-
cessing model of positive and negative information: pharmacological dissociations
(dopamine mediating positive affect and seretonin mediating negative effect), architec-
tural separability in subcortical regions (the nucleus accumbens implementing positive
affect and the amygdala implementing negative affect), and hemispheric specificity of pro-
cessing systems from which affect derives (left hemisphere more important for positive
affect, and the right hemisphere more important for negative affect). A close inspection
of the existing evidence shows that the three lines of evidence cited in support of biva-
lence are far from conclusive, and these dissociations may be more apparent than real
(Duncan et al., 2005).
Congruence, differences and research implications for organizational scholars

To date, the valence/arousal and NA/PA models have been treated as alternative, nomo-
thetic models of affective experience. They are thought to apply equally to all partici-
pants in a particular sample, and to all people in the population that was sampled. Both
have enjoyed substantial replicability in cross-sectionally measured samples. When a
group of individuals report on their affective state at one point in time (be it their
momentary experience or some aggregate of their experiences for a given period), the
two models are entirely congruous. As rotational variants of one another in exploratory
factor analyses of self-reported affect, neither set of dimensions accounts for more vari-
ance in affect ratings than the other (on average, they account for about 40–70% of the
variance). As long as the entire affective space is adequately measured, either set of axes
can be converted through simple calculation to the other (thereby demonstrating that
one set of dimensions correlated to external criteria is not evidence of its superior valid-
ity). Recent evidence suggests that even when measured separately, the two sets of
dimensions are strongly related to one another and can easily be integrated into one
affective structure (Barrett & Russell, 1998; Carroll et al., 1999; Yik et al., 1999).
Therefore, from a mathematical point of view, the two models are indistinguishable; one
can be mathematically derived from the other by rotating the factor structures by 45
degrees in the affective circumplex.
The validity of the affective space, which is supported by both models, as well as the
mathematical congruence between them, gives flexibility to the conceptualization and
measurement of affect: it is a matter of how to slice the pie. This appears to be good news
for organizational scholars for two reasons. First, it is not only completely legitimate but
also desirable for organizational scholars to use the core dimensions of either model as
theoretically meaningful dimensions of affective experience in organizations. In addition,
they can use either model as a guiding framework for determining appropriate measure-
ment strategies. Second, the two models are not entirely different from each other. Due to
the mathematical congruence, research findings based on one model are always inter-
pretable from the other model at least in certain degrees. For example, if a study using the
PA/NA model found that PA is positively associated with job satisfaction, this result can
also be interpreted based on the valence/arousal model that a simultaneous increase in
pleasantness and arousal is positively associated with job satisfaction.
From a conceptual perspective, however, a choice of either model involves very different
theoretical and practical implications. Cropanzano et al. (2003) explained this problem in
detail. For example, let us suppose that one study has found that PA (measured using the
PANAS scale) is positively associated with creativity. From the valence/arousal model,
this result could be interpreted as, a simultaneous increase in pleasantness and activation
(PA) leads to greater creativity. However, it is still unknown whether the increase in cre-
ativity came from an increase in pleasantness or arousal unless pleasantness and arousal
are explicitly measured and tested. Thus, this result cannot adequately satisfy the the-
oretical concerns raised by the valence/arousal perspective. Moreover, because the two
models are based on distinct theoretical views about the key dimensions of affective expe-
rience, the theoretical interpretation of the same result could also differ. Using the same
example above, the researchers adopting the PA/NA model may argue that the positive
association between PA and creativity is found because both are simultaneously affected
by individuals’ approach motivation or positive sensitivity. In contrast, others can argue
based on the valence/arousal model that this result comes from an individual’s simulta-
neous increase in coping readiness (arousal) and positive evaluation of the current situa-
tion (pleasantness).
The differences in the theoretical viewpoints of the two models naturally lead to
different practical implications. For example, based on the PA/NA model, which links the
PA and NA dimensions to the two independent motivation systems of approach and
avoidance, managers need to implement practices that increase employees’ positively acti-
vated feelings (e.g., excitement and interest) to foster creativity at work, but do not neces-
sarily need to implement practices aiming to reduce negatively activated feelings (e.g.,
nervousness and anxiety). But if the two systems are in fact related, the prescription based
on this model (doing nothing with the NA related feelings) will be wrong. However, from
the valence/arousal perspective, managerial practices aiming to reduce unpleasant feelings

may have the same effects on creativity as those practices increasing positive feelings
because unpleasant feelings are simply the opposite of the same pleasantness dimension.
In addition, the two models also differ in measurement philosophy. The PA/NA model
assumes a simple structure (i.e., items load on one factor but not on the other) and thus
utilizes independent sets of affect items (PANAS scale, Watson et al., 1988) to measure
the PA and NA dimensions. In contrast, the valence/arousal model assumes a two-dimen-
sional structure, the circumplex, in which the affect items index more than one kind of
content at the same time (Guttman, 1957). To be consistent, the valence and arousal
dimensions should be measured by sampling the affect items representing all areas of the
circumplex and by using those items to build both the valence and arousal dimensions
simultaneously (e.g., Feldman, 1995a; Barrett & Russell, 1998; Barrett, 2004).
These fundamental differences in theoretical basis, measurement approach and prac-
tical implications of the two alternative models have three important implications not
only for scholars in the field of organizational behavior, but also for the field as a whole.
First, it is very important for organizational scholars to carefully choose between the
alternative models of affective structure, such that the chosen model is consistent with
the theoretical and empirical questions of interest and to explain such choices clearly and
explicitly. For example, Huy (2002) in his three-year inductive field study of a large firm,
explicitly acknowledged the two alternative models, and also clearly explained his choice
by suggesting that the PA/NA dimensions capture the four types of affective experiences
that employees typically experience and thus managers try to manage (promote and
prevent) during radical organizational change: pleasant/high-activated feelings such as
enthusiasm and excitement, unpleasant/low-activated feelings such as disappointment
and fatigue, unpleasant/high-activated feelings such as fear and anger, and pleasant/low-
activated feelings such as being calm and relaxed. Similarly, Barsade (2002) explicitly
chose the valence/arousal model in her experimental study of mood contagion in groups
by (i) conceptualizing mood contagion as an increase or decrease in group-level pleas-
antness on one bipolar dimension of pleasure and displeasure, (ii) linking this bipolar
dimension of emotional contagion to other bipolar variations in group behaviors such
as cooperativeness and group conflict, and (iii) by explicitly considering the role of
valence and arousal dimensions when mood contagion is experimentally induced by con-
federates. It is also important for scholars to choose measurement tools that are consis-
tent with their chosen model. For example, if scholars focus on happiness versus sadness
or on tranquility or calmness, they should not use the PANAS scale because it does not
measure it.
Second, due to the mathematical association (similarity) between the two models (only
a 45 degree difference in rotation), the result of any study that uses only one model is auto-
matically exposed to an untested alternative hypothesis that the use of the other model
could produce better results. Therefore, in order to precisely understand affective experi-
ence and its processes and outcomes in organizations, it seems desirable for organizational
scholars to design studies in a way that explicitly measures and compares both models to
each other whenever possible. For example, in two longitudinal studies, Wright and Staw
(1999) used measures based on both the pleasantness model and the PA/NA model and
found that job performance is significantly related to the former, but not related to the
latter.
Finally, from the standpoint of the field of organizational behavior as a whole, it is

important to have a fuller understanding of affective experience and its processes and out-
comes in organizations. Such understanding can be hindered when organizational scholars
are segregated into groups, one group holding one model while the other group adopting
the other, and thus the research findings cannot be shared and/or informed across the
groups. This problem is what Cropanzano et al. (2003) called, ‘the problem of the whole’.
The advancement in our understanding of affective experience in organizations can also be
limited by ‘the problem of the parts’, which Cropanzano et al. describe as an issue of omit-
ting potentially important dimensions of affective experience from adequate scholarly
investigation when organizational scholars focus dominantly on certain other dimensions
of affective experience. Therefore, it seems important for organizational scholars not only
to focus on the two alternative models of affective experience in a balanced manner, but also
to engage in an active effort to develop an integrative understanding of both models.
The valence/arousal and PA/NA models used in emotion research in organizations

We have reviewed the literature on emotion in organizations to explore how the two alter-
native models of affective experience have been used among organizational scholars in
light of important research implications. In particular, we selected academic articles that
focused on affective experience (state affect including emotion, mood, and affect) pub-
lished in the seven major journals in the area of organizational behavior over the last 10
years (1996–2006): Administrative Science Quarterly, Academy of Management Journal,
Academy of Management Review, Organization Science, Journal of Applied Psychology,
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, and Journal of Organizational
Behavior. We found a total of 63 articles in which the authors deal with state affect or
affective experience – moods and emotions – as one of the main constructs. We summa-
rized them in Table 1.1 and discussed the main findings below according to the emerging
themes.
Use of dimensional models of affective experience

Among the 63 articles that we reviewed, we found 34 (53.9%) in which the authors used
either or both of the dimensional models in their theory or measurement. Among the 34
articles, only 20 articles (58.8%) explicitly used either or both of the two alternative
models of affective structure as their theoretical basis to conceptualize affective experi-
ence, and among these 20 articles, only four (20%) explicitly considered and used both
models. For the other 14 other articles (out of the 34, or 41.1%) in which one of the models
was used, the authors used the models only as measurement tools, and in many cases, pro-
vided little explanations of their choices. These results clearly suggest that despite the con-
ceptual and empirical validity of the valence/arousal and PA/NA models and their wide
use in other fields including psychology, these dimensional models have been used only
moderately among organizational scholars, and in many cases, they have been used only
in a marginal or implicit fashion.
Although many factors could contribute to this limited use of the dimensional models,
one major reason that is also supported by our review is that many organizational schol-
ars have focused on emotional experiences or emotion episodes at work (i.e., intense and
less durable feelings identified with specific objects) as opposed to mood states (i.e.,
diffused and mild feeling states with longer duration that are not typically identified with
particular objects; see Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996; Weiss, 2002), and they tend to under-
stand such emotional experiences as certain discrete forms or categories (e.g., anger, fear,
sadness and happiness) rather than as underlying dimensions. Although such discrete
experiences of so-called emotions can be understood as a special kind of affective expe-
rience, which can be arrayed in specific areas of the affective circumplex (Russell &
Barrett, 1999) or can be grouped as first-order factors that are subsumed to the two
second-order dimensions of PA and NA (Tellegen et al., 1999), studies focusing on dis-
crete emotional experiences are less concerned about their underlying dimensionality.
Based on our review, the majority of the articles (32 out of 63, or 51%) focused on dis-
crete emotional experiences in organizations, and most of them (30 out of 32, or 94%) did
not consider the underlying dimensions informed by the two models of affective structure.
We found only two exceptions (George & Zhou, 2002; Lee & Allen, 2002) in which the
authors investigated the role of discrete emotions while simultaneously considering the
higher-order dimensions of PA and NA.
In addition, we found another reason that may explain the limited use of the dimen-
sional models. The majority of the articles (21 out of 39, or 54%) that focused on moods
or general affect (other than discrete emotions) did not explicitly consider the dimensions
of the two alternative models in conceptualizing moods or affect. A more common con-
ceptualization has been one that distinguishes affective states into positive versus negative
moods (also called positive or negative affect) (see, Brief & Weiss, 2002). The popularity
of this conceptualization could be partly explained by the fact that the research on
emotion in organizations has been strongly influenced by Isen and her colleagues’ pio-
neering work on positive affect (e.g., Isen et al., 1987; see Isen, 2000, for a review) in which
mild and pleasant feelings are experimentally induced (e.g., offering a candy bag) and
related to other behavioral outcomes (e.g., decision making). The positive–negative mood
conceptualization is not necessarily incompatible with the two dimensional models.
Instead, positive and negative moods can be fully understood by either the valence/
arousal model or the PA/NA model, or more precisely captured by the general dimension
of pleasant and unpleasant feelings (since the PA and NA dimensions assume a certain
level of arousal). However, few scholars have explicitly explained in their studies how these
positive and negative moods are conceptually and empirically related to the two models
of affective structure. Instead, positive versus negative mood has continued to serve as a
self-sufficient conceptual framework of understanding affective experience for many
organizational scholars (see, Brief & Weiss, 2002).
Popularity of the PA/NA model

Based on our review, we found that a total of 34 articles used either or both of the models
at least in their theory or in their measurement, and among them, nine used the
valence/arousal model (27%), 21 used the PA/NA model (62%), and four used both
models (12%). From the measurement standpoint, nine articles used the scales based on
the valence/arousal model (30%), 18 (57%) used the PANAS scale or somewhat equiva-
lent scales (e.g., Job Affect Scale), and four (13%) used multiple scales based on both
models. These results suggest that the PA/NA model has been used about twice as much
as the valence/arousal model among organizational scholars.
The dominant use of the PA/NA model among organizational scholars can be attrib-
uted to a number of reasons. First, from a measurement standpoint, the PANAS scale fits
Table 1.1 Summary of literature review results according to affect construct, theory, measure and research area
Article Affect construct Affect theory Affect measure Research area

Valence/arousal
Au et al. (2003) Mood Positive and negative mood Induced but checked by Decision making
PL/AT (affect grid)
Barsade (2002) Mood contagion PL/AT (emotional valence/ Induced & checked by Group affect & mood
emotional energy) pleasantness contagion
Bartel & Saavedra Work group moods PL/AT Both PL/AT & PA/NA Group affect & mood
(2000) contagion
Elsbach & Barr (1999) Mood Pleasantness with moderate PL/UP activated Decision making
activation moderately
Fisher (2000) Mood & emotions Distinguished emotion versus Pleasantness & PANAS Job satisfaction
mood/the model is undefined (JES)
Fong (2006) Emotional ambivalence Emotional ambivalence – neither PL/AT Creativity
Seo et al. (2004) Affective experience PL/AT Conceptual paper Motivation
30
Totterdell (2000) Mood (self & teammates) Not clearly defined PL/AT (happy–unhappy) Group affect &
performance
Weiss et al. (1999a) Mood PL/AT PL/AT (CMR) Job satisfaction
PA/NA
Anderson & Positive affect Undefined – only distinguished Trait PANAS Negotiation
Thompson (2004) between mood & emotions
Brockner & Higgins Emotions at work PANAS Conceptual paper Motivation
(2001)
Eisenberger et al. Positive mood Positive mood PANAS (energetic & Motivation
(2001) cheerful)
Erez & Isen (2002) Positive affect Undefined Induced & checked by Motivation
PANAS
George & Zhou Mood Undefined theoretically PANAS & discrete emotions Creativity
(2002)
Heller & Watson Mood PANAS – explicitly selected but PANAS Job satisfaction
(2005) not explained
Huy (2002) Emotional states PA/NA & PL/AT Inductive Organizational change
Ilies & Judge (2002) Mood PANAS PANAS Job satisfaction
Ilies & Judge (2005) Positive and negative affect PANAS PANAS Motivation
Judge & Ilies (2004) State affect (positive & Positive mood & negative mood: PANAS Job satisfaction
negative mood) not clearly defined
Lee & Allen (2002) Job affect PANAS & discrete emotions PANAS & discrete emotion Performance
Lewis (2000) Affective states PANAS – Larsen/clearly PANAS (JAS) Mood contagion &
explained & chosen leadership
Madjar et al. (2002) Mood Undefined PANAS (JAS) Creativity
Mittal & Ross (1998) Positive & negative affect Neither – not clearly defined Induced & checked by PA & Decision making
pleasantness
Pugh (2001) Positive affect Undefined – positive affect or PANAS (JAS) Mood contagion
emotion
Rothbard (2001) Positive & negative PANAS PANAS Motivation
emotional responses
Saavedra & Kwun Affective states PL/AT & PANAS PANAS (JAS) Motivation
(2000)
31
Stone & Kadous Negative affect PANAS – emotions Induced & checked by Decision making
(1997) PANAS
Sy et al. (2005) Positive & negative mood PANAS – explicit Induced & checked by Group affect,
(leader & team members) PANAS (JAS) leadership & mood
contagion
Totterdell et al. (2004) Job-related affect Explicitly adopted both models PANAS & pleasantness Social network &
but used PANAS in hypothesis mood Contagion
Wong et al. (2006) Negative affect Negative affect – discrete PL/AT (unpleasant) Decision making
emotions (coping)
Wright & Staw (1999) State affect PANAS & PL PANAS & PL/AT (only for Performance
dispositional)
Discrete emotions
Allred et al. (1997) Anger & compassion & Discrete emotion & mood (not Discrete emotion & Negotiation
mood defined) pleasantness
Bagozzi et al. (2003) Shame Discrete emotion Discrete emotion (shame; Performance
newly developed)
Table 1.1 (continued)
Article Affect construct Affect theory Affect measure Research area

Barclay et al. (2005) Inward focused/outward Discrete emotion Discrete emotion Justice
focused emotions
Brown et al. (2005) Negative emotions Discrete emotion Discrete emotion (JES) Performance
Butt et al. (2005) Discrete emotion Discrete emotion (valence & Discrete emotion Negotiation
agency)
Cole et al. (2006) Positive & negative Discrete emotion Discrete emotion (JES) – Job attitude
emotions similar to PANAS
Creyer & Kozup Decision task-related affect Discrete emotion Positive emotion (joy) Decision making
(2003)
De Cremer & Van Positive & negative Discrete emotion Discrete emotion (happy, Justice
Hiel (2006) emotions satisfied, angry)
Fessler et al. (2004) Anger & disgust Discrete emotion Induced & checked by Decision making
PANAS
32
Fitness (2000) Anger Discrete emotion Inductive Motivation
Friedman et al. (2004) Anger Discrete emotion Discrete emotion Negotiation
Judge et al. (2006) State hostility Discrete emotion PANAS Job satisfaction &
deviation
Kiefer (2005) Negative emotions Discrete emotion Discrete Organizational change
Koehler & Gershoff Negative emotions Discrete emotion Discrete emotion Decision making
(2003)
Kogut & Ritov (2005) Emotions Emotional reaction Sympathy (discrete) Decision making
Maitlis & Ozcelik Emotions Discrete emotion Inductive Decision making

(2004)
O’Connor & Arnold Negative emotions Discrete emotion Discrete emotions (anger) Negotiation
(2001)
Perrewé & Zellars Discrete emotion Discrete emotion Conceptual paper Organizational stress
(1999)
Pieters & Zeelenberg Regret Discrete emotion Discrete emotion Decision making
(2005)
Raghunathan & Sadness & anxiety Discrete emotion Discrete emotion Decision making
Pham (1999)
Ratner & Herbst Negative emotional Discrete emotion (regret) Discrete emotion Decision making
(2005) reactions
Van Dijk & Regret Discrete emotion Discrete emotion Organizational
Zeelenberg (2005) emotion
Weiss et al. (1999b) Discrete emotion Discrete emotion Discrete emotion Justice
Zohar et al. (2003) Emotional reactions to Discrete emotion PANAS & fatigue Organizational
work events emotion
Undefined
Barry & Oliver (1996) Affect Positive & negative affect – not Conceptual paper Negotiation
clearly defined
Beal et al. (2005) Affective experience Not defined – moods & emotions Conceptual paper Performance
Brown (2005) Experienced affect Neither Discrete emotions Training
(enjoyment)
33
Forgas & George Affect Neither – only distinguished Conceptual Motivation
(2001) between moods & emotions
Fuller et al. (2003) Mood Undefined – only distinguished One-item (good) Organizational
between mood & emotions stress & job
satisfaction
Kelly & Barsade Goup emotion & mood Neither – only distinguished Conceptual Group affect & mood
(2001) between moods & emotions contagion
Shiv & Fedorikhin Stimulus-based affect Neither Indirectly examined Decision making
(2002)
Steele-Johnson et al. Affect Neither Satisfied with performance Motivation
(2000)
Notes: CMR = Current Mood Report (Larsen and Kasimatis, 1990); JAS = Job Affect Scale (Brief et al., 1988); JES = Job Emotions Scale (Fisher, 2000);
PL/AT = pleasantness/activation; PL/UP = pleasantness/unpleasantness; PANAS = positive affect(ivity)/negative affect(ivity).
well with the dominant measurement philosophy in our field that generally prefers a
simple structure; PA and NA are measured by two independent sets of items, the PANAS
scale, 10 items for PA but not for NA and the other 10 items for NA but not for PA.
Second, also from a measurement standpoint, the PANAS scale is simple to use and brief
(20 items). The availability of a simple, convenient, clean and reliable measure of affective
experience could have contributed to the wide adoption of the PA/NA model relative to
the valence/arousal model among organizational scholars. The valence/arousal model
also has a simple measure, called an affect grid (Russell et al., 1989b), where the subject
is asked to place a single mark on a two-dimensional space of pleasure–displeasure and
arousal–sleepiness. However, this measure has not been widely used among organiza-
tional scholars as evidenced in our review that only one article in our review (Au et al.,
2003) used it. This is perhaps due to its unconventional measurement approach, that is,
using a one-item scale to measure multiple constructs simultaneously. Third, from a con-
ceptual point of view, the PA/NA model treats the two valenced dimensions of PA and
NA as two independent dimensions, which is consistent with the earlier and still popular
view among organizational scholars that positive and negative moods are distinctive and
mutually independent entities. In addition, positive and negative moods have also been
called positive and negative affect, which were terms previously referring to the PA/NA
dimensions. As a result, many organizational scholars tend to implicitly associate the pos-
itive and negative moods with the PA and NA dimensions or inadvertently accept the
PA/NA model by using the PANAS scale to measure positive and negative moods.
In contrast, the bipolar conceptualization of the pleasant and unpleasant feelings in the
valence/arousal model, as well as the heterogeneity assumption of affective states, appears
to be at odds with the pre-existing conceptual framework of positive versus negative mood
and the dominant measurement philosophy in our field. In particular, the measurement
philosophy associated with the valence/arousal model seems to have played a more impor-
tant role in constraining its adoption. Only a few authors (e.g., Weiss et al., 1999a; Bartel
& Saavedra, 2000) measured the pleasantness and activation dimensions by considering
the two dimensions of these constructs, for example, by sampling the items representing
all areas of the affective circumplex. Instead, most others measured only the pleasantness
dimension as a simple-structure construct, for example, by using only the affect items that
loaded on the pleasantness dimension (pure markers) (e.g., Elsbach & Barr, 1999;
Barsade, 2002).
Empirical comparisons of the two models

In the previous subsection, we discussed the importance of designing studies in a way that
both dimensional models are explicitly measured and thus the results can be directly com-
parable to each other. However, only two (Wright & Staw, 1999; Bartel & Saavedra, 2000)
out of a total of 56 empirical articles (3.6%) explicitly measured and empirically com-
pared both models.
First, as we briefly explained above, Wright and Staw (1999) conducted two longitudi-
nal studies, directly comparing the two models by examining their relative influence on
job satisfaction, and found that the pleasantness dimension is more effective in explain-
ing job satisfaction than the PA/NA dimensions. However, the comparison is still incom-
plete because they used a trait-based measure to capture the pleasantness dimension but
a state-based measure (PANAS) for the PA/NA dimensions.
We found a more complete empirical comparison of the two models in a study of mood
contagion within 70 work groups conducted by Bartel and Saavedra (2000). In this study,
Bartel and Saavedra not only explicitly sampled the eight distinctive categories of the
affective circumplex that represent exactly the four dimensions of the valence/arousal and
PA/NA models, but also empirically examined whether mood contagion within groups
occurred in each of these eight-dimensional categories. They found that group moods
converged for all of the eight dimensions, suggesting that mood contagion in work groups
occurs in the entire space of the affective circumplex rather than its specific parts. They
also showed that although group moods in all eight dimensions were systematically
related to most group environmental factors (such as membership stability and interde-
pendency) only the activated feelings, regardless of their valence, were positively related
to mood regulation norms. This indicates that some of these affective dimensions are
more or less effective than other dimensions in explaining certain organizational phe-
nomena under investigation. This study is a good example of how a direct comparison of
both models allows researchers to generate a comprehensive understanding of affective
processes and outcomes without leaving out potentially important dimensions of affective
experience.
Summary: problems and concerns

Our review of the past research on affect in organization has revealed three general prob-
lems: (i) the problems of the whole, (ii) the problems of the parts, and (iii) the narrowness
of research orientation. We describe them below as a summary of our review.
The problems of the whole Our review clearly shows the problem of the whole
(Cropanzano et al., 2003). In our view, the study of affect in our field has been highly frag-
mented in a conceptual sense. Affective experience has been investigated by different
groups of organizational scholars who understand the experience in different ways: some
understand it as a combination of valence and arousal, some as positive versus negative
activation, some as positive moods versus negative moods, and others approach it as dis-
crete emotional experiences. Although substantial progress in research has been made
within each of these camps, it has been difficult to integrate the research findings mean-
ingfully across these camps to enhance our understanding of affective processes and out-
comes in organizations. So far, only a few studies have attempted to bridge these
conceptual boundaries.
The problems of the parts The dominant use of the PA/NA model over the valence/
arousal model in our field, when it by no means suggests scientific superiority of this
model over the other, raises a concern that is directly related to what Cropanzano et al.
(2003) called, ‘the problem of the parts’ (p. 851). That is, by mostly focusing on the PA
and NA dimensions, researchers are more likely to exclude potentially important variables
from their investigations, and as a result, affective experience and its processes and out-
comes in organizations are suboptimally understood. Moreover, the PANAS scale, the
popular measure among organizational scholars, covers only narrow areas in the affective
circumplex and thus leaves other broad ranges of feeling states unexamined in most
empirical investigations. Those unexamined areas include the entire low-to-moderate acti-
vated feeling states such as pleasure, sadness, calmness, peace and fatigue, as well as other
neutrally valenced and activated feeling states in the affective circumplex, such as surprise
and arousal. A particularly important omission seems to be the activation or arousal
dimension as also echoed by Cropanzano et al. (2003). Based on our review, only four arti-
cles (i.e., Weiss et al., 1999a; Bartel & Saavedra, 2000; Barsade, 2002; Seo et al., 2004)
explicitly considered the role of the arousal dimension in their conceptual and/or empir-
ical investigations.
The narrowness of research orientation Our review also raises another related concern,
also echoed by Brief and Weiss (2002). That is, the theoretical and methodological ori-
entations in a certain domain of research become narrower as researchers choose their
theoretical frameworks and/or research methods based more on what is available and/or
popular, and less on thoughtful examination of alternative theoretical models, mea-
surement approaches, and which approach is more relevant to the phenomena under
investigation. In our review, most of the articles, particularly ones using the popular
PANAS scale, did not provide clear explanations for why a certain model is chosen as
either their theoretical framework or measurement instrument, or how the theoretical
and methodological questions under investigation were better answered by the chosen
model. Instead, the implicit logic was something like, ‘the model is chosen because it is
there’. Brief and Weiss suggested that this lack of theoretical consideration can be
attributed to the unique orientation of past research on emotion in organizations, which
primarily focused on applying the results and findings in the basic research (e.g., PA
enhances creativity) to organizational settings (e.g., so why not PA at work to enhance
creativity at work?). As a result, the dimensional models (the PA/NA model in particu-
lar) have been mostly used simply as a means to test (e.g., defining and measuring affect-
related variables) the certain known effects of affective experience in organizational
contexts.
Conclusions and future research directions

Our review of the past 10 years of affect research in organizations clearly points to several
problems that need to be addressed for the further advancement of our understanding of
affective processes and outcomes in organizations. First, affect research in organizations
has been highly fragmented in a conceptual sense (the problem of the whole), some focus-
ing on the PA/NA dimensions, some focusing on the valence/arousal dimensions, some
focusing on positive/negative moods, and others focusing on discrete emotion episodes,
but few bridging these conceptual boundaries. Second, some affective dimensions have
received substantially more scholarly attention while other important affective dimen-
sions have been generally ignored (the problem of the parts). Third, these problems have
been further exacerbated by the narrow research orientation of our field when scholars
do not broadly consider and/or carefully choose among alternative theoretical models and
measurement approaches in investigating affective phenomena in organizations (the
narrow research orientation). Here we propose several future research directions to
address these problems.
Solving the problem of the whole

To address the problem of the whole, we encourage organizational scholars to actively
engage in bridging and/or integrating the fragmented conceptualizations of affective phe-
nomena in organizations by either developing a new integrative conceptual framework or

adopting the existing integrative approaches. One promising approach is to use the
affective circumplex as an overarching framework to integrate other affect-related con-
cepts including the valence, arousal, PA and NA dimensions as well as positive–negative
moods and discrete emotion episodes (e.g., Larsen & Diener, 1992; Barrett & Russell,
1998; Carroll et al., 1999; Russell & Barrett, 1999). In this case, the valence and arousal
dimensions become the primary axes that subsume the PA and NA dimensions as well as
other discrete emotion episodes. Another useful approach is the hierarchical model devel-
oped by Tellegen et al. (1999). In their model, discrete emotional experiences are placed
at the bottom as the first-order factors, which constitute the second-order factors of PA
and NA at the middle of the hierarchy, which in turn, are subjected to the one bipolar,
third-order factor of hedonic tone and/or pleasantness at the top. In this case, the pleas-
antness dimension of the valence/arousal model still serves as a universal factor integrat-
ing the PA and NA dimension, but the activation dimension is subsumed into the PA and
NA factors.
Organizational scholars can enhance our integrative understanding of affective
processes and outcomes in organizations by using these integrative approaches in their
conceptualization of affect-related constructs, in their research design, and in discussing
their research findings. We particularly encourage organizational scholars to adopt these
integrative approaches in their research design so that multiple models of affective expe-
rience can be simultaneously examined and compared. For example, as we explained in
detail above, Bartel and Saavedra (2000) sampled the affect items from all areas of the
affect circumplex to explicitly build and test both the valence/arousal model and the
PA/NA model simultaneously. In another example, Lee and Allen (2002) also measured
and compared the relative impact of the PA/NA dimensions and the discrete emotion
episodes on work behaviors. Even if such an integrative research design is not feasible,
organizational scholars can still contribute to an integrative understanding by explicitly
positioning their research and discussing their research implications within these broader
integrative frameworks of affective experience.
Solving the problem of the parts

To rectify the problem of the parts, future research needs to directly investigate the rela-
tively less explored parts of the whole. In particular, our review shows that the activation
(arousal) dimension has received relatively less theoretical and/or empirical attention but
it contains many theoretical implications (e.g., Bartel & Saavedra, 2000; George & Zhou,
2002; Cropanzano et al., 2003). Thus, an important future research direction is to explore
the role of the activation (arousal) dimension in affective processes and outcomes in orga-
nizations.
Another less explored but also important part seems to be a wide range of low-
activated feelings in the affective circumplex, such as calmness, stillness, relaxation, and
fatigue, which are not adequately captured by the popular PANAS measure. In particu-
lar, according to the recent studies of Tsai et al. (2006), the PA/NA model (high-activated
feelings) reflect more a Western view of emotion, whereas Eastern cultures tend to place
more value on positive, low-activated feelings (e.g., calmness and tranquility). Research
also shows that such positive and low-activated feelings tend to play an important role for
the elderly (e.g., Levenson et al., 1994). Therefore, we encourage organizational scholars
to examine the unique roles of these low-activated feelings in organizations in the future,
particularly in various cross-cultural studies or studies on aging in organizations.
We believe, however, that a more fundamental solution to this problem of the parts is
to design future studies in a way that measurses the entire space of the affective circum-
plex so that all the important dimensions of affective experiences can be recovered and
empirically compared to each other.
Broadening research orientations

Future studies also need to broaden the narrow focus and the limited theoretical consid-
eration of the past research on emotion in organizations. To enhance further theoretical
development and stimulate broader theoretical discussions across the narrowly defined
affect-research boundaries, we encourage the authors of future studies to critically
examine and clearly explain their theoretical considerations, particularly regarding:
(i) which model of affective structure is adopted, (ii) why it is chosen among alternative
models, (iii) how the particular dimensions of affective structure are theoretically related
to the organizational phenomenon under investigation, (iv) which measurement
approaches are used in relation to the chosen model of affective experience, and (v) how
the theoretical implications and results of the study may convey to other alternative
models of affective experience.
The problem of narrow orientation also seems to exist in measurement strategies. Most
affect-related constructs have been measured based on the assumption that they form a
simple structure (and thus only one set of items, called ‘pure markers’, has been used to
measure one construct). Although this assumption directly contradicts the basic idea of
an affective circumplex, few studies have adopted a measurement orientation that con-
siders the multi-dimensionality of affective experience. Thus, future studies need to
broaden existing measurement orientations by adopting measurement approaches that
adequately capture the multi-dimensionality of the affect constructs.
Conclusions
In conclusion, we believe that organizational scholars have enormously advanced our
understanding of affective experience and its antecedents and consequences in organiza-
tions over the past decades. However, this advancement seems to have occurred mostly
within the boundaries of several alternative models of affective experience. We believe
that future advancement in our affect research in organizations depends on our collective
effort to build an integrative understanding across the boundaries and fill in the missing
parts. We hope that this chapter contributes toward such integrative efforts.
Notes
1. The term ‘semantic’ is used throughout this chapter to refer to a corpus of impersonal, conceptual knowl-
edge about affect-related phenomena that is shared by members of the same culture (Tulving, 1972), as well
as semanticized episodic knowledge (Nadal & Moscovitch, 1998) about affect consisting of ensembles of
aggregated episodic memories that exist without reference to time and place.
2. Many debates exist in the emotion literature, but none has seemed so intractable as the debate over whether
positive and negative affective states are independent or bipolar. This is due, in large part, to the fact that
many researchers have treated PA and NA as broadly representative of pleasant and unpleasant (or posi-
tive and negative) affect, when instead they represent a specialized type of pleasant and unpleasant affect
(i.e., highly activated affective states). Prototypical examples of positive and negative affect that are lower
in arousal, such as happiness and sadness, are not indicators of PA and NA, respectively. This tendency to
use NA and PA to represent general pleasant and unpleasant affect has resulted in a number of papers claim-
ing that positive and negative affect in general are independent because NA and PA tend to have a weak
zero-order correlation. In fact, when momentary pleasant and unpleasant affects are sampled representa-
tively (i.e., for those states both high and low in arousal), and when measurement error is corrected, the evi-
dence is more consistent with bipolarity (Green et al., 1993; Barrett & Russell, 1998). This stands in contrast
to the highly activated pleasant and unpleasant subtypes (i.e., NA and PA) that are moderately negative cor-
related when measurement error is corrected (ibid.).
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2 Emotion and organizational decision making:
the roles of negative affect and anticipated regret
in making decisions under escalation situations
Carmen K. Ng and Kin Fai Ellick Wong
Anyone who has ever made an important decision knows that emotions play a role.
(Mellers, 2000, p. 910)
Introduction
The role of emotion in organizations has attracted increasing attention from
researchers during the last decade (Fineman, 2000). In this chapter, we discuss how
emotion influences decision making in organizational settings, with a particular focus on
recent research that examines the influences of negative emotions on making decisions
under escalation situations. We first begin with a brief review of research that examines
the role of emotion in decision making. We then discuss the relationship between emotion
and organizational decisions, particularly those under escalation situations. Finally, we
discuss directions for future research.
Emotion and decision making

Since Bernoulli’s (1738 [1954]) initial work, research on decision making has focused pri-
marily on how decision behaviors are shaped by factors pertinent to rationality (von
Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947) and cognitive factors that limit rationality (Simon, 1956;
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). In later studies, researchers recognized that, in addition to
rationality and cognitive determinants, decision behaviors are also influenced by affective
factors (Fischhoff et al., 1981; Peters & Slovic, 1996, 1999; Loewenstein et al., 2001).
Indeed, some researchers have argued that emotions play a functional and beneficial role
in decision making (Kleinmuntz, 1990; Bazerman et al., 1998; Isen, 2000). Now, emotion
is generally considered to be an essential component of comprehensive theories of judg-
ment and decision making by researchers in a wide variety of disciplines (Bazerman et al.,
1998; Pacini & Epstein, 1999; Loewenstein, 2000; Mellers, 2000; Isen, 2001; Higgins,
2006). In short, the focus of decision-making research has shifted from a largely rational
perspective to acknowledging the cognitive limits of rationality, and more recently to rec-
ognizing the influence of emotions on decision making.
Research investigating emotions in this context has focused on two interrelated issues.
The first issue concerns the role of the actual emotions that individuals experienced in
decision making. Alloy and Abramson (1979), for example, proposed a sadder-but-wiser
hypothesis, suggesting that negative emotions such as sadness improve decision quality
(Lewinsohn et al., 1980; Taylor & Brown, 1988; but see also Dunning & Story, 1991).
Researchers have found support for this proposition in studies of individuals with clini-
cal depression. Specifically, when compared with less-depressed individuals, depressed
individuals exhibit: (a) no self-serving bias (Kuiper, 1978); (b) more accurate evaluations
45
of self and others (Brown, 1986); and (c) better use of statistical information (Alloy &
Ahrens, 1987). Another stream of research has focused on the impact of positive affect
on decision making and has revealed contradictory findings. While some researchers have
found that positive affect may increase decision quality by facilitating information inte-
gration (Estrada et al., 1997), increasing creativity (Isen et al., 1987; Isen, 1999) and
flexibilities (Isen et al., 1985, 1992), other researchers have demonstrated that positive
affect, particularly when it is intense, may decrease decision quality by increasing the
reliance on heuristics (Mackie & Worth, 1989, 1991) and undermining people’s motiva-
tion to think carefully (Schwarz & Bless, 1991; Schwarz et al., 1991). In addition, positive
affect influences people’s preference for risk (Isen & Patrick, 1983; Arkes et al., 1988;
Nygren et al., 1996) and increases variety seeking (Kahn & Isen, 1993).
Another issue with implications for decision making concerns the influence of emo-
tions that individuals anticipate experiencing in the future (i.e., anticipated emotions). The
central idea of this line of research is that people are motivated to make decisions that
lead them to experience or avoid future emotions (Bell, 1982; Loomes & Sugden, 1982;
Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Mellers, 2000). For example, people tend to make decisions
that avoid future regret in a wide variety of contexts, including gambling choices (Bar-
Hillel & Neter, 1996), consumer choices (Simonson, 1992), medical decisions (Ritov &
Baron, 1990), and risk-taking behavior (Zeelenberg et al., 1996). In a similar vein, antic-
ipated pleasure explains choice variances over and beyond subjective utility (Mellers et al.,
1999), a finding which led Mellers and colleagues to propose a subjective expected plea-
sure theory of choice (Mellers et al., 1999; Mellers, 2000).
Emotion and decision making in organizational contexts

The evolution of managerial decision making generally follows the same pattern
described earlier, from a traditional emphasis on the role of rational/cognitive factors to
a more recent acknowledgment of the role of affective influences (Sayegh et al., 2004). The
rational/cognitive perspective of decision making developed from the assumption that the
best decisions are made using formal logic (Simon, 1957, 1979; Klein, 1983). To obtain
optimal results, traditional theorists suggested that decision makers needed to have a ‘cool
head’ and minimize their emotional involvement when engaging in problem solving and
decision processes (Simon, 1957; March, 1978). Overall, emotion was generally regarded
as either irrelevant or detrimental to managerial decision making (Damasio, 1994; Huy,
1999).
However, organizational researchers began to express dissatisfaction with the long
neglect of the role of emotion in many aspects of organizational life (Fineman, 1993). In
a call for more attention to be paid to emotions in organizational settings, Walsh (1995)
stated: ‘If our work is to have strong external validity, we must consider the emotional
basis of work and its relationship with cognitive questions we have been asking’ (p. 307).
Decision-making researchers responded to this statement by questioning the rationalists’
assumptions and emphasizing the potential benefits of a certain degree of emotional
involvement in decision processes (Blattberg & Hoch, 1990; Langley et al., 1995; Sayegh
et al., 2004). Bazerman et al. (1998), for example, suggested that while making a decision,
an individual engages in a negotiation between his or her cool-headed, rational ‘should’
self and his or her hot-headed, emotional ‘want’ self. They further argued that, ‘it is wise
to seek input from the want self as well, not only because the want self can veto the
Emotion and organizational decision making 47
decisions of the should self but also because . . . the want self may know something
important that the should self has not yet realized. We should not assume that the want
self is “bad” or that the should self knows everything’ (p. 238).
This shift in perspective helped to generate a number of studies examining how deci-
sion behaviors in organizational contexts are influenced by emotion. Early empirical
research studied the relationship between emotion and decision quality. Staw and Barsade
(1993) examined two competing hypotheses concerning this relationship: the ‘happier-
and-smarter’ hypothesis, which was derived from the research by Isen and colleagues (Isen
& Means, 1983; Isen & Daubman, 1984; Isen et al., 1987), posits that positive emotion
increases managers’ flexibility, creativity and persistence, and hence helps them to make
better decisions; the ‘sadder-but-wiser’ hypothesis, which was derived from the depressive
realism literature (Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Alloy & Ahrens, 1987), posits that negative
mood is likely to trigger managers’ comprehensive search for information, reduces biases
and consequently increases decision quality. Staw and Barsade (1993) found a positive
relationship between individual positive affect and decision quality, providing support for
the proposition that positive emotion can improve decision quality. A later study by
Amason (1996) found support for the sadder-but-wiser hypothesis and revealed that neg-
ative affect arising from team conflicts reduced decision quality in top management teams.
Apart from examining the overall relationship between positive/negative emotion and
decision quality, researchers examining decision behaviors under escalation situations
have attempted to explore how emotion interacts with decision processes. In the next sub-
section, we discuss our recent studies and related research on this issue.
Making decisions under escalation situations

Decision makers in organizations often face ‘escalation situations’, which are character-
ized as ‘predicaments where costs are suffered in a course of action, where there is an
opportunity to withdraw or persist, and where the consequences of persistence and with-
drawal are uncertain’ (Staw & Ross, 1987, p. 40). There are three defining features of a
typical escalation situation (Staw & Ross, 1987; Brockner, 1992). First, a large amount of
resources, such as money, time or effort, has been invested in a certain course of action
(i.e., sunk costs). Second, this course of action receives negative feedback, which signals
that the prior decision is likely to be incorrect. Finally, this situation allows the decision
maker either to continue the investment in an attempt to recover the sunk costs or to with-
draw entirely from the course of action. Escalation of commitment is typically manifested
as the tendency to continue to invest in the losing course of action (Staw, 1976, 1997; Staw
& Ross, 1987; Brockner, 1992), particularly when one is personally responsible for the ini-
tiation of the failing investment (Staw, 1976; Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Conlon & Parks,
1987).
Although researchers have mainly studied escalation of commitment in the context of
project investment (Staw, 1976; Conlon & Garland, 1993; Moon, 2001), it is a general phe-
nomenon that occurs in various organizational contexts (see Staw, 1981). For example,
escalation of commitment to the prior hiring decision is manifested in terms of the ele-
vated evaluation scores of the employee in the appraisal context (Bazerman et al., 1982;
Schoorman, 1988). Similarly, National Basketball Association (NBA) teams granted
more playing time to their ‘highly drafted’ players and retained them in teams longer after
controlling for all players’ performance (Staw & Hoang, 1995).
Over the past three decades, research on escalation of commitment has focused pri-
marily on cognitive determinants, including self-justification (Staw, 1976, 1981; Staw et
al., 1995), problem framing (Whyte, 1986, 1993), sunk costs (Arkes & Blumer, 1985), goal
substitution (Conlon & Garland, 1993; Moon, 2001), self-efficacy (Whyte et al., 1997),
accountability (Kirby & Davis, 1998) and illusion of control (Staw, 1997). Despite the
considerable contributions of the cognitive approach in improving our understanding of
the nature of escalating commitment, prior researchers have paid scant attention to the
emotion of escalation. Given the essential role of emotion in decision-making processes
discussed in the above subsection, it is also important to understand the emotion involved
in escalation of commitment.
Next we discuss our recent works that deal with the emotional aspect of escalation of
commitment. The two major questions that we address are: (i) how does negative affect
influence escalating tendency, and what is the related psychological mechanism underly-
ing this influence, and (ii) how is a specific emotion – regret – related to escalating
tendency?
Influence of negative affect on escalating tendency

As an initial step toward understanding the role of emotion in escalating tendency, Wong
et al. (2006) tested the relationship between general negative emotion and escalation of
commitment. This research formulated competing hypotheses derived from three com-
peting theoretical perspectives that are conceptually relevant to making decisions under
escalation situations, namely coping, depressive realism, and cognitive dissonance. These
three perspectives suggest a unique ‘negative affect–responsibility’ interaction and these
predictions were tested in three separate studies with different experimental contexts and
with different operationalizations of negative affect. The results are generally consistent
with the predictions derived from the coping perspective.
A coping perspective
The literature on coping focuses on the strategies (or styles) individuals use to reduce
stress and anxiety induced by unpleasant and stressful situations (Miller et al., 1988;
Endler & Parker, 1990). One common strategy that people use to cope with negative
emotion is to withdraw from situations that induce negative emotions. This has been
termed the ‘avoidance-withdrawal’ strategy.
Converging evidence shows that the likelihood of using the avoidance-withdrawal strat-
egy increases as the strength of a person’s negative affect increases (Endler & Parker, 1990;
Terry, 1994; O’Brien & DeLongis, 1996). For example, under negative situations, people
with high neuroticism (i.e., those who are emotionally less stable) experience a relatively
high level of stress that is difficult to tolerate, thus tend to ‘avoid a particular stressful situ-
ation . . . by engaging in another task rather than the task at hand’ (Endler & Parker, 1990,
p. 846). People with low neuroticism, on the other hand, experience a relatively low level
of stress such that avoidance is deemed unnecessary. Therefore, a person is more likely to
withdraw from the current negative situation when he or she is more likely to experience
negative affect (e.g., those who have high neuroticism) or when he or she is in a situation
that is more likely to elicit negative affect.
The reliance on the avoidance-withdrawal strategy to cope with negative situations is
relevant to making decisions under escalation situations in two ways. First, escalation
situations are likely to be perceived as negative situations because an individual’s prior

decision receives negative feedback (Brockner, 1992; Staw, 1997). The negative feedback
signals the possibility that the prior decision might have been incorrect and hence would
pose a challenge to one’s positive self-image (Aronson, 1969), resulting in negative affect
(Baumeister, 1993; Baumeister et al., 1996).
Second, escalation situations are suitable conditions for individuals to use the avoid-
ance-withdrawal strategy to cope with negative affect. Recall that one of the defining fea-
tures of escalation situations is that individuals have the option to persist or to quit the
current decisions or situations. This freedom allows individuals to choose to withdraw
from the current escalation situation (i.e., to execute the avoidance-withdrawal coping
strategy) as the means to avoid receiving further negative feedback from the same source
and hence avoid experiencing negative affect.
From a coping perspective, strong negative affect would lead one to be more uncom-
fortable, and hence would be more likely to withdraw from the negative situation in order
to reduce the experience of negative affect. Thus, the coping perspective naturally leads
to a negative relationship between negative affect and escalating tendency. This negative
relationship, however, is expected to be less pronounced when one is not responsible for
the prior decision. Specifically, when a prior decision is initiated by another person, any
negative feedback on that decision is not attributable to the current decision maker and
thus does not challenge the current decision maker. We, therefore, offer the following
proposition with respect to the negative affect–responsibility interaction on escalation of
commitment:
Proposition 1 There is a negative affect–responsibility interaction effect on escalation of com-

mitment. When one is personally responsible for a failing decision, there is a negative correla-
tion between negative affect and escalation. When one is not personally responsible for a failing
decision, this negative correlation is significantly reduced.
Note that two other theoretical perspectives make different predictions with respect to the
negative affect–responsibility interaction. The depressive realism perspective (Alloy &
Abramson, 1979) postulates that people under negative emotions, particularly depres-
sion, are more realistic, more accurate and less overoptimistic in making decisions. As
escalation of commitment has been characterized as maladaptive and irrational
(Bazerman, 1994), this perspective suggests a negative correlation between negative
affect and escalation. In addition, because this perspective also suggests that this correl-
ation is due to future optimisticity (i.e., at a prospective locus), which is theoretically
independent of the prior decision responsibility (i.e., at a retrospective locus).
The cognitive dissonance perspective (Staw, 1976, 1981) postulates that people escalate
and hence avoid belief–behavior discrepancy in order to reduce negative affect as a result of
cognitive dissonance. This perspective, therefore, suggests a positive correlation between
negative affect and escalation of commitment. In addition, because cognitive dissonance
occurs only when information is self-relevant (Aronson, 1969), this positive correlation is
predicted to occur only when a person is responsible for the prior decision, but not when
he/she is not responsible for it. Table 2.1 summarizes the key features of the three perspec-
tives and Figure 2.1 outlines the predicted negative affect–escalation interaction.
Two approaches have been pursued to study negative affect in organizational research: the
dispositional trait approach and the transient mood approach. The former conceptualizes
Table 2.1 Summary of the three theoretical perspectives with respect to the negative
affect–responsibility interaction on escalation of commitment
Feature/prediction Perspective
Coping Depressive realism Cognitive dissonance
Locus at which negative Coping strategies Prospect optimisticity Belief–behavior
affect plays a role and decision quality discrepancy
Dependence on responsibility Yes No Yes
Prediction on the negative Figure 2.1a Figure 2.1b Figure 2.1c
affect–responsibility
interaction
Source: Wong et al. (2006). © American Psychological Association.
negative affect as a dispositional trait such as the Big Five’s neuroticism (e.g., Costa &
McCrae, 1992; Brief & Weiss, 2002) or negative affectivity (Watson & Clark, 1984). The
second approach conceptualizes negative affect as a momentary state where affective feeling
for a moment of time was measured (Bohle & Tilley, 1993; Weiss et al., 1999; Wofford et al.,
1999; Portello & Long, 2001; see Weiss & Kurek, 2003 for a review).
Wong et al. (2006) found that regardless of whether negative affect was measured as a
dispositional trait (in Studies 1 and 2) or as a transient mood state (in Study 3), negative
affect and personal responsibility interacted in a way consistent with the prediction from
the coping perspective. This pattern of results (see Figure 2.2) emerged when escalation
of commitment occurred in a project investment scenario (Study 1), a personnel selection
scenario (Study 2), and laboratory games with real consequences (Study 3). This research
indicates that people seek to escape from escalation situations in order to reduce its asso-
ciated unpleasant emotions. It also implies that organizations should pay particular atten-
tion to decision makers who are low in neuroticism, not only because they are more likely
to escalate, but also because they often appear to be cool and capable to deal with complex
decisions and business turbulence.
Effect of specific emotion on escalation tendency: regret

The next step in a systematic investigation of the role of emotion in escalation of
commitment is to identify the specific emotions that influence escalation tendency. In
this section, we examine further the influence of emotion on escalating tendency
through posing two research questions stemming from a different theoretical perspec-
tive from that of affective valence: emotion specificity. First, might a specific emotion
– regret – influence escalating tendency in the same way as general negative affect
does? Second, if regret does influence escalating tendency, through what mechanism
does it operate? Drawing from regret theory (Bell, 1982; Loomes & Sugden, 1982;
Zeelenberg, 1999), Wong and Kwong (2007) propose that people seek to minimize
future regret when making decisions under escalation situations. We shall begin this
section with a brief introduction to regret theory, and then we shall investigate how
people may take anticipated regret into account when making decisions under escala-
tion situations.
Not responsible
Responsible
Escalation tendency
Low NA High NA Low NA High NA Low NA High NA

(a) Coping (b) Depressive realism (c) Cognitive dissonance
Note: NA = negative affect.
Figure 2.1 Negative affect–escalation relationships as a function of personal

responsibility derived from coping (a), depressive realism (b), and cognitive
dissonance (c) perspectives
Anticipated regret and regret aversion

Regret is a common emotion that all people have experienced (Shimanoff, 1984).
Zeelenberg (1999) defined regret as an emotion that ‘we experience when realizing or
imagining that our present situation would have been better, had we decided differently’
(p. 94). After making a decision, people often compare the outcome of a chosen course
of action with the outcome of the unchosen course of action, and regret is ‘experienced’
if the chosen option turns out to be worse than the unchosen one (Gilovich & Medvec,
1995). Apart from experienced regret, people may also take a forward-looking approach
and imagine the regret they will probably have if they make a particular decision
(Simonson, 1992; Zeelenberg et al., 1996). This type of regret is referred to as ‘anticipated’
regret (see Zeelenberg, 1999 for a review).
Regret theory (Bell, 1982; Loomes and Sugden, 1982) incorporated the anticipatory
aspects of regret, and proposed that people are ‘regret averse’ such that they seek to avoid
choosing options that will induce regret. Applying regret theory to a two-option situation,
we expect that people are likely to choose the option that they anticipate to have a lower
possibility of regret. Alternatively, Option A is more likely to be chosen as net anticipated
regret about Option B increases, where net anticipated regret about Option B ‘regret
about Option B’ – ‘regret about Option A’.
Not responsible
Responsible
1.0
0.8
Escalation tendency (z scores)
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
–0.2
–0.4
–0.6
–0.8
–1.0
Low NA High NA Low NA High NA Low NA High NA
(a) Study 1 (b) Study 2 (c) Study 3
Note: NA = negative affect.
Figure 2.2 The negative affect–escalation relationships as a function of personal

responsibility revealed in Studies 1, 2, and 3
The motivation to avoid future regret is very strong. For example, while risk aversion has
been characterized as one of the most salient decision behaviors (Kahneman & Tversky,
1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991; Brandstatter et al., 2006), Zeelenberg and colleagues
(Zeelenberg et al., 1996; Zeelenberg & Beattie, 1997) demonstrated that one can be risk
seeking or risk avoiding depending on the possibility of future regret. In other words, under
conditions in which individuals will anticipate the possibility of future regret, it is expected
that their decisions are likely to be shaped by their anticipation of regret. Next, we discuss
the influences of anticipated regret on making decisions under escalation situations.
Anticipated regret and escalation of commitment

Individuals have two options, to quit or to persist, under escalation situations. Regret
theory suggests that which option will more likely be chosen depends on the relative antic-
ipated regret associated with each option. Specifically, decision makers compare the antic-
ipated regret about persistence with the anticipated regret about withdrawal. The
regret-reducing assumption implies that escalation of commitment is more likely when
the anticipated regret about persistence decreases and/or when the anticipated regret
about withdrawal increases. In other words, escalation of commitment would be more
likely when the net anticipated regret about withdrawal increases.
Moreover, this effect of anticipated regret is expected to be independent of retrospec-

tive antecedents such as personal responsibility of initiating the project. Retrospective
antecedents refer to factors that had occurred before the moment an individual makes a
decision. These factors are logically independent of prospective factors, which refer to
factors or events that will happen after the individual makes the decision. Under the
escalation situations, personal responsibility for the initial decision concerns events that
have already occurred before the current escalation decision (i.e., at a retrospective
locus), whereas anticipated regret for the current escalation decision concerns what may
emerge in the future after making such a decision (i.e., at a prospective locus). Anticipated
regret, therefore, is relevant to all decision makers regardless of their prior responsibility
for the failing decision. We therefore offer the following proposition:
Proposition 2 There is a positive relationship between the net anticipated regret

about withdrawal and escalation of commitment, regardless of the responsibility of a
prior decision.
Wong and Kwong (2007) conducted two studies to test these predictions. In Study 1, they
evaluated the proposition by manipulating regret possibility whereas in Study 2, they did
so by directly correlating measured regret with escalation of commitment. We turn first
to the study about regret possibility, and then to the one that measures regret directly.
The influence of regret possibility on escalation of commitment

The possibility of regret depends on whether or not one will know the outcome of the
unchosen option (Zeelenberg et al., 1996; Zeelenberg & Beattie, 1997; Zeelenberg, 1999).
That is, regret possibility is low when a decision maker would never know the outcome of
the unchosen option because the decision maker ‘cannot compare what is with what would
have been, and thus would not run the risk of experiencing post-decisional regret. Hence, if
one expects no feedback on what would have been, there is no need to anticipate future
regret’ (Zeelenberg, 1999, pp. 96–7). In contrast, regret possibility is high when a decision
maker knows the outcome of the unchosen option, because there is always a possibility that
the decision maker will know that the unchosen option indeed leads to a better outcome.
Accordingly, under escalation situations, when the possibility of regret about with-
drawal is low, the risk of experiencing future regret about withdrawal is much reduced.
The decision makers therefore should tend to have weak escalation tendency. In contrast,
when the decision makers expect that they will know the outcome of persisting even if
they decide to withdraw, the fear of future regret will induce the decider to avoid with-
drawal, and hence choose to escalate. In summary, regret theory suggests that decision
makers will exhibit stronger escalation of commitment in conditions where the possibil-
ity of regret about withdrawal is high than in conditions where the possibility of regret
about withdrawal is low.
Wong and Kwong’s results (2007, Studies 1a and 1b) were consistent with this predic-
tion, indicating that people tend to choose the option that precludes post-decisional com-
parisons of outcomes, and support the central proposition that people are regret averse
under escalation situations. In addition, the results also indicated that regret possibility is
independent of responsibility, suggesting that regret possibility explains escalation of
commitment above and beyond personal responsibility.
The influence of net regret on escalation of commitment

Wong and Kwong (2007, Studies 2a and 2b) tested Proposition 2 by directly measuring
anticipated regret about withdrawal and anticipated regret about persistence using an
11-point scale with the endpoints ‘no regret’ (–5) and ‘very much regret’ (5). This is a
method commonly used by regret researchers (Connolly et al., 1997; Zeelenberg et al.,
1998). The authors then obtained the net anticipated regret about withdrawal by
subtracting the anticipated regret about persistence from the anticipated regret about
withdrawal.
Consistent with Proposition 2, the results show that people exhibit stronger escalation
tendency when they anticipate that the likelihood of experiencing regret about withdrawal
increases. In addition, the strength of the positive relationship between the net anticipated
regret about withdrawal and escalation of commitment is independent of whether the
decision maker is responsible for initiating the losing course of action. Again, this indi-
cates that the measures of anticipated regret capture a prospective locus of decision
making, which presumably should be additive to factors that capture retrospective locus
of decision-making processes such as personal responsibility.
Implications from the escalation research

This section summarizes the theoretical implications of identifying the emotional deter-
minants of escalation of commitment. Practical implications for decision makers in
organizations are also discussed.
Theoretical implications for escalation of commitment

We believe that the research reviewed in this chapter constitutes an important step toward
facilitating systematic and rigorous research of decision making under escalating situ-
ations and will further our understanding of the role of emotion in this process. As men-
tioned previously, a substantial body of research studying escalation of commitment has
focused primarily on its cognitive determinants (Staw, 1976, 1981; Arkes & Blumer, 1985;
Conlon & Garland, 1993; Whyte, 1993; Whyte et al., 1997; Kirby & Davis, 1998; Moon,
2001), but it has paid scant attention to the emotional aspect of escalation of commit-
ment. The studies reviewed here examine escalation of commitment from an emotional
perspective; specifically, they identify how negative affect and regret influence escalating
tendency, and the psychological mechanism underlying these influences.
Thus far, we have discussed research which identified affective determinants that are
limited to negatively valenced affect. But an interesting question remains: how might pos-
itive affect influence escalation of commitment? There is consistent evidence that people
in a sad (vs. happy) mood tend to further scrutinize information and carry out analyti-
cal/systematic information processing before making judgments or decisions (Bless et al.,
1990; Schwarz and Bless, 1991; Forgas, 2001). In other words, positive (vs. negative) mood
might induce a different type of information processing, which in turn influences escalat-
ing tendency. Therefore, it might be necessary to examine the relationship between posi-
tive affect and escalating tendency to get a comprehensive understanding of escalation of
commitment.
Future research might also identify more specifically the effect of each basic emotion
(e.g., anger, sadness) on escalating tendency. DeSteno et al. (2000) suggested that some
types of decision bias (e.g., congruency bias of frequency estimation) are subjected not
to valence of emotion per se, but also function in an emotion-specific manner. This leads
us to suspect that it is not only valence that matters when making judgment and
decisions; therefore we shall examine the effect of different emotions on escalation of
commitment.
Practical implications for organizational decision makers

Organizations may want to increase employee commitment to a course of action under
some circumstances (Schwenk, 1986) or decrease it under other circumstances (Staw,
1981; Brockner, 1992; Bazerman, 1994). From the research reviewed here, we should
expect decision makers’ escalating tendencies to vary with both negative affect and antic-
ipated regret. Thus, some techniques can be developed to vary decision makers’ levels of
commitment to a particular course of action.
First, with the identification of negative affect as a moderator of the responsibility
effect on escalation of commitment, managers should pay attention to individuals with
low neuroticism as this ‘quiet’ group of individuals are extremely vulnerable to falling into
the trap of ‘throwing good money after bad’ when they are personally responsible for the
failing decision. Staw (1982) suggests that a de-escalation strategy for this group of people
is job rotation.
Another useful way to vary decision makers’ levels of escalation of commitment is to
instruct them to think about their future regret, about persistence or regret about with-
drawal whenever appropriate. Research on social cognition has shown that imagining how
a hypothetical outcome might be true increases one’s subjective belief in the outcome’s
subjective likelihood (Koehler, 1991; Hirt & Markman, 1995). In addition, instructed
thoughts about possible negative outcomes have been shown to successfully increase
people’s sense of anticipated regret, and hence reduce the associated behaviors
(Simonson, 1992; Richard et al., 1996)
In sum, identification of the affective determinants of escalation of commitment has
important implications for management practice. In particular, the knowledge can be
used to make managers more aware of the role of affective states/traits in organizational
decision making under escalating situations, and thus possibly contribute to the improved
decisions.
Discussion and conclusion

Taken together, our research (Wong et al., 2006; Wong & Kwong, 2007) and that of others
(Staw & Barsade, 1993; Amason, 1996) emphasize the importance of understanding the
role of emotion when making decisions in organizational contexts (Bazerman et al., 1998;
Fineman, 2000). Despite this importance, there is a paucity of research examining the
influence of emotion on managerial decisions. A quick and casual search of the three
major top-tier management empirical journals (Academy of Management Journal,
Administrative Science Quarterly and Journal of Applied Psychology) in PsycInfo from 1806
to July 2006 revealed that among the 10 504 entries of these journals, there are only 32 arti-
cles with the keywords ‘emotion or affect’ and ‘decision making’. This proportion is
extremely low as compared with the proportion of studies examining emotion–decision
relations in marketing, from which we found 27 articles with those keywords in 3216 entries
from the three major top-tier marketing empirical journals (Journal of Consumer Research,
Journal of Marketing and Journal of Marketing Research). This figure indicates that we are
now just at the early stage of understanding the emotion of managerial decision making,
suggesting that there are several areas in which we can extend this line of research.
While previous organizational studies have studied mainly the influence of negative
affect on decision making (Amason, 1996; Wong et al., 2006; Wong & Kwong, 2007), pos-
itive affect is also very influential in shaping individuals’ behaviors. One promising exten-
sion is to study the relationship between positive affect and decision making. The support
of a happier-and-smarter hypothesis from Staw and Barsade (1993) is a good example.
However, the literature on positive affect indicates that the relationship between positive
affect and decision making and the processes underlying this relationship is not that
straightforward. Positive affect encourages one not only to adopt more flexible strategies
for problem solving, but also to rely more on heuristics in making decisions (see Isen, 2000
for a review). This implies that more research is needed to increase our understanding on
how, when and why positive affect increases or decreases decision performance.
Another avenue is to study the influences of specific emotions. Positive or negative affect
may be too general to capture some very specific influences on decision making. In partic-
ular, different specific emotions from positive or negative affect are theoretically related to
different aspects of decision making (see Zeelenberg et al., 1998; Mellers, 2000; Brockner
& Higgins, 2001). For instance, Wong et al. (2006) suggest that depression, but not other
negative emotions, is the key of the sadder-but-wiser hypothesis on escalation of commit-
ment. A fair test of this hypothesis, therefore, is to examine it by using depression as the
predictor. Consistent with this view, Moon et al. (2003) found that escalation of commit-
ment is positively related to trait anxiety and is negatively related to trait depression.
To conclude, in this chapter we have offered a brief review of the literature dealing with
the relationship between emotion and decision making. Although this has been an impor-
tant topic in general decision making research, it is only in the past decade that organ-
izational researchers have begun to empirically address issues related to the role of
emotion in making decisions under organizational contexts. Some studies have started to
examine this issue by focusing on the influences of negative affect, reinforcing the view
that organizational decision making is likely to be largely shaped by emotional factors.
Future research may further benefit from extending this research to examine the role of
positive affect and more specific emotions in organizational decision making.
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3 Fear and loathing in the workplace
Julie Fitness
[A]n Army functions best when you’re frightened of the man above you and contemptuous of
your subordinates.
(Mailer, 1948, p. 181)
Introduction
Negative emotions are ubiquitous in workplace relationships. Workers in every type of
organizational context will sometimes fear their superiors, loathe their co-workers, and
despise their subordinates. Moreover, workers’ experiences and expressions of these and
other powerful emotions such as anger, disgust, and shame have the capacity to seriously
damage workplace morale and productivity. However, there is still much we do not under-
stand about the causes and consequences of such potentially difficult and destructive
emotions in the workplace.
The original brief for this chapter was negative emotions at work, but it should be noted
from the outset that from a functionalist perspective, there are no truly ‘negative’ emo-
tions. All emotions are potentially adaptive states of action readiness (Frijda, 2007) that
may or may not feel ‘good’ and that may or may not have destructive consequences. Love,
for example, is typically conceptualized as a positive emotion that feels wonderful and that
motivates constructive behaviors. However, love can also be experienced as a torment that
interferes with ongoing goals and plans and that has the potential to turn a workplace
upside-down with intrigues, conflicts, and jealousies.
Similarly, anger (a prototypically ‘negative’ emotion) may feel energizing and motivate
constructive efforts to change an unjust situation (Lerner & Tiedens, 2006). Guilt, too, is
an agonizing emotion that may, nonetheless, motivate constructive efforts to amend mis-
takes and repair relationships (Fitness, 2001). Even hate, arguably the most toxic of all
emotions, can motivate change or at least escape from an intolerable situation (Fitness &
Fletcher, 1993).
The overall topic of this chapter, then, is not ‘negative’ emotions per se, but negative or
destructive outcomes of the experience and expression of emotions such as anger and hate
in organizational contexts. Following a brief explication of the functionalist perspective to
emotions, I shall discuss relevant empirical work on the experience and expression of emo-
tions such as anger, hate, shame, and contempt in workplace settings. The impact of emo-
tional states and dispositions such as trait anger on workers’ cognitions and behaviors will
also be considered, followed by a discussion of power, gender, and emotion management
at work. The chapter will conclude with a call for more theoretically driven research on the
features, functions, and outcomes of potentially destructive emotions in organizations.
Functionalist accounts of emotional experience and expression

Evolutionary psychologists argue that emotions are hard-wired, psychological mechan-
isms that serve a variety of survival functions (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000; Panksepp, 2000).
61
One of the most critical of these functions is motivational, with emotional states such as
fear and anger urging individuals toward potentially adaptive behaviors such as fleeing
from danger and tackling obstacles that block their access to resources. Emotions, then,
‘move’ or motivate individuals to meet their physical and psychological survival needs.
Such needs, however, cannot be met alone. From the time they are born, humans need
committed caregivers and the protection of family and friends if they are to survive to
adulthood and achieve reproductive success. It is not surprising then, that emotions are,
for the most part, experienced within social contexts such as the family and the workplace
(Fitness & Case, 2003). Further, emotions like love and hate may motivate all manner of
constructive or destructive behaviors toward those who are perceived to be facilitating or
blocking the fulfillment of our needs and desires.
A second, critical function of emotions, and one that again underscores their sociality,
involves communication. Screams of rage and cries of distress communicate need states to
others who, in turn, respond with emotional expressions that communicate how happy (or
not) they are to meet those needs (Clark et al., 2001). Expressions of anger, for example,
send the strong message that all is not right with the world and that action must be taken
to improve matters; expressions of fear or sadness communicate helplessness and a need for
protection or comfort. Fortunately for human survival, individuals are born with the capac-
ity to both express and recognize such emotional expressions. However, it should be noted
that for adults, emotional expression does not necessarily imply emotional experience. The
raw power of a one-year-old’s cries of rage reflects impulses to action as yet unmoderated
by social sanctions or acquired techniques of emotion regulation. As they grow up,
however, children quickly learn culturally specific rules concerning the appropriate expres-
sion of emotions depending on factors such as how much power they have in a particular
situation, and even whether they are male or female (Fitness & Duffield, 2004). The devel-
opment of this emotion knowledge enables the kinds of deception involved in suppressing
anger with a smile, or even in feigning anger in order to intimidate others, or in strategically
expressing sadness in order to win sympathy and concessions (Clark et al., 1996).
In summary, emotions have an evolved, biological basis and serve motivational and
communicative functions. Moreover, they are most typically experienced, expressed, and
regulated in social contexts. Leaving aside the emotion-rich context of intimate relation-
ships, it could be argued that the workplace ranks as the next most potentially emotional
context, with its inherent power structures and relational complexities. In the next section
I shall review some of the most relevant theoretical and empirical work on two of the most
arguably problematic workplace emotions: anger and hate.
Features and functions of anger and hate

Over recent years there has been a steady increase in the number of incidents of so-called
‘work rage’ reported in the Western media. Such incidents include bullying and threaten-
ing behaviors, verbal abuse, vengeful behaviors including vandalism, theft, and sabotage,
and acts of extreme violence, including arson and murder (Folger & Baron, 1996;
VandenBos & Bulatao, 1996; Neuman & Baron, 1997; Tepper, 2000). Researchers have
also noted the negative impact of workplace hostility, both on individuals (e.g., increased
job stress, lowered morale, decreased job satisfaction) and on organizations (e.g., venge-
ful employee behaviors; diminished productivity; and, increasingly, litigation on behalf of
victimized workers).
Fear and loathing in the workplace 63
Much of the research interest in anger in the workplace has derived from its theorized
links with aggression, revenge, and antisocial behaviors (e.g., Allcorn, 1994; Johnson &
Indvik, 2000), and the focus has typically been on its management and regulation. Other
researchers have focused on the expression and control of anger at work depending on
factors such as gender and/or status (e.g., Glomb & Hulin, 1997; Tiedens, 2000). However,
there is still much we do not understand about the circumstances in which anger and
closely related emotions such as hate motivate antisocial and vengeful behaviors at work.
There is also a dearth of underlying theory driving research in this area. However, and
as noted previously, from a functionalist perspective, destructive behaviors are rarely
random occurrences with unknown causes. Rather, they are motivated by emotions that
have, in turn, been elicited in response to unmet and/or thwarted needs, including (and
especially) psychological needs for belonging, esteem, and control (Lazarus & Cohen-
Charash, 2001; Twenge et al., 2001).
In an exploratory study of anger at work, Fitness (2000) investigated the causes and
consequences of anger incidents between workers and their superiors, co-workers, and
subordinates. The design of the study was adapted from research on the experience
and expression of emotions in marriage (Fitness & Fletcher, 1993). Respondents were
asked to describe a remembered anger experience at work in as much detail as possible.
They were then asked a series of open-ended questions prompting them for details of the
incident, including what had triggered their anger; what they had thought and felt at the
time; how they had behaved; how the target of their anger had responded; and whether
or not the incident had been resolved.
As noted previously, anger is elicited in response to a perceived violation of, or interfer-
ence with, an individual’s goals or desires. It involves appraisals of unfairness and moti-
vates attempts to restore justice (Rozin et al., 1999). In line with this conceptualization, the
largest proportion of respondents in the current study reported that their anger was trig-
gered by unfair treatment (e.g., being falsely accused of lying, stealing, or having a rea-
sonable request denied; or being given an unfair workload). The second largest proportion
of respondents reported incidents that were less directly related to injustice but that
reflected overriding themes of ‘wrongness’ and of morally reprehensible behavior (e.g.,
laziness, dishonesty, or sleaziness: having sex with the boss). Respondents also reported
being angered by others who lied, stole, cheated on expenses, and took advantage of others.
The third largest proportion of anger-eliciting events involved clear examples of goal
frustration. They included incidents involving others’ incompetence and events that ham-
pered respondents’ abilities to get the job done or that cost their organization money or
goodwill. Slowness and apparent stupidity were also reported as anger-provoking, signi-
fying character flaws that violated respondents’ beliefs about how people should behave
in an (ideal) world.
One particularly interesting aspect of the study’s findings was that the kinds of events
that made people angry tended to differ according to whether they involved a superior, co-
worker, or a subordinate. Superiors, for example, were typically angered by the perceived
incompetence and/or negative characteristics of subordinates. Superiors believed that their
demands were fair and reasonable and their immediate behaviors (in line with their urges)
involved confronting subordinates in an effort to make them see the error of their ways.
Nearly 75 per cent of superiors were satisfied that the incident had been successfully
resolved and claimed to be back on good terms with the offender. Anger-eliciting events
for subordinates, however, were described differently. Subordinates were most typically
angered by unjust treatment, and their immediate behaviors (despite sometimes violent
urges) typically involved withdrawal, with the tendency to actually withdraw inversely
related to perceived power in the situation. Only 30 per cent of subordinates considered
the anger-eliciting incident had been resolved; most reported that they detached emotion-
ally from the offender, lost trust in him or her, and/or took some form of revenge (e.g.,
going slow, sabotage, or gossiping).
No significant gender differences were found in this study, suggesting that in the work-
place, power may be more salient than gender when it comes to managing the experience
and expression of anger (see also Gianakos, 2002). Further, power relations and the abuse
of power figured prominently in respondents’ reports of hatred during the anger incident.
Specifically, and in line with marital emotion research (e.g., Fitness & Fletcher, 1993), a
strong, positive association was found between respondents’ perceptions of having been
humiliated by offenders, and feelings of hatred for them.
Humiliation involves the experience of belittlement and reflects a perception of relative
powerlessness (Frijda, 2007). In line with this, humiliation in the current study was less often
reported by superiors than by subordinates. Further, the consequences of humiliation were
among the most severe reported in the study. One respondent, for example, reported that
she needed psychiatric assistance to overcome the trauma of public humiliation, while
another talked about his suicidal feelings as a consequence of his experience. Unfortunately,
experiences of humiliation including public ridicule and abuse are not uncommon in the
workplace, as studies of bullying have demonstrated (e.g., see Randell, 1997).
Taken together, these findings underscore the utility of considering emotions such as
anger and hate separately from one another. Conflicts inevitably arise in the workplace as
a function of perceived goal obstruction by others. However, feelings and expressions of
anger are signals that a problem needs to be engaged with and addressed. Feelings and
expressions of hate, on the other hand, are not simply instances of ‘intense anger’. Rather,
they signal an individual’s perceptions of having been demeaned or otherwise badly
treated, and perceptions that he or she has insufficient power to adequately address the
situation. Consequently, an individual feeling hatred may be motivated to escape and/or
to engage in some kind of covert revenge, such as sabotage, as a way of restoring power
(Bies & Tripp, 1998; Frijda, 2007).
In summary, perceived power appears to play an important role in how anger works at
work. Participants in angry workplace encounters have different perspectives on the situ-
ation, and the more powerful person’s perspective tends to prevail. In this respect, the
impact of anger episodes on subordinates may be potentially more severe and/or longer
lasting than on superiors who, as social psychologists have discovered, actually pay very
little attention to subordinates until they do something wrong (e.g., Fiske, 1993). Once
they perceive that their goals have been thwarted by subordinates, superiors become
angry, deal with the situation and then consider the case closed. Subordinates, on the
other hand, have long memories for unfair or demeaning treatment. Frequently they feel
that they have not been listened to or treated with respect (also referred to as ‘interactional
injustice’; e.g., see Barclay et al., 2005). Couple this with the likelihood that they may not
have communicated effectively with a superior during an anger episode and the scene is
set for lingering feelings of distrust and hatred long after the episode is officially closed,
with superiors unaware that anything is wrong.
Although there were limitations to the anger study, it did generate a host of new
research questions. In particular, individuals frequently mentioned feelings of disgust,
contempt, and shame, and/or perceived that they were the targets of these emotions from
others, in the context of anger-eliciting incidents. Unfortunately, the study’s design did not
allow for a systematic investigation of the features and functions of such emotions. In
fact, there has been very little empirical research on disgust, shame, or contempt, in work-
place contexts. In the next section I shall briefly review what we know about these emo-
tions and suggest some implications for their experience and expression in the workplace.
Disgust, contempt, and shame: features and functions

As previously discussed, anger can be a constructive workplace emotion that motivates
potentially constructive engagement with a perceived problem. Disgust, on the other
hand, is theorized to be triggered by perceived violations of sociomoral codes and
immoral behaviours and to motivate rejection of others, along with feelings of repulsion
for them (Rozin et al., 1999). This suggests that the experience and expression of disgust
may have particularly destructive outcomes in organizational contexts.
One intriguing line of research on the interpersonal causes and consequences of disgust
was reported by Cunningham et al. (1997). These researchers introduced the concept of
a ‘social allergen’ to describe the ‘objectively minor but emotionally major’ social experi-
ences that ‘grate on people’s nerves or make them emotionally “sick” ’ (p. 191). In their
research on the kinds of behaviors that made individuals feel disgusted, Cunningham
et al. found that 36 per cent of the most intense reactions were elicited by co-workers,
bosses, and teachers. The disgust-eliciting behaviors themselves fell into four categories
including intrusions and dominance (e.g., giving commands or criticism without having
legitimate authority; implying the other is of lower status); insensitivity and non-reci-
procity (e.g., asking inappropriate questions, engaging in monologues and constantly
interrupting); norm violations and discrepant behaviors (e.g., avoiding work, cheating or
telling lies to others); and annoying habits and personal qualities (e.g., consistently stand-
ing too close; conveying physically unpleasant sounds, odors, or appearance; frequently
expressing negative emotions).
Although there is some overlap between Cunningham et al.’s disgust categories and the
anger elicitors reported by Fitness (2000), there are also some distinctive elements that
suggest disgust is a discrete emotion with its own specific elicitors. For example,
Cunningham et al. argue that an important quality of social allergens is the way in which
individuals exposed to them become increasingly sensitized, to the point where even the
smallest ‘dose’ can trigger an intensely aversive reaction. In response to open-ended ques-
tions about emotional experiences at work, some of the respondents in the Fitness (2000)
anger study noted their disgust in response to colleagues’ and superiors’ repeated,
offensive behaviors, including intrusiveness (bordering on harassment), ingratiation
(‘sucking up’) to superiors, ‘stealing’ ideas and credit for others’ work, and bad habits such
as chronic lateness or laziness. These kinds of behaviors can be subtle and difficult to
articulate in the form of an official complaint (‘he just makes me feel uneasy’; ‘she’s always
finding someone else to do her work for her’); management may even regard such com-
plaints as trivial or petty. However, according to Cunningham et al.’s model, it is the
repetitive nature of such behaviors that is associated with increasing levels of disgust.
Further, it is plausible that such feelings may lead to avoidance behaviors, including
absenteeism and ultimately, resignation. Workers’ expressions of disgust or aversion, then,

may signal important interpersonal and/or ethical issues that should be taken seriously by
those who hold power in organizations.
One interesting question that arises here is the extent to which disgust and hate are dis-
crete emotions, given that they both appear to motivate withdrawal behaviors.
Cunningham et. al’s (1997) data suggest that power does not play such a prominent role
in disgust as it does in hate, and disgust may also be less likely than hate to motivate
revenge, as opposed to avoidance. However, another important emotion that does have
explicit relevance to power relations and power abuses in the workplace is contempt (also
referred to as derision, or scorn).
According to Rozin et al. (1999), contempt is a hierarchy-related emotion, elicited by
perceptions of superiority to others, and involving behaviors that suggest that the object
of contempt is inferior and not worthy of respect as a human being. Individuals who have
been humiliated perceive that they have been treated with contempt by more powerful
others; however, ostensibly low-power workers may also describe feeling contempt for
their superiors, particularly in situations where moral judgments are being made. For
example, and as noted by Cunningham et al. (1997), witnessing a manager repeatedly
engage in personally and/or morally offensive behaviors such as lying or cheating may
elicit strong feelings of contempt and moral superiority among his or her employees.
Almost nothing is known about the kinds of behaviors that feelings of contempt for a
superior might elicit, although undermining and disrespectful behaviors such as gossip
and reputational damage are likely to figure prominently among them.
It is also important here to note the links between the emotions of contempt and shame.
Shame is a powerful, painful emotion that is held by some to have no redeeming fea-
tures (e.g., see Tangney & Dearing, 2002). From a functionalist perspective, however,
shame plays an important and adaptive role in human survival. One of its most
obvious functions is to sensitize individuals to, and make them care about, the opinions
of important others within their social groups, and without whose goodwill they would
not survive.
Anticipating the pain of shame motivates individuals to ‘fit in’ with social group
members and to behave in ways that maintain their approval. (Consider, for example, the
hostility directed toward an apparently deviant individual who is considered to have ‘no
shame’.) The experience of being treated with contempt, then, is intrinsically shaming and
can result in severe acts of self-punishment, including suicide (Scheff, 1987). However, the
aversiveness of shame can also motivate defensive anger and/or aggressive and violent
behaviors (Tangney et al., 1992; Poulson, 2000). Given the hierarchical nature of so many
workplaces, it is reasonable to suppose that contempt/shame interactions figure promi-
nently within many of them, and that such interactions generate a great deal of hostility
and unhappiness.
In summary, there are several emotions that may be generated in situations where
workers perceive that they have been treated with injustice, callousness, and contempt.
Such situations violate individuals’ needs for control and esteem and their emotional
responses include anger, hatred, disgust, and shame. These emotions, in turn, may moti-
vate various kinds of behaviors at work including aggression, revenge, and avoidance. In
the next section I shall examine the impact of chronic emotional states and dispositions
on the ways in which individuals think and behave in the workplace.
Seeing red: the impact of emotional states on workers’ cognitions and behaviors
Emotions are elicited by individuals’ cognitive appraisals about a particular stimulus or
event in the world, including (and especially) other people’s behaviors. However, an emo-
tional incident takes place over time and the kinds of appraisals that generate particular
emotions can, in turn, be generated by those emotions in an ongoing and chronic fashion.
In effect, emotions can ‘hijack’ cognition and become a lens through which people per-
ceive the world (see Planalp & Fitness, 1999). Anger, for example, can influence people’s
appraisals of the world such that they become highly sensitive to potential insults and
injustices; these perceptions, in turn, motivate judgmental and punitive behaviors (e.g., see
Lerner & Keltner, 2000). Thus, an individual who leaves home angry with her spouse may
quickly ‘see red’ when confronted by an employee who has made a small mistake and
punish him disproportionately for his offence.
In a paper reviewing research on the effects of anger on judgment and decision making,
Lerner and Tiedens (2006) noted how, in line with its motivational push to engage with a
goal obstruction, anger triggers a ‘bias toward seeing the self as powerful and capable’
(p. 125). In some circumstances, this may motivate energetic and successful attempts to
resolve problems. At other times, however, anger may interfere with functional workplace
behavior. For example, Allred et al. (1997) found that the more anger and less compas-
sion negotiators felt for each other, the less willing they were to work together in future,
and the fewer joint gains they achieved. Once the attention of angry individuals is focused
on perceived obstructions, they tend to become less trusting of others, and less likely to
perceive opportunities to cooperate.
Over the longer term, chronic or trait anger (Spielberger, 1999) can create serious prob-
lems within an organization (Johnson & Indvik, 2000). Trait anger has been linked to
increases in workplace aggression (Douglas & Martinko, 2001) and is positively associ-
ated with hostile and risk-taking behaviors (Lerner & Keltner, 2000). Chronically angry
individuals constantly find fault with others and assume that everyone is ‘out to get them’
and maliciously motivated. Interestingly, it is these chronically hostile individuals who are
most likely to suffer the kinds of heart problems formerly associated more generally with
the ‘Type A’ personality (Whiteman et al., 1997). All Type A individuals are energetic and
impulsive; however, the subset of Type As who are also hostile derive their energy not
from enthusiasm or high intrinsic motivation but from their chronic rage at what they per-
ceive to be an unjust and obstructive world.
Another emotional disposition identified in the literature as ‘shame-proneness’ may
have similar feature and outcomes as trait anger (Tangney et al., 1992). Shame-prone indi-
viduals believe that they are worthless and inferior, and that everyone around them views
them with contempt. Ironically, however, they frequently cope with such painful feelings
by blaming everyone else for their own mistakes and by engaging in indirect expressions
of hostility. They tend to be suspicious and resentful of others and frequently find it
difficult to present their work for evaluation because it will inevitably (they fear) be found
wanting; hence strong links have been found between shame-proneness and procrastina-
tion (Fee & Tangney, 2000).
Guilt-proneness, on the other hand, is a potentially adaptive emotional disposition
whereby individuals believe that they are responsible for fixing mistakes, whether caused
by themselves or others (Tangney et al., 1992). In moderation, guilt-proneness motivates
prosocial behavior and relationship repair. Expressions of guilt can, however, lead to
negative outcomes for individuals in certain kinds of interpersonal situations, such as

where they are negotiating or bargaining for resources. For example, Van Kleef et al.
(2006) found that expressing appeasement emotions such as guilt signalled that expres-
sors felt overbenefited and they won fewer concessions from their negotiating partners.
However, expressing disappointment or sadness (supplication emotions) signalled that
expressors were needy and they won more concessions from their partners. These findings
again underscore the utility of analyzing discrete emotions in line with their evolved,
social functions (see also Lazarus & Cohen-Charash, 2001). Guilt and disappointment
may be painful emotions to experience, but the outcomes of expressing them may be pos-
itive. On the other hand, emotions like contempt can feel empowering and boost an indi-
vidual’s self-esteem; the consequences of expressing contempt, however, may be extremely
damaging to its targets.
Finally, there are some very interesting research findings emerging from the close rela-
tionship literature on an emotion and associated emotional disposition that have as yet
attracted almost no attention in the organizational literature: hurt and hurt-proneness.
Hurt feelings result from perceptions of personal rejection and relational devaluation
(Leary et al., 1998), both of which may be experienced more or less frequently by indi-
viduals at work, depending on their expectations of the extent to which others care for,
and about, them. Currently, the causes, frequency, and consequences of experiencing hurt
at work are unknown. Nor is anything known about how hurt is typically expressed to
more- or less-powerful others, although researchers have found that in general, men who
are hurt by other men are significantly less likely to show they are hurt than are men hurt
by women, or women hurt by men (ibid.). There is evidence, however, that just as some
individuals are chronically primed to respond to interpersonal situations with anger and
shame, so too are some individuals extremely ‘thin-skinned’ and hurt-prone (Leary &
Springer, 2001). Hurt-prone individuals are vigilant for, and readily perceive, criticism and
rejection from others, and they respond to their painful perceptions with a range of behav-
iors including hostility, dejection, withdrawal, and jealousy. Hurt-proneness, then, has the
potential to cause serious interpersonal difficulties in the workplace; however, we do not
have any data on its frequency or outcomes in that context. In summary, and to reiterate
the central argument of this chapter, emotions are not essentially negative or problematic.
Rather, it is the manner of their expression and the extent to which they may become
chronic ways of apprehending the world that may cause problems in organizational con-
texts. In the next section I shall discuss some implications of the theory and research
reviewed thus far for the management of emotions such as anger, hate, contempt, and
shame in the workplace.
Managing problematic workplace emotions

One important theme that underpins much of the research discussed thus far concerns
the role of power in managing potentially problematic emotions in the workplace. For
example, and as noted earlier, higher status is positively associated with the overt expres-
sion of anger. In other words, high-power people are more likely to express their anger
openly than low-power people because they can do so without fearing the consequences.
Further, Tiedens (2001) demonstrated how, in the absence of relative status information,
an individual who expresses anger tends to be regarded as powerful and competent. In
one study, for example, Tiedens found that research participants assigned a higher status
position and a higher salary to a hypothetical job candidate who described himself as
angry, rather than sad.
These findings may help explain why some individuals deliberately and strategically use
anger to intimidate others: angry people are perceived as threatening and dominant, but
also as competent and powerful (Clark et al., 1996; Gibson & Schroeder, 2002). Similarly,
several respondents in the Fitness (2000) study endorsed the strategic expression of anger
as a tool for getting your own way and for giving subordinates a ‘push’ when required.
There are problems, however, with the use of anger as a motivational tool. In particular,
intimidation generates fear and anxiety among subordinates – emotions which in the
short term may promote compliance in order to avoid punishment, but which in the
longer term destroy people’s capacity for taking pleasure in their work and motivate des-
perate attempts to avoid and escape an intolerably aversive situation (Stanley & Burrows,
2001). Lower-power workers may also view such intimidating behaviors as deriving from
personality inadequacies and/or moral failings, and view a bullying manager with
contempt.
The anger–status association raises some interesting questions about women’s experi-
ences and expressions of emotions in the workplace. Researchers have found that in most
interpersonal contexts women tend to express support-seeking emotions like sadness and
fear more frequently than men, who more frequently tend to express intimidating emo-
tions like anger and contempt (Brody, 1999). However, given that the underlying causes
of anger and contempt (i.e., goal obstruction and perceptions of superiority) are pre-
sumably gender neutral, it is interesting to speculate about the extent to which the expres-
sion of these emotions may be more a function of power relations than gender per se. In
particular, if power is more important than gender, then behavioral expressions of anger
and contempt for others should rise with organizational seniority, just as the behavioral
expressions of fear and sadness should diminish, regardless of gender.
Along with power, another important issue for managing potentially problematic emo-
tions concerns perceived injustice, both in relation to the distribution of resources (which
may be perceived as fair or unfair) and in relation to the extent to which individuals feel
they have been treated with respect and dignity. As noted earlier, perceptions of unfair-
ness typically generate anger, which may or may not have constructive outcomes depend-
ing on how it is managed. Interactional injustice, however, involves perceptions that one
has been treated with disrespect, and these perceptions, in turn, have been associated with
psychological distress, poor morale, higher turnover, and less-favourable attitudes toward
the job and the organization (Tepper, 2000). As Tepper notes, it is during times of organ-
izational change and restructuring that employees become most sensitive to issues of
injustice, in relation to both resource allocation and whether or not they have been treated
respectfully and with compassion. Importantly, these are also the kinds of conditions that
generate high levels of anger, hate, disgust, shame, and hurt in response to violated expec-
tations of job security, fair distribution of resources, and consideration for individuals’
needs and concerns (see also Morrison & Robinson, 1997).
Together, these findings suggest that there is value in viewing the experience of emo-
tions such as anger, contempt, and shame, not only as intrapsychic states that reflect an
individual’s personal needs and concerns, but also as virtually inevitable outcomes of
processes and power structures that systematically thwart or disregard workers’ needs and
concerns (Booth & Mann, 2005). This, in turn, suggests that there may be such an entity
as an ‘emotionally intelligent’ organization within which human needs, motivations and

emotions are acknowledged, understood, and respected at all levels of the workplace hier-
archy (see Caruso et al., 2006). Such a workplace would be characterized by a climate of
trust, consideration, and effective communication, including encouragement of lower-
power workers to express their concerns and needs, and training of higher-power workers
to listen and respond appropriately to such expressions. Managers would also realize that
emotions are significantly more likely to be transmitted to lower levels of the hierarchy
than to higher levels (Larson & Richards, 1994) (i.e., bosses express anger to subordinates
who go home and yell at the children, who kick the cat); accordingly, effective emotion
management must be modelled from the top down (Lewis, 2000). Indeed, transmitting
empathy, emotional understanding and acceptance from the highest levels of an organ-
ization may be one of the most effective ways of reducing a whole range of dysfunctional
workplace phenomena, including bullying and abusive supervision, interpersonal hostil-
ity and warfare, and vengeful behaviors such as aggression and sabotage.
Conclusions
At its heart, the workplace is a social context just like any other and individuals try to
meet their needs for control, esteem, and belonging at work just as they do in other kinds
of social groups. Throughout this chapter I have argued the case for regarding emotions
as discrete, potentially functional feeling states that send important signals about people’s
needs and concerns. The features and functions of a variety of workplace emotions are
still to be explored, as are the dynamics of both transient and chronic emotion states on
individuals’ cognitions and behaviors at work. Clearly, there is much to do in this chal-
lenging area of psychological enquiry. However, the rewards of such research are poten-
tially enormous, both with respect to enhancing our understanding of how emotions
work at work, and also to improving the lives of workers everywhere.
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4 The case for emotion-induced toxicity: making
sense of toxic emotions in the workplace
Sandra A. Lawrence*
Introduction
In recent years the term ‘toxic emotions’ has been used in both the academic literature
(Clair & Dufresne, 2004; Herkenhoff, 2004; Maitlis & Ozcelik, 2004) and in the broader
mainstream media (Hall & Hampson, 2006; Issacs, 2006). Interest in toxic emotions has
stemmed from Bradshaw’s (1988) work on toxic shame, although many of the references
to the term are based on Frost’s (2003) highly acclaimed book, Toxic Emotions at Work:
How Compassionate Managers Handle Pain and Conflict. In the book, Frost provided a
framework for understanding toxic events as sources of destructive emotions in organ-
izations. Frost drew together substantial literature linking organizational events to
emotions and individual outcomes, to categorize events that can lead to toxicity in organ-
izations. He identified that organizational toxic events fall into one or more of seven major
categories: intention (e.g., bullying); insensitivity (e.g., lack of empathy); incompetence
(e.g., poor interpersonal skills); infidelity (e.g., lack of loyalty to others); institutional
forces (e.g., perceptions of justice); intrusion (e.g., extra work and/or intentional blurring
of the work private divide); and finally, inevitability (e.g., change in organizations). These
seven toxic events are principally generated by either managers’ behaviors or structural
processes and policies within organizations. Frost argued that these ‘toxic events’ in the
workplace generate emotions that prove destructive to both the psychological and physi-
ological health of individuals within an organization, and the goals the organization is
trying to achieve.
Despite toxic emotions becoming a popular concept, neither Frost, nor any other
researcher, has endeavored to explain the term ‘toxic emotions’ or provide a definition. My
aim in this chapter is to provide a better understanding of emotion-induced toxicity in indi-
viduals in the workplace and determine whether ‘toxic emotions’ is the appropriate nomen-
clature for describing this phenomenon. First, I examine the relationship between
organizational justice-related events, the negative emotions they elicit within employees,
and the resulting individual and organizational outcomes. I then consider the nature of tox-
icity, drawing on the science-related toxicology and neuropsychology literatures to develop
an understanding of the broad parameters for defining toxicity. From an examination of
the nature of emotion suppression, using research evidence from medical biostatistics,
social psychology, and industrial and organizational psychology, I develop an argument
that intense negative emotions and the suppression of those emotions are involved in pro-
ducing toxic effects in employees. Finally, I draw some conclusions from the evidence I have
presented and discuss future directions for emotion-induced toxicity research.
Organizational events, emotional responses, and employee outcomes

An examination of the literature relating to the toxic events identified by Frost (2003)
clearly provides strong research evidence of the negative impact of these events on
73
employees. Specifically, the research evidence shows clear negative outcomes in terms of
the employees’ emotional responses (e.g., Maitlis & Ozcelik, 2004; Perrone & Vickers,
2004), their attitudinal and behavioral responses in organizations (e.g., Kiefer, 2005;
Spector et al., 2006), and more generally, on their physical and psychological well-being
(e.g., Sutherland & Cooper, 2000; Greenberg, 2006). While Frost’s seven toxic events are
clearly articulated and distinct events that are evident in many organizations, they can be
grouped under a single category – how people are treated in organizations. Greenberg
(2006) argues that this is the essence of justice in organizations. He further contends that
people’s perceptions of how they are treated predict a broad range of emotional and
behavioral outcomes. Greenberg (1993, 2006) notes that three different types of justice in
organizations need to be considered: distributive justice (perceptions of the fairness of the
outcome distributions); procedural justice (perceptions of the fairness of the process used
to determine the outcome); and interactional justice (perceptions of fairness of the quality
of interpersonal treatment – respect, truth and honesty – when procedures are enacted).
Research examining perceptions of organizational justice, employees’ elicited emo-
tional responses, and their impact on individual and organizational outcomes has pro-
duced a number of interesting findings. Employees form justice perceptions by making
social comparisons with others’ experiences in the workplace (see Greenberg et al., 2007).
These perceptions, in turn, ultimately influence a variety of individual and organizational
outcomes. In a meta-analysis, Colquitt et al. (2001) found that procedural justice was
significantly correlated with job satisfaction, organizational commitment, organizational
referenced organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs), performance and withdrawal
(absenteeism, turnover, neglect). Distributive justice was linked to job satisfaction,
organizational commitment, organizational referenced OCBs and withdrawal. Finally,
Colquitt et al. found that interpersonal justice was correlated with job satisfaction, organ-
izational commitment, individual referenced OCBs, performance and withdrawal. There
are also links of justice perceptions to health outcomes (e.g., Elovainio et al., 2002, 2003).
Greenberg (2006), for instance, found that experiences of injustice in the workplace were
reflected in an individuals’ experience of insomnia three years after the precipitating inci-
dent.
There is a clear link between perceptions of justice, experienced negative emotions and
individual and organizational outcomes. Kiefer (2005) reported that perceptions of inad-
equate treatment by an organization regarding ongoing organizational change, positively
increased employees’ experience of negative emotions, which, in turn, predicted employ-
ees’ lack of trust and withdrawal from the organization. A number of researchers found
that perceptions of low distributive and procedural justice increased employees’ counter-
productive work behaviors by increasing their experience of negative emotions (Fox et al.,
2001; Spector et al., 2006).
Perceptions of injustice have also been linked to a variety of experienced, discrete neg-
ative emotions. Mikula et al. (1998) revealed that the most frequently reported emotional
responses to organizational injustice were anger and disgust, followed by sadness, fear,
guilt and shame. Often involving perceived justice violations, research evidence shows that
organizational change victims experience discrete emotions such as anger, frustration,
social isolation, helplessness and anxiety, while organizational change survivors have been
found to experience emotions such as ranging from shock, anger, fear, relief, guilt and
excitement (see Ryan & Macky, 1998).
The case for emotion-induced toxicity 75
Increased perceptions of distributive justice in response to organizational downsizing

have been shown to have a positive influence on management trust, employee morale and
perceptions of change acceptability, by decreasing employees’ anxiety (Paterson & Cary,
2002). Although Dasborough (2006) reveals that leaders’ failure to display awareness and
respect evoked intense, discrete negative emotions (anger and annoyance, frustration and
loathing) in their employees, research by Fitness (2000) notes that it is lower-status
employees in particular who express anger in reaction to unjust treatment by their
supervisor.
Justice perceptions moderate the relationship between perceptions of outcome favora-
bility and discrete experienced emotions. Research by Matheny and Smollen (2005)
reveals that discrete negative emotions are most clearly associated with employees’ per-
ceptions of injustice and unfavorable outcomes. Barclay et al. (2005) reported that indi-
viduals’ perceptions of justice after being made redundant, negatively moderated the
relationships between outcome favorability and both inward-focused negative emotions
(shame, guilt) and outward-focused emotions (anger, hostility). The former finding was
argued to have occurred because individuals were internally attributing blame for their
layoff situation; and in the latter case, it was argued that the relationship arose because
individuals were externally attributing blame.
This argument that the relationship between perceptions of justice and discrete emo-
tional responses are dependent on cognitive attributions is supported by other research.
Individuals’ attributions of blame mediate the relationships between procedural and
interaction justice and experienced anger and hostility (ibid.). These negative emotions,
in turn, mediated the relationship between fairness perceptions and retaliation intentions
(ibid.). Similarly, Weiss et al. (1999; see also Cropanzano et al., 2000) found that the type
of discrete negative emotion experienced (e.g., guilt, pride, sadness, anger) depends on
both whether the event outcome is judged to be favorable and whether procedural justice
was biased in the individuals’ favor.
The literature reviewed above reveals that a ‘toxic event’ such as justice violations,
whether related to distributional, procedural or interactional issues, generates a range of
discrete negative emotions in employees. Although some emotions dominate in response
to particular events, Fisher (2002) argues that it is reasonable for employees to experience
a range and a combination of emotions over time. It is clear that events are important
triggers for the experience of emotions (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). Emotional responses
are inherently an individual phenomenon, influenced during appraisal processes by cog-
nitive perceptions (e.g., social comparisons, favorability of outcomes, attributions of
blame) and personality factors (e.g., dispositions, emotional intelligence; see Paterson &
Härtel, 2002; Ashton-James & Ashkanasy, 2005).
The fact that negative emotions are being generated from ‘toxic’ events implies that any
discussion of ‘toxic emotions’ needs to take note of the characteristics of those emotions
generated. There has been a popular opinion that emotions should be conceptualized with
regard to discrete distinctions. It is clear, however, that due to a combination of language
vagaries, cultural variations and the fact that emotions are very personal experiences that
vary in intensity, duration and source, no single list of basic emotions exists that is broadly
used and accepted (Russell, 1991; Mesquita & Frijda, 1992). This makes using an emo-
tional taxonomy to identify discrete negative emotions, let alone possible ‘toxic’ emotions,
problematic at best. A better way to conceptualize possible ‘toxic’ emotions is in terms of
the valence of the emotion and its intensity (see Cropanzano et al., 2003). Ortony et al.
(1988) define an emotion as a reaction that emerges from the perception of individuals to
a situation, another person, or an object. By considering the intensity and valence of an
experienced emotion, it is possible to account for individual differences in reactions to
events or situations. This then provides an explanation of why an event may affect some
people in a significant way, but be overlooked by others. In the next section I examine this
differential effect in greater detail.
Understanding emotion-induced toxicity in individuals

Based on my review so far, workplace events involving justice violations can invoke a
variety of discrete negative emotions in individuals in the workplace. So what is it about
these emotions that have toxic consequences for employees? In the following sections, I
examine research evidence from science-related toxicology, neuropsychology, medical
biostatistics, social psychology, and industrial and organizational psychology, to uncover
how negative emotions might induce toxic reactions in individuals.
Science-related toxicology research

In the sciences, toxicity refers to the poisonous quality of a substance, with reference to
its degree or strength (Sonsalla et al., 1989; Gable, 2004). More specifically, toxicity is a
measure of the degree to which an external substance, whether chemical, biological or
physical, is poisonous to living things, from a whole organism, down to organ systems,
individual organs, tissues, cells and sub-cellular units, such as genomes (Hussein & Brasel,
2001; Waters et al., 2003). I argue that any definition of ‘toxic’, whether in relation to
organizational events or workplace emotional reactions, should conform to the principles
of toxicology as outlined by scientific researchers in this area. Toxicologists are principally
concerned with determining the threshold ‘safe’ or ‘lethal’ doses of toxic substances, by
examining the effects on the host organism. Toxins, however, do not behave consistently
in terms of their effects. For instance, the ingestion of a benign substance such as water
can lead to water intoxication when taken in large enough doses (Christian & Greger,
1992). There are other toxins such as snake venom, which do not have an effect if taken
in minute doses (Meier & White, 1995).
Determining that threshold dose requires an examination of factors such as the
pathway of administration (via skin, ingested, inhaled, injected), the physical form of
the toxin (solid, liquid, gas), the level or concentration of exposure (acute or chronic), the
number of exposures (single or multiple over time), and the host’s ability to fight back
(susceptibility, based on the genetic makeup of an individual and the individual’s overall
health; Dacre & Goldman, 1996; Lipfert, 1997; Sweet & Zelikoff, 2001). The effective tox-
icity is therefore a combination of both the properties of the toxic substance and the reac-
tions to the toxin by the host organism (Dacre & Goldman, 1996; Hussein & Brasel,
2001).
An examination of research into a specific toxin demonstrates the complexity involved
in analyzing the effect of toxins. Sweet & Zelikoff (2001) note that in assessing the thres-
hold for mercury-induced immunotoxicological effects, researchers need to examine: (i)
the extent of exposure to the toxin with longer exposure or multiple exposures creating
more intense reactions; and, (ii) the susceptibility of subpopulations which may be at a
greater risk of toxicological impact. Because individuals typically have different levels of
response to the same dose of a toxin, a population-level measure of toxicity is often cal-
culated which relates the probability of an outcome for a given individual in a population
(Lipfert, 1997; Sweet & Zelikoff, 2001). Clearly, there is scope for considering this type of
approach when considering the toxicity of events in organizations and their relationship
to toxic emotional reactions and their impact on psychological and physiological health.
Neuropsychological research
Research has shown that neurobiology is at the basis of the experience of emotion (see
Gross, 1999; Ashkanasy, 2003; Barrett et al., 2006). With this in mind, Ashkanasy et al.
(2000) defined emotions in terms of endogenous and exogenous input to particular neural
systems, and the subsequent manifestations of internal (experienced) and external
(expressed) emotions. Endogenous variables include things like the individual chemistry
of the individual and their genetic makeup, while exogenous variables are those factors
outside of the individual, such as their life experience and specific stimuli that generate
emotions.
Van Winkle (2000) argues that endogenous toxicosis (toxicity created by our physiol-
ogy) caused by the continual suppression of negative emotions, is a primary biological
cause of nervous disorders, mental disease and violent behavior. She argues that gener-
ally in the body, endogenous or exogenous substances that cannot be utilized by organic
cells are recognized as toxic and eliminated. However, if elimination processes are
impaired, toxins accumulate. The cells adapt to toxicosis, but when levels of toxin become
intolerable, the body initiates a detoxification process. It is this detoxification process that
results in serious ill-health. Thus, Van Winkle argues that toxicosis is the actual disease,
and what we know as disorders and disease are remedial actions, a complex of symptoms
caused by efforts to eliminate the toxins.
Van Winkle provides the organizational behavior literature with an understanding of
how emotional reactions produce both mild and extreme forms of psychological ill-
health. She clearly argues that it is not simply the experience of negative emotions, but the
continual suppression of these emotions that is poisonous and gives rise to intolerable
levels of toxicosis in the brain and, in turn, psychological ill-health related to anxiety,
depression and violence. For Van Winkle, and unlike science-related toxicologists, the
event causing the emotional response is not critical to the production of toxicity. Instead,
it is the type of emotion the individual experiences (i.e., negative) and frequency of emo-
tional suppression by that individual that is the predominant cause of toxicity.
Medical biostatistics research

The previous subsection outlined the links between emotional suppression and psycho-
logical outcomes. However, the inhibition or suppression of negative emotion has also
been associated with adverse physiological outcomes (Parker & Wall, 1998). Ashkanasy
et al. (2002) argue that this occurs through a complex process that ultimately weakens an
individual’s immune system. The suppression of negative emotion has been linked to a
variety of slow-developing multi-factorial diseases processes, such as asthma (e.g., Florin
et al., 1985), cancer (e.g., Denollet, 1998), chronic pain disorders (e.g., Beutler et al., 1986)
and cardiovascular diseases (e.g., Brosschot & Thayer, 1998). The inhibition of negative
emotions has been found to predict all-cause mortality as well as the incidence of coro-
nary heart disease and hypertension (Grossarth-Maticek et al., 1985; Julkunen, 1996).
Denollet et al. (1996) found that heart attack survivors who reported high levels of dis-
tress and inhibition of emotions had a significantly higher death rate (27%) than other
patients (7%).
The influence of the suppression of specific emotions on health outcomes has also been
examined in the literature. Hostility and anger suppression, for example, has been related
to coronary heart disease (Redford & Barefoot, 1988; Wedner et al., 1989). Dembroski
et al. (1985) found that hostility predicted severity of atherosclerosis only in patients who
were also likely to suppress feelings of anger. Suls et al. (1995) concluded from a meta-
analysis that anger suppression plays an important role in essential hypertension.
In summary, the research evidence from medical biostatistics is clear that suppression
of negative emotions, and particularly intense negative emotions (see Burns, 1995), is
linked to long-term poor health and disease. Again, I note in line with Fisher (2002), that
we all have emotional ups and downs as a part of working in organizations and some-
times it may be necessary to suppress negative emotions (Mumby & Putnam, 1992). The
research outlined above, however, suggests that the continual suppression of negative
emotion has long-term toxic consequences for individuals.
Social psychology research

There is one area of research in the social psychology domain that is particularly relevant
to the discussion of emotion-induced toxicity in organizations. It involves the extensive
work conducted to investigate the psychosocial process of emotional regulation. Gross
and his colleagues have amassed a significant stream of experimental research examining
the phenomenon of emotional regulation, including emotional suppression, and its links
to short-term negative health outcomes. According to Gross (1998, p. 275), emotional
regulation is ‘the process by which individuals influence which emotions they have, when
they have them, and how they experience and express these emotions’. Gross (1998, 1999)
proposes that emotional regulation can occur at two points in the process: antecedent
focused and response focused. Suppression is a response-focused emotion regulation
strategy, which attempts to inhibit an ongoing emotion-expressive behavior, that is,
inhibiting an emotion once it is already underway (Gross, 2002). Generally, when indi-
viduals inhibit negative emotions, only the expression of it is masked to some degree. The
experience of the emotion remains at the same intensity, but the physiological responses
often increase due to the self-monitoring effort and cognitive resources needed to inhibit
an ongoing emotion-expressive behavior (ibid.).
Gross and Levenson (1993, 1997) demonstrated that the suppression of negative emo-
tions contributes to immediate negative physiological effects on the cardiovascular
system. This effect was greater than for freely expressed negative emotion. Mauss and
Gross (2004) argue that both suppression and expression result from the experience of
intense negative emotions. They conclude that the physiological impact of emotion sup-
pression grows out of counterbalancing attempts to inhibit expression against strong
impulses to express.
Overall, research performed by Gross and his colleagues reveal that in the short term,
the suppression of experienced negative emotions leads to a reduction in body movement
and heart rate associated with negative expressive behavior, to levels that either cannot be
detected (Gross & Levenson, 1993, 1997; Gross & John, 2003), or are reduced, but not
entirely hidden (Gross & Levenson, 1993; Harris, 2001). Physiologically, individuals
experience acute increases in sympathetic activation of the cardiovascular system in

response to the suppression of negative emotions, such as disgust, anger, sadness and
embarrassment (Gross & Levenson, 1993, 1997; Gross, 1998; Harris, 2001). Affectively,
suppression of negative emotions either has no impact on the experience of that emotion
(Gross, 1998; Harris, 2001), or can lead to increased experience in the intensity of that
negative emotion (Gross & John, 2003). Cognitively, suppression of negative emotions
leads to a reduction in both objective verbal memory tests and memory confidence
ratings, whether the emotional stimulus was low or high in emotional intensity (Richards
& Gross, 2000, in press). These findings provide support for the idea that the suppression
of negative emotions is cognitively taxing.
Gross and his colleagues (Gross, 2002; Mauss & Gross, 2004) also argue that the sup-
pression of negative emotions in the short term can play a negative role in the develop-
ment and maintenance of relationships. For instance, the inappropriate (Davidson et al.,
1999; Butler et al., 2003) or habitual (Gross & John, 2003) suppression of negative emo-
tions have both been shown to influence negative social interaction behaviors. Finally,
Gross and his colleagues argue that over the longer term, individuals who suppress high
levels of negative emotion report higher levels of depression and lower levels of life satis-
faction and well-being (Gross & John, 2003) and seem to be at greater risk of cardiovas-
cular disease (Mauss & Gross, 2004).
Industrial and organizational psychology research

In the previous subsection I reported on research evidence from social psychological
research on human reactions to emotional suppression. It is now appropriate to examine
the evidence from research in industrial and organizational psychology to assess the
impact of emotions and emotional suppression in the workplace. Given the extensive
research conducted in this area, it is surprising that so little has been done in the area
of emotional suppression. There are, however, some studies that provide an insight into
the impact of emotions (and by inference the effects of emotional suppression) in the
workplace.
Fitness (2000), for example, found that power played a role in how anger was addressed
in the workplace. She found that lower-status workers expressed anger at morally ques-
tionable actions and they also were angered by acts of public humiliation and unjust treat-
ment. However, they were more likely to hide anger from their bosses, less likely to seek
to address the situation and more likely to perceive the source of their anger as being unre-
solved. If this outcome is linked to my discussion of previous research evidence which
suggests that emotional suppression responses to events results in worse physiological and
psychological outcomes (e.g., Van Winkle, 2000; Mauss & Gross, 2004), it is clear that the
suppression of anger in the workplace can create toxicity.
There has been some research done in the area of workplace bullying that provides
evidence of the effects of suppressed emotions in the workplace. Perrone and Vickers
(2004) highlight three types of affective responses that employees may invoke to strate-
gically protect themselves in a hostile, bullying workplace: hiding emotions associated
with distress, emotional acting and deliberate expression of aggressive emotion, all of
which can contribute to counterproductive work behaviors. Einarsen and Gemzoe (2003)
argue that victims of bullying show symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder, a clear
indication of the presence of emotions that are producing toxicity in workers. Again, this
demonstrates that employees are experiencing physiological and psychological problems

as a result of workplace experiences and that this is linked not just to the experience of
emotions, but also to the suppression of those emotional experiences.
Another area where emotional suppression is evident is in the area of emotional labor.
The work of emotional labor researchers has greatly informed the nature of emotional
regulation in the workplace. Hochschild (1983) is often cited as one of the founding
researchers in the area of emotional labor. She identified that frequent emotional sup-
pression in social interaction contexts is a source of anger, frustration and resentment.
When these emotions are bottled up, they eventually result in dysfunctional behavior,
including angry outbursts. Montgomery et al. (2005) argue that the continued manage-
ment of emotions for social interactions can be ‘toxic’.
Building on Hochschild and the emotional regulation work of Gross (1998, 1999), emo-
tional labor researchers generally argue that employees in the workplace express the emo-
tions they feel, or when this will not produce the desired appropriate display (from an
interactional, supervisor or organizational perspective; Diefendorff & Richard, 2003;
Côté, 2005), they may surface act (fake unfelt emotions and/or suppress felt emotions) or
deep act (modify felt emotions so that genuine displays follow; Ashforth & Humphrey,
1993; Grandey, 2000; Zapf, 2002; Diefendorff & Gosserand, 2003). According to Grandey
(2000), Gross’s (1998, 1999) response-focused emotional regulation processes correspond
with the emotional labor concept of surface acting.
Displays of emotion convey substantial information about individuals’ goals, interests
and intentions in social interactions, and as a result, displays of emotion effectively coor-
dinate interpersonal encounters (Rafaeli & Sutton, 1989; Kelly & Barsade, 2001). People
have been shown to strategically use displays of emotion as ‘control moves’ to achieve per-
sonal goals (Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987; Frijda & Mesquita, 1994). For example, people sup-
press their displays of anger to get others to like them (Clark et al., 1996). Modifying
emotional expressions within the workplace is also seen as critical in some job roles relat-
ing to client–service interactions (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1993). Generally, researchers
argue that suppressing intense negative emotions plays an important role in facilitating
social interactions (Campos et al., 1994; Côté, 2005).
Once an emotion is underway, a person who suppresses his or her public display of
emotion through surface acting creates dissonance between that display and his or her
internal experience (Grandey, 2000). These feelings result, in part, from the constant
requirement to monitor one’s negative emotions, and to express positive ones (Ashkanasy
et al., 2002). In contrast, deep acting does not produce dissonance, because the displayed
emotion matches the internally experienced emotion. Consistent with these arguments,
research in applied settings has found that emotional dissonance is correlated with surface
acting, but not with deep acting (Holman et al., 2002; Glomb & Tews, 2004). The emo-
tional dissonance model thus predicts that surface acting heightens strain, but deep acting
is not systematically related to strain. Importantly, employees experiencing emotional dis-
sonance may not successfully mask their experienced emotions when surface acting
(Ekman et al., 1988; Mann, 1999).
Researchers have also found that general display rules (Brotheridge & Lee, 2003;
Grandey, 2003) and distinct positive and negative display rules (Brotheridge & Grandey,
2002) are all positively correlated with both surface and deep acting. Further, Brotheridge
and Grandey (2002) found that display rules for hiding negative emotions did not differ
in degree across occupations. Nevertheless, when jobs require frequent contacts with
others in the workplace, employees have a greater need to regulate their emotional dis-
plays through both surface and deep acting (Morris & Feldman, 1996; Brotheridge &
Grandey, 2002; Brotheridge & Lee, 2003). In an organization, therefore, there may be
display rules that require that negative emotions be suppressed so that a task can be
accomplished professionally (e.g., nurse or doctor who represses anger toward a difficult
patient), or alternatively, there may be display rules that require that negative emotions
should be suppressed in order to protect one’s personal boundaries (e.g., a doctor working
in an oncology unit suppressing feelings of sadness for his/her patients; Montgomery
et al., 2005). In such a case, surface acting may be required to ensure that non-expression
of negative emotion is achieved.
The perception of demands to suppress unpleasant emotions is influenced by individ-
ual personality factors such as negative affectivity (Schaubroeck & Jones, 2000;
Diefendorff & Richard, 2003) and organizational factors such as interpersonal job
requirements and supervisor-determined display rules (Diefendorff & Richard, 2003).
They, in turn, positively influence surface acting (suppression) behaviors and the subse-
quent experience of emotional burnout (Brotheridge & Grandey, 2002; Brotheridge &
Lee, 2002). The actual suppression of unpleasant emotions is associated with emotional
exhaustion (Glomb & Tews, 2004), decreased job satisfaction and increased turnover
intentions (Côté & Morgan, 2002), and poor physical health (Schaubroeck & Jones,
2000).
The latest development in the organizational behavior literature that considers emo-
tional suppression in the context of social interactions concerns the work of Côté (2005),
who combined the emotional labor literature with the emotional regulation literature to
propose a social interaction model of the effects of emotional regulation on work strain.
Côté argued that the social interaction model overcomes the failures of both models to
account for all the various findings in the literature and, importantly, incorporates the
social functions of emotion by involving senders and receivers of emotion displays in a
feedback loop.
Recasting deep and surface acting within Gross’s (1998, 1999) emotional regulation
framework of antecedent- and response-focused emotional regulation, Côté (2005,
p. 510) argues, ‘deep acting concerns the manipulation of components of emotion before
the emotion is fully under way . . . Surface acting concerns the manipulation of compo-
nents of emotion once the emotion is fully under way. As such, surface acting changes the
public display but not the internal experience of emotion’. Based on the work of
Hochschild (1983) and Levenson (1994), he also highlights the two potential directions of
emotional regulation: emotion amplification and emotion suppression. Côté combines
the form (deep versus surface acting) and the direction (amplification versus suppression)
of emotion regulation to propose a 2 2 conceptualization of emotion regulation with
social interaction contexts. In direct contrast to Grandey’s (2000) idea that suppression is
only linked to surface acting, Côté (p. 511) argues:
[E]mployees can suppress an emotion through deep acting by emitting behaviors that reduce or
eliminate the internal experience and, in turn, the public display of that emotion [what Gross
(1998, 1999) calls ‘antecedent-focused regulation’]. They can also suppress an emotion through
surface acting by emitting behaviors that reduce or eliminate the public display of that emotion
when that emotion is internally experienced [what Gross calls ‘response-focused suppression’].
Defining emotion-induced toxicity in employees in the workplace

The aim of this chapter was to provide an understanding of the process through which
emotion produces toxicity in the employees in the workplace and ascertain whether ‘toxic
emotions’ is the appropriate nomenclature for this phenomenon. Based on the research
evidence I have presented, I argue that it is not. I instead propose that the terms ‘emotion-
inducing toxicity’ or ‘toxic emotional reactions’ better describes the combined toxic
influence of intense, negative discrete emotions and the repeated suppression of those
emotions, in response to organizational events. The rationale for this conclusion is out-
lined below.
First, I discount the notion that this toxic phenomenon should be relabeled with
reference to the event, rather than the emotional response. It is clear that negative organ-
izational events can cause negative emotional responses, which, in turn, negatively
influences health and behavioral outcomes (Greenberg, 2006). Consistent with affective
events theory (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996), researchers have found that the frequency
with which an employee experiences an event determines the nature of their emotional
reactions (see also Ashkanasy, 2003). As outlined above, toxicology research provides
us with an insight into the possible impact of ‘toxic’ organizational events (Frost, 2003)
on employees. The toxicology literature revealed that toxic substances are poisonous to
an organism when certain conditions regarding the concentration, degree of exposure
and the susceptibility of the organism itself are met. Although the susceptibility of an
organism is an important feature to the ultimate impact of the toxin on the organism,
exposure level and concentration of the toxic substance is paramount in determining
toxicity.
This scientific fact is reflected in a slightly different way in organizations. In the case of
negative organizational events, clearly the frequency of event exposure is important;
however, it appears to be both the concentration of intense negative emotions combined
with the individual emotional regulation response of frequent suppression of this
emotion that principally creates the toxic reaction in employees. Employees’ differently
perceive and emotionally respond to negative organizational events, and it is the com-
bined experienced intense negative emotion and emotional regulation strategy that is
needed before toxicity builds within the mind and body.
Second, I argue that it is not negative emotions that are toxic per se, but the combined
emotional reaction of intense negative emotion and repeated suppression of that
emotion, which is the toxic mechanism. Based on the research evidence from neuropsy-
chological research (Van Winkle, 2000), the mere experience of intense negative emotion
does not cause a toxic reaction within employees. There is evidence that the experience of
discrete intense negative emotions can lead to positive individual and organizational out-
comes. For example, the experience of fear in organizations can lead employees to re-visit
their old assumptions and even help them to realize new opportunities in familiar work-
place policies and practices (Caruso & Salovey, 2004). The experience of sadness or loss
gives individuals the opportunity to reflect upon what went wrong and realize a new way
forward to ensure that the same thing does not happen again (ibid.). Anger, alternatively,
allows an individual to focus on a perceived threat, provides an individual with the energy
to put right a legitimate wrong (ibid.), and the expression of anger confers higher-status
perceptions by others (Tiedens, 2001). Clearly, intense negative emotion, of itself, does
not create toxicity.
I noted earlier that Frost’s (2003) seven toxic events can be grouped under a single cat-
egory – how people are treated in organizations. Justice matters. The evidence from justice
research (e.g., Greenberg, 2006), when combined with the results of psychological
research (e.g., Gross, 1998), clearly reveals that intense negative emotions are at the center
of emotion-induced toxicity. What is significant is that discrete intense negative emotions
are differentially invoked by a range of factors including specific organizational events
(Frost, 2003), individuals’ cognitions (e.g., social comparisons, attributions of blame;
Greenberg et al., 2007), personality characteristics (e.g., affective disposition, emotional
intelligence; Paterson & Härtel, 2002), and environmental factors (e.g., organizational
performance standards; Poulson, 2000) during appraisals of the organizational event. In
other words, the event alone does not create toxicity; it is a combination of the event, the
individual’s emotional reaction and how he/she copes with that situation that ultimately
creates toxicity within an individual.
For this reason, I argue that it is not the suppression of these intense negative emotions
that is toxic, but the repeated suppression of these emotions. Gross (1998, 1999) defined
suppression as a response-focused emotion regulation strategy. Such a strategy is consis-
tent with some aspects of surface acting (i.e., non-expression of experienced negative
emotion; Grandey, 2000; Côté, 2005). Côté’s conceptualization of deep acting as includ-
ing a suppression component, would correspond to Gross’s (1989, 1999) antecedent-
focused emotion regulation strategies (e.g., reappraisal). Emotional labor research shows
that momentary, appropriate suppression of negative emotions can lead to reduced strain
and improved interpersonal relationships (see Côté, 2005). Suppressing negative emotions
in the workplace is often vital for the relationship maintenance and development
(Diefendorff & Richard, 2003; Butler & Gross, 2004; Côté, 2005). It is also argued that
the relationship between intense negative emotions and the suppression emotional regu-
lation response can be moderated by environmental factors such as organizational emo-
tional display rules and relationship qualities (Diefendorff & Richard, 2003), and
individual personality characteristics and skills, such as individual expressivity and emo-
tional intelligence (Barrett & Gross, 2001; Côté et al., 2006).
The social psychology literature, however, provided evidence that inappropriate or
habitual suppression of intense negative emotions result in the short term in less-negative
behaviors, stable or increased experience of these negative emotions, increased physio-
logical responses and decreased social functioning. In the long term, the neuropsycho-
logical and biostatistics literatures provided evidence that repeated suppression of
negative emotion resulted in adverse psychological and physical health outcomes. Van
Winkle’s (2000) work suggests that while in the short term, toxicity builds up in the brain
producing some toxic effects for employees, the commencement of the brain’s
detoxification process signals the extremity of the individuals’ toxicity tolerance point. If
this process is repeated too often, the development of adverse longer-term negative psy-
chological health outcomes eventuate and negative physical health outcomes, such as
disease, can occur.
To conclude from the literature reviewed above, I argue that emotion-induced toxicity
in employees in the workplace is principally induced by the combined individual response
of experienced intense negative emotions and the repeated suppression regulation of
those emotions. The frequency of exposure to negative organizational events plays an
important, but more minor role in determining the nature of these emotional reactions.
Thus emotion-induced toxicity is an inherently individual phenomenon, which can also

be influenced during appraisal processes (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Ashton-James &
Ashkanasy, 2003) by various individual and environmental moderating variables.
Future research directions

Clearly, my contribution in this chapter is a first step to really understanding the nature
of emotion-induced toxicity in organizations. As a way of improving our understanding
of toxic mechanisms within organizations, the next step is to develop and test a model of
how emotion-induced toxicity emerges within organizations. This may include a consider-
ation of the degree to which different organizational events and different employee attri-
butions produce different toxic emotional and physiological experiences. Or indeed, such
a model could focus on discrete, intense negative emotions and how the repeated sup-
pression of these emotions in workplace settings produces emotion-induced toxicity in
employees. Empirical testing of these models could then confirm our understanding of
these processes.
Further research could also explore in general terms the toxicity levels of specific com-
binations of organizational events, intense negative emotions and suppression frequency
to determine their effects on employees. Allowing for individual differences and drawing
on medical biostatistics and neuropsychology, an indication of potential extreme toxic
tolerance point (akin to lethal dose in toxicology research) could be determined.
Finally, as the purpose of such research is to reduce the experience of emotion-induced
toxicity, research is required regarding interventions that could ameliorate the emotion-
induced toxic process. While I have already suggested that altering events will have an
impact on the production of these effects, the focus of my argument has been in relation
to the effects of suppression in creating emotion-induced toxicity. From this point of view,
research is required on how individuals can better cope with emotion-induced toxicity.
Given that emotions shape perceptions, direct behavior and influence interpersonal inter-
actions (Frijda, 1986), interventions to alter the toxic emotional reaction combination of
both intense negative emotions and emotional suppression could be aimed in four prin-
cipal directions:
1. Change events: reduce prevalence and frequency of known ‘toxic’ events such as
justice violations (see work by Greenberg, 2006).
2. Change perceptions: cognitively changing attribution perceptions that lead to nega-
tive emotional responses (Barclay et al., 2005; Matheny & Smollen, 2005).
3. Change emotional regulation strategy: using emotional intelligence training to focus
employees on reappraisal strategies to regulate emotions rather than suppression.
This would reduce experience of intense negative emotions and prevent the extremely
negative impact of suppression on health outcomes (see Barrett & Gross, 2001; Côté
et al., 2006).
4. Change environmental factors that moderate the relationship between intense nega-
tive emotions and emotional regulation by:
a. changing environmental factors relating to display rules (Brotheridge &

Grandey, 2002; Brotheridge & Lee, 2003), organizational performance standards
(Poulson, 2000), or
b. changing environmental factors relating to the supportive climate in the work-

place (Gross & John, 2003; Butler & Gross, 2004).
Note
* This chapter was funded by grants from the Australian Research Council. I wish to thank Peter Jordan for
his suggestions on early drafts of this chapter.
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5 Disappointment and regret
Wilco W. van Dijk and Frenk van Harreveld
Introduction
Emotions do not simply occur; they signal events that are relevant to the individual’s well-
being and can be considered as a mechanism for signaling to the individual’s cognitive and
action systems that events are favorable or harmful (Frijda, 1994). Emotions serve as feed-
back about the nature and urgency of the situation and this information serves as input
for judgment and decision-making processes as well as for reordering processing priori-
ties (Carver & Scheier, 1990; Schwarz, 1990). Not only do emotions have a signaling func-
tion, they are also motivators for behavior aimed at dealing with emotion-evoking events.
Or to put it in Frijda’s (1998, p. 354) words: ‘Emotions exist for the sake of signaling states
of the world that have to be responded to, or that no longer need response or action’.
Negative emotions result from a threat or harm to some goal or from the realization that
the rate of progress toward a goal is less than expected (Carver & Scheier, 1990). They
inform the individual that the current situation is problematic and alert him/her to the fact
that some action should be undertaken in order to set things right or prevent unpleasant
things from actually occurring.
In the present chapter we focus on two specific negative emotions, disappointment and
regret. We shall first define both disappointment and regret and address their differences
in experiential content. Subsequently we shall discuss the comparative nature of these
emotions, addressing both disappointment and regret and their relation to counterfactual
thinking. Finally, we shall address the regulation of disappointment and regret. In our
discussion we assume that emotional experiences go beyond mere valence. In this regard
we adhere to Zeelenberg and Pieters’s (2006) feeling-is-for-doing perspective. The main
argument of this perspective is that the emotional system is the primary motivational
force toward goal-directed behavior, and each specific emotion serves distinct motiva-
tional functions in this goal-directed behavior. Focusing only on the valence of an emo-
tional experience tends to ignore the specific motivational aspects of different emotions
and reduces their behavioral implications to either approach or avoidance. Taking into
account the specific meaning of different emotions offers more insight into the behavioral
guidance that specific emotions provide.
What do we talk about when we talk about disappointment and regret?

Disappointment and regret are negative emotions familiar to most if not all of us. They
can have a significant impact on people’s lives and their social interactions. Research has
clearly indicated that both disappointment and regret are frequently experienced and that
these experiences can be very intense. For example, Schimmack and Diener (1997)
instructed their participants to report one pleasant and one unpleasant emotional event
in a diary, each day during a three-week period. Results showed that disappointment, after
anxiety and anger, was the third most frequently reported negative emotion. Participants
reported on average almost 19 events in which they experienced disappointment over a
90
Disappointment and regret 91
period of 21 days. Furthermore, when comparing all negative emotions assessed in this
study, disappointment was reported as one of the most intense emotions. These findings
corroborate our own research, in which we showed that disappointment is a frequently
experienced aversive emotion that people try to avoid, and when this is not possible, they
try to get rid of this emotion as soon and much as possible (van Dijk, 1999).
Regret is also a commonly experienced negative emotion. For example, recent research
has shown that among a large range of different positive and negative emotions, regret
was rated as the most intense of these negative emotions. In this study, regret was rated as
more intense than, for example, anger, anxiety, guilt, fear, sadness, or jealousy and was
rated as the second most frequently experienced emotion after anxiety (Saffrey & Roese,
2006). Furthermore, research by Gilovich and Medvec (1994) shows that the experience
of regret can be very enduring. When asked about their biggest regret in life, many people
report events occurring many years earlier.
What is disappointment?
What seems to be central in disappointment is an expectation that is not fulfilled. This
relation between disappointment and expectations was already present in the work of
Shand (1914). Near the beginning of the 20th century he described disappointment as
follows:
In disappointment there is the thought and expectation of an end being realised followed by
its sudden frustration; or the experience of the end being realised, and of its falling below expec-
tation. The event being always unexpected, surprise enters into the emotion. The law of disap-
pointment is therefore that: Whenever we think and expect that the end desired, or any
process auxiliary to it, will be realised, or that, being realised, it will attain to a certain charac-
ter, then, when it is not realised, or does not attain to this character, we tend to feel disappointed.
(p. 467)
Another central feature of disappointment is that the expectations refer to something

positive or desirable. According to Shand, disappointment implies that we have been
hopeful, if not confident, that something we desired would happen. Ortony et al. (1988,
p. 110) also stress the importance of both desire and non-fulfillment of an expected
outcome in their definition of disappointment: ‘To be displeased about the disconfirmation
of the prospect of a desirable event’. Moreover, they state that the intensity of disappoint-
ment is affected by hope. High hopes give rise to more intense disappointment if these hopes
are dashed. In a slightly different vein, Frijda (1986) related disappointment both to expec-
tations: ‘Nonachievement of an expected outcome’ (p. 280) and promise: ‘Promises gener-
ally turn into disappointments when not fulfilled’ (p. 287). Disappointment, thus, is
experienced in a situation in which something positive was expected but did not occur. It
seems to be closely linked with hope, desire, and promise (van Dijk & van der Pligt, 1997;
van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002a).
In our own research we have found empirical evidence for this line of reasoning (van
Dijk et al., 1999b). In this study we focused on two types of negative outcomes: the
absence of a positive outcome and the presence of a negative outcome. It was argued that
disappointment, because of its close link with hope, desire, and promise is caused more by
the former type of outcome than by the latter. In four studies we found evidence for this
argument. For example, in one study, participants played a game involving real monetary
payoffs. For half of the participants the game was framed in win terms (they could win
€5 or not win €5). For the other half, the game was framed in loss terms (they could lose
€5 or not lose €5). Or in other words, participants who lost the game were confronted with
either the absence of a positive outcome or the presence of a negative outcome. Results
clearly showed that disappointment was more intense after experiencing the absence of a
positive outcome than after experiencing the presence of a negative outcome.
What is regret?
Like disappointment, regret is often defined in terms of a disparity between expectations
and outcomes. Both emotions are defined as being cognitively driven (Gilovich & Medvec,
1994; van der Pligt et al., 1998). However, definitions of regret often also incorporate some
sense of personal responsibility. Regret is experienced when the obtained outcome com-
pares negatively to an outcome that might have been, had one acted differently and is
related to decisions, failures, limitations, losses and mistakes. For example, Landman
(1993) argues:
Regret is a more or less painful cognitive and emotional state of feeling sorry for misfortunes,
imitators, losses, transgressions, shortcomings or mistakes. It is an experience of felt-reason or
reasoned-emotion. The regretted matters may be sins of commission as well as sins of omission;
they may range from the voluntary to the uncontrollable and accidental; they may be actually
executed deeds or mental ones committed by oneself or by another person or group; they may
be moral or legal transgressions or morally and legally neutral. (p. 36)
Zeelenberg (1999, p. 93) proposes a less elaborate definition. He argues: ‘Regret is a

negative, cognitively based emotion that we experience when realizing or imagining that
our present situation would have been better, had we decided differently’. Research on
regret paid considerable attention to factors that determine when regret is particularly
hurtful. In this respect, a distinction has been made between regret as a result of some-
thing we did (‘action regret’) versus something we failed to do (‘inaction regret’). Gilovich
and Medvec (1994, 1995) have argued that in the short term it is actions that we regret,
while in the long run our inactions prove most hurtful.
Although there has been considerable discussion on the causes of regret, there is little
dispute about the notion that people attempt to avoid feelings of regret altogether. As
Zeelenberg et al. (1996) state, people are regret averse. A consequence of this regret aver-
sion is that people tend to opt for regret minimizing choices when anticipating the possi-
bility of post-decisional regret. On the basis of this regret aversion, regret theorists have
suggested that incorporating anticipated regret can improve models of decision making
(Bell, 1982; Loomes & Sugden, 1982). These theories assume that people compare the
outcome of their preferred option with the outcome they would have obtained, had they
chosen differently. As a result of such a comparison, people can experience regret about
their (inferior) choice. Second, these theories assume that anticipated emotional conse-
quences of decisions are a factor in the decision-making process. People aim to avoid neg-
ative emotions, and as a consequence attempt to choose the option that minimizes the
chances of experiencing regret – even if this means that they have to choose an option
with a lower expected utility (Larrick & Boles, 1995). Another way to avoid regret is to
prefer not to get feedback about the not chosen option. Research shows that the antici-
pation of regret has consequences for a wide range of behaviors, including sexual risk
taking (Richard et al., 1996), consumer behavior (Hetts et al., 2000), gambling (Ritov,
1996), and investment decisions (Zeelenberg & Beattie, 1997).
The experiential content of disappointment and regret

What does the experience of disappointment and regret entail? Research has shown that
emotions can be differentiated in terms of distinctive feelings, thoughts, action tenden-
cies, actions, and motivational goals. All these five response types are assumed to be part
of an emotional experience (Frijda, 1987; Roseman et al., 1994). In our own research we
have shown that disappointment and regret are clearly distinctive in respect of all these
five response types (Zeelenberg et al., 1998b). Participants in our study were asked to
recall an occasion in which they felt either intense regret or intense disappointment. After
recalling the experience, participants answered closed-ended questions concerning what
they felt, thought, felt like doing, did, and wanted to do during this experience. The
findings showed that disappointment and regret clearly differ in experiential content. That
is, disappointment and regret can be distinguished with respect to the feelings, thoughts,
action tendencies, actions, and motivational goals that comprise these two emotions. The
differences were most pronounced for action tendencies and motivational goals, which
suggest that the two emotions differ most remarkably with respect to their implications
for future behavior. More specifically, the results showed that the experience of disap-
pointment, more than that of regret, involves feeling powerless, feeling a tendency to do
nothing and to get away from the situation, actually turning away from the situation, and
wanting to do nothing. In contrast, the experience of regret, more than that of disap-
pointment, involves feeling more intensely that one should have known better, thinking
about the mistake that has been made, feeling a tendency to kick oneself and to correct
the mistake, and wanting to undo the event and to get a second chance.
In a related study we compared the appraisal patterns of disappointment and regret
(van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002b). Results of this study showed clear differences between
regret and disappointment in this respect. Disappointment was appraised as unexpected
and related to wanting something pleasurable. Moreover, it was related to thinking that
one was morally right, and that the situation was caused by circumstances beyond one’s
control. Regret on the other hand was appraised as thinking that one could have done
something about the event and that one was personally responsible. These results clearly
indicate that while disappointment can be the result of something beyond one’s control,
the experience of regret requires a sense of responsibility for the decision that is made (see
Zeelenberg et al., 1998a, 2000a). If things go awry and one feels no responsibility, one can
experience disappointment but not regret. Moreover, these results suggest that the expe-
rience of disappointment might be more paralyzing than that of regret. On the other
hand, these results also suggest that one can set aside an experience of disappointment
more easily than one of regret. Where regretters perhaps ruminate and focus on past
events and forgone options, disappointed people may banish thoughts of disappointment
from their mind and continue with their life, thereby avoiding paralysis. Both interpreta-
tions might be valid. For example, a single experience of disappointment might be easy
to live with, and can motivate one to do other things. A sequence of disappointing expe-
riences, however, might be extremely paralyzing because it can result in learned helpless-
ness (Seligman, 1975).
Table 5.1 Profit increase for production strategy A and production strategy B for each
possible state of the world (S1 to S5)
States of the world

Choice S1 S2 S3 S4 S5
Production strategy A $25m $10m $10m $0m $5m
Production strategy B $0m $25m $10m $10m $5m
Note: Each state of the world has a probability of occurrence of 20%.
What might have been: disappointment and regret as comparison-based emotions

In theories on the role of disappointment and regret in decision making (Bell, 1982, 1985;
Loomes & Sugden, 1982, 1986, 1987; Zeelenberg et al., 2000b) it is assumed that these two
emotions arise from different sources of comparison. Both disappointment and regret stem
from a comparison between ‘what is’ and ‘what might have been’, also known as ‘counter-
factual thinking’ (Roese, 1997). Disappointment is assumed to originate from a compari-
son between the factual outcome and a counterfactual outcome that might have been had
another state of the world occurred. Regret, on the other hand, is assumed to originate from
comparisons between the factual outcome and a counterfactual outcome that might have
been had one chosen differently. This difference can be illustrated by the choice depicted in
Table 5.1, in which a manager has to decide between production strategies A and B.
The increase in profits due to the two possible strategies depends upon the occurrence
of one of five possible states of the world. According to disappointment theory, disap-
pointment would be felt, for example, if a manager chooses production strategy B, and
S5 were to occur. The profit increase obtained in this combination ($5m), is worse than
the majority of outcomes in another state of the world. Note that although a manager
would experience disappointment when confronted with this outcome, he or she should
not experience regret, since the outcome of the rejected strategy A was equally worse.
According to regret theory, a manager feels regret after having chosen strategy A, and
state of the world S2 occurs. Regret occurs because the manager knows that given this
state of the world, strategy B would have resulted in a higher profit increase.
Thus, disappointment and regret theories state that disappointment stems from com-
parisons with outcomes obtained had another state of the world occurred, whereas regret
stems from comparisons with outcomes obtained if one had chosen differently. In order
to make the relevant comparisons between the different outcomes, one has to have all
information about all relevant actions one could take and all relevant states of the world
that could occur. In most situations, however, one is only knowledgable about a selection
of this information. In these situations of restrictive knowledge people can, however,
imagine possible outcomes that would have occurred, had things been different. In other
words, they may generate counterfactual thoughts or ‘counterfactuals’ (Kahneman &
Miller, 1986; Roese, 1997). In sum, both disappointment and regret are based on com-
parisons between factual and counterfactual outcomes. These counterfactual outcomes
can be based upon both known counterfactual outcomes (as suggested by regret and dis-
appointment theory) and imagined counterfactual outcomes.
Counterfactual thinking and disappointment and regret

The ideas in regret and disappointment theory concerning the comparisons involved in
disappointment and regret are easily combined with the counterfactual thinking
approach derived from ‘norm theory’ (Kahneman & Miller, 1986). Counterfactual think-
ing involves mentally altering one or more aspects of a past event. It includes thoughts in
which current reality is changed into what might, could, would, or should have been.
People can make upward and downward counterfactuals. The former involve thoughts
about how things could have turned out better, the latter are thoughts about how things
could have turned out worse. Research by Roese (1997) has shown that people sponta-
neously generate more upward than downward counterfactuals. Counterfactual thinking
has been shown to influence the intensity of individuals’ emotional reactions to outcomes
and events (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Medvec et al., 1995). For example, if one gets a
pay rise, how happy one feels with this rise partly depends on which counterfactuals come
to mind. If the possibility of getting a larger rise is the dominant alternative to reality one
might be less happy than if the possibility of getting no rise at all is construed as the alter-
native. This process in which the intensity of an emotional reaction is influenced by con-
structing alternatives with which reality is contrasted has been referred to as ‘emotional
amplification’ (Kahneman & Miller, 1986).
In our own research (Zeelenberg et al., 1998c) we have shown that counterfactual
thoughts can influence emotional reactions to events that go beyond mere amplification.
In several studies we have shown that disappointment and regret are associated with
qualative different counterfactuals. Disappointment is related to, what we have termed,
‘situation-focused counterfactuals’, that is, counterfactuals in which the (negative)
outcome is undone by changing something that was not under one’s control (something
involving another state of the world). Regret, by contrast, is related to ‘behavior-focused
counterfactuals’, that is, counterfactuals in which the outcome is undone by changing
something that was under one’s personal control (something involving a decision or
choice one made). In our first study, participants were asked to recall an event from
their own life in which they experienced either intense disappointment or intense regret.
When asked to undo this event by changing any aspect they wanted, participants who
had reported an event in which they experienced disappointment mainly altered aspects
in the situation (‘If only the last assignment would not have been so difficult’). By con-
trast, participants who had reported an event in which they experienced regret mainly
altered their own actions (‘If only I had practised more for the assignments’). These
results showed that disappointment and regret are associated with different counterfac-
tual thoughts. In a second study we showed that counterfactual thinking also shapes
specific emotions in relation to an event or outcome. In this study, participants read a
scenario that could elicit both regret and disappointment. Subsequently they engaged
either in behavior- or situation-focused counterfactual thinking. Results showed that
participants instructed to generate situation-focused counterfactuals reported more
disappointment than regret. In turn, participants instructed to generate behavior-
focused counterfactuals reported more regret than disappointment. Thus, counterfactual
thoughts not only intensify the emotions people experience, but also influence which
specific emotion is experienced. Disappointment is experienced when counterfactual
thoughts are generated that focus on how things could have been better had another state
of the world occurred, whereas regret is experienced when counterfactual thoughts are
generated that focus on how things could have been better if one had made a different
choice.
Regulation of disappointment and regret

Although emotions help us respond effectively to threats and opportunities, this does not
mean that emotions are always helpful in achieving our goals. Knowing how and when to
regulate our emotions might be extremely helpful in this respect. People who are able to
regulate their emotions successfully, avoid becoming physiologically overaroused and
behaving in ways that undermine, for example, the quality of their social interactions.
Whereas successful emotion regulation might facilitate social competence, unsuccessful
emotion regulation might compromise social functioning. A recent study among prison
inmates shows that an effective regulation of negative emotions is related to increased
well-being. Especially active, emotion-focused coping is related to higher levels of psy-
chological and physical well-being as compared to passive forms of coping (van Harreveld
et al., 2007). Emotion regulation spans the full range of changes in experiential, physio-
logical, and behavioral responses and can broadly be distinguished in two categories:
antecedent- and response-focused emotion regulation (Gross, 1998). Whereas, the former
involves modifying the inputs to the emotion system, the latter involves diminishing or
augmenting the experiential-, behavioral-, or physiological-response tendencies that have
been generated.
Antecedent-focused regulation of disappointment

As disappointment stems from disconfirmed expectations, probably the most efficient
way of regulating disappointment might be preventing one’s expectations from being
disconfirmed. This might be achieved in at least three different ways: (a) avoiding
specific expectations, (b) trying to live up to one’s initial expectations, or (c) lowering one’s
expectations.
Avoiding specific expectations A first strategy for regulating disappointment is to avoid

specific expectations, for example, by setting very global (i.e., less specific) expectations.
Setting global expectations has an advantage over specific expectations, in that the former
are less easily disconfirmed than the latter and are therefore less likely to lead to disap-
pointment (Armor & Taylor, 1998). For example, students are less likely to be disap-
pointed when their expectation concerning their studies is to do well, as opposed to
finishing their first year with straight As. Results of a recent study corroborate this line of
reasoning by showing that participants were less disappointed with missing out on a
lottery prize when they did not know whether they had forgone a CD or a Dinner for Two,
as compared to when they did know which specific prize (CD or the Dinner for Two) they
missed out on (E. van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2005).
Living up to initial expectations A second strategy to regulate disappointment is to live

up to one’s initial expectations. Usually people try hard to obtain a desired outcome.
Investing effort generally increases the probability of attaining a desired outcome, and
therefore decreases the probability of becoming disappointed. However, even when trying
hard, actually obtaining a desired outcome can be difficult because outcomes are often
dependent upon different factors, some of which are beyond our control. Moreover,
trying extra hard may actually backfire. For example, our own research has shown that
investing more effort in obtaining a desired outcome leads to more disappointment when
the attempt turns out to be unsuccessful, that is, the effort invested in vain actually aug-
ments the experience of disappointment (van Dijk et al., 1999a).
Lowering expectations A third strategy to regulate disappointment is to lower expecta-

tions about obtaining a desired outcome. This strategy is consistent with the assumed link
between expectations and satisfaction (Feather, 1967). Usually people perceive unex-
pected positive outcomes as more attractive than expected positive outcomes, whereas
they perceive unexpected negative outcomes as more disagreeable than expected negative
outcomes. Thus, irrespective of whether an outcome is favorable or unfavorable, the lower
one’s initial expectations, the greater one’s satisfaction or the less intense one’s disap-
pointment with the actual outcome. Lowering expectations might have the advantage of
attenuating disappointment, because we have expected it to a certain extent. The main dis-
advantage of this strategy is that a lowering of expectations could lead to loss of hope,
pessimism, or even despair, and consequently to avoidance behavior. Research has shown,
however, that people use their expectations to some extent in a strategic way. That is,
people tend to lower their expectations only when a possible disappointing outcome is
imminent. For example, our own research has shown that people lowered their estimates
concerning their scores on an important test only when they expected immediate feedback
and not when they expected feedback on a long term (van Dijk et al., 2003). In similar
vein, it has been found that college students became less optimistic about their likely start-
ing salary in their first full-time job, but only if graduation was imminent, and that people
became less optimistic about the result of a medical test that would be available in the near
future (Shepperd et al., 1996; Taylor & Shepperd, 1998). Thus, when people are faced with
uncertainty regarding the occurrence of a desirable outcome, they may attempt to protect
themselves from the experience of disappointment by underestimating their chances of
obtaining the outcome in question.
Antecedent-focused regulation of regret

As regret stems from bad decisions, probably the most efficient way of regulating regret
might be to avoid making a bad decision in the first place. This can be achieved in at least
three different ways: (a) avoiding making a bad decision, (b) avoid realizing that one has
made a bad decision, or (c) avoiding responsibility for a bad decision (see Zeelenberg &
Pieters, 2006, for a detailed discussion on regret regulation).
Avoiding making a bad decision In order to avoid making a bad decision, people can
simply delay or completely avoid making a decision (Beattie et al., 1994). Although delay-
ing or avoiding a decision prevents regret, this strategy is often not very useful, because
many situations require a decision. Instead of becoming decision averse, people may
try to improve the quality of their decision by using as much relevant information as
possible .
Avoid realizing that one has made a bad decision Since regret stems from feedback on
forgone options, people can avoid regret by avoiding feedback about non-chosen options.
Research has shown that people have a tendency to protect themselves from potentially
threatening feedback about non-chosen options (Zeelenberg et al., 1996; Zeelenberg &
Beattie, 1997; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2004). In a typical paradigm used in this line of
research, participants are presented with a choice with a risky option (50% chance of
winning €100, 50% of winning nothing) and a safe option (€40). Despite the fact that the
risky option has the highest utility, most people opt for the safe choice. One reason for
this is that if they opted for the risky choice and lost, they would know for sure that they
would have obtained €40 had they chosen otherwise. The risky choice is obviously less
certain and if one opts for the €40, one does not know what the outcome of the alterna-
tive would have been. A study by Zeelenberg (1999) shows, however, that those who
expected to receive feedback on the risky option tended to choose that option. In other
words, people tend to choose the option they expect to receive feedback about. Regardless
of whether it is a safe or risky choice, they shield themselves from unfavorable feedback
about the non-chosen option.
Avoid responsibility for the bad decision Regret stems from realizing that one is person-
ally responsible for making a bad decision (Zeelenberg et al., 1998a, 2000a). Thus, one
way of regulating regret is to avoid responsibility for a bad decision. This can be achieved
in several ways. One can transfer the responsibility of a decision to others or even leave it
to fate. For example, one can leave an investment decision to experts or advisors or one
can decide upon a holiday destination by the flip of a coin. Another way of avoiding
responsibility for a decision might be to make a decision that is easily justified. This strat-
egy, which is central in decision justification theory (Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002), might
account for the observation that intention-behavior consistency (being a ‘norm’), attenu-
ates the experience of regret, independent of the decision outcomes (Pieters & Zeelenberg,
2005). Moreover, it might also explain why default options generally produce less regret
than switch decisions, and the reversal of this effect when prior experience clearly calls for
action (Zeelenberg et al., 2002).
Response-focused regulation of disappointment and regret

Although it may be efficient to regulate the experience of disappointment and regret as
early as possible, preferably before any emotional response tendencies have been gener-
ated, this is not always feasible. In these cases, people have to rely on more response-
focused regulation strategies of disappointment and regret. The most obvious strategy is
changing one’s behavioral response. Zeelenberg and Beattie (1997) examined decision
making subsequent to the decision that led to regret. They found that participants who
experienced regret were inclined to change their preference toward the non-chosen option
(see also Zeelenberg & Pieters, 1999). Quite often of course, decisions are final and the
non-chosen option is no longer available. In such cases people have to rely on more psy-
chological strategies. We shall discuss here two strategies that might be applicable to the
regulation of both disappointment and regret: cognitively changing a negative outcome
and dealing with a negative outcome.
Cognitively changing a negative outcome In order to regulate disappointment and regret

people can try to reinterpret the obtained negative outcome. That is, people might bias
their thinking about what happened and what might have happened in order to miti-
gate their negative emotional experiences and regulate what they feel. One way of
reinterpreting outcomes is by shifting the standard of comparison (Armor & Taylor, 1998).
People can reduce the experiences of disappointment and regret by shifting the standard
against which attained outcomes are evaluated. First, they may select a worse-off social
comparison target. This enables people to maintain a belief that one’s current status is not
as bad as other (more objective) standards might suggest. For example, a person who is
experiencing some problems with a recently bought car, can consider his neighbor, who is
having even more problems with his car, which in addition was much more expensive. Our
research has shown that comparing one’s outcome with that of less fortunate others can
also help to alleviate feelings of regret. This strategy appears particularly effective in cases
where there appears to be no subsequent occasion to make a better decision. If people do
feel that they can redeem themselves in the future, they try to acquire information that can
help them make a better decision next time (van Harreveld et al., 2008). A second way of
shifting standards involves the generation of counterfactuals. One can feel good about
one’s current (negative) outcome if one compares the outcome with an even worse situa-
tion that could have occurred (Markman et al., 1993) – although it has been raining a little
too frequently at one’s holiday destination, it could have rained even more. Another way
of regulating disappointment and regret is by biasing the recall of what was initially
expected. This can be obtained by simply forgetting the initial expectation, thereby remov-
ing it as a basis for evaluation. Similarly, people may question the validity of their initial
expectation. For example, they may argue that their initial expectation was perhaps too
optimistic, and adjust their expectation retrospectively in such a way that the discrepancy
between the obtained outcome and their expectation is smaller. Or they might reappraise
the decision process and outcomes, and how this matches their preferences and come to
the conclusion that the chosen option is actually the best. For example, research by
Tykocinski (2001) has shown that when faced with an unfavorable outcome, people tend
to exhibit ‘retroactive pessimism’ namely, they attempt to attenuate the outcome’s emo-
tional impact by telling themselves that it was more or less inevitable.
Dealing with a negative outcome Apart from trying to change or reinterpret a negative
outcome, people might also try to engage in psychological repair work in order to regu-
late their feelings of disappointment and regret (Gilovich & Medvec, 1995). For example,
they may employ a ‘silver lining’ strategy in order to take the edge off their disappoint-
ment and regret. This strategy involves focusing on the beneficial aspects of a bad situa-
tion. Instead of focusing on disconfirmed expectations or bad decisions, people may focus
on the lessons they have learned from the experience. An example of thinking about silver
linings is someone who regrets having married the wrong partner but emphasizes the fact
that wonderful children are the result of this marriage. This ‘silver lining’ strategy may
regulate disappointment and regret because it directs attention away from the bad expe-
rience, thereby reducing its magnitude.
Furthermore, reframing a negative outcome can emphasize the lessons obtained from
the experience, and this may attenuate both disappointment and regret (Armor & Taylor,
1998). Another way of dealing with a negative outcome is by putting the outcome into per-
spective. When confronted with an outcome that was less than expected, it could be argued
that the outcome was not that important anyway, because there are other even more impor-
tant things in life. For example, if one chooses a cheap holiday with uncertain weather con-
ditions in favor of a more expensive holiday to a destination where the sun always shines,
one can experience regret if rain is pouring down on arrival. One way to reduce felt regret
is to convince oneself that sunshine was never going to be the most important aspect of
this holiday anyway. By derogating the importance of an (unobtained) outcome, any expe-
rienced emotion in reaction to this outcome is likely to be less intense.
Many of these strategies are related to processes of ‘dissonance reduction’ (Festinger,
1957), in the sense that people can experience dissonance between the outcome one
desired and the outcome that is obtained. These feelings can be attenuated by changing
the evaluation of the expected or obtained outcome. Decision makers may bolster their
decisions and downplay the rejected alternatives similar to how this was proposed in cog-
nitive dissonance and self-perception theory (Gilovich et al., 1995), in order to live with
their decisions. In Gilovich et al.’s research, outcomes were rigged such that participants,
ostensibly as the result of their decision, ended up with a small prize and missed out on a
bigger one. The more regret that these participants felt, the more likely they were to engage
in dissonance-reduction strategies (i.e., they comforted themselves by increasing the val-
uation of the small prize). Also, one critical way to avoid or reduce regret once the
outcome of a decision becomes known is to justify the chosen decision. People may reap-
praise the decision process and outcomes, and how this matches their preferences, and
come to the conclusion that the chosen option is actually the best. For example, they may
dislike thinking about how they would feel if they miss out on a better outcome. These
results show that decision makers may be motivated to ‘distort’ their thinking about what
happened and what might have been in order to mitigate their negative emotional experi-
ences and thus to regulate their feelings of disappointment and regret.
Concluding remarks
We hope that we have convinced the reader that although disappointment and regret are
both negative emotions following an unwanted outcome, they are remarkably different in
their antecedents, experiential content, behavioral implications, and regulation processes.
In closing, we would like to make a case for integrating research from different areas.
Research on disappointment and regret has greatly benefited from such an integrated
approach. Disappointment and regret have been studied within the fields of emotions and
decision making, and each area has made its own unique contribution to our knowledge
of the interplay between emotions and behavior. Whereas emotions research has helped
us to understand the antecedents and phenomenology of disappointment and regret,
decision-making research has provided us with more insight into specific behavioral con-
sequences of anticipated and experienced disappointment and regret. In our view,
increased collaboration between different research traditions will be helpful in develop-
ing a better understanding of the relation between emotions and behavior. Thus,
researchers from different approaches should combine their theories, paradigms, and
findings as we anticipate that many new and exciting research questions might emerge
from such integration.
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6 The impact of emotions, moods and other
affect-related variables on creativity, innovation
and initiative
Johannes Rank and Michael Frese
We can now conceive what an emotion is. It is a transformation of the world. When the paths
before us become too difficult, or when we cannot see our way, we can no longer put up with
such an exacting and difficult world. All ways are barred and nevertheless we must act. So then
we try to change the world.
(Sartre, 1939, p. 39)
Introduction
Creativity, innovation and initiative can be described as processes that facilitate transi-
tions into desired future states, including transformations of individual work roles, teams
and entire organizations (Rank et al., 2004b). As the introductory quote suggests, emo-
tions may reflect a transformation of one’s world. Whereas Jean-Paul Sartre’s existential-
ist emotion theory depicted the experience of emotion as an escapist choice to deliberately
change one’s perception of reality, recent research suggests that both positive and nega-
tive affect may contribute to real changes of the world by influencing creativity and innov-
ation (e.g., George & Zhou, 2002; Anderson et al., 2004; Amabile et al., 2005). The
purpose of this chapter is to review and integrate the literature on the influence of affect-
related variables on creativity, innovation and initiative in organizations and to provide
suggestions for future research.
The relationship between affect and creativity is one of the most fascinating and puz-
zling areas of enquiry in psychology and organizational behavior (Higgins et al., 1992;
Russ, 1999; James et al., 2004). Creativity is typically defined as the development of novel
and useful ideas, products or problem solutions (Madjar et al., 2002; Amabile et al., 2005).
In the beginning of the 20th century, psychodynamic theorists (Jung, 1912; Freud, 1913)
asserted that emotional and creative processes are inextricably intertwined. The pathway
to creative insight proposed in these models is the ability to gain access to unconscious
affect-laden material via associative processes, called ‘primary-process thinking’ in
Freud’s psychoanalysis (Russ, 2000) and ‘fantasy thinking’ in Jung’s analytical psychol-
ogy (Chodrow, 2006). Central to Freud’s view of creativity is his concept of sublimation,
a defense mechanism transforming repressed libido associated with anxiety-laden desires
into socially acceptable outcomes such as scientific or artistic pursuits. In C.G. Jung’s ana-
lytical psychology, the therapeutic process of active imagination involves the creation of
symbolic images and stories that express problematic moods or emotions in a more bear-
able way. As Chodrow recently noted in her discussion of this Jungian concept, ‘active
imagination and creative imagination are basically the same process. Both involve the
expression and transformation of the emotions’ (ibid., p. 216).
In the beginning of the 21st century, sophisticated new approaches also suggest a strong
impact of affect on creativity. For example, the affect infusion model (Forgas & George,
103
2001) implies that novel and complex tasks require the use of open-ended substantive
information processing strategies that are particularly amenable to mood influences
(Ashkanasy & Ashton-James, 2005). ‘Creative productivity is likely to be particularly sen-
sitive to the disruptive and enhancing effects of emotion’ (Higgins et al., 1992, p. 127).
However, the available empirical evidence is inconclusive. Whereas several studies
identified positive mood as a facilitator of creativity (e.g., Isen et al., 1987; Estrada et al.,
1994; Madjar et al., 2002; Amabile et al., 2005), a few studies have revealed positive rela-
tionships between negative moods and creativity (Kaufmann & Vosburg, 1997; George &
Zhou, 2002). One of the most recent efforts in this domain has further demonstrated the
complexity of this issue by revealing that emotional ambivalence (i.e., the simultaneous
experience of positive and negative moods) was positively associated with creativity
(Fong, 2006).
Even more startling than the inconclusiveness of findings regarding the link between
affect and creativity is the lack of research on the impact of affect-related variables on
innovation. In contrast to creativity, which is primarily an intraindividual cognitive
process, innovation concerns the actual intentional implementation of new and beneficial
ideas for work products or processes at the individual, group or organizational level (West
& Farr, 1990; Anderson et al., 2004). Idea implementation may evoke a wide variety of
emotions such as pride, anger and anxiety, as it frequently involves the need to overcome
resistance to change and other barriers (Farr & Ford, 1990).
The influences of affective phenomena on personal initiative (PI) are also largely unex-
plored. Frese and Fay (2001) defined PI as ‘work behavior characterized by its self-starting
nature, its proactive approach, and by being persistent in overcoming difficulties that arise
in the pursuit of a goal’ (p. 134). PI plays an important facilitative and moderating role
within the innovation process (Rank et al., 2004b). A few studies suggest that PI positively
predicts individual and team-level innovation, that creative ideas are more likely to be
implemented when initiative is high and that implemented process innovations result in
enhanced financial performance only when there is a climate for initiative, that is, when
shared perceptions of initiative are high (Baer & Frese, 2003; Rank et al., 2004a).
The remainder of this chapter unfolds as follows. In the first two sections, we discuss
the impact of undifferentiated positive as well as negative affect on creativity, innovation
and initiative. Subsequently, we consider the role of more specific discrete emotions
(e.g., anxiety, guilt, pride and hope). Finally, we discuss implications of a wider range of
affect-related variables (e.g., emotional intelligence, emotion control, affective diversity).
Furthermore, we shall not only review the empirical evidence and summarize implications
of recent theoretical work, but also provide suggestions for new research endeavors in
each of the sections.
‘Although creativity scholars have long recognized the importance of emotion and
affect in the creative process, only recently has research investigated the role of affect in
creativity’ (Russ, 1999, p. 659). Most of these studies have considered relationships of pos-
itive or negative moods with creativity. Moods are relatively transient affective states that
are typically not directed at any particular object or behavior and best characterized by
the two dimensions, positive and negative (Watson et al., 1988; George & Brief, 1992;
Madjar et al., 2002). The term ‘affect’ is a generic label comprising both mood and
emotion. In contrast to moods, emotions are more discrete states that are perceived to
have an identifiable cause or referent (Watson et al., 1988; Pirola-Merlo et al., 2002).
The impact of affect-related variables on creativity, innovation and initiative 105
The impact of positive affect on creativity, innovation and initiative

As George and Brief (1992) noted, ‘workers in positive mood states are more likely to be
creative and innovative’ (p. 316). A series of experiments (Isen et al., 1987) examined
whether positive mood, induced via the presentation of a comedy film or the provision of
a small gift, facilitated creative problem solving, as assessed with ingenuity tests including
Duncker’s candle task and the Remote Associates Task. In the former, participants are
given a box of tacks, a candle and a book of matches, and are asked to attach the candle
to the wall in such a way that it burns without dripping wax. The Remote Associates Task
requires respondents to name a word related to each of three other words presented.
Overall, individuals in whom positive affect was induced performed significantly better
than those in the control group and those in whom negative affect or neutral arousal was
induced. The authors concluded that positive mood enhanced the ability to see relatedness
in diverse stimuli and to overcome functional fixedness (i.e., the inability to consider alter-
native uses for an object). Thus, positive affect may facilitate the process of bisociation,
which reflects a combination of two different frames of reference. Other laboratory studies
showed that positive affect resulted in more unusual and novel associations, more inclusive
categorizations of stimuli, increased cognitive flexibility, and heightened intrinsic motiva-
tion (Isen & Baron, 1991; Isen, 1993; Estrada et al., 1994).
According to Madjar et al. (2002), the notion that intrinsic motivation facilitates cre-
ativity ‘includes a mood component in that individuals are expected to experience posi-
tive mood states when they are intrinsically motivated’ (p. 758). Their field study of
Bulgarian employees from three companies in the knitwear industry revealed a positive
and significant 0.20 correlation between employees’ positive mood and supervisor-rated
creativity. Positive mood explained a significant increment in the creativity variance, after
several control variables (e.g., education) and creative personality scores had been
accounted for. Furthermore, positive mood mediated the positive relationships between
support for creativity from work as well as nonwork sources and creativity.
In one of the most comprehensive field studies of affect and creativity to date, Amabile
et al. (2005) analyzed more than 11 000 daily diary entries written by 222 employees from
seven companies. Drawing on Isen’s (1993) work, Simonton’s (1999) variation theory and
the broaden-and-build model of positive emotion (Fredrickson, 2001), they argued that
positive affect increases cognitive variation, that is, the number of cognitive elements
available for association and considered as relevant to the problem. Specifically, positive
affect makes additional material available for processing, enhances the breadth of ele-
ments available for association by inducing a defocused scope of attention, and increases
the probability that diverse elements will become associated. The measures included daily
electronic questionnaires featuring a positive mood scale, monthly peer ratings of cre-
ativity, and coder-rated positive mood as well as creative thought scores based on daily
narrative accounts. The researchers identified significant positive relationships between
self-rated positive mood and monthly peer-rated creativity, and between coder-rated posi-
tive mood and coder-rated same-day creative thought. Furthermore, self-reported posi-
tive mood significantly predicted coder-rated daily creative thought for the same day and
the next two days, which illustrates the benefits of positive affect over time. The positive
relationship between positive affect and creativity was linear rather than curvilinear.
Hence, there was no support for the proposition that particularly high levels of emotional
intensity hinder creativity (James et al., 2004).
Based on their findings, Amabile et al. (2005) proposed an affect-creativity model,

which entails an interconnected cycle implying that positive affect facilitates cognitive
variation, which in turn increases the likelihood that new associations will be formed after
an incubation process. The resulting creativity may be accompanied by affect as a con-
comitant and trigger organizational events, including reactions of others, which in turn
provoke affective responses and influence the subsequent affect-creativity cycle. In
particular, the last links in this model should be examined in further quantitative research.
In comparison with creativity, considerably less research has examined affective pre-
dictors of initiative and innovation. As Van Dyne et al. (1995) argued, the overall affective
state conducive to challenging and promotive forms of discretionary employee behavior
(e.g., making constructive suggestions for change) is likely to be positive, because ‘the
focus is on the possibility of a better solution’ (p. 266). Some of the effects of positive
affect, including intrinsic motivation, cognitive flexibility, persistence, enhanced risk
taking, greater decision-making efficiency, and more integrated approaches to negotiation
(Isen & Baron, 1991; Isen, 1993), may also be conducive to initiative and innovation.
George and Brief (1992) proposed that positive mood facilitates organizational spon-
taneity, which reflects voluntary behaviors relevant to initiative and innovation, such as
making constructive suggestions, developing oneself, and helping co-workers. For
example, individuals in positive moods are more likely to engage in self-development,
because they view themselves more favorably, experience greater self-efficacy and develop
higher aspirations. The self-development dimension of organizational spontaneity over-
laps with the PI facet ‘education initiative’ (self-chosen participation in work-related edu-
cation; Frese & Fay, 2001). George (1991) identified state positive mood at work as a
significant predictor of prosocial behavior toward co-workers and customers. Acts of
helping not requested by others may also be considered PI (Frese & Fay, 2001). In a study
of MBA students’ assessment center performance (Staw & Barsade, 1991), positive affect
positively predicted several dimensions of interpersonal performance and decision
making that may be beneficial for initiative and innovation, including assessor ratings of
leadership, participation and task engagement and peer ratings of contribution to group
effectiveness. Further research should explicitly link positive affect to innovation and ini-
tiative and assess whether trait or state measures account for greater portions of the vari-
ance in these criteria.
Previous research has also identified several predictors of innovation and initiative,
including self-efficacy and control perceptions (e.g., Frese et al., 1996; King & Anderson,
2002), which are usually associated with positive affect (Saavedra & Earley, 1991;
Saavedra & Kwun, 2000). Rank et al. (2007) identified affective organizational commit-
ment as a positive and significant predictor of supervisor-rated proactive service perfor-
mance, an initiative construct defined as individuals’ self-started and long-term-oriented
service behavior that exceeds explicitly prescribed performance requirements. Affective
organizational commitment reflects one’s emotional attachment to the organization and
is typically related to the experience of positive affect (Meyer et al., 1993).
Finally, positive affect may also influence negotiations about innovation proposals as
well as idea adoption decisions in mood-congruent ways, because affect infusion occurs
most likely when substantive processing is needed (Ashkanasy & Ashton-James, 2005).
‘The conditions under which important managerial decisions occur are the very condi-
tions in which substantive processing is most likely: high complexity, ambiguity, and
uncertainty requiring extensive and constructive processing’ (Forgas & George, 2001,
p. 27). Individuals in a positive mood are more likely to formulate optimistic expectations,
use more cooperative bargaining strategies, and produce more successful negotiation out-
comes (Brief & Weiss, 2002). Decision makers may be more likely to adopt innovation
proposals in positive mood states, unless they are consciously aware of their moods and
decide to adopt self-serving judgmental strategies. The suggestion to revisit important
decisions in differing affective states to gain a broader perspective (Forgas & George,
2001) may be especially helpful when top managers have to make decisions regarding the
adoption of radical innovations. Overall, the previously discussed studies and theoretical
considerations suggest that positive affect facilitates not only creativity, but also initiative
and innovation.
The impact of negative affect on creativity, innovation and initiative

According to Amabile et al. (2005), the majority of studies indicate that positive rather
than negative affect facilitates creativity. However, these authors as well as Russ (1999)
and Eisenberg and James (2005) also note the high incidence of affective disorders such
as depression and bipolar disorder among creative individuals. However, this phenome-
non applies mainly to artistic creativity, and the best creative work among individuals
suffering from bipolar disorder appears to occur during the hypomanic phase, when
thinking is not too disorganized and positive affect is accompanied by risk taking (Russ,
2000). Isen et al. (1987) explained why negative affect may facilitate creativity among those
suffering from unipolar affective disorders (e.g., major depression): ‘It may be that for
clinical depressives, compared with normal persons, more cognitive material is accessed
by sadness’ (p. 1130). Conversely, positive affect may facilitate access to a wider range of
material among non-depressed persons. Regarding the general population, a few experi-
mental studies found a positive influence of induced negative affect on creative problem
solving (e.g., Kaufmann & Vosburg, 1997), although most other laboratory studies found
either no effect or a negative effect (Isen et al., 1987; Isen, 1993). Inhibitory influences
include dichotomous thinking, constrained cue utilization and the neglect of new cogni-
tive pathways (Russ, 1999; Madjar et al., 2002).
With respect to innovation, research on transformational leaders and innovation cham-
pions also implies that low levels of negative affect are preferable. Innovation champions
are individuals who informally emerge in the organization and make a decisive contribu-
tion to an innovation by enthusiastically promoting its progress. Howell and Shea (2001)
found that the framing of an innovation as a response to a threat was associated with
lower levels of champion behavior. This type of framing may reflect negative affect,
because ‘threats are associated with negative outcomes and expectations of loss’ (p. 17).
Transformational leadership, which is positively associated with one’s emergence as an
innovation champion (Howell & Higgins, 1990) as well as followers’ creativity (Jung,
2001), entails behaviors such as intellectual stimulation and inspirational motivation.
According to Ashforth and Humphrey (1995), the process in which transformational
leadership affects change ‘is largely dependent upon the evocation, framing and mobi-
lization of emotions’ (p. 116). Ashkanasy and Tse (2000) argued that supervisors experi-
encing little negative affect may be more likely to achieve creativity and innovation among
themselves and their followers. They proposed a sequential model, starting with the
assumption that transformational leaders tend to engage in impression management and
are thus less likely to experience negative mood. This will lead to more creative decision
making among such leaders and ultimately to more creativity and innovation among their
followers. This spillover effect from leader to follower affect and creativity should be
further examined in empirical studies.
In apparent contradiction with the view that negative affect is detrimental, the notion
that it may be conducive by indicating a deficient status quo and an opportunity for
improvement has recently gained in popularity. As Sutton (2002) noted, ‘many successful
ideas were invented because someone got upset about something and then did something
about it’ (p. 182). Madjar et al. (2002) argued that feelings of tension and dissatisfaction
may be needed for creative problem-solving. ‘Negative emotions may be necessary to
break down old expectations and paradigms’ (Higgins et al., 1992, p. 122). Anderson et
al. (2004) presented a distress-related innovation model, arguing that distress-related vari-
ables at the individual, group and organizational levels of analysis ‘act as a trigger for
innovation’ (p. 166). They cited studies demonstrating positive effects of an individual’s
negative mood or job dissatisfaction, of group distress associated with the experience of
minority dissent, and of external demands such as turbulent environments on the orga-
nization as a whole.
George and Zhou (2002) found negative mood to be positively associated with super-
visor-rated creativity when both mood clarity and recognition of creative performance
were high. The latter variable reflected the perceived impact of exhibited creativity on pay
rises and promotions. Mood clarity was defined as ‘an enduring tendency to monitor one’s
feelings and to experience them lucidly’ (p. 689). According to the mood-as-input model
(Martin et al., 1993), people use their current mood state as an informational cue signal-
ing the level of effort needed to achieve satisfactory outcomes. Positive mood indicates
that all is going well, whereas negative mood suggests that continued effort is necessary.
Drawing on this theory, George and Zhou argued that negative mood indicates that the
status quo is problematic and that one must try harder to find a creative solution. They
noted that their logic could be reconciled with Isen’s (1993) work: whereas she used short-
term tasks, their field research captured longer-term creative performance, for which the
differential effort expenditure predicted by the mood-as-input model may be crucial.
Whereas George and Zhou did not isolate the specific source of negative affect, Van
Dyne et al. (2002) examined effects of experienced work and home strain separately. Work
and home strain were operationalized as subjective affective responses to conflict and
tension. Overall, home strain was negatively related to creativity and work strain was unre-
lated. Work strain even positively predicted creativity when the quality of leader–member
exchange was high. Given mutual trust and respect, supervisors are more likely to accom-
modate unique subordinate needs and to express confidence in them, which may alleviate
strain effects (ibid.). Baer and Oldham (2006) found a curvilinear inverted U-shaped rela-
tionship between creative time pressure and creativity for employees who received support
from supervisors and co-workers. The curvilinear effect was only found for employees high
in openness who might experience greater negative affect if their job does not allow enough
time for creative endeavors. Together, these studies suggest that work-related demands may
facilitate creativity when support or recognition is given, whereas negative affect emanat-
ing from other sources is detrimental.
A few studies that linked initiative or innovation to the stress process are also relevant,
because stressors typically involve the experience of negative affect. ‘A job stressor is
considered to be a condition or situation that elicits a negative emotional response, such

as anger/frustration or anxiety/tension’ (Spector, 1998, p. 154). Spector argued that
problem-focused coping is often productive, for example, when an employee responds to
an increase in workload by suggesting a more efficient procedure to save time. Bunce and
West (1994) argued that innovative problem-focused coping occurs when ‘an individual
perceives him- or herself intentionally to introduce and apply, alone or within a group,
new skills or procedures, designed to significantly benefit self, the group or the organiz-
ation, with the result that recognized external demands appraised as taxing or exceeding
are actually reduced or alleviated’ (p. 320). They found that innovative coping was most
frequently elicited by overwork, procedural difficulties (e.g., problems with administrative
tasks) and interpersonal problems. In a subsequent field experiment testing the effects
of stress management interventions (Bond & Bunce, 2000), an Innovation Promotion
Program (IPP) resulted in greater propensity to innovate and reduced depressive symp-
toms. The IPP encouraged participants to identify features of their work that led to strain
and to engage in innovative coping. Mediation analyses identified work change (the extent
to which people modified their work methods, processes and environments) as the mech-
anism explaining the effects of the IPP on propensity to innovate. The authors suggested
that an enhanced sense of control may explain why the IPP also reduced depressive symp-
toms. Hence, innovative behavior can be a response to experienced stress and related neg-
ative affect.
On the basis of action theory (Frese & Rank, 2006), which conceptualizes stress as a
disturbance of action regulation, Fay et al. (1998) discussed potential relationships of
stressors with initiative and innovation. Action theory entails a stressor taxonomy com-
posed of the three categories of regulation obstacles (e.g., interruptions or lack of infor-
mation), regulation uncertainties (e.g., role ambiguity) and overtaxing regulations
(e.g., time pressure). Although such stressors may sometimes reduce initiative and inno-
vation by impeding goal or plan development, they may also be conducive when they indi-
cate a need for change (Farr & Ford, 1990; Fay et al., 1998).
Fay and Sonnentag (2002) adopted a control theory framework, modeling PI as an
output function, that is, behavior shown in response to a perceived discrepancy between
the current and desired state. In this model, a stressor is ‘regarded as a signal indicating
that a process, procedure or design is below an optimal level’ (p. 224). Interestingly, Fay
and Sonnentag noted that individuals usually do not take initiative immediately when
stressors are acute. Situational constraints and time pressure positively predicted subse-
quent increases in initiative, although each stressor emerged as a significant predictor
when it was experienced at moderate rather than very high levels. ‘A stressor that one
encounters every day is less likely to be perceived as an option for initiative than a stres-
sor that occurs more seldom’ (p. 230).
In conclusion, it may appear contradictory that negative affect sometimes facilitates
and sometimes hinders creativity, innovation and initiative. However, considering all of
the reviewed theoretical and empirical contributions, a pattern emerges: obviously, high-
arousal negative affect involving anger or frustration regarding suboptimal work
processes or products may sometimes be beneficial, especially when recognition or
support is given (Fay et al., 1998; George & Zhou, 2002; Van Dyne et al., 2002). Anger is
often a key ingredient of work-related stress and may function as an energizing force
(Pekrun & Frese, 1992). On the contrary, low-arousal negative affect (e.g., boredom,
sadness) is usually detrimental, particularly when it is emanating from non-work sources

(Higgins et al., 1992; Van Dyne et al., 2002), with the potential exception of clinically
depressed individuals who may gain access to a wider array of stored information in
depressed states (Isen et al., 1987).
Beneficial effects of negative affect may be enhanced if innovative coping and initiative
are encouraged, keeping in mind that these effects may not occur immediately during the
state of greatest frustration, but after a certain delay (Bond & Bunce, 2000; Fay &
Sonnentag, 2002). Because individuals may then also experience a certain level of posi-
tive affect, and because positive and negative affect are usually considered independent
dimensions (Watson et al., 1988; George & Brief, 1992), it is possible to conclude that both
forms of affect may sometimes be conducive. Further research directly capturing the
potentially beneficial type of work-related negative high-arousal affect would be useful.
Field research is also needed to further examine Vosburg’s (1998) suggestion that positive
mood facilitates creativity when a satisficing strategy (e.g., a large number of ideas) is ade-
quate, whereas negative mood is conducive when an optimizing strategy (e.g., one high-
quality solution) is appropriate.
Finally, another way to resolve these issues is to further explore benefits arising from
emotional ambivalence, that is, the simultaneous experience of positive and negative
emotion (Fong, 2006). James et al. (2004) proposed that complex affective states com-
posed of both positive and negative elements may positively influence creativity. Amabile
et al. (2005) did not find evidence of such a relationship in their field research. However,
Fong (2006) conducted two laboratory experiments showing that individuals experienc-
ing emotional ambivalence achieved higher scores on the Remote Associates Task. She
argued that emotional ambiguity is interpreted as a signal that one is in an unusual envi-
ronment and that this leads to an increased sensitivity to recognizing unusual associations.
Her second experiment revealed the positive relationship only for participants who
believed that emotional ambivalence is atypical. This is consistent with her assumption
that the ‘atypicality associated with this emotional experience would be interpreted as an
indication that one is in an unusual environment where other unusual relationships might
also exist’ (p. 1019). Field research is needed to corroborate this finding and assess its
generalizability to the related criteria of innovation and initiative.
The impact of discrete emotions on creativity, innovation and initiative

In comparison with the previously discussed mood states, emotions are generally more
intense and short-lived and typically arise in response to a specific event (Salovey &
Mayer, 1990; Pirola-Merlo et al., 2002). Brief and Weiss (2002) criticized ‘the over-
emphasis of the study of mood at the expense of discrete emotions’ (p. 297). In their pre-
viously noted study, George and Zhou (2002) also measured the specific affective states of
fear, joviality, attentiveness and self-assurance. None of them was significantly correlated
with creativity, but all four yielded the proposed interaction effect: fear positively related
to creativity when mood clarity and recognition of creativity were high, whereas the three
positive affect dimensions negatively related to creativity under these circumstances.
Higgins et al. (1992) presented a model suggesting effects of five discrete emotions
(anxiety, depression, anger, exhilaration and passion) on the four creativity phases pre-
paration, incubation, illumination and verification. Interestingly, they described mainly
negative effects: all five emotions may cause an individual to be unable to focus on the task
in the preparation phase or to engage in uninhibited information integration during the

incubation stage. In the illumination phase, individuals may devalue or overvalue the
insight because of the experience of positive or negative emotions. This effect ‘is particu-
larly troublesome for the organization because many “great ideas” may be lost and other
weaker ideas might receive disproportionate organizational attention’ (p. 125). All five
emotions may limit one’s ability to systematically analyze the value of the idea in the
verification stage, which may sometimes lead to sponsorship of poor ideas or rejection of
prematurely presented good ideas. Clearly, influences of emotions on specific creativity
stages (Amabile, 1996) deserve further consideration.
The absorptive state of flow (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996), which is conducive to creativity,
may be experienced when there is an optimal balance between challenges and skills and
both are at least moderately high. When skills exceed challenges, boredom occurs.
Although researchers usually emphasize negative consequences of boredom such as per-
formance decrements (Fisher, 1998), it would be interesting to investigate whether bored
employees sometimes engage in voluntary acts of creativity or initiative to make their
work more interesting. In the flow state, action and awareness are merged, distractions are
excluded from consciousness, the sense of time becomes distorted, there is no worry of
failure, and the activity becomes autotelic (i.e., an end in itself). Csikszentmihalyi and
LeFevre (1989) found that the flow state occurred more frequently in work than in leisure.
Pekrun and Frese (1992) noted that flow may relate to aesthetic pleasure, which can be
experienced in a variety of jobs when harmonious outcomes going beyond pure func-
tionality are produced. Sosik et al. (1999) identified flow as a mediator between transfor-
mational as well as transactional contingent reward leadership and creativity in a
brainstorming task under conditions of anonymity, when participants entered their ideas
into an electronic support system. Their flow measure was a composite of perceived task
focus, task feedback and intrinsic motivation. Future research may also capture affective
elements of flow (e.g., joy, lack of worry) and examine whether flow also facilitates innov-
ation and initiative. Certain flow features (e.g., intrinsic motivation, perceived control)
may be conducive, but the disregard of environmental influences might be detrimental in
the implementation phase.
A few change studies have implications for the role of emotions in initiative and innov-
ation. Kiefer’s (2002) investigation of Swiss service sector human resource managers
during a merger revealed a wide variety of experienced emotions (including joy, pride,
relief, frustration, anger and fear). Considering the relational themes associated with
specific emotions (Lazarus, 1991) and the action tendencies engendered by them (Frijda,
1986), Kiefer identified certain consequences of joy, fear and anger that imply different
levels of initiative and innovative behavior. Joy, which reflects progress toward a goal and
typically leads to action readiness, was essential for sustained levels of active support for
change. On the contrary, fear frequently led to avoidance and inhibition tendencies, as
reflected in managers’ reluctance to speak up or criticize the process. The consequences
of anger were multifaceted, because different respondents reported two antagonistic
action tendencies (i.e., removing obstacles or showing resistance). Hence, research identi-
fying the circumstances under which anger leads to these different outcomes may help
clarify when organizationally functional initiative will be taken. Another study (Matheny
& Smollen, 2005) revealed that distinctive forms of change were associated with different
discrete emotions. Technological changes were related mainly to positive, policy changes
primarily to negative, and social interaction changes to both positive and negative emo-
tions. Future research may assess whether different emotions are also associated with
similar forms of innovation (e.g., technological and administrative; King & Anderson,
2002) and whether levels of initiative differ across these forms because of these experi-
enced emotions.
The wider social psychological and organizational literature also suggests further
implications of discrete emotions (e.g., anxiety, guilt, shame, pride, hope, surprise).
Evaluation anxiety has been proposed as a reason why brainstorming in groups leads to
the generation of fewer and less creative ideas than the nominal group technique, which
requires individuals to work separately (Thompson, 2003). However, laboratory research
indicated that the inferiority of traditional group brainstorming is caused mainly by pro-
duction blocking, as only one person can speak at one time (Diehl & Stroebe, 1991). Task-
related anxiety may also lead to a decision not to engage in discretionary behaviors (Beal
et al., 2005): ‘For example, anxiety experienced as a result of an approaching deadline
may inform a worker that there is not enough time available for the typical level of help-
fulness to other employees’ (p. 1063). Similarly, an employee experiencing such anxiety
may decide not to exhibit initiative or voluntary forms of creativity or innovation.
On the other hand, fearful situations may sometimes trigger courageous incidents of
initiative. An act may be considered courageous if it involves free choice, some sort of risk
is present and has been adequately judged, and the action serves worthy aims (Worline
et al., 2002). A qualitative study in high-technology companies showed that those who
witnessed others’ courageous actions were more likely to overcome fear and act with
courage themselves in a future situation. Worline et al. explicitly discussed how observa-
tions of others’ courageous behavior may affect creativity, arguing that these effects will
be positive when the experience of courage generates positive emotion, but negative when
it generates negative emotion.
Very little research has investigated the role of self-conscious emotions (Tangney, 2003)
in creativity, initiative and innovation. Pride, embarrassment, guilt and shame are evoked
by self-reflection and self-evaluation. Negative self-conscious emotions are felt when
standards are violated. Whereas guilt involves a negative evaluation of a specific behav-
ior, shame involves a negative evaluation of the global self (ibid.). Shame is typically
accompanied by feelings of powerlessness and a desire to escape the situation, hence
inhibiting initiative. In comparison, guilt leads to regret and motivates reparative behav-
ior, such as attempts to fix the situation. Guilt may even promote initiative and innovation,
as it ‘motivates people in a constructive, proactive, future-oriented direction’ (p. 388).
Tangney also noted that guilt facilitates empathy because it highlights the consequences
of one’s behavior for distressed others, whereas the painful self-focus of shame may derail
the empathic process. Empathy is critical when change agents try to convince others to
implement new ideas (Huy, 1999).
Pride originates in an internal attribution in response to a positive event (Pekrun &
Frese, 1992). Tangney (2003) distinguished between ‘alpha pride’ (hubris or pride in the
global self), which may sometimes cause maladaptive attempts to distort situations to
enhance the self, and ‘beta pride’ (pride in a specific action or behavior), which may be
beneficial for initiative or innovative behavior. ‘Given an important action goal, the most
important factor leading to pride is overcoming a barrier’ (Pekrun & Frese, 1992).
Anticipated emotions, such as the pride one expects to experience once challenges are
mastered, are relevant to initiative and innovation, which involve a need to overcome bar-
riers and to anticipate future developments.
Surprise and hope may also facilitate creativity, innovation and initiative. The experi-
ence of surprise has been suggested as a mechanism explaining why minority dissent
enhances creativity (De Dreu & West, 2001): ‘Minority dissent is surprising and leads
majority members to wonder why the minority thinks the way it does . . . The tension pro-
duced by minority dissent and the majority’s desire to resolve this tension produce diver-
gent thinking’ (p. 1191). The authors suggested that authentic minority dissent is more
effective in facilitating creativity than devil’s advocacy, which is unlikely to elicit the
tension and surprise needed to induce creative thinking, as it involves role-playing behav-
ior by a member who is known to disagree out of duty. The role of surprise in the inno-
vation implementation process should also be explored in future research.
‘Hope propels people into taking actions that could improve their lot, it fuels their per-
sistence’ (Huy, 1999, p. 338). However, Lazarus (1991) classified hope as a negative
emotion, because it does not imply a clear-cut action tendency and involves a desire to
escape from a negative situation. Although hope may sustain constructive efforts, it may
sometimes lead us to have unrealistic expectations and to remain committed to a course
of action that we would be better off abandoning (Cornelius, 1996). Averill et al., (1990)
noted that people tend to be more persistent in their efforts to bring about hoped-for
events when they feel a sense of control over these events. This is consistent with the
finding that perceived control positively predicts creativity and initiative (e.g., Amabile et
al., 1996; Frese et al., 1996).
In conclusion, future research assessing associations between discrete emotions and
creativity, innovation and initiative would be valuable. Anxiety, boredom and shame
appear to be rather detrimental (Higgins et al., 1992; Tangney, 2003), although efforts to
overcome them may be helpful (Worline et al., 2002), whereas anger, guilt, pride, hope and
surprise may sometimes be beneficial. Future-oriented emotions such as hope or antici-
pated pride (Pekrun & Frese, 1992) are relevant to initiative and innovation, which involve
forward thinking. Another interesting avenue for future research would be a considera-
tion of cross-cultural differences (Rank et al., 2004b). In a study examining the experience
of eight discrete emotions, Scollon et al. (2004) identified the largest difference between
cultures in the report of pride. Specifically, pride was less frequently experienced in Asian
cultures and even grouped with unpleasant emotions in India, possibly because it may
separate individuals from others. Moreover, those from Asian backgrounds generally
tended to report comparatively low levels of pleasant and high levels of unpleasant emo-
tions (ibid.). Such differences may partially explain potential distinctive levels or types of
individual-level initiative or innovative behavior shown by employees with different cul-
tural backgrounds.
The impact of other affect-related variables on creativity, innovation and initiative

Future research should incorporate affect-related constructs such as emotional intelli-
gence (EI), emotion control and group-level affect variables. EI involves the ability to
monitor one’s own and others’ emotions, to distinguish between different emotions and
to use this information effectively to guide one’s thinking and actions (Salovey & Mayer,
1990; Huy, 1999). Ashkanasy and Tse (2000) argued that EI involves the ability to utilize
emotions to allow flexible planning and creative thinking. The ability to perceive others’
emotions and to influence them is beneficial when innovation champions have to convince
others of the value of new ideas. Huy (1999) considered empathy, one’s ability to under-
stand and re-experience someone else’s feelings, as a central EI attribute that enhances
receptivity to change. A qualitative study (Huy, 2002) revealed that middle managers had
to engage in emotional balancing by showing emotional commitment to change projects
as well as concern about recipients’ emotions to facilitate adaptation of their work groups.
If emotion recognition is more accurate when emotional expressors and perceivers are
from the same cultural group (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002), it would be interesting to
explore whether EI is particularly helpful in cross-cultural innovation negotiations.
EI may also exert a moderating influence on relationships between affect-related vari-
ables and different outcomes. Carmeli and Colakoglu (2005) found affective organiz-
ational commitment to be more positively associated with altruistic behavior for high EI
employees. Future research is needed to explore interactive effects of multiple affect-
related variables on initiative, innovation, and creativity. Emotion control, an individual’s
self-regulatory capability to minimize detrimental emotional states and to maintain task-
focused attention (Kanfer & Heggestad, 1997), may also function as a moderator.
Emotion control represents a central facet of emotion regulation, with the latter ‘defined
broadly as the processes by which individuals and environments influence the experience,
expression, and control of an individual’s emotion’ (Kanfer & Kantrowitz, 2002, p. 433).
Innovative attempts to implement new ideas in the workplace may not only involve
worries about the feasibility of the idea or about anticipated resistance, but also lead to
anger resulting from setbacks (Farr & Ford, 1990). Therefore, emotion control may exert
not only a main effect on innovation, but also a moderating effect, as negative affect will
less likely be detrimental for individuals who are able to redirect attention to the task at
hand.
Although most of the previously discussed research concerns individual-level affect,
many of these studies have implications for the group level. George (1990) defined
affective tone as consistent or homogeneous reactions within a group and found negative
affective tone to be negatively related to group-level prosocial behavior. The role of emo-
tional contagion, which refers to ‘the processes whereby the moods and emotions of one
individual are transferred to nearby individuals’ (Kelly & Barsade, 2001, p. 106), in the
innovation process should also be examined. For example, findings indicating that indi-
viduals high in nonverbal expressiveness are better able to transfer their emotions to
others (Kelly & Barsade, 2001) may also apply to emotional contagion processes triggered
by innovation champions. It would also be useful to investigate effects of affective diver-
sity (i.e., affect-related heterogeneity across group members). In a study of top manage-
ment teams (Barsade et al., 2000), homogeneity regarding trait positive affectivity was
positively associated with perceptions of influence among group members and their
leader’s use of participatory decision making, a facilitator of innovation (King &
Anderson, 2002). On the other hand, affective diversity may reflect a synergistic constel-
lation of group-level emotional ambivalence, such that negative affect members identify
deficiencies and options for improvement, while positive affect members exhibit cognitive
variation and associative thinking.
Pirola-Merlo et al. (2002) applied affective events theory to the group level by propos-
ing that ‘certain events impact on a collective sense of affect in the team, which subse-
quently influences attitudes and behaviors’ (p. 564). They examined the impact of
obstacles on team climate variables and subsequent project performance, arguing that
team climate factors such as participative safety (West & Anderson, 1996) have strong
affective components. When obstacles were experienced constantly over a four-month
period, lower levels of a few of the team climate factors, including participative safety,
were reported. Because these climate variables are not affect variables per se, future studies
incorporating concepts such as affective tone would be useful. The distress-related model
by Anderson et al. (2004) also involves several effects operating across the individual,
group and organizational levels. For example, group-level distress resulting from minor-
ity dissent may stimulate individual-level creativity. Multi-level investigations examining
potential cross-level effects would be particularly illuminating.
Conclusion
The research discussed in this chapter demonstrates not only that positive affect facilitates
creativity and that it may promote initiative and innovation, but also that negative affect
and emotional ambivalence positively influence these outcomes under certain circum-
stances. Shalley et al. (2004) concluded that research should ‘identify the entire set of con-
ditions that need to be present if negative moods are to boost employee creativity’ (p. 946).
Similar efforts should be undertaken with respect to the outcome variables initiative and
innovation. The effects of various discrete emotions such as pride, guilt and surprise as
well as those of affect-related variables such as emotional intelligence or affective diver-
sity should also be investigated. International research would be particularly interesting,
for example, studies exploring implications of cross-cultural issues related to emotion
recognition or the experience of pride. Interactions among multiple affect-related vari-
ables may also be examined. For example, the research summarized in this chapter sug-
gests that negative affect may be less detrimental or even beneficial among employees high
in emotional intelligence, emotion control or affective organizational commitment.
While the present chapter focused on the impact of affect on creativity, innovation and
initiative, researchers should also consider the influence of these variables on subsequent
affect. Amabile et al. (2005) found that most of the reported short-term reactions to cre-
ative thought events entailed positive emotional reactions such as joy or pride. However,
Anderson et al. (2004) suggested that innovative efforts in response to distress may para-
doxically trigger subsequent distress and team conflict. They noted that innovation may
cause potential negative consequences at the individual, group and organizational levels
of analysis, including increased role ambiguity, group work load or turnover. Similarly,
Fay et al. (1998) argued that innovation or initiative may sometimes cause stressors, such
as time pressure or role conflict. Overall, ‘the majority of research suggests that employ-
ees associate organizational change with negative emotional responses’ (Ashkanasy &
Ashton-James, 2005, p. 253).
In our age of ubiquitous change, it is encouraging that several studies discussed in this
chapter suggest that negative affect may serve as a starting point for innovative improve-
ments (Bunce & West, 1994; Fay & Sonnentag, 2002; George & Zhou, 2002; Anderson
et al., 2004). As suggested in the introductory quote, emotions may not only be the result
of change, but also trigger transformations of reality. Considering that negative affect may
sometimes engender creativity and innovation, Jung’s (1912) concept of active imagination
appears relevant as a technique to make problematic emotions and moods more bearable.
Hopefully, future research will further reveal how individuals in changing organizations
can achieve the transformative creative process that Jung described poetically: ‘What on a
lower level had led to the wildest conflicts and to panicky outbursts of emotions . . . now
looked like a storm in the valley seen from the mountain top. This does not mean that the
storm is robbed of its reality, but instead of being in it one is above it’ (p. 38).
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7 Emotions in and around performance: the thrill
of victory, the agony of defeat
Cynthia D. Fisher
Introduction
A great deal of research attention has been given to the consequences of affect, and there
are volumes of social psychology research on the effects of induced mood on memory,
cognition, and behavior (see Forgas, 1999; Martin & Clore, 2001). The induced mood par-
adigm has strongly influenced the thinking of organizational scholars, producing an
almost exclusive focus on the effects of induced or incidental affect on motivation and per-
formance at work (Forgas & George, 2001). The assumption is made that affect from
unspecified sources intrudes from outside the immediate work activity to hijack attention
or change perceptions and cognitive functioning. For instance, Beal et al. (2005) present
a detailed model of how affect can damage performance by distracting attention from the
task and requiring the expenditure of scarce regulatory resources. Seo et al. (2004) suggest
that core affect influences motivational direction, intensity, and persistence via impacts on
goals, expectancies, and utility.
In contrast, there has been almost no attention given to the real-time work setting
causes of moods and emotions while working. Brief and Weiss’s (2002) review of affect
in organizations does discuss sources of affect at work, but all seem fairly distal to
the immediate person–task–performance transaction (e.g., off-the-job events, circadian
cycles, work group mood, justice). Surprisingly, the nature of the current task and per-
formance on the current task are not mentioned as causes of affect. The purpose of this
chapter is to explore in considerable detail these likely immediate contributors to mood
and emotion while working.
Experience sampling studies have shown that mood and emotions at work vary con-
siderably over short periods of time (Fisher & Noble, 2000). The search for potential
causes of this fluctuation must focus on equally transient stimuli. Logical candidates to
cause emotion fluctuations at work are appraisals related to what one is doing and to how
well one is doing it at the moment. The next section considers main effects of task char-
acteristics on emotions during task engagement. The subsequent section builds the case
that perceived performance can be a potent contributor to emotions experienced at work
and suggests the specific emotions most likely to occur as a consequence of performance.
Following that, attention is given to anticipatory emotions in advance of performance
events, and relived emotions well after performance events. Finally, I discuss work setting
and individual difference features that may result in differential affective reactivity to per-
ceived performance.
Task effects on emotions

One might wonder whether there are aspects of tasks themselves that tend to create pos-
itive or negative emotions in performers. The answer is most likely ‘yes’. Research on job
120
Emotions in and around performance 121
enrichment and job redesign point to attributes such as skill variety, task significance, task
identity, autonomy, and feedback from the task itself as antecedents of pleasant feelings
while working (Hackman & Oldham, 1980). Csikszentmihalyi’s work on flow states (1975,
1990) suggests that flow can only occur when a task provides a clear goal and immediate
feedback. Deci and Ryan’s self-determination theory sees autonomy or autonomy
support as important aspects of task environments which encourage intrinsic enjoyment
of activities (Deci & Ryan, 1987). On the other side of the spectrum, tasks that are simple,
repetitive, machine paced, offer low control, require sustained vigilance for infrequent
targets, or involve waiting around with nothing to do tend to produce negative emotions
such as boredom, frustration, and hostility (Fisher, 1993). Tasks which are too hard and
impossible to comprehend can also produce the same negative emotions (ibid.).
‘Interest’ is often considered to be an emotion (Silvia, 2005) but has received surpris-
ingly little research attention. In an experience sampling study in the workplace, Fisher
and Noble (2004) found that performers felt more positive and less negative emotions
while working on tasks that they rated as more interesting. There are at least two types
of interest. ‘Situational interest’ occurs when a novel and complex stimulus initially
catches a perceiver’s attention. Situational interest may motivate initial engagement with
a task and may be experienced at work from time to time when an unfamiliar task is
encountered. ‘Personal interest’ is felt when a more stable preference for one activity over
another has been developed. Personal interest occurs when individuals are captivated by
the challenge and skill development opportunities in a task. This form of interest both
nurtures skill development and is in turn strengthened by a feeling of competence and
increasing task challenge (Renninger et al., 1992; Csikszentmihalyi et al., 2005). It is
likely to be experienced more often on familiar work tasks on which one has experienced
past success/progress but which remain somewhat challenging.
Many of the above theories point to interactions between the person and the situation
rather than simply main effects of task characteristics on affective states. For instance,
individuals must be interested in the content of a task and find it relevant to their current
concerns in order not to be bored (Fisher, 1993). Several theories specify that competence
or task-relevant skills are essential to positive affective outcomes. Individuals must feel
competent in order to experience intrinsic motivation in the presence of autonomy (Deci
& Ryan, 1985), a task must offer optimal challenge commensurate with suitable skills
from the performer in addition to goals and feedback to engender flow (Csikszentmihalyi,
1975, 1990), and successful skill development underlies personal interest. Fisher and
Noble (2004) found that the relationship between interest and emotions was partially
mediated through perceived performance. So while engaging in an appropriately designed
task may be enjoyable for its own sake, enjoyment is likely to be much greater when suc-
cessful performance, progress, or competence is also experienced. The next section builds
the case for perceived performance being a potent contributor to affect while working.
Why might people experience emotions about performance?

Core affect is the pleasant or unpleasant feeling that is the product of a continuous and
automatic appraisal of events and current situations with respect to one’s goals and well-
being (Russell, 2003). While at work and engaging in a task, information about one’s
behavior and outcomes with respect to that task and related goals is likely to be both
available and salient as input to core affect judgments. If job performance matters to an
individual, and is seen as having relevance to his or her well-being, affect should be gen-
erated based on how well the performance is going (Frijda, 1988; Lazarus, 1991). Work
occupies a central role in the lives of most people, taking up large chunks of time and in
many ways defining self-image and self-worth. Further, the work setting offers opportu-
nities to demonstrate and experience competence, which is one of three basic needs in
self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 2000). Competence (together with autonomy)
also underlies intrinsic motivation, which is often operationalized as task enjoyment
(Deci & Ryan, 1985; Deci & Moller, 2005). Further, performing a work task can be
viewed as an ‘affective event’ that has immediate affective consequences for most employ-
ees (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996).
Frijda’s (1988) first law of emotion is the law of situational meaning. It states that emo-
tions are determined by the meaning of events to individuals, so it is performer-perceived
performance that should be the most immediate antecedent of emotion, rather than
objective or other-rated performance. Frijda (p. 349) goes on to state that, ‘Events that
satisfy the individual’s goals, or promise to do so, yield positive emotions; events that
harm or threaten the individual’s concerns lead to negative emotions’. Frijda’s second law
of emotion suggests that emotion will be stronger if the event is more important to the
individual’s goals, motives, or concerns. Importance also triggers self-regulation around
the desired state. Bandura’s social cognitive theory of self-regulation points out that indi-
viduals continuously self-regulate through three mechanisms: self-monitoring of behav-
ior and the surrounding situation, judgment of that behavior against standards, and
affective self-reactions depending on the outcomes of the first two mechanisms (Bandura,
1991). Control theory describes the likely sign of those affective self-reactions. Negative
affect should occur when performance is perceived to fall below a desired standard, or
when the rate of progress toward a standard is less than anticipated, whereas positive feel-
ings occur when performance or the rate of progress toward a standard is perceived to be
above expectation (Carver & Scheier, 1990; Hsee & Abelson, 1991).
Empirically, the expected relationship between perceived performance or feelings of
competence and hedonic tone has been supported (see Cabanac et al., 1997). Sheldon
et al. (1996) found that individuals reported more positive affect, well-being, and vitality
on days during which competence at major tasks was higher. Experience sampling studies
have found significant within-person relationships between perceptions of goal progress
and task enjoyment (Alliger & Williams, 1993) and between self-rated momentary task
performance and concurrent emotions (Fisher and Noble, 2004). Fisher (2003) reported
that the average within-person correlation between mood and momentary task perfor-
mance was 0.41, while the average within-person correlation between immediate task sat-
isfaction and concurrent task performance was 0.57. In other words, people experienced
a better mood and more task satisfaction when they believed they were performing better
than usual for them, and a worse mood and less task satisfaction when they believed they
were performing more poorly than usual.
The extensive literature on feedback also suggests that positive affect usually follows
receipt of positive feedback, and negative affect follows receipt of negative feedback
(Kluger et al., 1994; Kluger & DeNisi, 1996). The goal-setting literature confirms that
individuals are more satisfied with their performance, and report liking a task more when
they are told they have performed well against goals than when they fail to reach goals
(Locke et al., 1970; Locke & Latham, 1990). The effects of feedback on affect are so robust
122
that false feedback about performance on an ostensibly important task is often used to
manipulate mood in laboratory research (Isen, 1999).
What specific emotions may occur about performance?

There seems little doubt that pleasant feelings tend to follow perceived good performance
and unpleasant feelings follow perceived poor performance. However, the specific emo-
tions experienced depend on further consideration and attributions about the likely
causes of performance. Appraisal theories of emotion delineate some of the dimensions
and processes that may be involved in the generation of specific emotions, and suggest
prototypical scripts for each emotion. Weiner’s theory of attributions and emotions
(1985) is perhaps most relevant in the context of emotions in achievement situations such
as work performance. Weiner also suggests a two-stage process of valence first and specific
emotion second. In terms of the primary appraisal, ‘Success at achievement-related activ-
ities was associated with the affect of happy regardless of the cause of that outcome, and
failure seemed to be related to frustration and sadness’ (p. 561). These are the ‘outcome-
dependent’ emotions. The secondary appraisal considers attributions of the cause of per-
formance and results in more specific ‘attribution-dependent’ emotions. Attributions may
be made to internal or external causes, stable or unstable causes, and controllable–
intentional or uncontrollable causes. Combinations of these create prototypical emotion
scripts. For instance, success due to internal causes results in the emotion of pride, success
due to the actions of others may produce gratitude, and success due to luck may create
feelings of surprise. Failure due to the intentional interference of others leads to anger.
Failure due to internal factors may result in guilt or shame, while failure due to stable
internal causes leads to feelings of hopelessness.
Pride, shame, guilt, and embarrassment have been called the ‘self-conscious’ emotions.
Considerably more attention has been devoted to understanding the negative self-
conscious emotions of shame, guilt, and embarrassment than the positive one of pride,
and there has been surprisingly little research on pride and feelings of self-satisfaction as
a consequence of performance in the workplace. Most of the existing literature on pride
focuses on how and when children learn the social rules for experiencing pride, with older
children following the prototypical script more than younger children (see Seidner et al.,
1988; Mascolo & Fischer, 1995). To evoke pride, a success must be seen as having been at
least partly contingent upon one’s own behavior or characteristics. Further, pride may be
stronger if attributed to volitional causes such as effort rather than to less controllable
stable internal features such as intelligence, ability, or physical characteristics (Neumeister,
2004). Pride is only felt if an outcome attributed to the self surpasses a normative standard
and occurs on a task seen as challenging (Reissland, 1994). Relatedly, the experience of
pride requires ego-involvement, where performance is seen as having relevance for self and
social esteem (Lazarus, 1991). Having an audience, receiving public praise, and being given
favourable social comparison information may all increase the strength of feelings of
pride, but are not essential to its occurrence (Webster et al., 2003). Seidner et al. (1988)
found that 40 per cent of incidents recounted as having produced pride did not mention
an audience being present at the time.
There is less research on other positive emotions that may accompany successful per-
formance, but one might expect that joy, elation, gladness, and interest would be likely
candidates. Csikszentmihalyi (1975, 1990) has described ‘flow’ as a state of absorbed
interested or optimal experience that can be accompanied by feelings of ecstasy, exhila-

ration, and aesthetic rapture. De Rivera et al. (1989) found that feelings of gladness
occurred following success when success was seen as possible but by no means certain,
whereas elation occurred when success was considered highly unlikely, almost a fantasy,
but was nevertheless achieved. When success is uncertain and highly valued in order to
avoid negative consequences, successful performance may also produce feelings of relief
(Lazarus, 1991).
Poor performance is likely to produce unhappiness following primary appraisal, again
with more specific emotions depending on further attributions. Embarrassment is felt
when a poor performance occurs in front of an audience, and may be more severe if the
performance is due to internal and controllable factors rather than accident or bad luck
(Seidner et al., 1988). A considerable amount of research has investigated the similarities
and differences between guilt and shame. One difference seems to be that guilt always
involves violating a moral imperative, when one had control over the behavior. Shame can
occur following a failure to live up to any personal goal or standard, again probably voli-
tionally (Lazarus, 1991). Like embarrassment, shame is usually regarded as requiring an
audience. Shame may have more severe consequences than guilt, as it focuses on ‘the self’s
deficiencies, whereas guilt involves focus on the negative event for which one is responsi-
ble’ (Barrett, 1995, p. 28). If future performance is judged unlikely due to the current
failure being attributed to stable causes, emotions such as depression and hopelessness
may also be experienced.
Poor performance may also produce emotions focused on other objects than the self.
When failure to make desired progress on a task is occurring, one may feel frustration or
irritation in general, or anger at any specific circumstance or person that is seen to be
inhibiting performance. Confusion has been suggested as a neglected but quite common
emotion when uncertainty is experienced (Rozin & Cohen, 2003). Finally, worry and
anxiety are likely to occur when the likelihood of failure and/or the importance of suc-
cessful performance are high (Folkman & Lazarus, 1985).
Emotions before performance

The above discussions concern emotions experienced concurrently with performance, or
immediately after performance when feedback is received or progress evaluated. However,
emotions also may be experienced in connection with impending performance opportu-
nities or achievement situations. Prospective emotions about future performance events
probably depend on both self-efficacy and the importance of performing well. When
success on an upcoming challenging task is considered within reach, performers might
feel enthusiasm, eagerness, excitement, and pleasurable anticipation. When success is
much less likely, performers may feel anxiety, nervousness, worry, fear, dread, trepidation,
or even hopelessness as they anticipate failure and the negative emotions that will follow.
Bandura (1997) concludes that self-efficacy and perceived control both reduce anxiety in
the lead-up to achievement situations. The literature on fear of failure and perfor-
mance/evaluation anxiety (see Zeidner & Matthews, 2005) suggests that some individuals
are particularly prone to debilitating negative feelings in advance of achievement
challenges.
Folkman and Lazarus (1985) showed that emotions in advance of a university exam
were considerably more mixed in valence than emotions during or after the exam. Many
respondents experienced both threat (worried, fearful, and anxious) and challenge
(confident, hopeful, and eager) emotions before the exam when uncertainty about per-
formance was at its highest. As performance levels became clearer during and after the
exam, emotions were less mixed and more consistent with estimated or actual perfor-
mance. Prior to the exam, those who had a greater stake in the outcome of the exam expe-
rienced stronger threat emotions, whereas those feeling greater control experienced
stronger challenge emotions.
A series of studies inspired by Bagozzi (Brown et al., 1997; Bagozzi et al., 1998; Perugini
& Bagozzi, 2001) addressed the role played by ‘anticipatory’ or ‘goal-directed’ emotions
in the motivation of task performance. Anticipatory emotions are thoughts about how
one would feel following future success or failure to reach a goal. Anticipatory emotions
were stronger the larger the ‘stake’ the individual had in the goal. As hypothesized, antic-
ipatory emotions predicted behavioral intentions, plans, and efforts to achieve the goal.
It is not clear, however, that anticipatory emotions are actually experienced as emotions.
Instead, they may be cognitions about future emotions, which are actually felt only after
the goal is achieved or not achieved. There is some evidence for the existence of an ‘impact
bias’, such that individuals anticipate feeling stronger emotions following upcoming
events or potential achievements than they actually do when the event occurs (Brown
et al., 1997; Wilson & Gilbert, 2003).
Emotions after performance

Emotions are felt in real time during or immediately after performance. However, indi-
viduals are also capable of reactivating and re-experiencing performance-related emo-
tions long after the performance is over. Negative emotions have received the most
attention, in the form of a great deal of research on rumination about unattained goals.
Rumination consists of repetitive, usually negative, self-focused thoughts, dwelling on
one’s misery and failures (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2004). Rumination is implicated in
depression and negative mood. Individuals with greater dispositional tendencies to rumi-
nate might be expected to more frequently and intensely mentally replay performance fail-
ures and re-experience the negative emotions that occurred at the time.
Research on reliving positive emotions is much harder to find. Early conceptualizations
of rumination included the possibility of ruminating on successes and positive experi-
ences (Martin & Tesser, 1996), but this idea has attracted little attention. One exception
is a stream of research by Bryant (2003) on ‘savoring’ positive outcomes. His research sug-
gests that individuals differ in their abilities to savor positive events in advance (antici-
pating pleasure), during the event itself, and by reminiscing about pleasure after the event.
In sum, there is good reason to believe that individuals may experience emotions (or
cognitions about emotions) prior to performance episodes, feel emotions during and
immediately after performance that are linked to their judgments of performance
effectiveness, and relive emotions through recollection and rumination some considerable
time after a performance event. The general direction is that successful/at-or-above stan-
dard/rapidly progressing performances will result in positive emotions and unsuccess-
ful/below-expectations/slower-than-expected progress performances will result in
negative emotions, given at least some relevance of performance to the self. However,
there is considerable reason to believe that affective reactivity to perceived performance
may vary across individuals and also across aspects of the performance setting. The next
section explores a number of possible moderators of the strength of performance–affect

relationships. Three general classes of moderators will be discussed. These are character-
istics of the goal held for a particular performance task, aspects of the task itself, and
stable traits of the person.
Goal characteristics as moderators of the performance–emotion relationship

For performance or progress to be assessed, there must be some kind of goal or standard
against which to compare. A number of authors have suggested qualities of goals that
may influence the extent to which performance against standard will influence affect. Goal
qualities to be discussed include importance, congruence with personal needs and values,
concordance with organismic needs, perceived locus of causality, and goal orientation.
1. Goal importance As mentioned above, performers must feel that they have a ‘stake’
in performance (Lazarus, 1991), and that performance is indeed relevant to their goals,
motives, and concerns (Frijda, 1988) in order to feel emotions about performance.
Sometimes performing well is an important goal in itself. ‘Competence valuation’ is
how much an individual cares about doing well at an activity (Sansone, 1986). It has
been hypothesized and found to intensify affective reactions to performance feedback
and to mediate the effects of feedback sign on task enjoyment (see Elliot et al., 2000).
Goals may also be important due to their place and connections in an individ-
ual’s goal hierarchy. Carver and Scheier (1998, p. 141) point out that ‘discrepancies
have more emotional impact when they concern a central element of self than when
they bear only on a peripheral goal. Failure sometimes has a big impact on people’s
feelings and sometimes not’. Lower level goals may take on importance by virtue of
being instrumental to the achievement of higher-level goals. Therefore, success or
failure on a task seen as essential to achieving a higher-level goal will have greater
affective consequences than similar performances on a task which is not so strongly
linked to higher-level goals. McIntosh (1996) has shown that some people are
‘linkers’, with the disposition to have stronger links between lower- and higher-level
goals. These individuals are more affectively reactive to goal non-attainment, feeling
more negative, experiencing these unpleasant feelings for longer, and ruminating
more after failures to accomplished lower-level goals because of their perceived
instrumentality for attaining more important goals.
2. Goal congruence with personal motives and values A related attribute of goals may
be the extent to which they are congruent with an individual’s own pattern of deep-
seated motives and values. Kehr suggests that individuals are not always aware of
their implicit or latent motives (for values such as achievement, affiliation, or power),
but are aware of explicit motives. Explicit motives are not always congruent with
implicit motives. Achieving goals related to incongruent explicit motives may produce
less positive emotion than anticipated, or may even damage well-being. ‘Goal attain-
ment should lead to satisfaction and well-being . . . only if goals are congruent with
a person’s implicit motives’, and if there are no competing explicit motives (Kehr,
2004, p. 483).
3. Goal concordance with organismic needs Along similar lines, the self-concordance
model (Sheldon & Elliot, 1999) states that the attainment of goals that are linked to
essential human needs for competence, relatedness, and autonomy yields greater
well-being than reaching goals that are not so linked. Their research has shown that
individuals experience the greatest satisfaction and well-being from activities and
progress on goals relevant to these needs (Sheldon et al., 1996, 2001; Sheldon &
Kasser, 1998; Reis et al., 2000). The findings hold up whether the researchers exam-
ined relationships between goal attainment and well-being at the between-persons
level, or at the day-to-day within-person level.
4. Perceived locus of causality Deci and Ryan’s self-determination theory (2002) further
develops the need for autonomy mentioned above. Goals may be adopted and tasks
undertaken for reasons internal or external to the performer. Recent versions of self-
determination theory divide the intrinsic–extrinsic dichotomy into finer gradations.
Pure intrinsic motivation is when an activity is undertaken entirely for its own sake,
out of interest, rather than the instrumental value of the activity to some other goal.
The highest level of autonomy is felt, and competent performance brings strong pos-
itive emotions. ‘Integrated regulation’ is closest to intrinsic. An individual undertakes
a task voluntarily and to fulfill important values that are central to his or her identity,
though perhaps not purely for the enjoyment of the task. ‘Identified regulation’ is
slightly less autonomous. Individuals choose to perform tasks that they considered
important, even though they may not enjoy them. The experience of competence,
together with some amount of autonomy, should result in positive emotions follow-
ing successful performance on both integrated and identified goals. ‘Introjected
regulation’ occurs when individuals make themselves undertake a task for less self-
determined and more controlled reasons, such as to avoid guilt, show off to others, or
maintain self-esteem. The experience of performance is not likely to be a strong source
of positive emotions, though success may bring feelings of relief. ‘External regulation’
occurs when a goal is imposed and sustained by external contingencies and no auton-
omy is felt at all. Individuals are unlikely to experience positive emotions from
progress or performance on these controlled goals (Sheldon & Kasser, 1998).
5. Goal orientation A substantial literature dating back to Dweck’s seminal work on
learning versus performance goals (summarized in Dweck, 1999) has relevance for the
affect experienced in connection with goal attainment. Learning goals, now often called
‘mastery’ goals, focus the performer on gaining skills and increasing competence, even
if the process includes errors along the way. Intelligence and skills are seen as malleable
and subject to development with effort. In contrast, performance goals involve demon-
strating competence to others or performing better than others. Intelligence and
skill are seen as relatively fixed. Performance goals have been differentiated into
performance-approach goals, which are aimed at achieving positive results and demon-
strating competence, and performance-avoidance goals, which are aimed at avoiding
failure or being seen to be inadequate. Mastery goals probably have much in common
with intrinsic motivation, while performance-avoidance goals may be more similar to
introjected regulation. A meta-analysis by Rawsthorne and Elliot (1999) clearly shows
that task enjoyment is highest when working under mastery or performance-approach
goals, and is considerably lower when working under performance-avoidance goals.
Higgins’s regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1998; Brockner & Higgins, 2001)
presents a similar categorization of goal types. Higgins suggests two possible regu-
latory foci – promotion, which is about approaching pleasure, seeking gains, and
moving toward one’s ideal self, and prevention, which is about avoiding pain and
loss, achieving security, and complying with what one ‘ought’ to do. The promotion
concept seems similar to autonomous motivation and mastery and performance-
approach goals, while prevention focus is similar to introjected motivation and
performance-avoidance goals. Regulatory focus theory makes very specific predic-
tions about the nature of the emotions that will be experienced following success and
failure under each regulatory focus. Success in reaching or making progress toward
a promotion goal results in feelings of pleasure, elation, and cheerfulness, while lack
of success causes feelings of dejection, disappointment, dissatisfaction, and sadness.
Success on prevention goals leads to quiet, calm, and relaxed feelings, while failure
leads to agitation, tension, and fear (Higgins et al., 1997). Anticipatory emotions for
promotion goals include eagerness, whereas anticipatory emotions for prevention
goals include anxiety and worry.
In sum, attributes of goals held for a particular task may influence the extent to which
emotions are linked to performance, as well as the specific emotions felt. Performance and
affect should covary more strongly for goals that are valued by the performer, linked to
important higher level goals, and congruent with values and basic needs. Positively
valent/high-arousal emotions should be more tightly linked to performance when goals
are autonomous, mastery oriented, and promotion focused.
Task characteristics as moderators of the performance–emotion relationship

As discussed above, there may be some task main effects on affect, with more enriched
and autonomous tasks producing greater positive emotions. However, there may also be
aspects of tasks which increase the correlation between performance and affect.
Individuals should be more affectively reactive to their performance level on tasks seen as
more important, more autonomous, more challenging, more diagnostic of important
skills, and/or richer in feedback. This was suggested decades ago in an early statement of
Hackman and Oldham’s (1980) job characteristics theory. Fisher and Noble (2000) found
support for this prediction in an experience sampling study. Individuals on enriched jobs
displayed stronger within-person performance–affect correlations than those on less
enriched jobs. A meta-analysis of the satisfaction–performance relationship by Judge
et al. (2001) found similar results at the between-person level. Job satisfaction and job per-
formance were significantly more strongly correlated for individuals holding complex jobs
than they were for individuals holding low or moderate complexity jobs.
Individual differences as moderators of the performance–emotion relationship

A great deal of research points to individual differences in affective reactivity to perceived
performance. Some individuals may be affectively reactive to their perceived performance
across the entire range of performance, with higher highs following good performance
and lower lows after poor performance. Others may be especially prone to experience
strong positive emotions in proportion to successes, or to experience accentuated nega-
tive emotions in response to failures.
Approach–avoidance systems and the performance–emotion relationship

Evidence is growing that there are two distinct self-regulatory systems in the brain, one
aimed at approaching pleasure and being especially sensitive to rewards and potential
rewards, another at avoiding pain, being vigilant for potential punishers, and being ready
to move away from aversive stimuli. The former is called the behavioral activation system
(BAS), the latter the behavioral inhibition system (BIS) (Carver & White, 1994).
Individuals differ in the sensitivity of their behavioral activating and inhibition systems.
A constellation of traits previously investigated under other names now appears to be
closely linked to BAS/BIS sensitivity. In particular, BAS has much in common with extra-
version, trait positive affectivity, dispositional promotion focus, and the dispositional ten-
dency to set performance-approach and mastery goals (Carver et al., 2000; Elliot &
Thrash, 2002; Gable et al., 2003). One might also expect that BAS is implicated in trait-
based tendencies to savor positive experiences (Bryant, 2003), trait mindfulness (Brown
& Ryan, 2003), autotelic personality (Csikszentmihalyi et al., 2005), intrinsic motivational
orientation (Amabile et al., 1994), and trait optimism (Chang, 2001). Individuals with a
more sensitive BAS experience more positive emotions, and may be more affectively
responsive to pleasant events. It seems likely that in the workplace, they would experience
flow more often, enjoy challenging tasks more, and gain greater pleasure from progress
against mastery and performance-approach goals. Thus, individual differences in BAS
sensitivity are hypothesized to moderate the relationship between perceived performance
and concurrent affect, particularly following successful performances.
BIS sensitivity overlaps with neuroticism and trait negative affectivity (Carver et al.,
2000; Gable et al., 2003) and is implicated in the adoption of performance-avoidance
goals (Elliot & Thrash, 2002). It seems likely that concepts such as trait pessimism, fear
of failure, and perfectionism (Flett & Hewitt, 2002; Chang et al., 2006) may also be part
of the BIS constellation. Individuals high in trait negative affectivity, neuroticism, or BIS
sensitivity have been shown to be more affectively reactive to unpleasant events (Suls et al.,
1998; Gable et al., 2000). Norem and Smith (2006) report that defensive pessimists are less
satisfied with their past performances than more optimistic people, even though perfor-
mance is usually good. They experience more anxiety, and tend to feel relief rather than
pleasure after success. Perfectionists ruminate and worry more, set extremely high stan-
dards, then take themselves to task for small aspects of performance that ‘weren’t just
right’, thus missing the opportunity to enjoy their successes (Chang et al., 2006). It seems
likely that individuals with a strong BIS may be less affectively reactive to pleasant events
including successful work performance, and more affectively reactive to unpleasant events
such as poor performance or goal non-attainment.
Self-esteem and the performance–emotion relationship

There is a very large body of literature on the reactions of high and low self-esteem indi-
viduals to success and failure feedback. The weight of evidence indicates that low self-
esteem individuals (LSEs) suffer more after failure than do high self-esteem individuals
(HSEs). Both are sad, possibly equally sad, after failure, but the specific emotions experi-
enced differ systematically. LSEs experience greater declines in feelings of self-worth
(pride, pleased with self, ashamed of self, humiliated) following failure than do HSEs
(Brown & Dutton, 1995; Brown & Marshall, 2001). This may be due partly to the ten-
dency of HSEs to externalize blame for failure, while LSEs are more likely to regard
failure as a permanent indictment of their abilities (Jussim et al., 1995; Dutton & Brown,
1997). The pattern of feedback most upsetting to LSEs is success followed by failure,
whereas HSEs are most unhappy with two sets of failure feedback (Brown et al., 2002).
HSEs and LSEs are often assumed to have similar affective reactions to positive feed-
back, but this is not always true. Wood et al. (2005) found that LSEs were more likely to
experience anxiety after success. LSEs expressed disappointment that they did not do even
better, and worried that they might not perform as well again in the future. Reis et al.
(2000) reported that HSEs had stronger relationships between daily competence and daily
positive affect than did LSEs. Thus, it seems likely that self-esteem will moderate affective
reactions to performance. HSEs should be particularly likely to experience positive affect
in proportion to task success, and LSEs to experience negative affect and negative feelings
of self-worth in proportion to failure.
There is also evidence that self-esteem variability, or fragility, is very important in
understanding individuals’ affective reactions to performance. Kernis (2005, p. 1575)
states:
One core characteristic of people with fragile self-esteem is that they are highly responsive to
events that have potential relevance to their feelings of self-worth – in fact, they may interpret
events as being self-esteem relevant even when they are not. People with relatively stable self-
esteem typically have less extreme reactions to potentially evaluative events, precisely because
these events have little impact on their immediate feelings of self-worth.
Those with fragile self-esteem are more vigilant for events that may have self-evaluative
implications, are biased toward interpreting events as having self-relevance, and general-
ize current failures more broadly to overall self-worth (Kernis, 2005). Thus, individuals
with fragile self-esteem might be expected to be highly affectively reactive to perceived per-
formance at work, possibly over the entire range of performance, and certainly in the
unsuccessful range of performance.
Achievement motives
Both need for achievement and fear of failure have been defined in terms of dispositional
tendencies to anticipate and then experience emotions associated with performance.
McClelland (1985) suggests that intrinsic achievement satisfaction is the ‘natural incen-
tive’ for effort and performance among those high in need for achievement. Atkinson says
that individuals high in need for achievement are able to feel pride in their accomplish-
ments, while those high in fear of failure are particularly prone to feel shame and humil-
iation when they perform poorly (Atkinson, 1957). The latter prediction has been borne
out by McGregor and Elliot (2005). Individuals high in need for achievement prefer chal-
lenging tasks, specific performance goals, competitive situations, tasks that are diagnos-
tic of ability, and plentiful and prompt feedback (Trope, 1975; Sansone, 1986; Tauer &
Harackiewicz, 1999; Harackiewicz et al., 2005). Presumably these environmental features
permit emotional experiences to be closely linked to perceived performance. Those high
on need for achievement should also experience the anticipatory emotions of excitement,
eagerness, and hope as they approach moderately difficult tasks.
Self-regulatory skills
Kanfer and her colleagues (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1996; Kanfer & Heggestad, 1999) have
suggested an important role for emotional control skills in helping performers manage the
potential negative affective consequences of poor performance. Individuals with greater
emotional control skills are able to reduce worry, anxiety, and distracting thoughts of
failure and negative self-worth during performance attempts. Emotional control skills are
likely to be especially important when negative feedback is most likely, such as for those
low in ability or individuals just learning a new task. The ability to dampen feelings of
depression or confusion associated with poor performance facilitates continued engage-
ment with the task and perhaps eventual success. Hence, emotional control skills should
weaken the relationship between performance and negative emotions.
Conclusions
We know little about the phenomenology of task performance – how people actually feel
and why they feel that way while working on job tasks. The purpose of this chapter has
been to begin to remedy this deficit by discussing immediate antecedents of affect while
working. The case has been made that emotions at work are caused at least partly by
aspects of the task being performed at the moment, and more importantly, by perceived
performance, progress, or competence on that task. It is unlikely that individuals react in
the same way to every incident of performance. Affective reactions to a given performance
event should be stronger when the goal for that event is more important and is linked to
more important higher-order goals. Positive affect should be particularly likely to follow
from effective performance when goals are concordant with needs, autonomous, oriented
toward mastery or performance approach, or promotion focused. Further, there are likely
to be individual differences in affective reactivity to perceived performance. Specifically,
individuals with high BAS sensitivity and with trait positive affect, extraversion, promo-
tion focus, or high need for achievement may be more affectively responsive to perceived
performance successes, while those with high BIS sensitivity, trait negative affect, neu-
roticism, prevention focus, low or fragile self-esteem, and fear of failure might be more
reactive to perceived poor performances.
In most cases, the research evidence for these assertions is somewhat indirect, being based
on between-person research and/or relatively artificial laboratory settings. Unambiguous
tests of the effects predicted in this chapter require experience sampling research in which
performers encounter job tasks that vary in task and goal characteristics, and experience
both more and less successful performances. Further, the experience sampling studies need
to contain fairly large numbers of individuals to allow testing of predictions about
individual difference moderators of the strength of within-person affect–performance rela-
tionships.
Finally, one might ask whether there are practical reasons to care about affective reac-
tions to work tasks and to perceived performance. Clearly, positive emotions have value,
both for their own sake (immediate pleasure) and for further consequences to the per-
former and the organization, including cognitive functioning, well-being, health, motiva-
tion, absenteeism, employee retention, and so on (Fredrickson, 2001; Isen, 2003; Seo et
al., 2004). The positive affect that follows from making progress on a challenging task is
likely to fuel sustained personal interest and hence future task engagement and further
skill development (Csikszentmihalyi et al., 2005). Being affectively reactive to perfor-
mance means that valent emotional outcomes are closely linked to perceived performance.
Therefore, individuals should be motivated to perform well and avoid performing poorly
in order to maximize their affective experience. This could render more external and
heavy-handed means of control of work behavior less necessary. While some determi-
nants of affective reactivity to performance reside in stable individual differences, others
are potentially amenable to organizational influence. Organizations could strive to create

conditions allowing individuals to more readily experience the pleasure of a job well done
and the dissatisfaction of failing to meet one’s standards. These conditions may include
optimally challenging tasks with plenty of feedback, an autonomy supportive climate,
sufficient training and coaching to enhance the development of competence, and the
removal of external constraints on performance.
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8 Affect, satisfaction, and performance
Timothy A. Judge and John D. Kammeyer-Mueller
Introduction
Historically, the study of mood and emotions in organizational settings has not been well-
received. Researchers trained in either behaviorism or the rational-actor tradition steered
away from the more subjective, emotional side of human experience (Brief & Weiss, 2002;
Härtel et al., 2005). Emotions at work were also ignored because the traditional research
designs for organizational behavior are also poorly matched to the investigation of tran-
sient mood states. Methodological difficulties include finding ways to capture each indi-
vidual’s subjective experience of a situation in real time, collecting data that represent
within-person variability, and difficulties in the analysis of repeated measures data.
Recently, however, researchers have recognized both theoretically and empirically that
many of the most important aspects of the experience of work cannot be adequately
explained without appealing to affect. As this review will show, even rational models of
human behavior, such as expectancy theory and decision making, are substantially
influenced by emotional experiences.
Based on the premise that dispositions and situations influence attitudes and behavior
as mediated through the day-to-day process of affect (Lord & Kanfer, 2002), we provide
a conceptual overview of the research of affect and work outcomes in Figure 8.1. There
are five primary linkages in our model. Path A represents the influence of affective traits,
especially dispositional positive and negative affect, on affective states, such as moods and
emotions. Path B represents the direct influence of affective traits on job satisfaction
and performance. Path C represents the influence of moods and emotions on satisfaction
and performance. Path D represents the influence of situational factors on moods and
emotions. Finally, Path E represents the process of emotion regulation. In this review, we
summarize the growing body of research on these relationships between affect and work
outcomes and provide suggestions throughout the chapter for how future research can
strengthen our understanding of these links.
Path A: affective traits and affective states

A key question for organizational psychologists interested in the study of affect and
work is how dispositional affects lead to specific moods. Dispositional affects are ten-
dencies to experience similar affective states over time. As such, they are conceptually
related to personality trait measures. According to Watson et al. (1988) positive
affectivity (PA) is characterized by high energy, enthusiasm, and pleasurable engage-
ment, whereas negative affectivity (NA) is characterized by distress, unpleasurable
engagement, and nervousness. Traits PA and NA are moderately negatively correlated
( 0.36; Thoresen et al., 2003) and evince different patterns of relationships with
other variables (Watson, 2000). The general trend seems to be that PA more strongly
relates to positive outcomes whereas NA is more strongly associated with negative
outcomes.
136
Affect, satisfaction, and performance 137
Affective traits
• Positive affectivity B
• Negative affectivity
• Core self-evaluations A
Affective states Work outcomes
• Positive affect • Satisfaction
C
• Negative affect • Performance
D • Discrete emotions • Workplace deviance
Situational factors
• Task events
E
• Interpersonal events
Emotion regulation
processes
Figure 8.1 A conceptual model of affect, satisfaction, and performance
Watson and Clark (1992) found that there were significant relationships between neu-
roticism and trait NA across four samples, with correlations ranging from r = 0.52 to r =
0.65. Correlations between extraversion and trait PA were also strong, ranging from r =
0.48 to r = 0.64. This same study found that when the facets of neuroticism and extraver-
sion were factor analyzed with measures of PA and NA, two interpretable factors
appeared with the facets of neuroticism and NA loading on one factor and the facets of
extraversion and PA loading on another. As with personality, there is a body of evidence
suggesting that these dispositional affects are influenced to a large degree by genetic
factors (e.g., Pedersen et al., 1988).
Although the Big Five traits are not necessarily affective in nature, extraversion and
neuroticism are related to specific affective states. One of the key issues here is the extent
to which conventional personality measures are related to specific positive and negative
affects. One of the first diary studies to combine both personality data with more situa-
tional data found that even after accounting for life events, neuroticism was significantly
correlated with average NA (r 0.43) and PA (r 0.25), and extraversion was
significantly correlated with PA (r 0.20) (David et al., 1997). Ilies and Judge (2002)
found that there was a negative relationship between neuroticism and PA (r 0.36), and
a positive relationship between extraversion and PA (r 0.40) in an experience sam-
pling study of 27 employed individuals. There is also evidence showing that in customer
service encounters, extraversion is positively related to displayed positive emotions and
neuroticism is negatively related to displayed negative emotions (Tan et al., 2003).
There are several mechanisms by which dispositional affect can be related to affective
states. Personality also can be related to one’s situational appraisals of situations that can
lead to positive or negative affective states. Studies investigating long-term psychological
distress find that those who are high in neuroticism tend to experience more life problems
overall, and show greater reactivity to negative events (Ormel & Wohlfarth, 1991). A diary
study in an academic setting found that perceived challenge stress was positively related
to extraversion and negatively related to neuroticism, whereas perceived threatening stress
was positively related to neuroticism and negatively related to extraversion (Gallagher,
1990). Laboratory studies have shown that affect induction efforts cause different
reactions based on personality. Individuals who are high in neuroticism experience espe-
cially strong changes in their moods when exposed to negative mood induction, whereas
individuals who are high in extraversion experience especially strong changes in their
moods when exposed to positive mood inductions (Larsen & Ketelaar, 1991).
Taken in total, there is good evidence that dispositional affect is related to the experi-
ence of specific emotional states. Because comparatively few of these studies have been
performed in the organizational domain, it is not entirely clear exactly how strong the
influence of dispositional affect is for mood and emotion at work. Research exploring how
organizational contexts moderate the importance of dispositions as predictors of mood
states would be a welcome contribution to this area.
Path B: affective traits and work outcomes

Having demonstrated that dispositions are linked to affective states overall, we now turn
our attention to studies from the organizational literature that show dispositions are
related to work outcomes. These direct-effects studies show that affective dispositions can
explain variations in attitudes and behavior at work.
Satisfaction
One area of considerable dispute within the literature on job attitudes, which must
precede our discussion of affect and satisfaction, is the extent to which satisfaction scales
represent measures of pure cognition or pure affect. If job satisfaction is an emotional
reaction to the job, then we can be said to have an extensive research literature on emo-
tions at work already. In part, this question is difficult to answer because affect influences
cognition and cognition influences affect over time. As such, simple manipulation of ques-
tion wording in surveys to more completely reference only affective or only cognitive reac-
tions to the job will not be particularly effective if surveys are taken at a global level. Even
event-based surveys will have difficulty separating these affective and cognitive appraisals
if they rise nearly simultaneously, which is likely given the extensive overlap between cog-
nitive and affective processing systems (Damasio, 1994).
Although the hypothesis that job satisfaction is rooted in individuals’ personality is rela-
tively new as a concerted area of research, there has been recognition of individual
differences in job satisfaction for as long as the topic of job satisfaction has been studied
(e.g., Hoppock, 1935). It was not until the 1980s, though, beginning with the publication of
two influential studies by Staw and colleagues (Staw & Ross, 1985; Staw et al., 1986), that
the dispositional source of job satisfaction came into its own as a research area. Staw and
Ross (1985), for example, inferred a dispositional source of satisfaction by observing that
measures of job satisfaction were reasonably stable over a two- (r0.42, p0.01), three-
(r 0.32, p0.01), and five- (r0.29, p0.01) year interval, even when individuals changed
both employers and occupation (over the five-year interval, r0.19, p0.01). Another indi-
rect study, by Arvey et al. (1989), found significant similarity in the job satisfaction levels of
34 pairs of monozygotic (identical) twins reared apart from early childhood.
Although these studies were intriguing, they do not permit strong inferences regarding
the source of job satisfaction, because stability in attitudes toward work can be due to
other factors, such as a tendency to have similar jobs over time (Gerhart, 1987; Gutek &
Winter, 1992). Similarly, since babies have no jobs they obviously cannot be born with job
satisfaction. However, even when objective indices of job characteristics are taken into
account, there is still a significant genetic contribution to job attitudes (Arvey et al., 1989).
Nonetheless, evidence showing similarity in twins’ job satisfaction levels does not indicate
which dispositions are important.
More recent research has directly linked affective traits to job satisfaction. The specific
traits that have been investigated have varied widely across studies. Staw et al. (1986), for
example, utilized clinical ratings of children with respect to a number of adjectives
assumed to reflect affective disposition (‘cheerful’, ‘warm’, and ‘negative’). Judge and
Hulin (1993) used a measure, adapted from Weitz (1952), assessing employees’ reactions
to neutral objects common to everyday life (e.g., 81⁄211 paper, today’s cars). One group
of studies has focused on traits PA and NA. Counter to the theory that PA is more
strongly related to positive outcomes than NA, Thoresen et al.’s (2003) meta analysis
revealed that trait NA was somewhat more strongly related to job satisfaction than was
trait PA (– 0.37 and 0.33, respectively). Judge et al. (2002) found that neuroticism
and extraversion each displayed moderate, nonzero relationships with job satisfaction:
neuroticism, 0.29; extraversion, 0.25. These results are quite similar to those
reported by Thoresen et al. (2003): neuroticism, 0.28; extraversion, 0.22.
Core self-evaluations (Judge et al., 1997a), which are fundamental premises that indi-
viduals hold about themselves and their functioning in the world, also appear to be rele-
vant dispositions for explaining work attitudes. Brief (1998) has argued that core
self-evaluation is not an affective concept because the items mostly reflect cognitions, but
we are somewhat agnostic as to whether such strict delineations between affect and cog-
nition would prove productive, especially given the evidence cited previously showing that
neuroticism (one of the key traits in core self-evaluations) is related to dispositional neg-
ative affect and negative affective states. Several primary studies have related core self-
evaluations to job satisfaction (e.g., Judge et al., 1998), and a meta-analysis by Judge and
Bono (2001) showed that the four core traits were similarly related to job satisfaction;
when the four meta-analyses were combined into a single composite measure, the overall
core trait correlated 0.37 with job satisfaction. More recently, Judge et al. (2003) devel-
oped a 12-item measure of core self-evaluations and, in two samples, showed that it was
related to job satisfaction (rc 0.59 and rc 0.49, p0.01).
In sum, research suggests that affective traits are relevant to job satisfaction. It appears
that both PA and NA are relevant, as well as core self-evaluations. It would be a worth-
while exercise for future research to integrate these systems into one coherent persono-
logical explanation of job satisfaction. Would NA and/or PA be subsumed under core
self-evaluations? Or, would PA/NA mediate the link between core self-evaluations and job
satisfaction? Or, as a third alternative and as suggested by Brief’s (1998) argument that
PA/NA are affective whereas core self-evaluations are cognitive, do these concepts make
independent contributions to job satisfaction? Although we have made great progress
toward understanding that people’s dispositional outlook does affect their judgments of
job satisfaction, further integrative work is needed.
Performance
Given the evidence already presented regarding the influence of affect on job satisfaction,
it seems eminently plausible to propose a similar association between affect and job per-
formance. Emotions have been described at the interface between the environment in
behavior, generating action tendencies and energizing individuals to behave. There are
several theories that posit a strong relationship between affect and goal cognition (e.g.,
Higgins et al., 1997). Meta-analytic evidence on dispositional affect supports these theo-
ries, showing that trait NA is negatively correlated with goal setting motivation (
0.29), expectancy motivation ( 0.29), and task self-efficacy ( 0.35) (Judge &
Ilies, 2002). This same meta-analysis showed that extraversion is positively correlated with
goal-setting motivation ( 0.10), expectancy motivation ( 0.10), and task self-
efficacy ( 0.33). This trait-based information would seem to suggest that dispositional
NA exerts a stronger influence on performance than does dispositional PA, but that both
are relevant.
However, the evidence regarding the relationship between job performance and NA is
not strong at a global level; meta-analytic estimates of the correlation between NA and
job performance are weak, with corrected correlations across multiple meta-analyses
between supervisor ratings of job performance and emotional stability being only
0.13 (Barrick et al., 2001). The relationship between objective job performance and extra-
version is even weaker. Although global relationships between task performance and dis-
positional affect are not terribly strong, stronger relationships appear when more nuanced
conceptions of performance are taken into consideration. Task performance is typically
conceived of as activities such as processing data and information, operating machines or
equipment, or coordinating plans. None of these has a very strong emotional or affective
content. Since the majority of supervisory ratings can be explained by task performance
(Rotundo & Sackett, 2002), it is again not especially surprising to see weak relationships
between global performance scores and affect.
Interpersonal interactions are likely to be more emotionally loaded than typical task
performance. As such, it is not surprising that emotionality is more related to performance
in interpersonal settings. On an episodic level, there is evidence that individuals who are in
positive mood states will be more likely to help others in most contexts (Isen, 1970), so it
makes sense to suppose that those who are dispositionally more likely to be in positive
mood states will likely be more helpful toward others. Neuroticism is also negatively related
to prosocial organizational behavior in meta-analysis (r 0.14), whereas PA is positively
related to prosocial organizational behavior (r 0.18) (Borman et al., 2001). Self-reported
PA at work has consistently been shown to be related to citizenship behavior more strongly
than a variety of other central job attitudes (e.g., Lee & Allen, 2002).
Trait PA may be related to job performance for a specific subset of jobs involving exten-
sive interpersonal interaction. A study involving a sample of managerial employees found
that extraversion was related to superior performance ratings, and that the relationship
was especially strong when the manager’s job was high in autonomy (Barrick & Mount,
1993). However, any conclusions about the implications of this study for affectivity must
be tempered by the fact that agreeableness, which is also related to PA, was negatively
related to rated job performance. Extraverts are seen as exerting greater influence in group
settings, and groups with more extraverts perform somewhat better (Barry & Stewart,
1997). Meta-analytic evidence also suggests that the relationship between extraversion
and sales performance at an aggregate level is fairly weak 0.13 (Barrick et al., 2001).
This same study estimated a correlation between neuroticism and teamwork performance
of 0.22.
Physical and psychological health are also potentially related to affectivity, which in
turn may be reflected in a number of performance-relevant constructs – sick and
depressed employees are not likely to be great performers. NA shows persistent relation-
ships with stress and somatic complaints (Watson & Pennebaker, 1989). Stress is nega-
tively related to some indices of immune system functioning (Cacioppo, 1994), whereas
dispositional hostility is related to cardiac problems (Smith, 1992). Both of these results
suggest that physical symptoms (and not just personal perceptions of physical distress)
represent at least part of the relationship between affect and heath. There is also evidence
that higher levels of dispositional PA are related to reductions in symptoms of illness
(Watson, 2000).
Employee absence and other signs of work withdrawal are conceptually related to phys-
ical and psychological health, and also to employee attitudes, so one might expect that
there would also be a relationship between dispositional affects and these outcomes. It is
even possible that absence is used by employees as a mechanism to repair negative mood
states, giving them an opportunity to recharge their emotional batteries, so to speak
(Martoccio & Jimeno, 2003). Research evidence linking dispositional affects to with-
drawal, however, is not entirely conclusive. One study found that extraversion was posi-
tively related to absence, whereas neuroticism was not significantly related to absence
(Judge et al., 1997b). Another study, however, found that neuroticism was significantly
related to employee withdrawal behaviors but extraversion was not (LeBreton et al., 2004).
Affective traits may also be related to counterproductive work behavior. Because affect
energizes behavior in a certain direction (Lord & Kanfer, 2002), it seems likely that nega-
tive affect will energize behavior in a negative direction, although the exact nature of ‘neg-
ative’ will vary based on the person and circumstances. Self-reported trait hostility and
anger have been shown to be positively related to workplace deviance in several studies
(Lee & Allen, 2002; Judge et al., 2006). It is possible that individuals can engage in
problem-solving approaches to addressing strong negative affects (such as attempting to
avoid sources of negative affect or taking actions to eliminate those who cause stress from
the organization). Open-ended interview data suggest that employees who experience
anger toward a co-worker often feel a need to leave the workplace to ‘cool down’, or may
engage in aggression such as yelling insults, or throwing things (Glomb, 2002).
In summary, the evidence to date suggests that dispositional affectivity is not strongly
related to global ratings of job performance. However, there are more specific dimensions
of performance that are related to affect. One application of this knowledge that has
not been explored extensively is understanding how the match between dispositional
affectivity and job demands can be used in a selection context (Arvey et al., 1998). For
example, the evidence described above suggests that in jobs with heavy interpersonal
demands will require higher trait PA and lower trait NA. Providing applicants with infor-
mation about interpersonal demands may induce self-selection out of the applicant pool
by those who will not be well suited to work that is inconsistent with their personalities.
Alternatively, organizations may seek to find new ways to assess dispositional affectivity
through simulations and ‘emotional interviews’ that engage an employee’s affective
system, to assess their responses in vivo.
Path C: affective states and work outcomes

In this section, we shall examine how affective states are related to work outcomes. Most
job attitude scales ask respondents to indicate how they feel over long periods or in
general, performance ratings typically represent the average of behaviors taken over
the course of several months. The process of aggregation means that intrapersonal
fluctuation in moods over time will eventually cancel each other out; as such, it is hardly
surprising to see little relationship between global performance and affects in some
studies. Because affects are, by their nature, transitory, it is theoretically appropriate to
consider them as predictors of within-person variability. At the same time, gathering
theory-based time-variant measures of performance and attitudes is a difficult under-
taking. If there is an answer to this apparent methodological stalemate (Larson &
Csikszentmihalyi, 1983), it is breaking the work day into discrete elements or performance
episodes (Beal et al., 2005). As such, most of these studies examine very time-limited emo-
tional episodes.
Satisfaction
At a general level, one would expect that affective states (moods, emotions) would mediate
the effect of affective traits on job satisfaction. Although such a hypothesis seems nearly
self-evident, there is surprisingly little data on the role of moods and emotions in job sat-
isfaction in general, and on their possible mediating mechanism in particular. Thoresen
et al. (2003) investigated PA and NA as mood states; however when one compares their
results for state PA and NA with those for trait PA and NA, a confusing story emerges.
State PA is somewhat more strongly correlated with job satisfaction ( 0.44) than trait
PA ( 0.33). However, state NA ( 0.36) is not more highly correlated with job sat-
isfaction compared to trait NA ( 0.37). It is difficult to know what to make of these
results.
One possible interpretation is that state mood is too blunt an instrument to explain job
affect. Affective events theory (AET; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996) emphasizes links
between job events and job affect. Because AET focuses on episodic (versus chronic)
affect, as Hulin and Judge (2003) note, it might be argued to better represent how an indi-
vidual feels on the job as opposed to how an individual feels about their job. If affective
events are ephemeral, then the affective states that we study must be commensurate; it is
not clear to us that mood states – as mid-range variables between affective traits and emo-
tions – are ideally suited to this context. If, as Hulin and Judge argue, job affect is inher-
ently dynamic, then the events that influence job affect, as well as the emotions that may
mediate the link between job events and job affect, are similarly dynamic.
What does this mean from the standpoint of conceptualizing and studying affective
states in job satisfaction research? First, given the dynamic nature of job affect (Weiss
et al., 1999; Ilies & Judge, 2002), we must use research designs that are sensitive to tem-
poral dynamics. Second, and related, we must utilize multi-level designs where emotions
and job attitudes would be expected to vary between and within persons. In short, if we
believe that affective states are critical to job satisfaction, then we must study those
affective states in ‘real time’ (or as close as is practicable) and model those sources of vari-
ance in such a way that allows affect and satisfaction to vary within and between people.
Some recent experience sampling studies are informative. Focusing on broad mood
states, Judge and Ilies (2004) found that state PA positively predicted, and state NA neg-
atively predicted, within-individual variation in job satisfaction and, moreover, that state
PA mediated part of the effect of trait PA on job satisfaction (trait NA was not
significantly related to between-individual variation in job satisfaction). Fuller et al.
(2003) also found that within-individual variation in positive mood was associated with
job satisfaction. Judge et al. (2006) found that state hostility negatively predicted within-
individual variation in job satisfaction and that when both state hostility and state NA
were used to predict job satisfaction, hostility remained significant but NA did not. Scott
and Judge (2006) also found that hostility negatively predicted within-individual variation
in job satisfaction. Moreover, they found that two positive emotions – joviality and atten-
tiveness – positively predicted within-individual variation in job satisfaction. In perhaps
the most comprehensive analysis to date, Fisher (2000) found that various positive (e.g.,
enthusiasm, contentment) and negative (e.g., anger, disappointment) emotions were asso-
ciated with within-individual variation in job satisfaction, and further found that these
relations held when the emotions were aggregated into general positive and negative mood
factors.
In sum, broad mood factors and specific emotions are associated with within-
individual variation in job satisfaction. Because this line of research is at a nascent stage,
it is difficult to make deeper generalizations than that. One might wonder, for example,
whether specific emotions or broad mood factors are more proximal to job satisfaction.
Although some evidence favors the former (Judge et al., 2006), it is far too early to make
generalizations. One may also wonder about the duration of the effects. Some evidence
suggests that mood/emotion effects decline over time, such that by the next day, the effect
of the previous day’s mood is much smaller (e.g., Fisher, 2000; Judge & Ilies, 2004).
Finally, if specific emotions are linked to job satisfaction, the question of which emotions
(of the many that might be relevant) are most important is a question yet to be answered.
Performance
Compared to research on contemporaneous measures of affect and satisfaction – which
we have already described as being in a nascent stage of development – the literature on
affect and performance is even sparser. There is almost no research that has linked within-
individual variation in specific emotions to within-individual variation in performance,
despite evidence that performance does exhibit considerable within-individual variation
over time (Henry & Hulin, 1987). Although measuring within-individual variations in
performance on a day-to-day basis is not a small challenge outside the confines of the lab,
what is difficult is not impossible. For example, one can envisage a study measuring
between- and within-individual variation in mood and emotions, and linking these mea-
sures to daily measures of service performance as judged by customers. Recently,
Thoresen et al. (2004) studied individual growth trajectories in sales performance over
time. Although the time frame in that study was longer (one year), with longer time
periods between intervals (quarterly), than we have in mind here, it is the type of design
that would allow studying the role of affective traits and states in performance growth
curves.
Those examining within-person variation of performance have approached the topic
from the perspective of resource allocation theory, based on the presumption that NA can
serve to deplete regulatory resources and make one especially prone to being distracted
and unable to cope with work problems (Beal et al., 2005). Evidence suggests that indi-
viduals in an experimentally induced negative mood will tend to be more sensitive to neg-
ative feedback, which in turn generates an increasingly negative mood (Cervone et al.,
1994). Negative mood states lead to lower levels of expectancy, instrumentality, and
valence for rewards, which translates into less-effective performance (Erez & Isen, 2002).
Because unmotivated individuals will perform poorly, the depressive cycle of failure to
negative mood states will be self-reinforcing and may have increasingly strong negative
impacts on performance over repeated performance events.
In the same way that NA can deplete psychological resources, positive moods can
increase resources. Experimentally induced PAs appear to have cognitive consequences
that can improve performance on cognitive tasks. Those who are in positive moods gen-
erate more cognitive associations among affectively neutral constructs and are also more
flexible in the manner in which they think about problems (e.g., Isen et al., 1985). As a
result, it is likely that those in a positive mood will be more effective at creative problem-
solving tasks (Isen et al., 1987). Positive mood states have been shown to increase intrin-
sic motivation (Estrada et al., 1994), which is explained by the tendency for individuals in
positive affective states to enjoy themselves more when engaged in relatively pleasant
activities (Kraiger et al., 1989).
Performance in managerial jobs often hinges on critical decision-making episodes, and
the rise of behavioral decision-making perspectives has fueled research on the question of
how emotions can influence decision accuracy. Behavioral neuroscientists have shown
that damage to the emotional processing centers of the brain can result in severe deterio-
ration of decision-making ability even when the rational, deliberative portions of the
mind are left intact (Damasio, 1994). Because decisions often involve intuition, assessing
the motives and intentions of others, and assessing one’s own desires and needs, behaving
as a completely emotionless decision maker is not only unattainable, but probably also
undesirable. Unlike the other research on affect and performance, which nearly univer-
sally suggests that positive mood states improve performance, the research on affect and
decision making is more mixed. Consistent with the depressive realism hypothesis, which
suggests that those in negative moods are more likely to consider negative aspects of a sit-
uation, both dispositional negative affect and negative affective states are related to less
susceptibility to escalation of commitment (Wong et al., 2006).
Like the relationship mentioned earlier between dispositional NA and deviance, there
are also studies showing that state NA is related to deviance. Negative discrete emotions
at work have been significantly related to deviant behavior in many instances (Glomb
et al., 2002). Judge et al. (2006) found that momentary hostility explained a large portion
of the within-person variance in workplace deviance. A three-year longitudinal study of
health service workers found a significant positive relationship between negative mood
states and absence (Hardy et al., 2003). LeBreton et al. (2004) found that negative work
affect was significantly related to more withdrawal behaviors.
Although there are some promising studies described above related to emotions and
behavior at work, there is still much to be done. Most significantly, there is no compre-
hensive theoretical or empirical model that compartmentalizes situations. Much of the
research described earlier that investigated the relationship between affect and attention,
decision making, and creativity was conducted in a laboratory setting where artificial con-
straints can be placed on the task environment to circumscribe observations. One obvious
direction for the examination of motivation and performance events is the increased use
of diary studies that contrast how various affective states influence facets of performance
in field settings as a means to developing a typology of emotional episodes (Beal et al.,
2005). Unlike research so far, it may be necessary to give performance diaries to supervi-
sors or other third-person observers to achieve external measures of behavior. The role of
emotions and affects in the motivational and attention processes is also not fully under-
stood. This begs the question of how emotions are related to goal-setting processes (e.g.,
selected goal difficulty), goal commitment, and goal cognition (e.g., appraisal of progress
toward desired goal states, determining when goal pursuit termination should occur).
Path D: situational factors and affective states

Although we have primarily concentrated on the influence of dispositions on experienced
affective states, even a person-centered perspective on affect must recognize that situations
have strong effects on affective states as well. There is a sizeable research literature in
social, personality, and clinical psychology addressing the general categories of events
that are likely to produce negative mood states. On a broad level, it appears that stress is
particularly related to negative affective states and social interactions are particularly
related to positive affective states (Watson, 2000). One study found that on a global level,
aggregated positive mood was significantly related to aggregated desirable work events
(r 0.42) but was not significantly related to undesirable work events, whereas aggregated
negative mood was significantly related to aggregated negative work events (r 0.34), but
was not significantly related to desirable work events (David et al., 1997). It is worth
noting that these relationships for work events were somewhat higher than the relation-
ships found between mood states and family or social events. Among air-traffic con-
trollers, higher levels of workload are related to increased negative mood states and
decreased positive mood states (Repetti, 1993).
A basic premise in the mood/emotions literature in organizational behavior, and as for-
mulated by AET, is that emotions mediate the relationship between the environment and
behavior. Latham (2007, p. 224) notes, ‘Emotions mediate environmental events and the
person’s subsequent behavior’. However, there is a paucity of data testing this premise in
organizational contexts. What work events precipitate particular emotions, and how is
this emotional experience then manifested in performance (if at all)? We suspect that jobs
differ in both the emotions experienced (e.g., the dominant felt emotions for a youth camp
leader or Starbucks’ barista are likely quite different from a hospice nurse or bartender)
and those expected to be expressed (e.g., humor may be better attempted by a Southwest
Airlines employee than a funeral home director or grief counselor). Although O*Net is a
rich source of information on the nature and skill requirements of myriad jobs, it does
not describe in specific detail the emotions that may be experienced, or must be managed,
on the job. It would be informative and important to delineate emotional factors by occu-
pation or task features. One might well find that such delineation has important implica-
tions for the interrelationships among emotional labor concepts of display rules, surface
and deep acting, felt emotions, and so forth.
Besides studies examining how situations affect the emotions or moods experienced at
work, there is also interest in the ways that situations affect the emotions or moods dis-
played at work. Although it might seem intuitive to suggest that experienced and displayed
emotions will be closely linked, the literature on emotional labor proposes that in a large
number of situations, individuals will alter their affective displays based on organizational
display rules. During very busy periods, customer service representatives display fewer
positive emotions, and customer service representatives display more positive emotions
when engaging in more-demanding (i.e., complex, time-consuming) interactions with cus-
tomers (Raefeli & Sutton, 1990; Tan et al., 2003), but it is not clear from the research how
this relates to how the employees feel. Moreover, Rafaeli and Sutton proposed that during
busy periods, customers expect less individualized attention and might even prefer brief,
informal interactions, but during complex interactions, more emotional displays may be
appropriate. Both of these premises suggest that the display of positive versus negative
interactions in a customer service setting is based on the perceived situational demands.
Studies that examine how such social pressures outside of customer service interactions
might be informative for understanding the substantial role of social interactions on
affective displays.
Another area for future research is on situational interventions that may influence
mood, emotions, and affect. In organizational behavior research, the dominant means by
which mood and emotions are investigated is through an observational approach, where
moods and emotions are reactively observed (versus proactively influenced). This stands
in stark contrast with the literature on PA (Isen, 2004), which manipulates PA through
humor, gifts, or other inventions. Similarly, there is an emerging literature on gratitude
which has induced this affective state by simply instructing individuals (Emmons &
McCullough, 2003, p. 379): ‘There are many things in our lives, both large and small, that
we might be grateful about. Think back over the past week and write down on the lines
below up to five things in your life that you are grateful or thankful for’. Individuals so
instructed appear to report greater well-being and higher levels of PA as a result of the
manipulation. Gratitude, or almost any other emotion, has not been manipulated in work
settings, but there is no reason beyond logistics why such investigations could not take
place (for an exception with PA, see Brief et al., 1995). It is true that such interventions
are manipulative, but they are not necessarily exploitative and, of course, no one can be
put in a good mood against his/her will.
However, in laboratory settings it may be possible to tease apart this process by directly
inducing either affects or cognitions. Verbal protocols, used frequently in cognitive psy-
chology studies of problem solving, could also supplement this approach by having par-
ticipants directly describe how they are thinking and regulating their emotions. Besides
the theoretical interest in understanding how individuals think about their emotions, it is
of practical importance to understand effective (and ineffective) emotion regulation tech-
niques so people may be trained to better regulate their emotions.
Path E: emotional regulation processes

A related topic for future research is to better understand how employees gain control
over their emotions. Heckhausen and Schulz (1995) argue that individuals use two
processes to control their environment. The most logical approach (primary control) is to
change the situation – ‘bringing the environment into line with one’s wishes’ (ibid., p. 285).
For example, both of the authors’ offices open up to a large, crowded, and noisy public
area. Moreover, next to one of these offices is a break room that at one time contained a
microwave oven that often magically emitted the most disgusting smells known to
cooking. How is one to cope with distraction, irritation, and disgust? One natural
response is to close one’s door, and indeed that is what we have done. However, in some
cases and for some jobs people cannot take actions to remove the emotional cue (if I
worked in a cubicle I could not shut my door). Heckhausen and Schulz argue that in such
cases we engage in secondary control through cognitive processes. For example, if one is
plagued by an irritating customer or co-worker, one might try to ignore the behavior, focus
on something else, try to see the humor in the situation, and other rational emotive
processes.
Perhaps the central premise of the emotional labor literature is that display rules (the
requirement to display certain organizationally desired emotions) are stressful to employ-
ees because they force dissonance between expressed and experienced emotions. Although
clearly there is some evidence, collapsed across jobs and employees, that this is the case
(Bono & Vey, 2005), we know little about why this might be the case – is it really the dis-
sonance that produces strain, or is it merely the inner experience of negative emotions?
This is a critical point because if the actual display of emotions is irrelevant to subsequent
strain, then the entire premise of emotional labor, and the importance of display rules,
might be called into question. This is an interesting and, we think, important area for
future research.
The foregoing examples also suggest that coping with emotion work is a complex
process that will likely vary by the episode (dealing with an angry customer is likely a
different process from dealing with a co-worker who made you angry), by the job (and the
personal control one can exert over one’s emotion work), and by the person (some people
characteristically cope differently from others, e.g., would someone high in need for cog-
nition – or ‘an individual’s tendency to engage in and enjoy thinking’ (Cacioppo & Petty,
1982, p. 116) – cope more inwardly?). Although evidence generally suggests that emo-
tional responses are similar across cultures, the process of emotion regulation varies
widely (Mesquita & Frijda, 1992). For example, in response to shame, Dutch employees
showed more evidence of withdrawal, and Filipino employees showed more prosocial
behavior and relationship building (Bagozzi et al., 2003). The points here are: (a) we can
define emotional labor more broadly, to include managing emotions in a work context,
(b) coping with emotions that is part of the emotional labor process is multifaceted and
can include internal and external acts, and (c) there is likely within- and between-
individual variation in these acts. We think that Heckhausen and Schulz’s (1995) concept
of primary and secondary control, Gould’s (1999) criticisms notwithstanding, might be
an effective means by which to study the processes by which individuals cope with emotion
work.
One question that has not been extensively examined in the emotion regulation litera-
ture is the variability in how individuals attempt to manage the emotions of others. The
literature on the importance of social interactions for mood states is quite strong, as indi-
cated previously. Impression management techniques mention specific behaviors such as
smiling and complementing others, which ostensibly will improve the moods of others.
The use of presents and granting favors to others as an attempt to induce a good mood
is described anecdotally, but there is little research investigating the systematic use of these
mood induction techniques in organizational settings. Finally, research suggests that emo-
tional displays can be very effective strategically in negotiations (Kopelman et al., 2006).
By bringing these literatures together, it seems likely that some individuals will be espe-
cially aware of the ways in which their behavior influences others’ moods/emotions, and
that they will use this information strategically. Research possibilities include investigat-
ing how individuals use affective feedback from others to direct their own influence
tactics – if one finds that a supervisor appears pleased by flattery, for example, one may
repeat this influence tactic. Research also might examine how the moods of the influence
target mediate the relationship between influence tactics and work behavior.
Conclusion
As our review indicates, in recent years the tendency for organizational behavioral
researchers to ignore the affective aspects of work in the past has been redressed by newer
studies. Methodological developments that facilitate interpretation of data that closely
correspond to the experience of emotions in the workplace means that we are now able to
state definitively that both trait affectivity and state affect are related to certain aspects of
job performance and job satisfaction. On this foundation, numerous columns of research
can be established. This review suggests only a few of the many possible directions for
future research.
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9 Affective influences on employee satisfaction and
performance
David T. Wagner and Remus Ilies
Introduction
For much of the 20th century, scientific psychology has been dominated by the behavior-
ist approach formulated and promoted by influential writers such as J.B. Watson,
E.L. Thorndike, and B.F. Skinner. Within the behaviorist tradition, unobservable psy-
chological terms such as those describing emotions, moods and feelings were considered
unworthy of scientific scrutiny. In the cognitivist paradigm that extended and then
replaced behaviorism, again, feelings and emotions were de-emphasized because they
were thought to disrupt rationality. In the organizational domain, scholars have formu-
lated cognitive models aimed at explaining job performance, motivation and attitudes. In
this general context, emotions and feelings were viewed either as outcomes of a cognitive
evaluation process (Muchinsky, 2000), or as undesirable phenomena that should be pre-
vented by institutionalizing norms of rationality (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1995).
Starting in the 1980s, however, scientific psychology has experienced an ‘affective explo-
sion’, with thousands of writings and reports that examined both short-term fluctuation
in affective states and stable individual differences in emotionality (Watson, 2000). There
was also a parallel trend in organizational research, manifested in an increased interest in
the experience and consequences of affect and emotions at work (e.g., George, 1990; Weiss
& Cropanzano, 1996; Fox & Spector, 2002). Echoing Watson’s ‘affective explosion’ obser-
vation, Weiss (2001), for example, notes that ‘there has been an explosion of research on
the topic over the past decade’, referring to affect in the workplace (p. 1).
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a review of research on the effects of affective
states on two of the most important criteria in organizational research: job satisfaction
and performance. Specifically, we shall describe a theoretical framework that links affect
to job satisfaction and performance and further explore the psychological mechanisms
that are responsible for these links. We also summarize the empirical findings on the topic,
paying particular attention to research examining the effects of transitory affective states
on state job satisfaction and episodic performance. Finally, we propose an agenda for
future research that would provide greater understanding of the importance of affective
states and their determinants for employee performance and well-being.
Construct definitions
Affect
The primary focus of this chapter is on transitory affective states experienced by employ-
ees at work during their day-to-day activities as predictors of satisfaction and perfor-
mance. However, dispositional (trait) affect indicates individuals’ tendencies to
experience corresponding moods and emotions (Watson, 2000); therefore, we shall also
152
Affective influences on employee satisfaction and performance 153
review relevant findings pertaining to trait affect (e.g., positive and negative affectivity).
Like other authors (e.g., Ashforth & Humphrey, 1995; Fisher, 2000), we consider ‘affect’
to be a broad term that refers to both emotions and moods. Emotions and moods,
however, are distinct phenomena. Three main factors distinguish mood from emotions:
intensity, duration, and causal antecedents (Frijda, 1994; Watson, 2000). Emotions are
more intense and shorter-lived than moods, and they are more likely to be caused by
external events (mood states are subject to endogenous influences such as the circadian
cycle; ibid.). Emotion theorists (e.g., Izard, 1991; Ekman, 1992; Plutchik, 1994) focus on
discrete emotions such as joy, fear, anger, and disgust. Researchers who study mood gen-
erally take a dimensional perspective on the study of affective states, focusing on broad
factors such as pleasantness–unpleasantness and activation (e.g., Larsen & Diener, 1992;
Russell & Carroll, 1999), or positive affect (PA) and negative affect (NA; e.g., Watson
et al., 1988).
To bridge the gap between the categorical and the dimensional approaches, Watson and
Clark (1994) have developed the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) –
Expanded Form, which measures both higher-order affect dimensions (PA and NA) and
specific affects that correspond to distinct emotions (PA: joviality, self-assurance, atten-
tiveness; NA: fear, sadness, guilt, hostility). A large proportion of applied research on
affect at work examined the broad affective dimensions of PA and NA as antecedents or
outcomes of organizational constructs.
Job satisfaction
Job satisfaction is an attitudinal construct reflecting one’s evaluation of one’s job. Even
though job satisfaction is thought to have both cognitive and affective components and
antecedents (Weiss et al., 1999; Ilies & Judge, 2004) its affective aspect has been generally
underemphasized, compared to its cognitive aspect (e.g., Brief & Roberson, 1989; Weiss
et al., 1999; Fisher, 2000). Furthermore, job satisfaction has generally been measured with
‘single-shot’, retrospective surveys, a method well-suited for studying stable between-
individual differences in satisfaction that implicitly assumes that job satisfaction is a stable
trait-like construct.
More recently, however, starting with Ilies and Judge’s (2002) study examining intra-
individual fluctuations in job satisfaction states, the construct has also been conceptualized
as a transient evaluating state that is influenced by temporally sensitive factors such as
events at work or employees’ mood. In this respect, following Eagly and Chaiken (1993),
Ilies and Judge (2004, p. 371), define job satisfaction as ‘a latent evaluative tendency of
one’s job that accounts for the covariation between work stimuli and responses and is
manifested through discrete evaluative states during the workday’. Ilies and Judge (2002,
2004) note that job satisfaction can be measured either as a general evaluative state – as
it has primarily been measured in past research – or as a transient evaluative state, and
further contend that transient state assessment is better positioned for capturing the
influence of affective experiences on the job.
Job performance
Job performance is broadly defined as ‘those actions and behaviors that are under the
control of the individual and contribute to the goals of the organization’ (Rotundo &
Sackett, 2002, p. 66). Subsumed within this definition are various subcomponents
including task performance, organizational citizenship behaviors, and counterproductive

work behaviors. Research on job performance and its related subdimensions has typically
treated the criteria as stable, with predictors such as personality, cognitive ability, and skill
(Motowidlo, 2003). However, Beal et al. (2005) present the concept of episodic job per-
formance, arguing that individual performance fluctuates across time, and that these
fluctuations are driven by both cognitive and affective processes. This chapter’s discussion
of job performance will focus primarily on dynamic, rather than static, conceptualiz-
ations of job performance and how performance relates to dynamic changes in affect.
Conceptual framework linking affect to satisfaction and performance

A recent conceptual framework that links affect to job satisfaction and job performance
is affective events theory (AET; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). In brief, AET proposes that
events that employees experience at work have immediate affective consequences (they are
‘affective events’) in that they generate emotional reactions and changes in momentary
affective states (ibid.). In turn, these affective states directly influence employees’ episodic
behavior (their ‘affect-driven behavior’ such as citizenship behaviors; ibid.) and also lead
to the formation of relatively stable work attitudes such as job satisfaction.
Importantly, AET ‘draws much-needed attention to streams of events that can unfold
in workplaces’ (Brief & Weiss, 2002, p. 284). Therefore, AET provides the basis for exam-
ining fluctuations in affect, satisfaction and performance over time. In addition, AET also
suggests that stable personal characteristics or work environment features can influence
the experience of work events as well as the employees’ affective and behavioral reactions
to these experiences.
Even though AET recognizes the importance of temporal fluctuations in affective
states and episodic behavior, within AET, job satisfaction is considered a stable attitude
(e.g., Weiss et al., 1999). As noted, Ilies and Judge (2002, 2004) proposed that job satis-
faction can also be measured as a state and have shown that average levels of state job sat-
isfaction converge with general attitude measures. These authors also contended that
focusing on processes that explain intraindividual variations in job satisfaction has the
potential to advance the literature on job satisfaction and behavior. Furthermore, because
job performance can also be conceptualized as an episodic construct (Motowidlo et al.,
1997; Beal et al., 2005), the relationship between satisfaction and performance can be
studied not only at the between-individual level (i.e., do more satisfied employees perform
at a higher level than those less satisfied?), as it has been done in most of the past research
on satisfaction and performance (Judge et al., 2001), but also at the within-individual level
(do employees perform better on days when they are more satisfied with their job?). On
this point, Fisher (2003) found that task satisfaction and performance were much more
strongly related (r 0.57) at the within-individual level (over time) than the typical
between-individual correlation between job satisfaction and job performance (r 0.30,
corrected for unreliability; Judge et al., 2001).
In summary, in studying the links among affect, satisfaction and performance, we adopt
the temporal focus proposed by AET and examine the influence of transient affective
states on satisfaction and performance. However, we also rely on more recent conceptu-
alizations of satisfaction (Ilies & Judge, 2002, 2004) and performance (Beal et al., 2005)
and examine the conceptual links between these constructs, as well as the empirical evi-
dence supporting such links, at the intraindividual level (over time).
Affect and job satisfaction

Despite Locke’s (1976) oft-cited definition of job satisfaction as a ‘pleasurable or positive
emotional state resulting from the appraisal of one’s job or job experiences’ (p. 1300), up
until recently, very little research has looked at affect as an explicit component of job sat-
isfaction. With the emerging importance of affect in social and organizational psychology,
various theoretical perspectives have emerged to give a more comprehensive explanation
of attitudes such as job satisfaction. AET (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996), the affect infusion
model (AIM; Forgas & George, 2001), and the stimulus–organism–response model (SOR;
Judge & Larsen, 2001) are among these emergent theories. The AIM specifies that affect
influences individuals’ attitudes directly by influencing their cognitive processing as they
develop judgments about attitude objects. AET and the SOR model differ from the AIM
in that they consider stimuli that trigger affective responses, with the effects of these stimuli
on the responses being moderated by individuals’ traits. The ensuing affective states then
help the individuals to form judgments about the target attitude objects.
Researchers seeking to test these theories have found success and have thus affirmed the
statement by Thoresen et al. that ‘researchers no longer can hope to develop a meaning-
ful understanding of the origins of job attitudes without taking both chronic (trait) and
transient (state or mood) affect into account’ (2003, p. 915). Recognizing the validity of
this statement, we now offer a brief review of the empirical literature that has addressed
the relationship between trait affect and satisfaction, and we then examine the influences
of state affect on satisfaction.
Trait affect and job satisfaction

Judge and Larsen (2001) reviewed empirical studies on the relationships between trait
affectivity and job satisfaction. Among these is an experimental study by Brief et al.
(1995) in which participant ratings of job satisfaction were significantly influenced
through the manipulation of participants’ affective states. These researchers also found
that trait anxiety (a surrogate for NA) was significantly related to job satisfaction
(r 0.34, p 0.01). Field studies drawing from multiple organizations similarly found
relationships between trait NA and various facets of job satisfaction (Necowitz &
Roznowski, 1994), and relationships between job satisfaction and measures of trait PA
taken two years apart (Watson & Slack, 1993).
Since the review by Judge and Larsen (2001), additional work has been performed to
better understand the explicit connection between affectivity and job satisfaction. Judge
and Ilies (2004) investigated the relationship between trait affectivity and job satisfaction
and found that trait PA, as reported by a significant other, significantly predicted the
average of self-reported job satisfaction across multiple days and measurement occasions
(r 0.35, p 0.01); they found no such effects for trait NA (r –0.16, not significant).
However, given the small sample size (N 55) for their between-individual analyses, they
encouraged readers to interpret the results with caution.
Meta-analytic estimates of the relationships between trait affect and measures of job
satisfaction suggest that both trait PA and trait NA are significant correlates of job sat-
isfaction (r 0.33, p 0.01 and r 0.37, p 0.01, respectively; Thoresen et al., 2003).
Additionally, trait PA and trait NA have a multiple R of 0.41 when jointly predicting sat-
isfaction, further showing that, although they share explained variance in job satisfac-
tion, each also explains unique variance in job satisfaction (ibid.). Given the studies
reviewed here, and particularly given the meta-analytic support, it is safe to say that
organizational psychologists agree that there is a relationship between trait affect and job
satisfaction.
State affect and job satisfaction

One of the major premises of AET (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996) is that affective experi-
ences lead to affective reactions, which subsequently influence job attitudes. Their model
suggests that affective experiences (driven by affective events) will cumulate to influence
an individual’s overall job evaluations, such as job satisfaction. In an innovative paper to
examine the simultaneous effects of beliefs and ‘true affective experiences’ on job satis-
faction judgments in a work-based sample, Weiss et al. (1999, p. 4) periodically surveyed
24 middle managers, measuring their pleasantness and affect intensity four times a day
over 16 working days. Results from the study suggest that average levels of pleasantness
predict global job satisfaction judgments, and that these effects occur even when control-
ling for job beliefs, which also significantly predicted job satisfaction. Additional analy-
ses suggest that the effects of pleasantness on job satisfaction persist when controlling for
dispositional happiness, and that the effect of happiness on job satisfaction is primarily
mediated by average state pleasantness.
In an attempt to illustrate the presence of affective and non-affective (e.g., cognitive)
components of job satisfaction measures, Fisher (2000) sampled 124 participants in
diverse jobs (e.g., hairdresser, accountant, bank teller) and obtained three distinct mea-
sures of job satisfaction, comparing the variation in these measures to the observed vari-
ation in measures of mood and emotions. She notes several important findings. First,
aggregated daily measures of mood, positive emotions, and negative emotions, each
significantly correlated with measures of job satisfaction. Second, positive and negative
emotions each explained unique variance in predicting job satisfaction. Third, measures of
mood and emotions (both positive and negative) correlated more strongly with the Faces
Scale of overall job satisfaction (Kunin, 1955) than with more cognitively laden measures
of job satisfaction (Job In General Scale, Ironson et al., 1989, and the Facet-Free Job
Satisfaction Scale, Quinn & Staines, 1979), indicating that many measures of job satisfac-
tion access both affective and cognitive portions of individuals’ attitudes about their jobs.
Meta-analytic evidence indicates that predicting job attitudes from state measures of
affect results in strong and consistent correlations, very similar to those obtained through
using trait measures of affectivity. Thoresen et al. (2003) found that there is no statisti-
cally significantly different relationship in the strength of the affect – job satisfaction cor-
relation when using state versus trait measures of affect. It is worth noting, however, that
the estimated mean population correlation coefficient between state PA and job satisfac-
tion was r 0.44, compared to r 0.33 for trait PA, suggesting that investigating dynamic
affective states might hold more promise for understanding job attitudes. We consider the
value of a more explicit within-individual approach in the following section.
Our discussion now turns to one of the most recent research directions in the literature
on job satisfaction and affect – examining patterns of intraindividual variation in affect
and job satisfaction. Consistent with AET (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996) most of the
research on the constructs of job satisfaction and affect has looked at static measures of
job satisfaction as predicted by aggregated measures of state affect (e.g., Weiss et al.,
1999). However, over the last few years researchers have begun to investigate how state
affect influences state job satisfaction over time. Doing so gives a more enlightening view
of what drives individuals at work, than does a one-time evaluation of job satisfaction.
The idea that job satisfaction fluctuates over time is clearly in line with theorizing on job
satisfaction by Locke who stated that job satisfaction is an ‘emotional state’ (Locke, 1976,
p. 1300, italics added), indicating that job satisfaction includes affective components, and
suggesting that job satisfaction is a state, which therefore might be subject to fluctuation,
rather than invariably stable.
To our knowledge, the first study to look at the co-occurring fluctuations in affect and
job satisfaction was conducted by Ilies and Judge (2002). They used experience sampling
methodology (ESM), obtaining four reports per day, over four weeks, from 27 full-time
employees. Not unlike prior research, they found that substantial variation in affect
occurred within individuals. However, their study extended beyond prior research by also
evaluating the intraindividual variation in job satisfaction. They found that 36 per cent of
the total variation in job satisfaction ratings over the four weeks was due to within-person
fluctuations; it is important to note that simply utilizing an average of these job satisfac-
tion scores would have treated this 36 per cent of variance as transient error variance,
rather than variance occurring within persons which could systematically be explained by
intraindividual affective processes. Beyond the finding that substantial variation in job
satisfaction resides within individuals, they also replicated past findings that trait mea-
sures of both PA and NA were related to job satisfaction. Their primary contribution,
however, resides in the finding that fluctuations in job satisfaction occurring within
persons could be explained by concomitant fluctuations in both state PA and state NA.
Since this paper, several other papers have reported similar findings, further strengthen-
ing the argument that employees’ emotional and affective experiences at work have
significant implications for how they evaluate their jobs.
As discussed earlier in this chapter, Judge and Ilies (2004) reported the results of their
between-individual investigation of the effects of affectivity on job satisfaction. However,
in addition to their finding of a relationship between trait PA and daily ratings of job sat-
isfaction, they noted that state PA partially mediated the effects of trait PA on state job
satisfaction. Furthermore, they found that, although trait NA was not significantly
related to state job satisfaction, state NA did predict job satisfaction. Moreover, state
ratings of NA were not only related to concomitant ratings of job satisfaction, but state
NA also significantly predicted job satisfaction at a later period in the day (a workday
involved three measurements/time periods).
The finding that negative, and not positive, mood persisted in its influence on job sat-
isfaction indicates one area in which the two broad conceptualizations of state affect may
have differential validities, and suggests that perhaps negative mood has a longer-lasting
effect on job satisfaction. In a practical sense, the importance of these findings is
magnified when considered in light of the findings of Miner et al. (2005), who conducted
an ESM study on the effects of events on moods and behaviors. They report that the ‘rela-
tionship between negative events and mood was approximately five times stronger than
that between positive events and mood’ (p. 171), suggesting that negative events may be
potent drivers of mood, with these events subsequently dictating ratings of job satisfac-
tion via their effects on fluctuations in mood.
In an 18-week longitudinal study, Fuller et al. (2003) found that the severity of stress-
ful events was negatively related to job satisfaction and positively related to perceived
strain on that day. They also found that mood and job satisfaction covaried, with mood
significantly predicting the subsequent day’s ratings of job satisfaction. In light of these
findings, and those of Judge and Ilies (2004) on the spillover of affect to job satisfaction
and affect at a later time period, we are confident in suggesting that mood and affect in
the workplace is a domain that merits further research, because it clearly has an impact
upon important attitudes such as job satisfaction.
Affect and Performance
Task performance
Research investigating the role of PA in task performance has shown that positive stimuli
(e.g., small gifts or pleasant fragrances), which were intended to elicit PA, have resulted in
improved performance in word construction and message decoding tasks (Baron &
Bronfen, 1994). Furthermore, previous research found that individuals experiencing PA
induction were also more likely to exhibit helping behavior (Baron, 1997). Shackman et al.
(2006), on the other hand, report the results of two studies in which subjects were threat-
ened with various stimuli and were evaluated on tasks of spatial working memory. Results
from the experiments suggest that, when threatened, participants experienced a disrup-
tion of their spatial working memory, and that this relationship was mediated by anxiety,
a negative emotion. These findings corroborate with other research and theory suggest-
ing that the experience of NA and emotions narrows our thought action repertoires and
reduces our task performance (Fredrickson, 2001), yet Shackman et al. extend the prior
findings by identifying a specific determinant of performance, visuospatial working
memory, which could in turn influence performance in a wide array of tasks.
At a broader level, Beal et al. (2005) suggest that one reason why (negative) emotions
may impede task performance is due to the consumption of cognitive resources that
occurs as a result of emotional regulation. In fact, Muraven and Baumeister (2000) pre-
sented a ‘strength model’ in which they suggest that the exercise of self-control, of which
emotional regulation could be considered a subset, leads to depletion of resources.
Empirical findings suggest that when individuals are required to perform consecutive acts
of self-control, performance on the second task is often impaired (Muraven et al., 1998).
Together, these findings and theories suggest that not only is PA beneficial in the work
environment, but that it is also important that employees actually feel PA, rather than
merely exhibiting PA, or suppressing NA. In the case of emotional regulation, the indi-
vidual might experience resource depletion which could adversely affect subsequent per-
formance episodes.
Customer service performance

In a field-based study of bank tellers, Pugh (2001) sought to understand how ‘service with
a smile’ influences customer affective outcomes and perceptions of service quality. Pugh
measured employee trait affect and emotional expressiveness, and coded bank tellers’
display of emotion during various service encounters with customers. He found that the
emotion displayed by the bank tellers influenced customers’ affective states, which subse-
quently influenced the customers’ perceptions of service quality.
Another study explicitly tested the influence of employee smiling on customer
encounter satisfaction (Barger & Grandey, 2006). These authors found that employee
smile strength was related to customer smile strength, offering support for the theory of
primitive emotional contagion (Hatfield et al., 1994). They also found that employee smile
strength predicted customer encounter satisfaction, and that this effect was mediated by
perceptions of service quality, thereby lending support for the affect infusion model
(Forgas & George, 2001).
To the extent that fostering positive customer evaluations is a component of job perfor-
mance, these studies identify a connection between the affective expression of customer-
service employees and their performance at work. Furthermore, these studies draw attention
to the growing literatures on emotional regulation and emotional contagion, as well as illus-
trate the effects of affective experience on ratings of satisfaction. Related studies have sug-
gested that the influence of employee affect influences customer outcomes (i.e., judgments,
behaviors) in sales contexts (e.g., Tsai & Huang, 2002; Sharma & Levy, 2003).
Team performance
Barsade et al. (2000) found that, in top management teams with heterogeneous trait
affectivity, the mean level of trait PA in the team was related to ratings of group cooper-
ativeness (positively), group emotional conflict (negatively), and group task conflict (neg-
atively). This study also found that teams homogeneous in their trait affectivity were less
influenced by the mean level of trait PA in the team. Furthermore, team affective diver-
sity was negatively related to an objective measure of firm performance (log company
market-adjusted returns), even when controlling for functional background diversity in
the team. These results suggest that affect not only has implications for individual per-
formance, but it can also influence broader performance indicators, perhaps even firm per-
formance. In a naturalistic lab setting, Ilies et al. (2007) studied the processes by which
affective states in teams are shared among team members. In their study they also included
an objective measure of team performance, which was significantly related to both PA and
NA of the individual team members. Although Ilies et al. did not specifically hypothesize
the connection between affect and performance, their data do indicate that a strong and
significant relationship exists. Despite the support that the aforementioned studies offer
for the connection between affect and performance, it is important to note that neither of
the studies is justified in making causal claims relative to these measures.
Organizational citizenship and counterproductive work behavior

Positive emotions have been theoretically proposed to lead to organizational citizenship
behaviors for various reasons. George and Brief (1992) suggest that affective states
mediate the influence of personality and contextual factors on citizenship behaviors.
Spector and Fox (2002) reasoned that affect leads to these behaviors because emotional
responses are key predictors of response tendencies and hence citizenship behaviors.
Accordingly, much research on the connection between individuals’ affectivity and organ-
izational citizenship behaviors has accumulated in the literature (e.g., Organ & Konovsky,
1989; George, 1991; Konovsky & Organ, 1996; Lee & Allen, 2002; see also Organ & Ryan,
1995).
Besides the findings indicating that those who generally experience more positive affective
states also engage in more citizenship behaviors, research taking a within-individual per-
spective on the relationship between affect and citizenship behaviors has started to appear
in the organizational literature. In a longitudinal study utilizing an experience-sampling
design, Ilies et al. (2006b) found a strong, positive relationship between daily reports of PA
and self-reports of organizational citizenship behaviors. Because of the study’s design, the
authors are able to support their claims that affective states and citizenship behaviors are
related not only between, but also within individuals. That is, they found that fluctuations
in affect across days were accompanied by concomitant fluctuations in reported citizenship
behaviors, thus illustrating another domain in which affect, and particularly affective states,
are connected to subsequent performance outcomes.
The foil to citizenship behaviors at work is the concept of counterproductive or deviant
behavior at work. Workplace deviance is defined by Robinson and Bennett (1995) as ‘vol-
untary behavior of organizational members that violates significant organizational
norms, and in so doing, threatens the well-being of the organization and/or its members’
(p. 556), and might include things such as coming to work late, leaving early, working
more slowly than one is capable of, using work time for personal issues, or other more
extreme behaviors such as sharing restricted company information with people outside
the company.
Research on the antecedents of counterproductive work behaviors has consistently
revealed relationships between counterproductive behaviors and justice perceptions
(Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001; Conlon et al., 2005; Colquitt et al., 2006), negative
emotions (Fox & Spector, 1999), and PA and NA (Dalal, 2005). However, until recently,
such work has taken a between-individual perspective. Similar to their intraindividual
analysis of citizenship behaviors, Judge et al. (2006) investigated the dynamic relation-
ships (within individuals) among justice perceptions, job satisfaction, and specific
emotion (hostility). Their findings indicate that over half of the variance in deviant behav-
ior is a function of within-person fluctuations. Furthermore, they found significant rela-
tionships between perceptions of justice, job satisfaction, and hostility, and deviant
behaviors. This study contributes to the literature by showing that variations in emotions
are directly tied to counterproductive work behaviors, and that taking a within-individual
perspective offers further enlightenment of the psychological processes that result in
behavioral outcomes.
Creative performance
One of the major findings from the program of research carried out by Alice Isen is that
positive affect promotes creativity. She suggests that PA enables people ‘to see relatedness
and interconnections among cognitions, and perhaps process material in a more inte-
grated fashion’ (Isen & Daubman, 1984, p. 1212). Isen et al. (1985) found that participants
in each of three different experiments (with positive mood induced differently in each of
the experiments) gave more unusual first associates to neutral words than did individuals
in the control conditions. The study suggests that positive mood can expand one’s bound-
aries of thought and open them up to more novel ways of thinking. In light of the findings
of Isen and Daubman (1984), the reason for the more unusual word associates may be the
manner in which individuals cognitively categorize materials in memory, thereby offering
broader networks of connections when the individual is in a positive affective state.
The mathematician Jules Henri Poincaré declared that ‘to create consists of making
new combinations of associative elements which are useful’ (Poincaré, quoted in
Mednick, 1962, pp. 220–21), and Isen and her colleagues subscribed to this definition in
one of the first attempts to explicitly connect PA to creativity. Consistent with the notion
that PA impacts on cognitive organization, Isen et al. (1987) conducted four experiments
to explicitly test the influence of PA on creative problem solving and, based on their
findings, arrived at the conclusion that the experience of PA results in greater creative per-
formance, and this effect was in addition to any effects that arousal may have had on cre-
ativity.
Additional work by Isen and her colleagues has further extended our understanding of
the influence of PA on creative performance by extending into the diverse domains of
medical diagnosis (Estrada et al., 1997) and product testing (Isen et al., 2004). Following
a similar manipulation given in other studies (a small bag of candy), physicians in the PA
condition were able to arrive at an accurate diagnosis of a fictitious patient’s condition
more quickly than were physicians in the control condition (Estrada et al., 1997). The
physicians in the positive mood condition also exhibited significantly less anchoring,
which the authors propose was indicative of the avoidance of inflexibility or distortion in
the physicians’ thinking.
Although the work above relied upon explicit induction of PA, recent research suggests
that affective states might be more subtly induced (Isen et al., 2004), thereby suggesting
extensive, and perhaps inexpensive, ways in which individuals and firms may induce PA
in their employees, thereby leading to enhanced creativity. Such incremental methods of
increasing creative performance could benefit individuals engaged in artistic or creative
pursuits, and should also be of interest to managers and leaders in firms that seek to
compete in domains that are heavily reliant upon creative performance.
Besides the large body of research supporting the connection between PA and creativ-
ity, three recent studies by George and Zhou (Zhou & George, 2001; George and Zhou,
2002, 2007) suggest that NA might also be related to creativity. In the first study, these
authors found differential effects of job dissatisfaction on employee creativity, contingent
upon the interaction of the employee’s level of continuance commitment and the useful
feedback the employee received from co-workers. In their second study they report that
NA was positively related, and PA was negatively related, to creative performance in the
particular case when employees had a high level of clarity of feelings and perceived that
the organization rewards creativity.
In their most recent study, George and Zhou (2007) investigate the joint effects of state
PA, state NA, and supervisor support. They found that the three-way interaction of PA,
supervisor support, and NA predicted supervisory ratings of employee creativity. The
form of the relationships is such that at high levels of each of the constructs, individuals
demonstrate higher creativity, and the authors consider their findings consistent with the
mood-as-information perspective (Schwarz & Clore, 2003). This theory predicts that the
presence of PA signals to individuals that they are in a safe environment and are able to
engage in divergent and playful thinking, whereas high NA signals that individuals should
pursue more analytical and detail-oriented thinking. George and Zhou suggest that indi-
viduals may experience fluctuations in mood throughout a week, and that the continued
fluctuations of PA and NA over the course of time will help the individuals think broadly,
yet critically, about their challenges at work, thereby resulting in creative performance.
Given the nature of three-way interactions, the studies by George and Zhou indicate not
only that NA is positively related to creativity, but also that NA is negatively related to cre-
ativity in certain contexts. When discussing the findings from their study of employees at
a helicopter manufacturing firm (involving 67 employees and their supervisors), George
and Zhou (2002, p. 692) state that ‘although it is not the subject of formal hypotheses,
Figure 1 also suggests that negative mood is negatively related to creativity when recogni-
tion is high and clarity is low and when recognition is low and clarity is high’. Likewise,
findings from their most recent study (including 161 employee–supervisor pairs; George &
Zhou, 2007) show a significant main effect of PA on creativity. In fact, among all the vari-
ables of interest, creativity shows the strongest bivariate correlation with PA (r 0.25, p
0.01). Therefore, the work of George and Zhou does not contradict Isen’s work, but
rather enriches our understanding of affect and creativity, adding boundary conditions
which further specify the contexts in which emotions and affective states might be expected
to relate to creative performance.
Mechanisms explaining the affect–performance link

Ashby et al. (1999) took a neuropsychological approach by proposing that PA leads to
increased cognitive functioning by increasing dopamine levels in the brain. Based on their
review of the literature, they conclude that ‘dopamine may mediate some of the effects
positive affect has on cognition’ (p. 533). In a less physiologically intensive theory of affect
and work motivation, Seo et al. (2004) theorize that core affective experience will influence
the components of motivation, direction, persistence, and intensity, such that more pleas-
ant core affect will result in more generative or exploratory action, higher goal setting and
goal commitment, greater expectancies of reaching goals, due to higher perceived utility
(equivalent to Vroom’s, 1964, conceptualization of ‘valence’), more positive expectancy
judgments, and more positive progress judgments (Seo et al., 2004). Ilies et al. (2006a)
extend this approach by integrating the effects that charismatic and transformational
leaders have on followers’ motivation. They propose a series of relationships wherein
leader attributes and manifest behaviors influence follower affect, thereby influencing the
follower’s self-set goals, self-efficacy, and subsequent motivation (conceptualized as direc-
tion, persistence, and intensity).
Indeed there is empirical evidence supporting a link between affect and cognitive
aspects of motivation. Erez and Isen (2002), for example, conducted a study examining
how positive affective states influence individuals’ cognitive evaluations of valence,
expectancy, and instrumentality, in an attempt to further understand the components of
expectancy motivation as presented by Vroom (1964). The paper discusses the results of
two studies in which participants engaged in anagram solving tasks (study 1) or a
decision-making task (job-decision task; study 2), with half of the participants in each
study receiving the PA induction prior to engaging in the task.
Participants in the PA condition had higher expectations that their efforts would lead
to performance, indicating that these participants had higher expectancy cognitions than
participants in the control condition. The PA participants were also more likely to believe
that reaching a certain level of performance (either solving a specified number of ana-
grams or correctly answering a specified number of questions on a cognitive ability test)
would lead to their obtaining one of the cash rewards for which they and all the other par-
ticipants were competing. Finally, with regard to the valence of rewards, compared to
those in the control condition, participants in the PA condition were more likely to evalu-
ate a moderate reward as being positive. The positive view of moderate rewards cannot
be attributed to response bias or overall positivity bias, as there was no effect of affect on
valence judgments at extremely low levels of rewards. Rather, the influence of PA on
valence judgments could be due to the fact that PA cues positive material in memory
(Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979) and leads to larger, more diverse categorizations (Isen et al.,
1985). Simply put, ‘participants in a positive mood state performed better, exhibited more
persistence, tried harder, and reported higher levels of motivation than did those in a
neutral mood’ (Erez & Isen, 2002, p. 1065). This was not simply due to activation, but was
explicitly shown to be due, in part, to ‘component cognitive processes underlying moti-
vation’ (p. 1065).
Goal setting and self-efficacy

Goal-setting theory suggests that individuals perform because they are driven to reach
pre-established goals (Locke & Latham, 1990). Social cognitive theory suggests that indi-
viduals who receive feedback indicating goal completion are likely to set a higher subse-
quent goal, thereby leading to greater performance (Bandura, 1986), and that setting a
more difficult goal is attributable to an increase in the individual’s self-efficacy (Bandura,
1997). The tendency for individuals to create new positive goal discrepancies following
goal completion has been shown in athletic contexts (Williams et al., 2000; Donovan &
Williams, 2003) as well as in tasks requiring cognitive exertion (Ilies & Judge, 2005). Ilies
and Judge also found that the influence of performance feedback on subsequent goal
setting was substantially mediated by affective states for each of their experimental
groups.
Research suggests that affect exerts an influence on cognition through mood congru-
ency effects, as suggested by AIM (Forgas, 1995). That is, when individuals experience PA,
positive memories are likely to be triggered, thus leading to mood congruent cognitions.
Such cognitions would result in positive evaluations of expectancy and instrumentality
(Erez & Isen, 2002), thereby leading the individual to pursue a difficult goal with an
increased level of self-efficacy. Thus we see that both affect and self-efficacy are important
components of models explaining performance with goal setting across time.
Finally, the effects of affective states on performance may be explained, in part, by sat-
isfaction (with the task or job). That is, because satisfaction and performance are related,
it is perhaps the satisfaction caused by positive affective states that leads to enhanced per-
formance. A qualitative and quantitative review of the job satisfaction–performance rela-
tionship conducted by Judge et al. (2001) found an overall estimated population
correlation coefficient of 0.30 between job satisfaction and performance. However,
the exact manner in which the two constructs relate is not clear. Therefore, the authors
note that causality cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed on the basis of the meta-analytic
data. What is clear is that the two constructs, job satisfaction and job performance, are
empirically related.
Recent work in this area has suggested that the extent to which cognitive and affective
evaluations of job satisfaction are in agreement will moderate the strength of the perfor-
mance–satisfaction tie, such that consistent evaluations (across both cognitive and
affective instruments) will result in stronger relationships between the primary constructs
(Schleicher et al., 2004). This finding highlights the incremental value that researchers add
by explicitly considering both affective and cognitive determinants, and measures, of job
satisfaction, and also emphasizes the need to systematically study important moderators
of the relationship.
Directions for future research

In reviewing findings and theory on affect, job satisfaction, and performance, we have
deliberately taken a dynamic perspective. That is, we have emphasized the research that
has examined the dynamic nature of the constructs addressed in this chapter. Our reason
for doing so is our recognition that each of the three constructs has enjoyed rather exten-
sive research attention for decades but the primary emphasis has been on between-person
relationships among them. We feel that the research area linking these constructs is ripe
for exploration from a more dynamic, real-time approach, which will allow researchers to
investigate how intraindividual fluctuations in the constructs of interest can enlighten our
understanding of essential workplace criteria.
Taking a dynamic approach will help researchers understand not only phenomena in
the workplace (e.g., determinants of satisfaction and performance across time) but also
how experiences at work might influence how employees feel and behave at home. Recent
work has begun to look at how experiences at work influence objective employee behav-
iors when the employees return home (Ilies et al., 2007). A related issue is whether expe-
riences at work influence an employee’s ability to recover, or merely lead to a need to
recover; and if recovery from stressful experiences at work is possible, what can employ-
ees do to enjoy full recovery? Further investigating the mechanisms of recovery from work
strains (Sonnentag, 2003) as well as the replenishing nature of social interactions away
from work (Rothbard, 2001; Greenhaus & Powell, 2006) will illuminate this area of organ-
izational concern.
The pervasiveness of multinational enterprises suggests that the topics identified in this
chapter should be analyzed in very different contexts from those of the past decades. The
establishment of global organizations is often associated with distributed work teams,
which means that evaluations of satisfaction with one’s team members and with one’s job
may have different meanings and different determinants from similar ratings given by
team members working in the same office or on the same factory floor. In fact, recent
research indicates that team members interacting in a collocated environment were likely
to ‘catch’ the affective states of the other members of their teams (Ilies et al., 2007). Will
such affective processes occur in teams that are distributed throughout the world, and if
so, how? A similar aspect of the growing workplace, telecommuting, will present similar
questions regarding the cohesion, performance, and dynamics of distributed work teams.
In addition to finding support for affective connections within teams, Ilies et al. (ibid.)
were able to show that the collectivistic nature of the team members was an important deter-
minant of the strength of the affective connection among team members. This finding
should be of interest to scholars and practitioners establishing teams with a diversity of cul-
tural perspectives, as the collectivistic (versus individualistic) nature of the team members
will have a considerable impact on the affective dynamics within the team. Clearly these
affective influences are important because of their connection to performance and satisfac-
tion. We encourage further research on the role of affect and emotions in teams and the
implications of team composition on outcomes including satisfaction and performance.
We encourage researchers to pursue dynamic investigations of affect, satisfaction, per-
formance, and other organizational phenomena. Time is an important, non-fungible,
factor that is germane to every employee, manager, and team (Harrison et al., 2003).
However, it is a largely unstudied phenomenon in organizational research. Adding the
dimension of time to our theories and practice will elevate our discipline beyond a mere
discussion of effect sign, to truly powerful theories that can predict not only what happens
and why, but also when and by how much. To the extent that theory and empirical tests
include time as a construct of interest, our understanding of our science will enjoy great
advances. However, in changing our approach to scientific investigation, it may be neces-
sary to break some habits in order to progress. High on the list of change should be the
habitual admission that ‘researchers should study this phenomenon longitudinally’, and
instead researchers themselves should pursue longitudinal approaches to understanding
their constructs of interest. We encourage scholars to scrutinize their research questions
and identify how the phenomena might change and what observation of the phenomena
at different points in time will yield. As more researchers agree to take these steps, we feel
that our understanding of organizational processes will more closely approach the
complex processes that occur in daily work life.
We also suggest that researchers seek to understand how the work on creativity can be
applied in the work domain, to the benefit of individuals, teams, and organizations. As
scholars are able to understand the mechanisms through which creativity is enhanced,
organizations may be able to foster cultures or organizational environments in which cre-
ativity flourishes. A rapidly emerging and related area of research interest is the field of
entrepreneurship. One of the core acts of the entrepreneur is venture creation, which gen-
erally involves the identification and selection of an opportunity (Sarason et al., 2006).
Accompanying the recent interest in entrepreneurship is the view that both cognition and
affect play important roles in the entrepreneurial process. As Isen et al. initially suggested
(1987), the presence of PA induces individuals to create broader categorization schemes,
resulting in larger conceptual holding bins, thereby increasing the likelihood that two for-
merly thought disparate ideas will collide. This connection of ideas is an essential aspect
of identifying new opportunities. Researchers should track the affective and cognitive
states of entrepreneurs and identify how and why they connect the dots the way they do
(Baron, 2006).
In discussing all these issues, it is important to note that there are stable individual
differences in job performance, creativity, affectivity, and dispositional satisfaction, but
to the extent to which these constructs vary within individuals there is the potential for
interventions that will enhance the positive and diminish the negative effects of their
antecedents. In summary, the workplace is a dynamic environment and we invite researchers
to study the workplace accordingly – dynamically across time.
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10 Affect and work motivation
Ruth Kanfer and Patrick C. Stubblebine
Introduction
Over the past few decades, scholarly interest in affect and emotions has burgeoned, and
substantial progress has been made in understanding the influence of mood and emotions
on decision making and behavior in organizational settings (see Weiss & Cropanzano,
1996; Ashkanasy et al., 2002; Russell, 2003 for reviews). These advances, along with the
increasing practical concern for the toll of emotional labor on job performance and
worker well-being and the growing recognition for the role of affect in exceptional job per-
formance, have spurred research on the instigation, expression, and regulation of different
affects and emotions related to work. Surprisingly, however, one area that has received less
attention to date pertains to how advances in the affective sciences inform extant
approaches to work motivation. Accordingly, the purpose of this chapter is to examine
how progress in the study of affect and emotions may contribute to our understanding of
work motivation and its outcomes.
At the most general level, affect and motivation represent distinct but complementary
paradigms for understanding the psychological forces and processes that influence the
direction, intensity, and persistence of behavior. Affect is often emphasized in the expla-
nation of an individual’s typical behavior over time, for example, when individuals who
work long hours are described as being passionate about their work or as highly moti-
vated to achieve. Similarly, individuals who are described as angry and hostile at work are
often characterized as unmotivated to perform well. In contrast, motivational frame-
works are often used to explain an individual’s behavior in specific time-bounded work
contexts, such as how well an individual performs on a project or how much time and
effort an individual devotes to completing a task. Clearly, there is substantial overlap
between affect and motivation in terms of determinants, correlates, and consequences. In
fact, as Mook (1996) notes, the relationship between affect and motivation is so close that
it is often difficult to separate the systems. That is, affect plays an integral role in motiv-
ation, and action tendencies represent a fundamental feature of discrete emotions.
Nonetheless, over the past 50 years, the study of work motivation and affect has occurred
largely independent of each other. As we hope to show in this chapter, developments in
the affective sciences offer new insights for work motivation researchers and practitioners.
This chapter coordinates advances in the affective sciences with work motivation theory
and research for the purpose of illuminating new directions in theory, research, and prac-
tice. From a theoretical perspective, for example, we review evidence consistent with
McClelland’s (1987) formulation on the operation of two motivational systems, namely
the better-known cognitively mediated system and a second, largely non-conscious and
affectively driven system. The conceptualization of work motivation from a dual-system
perspective represents a major new direction for work motivation theory development.
From a practical perspective, we note that affect and emotions influence work motiv-
ation at multiple levels across the stream of behavior in distinctly different ways.
170
Affect and work motivation 171
Individuals high in negative affectivity, for example, may judge the significance of work
event features differently from individuals low in negative affectivity. As a consequence,
individuals high in negative affectivity may initiate more frequent or different self-
regulatory processes to modulate emotional expression from persons low in the trait, with
differential effects on attention and performance. Similarly, different emotional reactions
to a work event, such as anger versus disappointment, are often associated with different
motivational signatures that can importantly influence both work behaviors and job atti-
tudes. Because organizational policies and managerial practices provide a critical context
for the interpretation of work events, elucidating differences in the motivational chain of
responses associated with different emotions, and identifying the key features of work
events that trigger the emotion-driven chain is particularly important for effective perfor-
mance management.
Accordingly, we focus selectively on advances in affect and emotion that have implica-
tions for work motivation. To set the stage for this analysis, we begin with a brief and
selective overview of contemporary work motivation formulations. Next, we consider
recent work on affect and emotions in organizational, personality, and biobehavioral psy-
chology. Specifically, we discuss the role of affect in expectancy-value formulations, the
influence of emotions on self-regulatory patterns of goal pursuit, and the influence of
implicit, affect-driven motives on behavior. In the final section we identify gaps in our
knowledge at the affect-motivation interface and identify directions for future research.
Work motivation: explicit motivation systems

For most of the last half of the 20th century, theories of work motivation have focused
largely on the cognitive processes and mechanisms underlying the choice and pursuit of
consciously accessible, articulated goals. As described below, advances in this area form a
cohesive picture of the explicit motivation system, including the determinants, mecha-
nisms and processes by which individuals select goals and engage in purposive, self-
regulatory activities to accomplish their goals.
In contrast, organizational theory and research on the implicit motivation system is less
well developed. Although personality theorists, such as McClelland (1985), have argued
for a number of years that behavior is driven by two motivational systems, an explicit,
cognitively based system of conscious goals, and an implicit, affect-driven system, prob-
lems in the measurement of the implicit motivation system have led work motivation
researchers to focus almost exclusively on the processes and mechanisms involved in the
explicit motivation system.
In this section we provide a brief, integrated overview of contemporary work motiva-
tion theories that focus on the explicit system (for full reviews of the work motivation lit-
erature, see, e.g., Campbell and Pritchard, 1976; Mitchell and Daniels, 2003; Latham and
Pinder, 2005; Kanfer et al., 2008). Consistent with modern conceptualizations of work
motivation that tend to coalesce around the goal construct, we organize various theories
in terms of their relative emphasis on the determinants of goal choice and the self-regu-
latory strategies and processes activated during pursuit of particular goals.
Goal choice
Several theories address the determinants of goal formation and goal choice. The best-
known class of theories, popular for much of the last half of the 20th century, is
expectancy-value models. Such formulations, including Vroom’s (1964) Expectancy

theory, Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1975; Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980) theory of reasoned action,
and Naylor et al.’s (1980) resource allocation theory, posit that person and situation
factors influence goal choice through their effects on three subjective variables: the indi-
vidual’s expectations about the relationship between effort and performance (i.e.,
expectancy), the individual’s expectations about the relationship between performance
and outcomes (i.e., instrumentality), and the individual’s judgment about the attractive-
ness of outcomes associated with different performances (i.e., valence). Although impor-
tant differences exist between models, each of these formulations assumes a largely
rational, hedonic process by which expectancies, instrumentalities, and valences operate
in unison to serve as the proximal determinants of goal choice. Empirical evidence for
such models is moderately supportive, although the proposed calculus by which expectan-
cies, instrumentalities, and valences combine remains controversial. Empirical findings
also suggest important boundary conditions on the effectiveness of these models for pre-
dicting work motivation outcomes. In general, these models are most effective for pre-
dicting proximal work behaviors that are a direct consequence of conscious, decisional
choice processes, such as choice among job offers and intensity of effort within a single-
task framework.
Recent approaches to goal choice, derived from advances in personality and cognitive
psychology, emphasize the directional and temporal components of goal choice. Goal
orientation theory (Elliott & Dweck, 1988; VandeWalle, 1997), for example, posits that
situational demands and individual differences in dispositional tendencies or motive
orientation influence the selection of approach or avoidance goal outcomes. In contrast to
classic expectancy-value models, which emphasize the decisional process among discrete
behavioral choices or levels of effort, goal-orientation formulations emphasize the direc-
tive function of goal choice for instigating different regulatory activities during goal
pursuit. Empirical findings provide general support for the influence of dispositional ten-
dencies on goal orientation, but show strongest support for the effect of approach-oriented
goal orientation on motivation outcomes. Specifically, positive, approach-oriented goals
are associated with more effective self-regulatory strategies and higher levels of perfor-
mance than avoidance-oriented goals directed toward prevention of negative outcomes.
The detrimental influence of avoidance-oriented goals on learning and performance is
inconsistent and appears to depend importantly on task demands. For present purposes,
however, goal orientation models of work motivation are particularly interesting since
individual differences in dispositional affective tendencies are posited to influence the
directional nature of goal pursuit.
A third broad cluster of work motivation theories emphasize goal formation as a func-
tion of the arousal of universal motives, such as Deci’s cognitive evaluation theory (Deci
& Ryan, 1985), and organizational justice theories (Greenberg, 1987, 1997). Although
these theories focus on the influence of different motives, they share a common assump-
tion about the intrinsic presence of particular motives, such as competence, autonomy,
mastery, and justice, held among all individuals. In contrast to expectancy-value models
that posit goal selection based on hedonic principles, or goal models based on individual
differences, universal motive models posit the activation of motivational systems to
promote motive accomplishment. In Adams’ (1965) equity theory, for example, percep-
tions of an inequity between one’s inputs and outcomes compared to another person is
posited to activate covert and/or overt behaviors designed to reduce the perceived dis-
crepancy and restore perceived equity. Although empirical support has been obtained
indicating the motivational consequences of motive disruption in each formulation, an
abiding problem pertains to predicting how individuals reduce or create psychological
tension. In equity models, for example, individuals may change their comparison, others
change their effort, and/or change their inputs. Most research investigating these formu-
lations has focused on the influence of situational constraints and affordances as they
affect the cognitions, attitudes, and processes that accompany motive pursuit. However,
relatively little is known about the emotions associated with various disruptions to motive
accomplishment or their role in the direction, intensity, or persistence of action.
Goal pursuit
Intentions and goals set the stage for performance. But, as is commonly observed, there
is often a discrepancy between what an individual wants to accomplish and the activities
an individual performs to accomplish the goal or the outcomes achieved. Goals that are
complex, ill-defined, or that can only be accomplished over prolonged periods require the
activation of self-regulatory processes to direct and modulate personal resources, includ-
ing attentional effort and affect. Conceptually, these self-regulatory processes facilitate
the effective pursuit of goals by enabling the individual to monitor their progress toward
the goal, evaluate their progress, and adjust their thoughts, feelings, and actions accord-
ingly. Self-regulation theories of goal pursuit, such as those formulated by Carver and
Scheier (1981), Bandura (1986), and Kanfer and Hagerman (1987), address the motiva-
tional processes by which individuals pursue (modify, or abandon) articulated goals. A
large body of research on the determinants of self-regulatory processes indicates the
importance of affective self-reactions to goal progress for sustained motivation and per-
formance. For example, numerous studies on the effects of self-efficacy judgments on goal
choice and effort persistence provide strong evidence for the role of affective self-reactions
to self-regulatory processes. Investigations of goal orientation further show that disposi-
tional goal orientation influences the interpretation and evaluation of goal progress (see
Carver, 2006).
Although most theories of work motivation accord affect a central role, they do so in
different ways. In expectancy-value theories, for example, affect influences the value of key
variables, including expectancies and the perceived valence of outcomes. In equity and
organizational justice models, affect provides the energetic force (e.g., felt tension) under-
lying covert and behavioral attempts to seek redress of perceived injustices and outcome
inequities. In goal formulations, individual differences in affectively toned traits are
posited to affect the effectiveness of self-regulatory processes by which individuals accom-
plish purposive goals. In short, affect plays a central role in work motivation theories
through its influence on the outcomes that individuals deem attractive (value), self-
variables that regulate goal accomplishment, and its energizing effects on psychological
and behavioral processes during goal pursuit.
Implicit motivation
Over the past decade, there has been renewed organizational interest in implicit motives and
the implicit motivational system Although most organizational research in this area has
focused on the assessment of individual differences in implicit motives as an alternative to
self-report measures of personality traits (e.g., LeBreton et al., in press), there is also
growing interest in the influence of the implicit motivation system on behavior, personal
adjustment, and achievement outcomes (e.g., Schultheiss & Brunstein, 1999; Kehr, 2004).
As conceptualized by McClelland (1985, 1987) and others (McClelland et al., 1989,
Schultheiss & Brunstein, 1999), the implicit motivation system operates largely indepen-
dently of the explicit motivation system and differs from the explicit system in terms of
instigating conditions and modes of functioning (see Michalak et al., 2006). Specifically,
implicit motives are posited to be fewer in number (e.g., affiliation, power, achievement),
not cognitively mediated or accessible by self-report, aroused or influenced by intrinsic
features of behavior or activity (rather than by external incentives for action as occurs in
the explicit motivation system), and lead to affectively driven preferences and non-
consciously mediated and often spontaneous behavioral tendencies.
Kehr (2004) recently proposed a compensatory model of work motivation that takes into
account both implicit and explicit motivation processes. Kehr posits that self-regulatory
processes come into play when there is insufficient support from the implicit motivation
system to support action tendencies, or when there is a discrepancy between implicit and
explicit motives. Since implicit motives reflect affective preferences, self-regulation activities
are needed to prevent these preferences from interfering with conscious or purposive goal
accomplishment.
The inclusion of an implicit motive system in Kehr’s work motivation model provides
a useful framework for understanding the detrimental effects of emotional labor on job
performance and personal well-being. As Kehr notes, conflict between the implicit and
explicit motive systems occurs when individuals must suppress natural emotional reac-
tions for effective job performance. In these situations, individuals must employ conscious
self-regulatory strategies to control emotional expressions. Consistent with theory and
research on the resource consumptive nature of self-regulatory activity (e.g., Baumeister
et al., 1998), sustained emotion control in such jobs can be expected to lead to a decline
in job performance, reduced self-control strength, and reduced well-being.
A major obstacle to theory testing and research on the implicit motive system in the
organizational sciences pertains to the measurement of individual differences in these
motives. Early investigations of implicit motive strength used the Thematic Apperception
Test (TAT)–a projective technique in which individuals create story responses to stan-
dardized picture scenes. Expert raters then score the stories for motive content to arrive
at a strength score. As McClelland (1987) proposed, implicit motive strength scores
obtained using the TAT tend to be only weakly related or unrelated to self-report mea-
sures of similar motive constructs (Spangler, 1992; Schultheiss & Brunstein, 2001).
However, problems of unreliability using the TAT and test length have impeded its use in
large-scale and organizational contexts. Recently, Sokolowski et al. (2000) developed a
new shorter measure, the Multi-Motive Grid, and provided initial evidence for the
improved reliability of this measure.
Although relatively few studies on implicit motives have been conducted in the organ-
izational behavior domain to date, recent findings in other domains suggest that the
implicit motivation system represents a major pathway by which affect influences explicit
work motivation and its consequences. From an applied perspective, the two-system con-
ceptualization provides an attractive paradigm for understanding motivational processes
associated with goal conflicts, emotional labor, and performance variability over time.
Affect and emotions

The influence of affect and emotions on motivation and action in achievement and work
contexts has been studied from both individual and situational perspectives, at levels of
analysis ranging from neuro-cognitive to behavioral, and across different time spans,
ranging from milliseconds to months and years. For present purposes, this voluminous
research literature may be usefully organized in terms of three key developments: (i) the
structure of affect and emotions, (ii) the influence of affect and emotions on cognitively
mediated motivational components, and (iii) the relationship between work events, affect,
emotions and their consequences. We discuss each of these developments next.
The structure of affect and emotions

Two major approaches characterize theorizing and research on the determinants and con-
sequences of affect and emotion in everyday life. Research on the biological determinants
and psychological and behavioral consequences of affect have coalesced around a dimen-
sional approach that specifies the operation of two primary affective systems – approach
and avoidance (Carver et al., 2000). The approach-oriented system, variously referred to
as the behavioral approach system (Gray, 1981), behavioral activation (Carver & White,
1994), the behavioral facilitation system (Depue & Collins, 1999), and positive affectivity
(Tellegen, 1985), refers to neural, biological, personality, and action patterns that respond
to incentives and are associated with positive feeling states and approach-oriented action
tendencies. In contrast, the avoidance-oriented system, variously referred to as the behav-
ioral inhibition system (Gray, 1981; Carver & White, 1994) and negative affectivity
(Tellegen, 1985), describes the neural, biological, personality, and action patterns
that respond to potential threats, negative feeling states and avoidance-oriented action
tendencies.
In contrast to the dimensional approach, theory and research on emotions has focused
on identification of the discrete emotion categories, their biological basis, and their con-
sequences for action. Although there is disagreement about the number of primary emo-
tions, most theories posit six to eight emotions, including happiness, fear, surprise, anger,
sadness, and disgust, as well as subcategories of emotions underlying those considered
primary (see Ortony & Turner, 1990; Ekman, 1992; Solomon, 2002; Ashkanasy, 2003 for
reviews). Cognitive appraisal theories posit that emotions represent the evaluation of
affective or feeling states, and that such evaluations provide guidance for specific action
tendencies.
Although there is overlap between dimensional theories of affect and categorical the-
ories of emotion, the two approaches are currently not well integrated. Nonetheless,
findings in both paradigms suggest several implications for understanding the role of
affect and emotions on work motivation. First, dimensional models point to the impor-
tance of underlying biological and personality processes as input to cognitively medi-
ated motivational processes. Individual differences in affectively driven approach and
avoidance systems are ubiquitous and may influence work motivation at multiple points
in the chain of action and in multiple ways, including sensitivity to work events, judg-
ments of interest and self-confidence, the manner in which information is processed, risk
taking in goal choice, and persistence during goal pursuit. From an applied perspective,
findings on the effects of approach and avoidance systems suggest that appraisals of
workplace events, such as a co-worker’s refusal to go to lunch, gain salience for action
through a combination of preconscious and conscious processes. For example, nuanced

individual differences in sensitivity to threat, developed across the lifespan at different
levels of analysis, along with the attributes of the event in the ongoing context, jointly
contribute to the extent to which the lunch invitation refusal is appraised as personally
relevant, and to the secondary appraisal processes that direct action strategies.
Cognitive appraisal theories further suggest that appraisals of feeling states produce
further sharpening of action tendencies through the evaluation of such states in terms of
specific emotions. For example, individual differences in negative affectivity may influence
the frequency with which work events stimulate primary appraisals of threat and sec-
ondary evaluations of specific negative emotions. Since such events often trigger activa-
tion of self-regulation strategies to modulate emotion, individual differences in negative
affectivity are likely to facilitate the development of more entrained (though not neces-
sarily more effective) emotion- and action-regulation strategies among persons high in
negativity than those low in negative affectivity.
It is important to note that although affective formulations of action give primacy to
non-conscious processes that activate and influence conscious processing, these formula-
tions do not diminish the importance of the conscious processes that govern action. For
example, individuals who have experienced repeated involuntary job layoffs may exhibit
greater sensitivity and higher levels of negative mood and distress in response to organ-
izational communications that suggest such outcomes than persons with no prior layoff
experiences. Over time and events, however, such affective influences may heighten feel-
ings of job insecurity sufficient to trigger conscious, deliberative processing directed
toward purposive action. Individuals may begin job search, engage in job behaviors aimed
at enhancing their chance of sustaining employment, and/or engage in emotion regula-
tion strategies designed to reduce negative affect. Individual differences in sensitivity to
threat, the frequency, intensity, and timing of events, individual differences in personality
traits and preferences, and the perceived value of specific actions and outcomes all play a
role in the determination of work-related behavior.
The influence of affect and emotions on explicit work motivation

As noted previously, extant expectancy-value and social-cognitive models of work moti-
vation accord affect an important role through their multiple influences on subjective
judgments of valence for behaviors and outcomes, effort expectations, and self-efficacy
judgments. Individual differences in affective traits influence both the goals that individ-
uals consider and goal choice, based on anticipated pleasure in goal attainment. During
the pursuit of complex or difficult goals, affective reactions to perceived progress or lack
of progress influence judgments of self-efficacy and decisions about whether to maintain,
modify, or abandon the goal and how to modulate personal resources for goal accom-
plishment. To date, however, research on the influence of affect on work motivation has
tended to focus narrowly on one or another motivational component.
Recently, Seo et al. (2005) have proposed an integrative model of affective influence
on work motivation. Specifically, and in one of few efforts tying affect to work motiva-
tion, Seo et al. employ the concept of ‘core affect’ to refer to primary emotional/affective
responses and feelings. Building on previous work by Russell (1980) depicting a cir-
cumplex model of emotion and the construct of core affect (Russell, 2003; Russell &
Barrett, 1999), Seo et al. posit core affect as a two-dimensional construct comprising
pleasure/displeasure and activation/deactiviation. Core affect thus provides a layer of

feelings that represents all experienced emotions and moods, and from which all specific
emotions and moods are subsequently derived. Seo et al. argue that it is the core affect
layer of feelings one experiences which directly and indirectly affects motivated work
behavior through influences on behavioral outcomes of direction, intensity, and persis-
tence (Kanfer, 1990). A particular focus for Seo et al. is the direction outcome, which
they view from a neurophysiological approach and avoidance perspective. According
to Seo et al., core affect serves an informational and motivational function in self-
regulation, not unlike that described in feedback research (e.g., Ilgen et al., 1979). The
informational function informs the individual about potential barriers to goal accom-
plishment and the likelihood of reaching a goal, whereas the motivational role of core
affect influences cognitive activity associated with goal choice and decision making. Seo
et al. suggest that core affect also indirectly influences work motivation through its effect
on self-regulation time and effort resource allocation in cognitive processing associated
with the setting of and striving toward goals. Moreover, and consistent with traditional
expectancy theory processes, core affect is seen as indirectly affecting expectancy and
utility judgments which subsequently influence approach or avoidance of behavioral
outcomes, as well as promoting indirect influences on goal-directed effort, goal com-
mitment, and persistence. Finally, beyond indirect effects, Seo et al. suggest that core
affect imposes direct effects on the direction, intensity, and persistence components of
work motivation.
The relationship between affect, emotions, and work events

All theories of affect and motivation recognize the importance of context for action.
Broad environmental presses and local contextual variables operate continuously through
the lens of an individual’s past experiences to influence both affect and motivation at mul-
tiple points in the chain of action. Sociocultural norms, organizational compensation and
recognition systems, task demands, task deadlines, interpersonal relations, and team/unit
norms may exert direct and/or indirect influences on experienced affect, motivational ori-
entation and goal choice, goal pursuit, and work attitudes.
Until recently, however, most research investigating affect in the workplace has exam-
ined the relationship between broad and presumably stable features of the work environ-
ment and job attitudes, such as job satisfaction, commitment, and involvement (e.g.,
Saavedra & Kwun, 2000). Research findings in this area indicate that job features often
exert similar effects on job attitudes and job performance. Over the past few decades,
however, two theoretical approaches have emerged that directly address the influence of
work events as they influence emotional and motivational processes.
Affective events theory

During the mid-1990s, Weiss and Cropanzano (1996) argued that the job characteristics–
job satisfaction paradigm was incomplete, and did not capture the important influence of
diverse affective reactions that occurred over the work-day. Specifically, they suggested the
adoption of a micro-analytic, episodic approach for evaluating how events in the workplace
gain affective significance and exert distinctive effects on behavior and attitudes.
According to affective events theory (AET; ibid.), workplace events may instigate
affective reactions that drive both work attitudes and behaviors. Consistent with cognitive
appraisal theories (e.g., Lazarus, 1991), an individual’s primary appraisal of work event
significance occurs when an individual interprets the event to have relevance and motiva-
tional significance. Similar to implicit motivation formulations, relatively stable individ-
ual differences in select personality traits, moods, and dispositional tendencies are posited
to influence sensitivity to events, and to influence the intensity of subsequent felt emo-
tions. Following primary appraisal, secondary appraisal processes operate to direct the
experience, expression, and regulation of emotional reactions. Affective-driven behaviors,
including the instigation of self-regultory strategies to modulate or suppress emotional
expression, are posited to occur largely independent of what Weiss and Cropanzano refer
to as ‘judgment-driven behaviors’ that are mediated by attitudes, such as job satisfaction.
To date, not much work has been done on the implications of AET for work motiva-
tion. However, AET raises a number of interesting questions for work motivation
researchers. For example, individual differences in personality traits and implicit motives
may independently and jointly influence the differential sensitivity to events that trigger
emotional experiences, the cycle time of affective episodes, and/or the nature of affect-
driven behavior.
Summary and future research directions

Theory and research on affect and motivation have often proceeded in relative isolation
from each other, often with the popularity of one approach waxing as the other wanes.
After decades of progress on cognitive-oriented formulations of work motivation,
increasing attention is now focused on affective formulations. As described in this chapter,
the emphasis on affect and emotions offers exciting new opportunities for work motiva-
tion researchers. Our review of the literature suggests three key themes for future theory
development and research on work motivation.
The first theme relates to affect-driven work motivation processes. Basic research pro-
vides support for two, integrated, multi-level affective systems that exert both direct and
indirect influence on work motivation. Evidence from multi-level studies indicates that
these approach and avoidance-oriented systems operate quickly and non-consciously to
detect events of significance, impart affective information, and activate associated behav-
ioral tendencies. The convergent evidence for these dimensions is consistent with theoriz-
ing by McClelland in the personality domain and Weiss and Cropanzano (1996) in
organizational psychology, both of which suggest that affect exerts both a direct and rapid
influence on behavior as well as input to cognitively mediated action. The quick, internal,
non-conscious processes suggested by these findings are also consistent with intuitive
decision-making processes identified in Beach and Mitchell’s image theory (1990) and
Csikszentmihalyi’s concept of flow (1990).
Although fast, non-consciously mediated feeling states may sometimes yield observable
action tendencies in the workplace, such as an anger outburst directed toward a verbally
abusive customer, it is important to keep in mind that most work motivation theories seek
to predict direction, intensity, and persistence of behavior over time. From a motivational
perspective, the demonstration of undesirable, affectively driven momentary behaviors at
work, such as yelling at co-workers, represents a failure of the cognitively mediated system
to support the modulation of affective action tendencies. When modulation failures occur
repeatedly, we look for problems in the explicit motivational system. The demonstration
of emotion-driven behaviors that fail to conform to organizational display rules may
occur for several reasons, including under-regulation or mis-regulation in the cognitively

mediated system. That is, individuals who engage in repeated anger outbursts may have
insufficiently developed self-regulatory strategies for emotion modulation, may have
depleted self-regulatory resources for emotion regulation, and/or may fail to apply
emotion regulation if the behavior is perceived to support goal accomplishment. In the
final analysis, the control of affect-driven behaviors requires a consideration of the
strength of the action tendency, the strength of the motivational system to provide regu-
latory control over such action tendencies, and the extent to which the context places
demands on the motivational system to impose regulatory control over affect-driven
behaviors.
The second theme concerns motivational signatures of discrete emotions. Both appraisal
(Lazarus, 1991) and attributional (Weiner, 1986) theorists argue that the individual’s
appraisal of a work event importantly determines the discrete emotion experienced. A
substantial body of research in the decision-making literature also shows differences
between positive and negative mood state on judgmental risk taking. However, relatively
less is known about the similarities and differences in motivational processing associated
with discrete emotions, in particular with respect to emotions that vary in terms of arousal
(e.g., anger vs. disappointment). Research is needed to identify the goals and self-
regulatory processes associated with each of these emotions, as well as the putative role
of non-ability traits in mediating emotion–action relations. It may be, for example, that
felt emotions at the high end of the arousal continuum are more difficult to modulate and
suppress through consciously mediated motivation and self-regulation processes than
emotions associated with lower arousal levels. Individuals who experience anger, for
example, may form different goals and/or be less able to effectively suppress their emotion
than individuals who experience disappointment. Structural elements associated with the
design of work and work flow processes also may provide opportunities for future
research on discrete emotion influences on work motivation. For example, job character-
istics theory (JCT; Hackman & Oldham, 1976) identifies specific influences of job attrib-
utes (e.g., skill variety, autonomy, knowledge of results) on work motivation. Anger or
frustration resulting from low levels of these features embedded within the structure of
jobs may influence goal choice and goal striving. In the work context, such findings would
suggest tailoring organizational practices to provide environmental support for goal
redefinition and to support emotion modulation to particular work events.
Research investigating sources of discrete emotions beyond those events generated at
work may also serve to advance knowledge regarding work motivation–emotion linkages,
An emerging body of research in the work–nonwork arena suggest that nonwork experi-
ences contribute to workplace affect and attitudes (e.g., Sonnentag, 2003). Additional
research is needed to elucidate the contribution of ongoing, nonwork sources of affect
and emotions, such as marital conflict and family difficulties, on work-related emotion
self-regulation processes and the direction, intensity and persistence of goal-directed
behavior. Such studies may ultimately provide useful information for understanding how
coping with life events influences employee attitudes and behavior.
The question of how and why a specific discrete emotion gains primacy over other
emotional reactions to a work event remains another important direction for future
research. Individuals who are informed that they are included in the target group for
layoffs to occur in the next year, for example, are likely to experience a litany of different
emotions, including anger, sadness, embarrassment, shame, anxiety, guilt, and perhaps
even relief that the job loss will not occur immediately. Each discrete emotion will likely
hold differential levels of strength and will be associated with a variety of potential moti-
vational tendencies. Research to determine the influence of individual differences in goals
may shed light on emotion primacy in these complex events. Since emotional reactions
to complex work events, such as anticipated layoff notice, occur over time, event-based
research is also needed to investigate the factors that influence the arousal of different
emotions related to a single event over time and their incremental and cumulative effects
on strain.
The third theme concerns social and temporal influences on affective reactions to work
events. Affective reactions to work events rarely occur in isolation, but rather appear to
occur in positive or negatively valenced clusters and are often associated with a specific
situation or individual. Repeated work events that are deemed significant and personally
threatening and may consequently entrain cognitively mediated motivation processes
over time. Individuals who are repeatedly reprimanded by a supervisor, for example, may
shift from a mastery goal orientation to a performance-avoidance goal orientation and
develop self-regulatory strategies for performance accomplishment that emphasize
avoiding a negative performance evaluation rather than higher levels of task accom-
plishment. Research is needed to examine how stable contextual features of the work
environment, including supervisors, peers, and work demands, shape affect and motiva-
tional patterns over time.
The temporal influence of affective reactions on work motivation may also be fruitfully
studied from a depletion perspective. As Baumeister et al. (1998) suggest, the effectiveness
of attempts to modulate unwanted emotions in the workplace may decline over time.
Research to study the decline rates of self-regulatory efficiency for discrete emotions
would be very useful for designing optimal workloads in the services sector.
Finally, a considerable body of research suggests age-related changes in emotion regu-
lation across the lifespan. Relatively little is known, however, about whether age-related
improvement in emotion regulation stems from reduced exposure to emotionally dis-
tressing events, to reduced sensitivity in the avoidance system, or to improved self-
regulatory control. Research to examine the source of age-related differences in emotional
reactions to common workplace events is needed.
As described in this chapter, affect and emotions exert formidable influence on work
motivation. The influence of these constructs on job satisfaction and performance has
long been acknowledged, but until recently relatively little was known about the mecha-
nisms by which these effects occur. Recent findings highlight the pathways by which affect
influences decision making and affect regulation influences job stress. These and other
developments in the affective sciences clearly suggest that an adequate account of how
affect and emotions affect work behavior requires a major reconceptualization of work
motivation theories. In particular, work motivation theories will need to consider both the
temporal dimension and how individual differences in affectively driven implicit motives
influence and interact with cognitive processes to affect both goal formulation and self-
regulatory activities during goal pursuit. Progress toward a formulation that more fully
specifies the influence of orchestrated biologically driven affective motives and event-
based contributions to action tendencies offers a plethora of new possibilities for both
work motivation theory and practice.
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11 Emotions and counterproductive work behavior
Lisa M. Penney and Paul E. Spector
Introduction
Counterproductive work behavior (CWB) has been a topic of great interest to organiza-
tional scientists and practitioners alike. These behaviors have long been recognized as
detrimental to the overall well-being of organizations and the people in them. Hence, a
profusion of theories and studies have been put forth to increase our understanding of
and ultimately aid in controlling these behaviors. The most commonly used models
acknowledge the pivotal role that emotion plays in many of these behaviors. This chapter
will begin with a general overview of CWB followed by a presentation of the available
research on the role played by emotions. The review will be organized in terms of how the
research fits into each of two frameworks within the emotion literature: cognitive
appraisal theory and emotion regulation. Finally, limitations and suggestions for future
research in this area will be discussed.
Counterproductive work behavior

CWB refers to ‘volitional acts that harm or are intended to harm organizations or people
in organizations’ (Spector & Fox, 2005, p. 151). It includes a wide range of behavior such
as arguing with others at work, making threats, withholding information, purposely
working slowly, stealing, wasting time, withholding effort, performing work incor-
rectly, taking longer breaks and calling in ‘sick’ when not ill. Other terms have also been
used to describe this broad set of employee behavior including: workplace aggression
(Baron & Neuman, 1996), workplace deviance (Robinson & Bennett, 1995), organization-
motivated aggression (O’Leary-Kelly et al., 1996), organizational retaliatory behaviors
(Skarlicki & Folger, 1997), organizational delinquency (Hogan & Hogan, 1989), revenge
(Bies & Tripp, 1998) and antisocial behavior in organizations (Giacalone & Greenberg,
1997). While the specific definitions of each of these constructs differ slightly depending
on the theoretical focus of the researcher, aspects that they share in common are that these
behaviors: (a) are performed by employees of an organization; (b) are volitional as
opposed to accidental; and (c) harm or have the potential to harm an organization or its
members (Spector & Fox, 2005). Other terms such as workplace incivility (Andersson &
Pearson, 1999; Cortina et al., 2001), employee abuse (Keashly et al., 1997), social under-
mining (Duffy et al., 2002), abusive supervision (Tepper et al., 2001) and mobbing/
bullying (Leymann, 1990; Zapf et al., 1996) also fall under the umbrella of general
counterproductive behavior; however, these terms tend to focus on a narrower set of
behaviors that are interpersonal in nature and emphasize the target’s perspective as
opposed to the actor’s. Because the focus of this chapter is to describe a broad range of
counterproductive employee behavior, the term CWB will be used in lieu of other terms.
One caveat is that the behaviors included in this domain are generally considered coun-
terproductive from the organization’s perspective. As will be demonstrated later in this
chapter, especially from an emotions perspective, some behaviors that employees perform
183
may have important personal or social functions, but at the same time may be counter-
productive to an organization’s larger goals.
Several typologies have been proposed to describe CWB, but perhaps the best known
and most widely used is the two-dimension typology of interpersonal and organizational
deviance developed by Robinson and Bennett (1995). Interpersonal deviance is behavior
that is directed toward other individuals in the organization (e.g., gossiping, blaming co-
workers, verbal abuse and endangering others), whereas organizational deviance is
directed at the organization (e.g., leaving early, wasting resources, sabotage and theft)
(Bennett & Robinson, 2000). Other researchers have also emphasized the importance of
categorizing CWB based on targets, although the terms CWB–O and CWB–P have been
used to distinguish between CWB that targets the organization and other people, respec-
tively (Fox et al., 2001; Spector et al., 2003).
Spector et al. (2006) suggested that there is value in looking at even finer categories of
CWB. They described five: abuse against others, production deviance, sabotage, with-
drawal and theft. Abuse against others is comparable to Robinson and Bennett’s (1995)
interpersonal deviance dimension in that it refers to behaviors that are directed at other
people. The remaining four categories mostly conform to Robinson and Bennett’s organ-
izational deviance, but distinctions are made among them because recent evidence indi-
cates that they have different antecedents (Spector et al., 2006). Production deviance is
‘the purposeful failure to perform job tasks effectively the way they are supposed to be
performed’ (ibid., p. 449). Production deviance is relatively passive and includes behav-
iors such as intentionally working slowly and failing to follow instructions. Sabotage, on
the other hand, is more openly aggressive, referring to physically damaging or defacing
organizational property. Withdrawal is behavior in which employees spend less time at
work or working than they are supposed to work. Taking longer breaks, calling in ‘sick’,
arriving late and leaving early are all forms of withdrawal. The last form of CWB is theft,
which includes stealing from the organization or from others in the organization.
Several theoretical models of CWB have been proposed, the majority of which include
an affective component in the prediction of CWB (e.g., Fox & Spector, 1999; Douglas &
Martinko, 2001; Spector & Fox, 2005). Within the emotions literature, there are two per-
spectives on emotions and behavior that are relevant to CWB. The first, cognitive appraisal
theories, focus on how the perception of events or other stimuli in the environment impacts
on emotions, which then serve as a catalyst for behavior. Information-processing models
also examine how emotions affect perceptions of environmental stimuli and events. The
second, emotion regulation, focuses on how behavior can be directed toward altering one’s
emotional experience. The following sections describe each of these perspectives in more
detail, showing how each can provide a useful framework for explaining CWB.
Cognitive appraisal theories of emotion and CWB

One of the main research streams in the emotion literature is based on cognitive appraisal
theories that explain how perceived events in the environment affect emotions, which in
turn affect individual behavior (Weiss, 2002). Cognitive appraisal theories emphasize the
distinction between cognitions or thoughts about an event and the emotional response to
it. They generally focus on two aspects of the connection between cognition and emotion:
(a) how the interpretation of events affects emotion and (b) how the experience of
emotion affects cognitions. This first aspect is based on appraisal theories of emotion
Emotions and counterproductive work behavior 185
(Scherer, 1994). The central idea is that individuals form subjective interpretations or
appraisals about the events, situations, people and objects they encounter. The appraisals
they form then determine the emotional response and subsequent behavior. In other
words, it is not what happens to people, but what people tell themselves about what hap-
pened (their appraisals/interpretations) that determines emotions. Thus, cognitions are
believed to be the most immediate precursors to emotions, although it can be argued that
under certain conditions such as the presence of a strong stimulus (e.g., encountering a
mountain lion on a hiking trail), the role of cognitive processes may be reduced to mere
perception of the stimulus that leads to an automatic emotional response of fear.
The second aspect of cognitive appraisal theories emphasizes the consequences of
emotions and mood on cognitions and information processing. For example, mood-
dependent memory effects have been demonstrated in a number of studies (e.g., Eich,
1995; Schwarz, 2000). Information encoding and retrieval is facilitated when the valence
of information is consistent with an individual’s current mood state. Thus, individuals in
a negative mood pay more attention to and recall negative information more than posi-
tive information. The reverse is true for individuals in a positive mood. Moreover, research
indicates that individuals in a positive mood tend to overestimate the likelihood of future
positive events and underestimate the likelihood of future negative events, whereas the
opposite result has been shown for negative mood (Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Nygren
et al., 1996). With regard to information processing, individuals in a positive mood tend
to use a top-down approach, relying on heuristics, whereas individuals in a negative mood
use a bottom-up approach and pay close attention to the specific details of the current
situation (Schwarz & Clore, 1996; Schwarz, 2000).
Several models have been proposed to explain CWB that are consistent with the cogni-
tive appraisal approach, including the work of Spector and his colleagues (Spector, 1975,
1978, 1997; Fox & Spector, 1999; Spector & Fox, 2005). Their models have evolved from
an initial focus on frustration and anger to an examination of a broad range of both pos-
itive and negative emotions. Other models have taken a different perspective based on
organizational justice (Folger & Skarlicki, 1998), employee aggression (O’Leary-Kelly
et al., 1996) and causal reasoning theory (Martinko et al., 2002). These models share some
of the same basic elements, including the mediational role which experienced negative
emotion plays between the perception of stressful or negative events and CWB. Thus,
these models can easily fit into the cognitive appraisal theories of emotion. Figure 11.1
illustrates the basic idea of how the process is thought to operate across the different
models. Specific models proposed by different researchers have integrated various indi-
vidual difference variables and attributional processes (ibid.) along with issues of control
(Spector & Fox, 2005). The simplified model presented here is meant to illustrate broad
similarities across theoretical models.
The model begins with an event in the environment that must first be perceived by an indi-
vidual. As with cognitive appraisal theories of emotion, an individual’s appraisal or inter-
pretation of the event is considered to be the most proximal determinant of the emotional
response. Although emotion researchers have proposed dimensions of appraisals that help
determine the specific emotional response (Smith & Lazarus, 1993), a thorough review of
appraisal theories is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, suffice it to say that for
researchers interested in CWB, the types of events that are most relevant are those that elicit
negative emotions and ultimately CWB. These include events or situations that are stressful,
Experienced
Environmental Perceived
negative CWB
condition stressor
affect
Individual differences
• NA/PA
• Trait anger; trait anxiety
• Emotional expressivity
Source: Penny et al. (2003).
Figure 11.1 A simplified model of emotional traits, emotions and CWB
such as situational constraints (things that interfere with or prevent completion of job
tasks), interpersonal conflict, role conflict, role ambiguity, workload and being the target of
abusive or uncivil behavior (Spector & Fox, 2005). Injustice might also be considered as a
job stressor, since it likely results in negative emotion (Fox et al., 2001). Douglas and
Martinko (2001) discussed the role of attributions in the process. Individuals are likely to
respond to events with negative emotions when they attribute the intent of the agent of the
event to be hostile; that is, the agent is purposely creating the stressful situation.
In this model of CWB, individual difference variables can function in a number of ways.
Affective dispositions, such as negative affectivity (the tendency to experience negative
emotions across situations; Watson & Clark, 1984) or trait anger (the tendency to experi-
ence anger across situations; Spielberger et al., 1988), reflect a tendency to perceive the
environment as threatening or challenging. Individuals high on these traits are more likely
than individuals low on these traits to perceive situations as job stressors and to respond
to job stressors with negative emotion. Thus, these traits make an impact on both attri-
butions (Douglas & Martinko, 2001) and emotional responsivity. Conversely, their ten-
dency to experience negative emotions results in individuals high in these affective traits
to frequently be in negative moods that would color their cognitions. Thus, the negative
mood reinforces the tendency of such individuals to perceive the world as stressful and
can result in an emotion spiral in which a negative outlook leads to perceptions of stres-
sors that reinforce negative emotions, making the perception of future stressors even more
likely, leading to even more negative emotion.
Negative emotions are posited to play a pivotal mediational role between perceived
events and CWB. This is consistent with Scherer’s (1994) assertion that emotions are the
interface between environmental input and behavioral output. Although positive inter-
pretations of events and hence other emotional responses are possible, models of CWB
typically focus on negative emotions because, more so than positive emotions, they signal
the need for action. Positive emotions tend to be less differentiated (Fredrickson, 1998)
and are generally not associated with a specific problem that needs to be solved (Lord &
Kanfer, 2002). Negative emotions, however, are typically associated with some specific
event and are thought to signal a disparity between existing and desired states and thus
the need to do something to remedy the situation. In other words, negative emotions
signal the need for some action and the physiological arousal that accompanies negative
emotions prepares the body to take the necessary steps to address the situation at hand.
For example, the increased activation of the autonomic nervous system (e.g., elevated
heart rate) associated with strong negative emotions such as anger prepare the body for
‘fight or flight’. There is also evidence to indicate that the physiological arousal associated
with sadness or depressed mood prompts the body to withdraw from stimulation and rest
(Keller & Nesse, 2005).
In summary, the predominant theories of CWB are consistent with cognitive appraisal
theories of emotion. The basic premise of these theories is that an individual’s subjective
appraisal or perception of an event results in a negative emotional experience which in
turn motivates an act of CWB.
Evidence from workplace studies

As stated previously, negative emotions have been investigated in relation to CWB far
more frequently than positive emotions, and the most frequently examined emotions in
the CWB literature are frustration and anger. In an early cross-sectional study of over 400
working adults, Chen and Spector (1992) found that feelings of anger and frustration were
related to a variety of forms of CWB including sabotage, interpersonal aggression, hos-
tility and complaining, theft and absenteeism, a finding that has been repeated in other
studies (e.g., Fox & Spector, 1999; Penney & Spector, 2002). Thus, increased levels of
anger and frustration were associated with greater levels of CWB. Studies have also found
support for the mediational role that emotions play between stressful experiences and
CWB (e.g., Keenan & Newton, 1984; Fox & Spector, 1999).
The important role that anger plays in the performance of CWB was also explored in
a qualitative study by Glomb (2002). She collected information on specific angry incidents
at work to identify what aroused the anger and what happened as a result. Consistent with
quantitative studies, she found that the events that provoked anger included perceived
injustice, personal and work-related conflicts with others at work, and experienced job
stress. Anger was also associated with verbally and physically aggressive behaviors (e.g.,
yelling, dirty looks, swearing, using hostile body language, throwing things). Moreover in
another qualitative study, Fitness (2000) found that the behavioral responses to anger
(often CWB) depended in part on status differences between the involved parties.
Individuals angered by a subordinate felt less intense anger and were more likely to imme-
diately confront offenders and punish them through formal means. However, individuals
angered by a supervisor or co-worker were far more likely to engage in emotional with-
drawal (e.g., giving the silent treatment, or ignoring) and revenge including spreading lies,
sabotage, purposely working slowly, or hiding important documents.
Hostility is another negative emotion that involves anger and strong feelings of antag-
onism toward others. It is more related to externalized than to internalized anger
(Spielberger et al., 1983; Bridewell & Chang, 1997). In a recent study, Judge et al. (2006)
used an experience sampling methodology wherein participants reported on their daily
experiences of justice, mood and CWB for three weeks. They found that within-person
differences in perceived interpersonal injustice were related to within-person differences
in state hostility. Moreover, within-person differences in state hostility were directly
related to within-person differences in CWB. This particular study is significant because
it is one of the first studies in CWB to examine how the experience of daily fluctuations
or variations in perceived justice impacts emotions and CWB.
The relationship of other discrete emotions with CWB was also explored in a qualita-
tive study by Tunstall et al. (2006). They administered an open-ended questionnaire
asking participants to describe an incident where they performed some type of CWB
including how they felt at the time. Not surprisingly, anger and frustration were the
most frequently reported emotions, although a number of other emotions, both positive
and negative were also identified including guilt, anxiety, stress/burnout, sadness, and
pleasure/happiness. Regarding whether different forms of CWB are related to different
emotions, Tunstall et al. found that CWB directed at other people (i.e., abuse against
others) was most frequently associated with feeling angry/frustrated (68%) or hurt (18%).
However, other forms of CWB (e.g., withdrawal, sabotage, theft, production deviance)
were associated with a wider range of emotions, suggesting that the affective significance
of those behaviors may be more complex. It should be noted, however, that participants
in this study reported on the emotions they felt at the time they performed the behavior
and thus, their responses likely reflect the entire affective experience (i.e., feelings experi-
enced before, during and after performing CWB) and not just emotions that preceded
their CWB.
The research discussed so far has focused on specific emotions (anger, frustration, hos-
tility), although some studies have used broader measures of negative emotion and found
similar results. One such measure, the Job-Related Affective Well-Being Scale (JAWS; Van
Katwyk et al., 2000) includes a negative emotion subscale that assesses the degree to which
individuals experienced several negative emotions as a result of their job over the prior
30 days. Several studies that used JAWS found support for the mediational role that neg-
ative emotion plays between experienced stressors (e.g., organizational constraints, inter-
personal conflict and injustice) and CWB (Fox & Spector, 1999; Fox et al., 2001; Spector
et al., 2003; Bruk-Lee & Spector, 2006). However, Lee and Allen (2002) found evidence
suggesting that measures of discrete emotions may account for additional variance in the
prediction of CWB than broad measures of negative affect. Specifically, they found that
hostility accounted for significant variance in the prediction of CWB over and above a
measure of general negative affect. They also suggested that different negative emotions
(e.g., guilt, fear, sadness, anger) may be related to different behaviors. This proposition
was supported by Yang et al. (2005) who found that both discrete positive (i.e., pride,
attentiveness and contentment) and negative emotions (i.e., envy, guilty/shame and
sadness) had incremental validity over higher-order affect factors in predicting CWB.
Emotion traits and CWB

The research presented thus far addresses the main pathway in the general model of CWB
from perceived event/stressor to emotion to CWB. As the model illustrates, individual
differences can impact on how the environmental event is perceived, which gets at the
second aspect of cognitive appraisal theories regarding how the experience of emotions
affects cognitions. However, the model also indicates how individual differences affect the
tendency to experience negative emotions, as well as the propensity to perform CWB.
Although emotions are generally considered to be transient states, researchers have rec-
ognized that individuals vary on the propensity to experience either specific emotions or
emotions in general.
Negative affectivity Negative affectivity (NA) is the dispositional tendency to experience

a variety of negative emotional states, such as anxiety, distress, guilt, anger, rejection and
sadness (Watson & Clark, 1984). According to Watson and Clark, individuals high in NA
are ‘in any given situation, more likely to experience a significant level of distress [and are]
particularly sensitive to minor failures, frustrations and irritations in daily life as evidenced
by the likelihood, magnitude and duration of their reactions’ (p. 466). Overall, individuals
high in NA are characterized as non-conformist, distrustful, hostile, demanding and distant
(ibid., p. 483). By contrast, persons low in NA are fairly calm, secure, agreeable and content.
The relationship between experienced negative emotions and CWB has been well sup-
ported. Because individuals high in NA experience these negative emotions more fre-
quently and intensely than low-NA individuals, it seems plausible that high-NA
individuals would be more likely to engage in CWB. One of the first studies to examine
NA in relation to CWB was by Skarlicki et al. (1999). They proposed that NA would mod-
erate the relationship between perceived fairness and CWB. Using self-report measures of
perceived justice and NA and peer-reported CWB, Skarlicki et al. found that in addition
to accounting for unique variance in CWB, NA moderated the relationship between per-
ceived fairness and CWB. That is, high-NA individuals were more likely to engage in
CWB under conditions of low perceived justice than low-NA individuals. A similar
finding was reported by Penney and Spector (2005) who found that NA moderated the
relationship between experienced workplace incivility and peer-reported CWB. Again,
individuals high in NA performed more CWB when they were the target of high levels of
incivility than individuals low in NA. Thus, it appears that high-NA individuals respond
to stressful events at work with less composure and more CWB.
In addition, Aquino et al. (1999) tested a model linking CWB with NA and justice per-
ceptions. Participants responded to scales assessing NA, their perceptions of distributive,
procedural and interactional justice at work and the number of times they engaged in
different types of CWB, which they conceptualized as organizational and interpersonal
deviance. Results from this study indicated that NA accounted for significant unique vari-
ance in both interpersonal and organizational CWB, even when justice perceptions were
entered into the regression first. Furthermore, the data were more supportive of their
model, indicating a direct relationship between NA and CWB (both interpersonal and
organizational), than an alternative model wherein justice perceptions mediate the rela-
tionship between NA and CWB.
Trait anger and trait anxiety Whereas some studies have examined the broad emotion trait
of NA, others have investigated the role of more specific emotion traits. For example, trait
anger refers to individual differences in the tendency to experience anger over time and across
a variety of situations (Spielberger et al., 1988). Similarly, individuals high on trait anxiety
find a broader range of situations to be anxiety provoking and experience higher levels of
anxiety in general. Research evidence indicates that both trait anger and trait anxiety are
related to CWB (Fox & Spector, 1999; Fox et al., 2001). In particular, trait anger was found
to be more strongly related to CWB directed at other people. Moreover, Fox et al. (2001)
found evidence suggesting that both trait anger and trait anxiety moderate the relationship
between job stressors (organizational constraints and interpersonal conflict) and CWB. In
each case, individuals with high levels of those traits performed more person-directed CWB
when they experienced high levels of stressors than individuals low on those traits.
In sum, the dominant theoretical frameworks in CWB research have much in common
with cognitive appraisal theories of emotion. This perspective emphasizes how individual
perceptions or interpretations of events influence the affective experience which in turn
shapes subsequent behavior. Research has shown that when employees encounter events
in the workplace that they label as stressful or aversive, they frequently experience nega-
tive emotions such as anger and frustration which can be followed by CWB. Cognitive
appraisal theories also stress how experienced affect can influence subsequent cognitions.
The CWB literature has shown that individual differences in the tendencies to experience
negative emotions are related to the perception of stressful events, as well as the perfor-
mance of CWB.
Emotion regulation and CWB

Whereas cognitive appraisal theories of emotion tend to emphasize individuals as reac-
tive to their cognitions and emotions, theories of emotion regulation point out ways in
which individuals are more proactive in their affective experience. The idea of emotion
regulation extends back to James’s (1884, 1894) view of emotions as adaptive response
tendencies with both behavioral and physiological elements that evolved in response to
environmental challenges. An extension of this viewpoint is that individual response ten-
dencies can be self-modified. For example, feeling anger does not always lead to yelling or
other aggressive outbursts. Instead, people are able to modify or adjust how they experi-
ence and respond to their emotions.
Emotion regulation is defined as ‘the processes by which individuals influence which
emotions they have, when they have them and how they experience and express these emo-
tions’ (Gross, 1998, p. 275). According to Gross, research on emotion regulation devel-
oped out of the literature on stress and coping. Lazarus and Folkman (1984) define
coping as the cognitive and behavioral steps taken by individuals in response to perceived
demands or stressors. Coping may include efforts to directly address and alter the source
of the problem (i.e., problem-focused coping) or efforts to reduce the negative emotional
experience (i.e., emotion-focused coping). However, emotion regulation is much broader
in scope than coping in that it emphasizes more discrete categories of emotion, both pos-
itive and negative, whereas the stress and coping literature focuses mostly on broad cate-
gories of negative emotion (Gross, 1998).
Emotion regulation processes can be categorized into either antecedent- or response-
focused strategies (Pugh, 2002). Antecedent-focused strategies attempt to control
emotion-inducing stimuli before response tendencies are set in motion, whereas response-
focused strategies target the expression of the emotion after emotion response tendencies
are activated. However, Gross (1998) makes much finer distinctions among emotion regu-
lation processes and proposes five categories. The first, ‘situation selection’, refers to delib-
erately engaging or avoiding certain people, places, or situations in order to avoid things
that might lead to unwanted emotions, or engage people, places, or situations that might
lead to desired emotions. In the workplace, this could include taking longer breaks to
avoid stressful tasks, and spending more time socializing with co-workers during work
hours to experience the positive emotions that come with camaraderie. ‘Situation
modification’ is akin to problem-focused coping in the stress literature (Lazarus &
Folkman, 1984). It consists of ‘efforts to directly modify the situation so as to alter its
emotional impact’ (Gross, 1998, p. 283). In work settings this might involve finding more
efficient ways to complete tasks in order to reduce workload. A third emotion regulation
strategy is ‘attention deployment’, wherein individuals distract themselves from undesired
emotions by concentrating on less emotion provoking stimuli (if experiencing negative
emotions), or in the case of positive emotions, perhaps thinking about an event associ-
ated with a positive emotional experience. This might involve web surfing at work in order
to distract from something unpleasant in the environment. In contrast, ‘cognitive change’
refers to attempts to reinterpret an emotion-provoking event so that it produces a more
desired emotional state. This is a controlled process that occurs before the emotion
response tendency is fully engaged. For example, an individual might cognitively reinter-
pret an event by focusing on potentially positive outcomes. Finally, ‘response modulation’
occurs after the emotion response tendency has been activated and consists of actions
taken to reduce the ‘physiological, experiential, or behavioral’ aspects of emotional
response (Lord & Harvey, 2002, p. 136). For example, alcohol and drug use, exercise and
relaxation techniques can reduce the physiological arousal associated with intense nega-
tive emotions such as anger.
Although CWB has not been studied in relation to emotion regulation, some behaviors
that are performed to regulate emotions could also be considered counterproductive from
an organization’s perspective. For example, employee withdrawal (e.g., taking longer
breaks than allowed, calling in ‘sick’, leaving early) can be a form of situation selection
that may reflect attempts by employees to regulate their negative emotions by limiting
exposure to stressful situations. Withdrawal could also be construed as a form of response
modulation. If an employee is experiencing stress, dissatisfaction, or other negative emo-
tions because of work, then taking time away from work may reduce the experience of
those negative feelings.
Response modulation also includes behaviors that inhibit or control the expression of
emotions. The research on emotional labor has focused specifically on how employees in
service jobs must regulate the emotions they display in front of customers (Hochschild,
1983). However, these behaviors could also be used to control the emotions that are dis-
played in front of co-workers and supervisors. Employees who experience strong feelings
of anger of frustration at co-workers or supervisors may decide that directly expressing
their emotions would be less than advantageous. An employee might attempt to express
positive emotions instead of the emotions felt, perhaps by smiling and using humor. To
the extent that the emotions are actually felt (i.e., deep acting; Grandey, 2000), the nega-
tive emotion can be modified.
Other CWB such as wasting time and performing non-work-related tasks (e.g., surfing
the internet, or hanging around the water cooler) could in some instances be a form of
attention deployment wherein employees distract themselves from unpleasant emotions
at work by focusing on other less emotionally relevant activities. Another possibility is
that those behaviors may be attempts to induce positive emotions because of the pleasure
they bring in the short term. In other words, employees who are bored at work may spend
time online instant messaging friends or playing games simply because it is fun. Finally,
other CWB such as theft and sabotage, is often construed as on act of retaliation or an
attempt to restore equity. While an abundance of research evidence supports retaliation
as a potential driver for theft, it is also possible that there is also a emotion component to
these forms of CWB. Employees who successfully get away with an act of sabotage or
theft may experience pleasure or satisfaction at getting back at the company. In the case
of individuals who are low in impulse control or high on risk taking, the satisfaction of
obtaining a desired object or pulling one over on a supervisor may be the principal goal.
In summary, while CWB is often a reaction to stressful or aversive conditions at work,
in some situations, CWB may actually be performed by employees as a means to regulate
their emotional experiences at work. Such behaviors can be effective in reducing negative
and enhancing positive emotion. This is primarily done through withdrawal from work
when the situation is potentially stressful, engaging in non-task activities as a means of
distraction and enhancing positive mood, or engaging in behaviors such as alcohol or
drug consumption to cope with negative emotions. Such acts can be forms of CWB that
have detrimental effects on organizations. It is also possible that under some conditions
such CWBs have positive effects as they represent constructive means of dealing with
difficult and stressful situations.
Limitations and future research directions

The evidence presented in this chapter clearly indicates that emotions, particularly anger,
play an important role in the performance of CWB. However, there are several limitations
to the research conducted to date and avenues that have not yet been explored. First,
whereas most models of CWB, including the stressor-emotion (Spector & Fox, 2005) and
causal reasoning (Martinko et al., 2002) models, typically describe the process as an
affective event, the majority of research in this area uses quantitative measures in cross-
sectional designs that capture an aggregation of experiences rather than examining a
single event in depth. While a few studies have examined CWB using qualitative methods
that collect data on incidents (Fitness, 2000; Glomb, 2002; Tunstall et al., 2006), these
studies have relied on retrospective accounts of employee CWB along with the events and
emotions that surround them. Such reports are subject to biases in recall and in most cases
(Tunstall et al., 2006 being the exception), have focused solely on anger. More studies are
needed like Judge et al. (2006) who used an experience sampling method to examine how
daily fluctuations in perceived justice impacts mood and subsequent CWB. Diary studies
also can be used to capture employees’ moods and emotions in relation to a wide range
of experiences and behaviors on the job.
Moreover, whereas the research on employee abuse, mobbing and bullying (Keashly &
Harvey, 2005; Zapf & Einarsen, 2005) has investigated the emotional impact on employ-
ees who are the target of others’ CWB, few studies have examined how engaging in CWB
affects the actor’s subsequent emotions. The emotion regulation perspective suggests that
some CWBs may be performed as an attempt by employees to regulate their own emo-
tional experiences at work by either reducing the experience or effects of negative emo-
tions or increasing the experience of positive emotions. However, no studies to date have
employed an emotion regulation perspective in the study of CWB. Knowing how actors
feel after performing CWB (e.g., happy or guilty) will help us to more fully understand
these complex behaviors.
Related to the theories of emotion regulation are the effects of individual differences in
emotional expressivity, defined as ‘the extent to which individuals manifest emotional
impulses behaviorally’ (Pugh, 2002, p. 168). Research has found that reliable differences
between individuals in terms of how expressive they are with regard to voice, facial expres-
sions and other body language can be measured (Gross & John, 1997). According to
Gross and John, individuals vary in the strength of their emotional response tendencies,
as well as in how intensely they express both positive and negative emotions. Perhaps indi-
viduals who are more emotionally expressive are more apt to perform CWB. The research
evidence supporting the role of negative emotions in the performance of CWB would
suggest that individuals with a greater tendency to express negative emotions may be more
apt to perform CWB. Similarly, theories of emotional intelligence suggest that individu-
als with greater levels of emotional intelligence are: (a) more aware of their feelings;
(b) more able to effectively regulate their emotions; (c) more motivated to perform appro-
priate behaviors; (d) more empathetic to others’ emotions; and (e) more skilled in
managing relations with others (Salovey & Mayer, 1990). As a consequence, because
individuals who are lower in emotional intelligence are less able to effectively manage their
emotions and express them appropriately, they may be more likely to perform CWB than
individuals higher on emotional intelligence. However, these ideas are merely speculation
and research is needed to examine what effects, if any, emotional expressivity and emo-
tional intelligence have on the performance of CWB.
Finally, the idea of emotional contagion is often discussed in the emotion literature, but
it has not yet been explored in the CWB literature. According to Pugh (2002), emotional
contagion occurs because individuals have a tendency to unconsciously imitate another
person’s emotional expressions (e.g., body language, or voice). This synchronization in
expressivity often leads to a synchronization of emotional experience. Research evidence
suggests that group levels of CWB are related to individual levels of CWB (Robinson &
O’Leary-Kelly, 1998). Furthermore, in their model of workplace incivility, Andersson and
Pearson (1999) propose that incivility spirals can negatively affect individuals who witness
uncivil exchanges among others in such a way that incivility is further propagated in the
work group. Future studies might investigate the extent to which emotion contagion
occurs when witnessing individuals as targets of abusive and uncivil behaviors and
whether such contagion results in CWB. It seems possible that the relationship in group
levels of CWB to individual levels can be explained in terms of emotional contagion.
Research might investigate the extent to which specific emotions, such as anger, spread
throughout groups and whether that contributes to CWB.
Conclusions
Emotion, particularly negative emotion, plays a prominent role in both research and
theory in the CWB domain. Both enduring emotion traits and transient emotional states
have been linked to a variety of CWB. Almost all of this research, however, fits into the
cognitive appraisal framework, whereby events and situations in the environment lead to
emotions which in turn lead to behavior. Such models leave the individual as a largely
passive pawn of the environment, merely reacting emotionally and behaviorally to events
as they occur. Although a role for individual differences is clearly indicated, these models
leave the behavior as a function of the external context and predetermined internal pre-
dispositions. The emotion regulation position, on the other hand, views the individual as
an active agent in choosing environmental exposure and the strategy for dealing with that
environment. Thus the person does not merely react in an almost automatic manner, but
is an active decision maker in determining the nature of the environment and reactions to
it. This approach has been overlooked by CWB researchers, whose work can be profitably
informed by this theoretical approach. It shows great promise in helping us understand
the complexities of employee CWB.
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12 Measuring emotion: methodological issues and
alternatives
Marie T. Dasborough, Marta Sinclair, Rebekah
Russell-Bennett and Alastair Tombs*
Introduction
Given the increased profile of emotions in the past decade (Ashkanasy & Daus, 2002), the
aim of this chapter is to raise awareness of measurement issues. As scholars, we are inter-
ested in examining emotions as dependent and independent variables, and also in manip-
ulation checks to verify experimental induction of emotional states. In spite of the many
studies on emotion, poor measurement remains the Achilles’ heel of this line of research
(Huelsman et al., 2003). Accurate assessment of emotion is imperative for advancing
knowledge in this field; therefore, our focus is on critical evaluation of commonly used
emotions measures.
Although there is no one agreed-upon definition, it is acknowledged that emotions
involve cognitive appraisal, physiological arousal, and subjective feelings (Kleinginna &
Kleinginna, 1981). While there is debate over the order of these responses, we do know
that each element may be used to measure emotions. The most common method is
through self-report measures which tap into cognitive appraisal and subjective feelings.
For the purpose of this chapter, the following discussion revolves around a number of
intricate issues involved with emotions research. First, we explore questions surrounding
the definition of emotion and the implications for self-report measurement. Then, we turn
our attention to specific self-report measures. Finally, we present some alternative mea-
sures, and conclude with some future directions for emotion measurement.
Emotion definition and implications for measurement

There are inconsistencies in the measurement of emotions, and danger lies in drawing gen-
eralizations about the effects without clarifying what exactly was measured and how.
Besides the overarching issue of terminology, some areas in need of clarification relate to:
the specificity of the examined emotion (generic positive and negative vs. discrete emo-
tions), the measured dimension (arousal vs. pleasantness), unitary or bipolar nature of the
construct, ability to express the emotional experience verbally, stability, cultural context,
and gender differences. Of great concern is the fact that most researchers do not provide
a theoretical rationale for the measurement approach used, for example why use one
measure of emotion over another? Another set of underlying concerns relates to the
actual measurement, in particular, the accuracy of recollection and self-report techniques.
The literature appears to refer inconsistently to four constructs: emotions, affect, mood,
and feelings. In many instances, erroneously, affect and emotion are used interchangeably.
These are in fact two different constructs. The prevalent view of affect in current research
is that of an overarching term for all emotions and moods (see Forgas, 1994; Weiss &
Cropanzano, 1996). Within this framework, Weiss and Cropanzano describe emotion as
197
an ‘affective reaction’ to an event. According to Frijda (1993) emotions are usually intense
and short-lived. Emotions differ from mood, which is regarded as a relatively stable feeling
that lacks specificity and tends to be longer in duration and of less intensity (ibid.). In
addition, momentary mood has been distinguished from subtle feelings, which are
described as a fleeting emotional state evoked by a specific activity (Petitmengin-Peugeot,
1999). Clearly, these distinctions have implications for measurement.
Although there is no consensus among researchers about the number of existing emo-
tions, most distinguish between a small set of primary (basic) emotions and a large
number of discrete emotions, which may be clustered under the primary emotion cate-
gories. Based on evolutionary theory, Plutchik (1980) identified eight basic emotions
(fear, anger, joy, sadness, acceptance, disgust, anticipation, and surprise); other
researchers arrived at slightly different lists, usually ranging between five and seven labels.
The most commonly added constructs are happiness, love, hate, and contempt (see
Shaver et al., 1987; Richins, 1997). There are a great variety in terms of discrete emo-
tions; some taxonomies list more than a hundred labels (see Shaver et al., 1987; Storm &
Storm, 1987).
While examination of discrete emotions is of interest due to the different stimuli behind
each one, they are often experienced in a patterned relation to one another (Diener, 1999).
Specifically, often the positive emotions are co-experienced, for example, joy and pride. In
a similar manner, the negative emotions often occur concurrently. Diener suggests that
there is ‘a glue that holds together certain discrete emotions’ (p. 803). Also, he suggests
that there are separate biological systems for pleasant and unpleasant affect, which is why
they follow different diurnal patterns (see also Ashby et al., 1999). Further, at any one
moment in time, especially in the case of intense emotions, individuals tend to feel either
pleasant or unpleasant emotions (not both).
An opposite trend has been to measure positive and negative affect as the most basic
emotional responses (Petty et al., 1991). This approach seems to be more suitable for cap-
turing a generic affective tone than discrete emotions (see Watson et al., 1988). Moreover,
there has been an ongoing discussion in the literature whether positive and negative affect
represent one bipolar construct (i.e., they are opposite extremes of the same continuum,
and thus are mutually exclusive) or whether they are two unipolar dimensions (i.e., they
are independent of each other, and thus can be experienced simultaneously) (see Russell
& Carroll, 1999a, 1999b; Watson & Tellegen, 1999), which has an obvious implication for
measurement. The unipolar view is supported by the above-mentioned findings that each
affect might be mediated by an independent neural pathway (see Diener, 1999).
Another measurement-related issue involves the underlying dimensions of emotions.
The most widely accepted dimensions are pleasantness and arousal (see Smith &
Ellsworth, 1985), although some scholars have added dominance as a third dimension (see
Richins, 1997), and others arrived at as many as six (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). The basic
two dimensions require differently constructed scales, reflecting the unipolar nature of
arousal and bipolarity of pleasantness (see Larsen et al., 1985). Since arousal evaluates
intensity without specifying the experienced emotion, it can be tested by a wider range of
instruments, including physiological measures. When measuring only one dimension, it
needs to be considered whether the other dimensions should be controlled for, depending
on the research purpose. For example, Elsbach and Barr (1999) assessed high and low
pleasantness while holding arousal at a moderate level.
Measuring emotion 199
Verbal self-report measures of emotion

Apart from physiological measures of arousal (discussed later in this chapter), there is no
known objective, external measure of the subjective, internal ‘events’ or emotions, that
people experience, such as fear, anger, joy, and so on (Barrett, 2004). For this reason, psy-
chologists have traditionally relied on self-reported emotion. These thoughts about emo-
tional experiences can be captured through spoken and written words on rating scales,
answers to open-ended questions during interviews and on surveys, self-assessments or
perceptions about others, and responding to projective instruments.
There are many self-report scales of emotional experience in the literature, and most
use a variety of words to verbally explain the emotions being experienced. The lexicon of
emotions is large, for example, Storm and Storm (1987) arrived at a hierarchical taxon-
omy including 525 emotion labels. In verbal measures, respondents rate whether or not,
or the intensity with which, they are feeling each emotion. The common element for self-
report measures is the assumption that emotion is the result of cognitive appraisal. This
places emotion as an outcome of mental processes and evaluation of an event or object
(Frijda, 1986), rather than as an autonomic involuntary, somewhat unconscious response
(Zajonc, 1980).
In the social sciences, the most commonly used scale is the PANAS (Positive and
Negative Affect Schedule; Watson et al., 1988); as at May 2008, it has been cited over 3600
times in the Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI). This scale has been used to measure
state affect (momentary mood), trait affect (dispositional mood), and positive and nega-
tive emotional responses as two independent reactions. Instead of working with ‘unro-
tated dimensions’ of pleasantness and arousal, the PANAS scale assesses positive affect
(PA) and negative affect (NA) as two overarching factors of emotional activation (see
Watson et al., 1988).
The PANAS scale consists of 10 positive and 10 negative adjectives that an individual
rates on a Likert scale, from ‘not at all’ to ‘extremely’. Since both scales have demonstrated
a consistently low intercorrelation, they can be used to measure independent effects of
each affect. The PANAS developers report stable scale intercorrelations in different time-
frames (from –0.12 to –0.25); however, others found differences (e.g., Diener & Emmons,
1984). Moreover, stability appears to increase with temporal aggregation (Watson et al.,
1988), although momentary ratings exhibit high reliability.
Although the PANAS is the most widely used measure of emotion in the social sciences,
it is not without criticism. One point of contention is that it only taps the high activation
poles of PA and NA, therefore it reflects only half of the theoretical basis of this instru-
ment (Huelsman et al., 2003). However, Watson et al. suggest that since emotions are
aroused-engaged states, we should only be interested in those that are higher in arousal.
A further criticism is that although the labels of PA and NA imply unipolarity, they are
in fact referring to bipolar dimensions. Hence, the labels are misleading and they fail to
include semantic opposites.
Fisher’s (2000) Job Emotions Scale (JES) comprises eight negative and eight positive
adjectives and uses a 1 ‘not at all’ to 5 ‘a great deal’ scale. The focus of this scale is on dis-
crete emotions, differentiating it from the PANAS. However, items of each valence tend
to be intercorrelated so they can be combined to create overall measures of positive and
negative emotions. The JES has been used to measure real-time momentary emotional
experience as well as retrospective reports of emotion. This scale has good reliability and
construct validity (Fisher, 2000); however, it has not been cited as frequently as the
PANAS due to its recent development.
Similar to the JES, the Job-Related Affective Well-Being Scale (JAWS: Van Katwyk
et al., 2000) uses a list of affective terms to assess emotional responses to jobs. This is a
longer scale, consisting of 30 items which provide a total JAWS score; and 20 of these 30
items are divided into four scales (5 items each) that represent: (i) high pleasure, high
arousal, (ii) high pleasure, low arousal, (iii) low pleasure, high arousal, and (iv) low plea-
sure, low arousal. This scale has not been used extensively, and has been criticized because
the empirical relationships between the sets of items were not taken into account in the
process of forming the scales.
The Job Affect Scale (JAS) also measures both positive and negative affect at work
(Brief et al., 1988). This scale is based on empirical work by Watson et al. (1988), who
found that positive and negative affect consistently emerged as the first two orthogonal
dimensions of self-rated emotion and that clear markers of each dimension could be
identified. Hence, the JAS and PANAS are conceptually similar; however the JAS is
focused on job affect, rather than general affect. Another difference is that the JAS was
designed to include four separate scales. Individual items consist of a list of adjectives
describing emotional responses to work, with each item being assessed on a 5-point scale
ranging from ‘not at all’ to ‘very much’.
The Semantic Differential Measure of Emotional State scale (Mehrabian & Russell,
1974), also referred to as the PAD scale, consists of 18 items measuring three subscales,
displeasure (P), arousal (A), and dominance (D). The items on these subscales are bipolar,
semantic-differential items. This instrument has a clear factor structure providing evi-
dence for the three subscales; each of these scales is reliable and there are only small inter-
scale correlations (see Mehrabian & Russell, 1974; Mehrabian, 1995). This scale differs
from the others because it includes the dominance dimension, which may also be the
reason why it has not been used as often as the PANAS (it is cited 532 times in SSCI).
One of the most commonly used scales in marketing is Shaver et al.’s (1987) list of dis-
crete emotions, which identifies emotions experienced around consumer consumption
(Richins, 1997). This list has three levels of emotions, the superordinate (positive and neg-
ative), six basic emotions (fear, anger, sadness, joy, love and, surprise) and 135 subordinate
emotions. This list has been recently refined by Laros and Steenkamp (2005), who identify
the two superordinate levels of negative and positive affect, eight basic emotions (anger,
fear, sadness, shame, contentment, happiness, love, and pride) and 35 subordinate emotions.
Also in the marketing literature, Izard’s (1977) Differential Emotions Scale (DES) has
been used to explain emotions associated with word-of-mouth and complaint behaviors
(Westbrook, 1987). This scale measures 10 emotions generally associated with those
expressed through facial expressions (distress/sadness, anger, disgust, contempt, fear,
shame/shyness, guilt, interest, enjoyment, and surprise). The DES-II has extended this
scale by using 30 emotional descriptors to measure the 10 basic emotions. This scale,
however, concentrates on only negative emotions, not positive emotions (see Mano &
Oliver 1993; Richins 1997).
Problems with self-report verbal emotion scales

Each of the above self-report measures asks respondents to indicate the extent to which they
feel a particular emotion. Self-reports rely on participants engaging in some cognition and
memory processes to complete the form (Erevelles, 1998). There are a number of problems
associated with this. First, how can the researcher be sure that these ratings reflect individ-
ual differences in the phenomenological experience of emotions, rather than their individ-
ual differences in the cognitive structure of emotion language? Self-report techniques
presume that the respondent is aware of the experienced emotion and can correctly classify
it. Studies of affective orientation (see Booth-Butterfield & Booth-Butterfield, 1990) and
emotional intelligence (see Salovey et al., 1995) indicate, however, that there are significant
individual differences in this respect. Thus, the accuracy of the reported (not experienced)
emotional state is mediated by respondents’ emotional awareness. The reported intensity
level (arousal) might be susceptible to a similar mediation effect. Other possible reasons for
inaccurate reflection of the emotion experienced could be memory failure and impression
management or self-censorship.
The researcher must ensure that the emotion words in the scale are suited to the phe-
nomenon being studied. For example, if measuring emotional experiences at work, the
strong emotions of love and hate may not be applicable. Once we can be sure that the
words chosen to include in the scale are appropriate, and that people are actually report-
ing the emotions they feel, researchers are also faced with the problem of participants
potentially reporting emotions from a long list (e.g., the Shaver et al. list of 135 emotion
words), which can be a laborious process. It may result in respondent fatigue or the
respondents becoming lost in the options and losing the ability to discern the differences
(Richins, 1997). This problem has been addressed by reducing lists of emotions down to
those deemed most relevant to the situation. For example, Richins (1997) and Laros and
Steenkamp (2005) narrowed down a combination of lists to generate a smaller list of con-
sumption emotions.
Cultural differences pose another challenge to self-report measures of emotion. We
need to take into account verbal differences in emotional experiences across cultures.
Many self-report verbal measures of emotions have been translated into other languages
(e.g., Oishi et al., 2004). For example, Yik and Russell (2003) explored how affect can be
described and compared across languages. They developed scales to measure the struc-
ture of momentary affect (pleasantness and activation) among Cantonese-speaking
Chinese. This involved translating commonly used affect scales into Chinese. Their
findings support the circumplex model of emotion which includes arousal and valence
(Russell, 1980; Larsen & Diener, 1992).
It should be noted, however, that in some cultures there are words for emotions that do
not exist in other cultures. For example, the German emotion word ‘schadenfreude’, which
is pleasure at another’s misfortune (Ben-Ze’ev, 1992; Hareli & Weiner, 2002). Although
this emotion may be experienced in the US, for example, there is no one word to
denote this in the English language. This, however, does not mean that only Germans
experience this emotion. Further, different emotions might be experienced in a similar
context due to cultural conditioning. For example, shame in Eastern cultures
(Confucianism), or guilt in Western cultures (Judeo-Christian tradition). Such factors
would need to be considered in the measurement of emotions in different countries when
examining between-person emotional experiences.
Gender should also be considered here. Empirical evidence suggests that there are no
gender differences in the emotions experienced by men and women (Brody & Hall, 1993;
Simon & Nath, 2004); however, there are differences in the expression of these emotions
(Kring & Gordon, 1998; Simon & Nath, 2004). For instance, while men and women may
both feel upset in an organizational situation, it is more likely that women will express this
emotion while men are more likely to suppress it. Three alternative explanations for this
difference in emotional expression are cultural norms (Hochschild, 1979), social position
(Kemper, 1991), and family needs and structure (Parsons, 1964). Hence, researchers must
acknowledge this when measuring emotions in mixed gender samples.
Visual self-report emotion scales

The potential for underdeveloped emotion vocabularies makes words a less reliable source
of information than some other forms of emotional expression (Salovey & Sluyter, 1997).
Limitations in the emotional vocabulary of respondents might be mitigated by using non-
verbal measures, such as graphics or photographs (see Matsumoto & Ekman, 1988;
Kunin, 1998). Indeed, a number of researchers have shown that nonverbal cues are uti-
lized significantly more than verbal cues in assessing affect in others (Trimboli & Walker,
1987; Elfenbein et al., 2002). Moreover, facial expressions of emotion may hold the most
potential for conveying accurate meanings in interpersonal communication (Ekman,
1982; Leathers, 1997).
Interest in individuals’ use of facial expressions to signal emotions to others can be
traced back to Duchenne (1862 [1990]) and Darwin (1872 [1965]), yet the development of
scales using faces to measure emotions has been limited. This is despite universal expres-
sions corresponding to some basic emotions, such as anger. Work by Ekman and Friesen
(1978) focuses on the configurations of facial muscular movements, which have been
shown to provide an accurate representation of the emotions felt by an individual.
However, Ekman and Friesen’s ‘pictures of facial affect’ have been developed to measure
perceptions of emotions in others rather than as a self-report measure of an individual’s
feeling.
Kunin (1955, 1998) proposed the use of facial expressions as scale descriptors to graph-
ically represent how the respondent is feeling on a single good/bad continuum rather than
using descriptive words or numbers. The use of faces rather than words was seen as an
attempt to reduce errors in the ‘translation of one man’s feelings into another man’s
words. . . . The respondent is required only to check the face which “looks like he feels”
rather than verbalizing his feelings’ (Kunin 1955, pp. 65, 66). Hence, this scale is a single-
item scale.
The Kunin Faces Scale (1955, 1998) contains 11 line drawings of faces ranging from
unhappy through neutral to happy. The faces were chosen to represent an equal interval
scale and are treated as any other metric scale. Depicted as line drawings rather than pho-
tographs, the Kunin Faces avoid factors that may bias respondents’ judgment, such as race
and attractiveness. The original Faces Scale depicted male faces. Dunham and Herman
(1975) validated a scale containing line drawings of female faces, and demonstrated that
male and female forms can be used on respondents of both genders without biasing
effects. Schematic (circular) faces have also been used successfully (Kunin, 1998). To avoid
any potential gender, ethnicity or cultural bias we suggest the use of schematic facial
expressions. Although highly abstract, they have been shown to be as convincing as
natural faces (Bartneck, 2001) and recognized across cultures (Cuceloglu, 1970).
The original and most common application is to assess employee satisfaction
with aspects of their jobs. Since then, however, they have also been used to measure
momentary mood (Fisher, 2000, 2003). This scale format might be especially suitable
where a quick response is required. Several researchers (Brief & Robinson, 1989; Fisher,
2000) have shown strong support for the use of a non-verbal emotions measure, suggest-
ing that because the Kunin Faces Scale requires less cognitive processing it is more effective
in capturing the affective component of job satisfaction than using more verbal scales. The
Kunin Faces Scale is highly suited to measuring generic pleasantness/unpleasantness, but
is unable to assess specific discrete emotions or arousal.
The Affect Grid (Russell et al., 1989) and the Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM) (Lang,
1985; Morris, 1995) are two visual measures that overcome the one-dimensional aspect
of the Kunin Faces Scale by also measuring arousal. The Affect Grid is a 9 9 square
grid anchored horizontally with pleasure/displeasure (valence) and vertically with
arousal/sleepiness (activation). Respondents are asked to mark the one square, out of the
81 possible squares, that best reflects how they feel along these two dimensions. This is a
single-item scale which appears to be quick and simple; however, it does require additional
effort in training the respondents to understand what they are being asked to do. Despite
its demonstrated reliability (Russell et al., 1989) and validity (ibid.; Kilgore, 1998), there
have been very few instances of the Affect Grid being applied in organizational research
(Holbrook & Gardner, 1998; Dube et al., 1995).
The SAM is a computer-based interactive graphical instrument assessing emotional
responses (Hodes et al., 1985); a paper-and-pencil version is also available (Bradley & Lang,
1994). This measure follows Mehrabian and Russell’s (1974) PAD dimensions by measur-
ing pleasure, arousal, and dominance; this is despite dominance being discounted as a
measure of affect (Russell & Pratt, 1980; Donovan & Rossiter, 1982; Olney et al., 1991).
Each dimension of affect uses a nine-point scale where the respondent scores how they are
feeling either below or between one of five manikin figures. Each scale consists of a series
of cartoons that represent a manikin with visible expressions ranging from happiness
(smiling face) to sadness (sad face), from sleepiness (eyes closed) to high arousal (shaking
and heart pounding), and from submissiveness (small size) to dominance (large size). This
scale has been used primarily to measure affective responses to pleasant and unpleasant
images. Morris (1995) suggests that this scale is appropriate for cross-cultural research
because it uses universally recognized cues, and does not rely on verbal descriptors.
A recent development in self-report visual scales comes in the form of expressive ani-
mated cartoons. The Product Emotion Measurement Instrument (PrEmo: Desmet, 2004)
measures 14 emotions (seven positive and seven negative) that are often elicited by
product design. Each of the emotions is expressed by a 1–2-second animation that por-
trays the facial, bodily and vocal expressions associated with the specific emotion. While
this scale appears to have wide application, to our knowledge, it has not yet been used
beyond measuring emotions evoked by product design (ibid.).
Although visual self-report measures have the advantage of overcoming the problems
associated with articulation and understanding emotional vocabularies, the limitation of
what can be measured by faces and affect grid scales means that for measurement of
specific emotions the researcher is still reliant on verbal scales. Moreover, as emotional
intelligence influences facial emotion recognition (Salovey & Sluyter, 1997), any nonver-
bal scale trying to capture specific emotions with facial expressions (for example, using
Ekman’s photographic faces rather than line drawings by Kunin) may only be effective for
those high in emotional intelligence.
Alternatives to self-report emotion scales

Since emotions involve physiological changes, observing physical changes to the body can
indicate emotional states. These include changes to blood pressure, heart rate, adrenaline
levels, neural images, perspiration, tears, posture, muscle activity (when smiling or frown-
ing), and lie detector readings. For example, Martin et al. (1992) measured affect by
changes in heart rate. Other options, used commonly under experimental conditions,
might be checking blood pressure, pupil dilation, or skin conductance (Vaidya et al.,
2002). These types of emotional indicators, however, would be difficult to implement in
workplace settings due to cost, intrusion of employee privacy and productivity, and
ethical concerns.
Some of these physiological measures involve methods that are quite sophisticated and
require specialized equipment. For instance, advances in brain-wave analysis have enabled
a more refined testing of emotional responses. Other methods, more prevalent in medical
research, include the use of structural magnetic resonance (MR) imaging and positron
emission tomography (PET) scanning (see London et al., 2004). These approaches might
be more objective; however, they are not only costly but also obtrusive and might inter-
fere with the studied phenomenon. Moreover, some experts caution that even brain waves
do not always represent an accurate measurement of an emotion (Davidson, 1990).
In other instances, such as study of pre-event anxiety, researchers have found that neu-
robiological measures provide more direct evidence than physiological testing. Instead of
measuring heart rate, for example, Roberts et al. (2004), tested cortisol levels by means of
saliva samples. They argued that data collection by means of user-friendly ‘salivettes’ offers
a fast, accurate and stress-free alternative that reduces interference with respondents’ feel-
ings. Similarly, galvanic skin response, used widely in pre-testing marketing campaigns
and commercials, can be replaced by a more elegant and unobtrusive voice pitch analysis,
performed by computer from recorded interviews (see Russell et al., 2003). There are a
variety of physiological and neurobiological measurement techniques now available.
Nevertheless, such indicators may not be able to identify the specific emotion that has been
evoked. For example, if one’s heart rate increases, is it due to fear or excitement?
We can also observe behaviors, such as facial expressions (e.g., smiling), aggression,
insomnia, laughing, alertness, screaming, activity level, attention or distraction, approach
or avoidance, to measure emotion. Some of these behaviors are valid across cultures; for
example, see the work on the universality of facial expression by Charles Darwin (1872
[1965]), and later Paul Ekman (see Ekman & Friesen, 1978). However, there is concern
that such behaviors may be a result of numerous factors and not just the emotion that is
the focus of the study. There is also the concern that we have cultural rules for behavioral
expression of emotion (see Matsumoto & Ekman, 1988), and in some cultures we are
trained from an early age to suppress some emotion (e.g., disappointment) and display
emotions we are not really feeling (e.g., smiling when we are not really happy) (see Ekman,
1982). This presents a challenge for organizational research that aims to measure specific
relevant emotions.
Suggestions for future research on emotions

This critical review of measures of emotions in organizational research is not all-
inclusive; word restrictions limit the number of emotions measures we can review, as
well as the depth of our critical analysis. We have, however, discussed the popular
self-report measures used in the social sciences, and draw attention to some viable alter-
natives. To conclude, we list some recommendations for future organizational research
on emotion.
1. Identify clearly which dimensions of emotion are to be measured (e.g., valence,

arousal, dominance), and select the measure accordingly. Researchers should also
explicitly state if they are measuring discrete emotions, or more generic emotional
states (positive emotions and negative emotions), and provide theoretical rationale
for their choice of measure.
2. Emotions are not considered to be stable over time; thus, delayed reports are likely to
be contaminated (Robinson & Clore, 2002). We recommend measuring emotional
states in situ and as soon as feasible after they are experienced. Consider the use of
new technology, allowing for experiential sampling methods of data collection (ESM;
Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987; Hektner & Csikszentmihalyi, 2002), or voice activ-
ated software (see, e.g., Dragon Systems, 2006). This would enhance recollection, and
thus improve the accuracy of measurement (Kurek et al., 2001).
3. If using self-report measures of emotion, it is important to control for random mea-
surement error (see Green et al., 1999). Single-item measures are particularly suscep-
tible to random measurement error compared to multi-item questionnaires and, as a
result, their reliability is usually modest.
4. If using a self-report verbal measure of emotion, researchers should limit the number
of measured emotions at one sitting to reduce common method variance (Podsakoff
& Organ, 1986), by minimizing sensitization and confusion of respondents.
5. Self-report emotion verbal scales could also be used for content analysis, to analyze
qualitative interview transcripts, observed behaviors, or open-ended written responses
on surveys (e.g., Bennett et al., 2004; Dasborough, 2006). Content analysis allows the
researcher to identify unsolicited emotions, rather than impose categories on the
respondent.
6. The choice of measurement instrument should take into account participant indi-
vidual differences. For example, is the measure suitable for a certain culture or gender?
Also, is it appropriate given the respondents’ emotional vocabulary and expressivity,
and their level of emotional intelligence?
7. Diener (1999) calls for the use of measures of emotions other than self-report. We
also suggest that to increase measurement precision, researchers should incorporate
multiple methods. To capture all aspects of the emotional experience (cognitive
appraisal, physiological responses, and subjective feelings), it would be preferable to
have self-report measures, plus physiological and behavioral measures too.
Note
* We would also like to acknowledge Neal M. Ashkanasy and Cyn D. Fisher for their input to discussions
about the measurement of emotion at the UQ Emotions Reading Group meetings.
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PART II
EMOTION AS AN INDIVIDUAL
DIFFERENCE VARIABLE
13 The use of emotional intelligence in business:
resolving varying definitions and measures and
their relationship to work performance
Peter J. Jordan*
Introduction
While doing the background research to write this chapter, I noticed that Daniel
Goleman’s book is now being published in a 10-year anniversary edition. This is
significant. It was Goleman’s (1995) book that first drew the public’s attention to the
concept of emotional intelligence and outlined the connection between emotional intelli-
gence and business. Indeed, the editors of this book note that Goleman’s book was a
major catalyst for business taking a broader interest in research into emotions in organ-
izations. While Goleman has done much to raise the profile of emotions in organizations
and emotional intelligence in particular, he has also generated discord between
researchers and consultants and human resource specialists over what it is to be ‘emo-
tionally intelligent’.
Academics have extensively debated the emotional intelligence construct definition (see
Mayer et al., 2000; Matthews et al., 2002; Jordan et al., 2003; Murphy, 2006) and methods
of measurement (Mayer et al., 2003). Despite these debates, the concept of emotional intel-
ligence (no matter what the construct definition) is making a difference in business – or at
least that is the opinion of many practitioners in information technology (Levinson, 2003),
in human resource management (Neely-Martinez, 1997), in finance (Kirch et al., 2001) and
in management (Myers & Tucker, 2005). The purpose of this chapter is to examine the use
of emotional intelligence in business, and to review the extent to which research findings
support the claim that emotional intelligence contributes to work performance. I shall also
offer some future research directions based on my review.
Emotions research and business

Emotions are well accepted as providing one of the three legs of the tripod that determine
human interactions: emotion, cognition and motivation (Frijda, 1986). Consequently, a
broad understanding of the impact of emotions on business is emerging (Ashkanasy et al.,
2000). This realization is not recent. If we really want to look at the first mention of the link
between emotions and work, a reading of James (1884) reveals a discussion of the emotions
generated by a farmer going about his daily business. Current research examining emotions
in business emerges from Hochschild’s (1983) groundbreaking work on emotional labor in
airline attendants and Rafaeli and Sutton’s (1987) work on emotional displays of checkout
operators in supermarkets. More recent significant contributions include Fisher’s (2003)
substantial refutation of the happy workers/productive workers thesis to show that it is not
happy workers that are productive but, rather that productive workers are happy. There have
also been significant theoretical developments in the field with models such as affective
events theory (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996), the theory of bounded emotionality (Putnam
211
& Mumby, 1993) and Ashkanasy’s (2003) outline of a multilevel model of emotions at work
providing an insight into the emotional processes inherent in the workplace.
While this extensive body of work has been collegial and researchers have built upon
one another’s work – the emergence of the concept of emotional intelligence has seen a
comparatively fierce debate erupt (see Daus & Ashkanasy, 2005; Landy, 2005; Locke,
2005). The focus of much of this debate has been around the impact of emotional intel-
ligence on work performance. Certainly, the introduction of emotional intelligence to the
business community through books such as those by Goleman (1995, 1998) and subse-
quent tomes by Weisinger (1998) and Cooper and Sawaf (1997) have increased the expec-
tations of performance improvements attributed to emotional intelligence. The timing of
the focus on the emotional aspects of businesses has also been significant.
If we look at the economic rationalist fervor of the 1980s, emotion was on the outer –
the focus in business was efficiency over effectiveness, and consequently, rationality dom-
inated emotions (despite the irony of rationality invoking a specific emotional state). The
outcome was some very economically efficient organizations, albeit ones that lacked com-
petitive advantage, as every other company was improving efficiency in the same way
(Pusey, 1992). By the 1990s, the focus on economic rationalism was declining and com-
panies were attempting to take a more holistic approach to business (ibid.). The only
trouble was that they had nothing to fill in the gap that was left by removing economic
rationalism. Some resorted to responses based on the humanist movement in human
resource management (Willmott, 2003), but this only really addressed procedural issues
in relation to individual performance and in some cases team performance. It did not
provide a platform for focusing the entire company on an alternative competitive strategy.
Enter emotional intelligence – a unifying concept that, when simply outlined, everyone
knew made a difference. Until Goleman’s (1995) book, however, managers did not have a
unifying construct to explain it. Salovey and Mayer’s (1990) introduction of emotional
intelligence and Goleman’s (1995) subsequent use of this concept in applying it to organ-
izational behavior provided the spark that filled this void.
What is emotional intelligence? Is it an intelligence?

Horn and Cattell (1966) argue that intelligence can be divided into two distinct factors:
fluid intelligence, or the adaptability and basic reasoning ability of an individual; and
crystallized intelligence, or the level of ability in skills valued by that individual’s culture.
Although most authors working in the field of emotional intelligence have described emo-
tional intelligence as a crystallized and therefore mutable ability (Mayer & Salovey, 1997),
others claim that there is an element of fluid intelligence involved in the construct (e.g.,
Cooper & Sawaf, 1997). Clearly, emotional intelligence incorporates a range of emotional
responses that are culturally prescribed, and therefore, emotional intelligence could be
described as a crystallized intelligence.
Sternberg (1985) maintains that three criteria determine the existence of intelligence.
First, he suggests that intelligence should reflect behavior in the real world, relevant to the
culture in which the individual lives. Second, it should be purposive or directed toward
goals. Third, it should involve either reasoning abilities (fluid intelligence) or the automa-
tion of high-level processes (crystallized ability).
Sternberg argues that the most valuable contributions in the field of intelligence
are contextual, that is, they tap the link between mental functioning and situational
Emotional intelligence in business 213
performance. Sternberg’s point here is that intelligence needs to be able to be applied and
to be useful in practical situations. Certainly, emotional intelligence fits this framework.
Emotional intelligence focuses on the link between cognitive activity and emotional per-
ceptions and reactions (Mayer & Salovey, 1997), a continuous process for every individ-
ual. The importance of the link between emotion and cognition has been noted by some
researchers who observe that individuals with high fluid intelligence (abstract thinking)
sometimes also lack interpersonal skills (Sternberg, 1997). The episodic and situationally
specific nature of emotions provides a practical focus to emotional intelligence, particu-
larly in business settings where emotions can both engender and decrease performance
(Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996).
Emotional intelligence in business

When emotional intelligence was first proposed in 1990 by Salovey and Mayer, it was seen
as a way of emphasizing the substantial link between emotions and cognition. This idea
was further enhanced when Joseph Le Doux’s (1996) groundbreaking work debunked the
myth of Descartes’s (1988) ‘I think therefore I am’, showing that emotions predominate
our thinking. Emotional intelligence was proposed as a broad construct to be used to
show how human beings feel and then think and then act. The emotional intelligence con-
struct obviously hit a cord with Goleman (1995), who pointed out the links to business
and then expanded on this in 1998 with a book entirely devoted to the impact of emo-
tional intelligence on business. Goleman’s initial work was followed in quick succession
by a number of popular books examining the topic of emotional intelligence in the work-
place, with special emphasis on executive development (Cooper & Sawaf, 1997) and lead-
ership (Ryback, 1998).
This explosion of interest in emotional intelligence and the subsequent proliferation of
material that was published in a variety of venues from newspapers to magazines to jour-
nals to books and websites set the scene for a period of confusion. The central question
everyone in business was grappling with was – what is emotional intelligence? How can
we best apply it to make a difference to our business? To cut a long story short: money
was available for anyone who could come up with a way of introducing emotional intelli-
gence into business. This is generally a bandwagon that a lot of people want to jump on.
Definitions of emotional intelligence in business

There is a bifurcation between the business view of emotional intelligence and research
views of emotional intelligence. Generally, business is happy to accept any process that
can produce improved performance in their business. As one CEO put it to me, ‘I don’t
care about the fine details of who has the right definition of emotional intelligence – as
long as I can see the sense of encouraging these skills in my employees and that
these skills will benefit both my business and my shareholders – who cares what the
definition is’.
While many CEOs and managers may not care about the fine details of construct
definitions, as a researcher, I argue that this is a major issue. If we are looking for perfor-
mance gains that can establish competitive advantage, then we need to be clear about what
we are doing and how it is different from what has been done before. To quote an old adage,
‘If we continue to do what we have always done, then we will continue to get what we have
always got’. Emotional intelligence, to be of any benefit, needs to provide something
different, to have incremental explanatory value over other psychological constructs used
in business.
John (Jack) Mayer and Peter Salovey

A broadly accepted definition used in research circles and in some practitioner circles that
clearly distinguishes emotional intelligence from aspects of personality is that of Mayer
and Salovey (1997). The model of emotional intelligence proposed by them includes per-
ception (awareness of own and others’ emotions), facilitation (ability to generate emo-
tions appropriate to the task), understanding (ability to understand emotional cycles and
patterns), and management of emotion (ability to control and express emotions in self
and others) (see Table 13.1). This model clearly links emotional intelligence to the inter-
action of emotion and cognition. In this model, perception provides the foundation for
using other emotional intelligence abilities. The process of developing emotional intelli-
gence, as described by Mayer and Salovey, is iterative, rather than linear. In other words,
experiences that produce emotions provide us with an opportunity for improving our
emotional abilities. For instance, if we experience an inappropriate angry outburst that
we regret, reflection will involve emotional understanding to determine why our emotion
intensified and this will transfer to emotional awareness in the future to enable us to
control the trigger for that emotion (emotional management). The model outlined by
Mayer and Salovey, however, is not the dominant model of emotional intelligence used in
business.
Daniel Goleman
Two models of emotional intelligence that dominate the workplace are those of Goleman
(1998) and Bar-On (1997). Both these models dominate business as each of these authors
quickly identified the commercial potential in emotional intelligence and sought to
develop measurement products to take advantage of that potential. Goleman outlines five
components of emotional intelligence: self-awareness, self-regulation, self-motivation,
empathy, and social skills (see Table 13.1 for a detailed examination of the constructs
involved in these components). Although three of these factors, self-awareness, self-
regulation and social skills, broadly interpreted, conform to the broad factors that a
number of researchers had identified as constituting emotional intelligence (see Table
13.1), there has been a significant debate over whether other factors, including motivation
and empathy, should be part of the construct. For instance, Mayer and Salovey (1997)
describe empathy as a ‘shadow construct’; that is, it may co-vary with emotional intelli-
gence, but they consider that empathy is not a factor of emotional intelligence. An exam-
ination of other models of emotional intelligence used by business also demonstrates a
divergence in its construct definition.
Reuven Bar-On
Bar-On (1997) separates emotional intelligence into five domains: intrapersonal skills,
interpersonal skills, cognition-orientation skills, stress management skills, and affect
orientation. The operational constructs for emotional intelligence suggested by Bar-On
include self-regard, emotional self-awareness, assertiveness, independence, self-actualiz-
ation, empathy, social responsibility, interpersonal relationship, stress tolerance, impulse
control, reality testing, flexibility, problem solving, optimism, and affective well-being
Table 13.1 Comparison of models of emotional intelligence used in business
Emotions constructs Other constructs

Author Awareness of Emotional Emotional Management Personality traits Attitude Compound
emotions knowledge facilitation of emotions constructs
Salovey and Yes No Yes Yes No No No
Mayer (1990)
Mayer and Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
Salovey (1997)
Goleman Self-assessment Empathy Communication Self-control Self-confidence Service orientation Leveraging
(1995, 1998) Emotional Conflict Adaptability Conscientiousness diversity
awareness management Achievement Commitment Political
drive Trustworthiness awareness
Optimism Initiative Self-motivation
215
Influence Developing
Leadership others
Innovation Change catalyst
Collaboration Building bonds
Team capabilities
Bar-On (1997) Self-awareness Empathy Problem solving Impulse Self-actualization Social Affective
control Self-regard responsibility well-being
Assertiveness Optimism Reality testing
Independence Stress tolerance
Flexibility Interpersonal
relationship
Source: Based on Jordon (2001).

(see Table 13.1). On closer examination, Bar-On’s factors of optimism, self-regard, social
responsibility, and independence are generally considered to be attitudinal factors, as
opposed to abilities. Other factors such as affective well-being, self-actualization, assertive-
ness, and stress tolerance may be outcomes of emotional intelligence, rather than factors of
the construct (see Table 13.1).
In considering models of emotional intelligence that have been applied in business set-
tings, I have been exclusive rather than inclusive in identifying models of emotional intel-
ligence. For instance, authors such as Cooper and Sawaf (1997) have published a
popularist definition of emotional intelligence that consists of four factors: emotional
alchemy, emotional literacy, emotional depth, and emotional fitness. The nomenclature
used by Cooper and Sawaf is clearly designed to be interpretative, rather than explana-
tory, and consequently I have restricted my discussion in this chapter to more mainstream
models of emotional intelligence that have stood the test of time in business settings.
So what do these varying definitions of emotional intelligence mean for business? As
can be seen from the table, some authors have used such broad definitions of emotional
intelligence, that separating out the unique contribution of emotional intelligence
becomes difficult. In other words, any performance improvement that can be attributed
to emotional intelligence may be confounded with benefits that emerge from personality
variables. I need to note here that I am not arguing that Goleman (1998) and Bar-On
(1997) have not identified attitudinal variables and aspects of personality that contribute
to business performance. Rather, the issue revolves around the incremental predictive
ability that the instruments developed using these definitions over existing personality
variables. Clearly, the commercial success of measures developed on these construct
definitions shows that they are useful and provide significant predictive ability in the
workplace (e.g., Wolff, 2006). There is also an argument that business prefers the overlap
of constructs in measurement tools as they are actually getting a range of measures in a
single comprehensive package. The essential issue for researchers is whether they capture
the essence of emotional intelligence and provide significant incremental predictive ability
over existing personality measures. Based on Table 13.1, I would have to say they may not.
With this in mind, it is also useful to examine methods of measurement of emotional
intelligence in business. Again, this has been the source of some controversy. There are
those who argue that emotional intelligence can only be measured by an ability measure
(Mayer et al., 2003; Daus & Ashkanasy, 2005), while others argue that self-report (Bar-
On, 1997) and 360-degree feedback (Boyatzis et al., 2000) are appropriate methods of
measurement. In the next section, I examine various methods of measuring emotional
intelligence and how these have been applied in business settings, with a view to assessing
their potential for predicting performance. I shall look at these methods in the categories
other researchers have used in previous publications, self-report, task analysis and 360-
degree feedback (see Jordan et al., 2006).
Measuring emotional intelligence in business

As noted earlier, researchers have adopted different frameworks to explain the construct
of emotional intelligence. Contemporaneously, measures of emotional intelligence have
been developed based on these different theoretical frameworks and have been assessed
using different methods. Methods for assessing emotional intelligence in business settings
include self-assessment (Salovey et al., 1995; Bar-On, 1997; Cooper & Sawaf, 1997;
Schutte et al., 1998; Cameron, 1999), task analysis (Mayer et al., 2000), and 360-degree
feedback (Boyatzis & Goleman, 1999; Boyatzis et al., 2000).
Murphy and Davidshofer (1998) argue that the development of measurement scales is
an iterative process where by new scales are developed based on empirical research with
theoretical underpinning. The method used to assess a measure/construct, therefore,
should be consistent with the theoretical understanding of the phenomenon. For instance,
task analysis is an accepted method of measuring fluid intelligence (abstract reasoning
ability). Task analysis tests the respondent’s ability to solve problems that have right and
wrong answers (e.g., Raven et al., 1979). Within personality research, self-reports of atti-
tudes are an accepted method of data collection, because this method draws out the under-
lying reasons why individuals perceive themselves to think or to act in a specific manner
(Costa & McCrae, 1992). Finally, 360-degree surveys are a commonly used method in busi-
ness to provide feedback to individuals on their performance and their strengths and weak-
nesses. Sternberg (1985) argues that the success of any measure of intelligence is its ability
to predict performance. Therefore, the link between measures of emotional intelligence
and performance are an important determinant of the success of any measure.
It is important to note here that I am using the traditional description of ‘task analy-
sis’ rather than ‘ability testing’ as I believe that this more accurately describes current mea-
sures of this ilk. In a recent research article, Mayer (2004) raises the important issue of
the nomenclature researchers use to classify measures and suggests that data should be
classified according to the type of test (the method) that is used to collect the data. I con-
sider that true ability testing is another level beyond the current methods of testing emo-
tional intelligence and may require third-generation testing procedures. First-generation
method I see as self-report (data collected based on personal reports of abilities); second-
generation method involves task analysis (data collected by asking respondents to answer
questions related to that ability); third-generation method, true ability testing, will assess
actual behaviors used in a specific situation. For instance, this may involve a situationally
driven interactive testing format using computer-generated scenarios. These results could
be corroborated possibly by contemporaneous physiological testing or seeking indepen-
dent assessment of these abilities through obtaining expert ratings, or peer or supervi-
sor assessment. At present, measures using a third-generation method have not been
developed.
Self-report measures of emotional intelligence in business
Emotional Quotient Inventory (EQi) – Bar-On The first commercially developed

measure of emotional intelligence was the Emotional Intelligence Inventory (EQi: Bar-
On, 1997). The EQi uses a self-report methodology incorporating 152 items, and is scored
on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = Not True of Me, 5 = True of Me). Later development of the
scale has seen the number of items reduced to 133 (Dawda & Hart, 2000). Subsequently,
short report and 360-degree versions have been developed, but these are all based on the
self-report. Bar-On et al. (2000) found that the instrument has good psychometric quali-
ties and validated it against an extensive range of personality constructs. Earlier, I
expressed concerns over Bar-On’s (1997) theoretical construct for emotional intelligence
and indicated that it may include factors that are not a part of the emotional intelligence
construct. Notwithstanding this distinction, Bar-On’s measure does deal with emotional
variables and has been widely used in business. Bar-On et al. (2000) maintain that the EQi
focuses on emotional and social processes and is designed to measure potential for per-
formance, rather than actual performance. As such, Bar-On et al. consider the measure
to focus on abilities.
An examination of the EQi and Bar-On’s (1997) factor analysis of the 152 items shows
that emotional well-being is a dominant factor, accounting for 23.1 per cent of the vari-
ance. It may be that emotional well-being, and not emotional intelligence, is the primary
construct considered by Bar-On. A prima facie examination of the constructs (Table 13.1)
confirms this. If this is the case, then a self-reporting method is appropriate for this
measure, because emotional well-being is a personal experience and is difficult to measure
in any other way. Possessing emotional well-being, however, while possibly linked to high
emotional intelligence, is not the same as high emotional intelligence as it refers to intra-
personal outcomes, rather than abilities possessed by the individual.
EQi links to business performance In a study of the predictive ability of the EQi,
Newsome et al. (2000) found that the EQi was unable to predict academic performance
and concluded that it was largely a measure of neuroticism. Other research in business
settings, however, has found links between the EQi and workplace behaviors.
Langhorn (2004) found that managerial emotional intelligence is positively related to
employee satisfaction, customer satisfaction and profit performance. Douglas et al. (2004)
report that among highly conscientious workers, those high in emotional intelligence had
higher performance scores than those low in emotional intelligence. Barling et al. (2000),
Sivanathan and Fekken (2002) and Mandell and Pherwani (2003) all link the EQi with
transformational leadership. Given the large number of variables outlined in the EQi and
the overlap of some of these variables with personality, it is credible that some of these
results may confound elements of personality with emotional intelligence. To confirm this
research, it would be helpful for these studies to determine the incremental validity of the
EQi over other personality measures.
Task analysis measures of emotional intelligence in business
Mayer–Salovey–Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT) Mayer and Salovey

have now produced three measures that use a task analysis methodology and adhere to
their multi-dimensional construct of emotional intelligence. The interactive Emotional
IQ Test (Mayer et al., 1997) is a multimedia measure administered through CD-ROM.
The Multi-factorial Emotional Intelligence Scale (MEIS: Mayer et al., 1997) is the
Emotional IQ Test’s paper equivalent. Finally, the Mayer–Salovey–Caruso Emotional
Intelligence Test (MSCEIT) (Mayer et al., 2003) is the current, commercially available,
emotional intelligence test this group has developed.
The MSCEIT consists of 141 items that conform to the construct for emotional intel-
ligence outlined by Mayer and Salovey (1997). Awareness of emotions is measured by
assessing emotion in faces and pictures; emotional knowledge is measured by asking
respondents to answer questions on emotional reactions including blends and changes in
emotions; emotional facilitation is measured by identifying emotions that may be helpful
in specific situations; and finally, managing emotions is measured by providing scenarios
with graded multiple choice answers for the respondents to choose between.
The MSCEIT results can be reported by providing a total score, two area scores (experi-
ential and strategic), four branch scores corresponding to the four-branch model, and eight
task scores. A correct answer for each measure is determined by consensus scoring, which
is obtained by gathering all responses to the item and determining the most frequent answer.
In summary, the MSCEIT has been shown to be a valid and reliable instrument (Mayer
et al., 2003). Despite this, the validity of methods used in the MSCEIT such as scenario
testing (scored using graded multiple choice answers) are problematic as they do not clearly
address Sternberg’s (1985) argument that contextual performance should be assessed.
Moreover, it does not allow for the possibility that emotional intelligence is a situationally
adaptive ability. In other words, emotionally intelligent people will respond differently in
different situations, tailoring their responses to both the other individuals involved and the
context. In conclusion, I am not convinced that emotional intelligence abilities are being
tested or whether it is simply emotional knowledge that is being tested using this method.
MSCEIT links to business performance There have been a number of studies that have
looked at the predictive ability of the MSCEIT in business settings. Brotheridge (2003),
in her study examining emotional labor, positively linked emotional intelligence to deep
acting, but not to surface acting. Surface acting only linked to awareness of emotions.
Lyons and Schneider (2005) found that specific dimensions of the MSCEIT predicted
stressor appraisals and performance. Lopes et al. (2005) reported a link between the
ability to regulate emotion as measured in the MSCEIT and quality of social interactions.
Importantly, this study demonstrated this effect over and above variance accounted for by
the ‘Big Five’ personality traits, and verbal and fluid intelligence. Finally, Leban and
Zulauf (2004) have found a link between the MSCEIT and transformational leadership,
and in particular the inspirational motivation idealized influence and individual consid-
eration components of transformational leadership.
360-degree measures of emotional intelligence in business

The final method for measuring emotional intelligence discussed in this chapter is the col-
lection of 360-degree feedback on respondents. An example of a measure that uses this
method is the Emotional Competence Inventory 360 (ECI 360: Boyatzis & Goleman, 1999).
ECI 360 – Boyatzis and Goleman The ECI 360 is a relatively recent measure based on
Goleman’s (1995) construct of human competence. As the title of the instrument implies,
the ECI 360 is designed to measure human competencies, not necessarily emotional intel-
ligence (Boyatzis et al., 2000). The ECI 360 assesses the respondent’s competencies in their
relational context and bases the assessment on the opinion of work peers, the individual’s
family, the individual’s manager and what the authors term ‘direct reports’. Based on
Goleman’s (1998) model of emotional intelligence the ECI 360 measures 25 competencies
in five clusters: the self-awareness cluster includes emotional awareness, accurate self-
assessment, and self-confidence; the self-regulation cluster incorporates self-control, trust-
worthiness, adaptability, conscientiousness, and innovation; the motivation cluster
involves achievement drive, commitment, initiative, and optimism; the empathy cluster
includes understanding others, developing others, service orientation, leveraging diversity,
and political awareness; and finally, the social skills cluster identifies influence, communi-
cation, conflict management, leadership, change catalyst, building bonds, collaboration
and cooperation, and team capabilities as competencies. As noted earlier and outlined in
Table 13.1, I argue that some of these competencies may co-vary with, but cannot be con-
sidered a part of, emotional intelligence (e.g., service orientation, initiative, trustworthi-
ness, self-confidence, achievement orientation, conscientiousness, change catalyst and
organizational awareness, conflict management, teamwork and collaboration).
The measure obtains 360-degree feedback on human competencies by asking respon-
dents to rate how characteristic the item is of their own behavior and then asking man-
agers, peers, and family to rate the respondent’s behavior based on a 7-point Likert type
scale. Typical items from the scale include: ‘takes calculated risks’, ‘ready to act’, ‘is
careful and accurate’, ‘responds calmly’, ‘calms others’, and ‘creates own measures of
excellence’. The test publishers report that the instruments are both valid and reliable
(Wolff, 2006).
Boyatzis and Burckle (1999) report that the ECI 360 demonstrates good reliability.
Correlations (Kendall tau) between self and others’ assessment are low, with average cor-
relation ranging from 0.17 between peer- and family assessment, 0.20 between managers
and respondents, and 0.36 between managers and peers. This is generally consistent with
previous research in the field (Powell, 1948; D’Augelli, 1973; Shore et al., 1998). Clearly,
further research is required before the significance of others’ ratings of the competencies
can be assessed. The findings of a low correlation between self and other ratings also
brings into question the method for collecting such data, and raises issues over how such
scores can be interpreted. This has implications for the types of applications this measure
can be used for in business.
ECI links to business performance While there is substantial normative data offered for
this instrument by the test developers, there are far fewer independent studies available on
the ECI. Rapisarda (2002) reports that emotional intelligence competencies as measured
by the ECI were linked to the group’s self-reported cohesiveness, and the self-reported
group cohesiveness showed a stronger relationship with emotional intelligence than with
group performance. Offermann et al. (2004) found that while cognitive ability predicted
individual academic performance, emotional intelligence was more effective at predicting
team performance, and was associated with team attitudes. Significantly, in the research
outlined here only the self-report version of this measure has been used. Clearly, there is
more independent research required on this measure to make any substantial observations
on the predictive ability of the 360-degree feedback measure.
Summary of concepts and measures of emotional intelligence used in business

I have argued to this point that the method of collecting data on emotional intelligence
should match theoretical underpinnings of the model of emotional intelligence upon
which it is based. A review of the Bar-On self-report measure of emotional intelligence
demonstrates that it is not based on a clear conceptualization of emotional intelligence.
This is further confounded by the fact that the questioning method in the EQi identifies
attitudes and preferred behavior, rather than actual applied abilities. For instance, Bar-on
(1997) contends that happy individuals are more emotionally intelligent.
Task analysis methodology, while promising, still appears to be in the early stages of
development. In addition, the only existing measure (Mayer et al., 2003) is subject to unre-
solved issues related to the practical application of emotional intelligence, particularly in
work settings. For example, it is debatable whether the ability to infer emotion in music or
art is an ability that is applicable in a business context (other than in very specific indus-
tries). Finally, although Mayer and his colleagues argue against using measures of pre-
ferred behavior, current methods of task analysis (e.g., MSCEIT) use scenario tests with
multiple choice answers that test respondents’ knowledge of preferred behaviors, rather
than their ability to apply these skills in practical situations. Mayer and Salovey (1997)
insist that if an emotional intelligence measure is to be considered as intelligence, it needs
to measure ability, rather than preferred behavior. I argue that the task assessment
measure they have developed mainly demonstrates knowledge, rather than practical appli-
cation of abilities.
Admittedly, identifying, defining and assessing a crystallized intelligence (culturally
appropriate, adaptive, effective behaviors) such as emotional intelligence is not an easy
task. Narrowing down this focus to a specific context should help. For instance, identify-
ing high emotional intelligence in a work context should be based on propensity of the
respondent to behave in an emotionally effective manner in a practical work situation.
Task analysis methodology appears to have something to offer, but further development
of measures is required to enable practical abilities to be tested.
Finally, 360-degree feedback is a method that also appears to hold promise. There are,
however, problems with the existing measure using this method (e.g., Boyatzis &
Goleman, 1999). As noted with Bar-On’s self-report measure, I have concerns over the
prima facie validity of the scales and subscales used in the Boyatzis and Goleman
measure. I identified earlier that some of the factors are personality variables while others
relate to attitudes that do not fit the criteria for emotional intelligence (i.e., the interaction
between emotion and cognition).
Similar to task analysis methodology, a major issue that needs to be addressed in any
measure using a 360-degree feedback method is whether preferred behaviors or actual
abilities are being tested. At present the measure developed by Boyatzis and Goleman
looks at preferred behavior in the self-report, rather than actual behavior. This form of
data collection requires that the self-reported data be corroborated in some way. The main
problem with this method at this stage is how to corroborate this evidence, as peer assess-
ment has traditionally been shown to suffer from poor self–other agreement.
Dawda and Hart (2000) note that research reveals a difference between observed and
self-reported personality traits (see Wiggins, 1973). Based on this observation and the
findings of their study, Dawda and Hart suggest that a multi-method approach to mea-
suring emotional intelligence would provide a method of overcoming measurement error
and would maximize the validity of the measure. The question that emerges is, if a multi-
method approach is required, which methods will be most successful in measuring emo-
tional intelligence?
Significantly, emotional intelligence is not just intelligence, rather it involves the inter-
action of emotions and intelligence (Mayer & Salovey, 1997). Despite this, the dominant
argument around measurement in research circles has examined emotional intelligence
and its position within intelligence testing. If emotional intelligence is the link between
emotion and cognition, then any measure of emotional intelligence also needs to be
judged in light of methods of measuring emotions. An examination of measurement
methods used in emotions research may help to unravel some new methods for testing
emotional intelligence.
New directions for emotional intelligence testing in business

Ortony et al. (1988) identify three major methods for assessing emotions that may be
useful in business settings: (i) physiological evidence of emotions; (ii) self-report of the
experience of emotions; and (iii) behavioral evidence of emotions. Each of these methods
has been used extensively in emotions research.
Clearly, gathering physiological evidence (measuring the respondent’s physiological
reaction when undertaking a task) may provide an indication of some aspects of
emotional intelligence. Individuals with high emotional intelligence may be expected to
have less-extreme physiological responses when faced with a stressful task (Goleman,
1995; Mayer & Salovey, 1997) as a result of their ability to control emotions. There
are two problems with this type of measurement. First, it is not practical for
researchers outside of laboratory settings. Second, the experience of emotions and the
physiological reactions that occur are personal and a physiological reaction is only one
part of emotional intelligence. Indeed, if we look at emotional intelligence as the inter-
section of emotion and cognition, then physiological testing may not pick up the cog-
nitive aspects of emotional intelligence that moderate people’s emotional reactions
(ibid.).
The second method identified by Ortony et al. involves gathering self-reports of the
experience of emotions. Although this is clearly a convenient method of collection in busi-
ness settings, Crowne and Marlowe (1964) note that a range of factors can influence the
results of self-assessment instruments, including self-protection, avoidance of criticism,
lack of self-awareness, and the need for social conformity. Indeed, this has been one of
the more stringent criticisms of emotional intelligence measures that adopt a self-
reporting format (Landy, 2005; Locke, 2005). This is also evident from the results of
self–peer collections. To try to improve this, I suggest that such a measure should focus
specifically on a questioning format that seeks responses to applied abilities within a
specific context, rather than preferred behavior. It should be noted that self-reports of
emotional states and reactions have been successfully used in research examining the real-
time experience of emotions in a work setting (Fisher, 2003).
Following the Ortony et al. (1988) framework, collecting behavioral evidence may
hold promise as a method of measuring emotional intelligence. In reviewing the
Boyatzis and Goleman (1999) measure, I have noted a number of problems with this
approach, but one that stands out is the accuracy of other assessment which demon-
strates a poor correlation between self and peer ratings (Powell, 1948; D’Augelli, 1973;
Shore et al., 1998).
There are two potential methods for overcoming this. The first is to simplify the ques-
tioning regime. Research has shown that the more complex and specific the questioning
regime the more variance will occur between self and peer ratings. The second involves
obtaining information from a third party who has worked with and experienced the
respondent’s abilities and behavior in work situations. D’Augelli (1973) notes that the use
of trained observers can improve the accuracy of peer ratings. Based on this, there is an
argument that training is required prior to involving work colleagues in a peer assessment.
Just as training should be provided to managers involved in performance appraisal, the
peers should be trained to focus on displayed behaviors.
Finally, as suggested earlier an alternative method for collecting behavioral evidence of
emotional intelligence would be to use an assessment center approach to administer an
emotional intelligence measure using interactive scenario testing. A final determination

of the success of such a measure would be its ability to predict performance.
Conclusion
I have demonstrated in this chapter that emotional intelligence research in business is still
in an early stage of development with varying construct definitions, measures and
methods being used to assess emotional intelligence in the workplace. Clearly, there is no
single method or measure that has captured the essence of emotional intelligence. Based
on this review of methods for measuring emotion, a multi-method approach using both
self-report and behavioral evidence appears to have the most promise as a method for
measuring emotional intelligence in a business setting. The focus, however, needs to be on
displayed behaviors and not on personal preferences. The challenge for researchers in the
near future is to develop such a measure.
Note
* This chapter was funded by a grant from the Australian Research Council. I wish to thank Sandra Lawrence
for her suggestions on an early draft of this chapter – as always her insights were invaluable.
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14 Emotional and social intelligence competencies
Richard E. Boyatzis
Introduction
Human talent has many components from values to traits to skills. These elements are
conceptualized, defined, and measured in many ways. Often attributed to a statement by
Edward Thorndike in the 1920s, efforts to explore deep capability have been linked to
various forms of ‘intelligence’ beyond cognitive. In contrast to the cognitive realm, these
alternatives are using the term ‘intelligence’ to connote a core or basic capability of the
individual as it applies to various aspects of human comportment. Emotional and social
intelligence competencies are a behavioral manifestation of two of these sets of abilities.
Research published over the last 30 years or so shows us that outstanding leaders, man-
agers, advanced professionals and people in key jobs, from sales to bank tellers, appear to
require three clusters of behavioral habits as threshold abilities and three clusters of com-
petencies as distinguishing outstanding performance. The threshold clusters of compe-
tencies include:
1. expertise and experience is a threshold level of competency;

2. knowledge (i.e., declarative, procedural, functional and metacognitive) is a threshold
competency; and
3. an assortment of basic cognitive competencies, such as memory and deductive rea-
soning are threshold competencies.
There are three clusters of competencies that differentiate outstanding from average
performers in many countries of the world (Bray et al., 1974; Boyatzis, 1982; Kotter, 1982;
Thornton and Byham, 1982; Howard and Bray, 1988; Luthans et. al., 1988; Campbell
et al., 1970; Spencer and Spencer, 1993; Goleman, 1998; Goleman et al., 2002). They are:
1. cognitive competencies, such as systems thinking and pattern recognition;

2. emotional intelligence competencies, including self-awareness and self-management
competencies, such as emotional self-awareness and emotional self-control; and
3. social intelligence competencies, including social awareness and relationship man-
agement competencies, such as empathy and teamwork.
This chapter is an exploration of the competency, or behavioral approach to emotional

and social intelligence. Let us first start with how they are defined, determined and mea-
sured. Are competencies enough for outstanding performance? No, so let us look at the
larger picture for the role of competencies.
Competencies as behavioral manifestations of talent

Emotional intelligence and social intelligence (i.e., EI and SI) are convenient phrases with
which to focus attention on the underlying emotional and social components of human
226
Emotional and social intelligence competencies 227
talent. While the earliest psychologist to explore the related concept of ‘social intelligence’
(Thorndike in the 1920s and 1930s; see also Goleman, 1995, 2006) offered the idea as a
single concept, more recent psychologists have appreciated its complexity and described
it in terms of multiple capabilities (Saarni, 1988; Bar-On, 1992, 1997; Goleman, 1998).
Gardner (1983) conceptualized this arena as constituting intrapersonal and interpersonal
intelligence – two of the seven intelligences. Salovey and Mayer (1990) first used the
expression ‘emotional intelligence’ and described it in terms of four domains: knowing
and handling one’s own and others’ emotions. Other conceptualizations have used labels
such as ‘practical intelligence’ and ‘successful intelligence’ (Sternberg, 1996), which often
blend the capabilities described by other psychologists with cognitive abilities and anchor
the concepts around the consequence of the person’s behavior, notably success or
effectiveness.
While other interpretations of ‘intelligence’ are offered in the literature, this author
offers a model of the criteria for labeling something as a type of intelligence versus just
some constituent ability or personality component. To be classified as ‘an intelligence’,
the concept should be:
1. related to biological and in particular neural-endocrine functioning. That is, each

cluster should be differentiated as to the type of neural circuitry and endocrine system
involved;
2. related to life and job outcomes;
3. sufficiently different from other personality constructs that the concept adds value to
understanding the human personality and behavior; and
4. the measures of the concept, as a psychological construct, should satisfy the basic
criteria for a sound measure, that is, show convergent and discriminant validity
(Campbell & Fiske, 1959).
This set of criteria is different from the Mayer et al. (1999) three standards for ‘an intel-
ligence’. In their view, relevant criteria regarding components of a capacity that is indeed
a specific kind of intelligence are: (a) it should reflect a ‘mental performance rather than
preferred ways of behaving’ (pp. 269–70); (b) tests of it should show positive correlation
with other forms of intelligence; and (c) the measures should increase with experience
and age.
As a theory of emotional intelligence, we believe that there should be a link to neural
(or possibly neuro-endocrine) functioning. If the theory claims that there are multiple
components of this emotional intelligence, then these different components should have
different neuro-endocrine pathways. This first proposed criterion is more specific than the
Mayer et al. (1999) first and second criteria. The construct should actually be able to
predict neural and endocrine (i.e., hormonal) patterns within the individual. Regarding
the rationale for including criterion 2 (i.e., job and life outcomes), the American
Psychological Association’s Task Force on Intelligence (APA Public Affairs Office, 1997)
reported that predicting real-life outcomes is an important part of the standard against
which we should judge an intelligence. It then went on to add that there should be a con-
sensus within a field as to the definition. Although the consensus is lacking in the field
regarding emotional intelligence at this time, the link between EI and SI competencies and
real-life outcomes is in fact testable.
While Mayer et al. (1999) seem to discard patterns of behavior as irrelevant to their
concept of EI, this approach contends that EI and SI should predict behavioral patterns
in life and work, as well as the consequences of these patterns in the form of life and work
outcomes. This seems a more relevant test of the concept than merely showing a link to
experience and age (i.e., as Mayer et al.’s third criterion).
A related stream of research has emerged focusing on explaining and predicting
effectiveness in various occupations, often with a primary emphasis on managers and
leaders (McClelland et. al., 1958; McClelland, 1973; Bray et al., 1974; Boyatzis, 1982;
Kotter, 1982; Thornton & Byham, 1982; Luthans et al., 1988; Spencer and Spencer, 1993).
In this ‘competency’ approach, specific capabilities were identified and validated
against effectiveness measures, or, often, inductively discovered and then articulated as
competencies.
An integrated concept of EI and SI competency offers more than a convenient frame-
work for describing human dispositions – it offers a theoretical structure for the organ-
ization of personality and linking it to a theory of action and job performance.
Goleman (1998, p. 121) defined an ‘emotional competence’ as a ‘learned capability
based on emotional intelligence which results in outstanding performance at work’. In
other words, if a competency is an ‘underlying characteristic of the person that leads to
or causes effective or superior performance’ (Boyatzis, 1982, p. 14), then an emotional
intelligence is an ability to recognize, understand, and use emotional information about
oneself and a social intelligence competency is the ability to recognize, understand and
use emotional information about others that leads to or causes effective or superior
performance.
A simpler definition of emotional intelligence may be that emotional intelligence is the
intelligent use of one’s emotions (Goleman et al., 2002) and social intelligence is the appli-
cation of this insight regarding others’ emotions (ibid.; Goleman, 2006). The definition
can be further expanded to say that EI and SI are a set of competencies, or abilities, in
how a person: (a) is aware of him-/herself; (b) manages him-/herself; (c) is aware of others;
and (d) manages his/her relationships with others.
If defined as a single construct, the tendency to believe that more-effective people have
the vital ingredients for success invites the attribution of a halo effect. For example, person
A is effective, therefore he/she has all of the right stuff, such as brains, savvy, and style.
Like the issue of finding the best ‘focal point’ with which to look at something, the
dilemma of finding the best level of detail in defining constructs with which to build a per-
sonality theory may ultimately be an issue of which focal point is chosen. With regard to
emotional intelligence, we believe the most helpful focal point allows for the description
and study of a variety specific competencies, or abilities, which can be empirically, causally
related to effectiveness and describe the clusters within which these competencies are
organized. But we must start with the competencies.
The articulation of one overall emotional or social intelligence might be deceptive and
suggest a close association with cognitive capability (i.e., traditionally defined ‘intelli-
gence’ or what psychologists often call ‘g’, referring to general cognitive ability)
(Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997; Davies & Stankov, 1998). Not only would the latter be
confusing, but it would also raise the question as to what one is calling emotional and
social intelligence and whether it is nothing more than an element of previously defined
intelligence or cognitive ability.
Competencies and a theory of performance

A competency is defined as a capability or ability. It is a set of related but different sets of
behavior organized around an underlying construct, which we call the ‘intent’. The behav-
iors are alternative manifestations of the intent, as appropriate in various situations or
times. For example, listening to someone and asking him or her questions are several
behaviors. A person can demonstrate these behaviors for multiple reasons or to various
intended ends. A person can ask questions and listen to someone to ingratiate him- or
herself or to appear interested, thereby gaining standing in the other person’s view. Or a
person can ask questions and listen to someone because he or she is interested in under-
standing this other person, his or her priorities, or thoughts in a situation. The latter we
would call a demonstration of empathy. The underlying intent is to understand the
person. Meanwhile, the former underlying reason for the questions is to gain standing or
impact in the person’s view, elements of what we may call a demonstration of influence.
Similarly, the underlying intent of a more subtle competency such as emotional self-
awareness is self-insight and self-understanding.
This construction of competencies as requiring both action (i.e., a set of alternative
behaviors) and intent called for measurement methods that allowed for assessment of
both the presence of the behavior and inference of the intent. A modification of the crit-
ical incident interview (Flanagan, 1954) was adapted using the inquiry sequence from the
Thematic Apperception Test and the focus on specific events in one’s life from the biodata
method (Dailey, 1975). The method, called the Behavioral Event Interview (BEI), is a
semi-structured interview in which the respondent is asked to recall recent, specific events
in which he or she felt effective (Boyatzis, 1982; Spencer & Spencer, 1993). Once the person
recalls an event, he or she is guided through telling the story of the event with a basic set
of four questions: (i) What led up to the situation? (ii) Who said or did what to whom?
(iii) What did you say or do next? What were you thinking and feeling? and (iv) What was
the outcome or result of the event? Autobiographical research (Rubin, 1986) has shown
the accuracy of recall of events is increased dramatically when the events are: (a) recent;
(b) have a high valence or saliency to the person; and (c) the recall involves specific actions.
All of these conditions were incorporated into the BEI.
The responses are audiotaped and transcribed and interpreted using a thematic analy-
sis process (Boyatzis, 1998). Thematic analysis is a process for ‘coding’ raw qualitative
information, whether in written, video or audio form. Through the use of a ‘codebook’
articulating specific themes and how to identify them, the researcher is able to convert
open-ended responses or unstructured responses and behavior into a set of quantified
variables for analysis. The method has been used in numerous studies showing predictive
validity of the competencies demonstrated by the person during the events as coded from
the interviews (Boyatzis, 1982; Spencer & Spencer, 1993; McClelland, 1998).
The anchor for understanding which behaviors and which intent is relevant in a situ-
ation emerges from predicting effectiveness. The construction of the specific compe-
tency is a matter of relating different behaviors that are considered alternative
manifestations of the same underlying construct. But they are organized primarily or
more accurately initially, by the similarity of the consequence of the use of these behav-
iors in social or work settings. For example, the competency called ‘empathy’ can be
observed by watching someone listen to others or asking questions about his or her feel-
ings and thoughts. If one is demonstrating empathy, the person would be undertaking
JOB DEMANDS
INDIVIDUAL
Tasks
Vision, values, philosophy Functions
Knowledge Roles
Competencies or abilities
Life/career stage
Style
Interests
BEST
FIT
ORGANIZATIONAL
ENVIRONMENT
Culture and climate

Structure and systems
Maturity of the industry and
strategic position of the
organization
Core competence
Larger context
Note: Maximum performance, stimulation, and commitment = area of maximum overlap or integration.
Source: Adapted from Boyatzis (1982).
Figure 14.1 Theory of action and job performance: best fit
these acts with the intent of trying to understand another person. On the other hand,
someone could show these acts while cross-examining a witness in a criminal trial where
the intent is to catch them in a lie – which is likely also to be the demonstration of
another competency, ‘influence’.
A theory of performance is the basis for the concept of competency. The theory used
in this approach is a basic contingency theory, as shown in Figure 14.1. Maximum per-
formance is believed to occur when the person’s capability or talent is consistent with the
needs of the job demands and the organizational environment (Boyatzis, 1982). The
person’s talent is described by his or her: vision, values, and personal philosophy; knowl-
edge; competencies or abilities; life and career stage; style and interests. Job demands can
be described by the role responsibilities and tasks needed to be performed. Aspects of the
organizational environment that are predicted to have an important impact on the
demonstration of competencies and/or the design of the jobs and roles include: culture
and climate; structure and systems; maturity of the industry and strategic positioning
within it; and aspects of the economic, political, social, environmental, and religious
milieu surrounding the organization.
Competencies and an integrated theory of personality

The specification of a competency comes from the personality theory on which this
approach is based. McClelland (1951) originally described a theory of personality as com-
prising the relationships among a person’s unconscious motives, self-schema, and
observed behavioral patterns. Boyatzis (1982) offered this scheme as an integrated system
diagram that showed concentric circles, with the person’s unconscious motives and trait
dispositions at the center. These affected, and were affected by, the next expanding circle
of the person’s values and self-image. The surrounding circle was labeled the skill level.
The circle surrounding it included observed, specific behaviors.
The synthesis of Goleman (1995) in developing the concept of emotional intelligence
and Goleman (2006) into the concept of social intelligence provided yet another layer to
this integrated system view of personality. In particular, Goleman’s synthesis introduced
the physiological level to this model by relating findings from neuroscience, biology, and
medical studies to psychological states and resulting behavior. The result is a personality
theory, as shown in Figure 14.2, that incorporates and predicts the relationship among a
person’s: (a) neural circuits and endocrine (i.e., hormonal) processes; (b) unconscious dis-
positions called motives and traits; (c) values and operating philosophy; (d) observed sep-
arate competencies; and (e) competency clusters.
This conceptualization of personality requires a more holistic perspective than is
often taken. When integrating the physiological level with the psychological and behav-
ioral levels, a more comprehensive view of the human emerges. The evidence of the
causal sequence predicted in this personality theory is emerging but is slow due to the
disparate nature of the different fields studying parts of the model. For example, arousal
of a person’s power motive both causes and is affected by arousal of his or her sympa-
thetic nervous system (i.e., SNS) (McClelland, 1985; Boyatzis et al., 2006). When a
person’s power motive is aroused, he or she is more likely to show behavior associated
with a group of competencies called ‘influence’, ‘inspirational leadership’, or ‘change
catalyst’ (Winter, 1973; McClelland, 1985). Boyatzis and Sala (2004) showed that these
competencies form an empirical cluster of emotional and social intelligence competen-
cies as assessed through the Emotional Competency Inventory and now Emotional and
Social Competency Inventory (ECI; Boyatzis & Goleman, 1996, 2006). These compe-
tencies are shown more frequently when a person is operating from a humanistic versus
a pragmatic operating philosophy (Boyatzis et al., 2000b). When the power motive is
aroused along with a person’s self-control at the trait level (McClelland, 1975, 1985;
McClelland et al., 1980, 1982, 1985; McClelland & Jemmott, 1980; McClelland &
Boyatzis, 1982; Jacobs & McClelland, 1994), the stressful effects of inhibiting one’s
urges add to the arousal of the SNS. The result is elevated blood pressure and decreased
levels of both immunoglobulin A and natural killer cells (i.e., basic indicators of the
immune system). Relatively recent research has shown that arousal of the SNS is asso-
ciated with neural circuits passing predominantly through the right prefrontal cortex
(Davidson, 2003; Davidson et al., 2000).
Observed cluster of competencies
Observed Observed Observed Observed

Competency 1 Competency 2 Competency 3 Competency 4
Value and philosophical foundations of a competency
Motivation and trait drivers of competency

as unconscious dispositions
Neural circuits and hormonal patterns related to

the specific competency cluster
Source: Boyatzis et al. (2000a).
Figure 14.2 Levels within the personality structure
In contrast, engaging a person’s behavior associated with the empathy and other social
awareness competencies is also related to an underlying humanistic operating philosophy
(in contrast to an intellectual operating philosophy). A pragmatic operating philosophy
is an approach to life based on looking for utility or comparison of costs and benefits
(Boyatzis et al., 2000b). In contrast, with the intellectual operating philosophy a person
determines the value through the degree to which the activity, person, or idea helps to con-
ceptualize and understand the phenomenon, work, or life.
A third basic approach, the humanistic operating philosophy, approaches value by
determining the impact of things on those people with whom the person has a close rela-
tionship. Demonstrating this pattern of behavior is associated with arousal of the
affiliation motive, which in turn is associated with arousal of the person’s parasympathetic
nervous system (i.e., PSNS) (Schultheiss, 1999a & b; Boyatzis et al., 2006). The arousal of
the PSNS results in decreased levels of blood pressure and healthy functioning of the
immune system (McClelland & Kirshnit, 1982). Again, Boyatzis and Sala (2004) showed
a set of competencies of emotional and social intelligence, from emotional self-awareness
to empathy and developing others, forming an empirical cluster associated with (i.e.,
causing as well as caused by) this PSNS set of neural and endocrine processes. These
preliminary findings support EI and SI competencies as potentially satisfying the first
criteria for ‘an intelligence’ suggested in this chapter and in earlier papers (Boyatzis and
Sala, 2004; Boyatzis et al., 2006).
Further, it is now the contention of leading researchers in affective neuroscience and
genetic expression that experience overtakes genetic dispositions in determining the bio-
logical basis of behavior once in adulthood (Davidson, 2003; Williams, 2003). This would
suggest that a person’s experience, and his or her arousal effect, rewire neural circuits and
tendencies to invoke certain neuro-endocrine pathways. Offering support for the obser-
vation, or prediction, is the proposed personality theory that use of one’s competencies
(i.e., behavior in specific settings in life) becomes an arousal that over time creates different
dispositions, even at the biological level.
The emotional and social intelligence competencies

Building upon and integrating a great deal of competency research, Boyatzis and
Goleman (2006) presented a model of emotional and social intelligence with 12 compe-
tencies arrayed in four clusters (Boyatzis, 1982; Spencer & Spencer, 1993; Rosier, 1994–97;
Jacobs, 1997; Goleman, 1998, 2006; Goleman et al., 2002; Boyatzis & Goleman, 2006).
This is a modification of their earlier models with other competencies that were empir-
ically determined to be incorporated into other ones in the latest version of the test
(Boyatzis, 2000a; Boyatzis & Sala, 2004; Wolff, 2005). They are, as shown in Box 14.1.
BOX 14.1 THE SCALES AND CLUSTERS OF THE

EMOTIONAL AND SOCIAL COMPETENCY
INVENTORY (ESCI)
Emotional intelligence competencies
Self-Awareness cluster concerns knowing one’s internal states, preferences,

resources, and intuitions. It contains one competency:
● emotional self-awareness: recognizing one’s emotions and their effects.
Self-management cluster refers to managing one’s internal states, impulses, and

resources. It contains four competencies:
● emotional self-control: keeping disruptive emotions and impulses in check;

● adaptability: flexibility in handling change;
● achievement orientation: striving to improve or meeting a standard of
excellence; and
● positive outlook: seeing the positive aspects of things and the future.
Social intelligence competencies
Social awareness cluster refers to how people handle relationships and aware-
ness of others’ feelings, needs, and concerns. It contains two competencies:
● empathy: sensing others’ feelings and perspectives, and taking an active

interest in their concerns; and
● organizational awareness: reading a group’s emotional currents and
power relationships.
Relationship management cluster concerns the skill or adeptness at inducing

desirable responses in others. It contains five competencies:
● coach and mentor: sensing others’ development needs and bolstering

their abilities;
● inspirational leadership: inspiring and guiding individuals and groups;
● influence: wielding effective tactics for persuasion;
● conflict management: negotiating and resolving disagreements; and
● teamwork: working with others toward shared goals. Creating group
synergy in pursuing collective goals.
Source: R.E. Boyatzis and D. Goleman (1996, 1999, 2001, 2007), Emotional and Social
Competence Inventory, Distributed worldwide by The Hay group (www.haygroup.com).
The Emotional Competency Inventory, version 2 (ECI-2) (i.e., the forerunner to the
current ESCI) and the closely related university version (ECI-U) showed desired levels of
convergent validity in confirmatory factor analyses for both the theoretical clusters
(Goleman et al., 2000; Wolff, 2005) and empirical clusters (Boyatzis and Sala, 2004) in
studies by Battista (2005) as well as Battista et al. (in press). In addition, a wide variety of
validation studies showed strong and consistent validity in predicting or explaining life
and job outcomes (Boyatzis and Sala, 2004; Wolff, 2005), and divergent validity in dis-
criminating validation by the clusters, as shown in Table 14.1. This helps to establish this
behavioral, competency approach to EI and SI as satisfying the second and fourth criteria
cited earlier in this chapter.
Meanwhile, Guillen et al. (in press) revealed no statistically significant relationship
between personality dimensions as measured by the NEO-PR and EI or SI competencies.
Burkle (2000) and Murensky (2000) showed small but significant correlations between
selected personality dimensions as measured by the Myers Briggs Type indicator and
selected clusters of EI and SI competencies, as mentioned in Table 14.1. These findings
suggest that this behavioral, competency approach to EI and SI satisfy the third criterion
mentioned earlier in this chapter.
In contrast, the model of EI offered through the Mayer–Salovey–Caruso Emotional
Intelligence Test (MSCEIT) (Mayer et. al., 2003) has a total score of a person’s EI, two
area scores of experiential and strategic, and branches within each area of: (a) perceiv-
ing (with subtests of faces and pictures) and facilitating (with subtests of facilitation and
sensations); and (b) understanding (with subtests of changes and blends) and managing
(with subtests of emotional management and emotional relationships). Although data
from studies comparing these tests are underway, conceptually we would expect small
correlations between these two different measures. The MSCEIT assesses a person’s
direct handling of emotions, while the ECI-2 which is intended to assess the EI and SI
Table 14.1 Summary of evidence of divergent validity of ECI-2 clusters
Cluster* Variable Author (date) of study Sample

Self-awareness Student retention Sala (2002b) Secondary school principals in the UK
Intuiting (MBTI) Burckle (2000b) US paramedics
Feeling (MBTI) Burckle (2000b) US paramedics
Openness, conscientiousness Murensky (2000) Oil company executives
Coach’s performance Van Sickle (2004) College coaches
Flexibility climate score Hay Group (2005) Consulting company staff
Self-management Job success Sevinc (2001) Turkish financial managers and
professionals
Client services call agents’ and Nel (2001) South African call center agents and
administrators’ job output managers
Bosses and subs to management Cavallo and Brienza (2002) Personal care products international execs
performance
Principals’ effectiveness Williams (2003) Public school principals in US
235
Conscientiousness Murensky (2000) Oil company executives
Coaching style Hay Group (nd) Broadcast executives in UK
Team cohesiveness Rapisarda (2003) EMBAs (average age 40)
Social awareness Subs to management performance Cavallo and Brienza (2002) Personal care products international execs
Student retention Sala (2002b) Secondary school principals in the UK
Openness Murensky (2000) Oil company executives
Affiliative, coaching styles Hay Group (nd) Broadcast executives in UK
Women more at home than work Rivera (2003) Puerto Rican managers
Coach’s performance Van Sickle (2004) College coaches
Relationship mgt Job success Sevinc (2001) Turkish financial managers and
professionals
Administrators’ job output Nel (2001) South African call center agents and
managers
Peers and subs management performance Cavallo and Brienza (2002) Personal care products international execs
Bosses potential ratings Cavallo and Brienza (2002) Personal care products international execs
Table 14.1 (continued )
Cluster* Variable Author (date) of study Sample

Principals’ effectiveness Williams (2003) Public school principals in US
Type B personality Diamantopoulou (2001) Greek bank employees
Feeling (MBTI) Burckle (2000b) US paramedics
Openness, conscientiousness Murensky (2000) Oil company executives
Affiliative, coaching styles Hay Group (nd) Broadcast executives in UK
Positive organizational climate Sala (2002b) Secondary school principals in the UK
Women more at home than work Rivera (2003) Puerto Rican managers
Executive success Hopkins (2004) Financial service execs in US
Team cohesiveness Rapisarda (2003) EMBAs (average age 40)
236
All clusters, Salary, life success Sevinc (2001) Turkish financial managers and
(showing a lack professionals
of divergent Performance as perceived by managers Stagg and Gunter (2002) UK firefighters
validity) Extroversion (NEO-PR) Murensky (2000) Oil company executives
Women vs. men Hay Group (nd) Hay Group large database
Team leaders effect on team performance Stubbs (2004) US Navy flight crews
Note: * To be listed as associated with a cluster, the variable must have shown statistically significant association or differentiation with that cluster and NOT
with all of the other clusters. If half or more of the competencies in that cluster showed significance, then it was listed.
For all Author of Study citations see Boyatzis and Sala (2004).
MBTI = Myeors Briggs Type Indicator; EMBA = Executive MBA; NEO-PR = test name.
Table 14.2 ESCI and EQ-i subscales comparison
ECI-2 and ESCI competency EQ-i subscale

Emotional self-awareness Emotional self-awareness
Influence Assertiveness
Empathy Empathy
Relationship management cluster Interpersonal relationship
Adaptability Flexibility
Emotional self-control Impulse control
Positive outlook Optimism
competencies described earlier assesses how the person expresses his or her handling of
emotions in life and work settings. Nonetheless, there may be correlation between: (i) self-
awareness competencies from the ECI-2 and the experiential area, in particular the facil-
itating branch from the MSCEIT; (ii) social awareness competencies from the ECI-2 and
the understanding branch of the strategic area; and (3) relationship management com-
petencies from the ECI-2 and the managing branch from the strategic area of the
MSCEIT.
Similarly, although the data bearing on this issue are presently being collected, cur-
rently there is no documented relationship among the ECI-2 competencies and the sub-
scales of Bar-On’s EQ-i (Bar-On, 1992, 1997). Although we believe that there will be little
correlation between the self-report version of the EQ-i and the others’ views of a person’s
competencies through the ECI-2, there may be substantial correlation among the EQ-i
subscales and ESCI when 360 measures of both are compared. In particular, in Table 14.2,
various positive correlations are predicted.
There are eight subscales in the EQ-i that are not expected to associate with ESCI com-
petencies. Similarly, there are 10 ESCI competencies that are not expected to associate
with EQ-i subscales. Therefore, we believe the ESCI generally measures different aspects
of EI and SI from the MSCEIT or the EQ-i.
Tipping points for outstanding performance

A major advancement in understanding the effect of competencies on performance came
from catastrophe theory, which is now considered to be a subset of complexity theory.
Instead of only asking the typical question, ‘Which competencies are needed or necessary
for outstanding performance?’ David McClelland, in a paper published posthumously in
1998, posed the question, ‘How often do you need to show a competency to “tip” you into
outstanding performance?’. In other words, how frequently should a competency be
shown to be sufficient for maximum performance? He reported that presidents of div-
isions of a large food company using competencies above the tipping points received
significantly higher bonuses, which were proportional to the profitability of their div-
isions, as compared to their less profitable peers (McClelland, 1998).
Using this method, Boyatzis (2006a) replicated significant findings regarding tipping
points in an international consulting firm. The profits from accounts of senior partners
were analyzed for seven quarters following assessment of their competencies. Senior part-
ners using competencies above the tipping point more than doubled the operating profits
from their accounts as compared to the senior partners below the tipping point. The
measure of competencies was the average perceived frequency of use of each competency
by others around the senior partner, using a 360-degree competency questionnaire.
Boyatzis showed that this method was superior to a simple median split or continuous
analysis of the relationship between the frequency of competencies shown and financial
performance of the senior partners, leaders, of this firm.
Knowing the point at which a person’s use of a competency tips them into outstanding
performance provides vital guidance to managers and leaders. It helps those coaching
others to know which competencies are the closest to added value in stimulating out-
standing performance. The tipping point is sometimes referred to as a ‘trigger point’.
The tipping point for each competency would be a function of the organization envi-
ronment. For example, the manager of an office of a strategy consulting company would
have a tipping point of adaptability at the maximum level. To show sufficient adapt-
ability to be outstanding, he/she would have to be using it ‘frequently and consistently’.
Their business, projects, and clients change each year. They typically have high turnover
in consulting staff as well. Meanwhile, the manager of a basic chemical processing plant
may have a tipping point of only ‘occasional or often’ of adaptability. The certainty of
their product line and predictability of their production processes does not create as
much uncertainty as the consulting business. They probably have less turnover in the
chemical plant as well, requiring even less adaptation to new staff. Analysis of tipping
points should become a standard feature of competency assessment studies in the
future.
Boyatzis (2006a) also confirmed the earlier argument about the importance of clusters.
It was shown that the dramatic increase in profit contributed to the company occurred
when senior partners were using an assortment of the competencies from each cluster
above the tipping point. It did not seem to matter which of the competencies were being
used above the tipping point to form each cluster. This allows for the differences in style
observed from outstanding leaders while confirming the importance of competencies as
predictors of performance.
Competencies can be developed

One of the benefits of the behavioral approach to EI and SI is that we enter a domain of
human talent that can be developed in adulthood. Although the understanding of com-
petencies themselves has been extended, perhaps the most important contributions in the
last 30 years have come about primarily in the last 15 years. Decades of research on the
effects of psychotherapy (Hubble et al., 1999), self-help programs (Kanfer and Goldstein,
1991), cognitive behavior therapy (Barlow, 1988), training programs (Morrow et al.,
1997), and education (Winter et al., 1981; Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991) have shown that
people can change their behavior, moods, and self-image. But most of the studies focused
on a single characteristic, such as maintenance of sobriety, reduction in a specific anxiety,
or a set of characteristics often determined by the assessment instrument, such as the
scales of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory. For example, the impact of
achievement motivation training was a dramatic increase in small business success, with
people creating more new jobs, starting more new businesses, and paying more taxes than
comparison groups (McClelland and Winter, 1969; Miron and McClelland, 1979).
The impact of power motivation training was improved maintenance of sobriety (Cutter
et al., 1977). But there are few studies showing sustained improvements in the sets of desir-
able behavior that lead to outstanding performance.
The ‘honeymoon effect’ of typical training programs might start with improvement
immediately following the program, but within months it drops precipitously (Campbell
et al., 1970). Only 15 programs were found in a global search of the literature by the
Consortium on Research on Emotional Intelligence in Organizations to improve emo-
tional intelligence. Most of them showed impact on job outcomes, such as number of new
businesses started, or life outcomes, such as finding a job or satisfaction (Cherniss and
Adler, 2000), which are the ultimate purpose of development efforts. But showing an
impact on outcomes, while desired, may also blur how the change actually occurs.
Furthermore, when a change has been noted, a question about the sustainability of the
changes is raised because of the relatively short time periods studied.
The few published studies examining improvement of more than one of these compe-
tencies show an overall improvement of about 10 per cent in emotional intelligence abil-
ities 3–18 months following training (Hand et al., 1973; Wexley and Memeroff, 1975;
Latham and Saari, 1979; Noe and Schmidt, 1986; Young and Dixon, 1996). More recent
meta-analytic studies and utility analyses confirm that significant changes can and do
occur. But they do not show the impact that the level of investment or the many types of
training would lead us to expect (Burke and Day, 1986; Baldwin and Ford 1988; Morrow
et al., 1997). There are, undoubtedly, other studies which were not found and reviewed,
or were not available through journals and books and, therefore, were overlooked. We do
not claim that this is an exhaustive review, but suggestive of the percentage improvement
as a rough approximation of the real impact. This approximation is offered to help in the
comparison of the relative impact of management training, management education, and
self-directed learning.
The results appear no better from standard MBA programs, where there is no attempt
to enhance emotional intelligence abilities. The best data here come from a research
project by the American Assembly of Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB). They
found that the behavior of graduating students from two highly ranked business schools,
compared to their levels when they began their MBA training, showed an improvement
of only 2 per cent in the skills of emotional intelligence (DDI, 1985). In fact, when stu-
dents from four other high-ranking MBA programs were assessed on a range of tests and
direct behavioral measures, they showed a gain of 4 per cent in self-awareness and self-
management abilities, but a decrease of 3 per cent in social awareness and relationship
management (Boyatzis & Sokol, 1982; Boyatzis et al., 1995c).
A series of longitudinal studies at the Weatherhead School of Management (WSOM)
of Case Western Reserve University have shown that people can change on this complex
set of emotional and social intelligence competencies that distinguish outstanding per-
formers in management and the professions (Boyatzis et al., 2002b). And the improve-
ment lasted for years. A visual comparison of the percentage improvement in behavioral
measures of emotional and social intelligence competencies from different samples is
shown in Figure 14.3. This was achieved by MBAs taking a course designed on the basis
of intentional change theory (Boyatzis, 2001, 2006b).
MBA students, averaging 27 years old at entry into the program, showed dramatic
changes on videotaped and audiotaped behavioral samples and questionnaire measures
of these competencies as a result of the competency-based, outcome-oriented MBA
80
70
Self-awareness
60 and management
50 Social awareness
and relationship
40 management
30
20
10
0
1–2 3–5 5–7
Years Years Years
Key:
Indicates impact of company and government training programs
3–18 months after training on multiple emotional intelligence competencies.
Indicates impact of a variety of above-average MBA programs.
Note: For n and description of measures, see Boyatzis et al. (2002b); comparison references are listed in
Goleman et al. (2002).
Source: Goleman et al. (2002).
Figure 14.3 Percentage improvement of emotional and social intelligence competencies

from behavioral measurement of different groups of MBA graduates taking
LEAD
program implemented in 1990 (Boyatzis et al., 1995a, 1996, 2002b). Four cadres of full-
time MBA students graduating in 1992, 1993, 1994, and 1995 showed a 47 per cent
improvement on self-awareness competencies such as self-confidence and on self-
management competencies such as the drive to achieve and adaptability in the one to two
years to graduation compared to when they first entered. When it came to social aware-
ness and relationship management skills, improvements were even greater: 75 per cent on
competencies such as empathy and team leadership.
Meanwhile with the part-time MBA students graduating in 1994, 1995, and 1996, the
dramatic improvement was found again in these students who typically take three to five
years to graduate. These groups showed a 67 per cent improvement in self-awareness and
self-management competencies and a 40 per cent improvement in social awareness and
social skills competencies by the end of their MBA program.
And that is not all. Jane Wheeler (1999) tracked down groups of these part-timers two
years after they had graduated. Even after all that time, they still showed improvements
in the same range: 63 per cent on the self-awareness and self-management competencies,
and 45 per cent on the social awareness and relationship management competencies. This
is in contrast to MBA graduates of the WSOM of the 1988 and 1989 traditional full- and
part-time program who showed improvement in substantially fewer of the competencies.
The positive effects of this program were not limited to MBAs. In a longitudinal study
of four classes completing the Professional Fellows Program (i.e., an executive education
program at the WSOM), Ballou et al. (1999) showed that these 45–55-year-old profes-
sionals and executives improved on self-confidence, leadership, helping, goal setting, and
action skills. These comprised 67 per cent of the emotional intelligence competencies
assessed in this study.
Concluding thought
The study of emotions opens the door to insights about humans and human talent.
Definitions, theory and empirical research has been reviewed, contending that a behav-
ioral, competency approach to emotional and social intelligence satisfy important criteria
as being forms of ‘intelligence’. Extending this into the arena of behavior competencies
allows precision in observation, measurement and development of human talent and the
realm of emotions. Competencies are a critical ingredient to outstanding performance.
Adults can develop competencies that are vital to outstanding performance in manage-
ment, leadership, and many other occupations and professions.
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15 Learning to face emotional intelligence: training
and workplace applications
Catherine S. Daus and Tiffani G. Cage
Introduction
Emotions research in organizations has increased in the last 20 years. Arguably, this is
partly due to the transition from an industrial manufacturing economy to a post-industrial
service economy (LeBreton et al., 2004). Now, an organization’s ability to deliver quality
service is a competitive advantage (Gronroos, 2006). Emotional intelligence, one of the
‘key players’ in emotion research, has reached a critical point in its emergence as a legiti-
mate scientific and practical construct in the realm of organizational science. While the
debate still appears to be alive and well regarding even the actual valid existence of the con-
struct1 for the most part, the discussions and science have moved beyond attempts to dis-
tinguish it as a legitimate construct to measurement and practical application concerns.
The increased attention on service has generated interest in emotional intelligence or
skills training to improve service delivery, which positively affects organizational perfor-
mance. As noted elsewhere (Ashkanasy & Daus, 2005; Daus & Ashkanasy, 2005; Landy,
2005), unfortunately, practice has preceded science regarding the training of emotional
intelligence, a concern of academic critics and proponents alike, of the construct
(Ashkanasy & Daus, 2005; Daus & Ashkanasy, 2005; Landy, 2005; Locke, 2005). The fact
that many consultants are ‘selling’ emotional intelligence training without the empirical
support is alarming. In this chapter, we shall review the empirical literature on what
exactly has been done regarding emotional intelligence training, and then provide needs
assessment guidelines for the development and implementation of a scientifically valid,
theoretically solid, practically useful emotional intelligence training program.
Ability perspective of emotional intelligence

For the purposes of this chapter, we shall primarily focus on the ability perspective of
emotional intelligence (EI) which argues that EI is a set of skills and abilities that are
learned and can be developed over time. We follow Mayer et al.’s four-branch ability
model (1999, 2000) which includes awareness or emotional perception, emotional facili-
tation of thought and problem solving, emotional knowledge and understanding, and
management of emotion, which includes managing self and others’ moods. For a thor-
ough review of all perspectives of emotional intelligence and training, see McEnrue
et al.’s (2008a) insightful and helpful article.
According to Mayer et al. (2000), emotional perception is the ability to recognize emo-
tions in the self and others such as customers or clients. Emotional facilitation of thought
and problem solving are the abilities to link emotions to other objects and to use emo-
tions to enhance reasoning and problem solving. Emotional understanding involves the
ability to understand how emotions relate to each other and what emotions mean. Finally,
emotional management is an ability to understand and manipulate emotions in the self
245
and in others. An example of this is an employee who is able to invoke an appropriate

work-related mood in him- herself in order to fulfill the job role, even though he/she may
be depressed or upset, while trying to calm down an irate customer (Webb, 2003).
Mayer et al. also suggest that EI develops over time and that these four branches are
arranged in terms of theoretical psychological levels, with perception of emotions, ‘the
most basic’, at the bottom level and emotional management, ‘the most complex’, at the
very top of the hierarchy. In practice, this suggests that individuals who are unable to per-
ceive emotions would also lack the ability to manage emotions. For example, an employee
who does not address the mounting anger of a displeased customer before the situation
escalates is likely to be unable to detect his/her own mounting anger with the displeased
customer. Therefore, the employee will be less likely to adjust his/her mood accordingly.
In that event, the employee’s inability to detect his/her anger may lead to the communi-
cation of threatening body language and facial expressions, which the customer may feed
on and communicate back to the employee. Also, the employee’s inability to detect the
customer’s anger and defuse the situation may lead to the customer leaving due to the
employee’s unsatisfactory performance. An emotionally intelligent employee, one who is
able to perceive and manage his/her emotions, will be able to maintain a positive expres-
sion of mood, possibly even altering his/her internal state in order to problem solve based
on the mood s/he may have invoked.
We shall now provide a brief empirical review of general EI training within the ability
purview, followed by a review of relevant empirical work regarding training relevant
specifically to each of the four branches.
Current empirical work on emotional intelligence training
General EI training
There is currently very little published work on training that utilizes the ability model of
emotional intelligence. Yet proponents of the ability model argue that we should be able
to develop training that can improve people’s skills and abilities in the four branches
(Lopes et al., 2006). In fact, this notion is rooted in Mayer and Salovey’s earlier writings
on EI (Mayer & Salovey, 1997). Below, we review the scant evidence in support of general
EI training within the ability framework.
Murray and Lawrence (2006) who used the Workgroup Emotional Intelligence Profile
(WEIP; a self-report measure based on the ability model) with public sector organizational
members, gave training in interpersonal skills, goal setting, and conflict resolution and
compared scores to a control group. Study 1 showed no rise in EI scores but in Study 2,
where participants were trained in EI (in the same company), the researchers found rela-
tional and behavioral skills to map onto a four-branch model. Paired sample t-tests showed
an increase in WEIP scores in the trained group, but not in the control or the group trained
in interpersonal relations. However, as mentioned by McEnrue et al. (2008b), it should be
noted that the WEIP only taps into two of the four branches of the Mayer et al. ability
model (ability to deal with own and ability to deal with others’ emotions).
In another application of the WEIP, Moriarity and Buckley (2003) developed and
administered a training program with students working in teams over a semester. In one
course (the control group), students received information via the traditional lecture-based
teaching strategy and in another course (same class, different section; experimental
Learning to face emotional intelligence 247
group), students were assigned to groups/teams and used a self-led teaching paradigm.
Students in the autonomous group format reported a statistically significant increase in
ability to deal with others’ emotions, but not with self, whereas the control group showed
no significant increases in either dimension of EI. Regarding peers’ assessment of EI, both
dimensions of EI improved with the experimental group from Time 1 to Time 2. It should
be noted, however, that this program/article did not focus on training EI, per se, but
showed that using team process applications and training appeared to have an impact on
(increase) participants’ self and peer reports of EI.
Metts and Daus (2006) reported on a three-day training program used with 36 mid-level
employees based on aspects of Bar-On’s (1997) and the full Mayer et al. models. The train-
ing program focused solely on EI and included presentations and discussions regarding
emotional intelligence, emotional competencies, emotional efficacy, and the intersection
between emotion and intellect among other topics; self-assessment activities including dis-
cussing results from the Mayer–Salovey–Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT)
(Mayer et al.’s ability measure), the Bar-On EQi, and the Emotional Barometer (devel-
oped and copyrighted by Impact Associates, Inc., 2003); and group activities including
role plays/dramas and games (simulated baseball game with emotions focus), all with a
specific emphasis on developing EI. Paired sample t-tests of managers’ perceptions of EI
skills before and after training showed that supervisors perceived an increase in skills
and abilities of employees in all four branches of Mayer et al.’s (1999, 2000) ability model
of EI.
Finally, McEnrue et al. (2008b) describe an EI development/training program used
with undergraduate business students. The measure used to assess EI (the Emotional
Intelligence Self Descriptive Inventory: EISDI; Groves et al., 2008) was developed by the
authors based on the four-branch ability model. Like the WEIP, it is a self-report measure,
but unlike the WEIP, it taps all four branches of EI (ibid.). The training program was
designed to enhance participants’ understanding of the four branches/abilities of the
ability model, give them an opportunity to focus on a few, specific skills chosen as per-
sonal development goals, and give feedback on their progress over the course of the train-
ing period (almost three months). Further, participants also took part in several exercises
(10 sets) designed to give them practice in developing EI skills. Results from paired sample
t-tests showed improvement in self-reports of all four branches of the ability model of EI
for the treatment, but not for the control group participants.
Thus, as the reader can readily assess, there is a dearth of published work utilizing the
four-branch ability model of EI. In fact, of what was discussed, two studies used a self-
report measure tapping only two of the four branches and another utilized a self-report
measure tapping all four branches, but with students. The first author has noted elsewhere
(Daus, 2006) her strong concerns with the use of self-report measures of EI which include,
among other undesirable properties, an undeniable propensity for self-report biases
inflating scores. This would appear to be a particular concern with all three studies, as
employees and managers alike have a strong, vested interest to say (or even feel!) that they
have improved on these skills/abilities . . . after all, they have just spent a considerable
amount of time and money investing in developing these skills – it would be distressing,
indeed, if there were no improvements. Nevertheless, these studies are the first steps in the
right direction, in what we hope will become a stream of studies, using experimental
designs to establish clearly the validity of (overall) EI training.
Specific EI training
Awareness or recognition of emotion We know empirically that ‘posed facial expressions

of emotion can be accurately recognized by untrained observers (Ekman, 1982; Izard,
1971)’ (McAlpine et al., 1991). Methodologically, this is critical as we can then justify
using still, or ‘posed’ expressions of emotion to test a person’s emotion recognition skills
(as is done in the MSCEIT’s first task). We also know that people differ on this skill. The
logical inferential question, then, is, can we increase someone’s low ability in this – in other
words, can this be taught?
Facial expression/recognition training has received much attention in the literature
dealing with psychologically challenged populations. These populations are particularly
interesting to study since decoding facial expressions poses particular difficulties for them.
For example, Walker et al. (Walker et al., 1980, 1984) discussed and tested emotional
recognition skills of those with schizophrenia and commented: ‘it appears that schizo-
phrenics, although capable of deciphering facial cues of identity, are impaired in the
ability to extract salient emotional cues from faces’ (Walker et al., 1984, p. 37).
Emotionally disturbed children were also found to demonstrate lower ability in this skill
(Zabel, 1979; note that this author also demonstrates that older children are better than
younger ones, further substantiating Mayer and Salovey’s (1997) contention that it is a
skill that develops over time) as were children with autism (Hobson, 1986a, 1986b;
Tantam et al., 1989). Furthermore, those who are cognitively mentally impaired demon-
strated lower levels of this ability (Gray et al., 1983; McAlpine et al., 1991, 1992a).
Some research has shown that emotion recognition training does help develop these
challenged populations’ abilities. For example, McKenzie et al. (2000) described a group
training program that significantly improved the ability of six individuals with a learning
disability to identify emotions. The training was intensive and long: 50–55 minutes once
a week for 10 weeks. Photographs depicting basic emotions (happy, sad, angry, worried,
bored, and afraid) and emotional scenes (e.g., at a funeral or wedding), video clips from
real-life situations from news and television, and role plays were all utilized in the group
training. Further, McAlpine and colleagues who studied emotion recognition impairment
in adults with mental retardation, also developed a training program for a sample of this
population (seven clients), involving an individualized program of systemic input twice a
day for 5 days a week over 70 sessions (McAlpine et al., 1992b). Participants’ average
increase in facial recognition was 30–50% above baseline.
Within clinical psychology and psychiatry, researchers have also been investigating
whether clinical populations can be taught (trained) how to recognize emotions better as
part of a program to treat some of the core functional difficulties of certain clinical diag-
noses (e.g., schizophrenia, autism). For example, one core aspect of schizophrenia is
abnormality in emotional processing: ‘emotional deficits appear to be uniquely associated
with core symptomotology and cognitive impairments in schizophrenia’ (Silver et al.,
2004, p. 147). In a study investigating whether this core symptom could be improved with
training, the investigators studied 20 male patients with chronic schizophrenia.
Participants agreed to undergo a commercially developed computerized training program
developed for teaching children with autism-spectrum disorders how to identify emotions
in others. The computer program provided a series of facial expressions, scenes, or objects
followed by a short question and either two or four response buttons. Participants
received feedback on their responses and had to complete each section correctly before
moving on to another section. Paired sample t-tests of pre-post training showed
significant improvements in facial recognition.
Regarding ‘normal’ populations and training in reading facial expressions, it is fasci-
nating to note that two of psychology’s founding fathers, Floyd H. Allport and J.P.
Guilford, were interested in whether or not the ability to read faces could be improved
with training. Guilford (1929, p. 191) comments:
Professor Allport has found that the ability to read faces and to name the expressions improves
slightly with but fifteen minutes of training in the analysis of faces. . . . Is it possible that such
training might lead to any great degree of improvement if more attention is given to it over a
longer period of time?
Guilford discusses Allport’s reporting of a ‘test’ of seven men and eight students in
social psychology. These students examined a series of faces, rated six basic emotion
expressions (pain/grief; surprise/fear; anger; disgust; pleasure; attitudinal), were instructed
in and studied the anatomy of facial expressions, and then rated different sets of faces on
the same emotions. Average improvement for both men and women was 51% over initial
performance. This is quite fascinating as Guilford devised a more extensive training study
where participants were given training in analyzing facial expressions over 10 days with
multiple testing periods and found ‘the average gain in ability was 51% over the original
ability’ (ibid., p. 202).
Also, people differ on the ability to recognize the difference between ‘real’ and ‘fake’
expressions of emotion as Ekman and O’Sullivan’s groundbreaking (1991) research
showed: US secret service agents were the only group (among judges, federal polygra-
phers, robbery investigators, psychiatrists, and students) who were able to detect liars in
videotapes above chance levels. Unauthentic displays of emotion and/or the inability to
detect them, can have detrimental effects for a variety of reasons, on both employees’
ability to perform adequately as well as on bottom-line and extra-role performance of
employees (e.g., customer service representatives; see Ekman & Friesen, 1982; Rafaeli,
1989; Ekman, 1992; Frank et al., 1993; Grandey et al., 2005).
Recently, the first author (Daus, 2008) developed one-hour, lecture-based training with
several illustrations based specifically on Ekman’s and Izard’s work in emotion recogni-
tion in faces and facial expressions of emotion (utilizing information from the FACS and
MAX, Ekman’s and Izard’s paradigms for muscular and facial recognition of emotion,
respectively). Participants who were low in the ability to read emotions in faces were
invited to participate in a one-hour training session which presented an overview of the
six basic emotions (happiness, sadness, fear, anger, disgust, and surprise), and then
focused on facial aspects of recognizing emotions. Scores from the Mayer et al. ability
measure of reading emotions in faces were used as pre- and post-training measures.
Correlations, and paired-sample t-tests with and without comparisons to a control group
showed significant increases in the ability to read emotions in faces for the experimental
group, but not for the control group.
Emotional facilitation Emotional facilitation is the ability to utilize emotions effectively

to facilitate thought. Although there is no extant research on training in this area of EI,
there is certainly substantial evidence to support it (see Mayer & Salovey, 1997; Mayer et
al., 1999, 2000); such examples, the extensive literature on creating moods or using moods
effectively such as a positive mood to enhance creativity (such as Isen’s work – see Isen,
1999, for a representative review of positive affect) or Schwarz’s well-known research on
sad moods leading to more systematic information processing (see Schwarz, 2001).
Emotional knowledge or understanding emotions This ability involves understanding

how emotions develop, blend and progress over time. Once again, there is no known
research regarding training focusing specifically on this dimension, although there is a
solid empirical foundation upon which this dimension was proposed (see Mayer &
Salovey, 1997; Mayer et al., 1999, 2000).
Management of emotion This dimension, not surprisingly, involves mood management,

and being able to regulate one’s own and others’ emotions. There is a plethora of research
on specific emotion management with both ‘normal’ and non-normal or ‘special’ popu-
lations. For example, anger management training has been successfully applied in a
military/occupational setting (Linkh & Sonnek, 2003), with children (Nemeth et al.,
2002); with particularly aggressive youth (McCarthy-Tucker et al., 1999; Williams, 2002);
with forensic inpatients with a learning disability (Burns et al., 2003); and with others
with cognitive impairments and/or learning disabilities (Rossiter et al., 1998; King et al.,
1999). Typically, such programs included the use of multiple inventories to gain insight
into the individual’s typical anger management strategies, provoking situations, and
personality-prone traits (e.g., Type A behavior), role plays with feedback, videotapes (of
self and others for critique and modeling), group lectures, and discussion.
Empathy training has also been utilized with both normal and non-normal populations
with quite a degree of success. For example, in one study (Long et al., 1999), several
romantic couples agreed to undergo a 10-hour empathy training program and were able
to improve their empathic abilities significantly. Therapists were also able to improve their
empathic communication after undergoing empathy training (Nerdrum & Ronnestad,
2003) as were hospital staff nurses (Herbek & Yammarino, 1990). Empathy training also
helped aggressive adolescent females increase their affective empathy (Pecukonis, 1990).
Similar to anger management training, empathy training programs often involve inven-
tory assessments, role-playing, videotaped interactions (of self and others), and lecture,
discussion and feedback.
As the reader can readily ascertain, there is much research from other disciplines and in
more specific domains that pertains to the training of emotional intelligence. The fields of
education, abnormal/clinical psychology, and counseling psychology, to name a few, have
a variety of intriguing studies and techniques already developed as a starting-point for
interested researchers who want to develop empirically solid training efforts. We suggest
that researchers cull what appears to be helpful to them in their development efforts and
expand on the already burgeoning literature by tying those efforts more directly to the four-
branch, ability model of EI. Below, we discuss our recommendations for developing empir-
ically solid, yet both practically useful and financially impacting EI training programs.
Emotional intelligence training with impact

Although emotional skill training is relatively recent, much has been claimed about its
economic value in organizations. However, primary factors limiting validity and
practical application are that it often lacks organizational and job context. It seems that
training was developed without understanding the needs of the organization, job, or
employee. There is a need to establish tools for conducting needs assessments with a
specific emphasis on emotional content. In this section, a case is made for an emotion-
focused needs assessment in terms of organizational-, job- and person-level needs. In the
final section, recommendations are made for conducting an emotion-focused needs
assessment.
Organizational-level emotional needs assessment

Regarding organizational context, major issues to explore are whether emotional skill
training programs are congruent with the organization’s goals and whether such training
is valued. Providing organizational context will aid in developing a business case to
increase support for emotional skill training throughout the organization.
Organizations committed to achieving their goals understand that achievement
requires more than just developing a strategy on the executive level; it involves managing
the strategy throughout the various departments and jobs within the organization.
Employees at all levels must understand and execute the organization’s strategy.
Consequently, even trainers are expected to engage in strategic training. Strategic train-
ing should enhance the employee’s knowledge, skills and abilities, which will help to
achieve the organization’s goals.
Organizational change is inherent to most business strategies. Organizational change
occurs in various forms such as downsizing, business mergers and acquisitions, technol-
ogy implementation and consolidation. Employees often react negatively to organiza-
tional changes, and overcoming negativity is a large part of strategy execution. Several
researchers have noted, to the extent that an organization is able to reduce negative reac-
tions to manage change effectively, this may determine the success of the change effort
(e.g., Piderit, 2000; Bovey & Hede, 2001) and possibly the organization’s ability to
compete – for example, negative emotional reactions to change may lead to negative out-
comes such as sabotage, procrastination, lack of trust and information and resource
hoarding (Kiefer, 2005).
Emotional skill enhancement for top management and employees may aid in facilitat-
ing an effective change management plan to execute the business strategy. Trainers who
are able to link emotional skill training to the business strategy may be seen as strategic
partners. Additionally, linking emotional skill training with the strategy demonstrates the
economic value in emotional skill enhancement.
In addition to linking training to strategy, trainers must also assess perceptions of emo-
tions to determine whether emotional skills are valued. Negative perceptions of emotions
may thwart any effort toward implementing an effective training program. For instance,
employees may believe that emotional skill training is too abstract, or too soft. Currently,
there is a significant gap between research on emotions and common perceptions of emo-
tions. Until recently, people believed that emotions lead to irrational behaviors (Picard,
1997). Now, research suggests that managing emotions is an important facet of main-
taining loyal customers and repeat business (e.g., Hochschild, 1983; Grandey, 2000).
Research also suggests that positive mood is associated with greater creativity and
flexibility in problem solving and more efficiency and thoroughness in decision making
(e.g., Isen, 2000). Finally, research suggests that the inability to manage emotions or
perhaps too much emotion work can negatively affect the individual and organization
(Brotheridge & Lee, 2002; Grandey, 2003; Giardini & Frese, 2006).
Supervisor perceptions are important to assess because supervisors are the key definer
and enforcer of emotional demands (Zapf, 2002; Diefendorff & Richard, 2003; Wilk &
Moynihan, 2005). Assessing perceptions of emotions is an effective way of determining
whether emotional skills are valued and whether the organization is likely to support emo-
tional skill training efforts. Managerial support is essential for emotional skill enhance-
ment because managers must model the new skills as well as reinforce them.
Future research should examine the relationship between emotional intelligence and reac-
tions to change to identify effective emotion-related skills for contending with organiza-
tional change. Another line of research may aim to examine how organizations can leverage
negative emotional reactions to change, as some reactions may be quite rational and war-
ranted. Organizations should be aware that if one’s fear is based on accurate information
and appraisal of the situation, that person’s perspective may aid in effective decision making.
Job-level emotional needs assessment

Regarding the job context, there is a strong need to develop analysis methods that capture
emotion-specific information. Specifically, there is a need to capture information that aids
in identifying emotion-related competencies for emotionally demanding occupations
such as bill collectors (Sutton, 1991); cashiers (Rafaeli, 1989); nurses (James, 1989, 1992);
restaurant workers (Adelmann, 1995); retail workers (Cage & Daus, 2006); and secretaries
(Wichroski, 1994). Furthermore, there is a need to develop a standardized method for
gathering emotion work requirements throughout the organization to expand the list of
emotionally demanding occupations.
An emotion-specific job analysis should identify the critical emotion-related tasks
being performed and the knowledge, skills and abilities needed to perform critical tasks.
Currently, there are no established job analysis methods specifically for gathering emo-
tions work requirements. However, some researchers have used job analysis interviews and
questionnaires to identify job-specific affect (Bernardin, 1987; LeBreton et al., 2004),
emotional labor (e.g., Brotheridge & Lee, 1998; Glomb & Tews, 2004) and emotion work
(e.g., Zapf et al., 1999). Research has demonstrated that both of these techniques are very
promising for gathering emotion work requirements.
The interview technique has recently been used to identify job-specific affect.
Researchers interviewed call-center representatives to identify job characteristics that
were frequently encountered and likely sources of negative emotional reactions
(Bernardin, 1987; LeBreton et al., 2004). The sources identified included sitting for long
periods or working with dissatisfied customers (Bernardin, 1987; LeBreton et al., 2004).
Both studies found that job-related emotional discomfort is an adequate predictor of
withdrawal behaviors (LeBreton et al., 2004) and turnover (Bernardin, 1987). In addition,
both research studies suggest that examining sources of positive and negative emotions
would strengthen the interview.
Another potentially useful method is the job analysis questionnaire. Currently, there
are several psychometrically sound measures of emotional labor (e.g., Adelmann, 1989;
Glomb & Tews, 2004), emotional regulation (e.g., Grandey et al., 2004), and emotions
work (Zapf et al., 1999) that may aid in assessing task-specific emotional demands. Future
research may aim to examine the utility of gathering critical emotion-related incidents in
a wide variety of occupations to bring together general emotion work requirements that
are present in several positions.
Person-level emotional needs assessment

At the person level, there is a need to capture individual differences in regulatory effort to
express organizationally desired emotions. Essentially, trainers need tools to identify
which employees have a greater propensity to experience negative and positive emotions
in reaction to specific job and organizational characteristics. An effective person analysis
should determine which employees would benefit from emotional skills training. This
information will aid in determining which employees need training and in developing
appropriate emotional skill training materials.
Most research studies suggest that several personality traits influence an individual’s
propensity to experience certain emotions. For instance, research has consistently demon-
strated that low extraversion, low emotional stability or high neuroticism increase the like-
lihood that an employee will experience more negative affective functioning (e.g., Iverson
et al., 1998; Wright & Cropanzano, 1998; LeBreton et al., 2004). In addition, research indi-
cates that these personality differences affect job performance (e.g., Barrick & Mount,
1991). Research on negative affect suggests that individuals high in negative affect are more
likely to adopt a pessimistic view of themselves and the world around them (e.g., Watson
& Pennebaker, 1989). Furthermore, several studies suggest that negative affect is related to
organizational constraints, interpersonal conflict at work, and workload anxiety (Spector
& Jex, 1998), role ambiguity and conflict (e.g., Fortunato et al., 1999; Zellars et al., 1999),
and lack of autonomy (Dollard & Winefield, 1998; de Jonge et al., 2001).
The research on personality and the experience of emotions suggests that some employ-
ees may experience a greater degree of emotional labor in positions that are incongruent
with their affective disposition. According to the research discussed above, it is conceiv-
able that an employee low in extraversion and high in neuroticism will likely expend more
energy expressing positive emotions than an employee high in extraversion and low in
neuroticism. In addition, the first employee is likely to view common events as negative
more often than the second employee.
Unfortunately, pre-screening or selecting employees solely based on their affective dis-
position is risky because personality measures do not measure emotion-related know-
ledge, skills and abilities. For example, several research studies have indicated that
emotional intelligence is independent of personality (e.g., Mayer et al., 1999, 2000; Tett
et al., 2005). Furthermore, advocates of the ability model of EI suggest that EI is inde-
pendent of emotional state (Epstein, 1999). Therefore, it is possible that a highly emo-
tionally intelligent employee (despite personality traits) has the skills and abilities to
manage his/her emotions to complete emotion-related tasks. This idea is in line with
Giardini and Frese’s (2006) study, which found that service employees with higher emo-
tional competence were less likely to experience negative effects from emotion work than
employees with lower emotional competence.
Arguably, negative emotions and personality traits have developed an undesirable rep-
utation as EI popularity increases. Organizations should be aware that an unhealthy pre-
occupation with positive emotions may be detrimental to organizational survival. For this
reason, some organizations may incorrectly believe that EI is what makes employees opti-
mistic, positive, pleasant and/or happy. On the contrary, EI is the mechanism that enables
an employee to comprehend the fact that a positive mood is not optimal in all situations
or for all kinds of thinking (Mayer et al., 2002). For instance, the tendency to think neg-
atively and view the world more negatively may serve as an advantage when devising con-
tingency plans and risk management strategies. Therefore, organizations seeking to
maximize human capital potential should focus on leveraging both negative and positive
personality traits. Clearly, more research is needed to determine how EI and personality
can be leveraged to improve job performance.
Conducting an emotion-focused needs assessment

The rationale behind an emotion-focused needs assessment is to expand the types of data
collected to identify root causes of organizational problems. In this section, we have
identified tools that will aid in collecting emotion-related data. Ideally, the tools and rec-
ommendations will be used in conjunction with other inquiry methods to determine
whether training (of any kind) is needed. If the data suggest that there is a performance
gap and training is the optimal solution, we have provided recommendations on how to
use the needs assessment to develop content for training.
Develop questionnaire to assess emotional reactions and perceptions

Practitioners interested in reducing negative reactions to change should start by examin-
ing what emotion-related knowledge, skills, and abilities reduce employee resistance and
increase employee commitment to change. For example, research studies suggest that
emotionally intelligent leaders are better able to transfer enthusiasm regarding the
changes, motivate and inspire employee participation, and communicate changes more
effectively than emotionally unintelligent leaders (Herkenhoff, 2004; Leban & Zulauf,
2004). In addition, emotionally intelligent employees may be better able to regulate and
control their emotions, thus reducing the likelihood that they will engage in counterpro-
ductive work behaviors in response to change.
One tool that may aid in identifying training material is the change readiness assess-
ment, which assesses employee perceptions of change. Survey responses are then used to
create change communication/marketing materials (e.g., newsletters, posters and emails)
to reduce resistance and increase commitment and acceptance of changes. Most organ-
izations create their own readiness scale and example items may include ‘I will accept the
change, and management is concerned about how the employees will be affected by the
change’. Including items on specific emotions toward change may strengthen this assess-
ment. For instance, items may include: when I think about the forthcoming changes it
makes me: ‘(1) anxious, (2) excited, (3) angry, or (4) sad’. Furthermore, adding items that
assess emotional regulatory strategies may also strengthen the assessment. Practitioners
should reference the literature on coping questionnaires (e.g., Folkman & Lazarus, 1985;
Carver et al., 1989) and emotion regulation at work scales (e.g., Totterdell & Holman,
2003; Grandey et al., 2004) to develop items that are tailored to the organizational
change. Sample items may include: when I think about the forthcoming changes: ‘(1) I
purposely think of the positive benefits of these changes or (2) I allow myself to get dis-
tracted from my work’. Assessing emotion-related content may aid in analyzing the emo-
tional climate and assessing emotional skill training needs. For instance, if the majority
of employees report a negative reaction to changes, one could imagine that employee
morale is low and that the work environment may be hostile. In addition, one could
conclude that employees with a negative reaction and ineffective regulatory skills may
benefit from emotional regulation training.
This assessment could also be adapted to assess perceptions of emotions as it relates to
the change or a specific job. For instance, sample change-related items may include, ‘It is
important to consider employees’ emotional reactions to changes’, or ‘The emotional
state of the employees does not impact on the success of these changes’. Appropriate
items for a specific job may include, ‘It is never appropriate to express anger or frustra-
tion to customers’, or ‘Employees must be attuned to nonverbal communication from the
customer’. This information can be used to create an internal ‘marketing plan’ to build
interest in emotional skill training. For instance, if managers believe that it is not impor-
tant to read nonverbal communications, they may benefit from a lunch-and-learn session
or newsletter that increases awareness of the importance of emotional skills. These and
other activities that increase managerial support are essential to implementing and main-
taining an effective emotional skills training program.
Develop job analysis interview or questionnaire targeting emotion work

One way to strengthen job analysis interviews or questionnaires is to focus more on how
the emotion work is being done. If contending with irate customers is a source of emo-
tional discomfort, the next questions should be: ‘How do you calm the customer? In other
words, what knowledge, skills and abilities are needed to calm an irate customer?’. For
example, an employee may respond that he/she understands that customers who return
items are frustrated with the item and not with the employee, which allows him/her to
reappraise the situation as a routine transaction versus negatively responding to customer
frustration. From that statement, a job analyst may infer that understanding situations
and self-regulation are essential job requirements.
Create an employee psychological profile

Organizations seeking to optimize employee personality traits should create a complete
psychological profile that includes the ‘Big Five’ personality traits as well as affective dis-
position. Creating a psychological profile that is linked to individual performance will
increase our knowledge of how emotional state affects performance. Imagine the conse-
quences of providing training to reduce negative mood and increase positive mood, but in
reality for certain tasks, negative mood facilitates performance and positive mood does
not. This was the case in George and Zhou’s (2002) field study, which found that under
certain conditions, negative mood actually promoted creativity, and positive mood did not.
Develop emotion skills training content from the needs analysis

Data collected from the needs assessment can then be used to develop emotional skill
training content. For instance, meaningful training content for managers may include a
seminar on how emotional skills impact on job performance and organizational perfor-
mance. Furthermore, managers may benefit from training that increases their skills in
managing employees who are in a negative mood. For example, managers may learn how
to discuss and acknowledge employees’ feelings effectively by redirecting the employees’
attention back to the organization’s goals and away from their emotions (Herkenhoff,
2004). In training, managers may also benefit from role-play to practice how to navigate
discussions on feelings. Managers may also benefit from learning how to self-induce,
express and transfer enthusiasm in order to generate excitement surrounding changes. In

addition, training content may include methods for inducing positive emotions such as
using humor effectively and conveying emotions in writing and speeches. This training
material is in line with Mayer et al.’s (2002) conceptualization of the managing emotions
branch, which involves the ability to manage emotions in the self and others.
Training for employees may include increasing knowledge of emotionally laden cus-
tomer transactions, such as customer returns and malfunctioning cash registers. In this
training, employees learn how to anticipate customer emotional reactions before they
occur. For example, a trainee may learn that customers will be frustrated with store
remodeling, and if this occurs, to make sure to acknowledge the customers’ frustration
and then discuss the benefits that remodeling provides for customers. This training mate-
rial is consistent with Mayer et al.’s conceptualization of the understanding emotions
branch, which involves the ability to connect situations with certain emotions.
Furthermore, this same curriculum may aim to improve a person’s ability to self-regulate
his/her emotions in order to express the appropriate emotions. Training materials may
focus on emotional regulation by recalling situations that elicit the desired emotion in
order to express it sincerely. This training content is consistent with emotion regulation
theory, which is defined as a process whereby individuals regulate which emotions they
experience and express (Gross, 1998). Training may also include role-play with an irate
customer scenario so that employees become desensitized to their emotional responses to
irate customers and develop effective ways of managing their emotions.
Results from the person-level analysis may suggest that some employees may benefit
from training designed to enhance emotional-related skills while considering their
affective disposition. For example, consider the following scenario: most positions require
some level of evaluation. Employees may be responsible for evaluating performance,
trends, products, creative works and so on. Suppose an organization discovered that
inflated performance evaluations cost millions of dollars per year in unjustifiable pay
increases. In addition, analyses revealed that employees high in positive affect were more
likely to assign significantly higher performance ratings and recommend significantly
higher pay increases. According to the mood congruence paradigm, this scenario is highly
plausible (Bower, 1981). In this scenario, the analyst may conclude that employees high in
positive affect may benefit from performance rater training that also includes lessons on
mood management and how moods influence judgments.
Align training with other human resource programs

Finally, if the needs assessment reveals that there is a need for emotional skill training,
then the organization must determine whether it is necessary to redesign other human
resource programs. Organizational members must create an environment that encourages
and sustains transfer of training skills. For instance, it may be necessary to redesign
specific jobs, roles, and/or processes. There may also be a need to redesign major human
resource systems such as recruiting, selection, rewards and recognition, compensation,
and performance appraisals to match the new emotion work requirements.
Conclusion
Emotional skill training is at a critical crossroads and its future is still uncertain. On the
one hand, academic researchers, in a variety of fields, have clearly demonstrated that
training can effectively increase emotion-related knowledge, skills, and abilities. On the
other, there is still much to be desired in terms of training content validity and work-
place application. The future of EI will remain uncertain as long as emotional skills
training is delivered simply because it is in vogue rather than a necessity. There is a
significant need to focus training efforts on developing empirically solid training pro-
grams that lead to workplace improvements. Therefore, we have provided recommen-
dations that will aid in developing scientifically valid, theoretically solid, practically
useful EI training programs that are rooted in the four-branch, ability model of EI. It
is our hope that researchers and practitioners will apply these recommendations in their
efforts to refine them.
Note
1. See special issue in 2005 of Journal of Organizational Behavior for a series of point/counterpoint debate
pieces by various scholars in the field on these issues.
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PART III
EMOTIONAL EFFECTS IN
DYADIC INTERACTIONS
16 Emotion scripts in organizations: a multi-level
model
Donald E. Gibson
Introduction
A paradox of emotions is that they are simultaneously in our control and out of our
control. ‘In our control’ implies that emotions tend to follow particular patterns and are
thus amenable to prediction and regulation; ‘out of our control’ suggests that they are
idiosyncratic, difficult-to-predict states. Experientially, this paradox is seen in the fact that
strong feelings of anger may elude our control, but even in a fury we rarely break our most
precious objects (Frijda, 1988). Our theorizing about emotion also illustrates this
paradox. Emotions have been conceived as interruptions (Mandler, 1985), as ineffable
bodily states (James, 1884), and as largely automatic responses out of our conscious
control (Damasio, 1994; Bargh & Chartrand, 1999), yet emotions also follow predictable
patterns, even ‘laws’ (Frijda, 1988), and current theories now focus on emotion regulation,
emphasizing how commonplace emotion control is in daily life (see Gross, 1998). It is my
contention that this in-control/out-of-control paradox can be fruitfully examined by con-
ceiving of emotions as scripted responses. Emotions exhibit a script-like structure. They
are seen, experientially (by laypeople) and conceptually (by researchers) as sequences of
events based on an if–then goal-directed logic. At the same time, social norms, individual
differences, and differing contexts produce infinite variations in these scripts. Thus, the
existence of scripts suggests that control is possible, but variation sets limits on that
control.
This chapter examines emotional experience and expression from the perspective of
script theory. I present a model integrating a variety of script approaches as a multi-level
model (see Figure 16.1). The purpose of the model is to integrate various viewpoints, to
accentuate connections between disparate strands of literature rather than to add new
strands. Script theory is useful in this purpose because scripts reveal both the descriptive
content of what ‘typically’ happens when emotions are felt and expressed, and they also
offer clues into what ought to happen, the normative content of what we expect to occur
and what we regard as appropriate.
Examination of emotion scripts is especially helpful in understanding the nature of
emotion in organizations. Organizations are boundedly rational structures that constrain
individuals’ experience and expression of emotion (Mumby & Putnam, 1992). In this
context, many interactions have a scripted quality; for example, researchers have analyzed
performance appraisals (Gioia et al., 1989), selection interviews (Poole et al., 1990), and
sales calls (Leigh & McGraw, 1989) as representing cognitive and behavioral scripts. At
the same time, the complexity of the variables involved – phenomena at the individual,
group, and organizational levels – adds to the variation in scripts. Anger may not be (and
typically is not) expressed in the same way in two different organizations, in two different
groups, even with two different target individuals. However, as researchers begin to refine
263
Specificity Level
More specific
Organizational script: Emotions shaped by structure (delineation of Individual, group,
groups, hierarchy), power, and gender organization
Relational script: Emotions shaped by interactions with significant

others and their reactions Dyadic
Social script: Emotions created and shaped by the structure of the Individually
social situation and cultural norms internalized social
and cultural norms
Cognitive script: Emotions shaped by intrapsychic of situations
Intrapsychic
and prototypical ways of responding
(within individual)
Biological script: Emotions primarily serving evolutionary survival
More general functions Neurological
Figure 16.1 Emotion scripts: a multi-level model
their work in emotions and seek to demonstrate the utility of their theories to practicing
managers, they are drawn to identifying antecedents and outcomes of emotions. Script
theory offers a template against which to compare and contrast this complexity and
variety. It applies the logic of sequences of events to discovering how emotions might play
out in organizational situations.
As this Research Companion will attest, there are myriad ways of viewing and research-
ing emotion. Often, these varied approaches are set up as opposing dichotomies. The ‘bio-
logical’ and ‘cognitivist’ perspectives are said to be ‘competing conceptualizations in the
literature’ (Forgas, 1996, p. 278), while the ‘universalistic approach’ (that there are basic
emotional responses characterizing all global cultures) is competing with the ‘cultural rel-
ativity approach’ (that cultures significantly shape the experience and expression of emo-
tions), and this competition is seen as a ‘major controversy’ (Scherer & Wallbott, 1994,
p. 310). One purpose of this chapter is to show how these dichotomous views are interre-
lated, and in fact, can be thought of as different levels of emotion scripts rather than as
competing explanations. As evidence for the usefulness of scripts in integrating different
levels of analysis, researchers have concluded that scripts offer a way to reconcile the uni-
versalistic versus cross-cultural variation approaches to understanding emotion meaning
(Russell, 1991b; White, 2000).
I begin by defining how emotion scripts have been used in the extant emotions litera-
ture. I then show how scripts have been evoked at a variety of levels: biological, cognitive,
social, relational, and organizational. I emphasize that understanding emotion scripts at
the organizational level depends on understanding scripts at the preceding levels, and
explore how the emotion script approach offers a methodology and conceptual frame-
work that can heighten our understanding of emotions in organizations.
Definitions: scripts, schemas, and related phenomena

Scripts are a type of knowledge structure; they are individuals’ structured ideas about how
thoughts, feelings and actions are carried out in particular situations. More formally,
‘schemas’ will be defined here as ‘organized representations of past behavior and experience
Emotion scripts in organizations 265
that function as theories about reality to guide a person in construing new experience’
(Baldwin, 1992, p. 468). A ‘cognitive script’ is a type of schema representing individuals’
ideas about the appropriate sequences of events that occur in specific situations (Schank &
Abelson, 1977; Baldwin, 1992). Well-known examples include the ‘restaurant script’,
depicting individuals’ ideas about the stereotypical order of events in ordering food in a
restaurant (Schank & Abelson, 1977). Scripts for social situations are seen as being char-
acterized by (a) declarative or descriptive knowledge, which helps the perceiver describe
what behavior tends to be followed by what responses (‘asking for the menu in a restaurant
is typically followed by the person ordering food’), and (b) procedural knowledge, which
offers a guide to the perceiver’s behavior (e.g., ‘If I respond negatively to this person, they
are likely to respond negatively back to me’; see Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1985; Baldwin, 1992).
Scripts are goal driven. Scripts represent a temporally based hierarchical structure con-
sisting of ‘in-order-to’ relationships between action elements (Lichtenstein & Brewer,
1980). That is, an activity is performed in order to accomplish subsequent activity which
is higher up in the hierarchy. Selection of food on the menu, for example, is done in order
to reach the goal of eating in a restaurant. Effective performance appraisal interviews are
structured as a specific sequence of events as a way to achieve the goal of providing useful
feedback to an employee. This structure implies that scripts are organized as goal–subgoal
hierarchies, characteristic of human goals in general, and add structure to both memory
and behaviors (Lord & Kernan, 1987; Austin & Vancouver, 1996). In addition, scripts are
adaptable; they are easily elaborated upon to incorporate new experiences (Bower et al.,
1979; Abelson, 1981), a phenomenon called ‘tagging’ (Lord & Kernan, 1987, p. 267).
Having shared scripts – common understandings of goal-directed behavior chains in well-
known situations – is functional in that it facilitates interactions and reduces ambiguity.
Researchers suggest that in the organizational context when employees share the same
script this is beneficial because it ‘creates convergence of knowledge and action, offering
a strategy for reducing conceptual divergence among individuals and teams confronted
with the same situation’ (Zohar & Luria, 2003, p. 841).
Emotion scripts
This chapter will focus on a particular type of script, an ‘emotion’ script, which refers to
an individual’s knowledge of emotion episodes and the prototypical sequence of events
characterizing particular emotions. As with cognitive scripts, emotion scripts contain
both descriptive elements (e.g., the ability of individuals to describe what causes feelings
of anger and what anger expressions look like) and normative elements (e.g., the ability
of individuals to identify contextual expectations and sanctions attached to anger expres-
sions) (Fischer, 1991).
I shall refer to the ‘contents’ of an emotion script as a person’s specific ideas about what
occurs, for example, when one feels and expresses emotions such as anger or fear or surprise.
Abelson expresses this idea succinctly when he argues: ‘A sizeable set of inferences can be
made from the knowledge that, say, “John is angry.” A negative thing has happened to John;
he blames it on someone; he regards it as unjust; he is aroused, flushed, and prone to swear
or lash out; he may seek revenge on the instigator, and so on’ (1981, p. 727). Emotion script
theory suggests that individuals’ knowledge structure for emotions is scriptlike; emotions
are best thought of as prototypical sequences of events that comprise an ‘episode’ (see Fehr
& Russell, 1984; Shaver et al., 1987; Lazarus, 1991; Russell, 1991b). An emotion episode
Table 16.1 Generic emotion scripts
Script elements Emotions described by respondents

Joy Anger Love Fear
Antecedents A desirable Judgment that Having spent a lot Threat of harm or
outcome; the situation is of time together, death (68%)
getting what illegitimate, having shared Being in a novel,
was wanted wrong, unfair special unfamiliar
(68%)* (78%) experiences (33%) situation (43%)
Task success, Real or threatened P finds O attractive Threat of social
achievement physical or (physically and/or rejection (28%)
(54%) psychological psychologically) Being alone
Receiving pain (57%) (28%) (walking alone,
esteem, respect, Violation of an O offers/provides etc.) (28%)
praise (33%) expectation; something that P
things not wants, needs, likes
working out as (22%)
planned (54%)
Behavioral Smiling (72%) Verbally attacking Feeling happy, Feeling nervous,
responses Communicating the cause of anger joyful, exuberant, jittery, jumpy
the good feeling (69%) etc. (52%) (48%)
to others (or Loud voice, Smiling (44%) Picturing a
trying to) (40%) yelling, screaming, Feeling warm, disastrous
Positive shouting (59%) trusting, secure, conclusion to
outlook; seeing Thinking ‘I’m etc. (43%) events in progress
only the bright right, everyone (42%)
side (40%) else is wrong’ Talking less, being
(38%) speechless (31%)
Self-control Suppressing the Acting unafraid,
procedures anger; trying not hiding the fear
to show or express from others (23%)
it (20%) Comforting
Redefining the oneself, telling
situation (11%) oneself everything
is all right, trying
to keep calm
(22%)
Note: * Percentages indicate the percentage of 120 subjects mentioning that feature. Subjects could identify
multiple categories; thus these percentages do not sum to 100%.
Source: Adapted from Shaver et al. (1987). © American Psychological Association.
typically comprises four primary elements: (i) an antecedent or triggering event; (ii) a phys-
iological reaction, and an awareness of ‘feeling’ the emotional reaction; (iii) expression or
behavior or effortful regulation of expression or behavior; and (iv) an outcome, which may
include the individual’s own reaction to the episode as well as the reactions of others. The
general contents of four typical emotion episodes are depicted in Table 16.1 (derived from
Shaver et al., 1987). The script concept is useful in that, when elicited, it helps to show how
social reality is constructed, and also indicates how ‘constructions of reality translate into
social behavior through action rules’ (Abelson, 1981, p. 727).
Two further distinctions are in order. First, emotion scripts differ in the degree to which
there is agreement among individuals as to the specific contents of the script. When there
is substantial agreement about the antecedents and consequences for a particular emotion
in a particular setting, this is considered to be a strong script. A weak script is one exhibit-
ing less agreement on common antecedents and consequences (Abelson, 1981). For
example, individuals’ understanding of what happens when an employee expresses anger
in a staff meeting may be largely shared: there may be substantial agreement that such
expressions are inappropriate and will elicit sanctions from the leader of the meeting.
However, employees’ understanding of what happens when anxiety is expressed may be
less elaborated; there may be less common agreement on the causes and consequences of
this emotion expression.
Second, emotion scripts vary to the degree to which they originate from idiosyncratic
or shared experiences (Fischer, 1991; Frijda & Mesquita, 1994). Individuals may have
their own emotion scripts developed on the basis of their own upbringing and family
experiences. Other scripts are widely shared based on cultural norms, for example, the
norm to feel sadness and cry at funerals and feel happiness and smile at weddings
(Hochschild, 1979). A person may use this emotion script knowledge to his/her advan-
tage. For example, an employee may be aware that in professional roles the expression of
extreme emotions is typically sanctioned (e.g., Gibson, 1997), but may have an individu-
ally developed script suggesting that expressions of extreme emotions may, at times, gen-
erate the desired effect in others (see Pierce, 1995).
In line with the idiosyncratic approach, Tomkins (1979) developed a script theory sug-
gesting that individual personalities are made up of more or less salient scripts, driven by
emotions. He argued that individuals form scripts based on three criteria: (i) when they
experienced the most ‘intense and enduring affect’ (1979, p. 223); (ii) when affect changed
during an event suddenly (from positive to negative or the opposite); and (iii) when
sequences of affect were repeated (e.g., an individual experiences a change from positive
to negative affect every time an event happens). While I acknowledge the existence of idio-
syncratic scripts, the emphasis in this chapter will be on the extent to which biological,
cognitive, social, relational, and organizational normative forces constrain and shape
these idiosyncratic scripts.
A multi-level model of emotion scripts

Given this basic idea, that emotions can be conceptualized as scripted sequences of events,
researchers have turned to the question, ‘Where do emotion scripts come from?’. The
answer this chapter provides is that scripts emerge at multiple levels. These levels are
depicted in this model (from bottom to top) in terms of the relative effect of context and
script specificity (see Figure 16.1). The first level, the biological script, is considered the
most basic and operates primarily automatically and unconsciously (see Plutchik, 1980;
LeDoux, 1996). Biological scripts provide the basic map on which the succeeding layers
operate. The second level, the cognitive script, emphasizes the degree to which emotions
arise from individuals’ appraisal of specific situations. Cognitive scripts are more specific
than biological scripts in that particular antecedents (e.g., the accomplishment of an
important task) are predicted to lead to specific emotions (e.g., joy). They are not regarded
as culturally specific, however; cognitive scripts are assumed to operate intrapsychically
to explain the connection between cognitions and emotions. The third level, social scripts,
suggests the degree to which emotions are socially constructed and driven by power rela-
tionships and cultural norms (see Kemper, 1990; Russell, 1991b; Scherer & Walbott,
1994). The fourth level, relational scripts, involves emotion scripts enacted primarily in
dyadic relationships (see Baldwin, 1992; Fehr et al., 1999; Fitness, 2000). The fifth level,
organizational scripts, is characterized by substantial complexity (involving multiple indi-
vidual and group relationships; power and gender effects, among others), and specificity:
organizations are seen as providing relatively specific scripts for the feeling and expression
of emotions (see Hochschild, 1983; Gibson, 1995, 1997; Fitness, 2000).
This model is not meant to be comprehensive in the sense of including all possible levels
of scripts. Depending on one’s perspective, additional layers could be added and their
listing reordered. Rather, I illustrate this multi-level model as a way of providing a foun-
dation for understanding the focus of this chapter: the emergence of emotion scripts in
organizations. It is my assertion that we cannot understand the intricacies of scripted
emotion experience and expression in organizations without first understanding what
drives and anticipates these scripts.
Biological scripts
From this view, emotions are considered basic and hard-wired, and our tendencies to act
are largely pre-programmed. This view has emotions driven by biology; they are primar-
ily adaptive responses to aid the survival of species. While complex emotional responses
exist and cultural and social forces shape emotional responses, the biological view empha-
sizes that human emotional responses, prior to the intervention of conscious cognition
and cultural overlays, have a basic quality that is largely universal: all humans respond to
needs in their environment with relatively similar emotional expressions representing rel-
atively similar feelings (see Ekman, 1992, 1994; but see critiques in Russell, 1994;
Wierzbicka, 1994).
In The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, Darwin (1872 [1998]) argued
that while the developing anatomy of a species could be explained as adaptive responses
to an organism’s environment, he also realized that evolution applied not only to anatomy,
but to an animal’s mind and expressive behavior as well. Darwin viewed emotions, and
specifically their expression, as functional responses by animals to survive in their envi-
ronment. Expressed emotions acted as signals and as preparations for action, and com-
municated information to others about intentions. Thus, there is an evolutionary
connection between an animal baring its teeth and the snarl of a human being, the simi-
larity in laughing expressions by monkeys and humans, and the universal tendency for
one’s hair to stand ‘on end’ in conditions of anger and fear.
Darwin emphasized that many, but not all, emotional expressions are unlearned or
innate. He showed, for instance, that emotional expressions appear in very young children
in the same form as adults, before much opportunity for learning has occurred, and some
expressions appear in similar form in widely distinct races and groups of humans. Darwin’s
contribution is the notion that emotional expressions are largely universal, and thus have
a biological basis, rather than being culturally bound. Since emotions serve evolutionary
functions, they must exist, though modified, in observable patterns throughout the world.
The evolutionary view is supported by more recent lines of research. Ekman (1972,
1992) drew on and extended Darwin’s ideas by showing that people from widely ranging
cultures can relatively accurately recognize emotion expressions for six basic emotions:
surprise, happiness, anger, fear, disgust, and sadness. Ekman argued that ‘there are dis-
tinctive movements of the facial muscles for each of a number of primary affect states,
and these are universal to mankind’ (Ekman & Friesen, 1969, p. 71). However, he also
cautioned that while the movement of facial muscles shows universal tendencies, the
evoking stimuli, subjective feelings, emotional ‘display rules’ and the behavioral conse-
quences ‘all can vary from one culture to another’ (p. 73). His research, then, is largely
consistent with a ‘dual-phase’ model in which biological affects are primary, and cultural
or cognitive processes are a secondary, though critically important, overlay (White, 2000,
p. 32).
Plutchik (1980) in a ‘psychoevolutionary synthesis’ argued that because all organisms
face ‘common survival problems’, including ‘finding food, avoiding predators and locating
mates’ (p. 130), emotions serve as behavioral patterns that help organisms adapt to these
problems by providing internal preparations for action as well as external behavior appro-
priate to controlling the environment. Thus, anger successfully prepares the body by
increasing the heart rate and heightening attentiveness, and seeks to control environmental
forces through facial expression (e.g., snarling, hair raised) and action (aggressive approach)
designed to elicit fear in others. Viewing emotions from this evolutionary functional
approach, Plutchik argues that there are eight basic emotions (anger, fear, anticipation, sur-
prise, acceptance, disgust, joy and sadness) corresponding to the needs of any organism to
respond to existential crises, including protection, exploration, and reproduction.
Recent neurological research has provided some support for the evolutionary point of
view. Summarizing his own and other research examining fear centers in the brain,
LeDoux expressed his view as: ‘I believe that the basic building blocks of emotions are
neural systems that mediate behavioral interactions with the environment, particularly
behaviors that take care of fundamental problems of survival’ (1996, p. 125). He also
argued that different ‘basic’ emotions rely on unique centers and pathways in the brain
rather than indicating an ‘emotional center’ for a variety of responses. He concluded that
human brains are largely programmed by evolution to respond in certain ways to
significant situations, so there is a large dose of automaticity in our emotional responses.
Determining significance is a combination of evolutionary history and our own memories
of past experiences. While much of our initial reactions are automatic, when we become
conscious of this neural activity, we can be said to ‘feel’ – we can have the strong subjec-
tive reactions we think of as emotions. Emotions, then, are ‘unconscious processes that can
sometimes give rise to conscious content’ (ibid., p. 269).
What are the implications of the biological approach for emotion script theory? First,
biological approaches provide support for the notion that emotions can be considered as
sequences of events beginning with sensing the environment for survival clues, reacting in
patterned physiological ways, and ending in behaviors or intended behaviors. Second, bio-
logical approaches, by emphasizing the existence of relatively discrete ‘basic’ emotions,
suggest that there are identifiable, and relatively strong emotion scripts surrounding a
certain small number of feeling states. The fact that researchers using the biological
approach have not been able to agree on the identity or number of basic emotions has been
critiqued (see, e.g., Russell, 1994). While this lack of agreement hinders the development
of universalistic scripts, the proposal of basic emotions has provided a foundation to allow
script researchers to explore families of scripts, especially those for anger and fear (see Fehr
& Russell, 1984).
What the biological view means for thinking about emotion scripts is that at its primary
level, our emotional responses are following biological scripts. Even researchers who
emphasize cultural differences note the importance of a biological ‘core’; for example,
Russell (1991b, p. 437) states about emotional expression, ‘There is a core of emotional
communication that has to do with being human rather than with being a member of a
particular culture’. As biological scripts play out in real interactions, they are typically
interrupted by consciousness and by willful self-regulation (Frijda, 1986). The level of
regulation depends on the significance of the event (how fearful one is, for example), and
on the strength of the conscious scripts that are invoked to alter the basic biological script.
We examine these more conscious scripts next.
Cognitive scripts
While the biological and evolutionary approaches emphasize the relative automaticity of
basic emotional responses, cognitive approaches emphasize the degree to which cogni-
tions impinge on nearly every aspect of feeling and expressing emotions. From a cogni-
tive perspective, how a person interprets or appraises a meaningful event and how
emotions are conceived as knowledge structures influence how different emotions are per-
ceived, understood, labeled and expressed (Fitness & Fletcher, 1993). Two research
streams, one focused on emotions as prototypes and one focused on cognitive appraisals
of emotion, exemplify the cognitive perspective on emotion scripts.
The prototype approach suggests that individuals conceive of emotions as ‘fuzzy sets’
of attributes. Emotions have been notoriously difficult for researchers to classically define
because there is not a set of conclusive necessary and sufficient features (such as would be
true about the category of even numbers, for example – see Shaver et al., 1987). Indeed,
the difficulty researchers have had in defining emotions (see Averill, 1983; Buck, 1990),
combined with the fact that laypeople have a strong intuitive sense of what emotions are
and how they operate, speaks to the applicability of the prototype approach (Fehr &
Baldwin, 1996). According to this approach, individuals categorize emotions based on
whether they bear a resemblance to what they think of as prototypical instances of
emotion (see Rosch, 1975). Thus, just as ‘chair’ is a prototypical subcategory of ‘furni-
ture’, ‘anger’ and ‘fear’ are considered by laypeople to be prototypical subcategories of
‘emotion’. Shaver et al. (1987) found, for example, that when 135 emotion terms were sub-
jected to hierarchical cluster analysis, five ‘basic’-level emotion words emerged: love, joy,
anger, sadness and fear. They concluded that a large number of emotion lexical terms
could be tied to a small number of prototypical emotions. The variability in emotion
words tend to specify either the intensity of a basic emotion (i.e., rage being more intense
than annoyance; jubilation being more intense than satisfaction) or the antecedent
context in which the emotion arises (i.e., disappointment tends to be preceded by differing
antecedents than grief). Consistent with a prototype approach, these findings suggest a
hierarchy in which a range of emotion words (such as grief, annoyance, jubilation) are
subordinate to a basic level (love, joy, anger, sadness, fear) which is subordinate to a super-
ordinate level (emotions). The hierarchical structure of these prototypes has been sup-
ported in several studies (see summary in Cropanzano et al., 2003).
In examining individuals’ knowledge structures of emotions, researchers further dis-

covered that these structures conceive of emotions as containing prototypical sequences
of events. That is, if asked, individuals not only provide good examples of what they think
an emotion is (e.g., ‘I felt really angry when my supervisor accused me of being late!’),
they also conceive of anger in terms of whether it fits a likely sequence of events (‘When
he accused me, I felt tense and sweaty – I had the urge to yell at him, but managed to
control it’). As noted above, individuals conceive of emotional feeling and expressions in
terms of event sequences, or scripts. As Fehr and Russell (1984) and Russell (1991a) depict
these structures, emotions are categorized depending on their prototypical features. These
features are organized cognitions and ‘knowable subevents: the causes, beliefs, feelings,
physiological changes, desires, overt actions, and vocal and facial expressions’ of emo-
tions. They are ordered ‘in a causal sequence, in much the same way that actions are
ordered in a playwright’s script’ (Russell, 1991b, p. 442).
Similarly, Shaver et al. (1987) characterize laypeople’s emotion scripts as episodes,
beginning with an interpretation of an event as good or bad, helpful or harmful, consis-
tent or inconsistent with a person’s motives (see also Roseman, 1984). Depending on
whether a situation is perceived as being motive consistent or inconsistent, the individual
then assesses whether action is necessary. Based on an individual’s appraisal of the event
(Is this a threat to me? Am I justified in taking action? Does this event make me feel good?)
a pattern of possible responses is initiated. These action responses (including action ten-
dencies, cognitive biases, and physiological patterns) are seen as arising fairly automati-
cally. However, individuals also tend to simultaneously engage in self-control efforts,
which can be initiated at any point in the emotion process and directed at any of the com-
ponents (appraisal, physiological response, and emotion expression (see Frijda, 1986;
Gross, 1998).
Closely related to the prototype approach, the cognitive appraisal approach focuses on
one aspect of this prototypical sequence: how an individual’s appraisal of the situation
leads to specific emotional responses (Lazarus, 1991). These researchers argue that it is an
individual’s evaluation or interpretation of events, rather than the events per se, that deter-
mine whether an emotion will be felt and which emotion it will be (Roseman, 1984). The
particular emotion felt by an individual depends on their appraisal of the situation based
on several dimensions. For example, Roseman identifies an individual’s appraisal of per-
ceived power (weak vs. strong), the probability of an outcome (uncertain vs. certain), and
his or her motivation state (seeking to avoid punishment versus seeking to attain reward),
among others. For example, anger is seen as resulting from the absence of a reward or
presence of a punishment that is caused by other people when a positive outcome is
deserved (see Roseman et al., 1990). Cognitive appraisal theorists differ from biologically
oriented theorists in their emphasis that emotions are not primarily hard-wired unthink-
ing processes, but rather, based primarily on cognitive interpretations (appraisals) of situ-
ational cues (Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 1991).
Social scripts
The notion of universal, evolutionary bases of emotion has come under attack (Scherer &
Wallbott, 1994; White, 2000). Sociologists and anthropologists argue that culture is not
simply an overlay to biological and cognitive patterned responses; it is fully integrated and
essential to emotional experience and behavior. Social constructionist psychologists
(e.g., Averill, 1982; Gergen & Davis, 1984) contend that while emotions have physiologi-
cal components, they are largely a result of social processes, especially expectations and
norms for how and when people are expected to feel and express emotions (Parkinson et
al., 2005). Geertz (1973, p. 81) concisely summarizes the point of social constructionists
by arguing that ‘Not only ideas, but emotions too, are cultural artifacts’. Hochschild
(1979, p. 552) proposes a two-step process in the social experience of emotion, one in
which factors in the structure of the situation (such as how much power we have, or
whether we are appreciated as part of a group) arouse primary emotional responses (we
are angered when a boss yells at us) that are then ‘managed’ by secondary acts. These sec-
ondary acts are cultural and organizational norms, described as ‘feeling rules’, that stip-
ulate how we ought to feel in given situations.
Social constructivists thus put relatively more importance in the effect of societal norms
on how we conceive of emotions rather than on biological responses. One such example
is the Japanese feeling and expression of amae. Amae means to presume upon another’s
love or indulge in another’s kindness; it is a sense of helplessness in which one is a passive
love object (see LeDoux, 1996). While the script for amae is well known in Japan and con-
sidered an essential part of the Japanese personality structure, there is essentially no
strong equivalent for this script in the Western tradition, indeed no comparable word for
it in any European languages. Social constructivists use examples such as these to show
that emotions are typically culturally determined rather than essentially hard-wired.
From an emotion script approach, I argue that while evolutionary psychologists
provide the neurological and biological ‘rules’ that govern emotional feeling and expres-
sion, sociologists such as Hochschild provide the social rules that shape and guide these
basic physiological responses (see also Kemper, 1990). There is a layer of biological
responses that form the foundational script for emotional response. Overlaid on that
script is a more refined social script that provides the connection between these basic
responses and the needs and expectations of social situations.
Russell (1991b) uses a script theory of emotions to reconcile the universalistic and cul-
tural relativity approaches. He argues that those cultures which have languages contain-
ing fewer emotion categories have more general emotion scripts. These scripts have fewer
specific features and cover a broad range of phenomena (we have termed these ‘weak’
scripts above). Cultures with languages with many emotion categories have more specific
scripts – each script ‘would have more features and cover a narrower range of phenom-
ena’ (ibid., p. 443). In this way, scripts vary to the degree that they are universal or specific,
depending on the culture. Within the script, antecedents of particular emotions will also
vary from universal to specific, as will action tendencies (Frijda, 1986), facial or vocal
expressions (Ekman, 1972), and physiological changes (Ekman et al., 1983). But the
nature of emotions-as-scripts exists across cultures.
Relational scripts
The previous work cited has primarily been at the neurological and intrapsychic level –
emphasizing a focal person’s thoughts, physiological changes, and reactions. However,
most emotions are felt in response to and in relation with other people, and thus emotion
scripts should include an interactional or relational component (Fehr et al., 1999;
Parkinson et al., 2005). The approach of researchers employing relational scripts is that,
based on past experience, individuals develop cognitive structures representing their
expectations around how their actions are likely to lead to reactions by another person
(Baldwin, 1992). In terms of emotion, this approach holds that we learn over time how
other people are likely to react to our expressions of particular emotions. If I have learned
that expressing my anger to my partner increases the chances that he or she will react with
defensiveness and avoidance, for example, this experience pattern will affect my current
expectations around what expressing anger means and others’ likely responses, shaping
the patterns of my new relationships (see ibid.).
Work in the area of relational scripts has focused on determining whether there are nor-
matively held interpersonal scripts for emotional expression, and then examining the
specific contents of those scripts. Gergen and Gergen (1988) cite a series of studies in
which they gave participants a scenario in which an emotion was expressed, then provided
a series of possible responses. For example, they had participants read a scenario about a
young married couple. In the first scene, the husband mildly criticized the wife’s cooking.
The participants then rated a range of behavioral options that the wife could take in
response (from embracing and kissing to physically striking). Following their choice of an
option, the participant then read that the wife had escalated the hostility – she had
responded by criticizing her husband. The story is again interrupted, and participants are
asked to rate the husband’s probable reactions, along with their desirability and advis-
ability. Through this methodology, Gergen and Gergen found predictable patterns of
escalation based on whether primarily aggressive or conciliatory tactics were used in early
stages of anger expression.
Fitness and Fletcher (1993) examined love, hate, anger, and jealousy in marital rela-
tionships. They first examined whether respondents, in outlining their experiences of these
emotions, showed evidence of prototypical knowledge structures. They found, using
profile analysis, that respondents cited cohesive elements for each emotion, allowing
researchers to construct summary prototypes. In second and third studies they also
showed that by presenting prototypical emotion elements, respondents could differentiate
and identify specific emotions based on the nature of the event and the appraisals offered
by protagonists. The more information provided in the vignette (the more complete the
script), the more accurate was their identification of the emotion.
Anger has been the most common focal emotion in studies of emotion scripts in rela-
tionships; this is not surprising, given its prototypicality ratings (Fehr & Russell, 1984;
Shaver et al., 1987). Fehr et al. (1999) studied anger in close heterosexual relationships.
Rather than having respondents generate their own experiences of anger episodes, they
provided respondents with basic elements of an anger script and explored whether
common patterns emerged. They were particularly interested in whether there would be
gender differences in the understanding and implementation of anger scripts. Based on
previous research and pilot testing, they presented respondents five causes of anger (e.g.,
betrayal of trust, negligence, unwarranted criticism – each with specific examples), six
possible anger reactions they could anticipate engaging in (e.g., avoid, aggress directly,
talk it over/compromise), and responses they would anticipate from their partner (e.g.,
avoid, deny responsibility, mock or minimize). Analyzing these responses, they found that
betrayal of trust was the most anger-provoking elicitor in these close relationships, and
that respondents anticipated that they and their partners would react to an anger-
provoking situation by talking things over rather than expressing aggression (similar to
previous research; see Averill, 1982). They also discovered gender differences: women
found the events to be more anger provoking overall, and were more likely to say that they
would express hurt feelings and behave aggressively, if necessary. These responses arose
more frequently in instances in which there was negligence (e.g., forgetting a birthday, or
personal criticism).
An important finding of this study, however, was that while men and women held
similar anger scripts in some situations (e.g., when an angered person chooses to express
anger in a positive way), under other conditions men’s and women’s anger scripts were
different. Specifically, when an angered person chose to react in a negative way, such as
aggressing directly, women were more likely than men to expect that their partner would
deny responsibility; men were more likely to expect that their partner would express hurt
feelings, avoid them or reject them. This study, then, showed both that individuals hold
similar scripts for the expression and reaction to anger, and also that other variables such
as gender can shape the content of the script and script selection.
Fehr and Harasymchuk (2005) found that emotion scripts differed in the context of
relationships between friends versus romantic partners. They found that people’s emo-
tional reactions were based on the responses they expected from a romantic partner or
friend when they expressed dissatisfaction. Specifically, they found that when a romantic
partner expressed dissatisfaction and received a response of neglect (a passive, destructive
response) they responded in a much more intense and negative way than when a friend
responded to dissatisfaction with neglect. Their study showed that the same event had
different meanings in the context of different relationships, and produced different types
of emotional behavior (see Whitesell & Harter, 1996).
Overall, these studies of emotion scripts in close relationships provide substantial
support for the idea that interpersonal expectations for emotional expression can be
empirically examined, and the findings suggest that relational scripts for emotions are
cognitively represented as if–then contingencies between self and other (Fehr &
Harasymchuk, 2005). This work adds further complexity, however, by emphasizing that
individual differences such as gender shape the expectations and contents of emotion
scripts.
Organizational scripts
The notion that emotions may best be represented as scriptlike phenomena has special
relevance to the organizational context, which constrains and organizes human behavior,
often through patterned sequences, such as rituals and routines (Lord & Kernan, 1987).
Cognitive researchers have applied script concepts to organizational behavior, arguing
that scripts perform two functions: to serve as guides to appropriate behavior; and to
provide a means for making sense of the behavior of others (Gioia & Poole, 1984). From
a cognitive schema approach, organizations themselves can be seen as ‘systems of shared
knowledge and meaning composed of repertoires of schemas that guide comprehension
and action’ (Poole et al., 1989, p. 272). Schemas provide a system for individuals to aid in
understanding the onrush of organizational decisions, behaviors, and interactions.
In applying cognitive schema models to organizations, however, observers argue that
emotions are often missing from the picture. Organizations are portrayed as shared
systems of meaning exemplified in routines and tacit assumptions, and scripts are por-
trayed as behavioral and cognitive structures. For example, an analysis of the script for
employee performance appraisals (Gioia et al., 1989) contains little reference to likely
emotional responses. Sociologists of emotion, however, argue that organizations, as situ-

ations in which vertical power relations and horizontal group cohesion play a large part,
are situations likely to generate strong emotional responses (see Kemper, 1978; Collins,
1981; Gibson, 1997). Collins (1981) argues that organizations can be seen as ‘market-
places’ of emotional and cultural resources, where resources are compared through con-
versational rituals and loyalties and power are negotiated. Organizational participants
‘monitor what each is feeling toward the other and especially toward those in authority’
(ibid., p. 994).
Three studies have extended the idea of emotion scripts into the sphere of organiz-
ations. What we find, in comparing these script analyses to the previous levels we have
examined, is an increasing level of complexity. Biological scripts indicate the degree to
which particular emotions fulfill discrete functions and exhibit unique action sequences.
The prototype and cognitive appraisal approaches more specifically identify these action
sequences and focus on antecedents and appraisals as determining the shape and struc-
ture of the emotion script. Research on close relationships introduces at least two new
variables to these existing scripts: the reactions of a target and the critical variable of
gender. In organizational contexts, a range of additional variables must be considered,
including hierarchical status and power relationships, multiple interactants (i.e., group
emotion scripts), and organizational culture.
In the first study, Fischer (1991) interviewed 56 employees reflecting on anger and fear
episodes in both ‘public’ (organizational) and ‘private’ spheres. In constructing scripts
based on her interviews, she examined respondents’ appraisal of the event, their action
tendencies, the perceived intensity and duration of emotional experience, the emotion
words used to describe the episode, their actual behavior, and whether they consciously
tried to regulate their emotion. In examining anger, Fischer noted that individuals tend
to have a ‘general anger script’ similar to the prototype identified by Shaver et al. (1987).
Individuals then refine this general script by adding specific elements depending on the
context (in this case, public vs. private settings), where these differing contexts are likely
to evoke different expectations, and thus, different scripts.
She found that the primary difference between anger scripts in private and public situ-
ations is how one appraises the expected reactions of others. In private situations respon-
dents ‘do not wish to hurt others’, but they want to ‘show commitment to others by
expressing their anger’ (1991, p. 151). In public situations, however, ‘one is far more con-
cerned with how others will evaluate one’s anger, so anger seems primarily to be used as
a device to maintain or improve one’s position’ (p. 151). She found a few gender
differences in terms of likely antecedents of anger: men were more likely to mention unjust
reproaches in private situations and more likely to refer to the negative behavior or others
in public situations. Women more often got angry because of rule violation in private sit-
uations and because they got ‘passed over’ in public situations.
Overall, Fischer found support for the idea of a ‘general anger script’ driving respon-
dents’ knowledge structures. There were wide differences in the types of antecedents cited,
however, making anger scripts specific to particular public and private settings more
difficult to compare. An example of how anger scripts became more contingent on context
is in the expression of anger. Overall, respondents regarded expressing anger as desirable.
It was considered to promote a healthy relationship in intimate settings, and it was nec-
essary to show one’s commitment in professional settings. At the same time, there were
limits to this script: respondents noted that if anger was expressed uncontrollably, nega-
tive consequences tended to result.
Gibson (1995, 1997) applied Plutchik’s (1980) evolutionary model as a way of under-
standing scripts for eight emotions in organizations: anger, fear, sadness, disgust, surprise,
joy, acceptance, and anticipation. He constructed scripts by coding and categorizing
respondents’ recollections of an emotional experience at work (n 143 MBA students)
into antecedents, agents (who were the instigator of emotion), whether the emotion was
expressed and to whom, and the perceived consequences of emotional expression or non-
expression. He found that there was substantial agreement by respondents on scripts for
particular emotions, and analyses of variance indicated differing feeling and expression
patterns across the different emotions. Qualitatively, Gibson (1995) found, for example,
that fear episodes revolved around a general theme of uncertainty, especially about one’s
actions (see Table 16.2). In this script, 53 per cent of episodes were explained by the top
three categories, which included the failure of the respondent to carry out a task appro-
priately (27% of antecedents), threats to survival, either personal or career (13%) and
threats to the organization itself (e.g., to merge or be bought out, 13%). Fear tended to be
caused by individuals superior to the respondent (43%) and tended not to be expressed.
Anger episodes, similar to previous findings (e.g., de Rivera, 1977; Russell, 1991a) were
characterized by a theme of perceived injustice. Criticism of the respondent characterized
16 per cent of these episodes, and another 16 per cent surrounded instances when respon-
dents’ suggestions or comments were ignored by others. At the organizational level,
respondents were angered by the company acting in an unjust way (e.g., by laying off
workers – 16% of the response). Agents of anger were primarily superiors (39%) or the
company itself (22%), and were often expressed: respondents expressed their anger to the
agent in 53 per cent of the episodes.
Gibson (1997) reported exploratory findings indicating that status of the agent made a
difference, noting that when superiors were the agent of emotions, there was less likeli-
hood of emotion expression than if peers or subordinates were agents. Interestingly, this
occurred for both positive (aggregating joy, acceptance, and anticipation) and negative
(aggregating anger, fear, sadness, and disgust) emotions. In terms of gender, though the
small sample size made his findings speculative, Gibson found that women both felt and
(for some emotions) expressed their emotions to a greater degree than did men. Women,
he proposed, typically had to engage in more regulation of emotion, since they felt their
emotions significantly more strongly than did men, yet expressed them at about the same
level.
Gibson concluded that these emotion scripts indicate that there is a small number of
emotions that are considered appropriate to express in organizations, primarily
‘approach’ emotions such as anger and acceptance, while many emotions – primarily
those indicating avoidance or vulnerability – are rarely expressed, such as fear, sadness,
and joy. He argued that this kind of limitation in emotion scripts could have implications
for organizational decision making and interpersonal processes. If employees’ full range
of emotions are not allowed to be expressed in organizational settings, for example, group
decision making in organizations may be limited by a constricted set of data.
Fitness (2000) examined anger scripts in the workplace, using a sample of 175 episodes.
She explored script differences that depended on the focal person’s hierarchical status in
the organization, whether the anger was directed to a supervisor (80 respondents), to a
Table 16.2 Organizational emotion scripts
Script elements Emotions described by respondents

Joy Anger Liking Fear
Antecedents Theme: personal Theme: injustice Theme: bonding Theme:
success Criticism of Camaraderie in uncertainty
Job or project respondent (16%) groups (53%) Failure by self
completed (47%)* Suggestions Positive (27%)
Respondent ignored by agent relationship with Threats external
receives (16%) a particular other to the
recognition or Company initiates (40%) organization
promotion (24%) layoffs (16%) Respondent (13%)
Job or project 48% explained by receives Lack of
beginning (12%) top 3 categories recognition or corporate
82% explained by promotion (7%) support for
top 3 categories 100% explained by respondent (13%)
top 3 categories 53% explained by
top 3 categories
Agents Work itself (38%) Superiors (39%) Team/peers (67%) Superiors (43%)
Superiors (25%) Company (22%) Self (21%)
External agents
(13%)
Expression/ Expressed to agent Expressed to Expressed to agent Expressed to
behavior (19%) agent (53%) (60%) agent (20%)
Did not express Did not express Did not express Did not express
(81%) (47%) (40%) (80%)
Consequences None listed (47%) Nothing; no one Bonding with Respondent
Bonding with cared (21%) group or peers receives
group or peers Outcome (47%) sympathy,
(24%) favorable (21%) Positive feedback emotional
Outcome from agent (27%) support from
unfavorable (16%) others (33%)
Nothing; no one
cared (27%)
Note: * Percentages indicate the percent of respondents mentioning each script element. Sample size for Joy
was n 16, Anger, n 19, Liking, n 15, Fear, n 15.
Source: Adapted from Gibson (1997).
co-worker (57 respondents), or to a subordinate (38 respondents). She elicited scripts

through an interview schedule that asked respondents to ‘remember a time when you felt
really angry with someone at work’, and then to describe the antecedents to their anger,
how they thought and felt at the time, how they behaved, and whether they thought the
incident had been successfully resolved. As with previous studies, there was substantial
agreement over prototypical anger-eliciting events. For example, 44 per cent involved
‘being directly and unjustly treated by another’. Other prominent antecedents included
immoral behavior (23%) and job incompetence (15%). Importantly, Fitness also found
differences in antecedents depending on who was perceiving the anger; for example, 69 of
the superior-instigated incidents involved directly unjust treatment, while only 28 per cent
of co-worker and 16 per cent of subordinate-instigated offences were considered to be
unjust. For co-workers who instigated anger, the primary event involved morally repre-
hensible behaviors, such as laziness or dishonesty; for subordinates who instigated anger,
the primary antecedent was job incompetence.
In terms of behavior, Fitness found expected differences in whether anger was expressed
depending on status. Only 45 per cent of respondents angered by superiors immediately
confronted them during the course of feeling anger, compared with 58 per cent of respon-
dents angered by co-workers, and 71 per cent of respondents angered by subordinates.
Fitness’s study demonstrates the importance of studying context in order to outline and
understand emotion scripts. She identified two distinct anger scripts, depending on power.
That is, high power respondents were likely to be angered by different eliciting events,
likely to express their anger to a greater degree than low power respondents, and were
more likely to think that the anger incident had been successfully resolved. She also noted
that she discovered no gender differences in this setting: rather, in the organizational
context the variable of power appeared to overwhelm gender in affecting emotion scripts.
While there are few studies specifically examining organizational emotion scripts, numer-
ous other studies have implications for a script approach, though they might not specifically
use the terms of script theory. For example, Sutton (1991) found that respondents in a bill
collection agency were well aware of specific norms around how to express emotions to
debtors they wanted to collect money from. There were norms, for example, to express neu-
trality to angry debtors and norms to be more easy-going (at first) with distressed debtors.
These normative instructions are clearly indicative of an emotional script for these trans-
actional dyads. Moreover, in the negotiations literature, studies now examine how emo-
tional expressions by negotiators affect their targets, and vice versa (Van Kleef et al., 2004).
A particularly important direction for emotion script research is the recognition that
knowledge of emotion scripts may allow participants to express their emotions strategi-
cally, knowing that they are likely to elicit a particular response. Clark, et al. (1996) argue
that because people share assumptions about the script (its structure, antecedents and
consequences), people can ‘learn to present emotions to others to accomplish specifiable
social goals’ (p. 248). Indeed, negotiations researchers are finding that negotiators who
strategically display particular emotions are able to affect the outcome of the negotiation
(Kopelman et al., 2006) and qualitative studies of professionals – such as lawyers – show
frequent use of strategic emotions (Pierce, 1995). As Forgas notes, this emphasis on the
strategic nature of scripts suggests that ‘affect is not merely a private experience, but at
the same time is a public event’ (1996, p. 282).
Implications and conclusions

This chapter outlines a multi-level model of emotion scripts. It provides a way of con-
ceptualizing scripts that helps to integrate widely divergent approaches to emotion.
Scripts are both observed sequences of events and also understandings about how
sequences of events tend to occur. On the one hand, this combination of descriptive and
normative elements accounts for their explanatory versatility across a range of widely
divergent research landscapes. On the other, this eclecticism may have also impeded
further study into scripts. By addressing a range of approaches, the script approach offers
a metaphor and a methodology for studying sequences of behaviors, but its very applic-
ability and consequent lack of specificity may also be its undoing. Compared to general
cognitive appraisal approaches (e.g., Lazarus, 1991; Scherer, 2001) or sociological/
normative approaches (e.g., Kemper, 1990), the theory and research on emotion scripts
has been less well developed.
The fundamental outlines of prototypical emotion sequences are well developed and
well supported (see Fehr & Russell, 1984; Shaver et al., 1987). But the investigation of
scripts in differing contexts is much less well developed. Studies of anger predominate in
script theory (see Gibson, 1995, 1997 for an exception), while scripts for other emotions
(other than fear) have received far less attention. The issue, for the future of emotion script
research, will be to develop scripts at a level of detail that can help in understanding
organizational problems while not being so specific that they are only applicable to one
context (see Fitness, 2000 for one illustration of such meso-level scripts).
Future directions in emotion script research
Studies of additional emotion scripts In parallel with emotions research more generally,
emotion script research needs to expand its focus from anger and fear to other critical dis-
crete emotions (see Gibson, 1997). While anger and fear offer a cohesive prototypical view,
they also offer only one slice of organizational life. For example, while most studies of
emotion have focused on negative emotions and moods, in fact, linkages to organizational
outcomes such as individual and group achievement, decision-making effectiveness, and
creativity tend to be far more compelling for positive emotions (Lyubomirsky et al., 2005).
While emotion scripts have been relatively well articulated for anger and fear, we know
much less about happiness and liking/acceptance. Studies of strategic displays of emo-
tional expression (e.g., Clark et al., 1996) indicate that displaying happiness (and sup-
pressing anger and sadness) is related to ingratiation behavior and increasing the liking of
a target, both phenomena of interest to organizational researchers (Jones & Pittman,
1982). More refined scripts for organizational envy (Cohen-Charash & Mueller, 2007),
sadness, and shame/guilt (Poulson, 2000) would also be in line with current research
inquiry.
Individual differences and scripts A continuing avenue of research will be to discover under
what conditions individual differences shape the execution of scripts. Because they are
focused on sequences of events, studying scripts can uncover findings about contingencies
that would not be revealed in correlational work or work focused on intrapsychic, context-
free environments. For example, Fehr and Baldwin (1996) point out that the commonsense
understanding that women are more likely to cry in response to anger may not be the whole
story. Rather, what their findings indicate is that women may not be more likely to respond
with crying and hurt feelings whenever angry, but rather, they ‘are more likely to experience
being angered in situations when hurt feelings are a key element of the anger experienced
(e.g., the betrayal of trust)’ (ibid., p. 240). That discovery was only made possible by
researchers examining the antecedents of anger, since different kinds of people may be more
or less sensitive to different kinds of instigators, may have different kinds of experience with
them, may have different styles in terms of emotion regulation, and so on. Thus, script
methodologies may be especially well suited to discovering different contingencies related

to individual differences, gender being a prominent, but not the sole, example.
Degree of script convergence A primary approach to determining whether organizational

participants share a script is to measure the degree to which participants cite a particular
element in their narrative of an episode. For example, Fitness (2000) found that 69 per cent
of anger episodes in her sample were caused by superiors who unjustly treated their subor-
dinates (see also Fischer, 1991; Gibson, 1997). While these proportional approaches provide
good overall support for the level of agreement in terms of the existence of common scripts,
more specific and accurate measures need to be developed. Studies of cognitive scripts, for
example, have used videotaped interactions and more elaborate qualitative methods to
assess the degree of cohesiveness in organizational scripts (see Gioia et al., 1989; Poole
et al., 1990). Advancing methods in sequence analysis (see Abbott, 1990), and reliability
ratings (Forrest & Abbott, 1990) will provide important means of gathering these data.
Measuring the degree of convergence would represent a significant advance in understand-
ing emotion scripts. One application of this research would be to examine the effect of
diverse versus homogeneous scripts on organizational behavior and performance. For
example, Barsade et al. (2000) showed that similarities in affective disposition in top man-
agement teams led to increased performance in top management teams. Future research
should examine organizational members’ emotional scripts to determine whether similar-
ity in scripts also contributes to team effectiveness, and under what conditions.
Scripts as methodology I have argued that scripts offer both descriptive and normative
material for analysis. The script approach is particularly applicable to emotions, since
laypeople tend to think of emotions in terms of prototypical sequences of events (see
Shaver et al., 1987). Following this line of reasoning, in addition to identifying scripts and
assessing their convergence, script data are very useful for identifying and understanding
organizational emotion norms and culture. Recently, scholars have called for more
research on the nature of organizational cultural norms for emotion expression (see, e.g.,
Barsade et al., 2003). However, gathering data on norms (without directly observing
behavior), is often difficult. Having respondents outline their perceived scripts for emo-
tional expression may be one means to illustrate organizational norms.
For example, Van Maanen and Kunda (1989) identified emotion norms stipulating
that employees at Disneyland express positive emotions while cloaking their dissatisfac-
tion, and participants in a high-technology company express passion around the firm’s
products. While these authors determined these norms through participant observation,
an alternative method would have been to interview participants on the structure of
emotion scripts in their organization. While identifying generalized norms may be
difficult for participants, experiential learning with scripts suggests that they may more
readily generate episodes of emotional expression (Gibson, 2006) that can be useful in
determining normative scripts. Similarly, while it may be difficult for employees to discuss
risky issues such as gender and power in their organization, having them discuss emotion
scripts may indirectly lead to these issues (see Fitness, 2000). A caution here, of course,
is one of social desirability: there may be a tendency on the part of employees to provide
‘acceptable and warrantable public explanations’ for their behavior, rather than a faith-
ful recollection of events (Forgas, 1996, p. 284). Forgas argues that a wider variety of
methods, including experimentation approaches (see, e.g., Clark et al., 1996) would help
to address this concern. New approaches in negotiation research (see Van Kleef et al.,
2004; Kopelman et al., 2006) apply similar methods focusing on specific emotions (e.g.,
happiness and anger) to determine more specific antecedents and consequences.
Conclusion
The explosion of emotions work in the organizational context has advanced the field in
many ways: as this research companion demonstrates, advances in the definition of emo-
tions, context specificity and methodologies have stripped away some of the mystery and
‘conceptual and definitional chaos’ that once characterized emotions research (see Buck,
1990, p. 330). I am recommending emotion script theory as one advance that deserves
more attention. While scripts have been invoked in emotions research almost as long as
we have examined emotions themselves, work using this approach has advanced unevenly.
Scripts provide clues to the basic, biological nature of emotions, and they allow us to
examine how additional levels of normative structures inherent to relationships and orga-
nizations are laid over this basic foundation. They provide vital clues to how we live out
our emotional experiences in organizations.
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17 Emotion regulation in the workplace
Stéphane Côté, Sue Moon and Christopher T.H. Miners*
Introduction
Emotion regulation is currently a hot topic in organizational behavior, but the interest in
the role of emotion regulation at work is relatively recent. It was not until the publication
of Hochschild’s (1983) The Managed Heart that organizational researchers paid
significant attention to it. Mostly qualitative studies were published in the late 1980s and
early 1990s. This was followed by an increasing number of empirical studies in the late
1990s and early 2000s. This research has taught us a lot, but the field of emotion regula-
tion at work is still in its infancy. The goal of this chapter is to review some of the most
important recent developments and to describe important future directions for the field.
This chapter is organized as follows. We first define emotion regulation and describe the
conceptually important types of emotion regulation. We then review the studies that
examined how emotion regulation is associated with two main outcomes: work strain and
job performance. We describe the conceptual mechanisms that researchers have invoked
to explain these associations. Finally, we discuss six major potential future directions. Our
hope is that this chapter will be useful to guide future research aimed at advancing our
knowledge of emotion regulation at work.
Definition of emotion regulation

Emotion regulation refers to the behaviors aimed at increasing, maintaining, or decreas-
ing one or more components of an emotion (Gross, 1999). The components that can be
regulated are identified in models that conceptualize emotions as affective experiences
that unfold over short periods (Scherer, 1984; Frijda, 1986). These models propose that
people typically feel emotions when they evaluate the significance of personally relevant
events along dimensions such as pleasantness and causality. For example, a personally rel-
evant event evaluated as unpleasant and caused by another person tends to elicit anger.
Individuals can regulate emotions by changing the way they appraise certain events to, in
turn, have a different emotional reaction to the event. Models of emotion also propose
that they are manifested via several types of responses to the eliciting events. These
responses include action tendencies, cognitive tendencies, physiological changes, facial
expressions, bodily expressions, and subjective internal experiences (Frijda, 1986;
Fredrickson, 1998). For example, subordinates may attempt to hide the anger that they
feel after having been unfairly treated to avoid angering the leader. Individuals can regu-
late emotions by changing one or more of these responses.
Organizational researchers have focused on a specific subset of emotion regulation acts
that involve managing public displays of emotion during interpersonal encounters to
comply with demands from the organization (e.g., Morris & Feldman, 1996; Grandey,
2000; Brotheridge & Lee, 2002). These acts have been termed ‘emotional labor’
(Hochschild, 1983). Not all emotion regulation, however, is done in the service of emo-
tional labor (Totterdell & Holman, 2003), and emotional labor excludes many instances
284
Emotion regulation in the workplace 285
of emotion regulation that might be associated with outcomes such as strain and perfor-
mance. For example, negotiators may amplify their displays of anger to intimidate their
opponents and claim the highest possible value (Van Kleef et al., 2004). Emotion regula-
tion reflects a broader and more pervasive set of behaviors than emotional labor. To max-
imize breadth, we focus on emotion regulation in this chapter.
Dimensions of emotion regulation

Organization members regulate their emotions in different ways. For instance, service
agents often amplify their displays of enthusiasm to increase sales and customs officers
sometimes amplify their displays of anger to elicit honest declarations. Accordingly,
researchers are using increasingly precise conceptualizations and measurements of
emotion regulation, and they are finding that different types of emotion regulation often
have different correlates. It is therefore important to delineate the dimensions of emotion
regulation to fully understand how it is associated with other constructs. Past research
suggests that the dimensions of emotion regulation can be distinguished along several
characteristics. We focus on three characteristics that we believe are particularly impor-
tant: the form, the direction, and the discrete emotion.
Different forms of emotion regulation

Forms of emotion regulation can be distinguished based on their timing during the
unfolding of an emotion response. People may regulate emotions by modifying compo-
nents that occur early during the unfolding of an emotion, such as when they change how
they appraise events, or late during the unfolding of an emotion, such as when they
change their facial expressions. At a broad level, researchers have distinguished between
two forms (Hochschild, 1983; Gross, 1998; Grandey, 2000). Deep acting, or antecedent-
focused emotion regulation, includes actions that occur before the emotion is fully under-
way. For example, people may appraise a threat as harmless to avoid the internal
experience and, in turn, the public display of fear. Deep acting changes both the internal
experience and the public display of emotion due to its early timing. In contrast, surface
acting, or response-focused emotion regulation, includes actions that occur once the
emotion is fully underway. For example, angry employees may reduce their public displays
of anger while leaving their internal experiences of anger intact. Surface acting changes
the public display of emotion, but it occurs too late to change its internal experience to
any great extent. Deep and surface acting are differentially associated with outcomes such
as emotional exhaustion (e.g., Grandey, 2003). Research in this field must therefore iden-
tify the form of emotion regulation of interest because results about deep acting may not
translate to surface acting, and vice versa.
Different directions of emotion regulation

Emotion can be regulated in two directions: it can be amplified by initiating or enhanc-
ing it, or it can be suppressed by reducing or eliminating it (Hochschild, 1983). Sales
clerks may amplify their public displays of happiness to sell more merchandise.
Conversely, negotiators may suppress their public displays of happiness to avoid sig-
nalling that they are satisfied with the current state of affairs. There is evidence that
emotion amplification and emotion suppression exhibit different associations with
strain (e.g., Côté & Morgan, 2002). It is therefore important to identify the direction of
interest because results pertaining to one direction may differ from results pertaining to
the other direction.
The regulation of different discrete emotions

Ekman (2003) has identified seven emotions with distinct and universal facial expressions:
anger, contempt, disgust, fear, sadness, happiness, and surprise. Other candidate basic
emotions such as shame, guilt, and interest have been proposed (Fredrickson, 1998;
Tangney, 1999). The initial studies of emotion regulation at work paid little attention to
which discrete emotion was being regulated. In addition, several of the mechanisms
invoked to explain the effects of emotion regulation did not consider which emotion was
being regulated. For instance, models that propose that the effort exerted during regula-
tion enhances strain implicitly suggest that the efforts to regulate happiness are equally
damaging as the efforts to regulate anger. There is accumulating evidence, however, that
regulating different emotions has different correlates (e.g, Côté & Morgan, 2002; Zapf &
Holz, 2006). In addition, there is evidence that individuals distinguish between require-
ments to display different discrete emotions (Matsumoto et al., 2005). Researchers must
therefore identify the discrete emotion of interest to fully understand the association
between emotion regulation and work outcomes.
Research findings on emotion regulation

To understand the consequences of emotion regulation at work, researchers have mainly
studied two potential outcomes, work strain and job performance. We briefly summarize
the available findings pertaining to these two outcomes. More detail about the findings
can be found in Grandey and Brauburger (2002), Pugh (2002), Zapf (2002), and Côté
(2005).
Research findings: emotion regulation and work strain

The bulk of the research on the correlates of emotion regulation at work has focused on
work strain – a set of adverse psychological, physiological, and behavioral reactions to
work stressors that include anxiety, low commitment, elevated heart rate, and absenteeism
(Karasek, 1979; Jex & Beehr, 1991). The interest in work strain as a potential outcome of
emotion regulation is most likely due to Hochschild’s (1983) qualitative studies of flight
attendants that revealed that emotion regulation may cause emotional exhaustion. These
studies have led researchers to propose that frequent or intense emotion regulation is
related to high strain.
There is some evidence for such deleterious effects of emotion regulation, as some types
of emotion regulation have consistently been found to relate to high strain. Surface acting,
in particular, has been consistently associated with high strain (Pugliesi, 1999;
Brotheridge & Grandey, 2002; Brotheridge & Lee, 2002; Holman et al., 2002; Grandey,
2003; Grandey et al., 2005b; Beal et al., 2006). There is evidence that surface acting is
hurtful when it is used to both amplify and suppress emotion (Glomb & Tews, 2004).
Despite this evidence, it may be premature to conclude that surface acting is always prob-
lematic because past research has not distinguished between different discrete emotions.
It is possible that future research will find that regulating certain discrete emotions via
surface acting has neutral or positive consequences. Specific situations in which surface
acting is related to positive outcomes may also be identified in future research.
Past research has not always found that emotion regulation is associated with high
strain. In particular, the findings concerning deep acting are mixed. Some studies have
found that deep acting is associated with high strain (Holman et al., 2002; Grandey, 2003;
Totterdell & Holman, 2003), some studies have found that deep acting is associated with
low strain (Brotheridge & Grandey, 2002; Brotheridge & Lee, 2002), and yet other studies
have found that deep acting is unrelated to strain (Beal et al., 2006). This suggests a need
to identify which types of deep acting are beneficial, which types are hurtful, and which
types are unrelated to work outcomes. There is some indirect evidence suggesting that
amplifying pleasant emotions such as happiness and hope may be associated with low
strain. This evidence is based on some findings that requirements to display positive emo-
tions relate to low strain (Adelmann, 1995; Brotheridge & Grandey, 2002; Brotheridge &
Lee, 2002; Diefendorff & Richard, 2003). In addition, one study found that amplifying
positive emotions was associated with a positive change in job satisfaction and, in turn, a
decrease in intentions to quit from one month to the next (Côté & Morgan, 2002). This
evidence is not conclusive, however, as no study has so far distinguished between ampli-
fying positive emotions via deep acting versus surface acting. This type of study would
reveal exactly which types of emotion regulation can benefit workers. This information
should be helpful to practitioners who could promote these types of emotion regulation
to potentially create healthier organizations.
Research findings: emotion regulation and performance

In the realm of emotion regulation research, performance has been conceptualized in
different ways. Grandey (2003) has framed performance as affective delivery – ‘the extent
that service delivery is perceived as friendly and warm’ (p. 89). She found that deep acting
is positively related and surface acting is negatively related to ratings of affective delivery.
This presumably occurs because deep acting, relative to surface acting, is more likely to
be perceived as authentic. In a subsequent study, Barger and Grandey (2006) found that
both the occurrence and the intensity of smiling relate to high ratings of affective deliv-
ery.
Brown et al. (2005), who conceptualized performance as supervisory ratings of sales
performance, investigated how certain emotion regulation strategies moderate the rela-
tionship between negative emotions and performance. They found that self-control –
restraining from indulging in negative action tendencies – buffers the adverse effects of
negative emotions on job performance, and that venting – expressing negative feelings to
others – amplifies the adverse effects of negative emotions on job performance. Emotion
regulation may thus be adaptive or maladaptive, depending on the strategy used.
Other studies have found that the association between emotion regulation and perfor-
mance depends on key moderating factors. Bagozzi et al. (2003) demonstrated that culture
may moderate how emotion regulation strategies are associated with performance. For
instance, they showed that shame leads to enhanced customer relationship building
among Filipino employees, who are relatively collectivistic, and to diminished customer
relationship building among Dutch employees, who are relatively individualistic. A sub-
sequent study showed that the busyness of a store and task performance moderate the
relation between authentic displays of positive emotions and outcomes such as affective
delivery and customer satisfaction (Grandey et al., 2005a). It was specifically found that
authentic displays of positive emotions are more strongly related to affective delivery
when business is slow than when it is fast. It was also found that authentic displays of pos-
itive emotions are more strongly related to customer satisfaction when tasks are per-
formed well than when they are performed poorly.
In effect, past research suggests that the association between emotion regulation and
performance depends on the emotion regulation strategy that is chosen and key moder-
ating factors.
Mechanisms linking emotion regulation to workplace outcomes

The preceding section reveals associations between emotion regulation and strain and
performance. The mechanisms that underlie these associations, however, remain unclear.
The following mechanisms have been invoked to explain why emotion regulation may
influence strain and performance. Consistent with Hochschild’s (1983) focus on the detri-
mental effects of emotion regulation on work strain, the models that were first developed
described how intense or frequent emotion regulation increases strain. More recently,
models have been developed to explain the potential beneficial effects of emotion regula-
tion, and also to describe when emotion regulation may be beneficial and when it may be
detrimental.
Emotional dissonance
Emotional dissonance is a state of discrepancy between a public display and a subjective
experience of emotion (Hochschild, 1983; Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987; Morris & Feldman,
1996). Individuals may create emotional dissonance when they employ surface acting
strategies (Grandey, 2000; Côté, 2005). Emotional dissonance is theorized to enhance
strain because a misfit between publicly displayed and subjectively experienced emotions
is psychologically taxing. In addition, emotional dissonance is associated with feelings of
inauthenticity that are also psychologically taxing.
The evidence for the intervening role of emotional dissonance in the link between
emotion regulation and work outcomes is mixed. The role of emotional dissonance has
been tested in both laboratory and field studies. Early laboratory studies showed that the
suppression of emotion through surface acting strategies reduces physiological signs of
strain (Lanzetta et al., 1976; Zuckerman et al., 1981). More recent laboratory studies have
been somewhat more favorable to the emotional dissonance explanation. Participants
who suppressed displays of emotion through surface acting while watching film clips
exhibited several physiological signs of strain (Harris, 2001; Gross & Levenson, 1997;
Gross, 1998). These studies, however, were not completely conclusive because the use of
surface acting strategies also decreased heart rate.
Field studies of emotional dissonance also reveal mixed findings. Self-reports of emo-
tional dissonance have been related to high burnout, anxiety, depression, and low job sat-
isfaction (Abraham, 1999; Zapf et al., 1999; Kruml & Geddes, 2000; Holman et al., 2002;
Glomb & Tews, 2004). These self-report measures, however, have also been related to job
involvement (Kruml & Geddes, 2000) and personal accomplishment (Zapf et al., 1999).
It is important to note that the role of common method variance in these associations is
unknown. Several sources of common method variance may have inflated some of the
correlations between emotional dissonance and work strain. To overcome the limitations
of self-report measures of emotional dissonance, three studies measured internal experi-
ences and public displays of emotion separately, and then used polynomial regression
analysis to test for associations between emotional dissonance and work strain (Zerbe,
2000; Totterdell & Holman, 2001; Glomb et al., 2002). These studies revealed little
support for emotional dissonance.
Taken together, these findings provide reason to doubt an important role of emotional
dissonance in explaining why emotion regulation influences work outcomes. In particu-
lar, emotional dissonance may not be as psychologically taxing as previously thought.
This conclusion is important, because a role of emotional dissonance is often taken for
granted in the conceptual arguments that are advanced in this field.
Personal control
Personal control is the belief that one can deliberately maximize pleasant outcomes and
minimize unpleasant outcomes (Ganster & Fusilier, 1989). Workers experience relatively
high personal control when they regulate emotion for personal reasons such as to intim-
idate an opponent during a negotiation. In theory, however, they experience relatively
little personal control when they regulate emotion for outside reasons such as to conform
to display rules of the organization (Hochschild, 1983; Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987). The per-
sonal control approach predicts that emotion regulation that is outside one’s control pro-
duces strain (Pugliesi, 1999; Grandey & Brauburger, 2002).
There is some evidence to support the importance of personal control to explain how
emotion regulation is associated with work outcomes. Schaubroeck and Jones (2000)
found that perceived demands to amplify displays of pleasant emotions and to suppress
displays of unpleasant emotions are associated with poor physical health for some
workers. Grandey et al. (2005b) found that the positive association between surface acting
and emotional exhaustion becomes weaker as perceived autonomy in the job increases.
There are other findings, however, that pose challenges to the personal control expla-
nation. Diefendorff and Richard (2003) found that perceptions of demands to display
pleasant emotions are associated with low strain. In addition, Zapf and his associates
have found that the perception of some display rules is associated with indicators of high
strain such as irritation and job dissatisfaction, but also some indicators of low strain such
as high perceptions of personal accomplishment (Zapf et al., 1999, 2001; Zapf & Holz,
2006). More directly, Pugliesi (1999) found that employees who report having low control
over their emotion regulation do not experience more strain than employees who report
having high control, posing an important challenge to the personal control explanation.
The role of personal control in explaining the outcomes of emotion regulation remains
an open question. The findings from several studies that perceptions of demands to reg-
ulate emotions are associated with low strain are difficult to explain if lacking control over
one’s emotions is detrimental. It is possible that employees may attain positive outcomes
even when they have little control over their emotion regulation, such as when they regu-
late emotions to comply with organizational display rules.
Effort
Emotion regulation involves efforts to change one or more components of emotion. The
efforts exerted to regulate emotion may increase strain because they consume resources
that cannot be readily regained (Kruml & Geddes, 2000; Brotheridge & Lee, 2002; Pugh,
2002). This mechanism is based on Hobfoll’s (1989) conservation of resources theory that
proposes that people strive to obtain and retain valued resources and minimize losses of
these resources. Experimental evidence that regulating emotions decreases cognitive

resources such as memory space also provides the basis for the effort mechanism
(Baumeister et al., 1998; Richards & Gross, 2000).
Some of the laboratory findings that we summarized in the section on emotional dis-
sonance (Gross & Levenson, 1997; Gross, 1998; Harris, 2001) support the effort model.
These studies showed that efforts to modify one’s displays of emotions were associated
with several indicators of high strain. The results of these studies, however, were not
entirely conclusive because heart rate decreased as a result of emotion regulation. In add-
ition, the earlier studies found that emotion regulation reduces strain (Lanzetta et al.,
1976; Zuckerman et al., 1981). To our knowledge, only one study has explicitly measured
effort and examined its association with work strain. This study found that self-reported
effort to regulate emotion was related to low strain in the form of high personal accom-
plishment, low depersonalization, and high job involvement (Kruml & Geddes, 2000).
The available evidence therefore suggests that the effort mechanism does not adequately
explain how and why emotion regulation is associated with work strain. It seems more
likely that some efforts to regulate emotions are associated with positive outcomes and
others with negative outcomes.
Facial feedback
The facial feedback model proposes that the facial display of an emotion enhances or ini-
tiates the internal experience of that emotion (Tomkins, 1962). For example, amplifying
public displays of happiness increases the internal experience of happiness. Organization
members may trigger the internal experience of an emotion when they amplify their display
of that emotion. The modified internal experience of emotion may correspond to an
increase in work strain if the emotion is negative and a reduction if the emotion is positive.
Laboratory studies have provided support for the facial feedback model (Duclos et al.,
1989; Ekman et al., 1983). The effect of facial feedback on work outcomes has not been
explicitly examined in the field. Some studies, however, used the facial feedback model as
a basis for predictions. These studies have revealed mixed findings. For instance,
Adelmann (1995) found that emotion regulation is associated with high satisfaction with
growth opportunities, and Diefendorff and Richard (2003) found that perceived demands
for displays of positive emotion are associated with job satisfaction. Schaubroeck and
Jones (2000), however, found that perceived demands for positive emotion displays are
related to poor physical health in some workers.
Facial feedback effects have fared well in the laboratory and, with one exception, the
field studies that used this model as a basis for predictions have revealed results that are
consistent with this explanation. Even so, it is difficult to pinpoint the role of facial feed-
back because this process is difficult to capture in field studies. The effects proposed by
the facial feedback model can be explained by other models and hence we cannot be
certain that facial feedback explains the observed associations between emotion regula-
tion and work outcomes.
Social interaction
The models covered so far – emotional dissonance, personal control, effort, and facial
feedback – describe processes that occur inside the mind and body of the person who
regulates the emotion. The social interaction model proposes instead that the processes
linking emotion regulation to outcomes are located, in large part, in interpersonal

encounters. This model is based on social functional accounts of emotion that posit that
public displays of emotion communicate rich and important information to other people
during interpersonal encounters (Frijda & Mesquita, 1994; Ekman, 2003). It specifically
positions senders and receivers of emotion displays in a feedback loop. In the first part of
the feedback loop, senders’ emotion regulation influences the emotions that they publicly
display to others. In the second part, senders’ displays of emotions produce behavioral
responses from receivers. In the third part, receivers’ behavioral responses influence
senders’ strain.
The social interaction model proposes that some types of emotion regulation increase
strain. These types of emotion regulation produce displays that provoke unfavorable
responses from others. For instance, amplifying happiness though surface acting produces
an inauthentic display of happiness that may provoke a negative response from others. This
negative response should, in turn, enhance the strain of the person who faked happiness.
The social interaction model also proposes that some types of emotion regulation decrease
strain. These types produce displays that provoke favorable responses from others.
Amplifying happiness though deep acting, for example, produces an authentic display of
happiness that may provoke a positive response from others. This positive response should,
in turn, reduce the strain of the person who genuinely amplified happiness.
The social interaction model was developed using theory and research supporting each
of the parts of the feedback loop between senders and receivers of emotion displays. It is
relatively recent and has not yet been directly tested. It involves more specificity than com-
peting models because it makes specific predictions for different forms, directions, and dis-
crete emotions. Future research should directly test the propositions of the social
interaction model.
Future directions in research on emotion regulation

Our review of the theoretical and empirical research demonstrates that emotion regula-
tion is a vibrant area of research in organizational behavior. In this section, we describe
six areas of research that we believe warrant additional research efforts. These areas
concern the conceptual mechanisms that underlie associations between emotion regula-
tion and work outcomes, the moderators of associations between emotion regulation and
work outcomes, cultural influences on emotion regulation, the training of emotion regu-
lation, wise emotion regulation and its relation to emotional intelligence, and automatic
versus conscious regulation.
Understanding conceptual mechanisms

We summarized the major theoretical models that researchers have invoked to explain
how and why emotion regulation relates to work strain and performance. We currently
have little explicit evidence concerning these mechanisms. Researchers may indirectly
infer mechanisms from the patterns of findings concerning specific types of emotion reg-
ulation by examining whether the findings are consistent with the mechanisms. This
approach, however, does not allow researchers to pinpoint the exact mechanisms because
the models do not make unique predictions about many types of emotion regulation.
More than one model typically predicts a specific association and hence any single finding
cannot be attributed to one model.
A more promising approach involves measuring the mechanisms that the models
propose and statistically testing their effects. For instance, some researchers have mea-
sured both externally displayed and internally experienced emotions to explicitly test
whether emotional dissonance explains why emotion regulation is related to strain (Zerbe,
2000; Totterdell & Holman, 2001; Glomb et al., 2002). Similarly, researchers may test the
proposition that social interaction plays a role in the association between emotion regu-
lation and strain by measuring a person’s response to a counterpart’s act of emotion reg-
ulation and statistically testing whether that response plays an intervening role. Research
could also measure the depletion of resources and test its proposed intervening role.
Moderating conditions
The empirical research reviewed above has identified several direct associations between
emotion regulation and work outcomes, but some of the most recent research has
identified moderators of these effects (e.g., Bagozzi et al., 2003; Grandey et al., 2005b).
Whether the effects of emotion regulation are mostly direct or moderated by important
factors is a question that warrants additional research.
Moderation effects suggest that there are circumstances under which emotion regula-
tion is relatively important, and other circumstances under which it is relatively unim-
portant. For example, emotion regulation may be particularly important in jobs that have
high emotional demands. The particular emotion to be displayed is often dictated by
company policy or the nature of a profession. In healthcare, for instance, workers are
expected to show empathy (e.g., Miller et al., 1988, 1995). When a job requires the display
of a certain emotion regardless of the behavior of a customer, client, or patient, emotion
regulation may be an important component of job performance. Conversely, in jobs in
which there are very few emotionally charged situations, such as data entry, emotion reg-
ulation may play a comparatively small role in determining work outcomes.
Emotion regulation may also be relatively important in jobs that require frequent deci-
sion making or in which the decisions that have to be made are of large consequence (e.g.,
personal asset manager for high net worth individuals or corporate bond trader).
Emotion regulation may enhance job performance by influencing the quality of decisions
(Law et al., 2004). For example, a manager who understands that anger tends to lead
people to underestimate the degree of risk in situations (Lerner & Keltner, 2001) may sup-
press anger before making an important financial decision. This benefit cannot be real-
ized if the nature of the work, however, does not necessitate making frequent or critical
decisions.
Emotion regulation may also be especially important in strong organizational cul-
tures in which there are clear standards against which to measure the appropriateness
of behavior. For example, failing to express excitement and enthusiasm at Microsoft
could be viewed as a mistake, at least if Steve Ballmer’s memorable address to his
employees early in his tenure as the CEO of Microsoft is in any way normative!
Similarly, in what Mischel (1977) termed ‘strong situations’, there are uniform expecta-
tions about what constitutes appropriate behavior. It is more appropriate for the area
director to express anger to a group of employees than for the employees to behave in
that way toward the area director. Emotion regulation may have more important con-
sequences in strong than in weak situations because specific emotions and behaviors are
expected in strong situations.
In addition, emotion regulation may be more beneficial in contexts in which the job
stressors are high than in contexts in which the job stressors are low. For example, Côté
et al. (2006b) found that amplifying happiness via deep acting exhibited a stronger posi-
tive association with the adjustment of expatriates who perceived that they received little
social support from host country nationals than for expatriates who perceived that they
received ample social support.
Finally, characteristics of the person may moderate the associations between emotion
regulation and work outcomes. It is possible that some individuals capitalize on emotion
regulation acts, while others suffer from their consequences. It is also possible that some
individuals are able to implement emotion regulation strategies more successfully than
others. For instance, emotionally intelligent individuals who have considerable experience
in applying emotion regulation strategies may derive more benefits from them than their
counterparts (Matthews et al., 2002; Côté et al., 2006b). A recent study lends credence to
these arguments. Individuals who were rated as emotionally competent by their peers were
less exhausted in emotionally demanding jobs than their counterparts (Giardini & Frese,
2006). Another study found that emotionally intelligent individuals use fewer avoidance
strategies to cope with demanding and difficult tasks than their counterparts (Matthews
et al., 2006). A related study found that individuals who feel self-efficacious in regulating
their emotions reported a higher level of engagement with emotionally demanding work
than their counterparts (Heuven et al., 2006).
The potential moderating variables that we have considered are not meant to constitute
an exhaustive list. A number of other moderating variables likely exist, and future
research should try to identify them.
Cultural differences
Culture reflects a way of living shared by most members of a social group (Adler, 1997).
As such, culture structures people’s perceptions of the world and shapes their behavior.
One important way in which cultures differ is the extent to which they are individualis-
tic versus collectivistic (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005). While individualistic cultures
emphasize personal achievement and autonomy, collectivistic cultures emphasize
group harmony and personal relationships (Silverthorne, 2005). This cultural difference
may influence emotion regulation behavior. For example, the Netherlands and the
Philippines represent near opposite ends of the individualism–collectivism contin-
uum. This, in turn, likely leads to a significant difference in how workers from the two
cultures manage shame (Bagozzi et al., 2003). In the Netherlands, an individualistic
culture, workers manage shame via withdrawal behavior as they direct mental resources
inward. In the Philippines, a collectivistic culture, workers manage shame via enhanced
customer service and organizational citizenship behaviour as they seek to repair
relationships.
In a related study, Matsumoto et al. (2005) found both cross-cultural similarities and
differences in emotion regulation among Americans, Japanese, and Russians. For
instance, in all three cultural groups, the basic emotion that was most often genuinely
expressed was happiness, and the emotion that was most often masked was sadness. There
were a number of differences, however. For instance, American participants, who tend to
be individualistic, reported the most amplification of emotion, while Japanese partici-
pants, who tend to be collectivistic, reported the most deamplification. These differences
may be related to the finding that individualists favor high-arousal emotions such as
excitement because they are associated with distinctiveness and influence over others (Tsai
et al., 2006). Collectivists, in contrast, favor low-arousal emotions such as calmness
because they facilitate unity and adjustment to others.
Dimensions of culture other than individualism–collectivism may also play a role. In
another recent study, Grandey et al. (2005b) found that the association between surface
acting and job dissatisfaction depends on whether a given culture is institutionally versus
impulsively oriented. In institutionally oriented cultures such as the United States, there
are strong norms about regulating emotions to fulfill institutional roles and standards. On
the other hand, in impulsively oriented cultures such as France, expressing unregulated
emotions is valued. The association between emotion regulation and job dissatisfaction
was weaker in France than in the United States. Grandey et al. theorized that this occurs
as emotion regulation in impulsively oriented cultures stems more from interpersonal
versus instrumental goals and intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation.
Overall, research suggests that culture plays a significant role in what emotions are
appropriate, their level of intensity, and their effects on behavior. However, while research
has identified ways in which emotion regulation differs across cultures, more attention
needs to be paid to intervening mechanisms. For instance, while Bagozzi et al. (2003)
showed that shame is managed differently in the Netherlands versus the Philippines, they
did not measure individualism–collectivism and therefore could only speculate about the
underlying reasons for cross-cultural differences. In effect, future research should seek to
illuminate the ‘black box’ between culture and emotion regulation by showing not only
how emotion regulation processes differ across cultures, but also why.
Training
Despite the prevalence and importance of regulating emotions in the workplace, there is
relatively little research on training individuals to regulate their emotions better. In a field
study, Totterdell and Parkinson (1999) explored the use and effectiveness of emotion reg-
ulation strategies for improving mood among a group of trainee teachers. To improve
mood, trainee teachers used both engagement and diversion strategies. Engagement
strategies involve directing attention toward the affect or concern (e.g., reappraisal, social
support, and venting). Diversion strategies, in contrast, involve diverting attention away
from the affect or concern (e.g., engaging in pleasant or relaxing activities, cognitive dis-
traction, and avoidance). Reappraisal and engaging in pleasant or relaxing activities were
the strategies associated with the greatest improvement in mood, but cognitive distraction
was the most frequently used strategy. Moreover, during the middle six days of the two-
week study, Totterdell and Parkinson instructed half of the trainee teachers to increase
their use of engagement strategies and the remaining half to increase their use of diver-
sion strategies. Participants were in fact able to increase their use of particular strategies.
Furthermore, participants in the engagement group were more cheerful during the six-day
intervention period than those in the diversion group.
Given that research suggests that emotion regulation can be improved through train-
ing, it is surprising that there is little research in this area. The potential benefits of train-
ing emotion regulation suggest that more research is warranted. Totterdell and
Parkinson’s (1999) study showed that people can learn to better regulate their emotions
in the short term. An important next step is to explore whether enduring changes can
occur. Another important step is to identify exactly which type of emotion regulation
should be the focus of training interventions.
What is wise emotion regulation and the link between emotion regulation and emotional
intelligence?
One of the major challenges to teaching wise emotion regulation pertains to the difficulty
in identifying specifically what it is. Some behaviors that seem wise at first glance may in
fact be unwise, and vice versa. Several approaches to specifically defining wise emotion
regulation have been suggested. One approach has been identifying a set of emotion reg-
ulation behaviors, studying the consequences of these behaviors, and then judging the
wisdom of these behaviors based on their consequences. For instance, based on empirical
evidence, Salovey et al. (1999) concluded that rumination (i.e., mulling over circumstances
surrounding distress) is an unwise way to manage emotions, while tapping into social
resources and disclosing emotional experiences are wise ways to manage emotions. A
problem with this approach is the underlying assumption that wise emotion regulation is
a discrete event, rather than a dynamic process. In effect, it ignores the possibility that a
given emotion regulation behavior may be wise at one particular point in time and in one
particular context but not in others.
Mayer and Salovey (1995) proposed a framework that addresses some of the difficulties.
They proposed that a given act of emotion regulation is wise to the extent that it is logi-
cally consistent and adaptive. Specifically, their model of wise emotion regulation
involves: (i) forgoing pleasure in the short run for greater or more sustained pleasure in
the long run; (ii) seeking emotions that are both pro-individual and pro-social; and
(iii) deciding what emotion is optimal after carefully reviewing the context.
Also, to address some of the difficulties in identifying wise emotion regulation, Côté
et al. (2006a) conceptualized wise emotion regulation as a four-step process. In the first
step, an effective emotion regulation goal must be set, which involves selecting the appro-
priate emotion and level of intensity. In the second step, an effective strategy for attaining
this emotion regulation goal must be selected. In the third step, the strategy must be
effectively implemented – successful implementation may depend on an individual’s pre-
vious experience and emotional intelligence. In the final step, emotion regulation must
reflect and adapt to constantly changing circumstances.
In summary, a major challenge in emotion regulation research is identifying what is
wise versus what is unwise emotion regulation. While there have been some recent
attempts to formulate more integrative and precise conceptualizations of wise emotion
regulation, much work remains to be done. Perhaps most notably, wise emotion regula-
tion may largely be beyond conscious awareness, and hence research on automatic versus
conscious emotion regulation may be required for a more comprehensive understanding.
Automatic versus conscious emotion regulation

So far, we have mainly focused on conscious emotion regulation. Some theoretical frame-
works, however, position emotion regulation along a continuum from controlled to auto-
matic (Lord & Harvey, 2002; Pugh, 2002). Controlled emotion regulation can be
characterized as conscious, whereas automatic emotion regulation can be characterized
as unconscious. Organizational researchers have predominantly considered conscious
emotion regulation, in part because it can be measured relatively easily with a self-report
questionnaire. Studying unconscious emotion regulation is important for at least two

reasons. First, it would broaden the scope of emotion regulation research and make it
more complete. Although we do not know what percentage of emotion regulation is more
unconscious than conscious, it is clear that the current attention is disproportionately
devoted to the more conscious types.
Second, the most desirable forms of emotion regulation may be unconscious. For
example, two human resource managers may employ the same strategy to decrease their
anxiety prior to informing an employee about the absent resources that will prevent the
scheduled pay increase. The first manager may have worked for many years longer than
the second, and have far more experience in reporting unfortunate circumstances to
employees. The implementation of the strategy to decrease anxiety may be automatic for
the first manager, but it may require deliberate effort on the part of the second. The mental
resources of the first manager may be largely, if not entirely, preserved during the imple-
mentation of the strategy. This may enable the first manager to respond more readily to
the peculiarities of the situation such as the nuances of the employee’s response. The
mental resources of the second manager, however, may be depleted rapidly. Accordingly,
it can be argued that the most successful implementation is automatic, leaving more
resources available.
In addition, the literature in social cognition shows that some of the best decisions are
made unconsciously. Conscious thought is rule based and very precise, but it suffers from
at least two problems (Levine et al., 1996; Dijksterhuis et al., 2006; Dijksterhuis & van
Olden, 2006). First, it has a low capacity that often results in taking into account only a
subset of the information that is relevant to making a decision. Second, conscious thought
often involves giving suboptimal weights to the pieces of information that are under con-
sideration. People have the natural capacity to appropriately weigh different pieces of
information when they are making a decision and, in turn, form a summary judgment of
the relevant information. They do not, however, have perfect access to the reasons behind
their thinking (e.g., Nesbitt & Wilson, 1977) and hence trying to access these reasons via
conscious thought may result in using the information that is readily accessible, plausible,
easy to verbalize, or self-enhancing. This subset of information receives more weight in
the subsequent decision than may be appropriate, thereby producing suboptimal deci-
sions. According to this line of reasoning, unconscious thought may increase the quality
of decisions by offering a larger capacity than conscious thought. Dijksterhuis and his
colleagues (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis et al., 2006) have shown that conscious
thought can produce good decisions on simple issues but worse and worse decisions on
issues as they become increasingly complex and require the larger capacity of unconscious
thought.
Extending these arguments to the domain of emotion regulation suggests the intrigu-
ing possibility that organization members make better decisions about how to regulate
emotion unconsciously than consciously. If unconscious is better than conscious emotion
regulation, at least in some instances, researchers in the field may currently be studying
some of the least successful acts of emotion regulation and missing some of the most suc-
cessful ones. With respect to training, this reasoning suggests that the best interventions
may be focused on rendering emotion regulation unconscious, perhaps by providing con-
siderable practice.
Conclusion
Emotion regulation is ubiquitous in the workplace. So far, the research in this area has
revealed that (a) emotion regulation is associated with important outcomes such as strain
and performance, (b) some emotion regulation strategies are more strongly associated
with these outcomes than others, and (c) some emotion regulation strategies are related
to negative outcomes, such as high strain. We hope that this chapter guides research that
will extend these findings and provide insights, for example, on why emotion regulation
produces the effects that we have observed, and how workers can be trained to regulate
their emotions more wisely.
Note
* This research was supported by a research grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council of Canada to the first author. We thank Gros Oiseau and Daan van Knippenberg for their
thoughtful comments on a previous version of this chapter. Correspondence concerning this chapter
should be addressed to scote@rotman.utoronto.ca, cminers@rotman.utoronto.ca, or smoon@rotman.
utoronto.ca.
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18 Emotional labour and employee well-being:
an integrative review
David Holman, David Martinez-Iñigo and Peter Totterdell
What I envy you, sir, is the luxury of your own feelings. I belong to a profession in which that
luxury is sometimes denied us.
(Mr Rugg, accountant and debt collector, speaking in Little Dorrit, Charles
Dickens, 1857 [1994], p. 299)
Introduction
Dickens draws attention to the way in which we sometimes have to constrain our emo-
tional lives according to our occupational role, and the discomfort this can cause. Dickens
was writing 150 years ago, but it was Hochschild’s seminal work in 1983, The Managed
Heart, that ignited interest in how employees actively manage the feeling and expression
of emotion as an essential requirement of their work role; and how this is done in accor-
dance with organizational rules concerning the feeling and display of emotion.
Hochschild also revealed that when the emotional feelings of employees do not match the
rules of emotional display – such as when an employee feels sad but must appear enthu-
siastic to a customer – they often use one of two strategies to ensure that their actions are
in line with the display rules. Deep acting alters felt emotion in order to change emotional
display and produces a genuine emotional display, whereas surface acting only alters the
outward expression of emotion and produces a faked emotional display. She called the
process of managing emotions as part of the work role, ‘emotional labour’, and a central
concern was how emotional labour, particularly the feelings of dissonance and inauthen-
ticity that arise from surface acting, affect employee well-being.
Since the publication of The Managed Heart there has been a burgeoning empirical
and theoretical literature on emotional labour. The theoretical understanding of emo-
tional labour has been deepened by attempts to consider it in relation to theories of emo-
tional regulation (Grandey, 2000), action regulation (Zapf, 2002; Diefendorff &
Gosserand, 2003); social interaction (Côté, 2005), and demand-resource approaches to
stress (Brotheridge & Lee, 2002). These theories have been used to test and explain the
extent to which emotional labour has positive and negative effects on employee well-
being. In short, developments in the field of emotional labour indicate that its effects are
dependent upon the extent to which the processes occurring during emotional labour
either promote resource gain (e.g., social support, self-efficacy) or act as a demand and
prompt resource loss. Resource gains improve well-being and resource losses decrease
well-being.
The aim of this chapter is to offer an integrative review of the literature on emotional
labour in order to understand its positive and negative effects on well-being. To do this we
first present our model of the emotional labour process, which is then used to explain the
effects of emotional labour on employee well-being.
301
Emotional labour: a process model

The process of emotional labour is shaped by a range of components, which can be seen
in Figure 18.1. We now describe how these components relate.
Antecedents of regulation: rules, events and dissonance

Social interactions at work are structured, in part, by two types of emotion rule. Feeling
rules govern the type and degree of emotional feeling. Display rules govern the type and
extent of emotional expression (Ekman, 1973). These rules can be either restrictive or
expansive. For example, a restrictive feeling rule about the type of emotion is ‘don’t feel
sympathy for a client’, while an expansive display rule about the degree of emotion is
‘express a lot of enthusiasm towards a customer’ (Parkinson et al., 2005). Across occu-
pations and organizations, emotion rules tend to be expansive with regard to positive
emotions (e.g., display happiness, feel enthusiasm) and restrictive with regard to nega-
tive emotions (e.g., do not display anger, do not feel unsympathetic) (Brotheridge &
Grandey, 2002; Diefendorff & Gosserand, 2003; Zapf & Holz, 2006). But there are
exceptions. Police interrogators and bill collectors can consider it legitimate to display
hostility towards subjects (Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987) and restrictions on positive emotions
include not being too enthusiastic or not expressing romantic love (Cropanzano et al.,
2004).
Emotion rules in organizations are also concerned with beliefs, true or not, about the
role and effects of emotion. They can be instrumental in nature and reflect assumptions
about how the feeling and expression of emotion can be used to achieve better perfor-
mance by influencing others (Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987). For example, many organizations
prescribe that employees should show positive emotions to customers because it will
impact positively on customer behaviour. Emotion rules can also concern the role of
emotion in moral behaviour (Goffman, 1967; de Sousa, 1990), such as being compas-
sionate towards the sick.
As emotion rules specify the type of behaviour needed to meet the higher-order goals
of performance and moral behaviour, employees are motivated to act in accordance with
emotion rules. When the employee’s felt emotion and habitual expression of this emotion
are in line with emotion rules, acting in accordance with the emotion rules is likely to be
Affective
events
Effort
Emotion-rule Emotion Emotion displays
dissonance regulation Self-efficacy
1. Fake displays Employee
1. Dissonance 1. Regulation
strategies 2. Genuine legitimate displays Self-authenticity well-being
2. No dissonance
2. No regulation 3. Genuine deviant displays Customer Rewarding social
reactions relationships
Emotion
rules
Antecedents Regulation process Task performance Customer reactions Resources Consequences
Figure 18.1 A model of emotional labour and its outcomes

Emotional labour and employee well-being 303
an automatic and relatively effortless process (Zapf, 2002), with subsequent behaviour
being a genuine display of underlying emotion.
However, affective events in organizations (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996), particularly
interpersonal events with customers and co-workers, induce in employees a variety of pos-
itive and negative emotions (Basch & Fisher, 2000; Totterdell & Holman, 2003; Dormann
and Zapf, 2004). So there will be instances when an employee’s felt emotion differs in type
or intensity from that prescribed by the emotion rules. This discrepancy between felt
emotion and that required by emotion rules has been called ‘emotional dissonance’.
However, emotional dissonance has also been defined as the discrepancy between felt and
displayed emotion. Zerbe (2000) points out that the former type of dissonance occurs
before emotional regulation, while the latter type occurs after emotion regulation. To
avoid confusion, we refer to the discrepancy between felt emotion and emotion rules that
occurs before emotion regulation as ‘emotion-rule dissonance’, and the discrepancy
between felt emotion and expressed emotion that occurs after emotion regulation as ‘fake
emotional displays’.
Emotion regulation
Emotion-rule dissonance is problematic for the employee as current feelings will inhibit
the required feeling and display of emotion, thereby threatening the achievement of
work goals. In response, the employee can attempt to regulate his or her emotional
behaviour through various emotion regulation strategies (Gross, 1998). These strategies
can be conceptualized as having two main dimensions that reflect different motives (see
Table 18.1).
The first dimension is concerned with the focus of regulation, that is, whether the strat-
egy aims to change emotional feeling or emotional display. Strategies aimed at altering
emotional feeling have been called ‘deep acting’ (Hochschild, 1983) but are more accu-
rately called ‘antecedent-focused’ strategies since they modify the situation or perception
of situation in order to adjust emotion (Grandey, 2000). (We use the term ‘deep acting’
due to its common use in the emotional labour literature.) Deep acting deals with the
problem of emotion-rule dissonance by altering felt emotion, thereby enabling the appro-
priate display of emotion. Importantly, the expression of emotion is a genuine display of
a felt emotion. Strategies aimed at altering emotional display have been called ‘surface
acting’ but are more accurately labelled ‘response-focused’ strategies since they modify the
response to a situation. Surface acting deals with the problem of emotion-rule dissonance
by adjusting the emotional display in order to bring it into line with the display rules; but
Table 18.1 Types of emotion regulation strategy
Focus of regulation
Deep acting (antecedent- Surface acting (response-
focused regulation) focused acting)
Amplification Express or amplify emotional Express or amplify
Direction of feeling emotional display
regulation Suppression Inhibit, dampen or neutralize Inhibit, dampen or
emotional feeling neutralize emotional display
it leaves felt emotion unchanged. Surface acting causes publicly displayed emotion to be
different from felt emotion, that is, it creates fake emotional displays.
The second dimension is concerned with the direction of change in emotion, namely,
whether strategies aim to suppress or amplify emotion (Matsumoto et al., 2005).
Suppression strategies aim to inhibit, dampen or neutralize emotional behaviour, whereas
amplification strategies aim to express or enhance it (Diefendorff & Greguras, 2006).
Combining the two dimensions means that deep strategies can be used to suppress or
amplify emotional feeling, while surface strategies can be used to suppress or amplify emo-
tional display (see Table 18.1). Furthermore, each strategy may be achieved through various
actions, for example, deep acting can be achieved by cognitive reappraisal of the situation
or by refocusing attention on things to induce the required emotion (Grandey, 2000).
According to our model, emotion-rule dissonance should be an important determinant
of emotional regulation. The evidence for this derives mainly from qualitative studies
(Hochschild, 1983), as quantitative studies have mainly measured fake emotional display
(i.e., the dissonance between felt and expressed emotion). But while emotion-rule disso-
nance stimulates regulation, other factors in the model influence choices about the focus
of regulation (i.e., whether to use deep or surface acting) and the direction of regulation
(i.e., whether to suppress or amplify).
The use of deep and surface acting has been associated with the general presence of
display rules (Brotheridge & Lee, 2002). But studies using differentiated measures of
display rules paint a different picture, with negative emotion display rules more highly
associated with surface acting, and positive ones being highly associated with deep acting
(Brotheridge & Grandey, 2002; Diefendorff et al., 2005). However, as levels of deep and
surface acting vary considerably between occupations and contexts (see Brotheridge &
Grandey, 2002; Brotheridge & Lee, 2002; Totterdell & Holman, 2003; Diefendorff et al.,
2005), individual and contextual factors appear to play a significant role in the adoption
of deep and surface strategies. (We focus on some of these later.)
Decisions about the suppression or amplification of emotion may depend largely on the
employee’s current emotional state and the emotional behaviour required by emotion
rules. Evidence for this is limited. But if true, as display rules in most organizations are
generally concerned with the restriction of negative emotions and the expansion of pos-
itive emotions, then the most commonly used strategies should be those aimed at the sup-
pression of negative emotions and the amplification of positive emotions; this was
confirmed by Diefendorff and Greguras (2006).
One response to emotion-rule dissonance is the regulation of emotional feeling and
display. Of course another response is to ignore the emotion rules, leading to a genuine
display of emotion, albeit one that might be labelled deviant by others in the organization
or the customer (Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987).
Task performance: genuine and fake emotional displays

Theories of emotional labour propose that the appropriate expression of emotion is an
essential aspect of task performance, since the display of emotion can influence the affect,
attitudes and behaviour of customers. A number of studies support this assertion. For
example, displays of positive emotions by store employees can directly improve a customer’s
mood, which in turn increases the time a customer spends in store, influences the customer’s
willingness to return to the store, and encourages the customer to speak more highly of the
store to friends (Tsai, 2001; Tsai & Huang, 2002). Likewise, debt collectors report that dis-
plays of negative emotions improve collection rates from debtors (Sutton, 1991).
Emotional displays, however, can be genuine or faked expressions of felt emotions.
Four pathways by which genuine and faked emotional displays are created can be specified
(see also Zapf, 2002). First, when no emotion-rule dissonance occurs, there is no need to
regulate emotions, so the employee’s behaviour proceeds spontaneously, is emotionally
genuine, and is legitimate because it conforms to emotion rules. Second, emotion-rule dis-
sonance occurs, but no attempt is made to regulate emotions, so the behaviour is emo-
tionally genuine but is likely to be labelled as deviant. Third, emotion-rule dissonance
occurs, emotional behaviour is successfully regulated through deep acting, resulting in
genuine legitimate emotional behaviour. Fourth, emotion-rule dissonance occurs, emo-
tional behaviour is successfully regulated through surface acting, and fake emotional
display results. Emotional regulation may also be unsuccessful, so unsuccessful deep
acting may lead to deviant or faked behaviour, while unsuccessful surface acting may lead
to deviant behaviour. Indeed, in surface acting, masked emotions may leak out due to the
difficulty of completely hiding them (Ekman & Friesen, 1975).
Authenticity
Authenticity is an important concept in emotional labour. The degree to which emotional
behaviour is genuine or fake is thought to affect the perception of self-authenticity, a
major life goal and important predictor of well-being (Hochschild, 1983; Sheldon et al.,
1997). Yet, faking may not necessarily lead to inauthentic experiences of the self. For
example, some professional occupations require felt emotions to be different from emo-
tional displays (Stenross & Klienman, 1989). Ashforth and Humphrey (1993) cite the
‘detached concern’ of doctors in which they must feel neutral but display sympathy
towards patients. Employees may feel that they are acting in an authentically professional
manner, even though expressed emotions are not genuine expressions.
Fake and genuine behaviour is also thought to influence customer perceptions of the
authenticity of employee behaviour. Experimental and field studies indicate that not only
can customers distinguish between authentic (i.e., genuine) and inauthentic (i.e., faked)
emotional behaviour, but that they rate authentic displays of positive emotion more
highly (Grandey et al., 2005; Hennig-Thurau et al., 2006). Displays that are perceived as
authentic therefore have performance benefits. This indicates that, in jobs where positive
emotional displays are required, effective performance requires not just displays of posi-
tive emotion but also genuine displays of positive emotion.
Emotional labour and employee well-being
Resources and demands in emotional labour

Emotional labour has been shown to have both a positive and negative relationship with
employee well-being (Bono & Vey, 2005). To understand the differential effects of emotional
labour, a range of complementary theories have been utilized that primarily focus on:
● demands and resources, such as conservation of resources theory (Hobfoll, 1998;

see also Brotheridge & Lee, 2002), demand-resource models of burnout (Demerouti
et al., 2001) and Côté’s (2005) social interaction model;
● emotion regulation (Gross, 1998; see also Grandey, 2000; Totterdell & Holman,
2003); and
● demands, resources and regulation, such as action theory (Frese & Zapf, 1994; see
also Zapf, 2002).
From these theories, the following relevant observations can be made.

People strive to obtain, protect and foster valued resources (Hobfoll, 1998). These
resources are both individual (e.g., self-efficacy, effort/energy, personal authenticity) and
contextual (e.g., job control, social support) (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Hobfoll, 1998).
Resources are valued if they are functional in achieving goals, reducing demand, and
stimulating personal growth, development and well-being (Frese & Zapf, 1994). Demands
can be understood as requirements (ibid.) and as threats to resources (Hobfoll, 1989) (e.g.,
workload and interpersonal conflict). Demands must be dealt with so that goals are met
and resource loss prevented.
To cope with demand and to protect, obtain or enhance resources, effort must be
expended in regulating behaviour. Different types of regulation strategy require varying
levels of effort. Regulation strategies that occur at the habitual level require less effort and
use up fewer resources than those occurring at the conscious level; and within the different
levels of regulation, certain strategies will consume more resources than others (Muraven
& Baumeister, 2000; Zapf, 2002).
Strain occurs when resources become depleted faster than they can be replaced, such
as when demands are high or when regulation is unsuccessful and goals not achieved
(Carver & Scheier, 1998). High levels of job demand are associated with indicators of low
employee well-being, including anxiety, depression, emotional exhaustion, depersonal-
ization, and low job satisfaction and personal accomplishment. Individual and job
resources are associated with high employee well-being (Bandura, 1997; Parker & Wall,
1999; Demerouti et al., 2001).
Given this theoretical background, the effects of each component of emotional labour
should be contingent on the extent to which it plays a role in depleting, obtaining or main-
taining resources. Four important resources that are likely to be affected by emotional
labour are rewarding social relationships, self-efficacy, self-authenticity and effort.
The achievement of rewarding relationships and self-efficacy is likely to be affected by
the genuineness or falsity of emotional behaviour and the type of emotion expressed
(Côté, 2005). First, customers may view fake emotional displays as inauthentic and take
this to indicate that the employee lacks interest and trust or is dishonest. Such evaluations
by the customer may make them react negatively, causing interpersonal difficulties and
lower expressions of social support. Grandey et al. (2005) found that inauthentic displays
of emotion lead to reduced customer ratings of performance, while the inauthentic dis-
plays of emotion that result from surface acting are associated with reduced interpersonal
functioning (Gross & John, 2003), less liking and rapport (Butler et al., 2003) and less-
rewarding relationships (Brotheridge & Grandey, 2002). Second, discrete emotions have
an interpersonal function (Parkinson et al., 2005), one of which is to communicate inten-
tions to others. For example, happiness communicates an intention to be friendly and
affiliate, which causes agreeable responses (Clark et al., 1996). So the genuine expression
of positive rather than negative emotions is likely to create rewarding relationships.
Third, the negative reactions of customers that arise from inauthentic displays may lead
employees to question their effectiveness. Since positive performance evaluations are an

important means of improving and maintaining self-efficacy (Bandura, 1997), fake emo-
tional displays are likely to reduce self-efficacy. In summary, fake emotional displays and
genuine displays of negative emotions are likely to impact negatively on rewarding social
relationships and self-efficacy, which in turn will lower employee well-being (Demerouti
et al., 2001).
Emotional labour may also deplete or threaten to deplete self-authenticity. When a fake
emotional display is experienced as an inauthentic expression of the self, it is likely to
reduce feelings of self-authenticity or represent a threat to its maintenance. Field and
experimental studies have found low self-authenticity to be associated with emotional
exhaustion, lower mood and lower well-being (Sheldon et al., 1997; Brotheridge & Lee,
2002; Gross & John, 2003).
Effort will also be expended as a result of emotional labour. Elements requiring more
effort will deplete energy reserves faster, thereby leading to lower well-being, particularly
feelings of exhaustion (Maslach, 1982). In general, spontaneous emotional behaviours
require less effort than those involving conscious regulation (Muraven & Baumeister,
2000; Zapf, 2002) and experimental studies show that deep acting uses less effort than
surface acting, as surface acting is more cognitively taxing (Richards & Gross, 1999,
2000). The display of negative emotions may involve greater overall effort than positive
emotions, as they may produce negative consequences (e.g., interpersonal difficulties) that
require more effort.
The consequences of emotional labour

To what extent are the results of research in keeping with the idea that the effects of emo-
tional labour on well-being are contingent on the extent to which each component plays
a role in depleting, obtaining or threatening resources? We start with emotional displays
and work backwards along the model.
Emotional displays Recall that emotional displays can differ according to: the type of
emotion felt and expressed in the display; whether they are a genuine or fake display of
felt emotion; the extent of deviance; and the level of emotion regulation involved in its
production. The effects of emotional displays on employee well-being could result from
one or all of these factors. Disentangling the possible effects of these factors is one of the
problems facing researchers.
Most research has examined whether the effects of emotional display on well-being are
a result of it being genuine or fake. In particular, fake emotional displays have been shown
to have positive associations with various indicators of low well-being, for example, emo-
tional exhaustion (Bono & Vey, 2005), depersonalization (Zapf & Holz, 2006), psycho-
somatic complaints (Zapf et al., 1999), anxiety and depression (Holman et al., 2002); and
negative associations with indicators of high well-being, for example, job satisfaction
(Morris & Feldman, 1997; Zapf & Holz, 2006) and personal accomplishment (ibid.). One
reading of these findings is that it is the actual experience of dissonance (between felt and
expressed emotion) in fake emotional displays that directly causes lower well-being.
However, Zerbe (2000) notes that these studies are limited as they use a measure of the
difference between felt and displayed emotion, and therefore obscure any contribution
that each component might make. Studies using separate measures of felt emotion
and expressed emotion generally find that it is felt emotion that explains the effect of
dissonance on well-being and not the difference between felt and expressed emotion
(Zerbe, 2000; Totterdell & Holman, 2001; Glomb et al., 2002). In particular, positive felt
emotions are associated with higher well-being and negative felt emotions are associated
with lower well-being. One possible explanation for this is that, at this stage in the
emotional labour process, the presence of negative felt emotions may represent the fact
that surface acting has been used, which involves more effort, whereas positive emotions
indicate that deep acting has been used, which involves less effort. Thus, findings of a rela-
tionship between fake emotional display and well-being are actually a reflection of
the relationship between emotion regulation strategies and well-being. In other words,
the increased effort involved in producing fake displays causes its association with lower
well-being.
Other possible explanations are that the experience of dissonance in fake emo-
tional display has an indirect effect on well-being through its impact on feelings of self-
authenticity or as a result of negative customer reactions to inauthentic behaviour (Côté,
2005). These explanations have not been tested, but Gross and John (2003) report that
authenticity mediated the relationship between surface acting (which causes fake emo-
tional displays) and negative mood.
While the majority of research concerning the effects of emotional displays has focused
on fake emotional displays, a few studies have examined the effects of legitimate and
deviant genuine emotional displays. Glomb and Tews (2004) reported that the display of
genuine negative emotions was positively correlated with emotional exhaustion. This rela-
tionship might be explained by the idea that the expression of negative emotions has neg-
ative consequences for the individual (e.g., more-negative customer reactions and
less-rewarding relationships); or if the genuine negative emotions were a result of deep
acting, then the increased effort may explain the relationship. The genuine expression of
positive emotions might be expected to have a positive effect on well-being. Surprisingly,
Glomb and Tews found it to be unrelated to emotional exhaustion. This may have
occurred because their measure did not distinguish instances of genuinely felt positive
emotion arising from spontaneous legitimate responses, deviant displays or deep acting,
nor did the analysis control for factors such as role or gender that might have masked any
relationship.
Studies of deviant emotional displays are also uncommon. Büssing and Glaser (1999)
found deviant emotional displays to be positively related to emotional exhaustion and
negatively related to job satisfaction. Zerbe (2000) suggests that, in a similar manner to
fake emotional display, deviant emotional display contains two elements – displayed
emotion and expected emotion. Using separate measures of displayed and expected
emotion, Zerbe found that only displayed emotion was related to well-being; with nega-
tive emotional displays having a positive relationship with emotional exhaustion and
depersonalization and a negative relationship with personal accomplishment. It therefore
appears that the experience of deviance in deviant emotional display does not have a
direct effect on well-being. Rather, deviant displays of emotion might only have negative
effects on well-being when negative emotions are displayed.
Emotion regulation Emotion regulation strategies differ according to the focus of regu-
lation (deep or surface acting), the direction of regulation (suppression or amplification)
and the type of emotion regulated (e.g., positive or negative). Although the effects of reg-
ulation on well-being may be a result of one or more of these factors, most research has
concentrated on the effects of deep and surface acting.
Deep acting requires less effort than surface acting (Richards & Gross, 1999, 2000). If
effort depletion is the main explanatory factor, then both surface and deep strategies
should display a negative relation to well-being, but with deep acting having weaker asso-
ciation. Research has found surface acting to have consistent relations with various indi-
cators of poor well-being, including emotional exhaustion and low job satisfaction (Bono
& Vey, 2005), depersonalization (Brotheridge & Grandey, 2002; Brotheridge & Lee, 2002)
and anxiety and depression (Holman et al., 2002). Bono and Vey’s (2005) meta-analysis
also found deep acting to have a positive association with emotional exhaustion but this
was weaker than the association between surface acting and emotional exhaustion.
However, deep acting has also been shown to have a non-significant relationship with job
satisfaction (ibid.) and emotional exhaustion (Totterdell & Holman, 2003) and a positive
association with personal accomplishment (Brotheridge & Grandey, 2002; Brotheridge &
Lee, 2002) and job satisfaction (Grandey, 2003).
The varied associations between deep acting and well-being suggest that, while deep
acting may directly deplete effort, deep acting may positively affect well-being due to its
role in promoting and obtaining resources. Confirmation of this comes from Brotheridge
and Lee’s (2002) study which demonstrated that the effects of deep acting on emotional
exhaustion were mediated by self-authenticity. In addition, the effects of surface acting
might also be explained by its effects on resources. Brotheridge and Lee reported that the
effects of surface acting on emotional exhaustion were mediated by self-authenticity and
rewarding relationships. Overall, research findings point to the fact that the effects of deep
and surface acting are partly a result of their impact on effort, self-authenticity and
rewarding relationships.
Few studies have compared the effects of amplification and suppression strategies on
employee well-being. Glomb and Tews (2004) examined amplification and suppression
approaches to surface acting. They identified two amplification strategies, faking positive
displays and faking negative displays, and two suppression strategies, suppressing posi-
tive displays and suppressing negative displays. All four correlated positively with emo-
tional exhaustion, with faking positive displays and suppressing negative displays
exhibiting a similar level of correlation (r0.35 and r0.40), both of which were higher
than faking negative displays (r0.17) and suppressing positive displays (r0.22). As
faking positive displays and suppressing negative displays are likely to occur when the
person is feeling negative emotions, these results indicate that the effort involved in regu-
lation is greater when the person is in a negative mood, and that the effects of suppression
and amplification on well-being are partly dependent on the person’s current emotional
state.
Display rules General measures of display rules (i.e., covering both positive and nega-
tive emotion display rules) exhibit negative, non-significant, and positive associations with
well-being (Pugliesi, 1999; Schaubroeck & Jones, 2000; Brotheridge & Lee, 2002).
Differentiated measures of display rules show more consistent results, with negative
emotion display rules associated with low well-being and positive emotion display rules
associated with high well-being (Zerbe, 2000; Diefendorff & Richard, 2003; Zapf & Holz,
2006). Interestingly, Zapf and Holz (2006) also found positive emotion display rules to be
positively associated with emotional exhaustion and that this relationship was mediated
by fake emotional display. These studies indicate that rules concerning negative emotion
have negative consequences for employees, possibly because they encourage surface acting
and fake emotional displays. Rules encouraging the display of positive emotion appear to
have positive and negative consequences for the individual. Positive consequences may
occur because the display of positive emotions helps sustain rewarding relationships and
self-efficacy; and negative consequences might occur when positive emotion display rules
lead to surface acting and fake emotional displays, and thereby consume more effort and
reduce self-authenticity (Brotheridge & Grandey, 2002). Another explanation for the
effects of display rules on well-being is that they reduce personal control (Pugliesi, 1999;
Grandey & Brauberger, 2002). From this it would be expected that display rules have gen-
erally negative effects on well-being. But as display rules exhibit negative and positive
effects, reductions in control as a result of display rules may only partly explain their
impact on well-being (Côté, 2005).
The unique effects of emotional labour

One criticism of research on emotional labour is that the effects that have been found are
simply a function of other individual and contextual variables (Bono & Vey, 2005). For
example, research showing a relationship between surface acting and well-being may
simply be a function of their joint relationship with negative affectivity (Watson, 2000;
Gosserand & Diefendorff, 2005). A few studies have examined whether the components
of emotional labour have unique effects. With regard to individual factors, Gross and
John (2003) report that the relationships of deep and surface acting to a host of well-being
measures were still significant when positive and negative affectivity were controlled for
(see also Schaubroek & Jones, 2000; Diefendorff et al., 2005; Zapf & Holz, 2006). The
effects of emotional labour constructs have also been shown to be above that of contex-
tual variables, such as job demand, job control and social support (Pugliesi, 1999; Zapf
et al., 2001; Lewig & Dollard, 2003). The components of emotional labour therefore
appear to make a unique contribution to well-being.
The effects of individual and contextual factors

Individual and contextual factors may directly affect emotional labour. This implies that
emotional labour might mediate the relationship between such factors and employee well-
being. For example, Diefendorff and Richard (2003) found that employees high in extra-
version perceived a greater demand to manage positive emotions according to display
rules, which in turn related positively to job satisfaction. Brotheridge and Lee’s (2002)
results suggest that the relationship between both role identification and social support
and job burnout is partially mediated by display rules, surface acting and deep acting.
It is difficult to make firm conclusions from these studies. But if the net of evidence is
broadened to include studies that have examined the direct effect of individual and con-
textual factors on emotional labour, it is possible to detect certain trends (among a set of
studies with some inconsistencies in their findings) which have implications for well-being.
Overall, these studies suggest that individual and contextual factors influence the percep-
tion of display rules, choice of regulation strategy and the level of dissonance. Personality
and affective traits that increase the experience of negative emotions (e.g., neuroticism,
negative affectivity) and lower the need for positive relationships (e.g., low agreeableness)
will increase the salience of negative emotion display rules and use of surface acting.
Traits that increase the experience of positive emotions (e.g., extraversion, positive
affectivity), the need for positive relationships (e.g., agreeableness) and the need to
conform to expectations (e.g., conscientiousness, identification), will increase the salience
of positive emotion display rules and use of deep acting (Schaubroeck & Jones, 2000;
Brotheridge & Lee, 2002; Gross & John, 2003; Diefendorff et al., 2005; Gosserand &
Diefendorff, 2005). As a result, employees with the former traits may experience more of
the ‘negative’ aspects of emotional labour with regard to well-being, whereas employees
with the latter traits will experience more of the ‘positive’ aspects of emotional labour.
Likewise, with regard to contextual factors, employees who work in jobs with high
demands (e.g., workload, interpersonal job requirements, unjust interactions) appear
more likely to experience the negative aspects of emotional labour, such as negative emo-
tions, greater surface acting and more faked emotional behaviour. Employees with high
job resources (e.g., job control, social support) are more likely to experience the ‘positive’
aspects of emotional labour, such as positive emotions, deep acting and genuine displays
(Zapf et al., 2001; Brotheridge & Lee, 2002; Bono & Vey, 2005; Rupp & Spencer, 2006).
Consequently, employees with high job demands and/or low job resources may experience
lower well-being.
Individual and contextual factors might also moderate the effects of emotional labour
on well-being. For example, having a low identification with one’s career or organization
has been shown to exacerbate the effects of job demands (e.g., interpersonal requirements,
Wilk & Moynihan, 2005; positive emotion display rules, Schaubroeck & Jones, 2000) on
well-being. Giardini and Frese (2006) found that emotional competence – being skilled at
regulating one’s own and others’ affect – reduced the effects of fake emotional displays
and high display rule demands on general well-being. Thus, an individual’s emotional
ability and identification with job role appear to buffer the negative effects of emotional
labour.
The evidence for a moderating role of contextual factors is far from conclusive. There
is limited support that demands, control and support moderate the effects of emotional
labour but these relationships are not always found (see Pugliesi, 1999; Zapf, 2002; Lewig
& Dollard, 2003; Grandey et al., 2005).
Conclusion
Since Hochschild’s seminal study on emotional labour our understanding of its nature
and effects has progressed considerably. It is worth taking stock of the positive aspects of
research on emotional labour.
There is a relatively wide consensus on the key components of emotional labour and
their relationships. These components include affective events, display rules, emotion-rule
dissonance, emotion regulation strategies, and genuine and fake emotional displays.
Furthermore, researchers are increasingly recognizing the need to develop more
differentiated concepts and measures in order to attain a more nuanced understanding of
emotional labour and its effects on well-being. The impetus behind this recognition is
twofold. First, there are good theoretical reasons to expect variation in the emotional
labour process to occur as a result of the discrete emotion, and valence of the emotion,
involved. This is because discrete emotions and emotions of different valence have
different causes, associated emotion rules and action tendencies (Barsade et al., 2003;
Côté, 2005; Diefendorff & Greguras, 2006). Second, as components of emotional labour
comprise different elements, more differentiated measures may help to disentangle the
exact effects of those elements. This more differentiated approach and its benefits are
evident from studies of display rules and emotion regulation strategies. Studies that have
used measures of both positive and negative emotion display rules have illuminated their
differential relationship to emotional regulation strategies and well-being (e.g., Zapf &
Holz, 2006) – differences that are masked in studies with general measures of display rules.
But emotion rules can be differentiated further by type of emotion, the feeling and display
of emotion, and whether they are expansive or restrictive (Parkinson et al., 2005). In a
similar vein, emotion regulation strategies can be differentiated by type of acting, sup-
pression or amplification and type of emotion. Thus, while general measures have shown
the different effects of deep and surface acting (Brotheridge & Lee, 2002), more fine-
grained measures of these broad categories have provided further insight. For example,
the results of Glomb and Tews (2004) suggest that the strength of the relationships
between well-being and both suppression and amplification surface acting strategies are
partly dependent on the valence of the emotion being displayed. The nomological
network of differentiated measures of emotion rules and emotion regulation strategies
remains to be tested fully.
Studies of fake emotional displays and emotional deviance that measure both elements
of those concepts separately (i.e., felt and expressed emotion) also suggest that the emo-
tional valence of these behaviours is important in understanding their effects (Zerbe,
2000). The same can be said of emotion-rule dissonance, a key component and hypothe-
sized predictor of emotion regulation strategies. But the almost complete lack of empir-
ical work on emotion-rule dissonance is perhaps one of the most surprising aspects of
research on emotional labour, and needs to be addressed in a study with separate mea-
sures of felt emotion and required emotion.
Another positive aspect of research on emotional labour is that an amalgam of com-
plementary theories have been utilized to test and explain its positive and negative effects
on employee well-being. Integrating these theories into a model of emotional labour sug-
gests that the effects of emotional labour are dependent upon the extent to which its com-
ponents promote either resource gain or loss. While there is support for many aspects of
this model, further research is needed, particularly on the direct and relative effects of
emotion regulation strategies and fake emotional displays on resources. The model also
indicates that resources mediate the relationship between emotional labour and well-
being. But full tests of such a mediated relationship in an occupational setting are rare
(Brotheridge & Lee, 2002; Zapf & Holz, 2006) and are required.
A further strength of existing research is that the effects of emotional labour on well-
being have been established as being over and above other individual variables (e.g., pos-
itive and negative affectivity) and contextual variables (e.g., job control). However, the
influence of individual and contextual factors on the relationship between emotional
labour and well-being is in need of further clarification. With regard to individual factors,
while certain trends can be detected with regard to affectivity and the ‘Big Five’ person-
ality factors, more consistent effects may be found if factors more pertinent to emotion
regulation are used, such as emotional competence (Giardini & Frese, 2006). It might also
be profitable to distinguish between constraining and enabling emotional labour environ-
ments. In constraining emotional labour environments, job demands are high, job
resources low and employees do not identify with display rules or the motives behind
them. Consequentially employees are more likely to experience the negative aspects of
emotional labour. In enabling emotional labour environments, the opposite is the case.
Finally, research on emotional labour and well-being has largely focused on intraper-
sonal processes. There are some exceptions, such as Pugliesi’s (1999) inclusion of other-
focused emotion regulation strategies and Martinez-Iñdigo et al.’s (2007) study of
interpersonal and intrapersonal mechanisms in emotional labour. On reflection this omis-
sion may seem somewhat strange given that emotional labour is a fundamentally social
process. A focus on interpersonal processes is required. An excellent starting-point would
be an empirical test of Côté’s (2005) social interaction model.
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19 Not all emotional display rules are created equal:
distinguishing between prescriptive and contextual
display rules
James M. Diefendorff and Erin M. Richard
Introduction
Emotional labor can be defined as the management of emotions as part of the work role
(Hochschild, 1983). Research on emotional labor has advanced considerably in recent
years. A search of the key words ‘emotional labor’ in PsycINFO yielded 348 hits of which
286 (82.18%) occurred in the most recent five years (2001–05). This growth of interest in
emotional labor mirrors the organizational reality that emotions are more important than
ever as many jobs have shifted from production work to service work, and the structure
of organizations has moved from individual to team-based contributors (Arvey et al.,
1998). Such changes naturally place a greater premium on interpersonal interactions, in
which emotions play a key role. Acknowledging the increased importance of emotion
management at work, researchers have begun to closely examine the components and
antecedents of emotional labor. Perhaps the most critical antecedents are emotional
display rules. Emotional display rules provide the standards for appropriate emotional
expressions in interpersonal situations (Ekman, 1973) and are widely regarded as the
impetus behind the emotional labor process (Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987; Ashforth &
Humphrey, 1993; Grandey, 2000; Diefendorff & Gosserand, 2003; Cropanzano et al.,
2004).
Research on display rules has demonstrated that they relate to a variety of individual
and organizational outcomes (Schaubroeck & Jones, 2000; Brotheridge & Grandey, 2002;
Diefendorff & Richard, 2003; Diefendorff et al., 2005, 2006; Gosserand & Diefendorff,
2005). However, close examination of the display rule concept in organizational research
(e.g., Grandey, 2000; Diefendorff & Richard, 2003) suggests that it has evolved to take on
a meaning that is different from the original conceptualization developed by Ekman and
colleagues (e.g., Ekman, 1973; Ekman & Friesen, 1975; Ekman & Rosenberg, 1997). As
outlined in this chapter, we believe that research on display rules at work should be
expanded to include the current conceptualization as well as the original formulation of
Ekman and colleagues as both concepts likely influence employee emotional displays. We
start the chapter by reviewing current thinking on emotional display rules and then con-
trast the two conceptualizations. Building on the theoretical work of Diefendorff and
Gosserand (2003), we then present a model that integrates the perspectives. We also
discuss the role of context in influencing the display rules that operate at any given
moment and consider directions for future research.
Definitions and background

Hochschild’s (1983) seminal work on emotional labor argued that organizations expect
people to feel and express emotions as part of their jobs, thus making the very private
316
Prescriptive and contextual display rules 317
experience of human emotions a commodity that is traded on the open market. A key
argument in her theory was that this commoditization of private human emotions is dam-
aging to individual well-being and society. Hochschild adopted the term ‘feeling rules’ to
describe the emotions individuals are expected to have as part of their work role. Rafaeli
and Sutton (1987) later dropped that term in favor of ‘display rules’ because the latter
focuses on observable behaviors (i.e., expressions) which can be more easily measured and
linked to observer perceptions than employee feelings. Since that time, emotional labor
research has primarily focused on emotional display rules when discussing the emotional
expectations placed on employees (Rafaeli & Sutton, 1989; Ashforth & Humphrey, 1993;
Grandey, 2000; Diefendorff & Richard, 2003).
Ekman and Friesen (1969) coined the term ‘display rules’ in their research on cultural
differences in emotional displays. They later elaborated on the concept, arguing that
display rules indicate ‘the need to manage the appearance of particular emotions in par-
ticular situations’ (Ekman and Friesen, 1975, p. 137). Thus, display rules describe what a
person believes he/she should do with his/her facial expression when feeling a specific
emotion in a particular situation (Matsumoto, 1990, 1993). Matsumoto et al. (1998) the-
orized that all facial displays reflect a combination of ‘biologically innate, universal
expressions and culturally learned rules for expression management’ (p. 148). Thus,
display rules are thought to impact on all emotional expressions to some degree.
In emotional labor research, display rules represent the emotions that employees are
expected to display as part of their work role (Rafaeli & Sutton, 1989; Ashforth &
Humphrey, 1993; Diefendorff & Richard, 2003). As such, display rules in organizational
research are considered to be standards for emotional expression that are given to employ-
ees by the organization (Diefendorff et al., 2006). The purpose of such display rules is to
constrain employee emotional displays in a particular way so as to facilitate the attain-
ment of organizational objectives. Cropanzano et al. (2004) argued that three organiza-
tional goals can be served by imposing display rules. First, the emotional displays that
result from display rules are thought to improve customer satisfaction. Work by Pugh
(2001) and Tsai (2001) supports this link, showing that positive employee emotional
expressions are directly related to customer reactions. Second, the emotional displays
resulting from display rules can maintain harmony among employees. Keltner and Haidt
(1999) argued that displayed emotions help to coordinate social interactions by convey-
ing information about (a) what the sender is feeling, (b) the sender’s social intentions, and
(c) the sender’s position in the relationship. Further, emotional displays can spread emo-
tions throughout workgroups via contagion processes (Bartel & Saavedra, 2001; Barsade,
2002). Thus, a display rule to express positive emotions might improve interpersonal inter-
actions among employees. The third organizational goal served by display rules is that
these emotional expectations may positively impact on employee well-being (Cropanzano
et al., 2004). For instance, Diefendorff and Richard (2003) found that employees who
reported perceiving strong display rules for expressing positive emotions were more
satisfied with their job.
Of course, the particular effect of display rules on employees and others will depend on
the content of the display rules. Wharton and Erickson (1993) identified three main types
of display rules in organizations: integrative, differentiating, and masking. Integrative
display rules are aimed at bringing people close together and involve expressing positive
emotions and hiding negative emotions. Such display rules are common in customer
service and sales occupations (Cropanzano et al., 2004) where the goal is to create posi-
tive emotions in customers. Differentiating display rules involve expressing negative emo-
tions and suppressing positive emotions so as to create negative feelings in the target.
Sample occupations with this type of display rule include bill collectors and police inter-
rogators. Finally, display rules requiring emotional masking involve expressing no
emotion (i.e., suppressing positive and negative emotions) so as to create the impression
of impartiality and objectivity. Occupations identified as having these display rules
include therapists, judges, and doctors. The vast majority of emotional labor research has
focused on integrative display rules (e.g., Brotheridge & Grandey, 2002; Gosserand &
Diefendorff, 2005), though examples of differentiating (Sutton, 1991) and masking
(Smith & Kleinman, 1989) display rules can be found in the literature.
Integrative display rules have been linked to the use of emotional labor strategies, such
as surface acting and deep acting (Brotheridge & Grandey, 2002; Diefendorff et al., 2005;
Gosserand & Diefendorff, 2005), and to others’ ratings of employee emotional displays
(e.g., Diefendorff & Richard, 2003; Gosserand & Diefendorff, 2005), which in turn have
been linked to service effectiveness (e.g., Pugh, 2001) and customer intentions to return
(e.g., Tsai, 2001). Display rules also have been shown to relate to job attitudes, employee
well-being, and burnout (Schaubroeck & Jones, 2000; Brotheridge & Grandey, 2002;
Diefendorff & Richard, 2003; Diefendorff et al., 2006). Thus, there is evidence that display
rules relate to a variety of individual and organizational outcomes.
Prescriptive versus contextual display rules

As described in the previous section, the emotional labor conceptualization of display
rules (e.g., Grandey, 2000) has taken on a meaning that is somewhat different from its orig-
inal formulation (Ekman, 1973). Recall that display rules in emotional labor research are
standards for emotional expression that are externally prescribed by organizations, dic-
tating what individuals should and should not express at work (e.g., Schaubroeck & Jones,
2000; Diefendorff & Richard, 2003). In contrast, Ekman’s (1973) original conceptualiza-
tion of display rules focused on what individuals believe they should do with their facial
expressions when feeling a particular way in a specific situation. We label these conceptu-
alizations ‘prescriptive’ and ‘contextual’ display rules, respectively. We argue that both
types of display rules influence employee emotional displays at work and thus have rele-
vance for understanding the emotional labor process. We elaborate on each type of
display rule and their differences below.
Prescriptive display rules

Prescriptive display rules refer to organizational expectations for emotional expression
that guide employee emotional displays across a variety of situations and emotional states
(Grandey, 2000; Diefendorff & Richard, 2003). Such display rules have been the focus of
emotional labor research because they provide employees with guidance on the emotions
they should display (e.g., express positive emotions) and should not display (e.g., suppress
negative emotions) as part of the work role (Brotheridge & Grandey, 2002). For example,
prescriptive display rules have been measured by asking employees the extent to which
they agree with statements like: ‘To be effective in my job, I must act cheerful and socia-
ble’ (Schaubroeck & Jones, 2000; Diefendorff & Richard, 2003) and ‘I am expected to sup-
press my bad moods or negative reactions to customers’ (Brotheridge & Grandey, 2002;
Diefendorff et al., 2005). Such display rules clearly reflect a ‘top-down’, organizational
influence on employee emotional expressions.
Because of their broad nature, prescriptive display rules typically refer to the general
expression management strategies of express and suppress (e.g., Schaubroeck & Jones,
2000; Brotheridge & Grandey, 2002; Diefendorff & Richard, 2003; Diefendorff et al.,
2005, 2006). In this context, ‘express’ is defined as displaying an emotion and ‘suppress’
is equated with not displaying or hiding an emotion (Diefendorff & Richard, 2003). When
the display rule is to show integrative emotions (as is common in emotional labor
research), these strategies are paired with the general categories of positive and negative
emotions, respectively. Thus, prescriptive display rules are typically operationalized as
perceived demands to express positive emotions and perceived demands to suppress neg-
ative emotions (e.g., Diefendorff & Richard, 2003). Thus, such display rules typically do
not focus on discrete emotions, but rather refer to general expectations for showing or
hiding broad categories of emotion.
Further, prescriptive display rules either do not identify a target, referring instead to
displaying or hiding emotions to perform one’s job well (e.g., Diefendorff et al., 2006), or
refer only to customer targets (e.g., Gosserand & Diefendorff, 2005). The focus on cus-
tomer targets derives from the notion that part of what is being sold by companies is the
emotional expressions of its employees (Hochschild, 1983). However, researchers have
expanded the concept of emotional labor to refer to any interpersonal interactions at
work (e.g., Pugliesi, 1999; Härtel et al., 2002; Cropanzano et al., 2004; Glomb et al., 2004;
Diefendorff et al., 2006), implying that prescriptive display rules are present in many jobs
(not just those dealing with customers) and govern emotional displays in many interper-
sonal interactions.
Contextual display rules

Contextual display rules refer to the rules that guide individuals’ emotional expressions
at any given moment (Ekman & Friesen, 1975). These display rules fluctuate based on fea-
tures of the situation, which include the actor’s felt emotions and the person(s) with whom
the actor is interacting. Matsumoto et al. (2005) assessed these display rules by having par-
ticipants imagine they were experiencing a particular emotion (e.g., sadness) in the pres-
ence of a particular person (e.g., acquaintance) and asking them to select an expression
management strategy that describes what they would do with their facial expressions.
Matsumoto et al. found that display rules differed depending on the unique combination
of situational features faced by the person, indicating that ‘bottom-up’, contextual factors
influenced display rule perceptions.
Contextual display rules depend in part on the actor’s emotional state (ibid.). As such,
the expression management strategies in these display rules describe what individuals
should do with their facial expressions relative to the emotional state. Ekman and Friesen
(1975) theorized that individuals may either express the emotion as it is felt or modify
expression of the emotion with one of the following strategies: (a) amplify (express the
emotion with more intensity than is felt), (b) deamplify (express the emotion with less
intensity than is felt), (c) neutralize (express none of the felt emotion), (d) mask (smile
without expressing any of the felt emotion so as to hide one’s feelings), or (e) qualify
(express the emotion, but with a smile so as to comment on the feeling). These six strate-
gies (including express) describe what individuals should do with their expression relative
to feeling a discrete emotion. However, Ekman and Friesen (1975) pointed out that a
seventh strategy, ‘simulate’, may be necessary for situations when the affective state is
neutral (i.e., no emotion is felt), yet individuals feel the need to portray a particular
emotion.
As indicated above, Matsumoto et al. (2005) provided initial evidence that display rules
depend on specific contextual features, including felt emotions and interaction partners.
They also supported the idea that such display rules included the six expression manage-
ment strategies described by Ekman and Friesen (1975). Diefendorff and Greguras (2006)
partially replicated these findings in an organizational context, finding that display rules
at work most often included the strategy of neutralize, followed by deamplify. Express,
mask, and qualify were included in display rule ratings at equivalent levels, followed by
amplify which was the least likely to be included. Diefendorff and Greguras also found
that display rules varied based on employee felt emotions and the work target with whom
they were interacting. We return to these findings in a later section of this chapter.
The dynamics of emotional display rule perceptions

The focus on prescriptive display rules in organizational research makes sense given the
desire of companies to standardize employee behavior and provide employees direction
for what they should express (Morris & Feldman, 1996). However, the reality of work life
is that situations are complex and dynamic and that the general nature of prescriptive
display rules may not provide enough guidance to employees in specific situations. Thus,
the display rules that guide behavior must reflect the needs of the moment as well as the
expectations of the organization. We theorize that contextual display rules represent the
display rules of the moment and are shaped by both bottom-up and top-down informa-
tion, emerging in response to both demands. Building on Diefendorff and Gosserand’s
(2003) theory of the emotional labor process, we articulate a model describing the inter-
relationship of these display rule concepts. First, we briefly review their model of emo-
tional labor.
Diefendorff and Gosserand’s model of emotional labor

Adopting a control theory perspective (see Lord & Levy, 1994 and Vancouver, 2005),
Diefendorff and Gosserand (2003) theorized that emotional labor is a dynamic process
whereby employees continuously match display rules with their emotional displays. If this
comparison process yields a discrepancy (i.e., a display does not match the display rule),
individuals are motivated to reduce this discrepancy by changing their behavior to bring
subsequent emotional displays in line with the display rule. According to Diefendorff and
Gosserand, this ‘output function’, or change in behavior, can take the form of modifying
one’s emotional expressions or felt emotions. We elaborate on this point in the next sub-
section. Discrepancies can also be reduced by changing the display rule to match the emo-
tional display. However, this discrepancy reduction strategy is presumed to be
maladaptive because display rules exist so that individuals can attain some performance
objective (e.g., sell a product, maintain group harmony, enhance employee well-being;
Cropanzano et al., 2004). Thus, display rules represent subgoals in a performance goal
hierarchy, and abandoning a display rule in favor of some other display standard (e.g.,
express one’s felt emotions) can negatively impact on job performance. Another implica-
tion of the goal hierarchy concept is that display rules themselves have subgoals
(e.g., smile, make eye contact) that must be achieved to ensure that discrepancies between
display rules and emotional displays do not occur (or are effectively reduced). Finally, if
the comparison of the display rule and the emotional display does not yield a discrepancy,
the individual is expected to continue displaying the same emotion.
Diefendorff and Gosserand (2003) theorized that whether individuals adopt and persist
with a display rule is affected by their commitment to the display rule, which is a function
of the expectancy (i.e., anticipated success) and valence (i.e., value) associated with dis-
playing the emotion. More specifically, if a person’s commitment to the display rule drops
below his/her commitment to some other display standard (e.g., express what one feels),
that person is predicted to abandon the display rule for the other display standard. This
feature of the model helps to explain the motivation behind performing emotional labor
and the circumstances under which an individual may abandon the display rule.
Consistent with these ideas, Gosserand and Diefendorff (2005) found that display rule
commitment moderated the link between display rules and employee displays of positive
emotions at work, such that the relationship was strong and positive at high levels of com-
mitment and weak at low levels of commitment.
A contribution of Diefendorff and Gosserand’s (2003) model is that it describes the
mechanism by which emotional display rules are presumed to impact on behavior – that
is, discrepancies between display rules and emotional displays motivate individuals to
change their subsequent emotional displays. In addition, the model depicts emotional
labor as a dynamic process whereby individuals interact with their environment over time
to produce the most effective emotional display for any given moment. This aspect of their
model suggests that emotional displays and display rules can evolve and shift in response
to the demands of situations. Indeed, the findings of Matsumoto et al. (2005) and
Diefendorff and Greguras (2006) show that display rules are quite flexible and can vary
from context to context. However, the notion that display rules vary across situations
seems to be at odds with much of the empirical research on emotional labor which implic-
itly assumes that employees have one set of display rules that apply to all situations (e.g.,
Schaubroeck & Jones, 2000; Diefendorff & Richard, 2003). It also raises the theoretical
question of how display rules can be dynamic and changing while still enabling people to
meet relatively constant performance objectives higher in their goal hierarchies. We
attempt to address these issues next by articulating theoretical links between prescriptive
and contextual display rules.
Linking prescriptive and contextual display rules

Building on the ideas of Diefendorff and Gosserand (2003), we contend that prescriptive
and contextual display rules exist at two adjacent levels in the performance goal hierar-
chy, with contextual display rules representing subgoals that are evoked in attempts to
attain prescriptive display rules. Figure 19.1 illustrates this hypothesized relationship
between prescriptive and contextual display rules. In the figure, each type of display rule
has its own negative feedback loop and both loops operate simultaneously and continu-
ously. However, the output of the negative feedback loop for the prescriptive display rule
is to instantiate a standard (i.e., goal; Lord & Levy, 1994) in the contextual display rule
negative feedback loop. In other words, the existence of a discrepancy for a prescriptive
display rule activates a particular type of contextual display rule aimed at reducing the
discrepancy.
Prescriptive display
Display
rule
integrative
emotions Comparator
Perception Adopt
of contextual
interaction display rule
(Person)
(Environment) Quality of Contextual display

interpersonal +
interaction rule
Amplify
Affective happiness Comparator
event
Smile more
Perception intensely and
of for a longer
display duration
(Person)
(Environment)
Emotional
display +
Affective
event
Figure 19.1 Negative feedback loops for prescriptive and contextual emotional
display rules
As previously noted, prescriptive display rules are organizational expectations for emo-
tional displays (e.g., Grandey, 2000), the purposes of which are to impact on the quality
of employees’ interaction with others, which impact on performance-related objectives.
For instance, the purpose of integrative emotional display rules is to bring people together
by creating positive emotions in the target individual (Wharton & Erickson, 1993), which
facilitates other organizational goals (e.g., sales). Thus, the environmental input that is
sensed by the individual in this feedback loop is the affective tone of the interpersonal
interaction. This information is perceived by the individual and matched against the inte-
grative display rule in the comparator (see Figure 19.1). If no discrepancy is detected, the
individual will continue displaying whatever emotion is currently being displayed.
However, if a discrepancy is sensed (e.g., the rapport during the interaction is not posi-
tive), then some output function is activated in an attempt to change subsequent behav-
ior and reduce the discrepancy. Diefendorff and Gosserand (2003) suggested that this
output can take the form of emotion regulation strategies, such as surface acting (i.e.,
changing one’s expression) or deep acting (i.e., changing one’s felt emotions). We agree
with this idea, but add that the output of a sensed discrepancy can be the adoption of a
contextual display rule that guides what the person should do with his/her facial expres-
sion. Indeed, the adoption of a contextual display rule may be considered as a form of
surface acting. Consistent with control theory models applied to other areas of human
behavior (e.g., Lord & Levy, 1994), we contend that several subgoals may be simultane-
ously activated in the pursuit of a higher-order goal. In this case, individuals may attempt
to reduce a discrepancy for a prescriptive display rule by simultaneously trying to change
their felt emotions (e.g., deep act) and adopting a particular contextual display rule (e.g.,
mask anger).
According to Diefendorff and Gosserand (2003), a key reason for discrepancies
between display rules and emotional displays is the occurrence of affective events (Weiss
& Cropanzano, 1996). Affective events are environmental circumstances that impact on a
person’s emotions (ibid.). When an event impacts on a person’s felt emotions, it can also
affect the person’s emotional displays, which may result in a discrepancy when compared
to the display rule. In other words, individuals may encounter situations that lead them
to feel and display emotions that they should not display, and they must adopt a contex-
tual display rule that enables them to reduce this discrepancy. As articulated by Rafaeli
and Sutton (1990), felt emotions can be volatile, changing across roles (e.g., interacting
with a customer vs. a co-worker), within roles and between transactions (e.g., dealing with
a difficult vs. a nice customer), or within roles and within transactions (e.g., dealing with
a nice customer who becomes unpleasant, such as during the negotiation of a car sale).
As a person’s emotions change, the contextual display rule needed to align his/her emo-
tional displays with the prescriptive display rule will change. Further, the contextual
display rules that emerge may depend on the target with whom the person is interacting
(e.g., the boss vs. a co-worker). In sum, the contextual display rule that emerges is consis-
tent with the top-down prescriptive display rule yet is tailored to meet the unique demands
of the situation. We present ideas later in the chapter about how emotions and targets can
impact on the contextual display rule that is adopted.
The feedback mechanism for the contextual display rule operates in much the same way
as the feedback mechanism for the prescriptive display rule. Here the standard is much
more specific; individuals must display a particular emotion with a particular intensity.
As shown in Figure 19.1, the comparator matches the person’s perception of his/her own
emotional display with the contextual display rule. Individuals typically cannot view their
own faces, so the perception of one’s own emotional display derives from the memory of
what an emotional expression feels like on one’s face (Ekman & Friesen, 1975), as well as
others’ reactions to one’s facial expression. If a discrepancy is sensed in this comparison,
individuals are predicted to modify their facial expressions by (a) selecting a different
facial area to manipulate (e.g., be sure the eyes also show delight), (b) modifying the
number of facial areas involved (e.g., ‘smile’ with both the mouth and eyes), (c) changing
the duration of an expression (e.g., smile longer), or (d) changing the excursion of par-
ticular facial muscles (e.g., smile broader, open eyes larger) (ibid.). Such changes result in
an emotional display of a particular form and intensity that the actor once again perceives
and compares against the contextual display rule. This discrepancy detection and reduc-
tion process repeats itself in an iterative fashion.
Situational influences in the contextual display rule feedback loop also take the form
of affective events, but the ‘events’ might reflect subtle variations on an existing event. For
instance, the affective event that created a discrepancy for the prescriptive display rule and
resulted in the adoption of a particular contextual display rule might have been ‘inter-
acting with an angry customer’. Thus, the contextual display rule in this situation might
be to ‘mask anger’ – that is, to smile so as to cover up one’s anger. However, if the
interaction partner becomes more hostile, this situation can increase one’s own anger,
making it more difficult to mask this negative emotion. Thus, this change in the affective
event can result in a discrepancy at the contextual display rule level, which will result in a
discrepancy at the prescriptive display rule level. Basing their ideas on Weick (1979),
Rafaeli and Sutton (1987) gave the following description of how an interaction can evolve:
[T]he initial emotions sent by a focal employee (an ‘act’) stimulate the target person to respond
with implicit or explicit feedback about the continuation of the displayed emotion (an ‘interact’).
The sender of emotion reacts to such feedback by readjustments including abandoning, revis-
ing, or maintaining the displayed emotion (completing a ‘double interact’). (p. 28)
In other words, cues from the situation and other person, provide employees with feed-
back about whether their contextual emotional displays are appropriate. Further, if the
discrepancy for the prescriptive display rule is not reduced by following a particular con-
textual display rule, the person may need to adopt a different contextual display rule.
Thus, the reactions of the target serve as feedback about the effectiveness of one’s dis-
plays, influencing the subsequent display rule that is adopted and the emotions displayed
(Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987).
At this point, we caution the reader not to think of these prescriptive and contextual
display rule feedback loops as typically requiring deliberate, conscious control
(Diefendorff & Gosserand, 2003). Indeed, Ekman and Friesen (1975) argued that indi-
viduals typically will not be aware of display rules unless they are in a new situation or
receive feedback that their emotional displays are clearly not appropriate. Thus, such
regulation of displays may only gain access to consciousness when discrepancies with
display rules are large, unexpected, or are of long duration (Diefendorff & Gosserand,
2003). In most situations, individuals may be able to automatically select contextual
display rules so as to regulate their emotional displays in relation to prescriptive display
rules without conscious awareness or effort. Further, we expect that individuals may come
to anticipate certain types of affective events (i.e., types of targets and felt emotions) and
become skilled at automatically adopting appropriate contextual display rules that seam-
lessly guide their emotional expressions (ibid.). However, when affective events are unex-
pected or when discrepancies between emotional displays and prescriptive display rules
are especially large, individuals may have to consciously select a contextual display rule to
respond to the discrepancy.
Implicit in the ideas presented thus far is the notion that a variety of contextual display
rules may be used to attain the prescriptive display rule. This property reflects the notion
of equifinality (Carver & Scheier, 1998), which suggests that goals (e.g., prescriptive
display rule) can be attained through a variety of means (e.g., contextual display rules).
The result is that behavior can appear stable in relation to the prescriptive display rule (i.e.,
the actor is having a positive interaction with the target) despite changes to the actor’s feel-
ings and the situation. This property is important because it enables individuals to handle
the emerging demands of the moment, or what Rafaeli and Sutton (1989) referred to as
the ‘transaction-defining cues’ of the situation.
Implications of the model for understanding employee well-being

Much has been made about the negative effects of emotional labor on those who perform
it (e.g., Hochschild, 1983). For instance, Diefendorff and Gosserand (2003) proposed that
very specific display rules lead to burnout and dissatisfaction. In the current theoretical
framework, the mechanism responsible for this proposed effect might be that very specific
prescriptive display rules prevent individuals from adopting contextual display rules that
they can tailor to situations. That is, a very formal prescriptive display rule may require
the same specific emotional display regardless of the context. Such a strict display rule
may not only make displaying expected emotions more difficult, but also prevent individ-
uals from having control over the means by which they can display organizationally
desired emotions. In other words, a very strict prescriptive display rule can prevent indi-
viduals from feeling self-determined or autonomous (Ryan & Deci, 2000) in their emo-
tional displays, which may be associated with lower levels of subjective well-being and life
satisfaction. This idea is similar to Ashforth and Tomiuk’s (2000) notion that the key
problem with emotional labor is not emotional dissonance (i.e., displaying emotions that
are different from what one feels), but rather it is feeling inauthentic because one is dis-
playing emotions for introjected, or externally controlled reasons. Thus, the negative
effects of emotional labor may derive in part from employees not being able to select con-
textual display rules with which they identify and that enable them to develop tailored
emotional responses to situations.
Summary
Contextual display rules reflect the means by which prescriptive display rules are met. The
attainment of contextual displays rule helps to reduce discrepancies for prescriptive
display rules, which reside higher in the goal hierarchy. A contribution of this model is
that it helps to explain how prescriptive display rules can remain constant while contex-
tual display rules can change over time in response to the demands of the moment. This
theoretical analysis adds an explanatory level to Diefendorff and Gosserand’s (2003) goal
hierarchy notion by arguing that display rules exist at two levels: prescriptive and contex-
tual. Table 19.1 highlights the distinctions between these display rule concepts.
What is the context of contextual display rules? Felt emotions and interaction targets
In this section, we consider in more detail how the situation shapes contextual display
rules. At any given moment, a person’s affective state and the presence of other individu-
als are among the most salient features of the situation. Consistent with Matsumoto et al.
(2005), we contend that these factors combine to influence the contextual display rule that
a person adopts to guide his/her facial expression. Of course, individuals can experience
a large number of possible felt emotions and encounter a large number of potential indi-
viduals. Thus, an organizing structure would help to guide thinking in this area. The
purpose of this section is to develop some initial theory on how differences in emotions
and targets may impact on contextual display rules.
Felt emotions
Although a prescriptive display rule will apply to almost all work situations, contextual
display rules only make sense in relation to the person’s felt emotions. As argued in this
chapter, what individuals feel at any given moment will be critical in defining the context
for the employee. Emotions are the result of a person’s interpretation of the situation
(Smith & Pope, 1992; Smith et al., 1993; Lazarus, 2001; Scherer, 2001), and as a result,
they reflect a person’s subjective integration of the context with which they are faced.
Table 19.1 Summary and comparison of prescriptive and contextual display rules
Prescriptive display rules Contextual display rules

Definition General organizational Specific goals for emotional
requirements for emotional expression at any given moment
expression across situations
Source(s) of influence ‘Top-down’ influence – Both ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’
handed down by influence – inferred from unique
organizations features of the situation but also
influenced by organizational
requirements
Attention to felt Relatively independent of felt Specific to felt emotions
emotions emotions
Attention to target Depend on the broad category Depend on the specific attributes of
characteristics to which a target belongs the target
Location in the goal Mid-level: serve as subgoals Lower level: serve as subgoals for
hierarchy for higher-level work goals prescriptive display rules (such as
(such as ‘sell cars’) ‘express integrative emotions’)
Temporal qualities Remain relatively constant Change rapidly in response to
over time transaction-defining cues of the
situation
Illustrating the effects of different felt emotions on display rules, Matsumoto et al. (2005)
found that seven universally expressed and experienced emotions (i.e., anger, contempt,
disgust, fear, sadness, happiness, and surprise; Ekman, 1993) impacted on individuals’
display rule ratings. Below we develop a theory about how different discrete emotions
might impact contextual display rules at work. To this end, we utilize the circumplex
model of emotions as a starting-point (Russell & Barrett, 1999; Russell, 2003).
In the circumplex model (e.g., Russell, 2003), any emotion can be characterized accord-
ing to its position on two continuums reflecting valence (ranging from positive to nega-
tive) and activation (ranging from low arousal to high arousal; see Figure 19.2 for
examples). We contend that the particular contextual display rule that is adopted at work
will depend on the way in which the felt emotion differs from the prescriptive display rule
along these two dimensions. When an employee experiences an emotion that opposes the
prescriptive display rule in valence (e.g., the prescriptive display rule is to express integra-
tive emotions, but the employee feels anger), he/she is expected to adopt a contextual
display rule of ‘neutralizing’ or ‘masking’ the felt emotion. However, if something may be
gained by leaking the felt emotion (i.e., leaking anger may signal to a target that his/her
behavior is unacceptable), the actor may do so but ‘qualify’ it with a smile, so as to let the
target know that the emotion will not be acted on. If an employee experiences an emotion
that is congruent in valence with the prescriptive display rule but lower in activation (e.g.,
the prescriptive display rule is to express integrative emotions, but the employee feels a
low activation, positive emotion), he/she is expected to adopt the contextual display rule
of ‘amplifying’ the felt emotion (i.e., displaying an emotion that is of a higher activation
High activation
Afraid Excited
Neutralize, Deamplify
mask, or qualify
Angry Happy
Neutralize, Express
mask, or qualify
Negative Positive
valence valence
Neutralize,
mask, or qualify
Amplify Contented
Sad
Neutralize,
mask, or qualify
Amplify
Simulate
Lethargic Tranquil
Low activation
Note: This figure depicts the contextual display rules that are assumed to emerge when the prescriptive
display rule is to display integrative (i.e., positive) emotions.
Source: Adapted from Russell (2003). © American Psychological Association.
Figure 19.2 The circumplex model of emotions with proposed expression management
strategies for contextual display rules
level than the felt emotion). Conversely, if an employee’s felt emotion is higher in arousal
than the prescribed emotional display (e.g., if the employee feels excited but the prescrip-
tive display rule calls for a more moderate activation positive display) he/she may adopt
a contextual display rule of ‘deamplifying’ (i.e., displaying an emotion that is of a lower
activation level than the felt emotion). Further, if the prescriptive display rule calls for a
positive emotion, yet the employee feels a low activation neutral emotion (e.g., fatigue),
we expect the employee to adopt a contextual display rule of ‘simulating’ the organiz-
ationally desired emotion. Finally, when the employee’s felt emotion is congruent with the
prescriptive display rule in activation level and valence, we would expect the employee to
adopt a contextual display rule of ‘expressing’ the felt emotion. Figure 19.2 illustrates
these possibilities by presenting examples of emotions at different points in the circum-
plex and suggesting what the possible expression management strategy might be, assum-
ing that the prescriptive display rule is to express integrative emotions.
Consistent with these ideas, Diefendorff and Greguras (2006) examined contextual
display rules in a sample of employees, where the prescriptive display rules involved
expressing integrative emotions. They found that the contextual display rules when feeling
happy were the most likely to involve expressing or amplifying the feeling, and that the
contextual display rules when feeling strong negative emotions, such as fear and con-
tempt, were most likely to involve neutralizing the feeling. Further, feeling sad, which is a
relatively low activation, negative emotion, was the most likely to involve masking the
emotion. Interestingly, anger was the most qualified negative emotion, suggesting that
intentionally leaking anger was more common in display rules than intentionally leaking
other negative emotions. Of course, a limitation of the Diefendorff and Greguras study is
that it did not explicitly examine activation level and valence as independent variables. For
instance, only one positive emotion was examined, preventing a comparison of positive
emotions that differ only in activation level. Future research on contextual display rules
with a wider variety of discrete emotions is needed.
Target of emotional display

The person with whom an employee is interacting also is an important part of the situ-
ation and thus should be a key influence on the contextual display rule that is adopted.
We argue that contextual display rules will vary in systematic ways related to the hori-
zontal and vertical dimensions of the employee’s relationship with the target (e.g., Brown,
1965; Locke, 2003; Hall et al., 2005). The horizontal dimension of interpersonal rela-
tionships (also referred to as the solidarity dimension) includes liking, psychological
closeness, and interdependence. This aspect of relationships tends to be based on simi-
larity in personal characteristics, experiences, and attitudes, as well as physical proximity
and the amount of time spent together. The vertical dimension of interpersonal relation-
ships (also referred to as the status dimension) includes perceived power, status, and dom-
inance differences. These aspects of relationships tend to be based on social order and
thus depend on culture (Brown, 1965).
When members of a dyad interact, the horizontal and vertical dimensions of relation-
ships are believed to greatly influence both persons’ behavior. For example, Brown used
these dimensions to explain differences in the norms of address (e.g., pronoun use) and
forms of greeting (‘Hi’ versus ‘Good morning’) between different kinds of dyads.
Similarly, we argue that contextual emotional display rules will depend, in part, on the
verticality (e.g., differences in status) within the dyad as well as the solidarity (e.g., emo-
tional ‘closeness’) of its members.
Generally, we anticipate that employees may be more likely to adopt contextual display
rules that strictly adhere to prescriptive display rules when interacting with higher-status
individuals, compared to lower- or equal-status individuals. That is, the mechanism used
to achieve the prescriptive display rule (e.g., display integrative emotions) may involve
more explicit control over one’s expressions when interacting with higher- compared to
lower-status targets. We expect that a similar effect may occur for differences in solidarity,
with interactions with low solidarity targets (i.e., one does not like or otherwise connect
with the target) invoking more controlled contextual display rules than interactions with
high solidarity targets. For instance, if the display rule is to express integrative emotions,
but the actor is feeling angry, the contextual display rule that is adopted may differ based
on the relative status and solidarity of the actor and target. If the target is of higher status,
the actor may neutralize the emotion or mask it with a smile, whereas if the target is of
lower status, the actor may qualify or deamplify the emotion, which allows for partial
expression of the emotion to the target. Consistent with this idea, Matsumoto (1990)
found that the display of negative emotions was rated as more appropriate when the target
was of lower relative status compared to when the target was of higher relative status.
If the target and actor are high in solidarity, the actor may be more likely to deamplify
or qualify the anger, whereas he/she may neutralize or mask the anger when interacting
with a low solidarity partner. Supporting these ideas, Matsumoto found that the display
of negative emotions was rated as more appropriate when the target was an in-group
member (family, close friends) compared to when the target was an out-group member (in
public, casual acquaintance). Matsumoto et al. (2005) also provided indirect support for
this idea. They found that display rules for targets who were presumably close (family,
friends) involved more expressing and amplifying of emotions than targets who were pre-
sumably not close (strangers, acquaintances). Further, display rules for strangers were
much more likely to involve masking and neutralizing emotions than display rules for
other targets.
In addition, it is quite likely that the horizontal and vertical relationship dimensions
may interact in complex ways to impact contextual display rules. Diefendorff and
Greguras (2006) provided indirect support for this idea. Consistent with the vertical
dimension of relationships, they found that the most control over expressions in contex-
tual display rules occurred for customers (more relative power), followed by supervisors
(more relative power), and finally co-workers (equal relative power). However, they also
found that display rules for subordinates (less power) involved amounts of control equal
to that of display rules for supervisors. Thus, display rules for co-workers exhibited the
least amount of control over emotional expression, suggesting that a simple power
differential was not driving this result. Diefendorff and Greguras theorized that employ-
ees may have had the highest degree of solidarity with co-workers, thereby resulting in
contextual display rules that required less control over their feelings compared to the other
targets with whom solidarity may have been lower (customers, supervisors, and subordi-
nates).
In addition to explaining differences across target categories (e.g., supervisors, co-
workers) similar to Diefendorff and Greguras, we expect that the horizontal and vertical
aspects of relationships might also explain display rule differences within categories. For
instance, contextual display rules for customer interactions may depend, in part, on
differences in vertical attributes such as perceived customer status (e.g., income, age, sex)
as well as horizontal attributes such as perceived similarity or the extent to which the inter-
action is a service encounter or service relationship (e.g., Gutek et al., 1999).
Summary
In this section, we developed theory about the ways in which two defining features of situ-
ations can vary to impact on contextual display rules: felt emotions and target character-
istics. In particular, we borrowed from existing models of emotion (e.g., Russell & Barrett,
1999) and interpersonal relationships (e.g., Locke, 2003; Hall et al., 2005) to describe the
ways in which contextual display rules may vary across situations. For ease of presenta-
tion, we focused on these influences independently. However, it is clear that emotions and
target characteristics may not be independent (e.g., Hall et al., 2005) and could combine
to influence contextual display rules in a number of ways. For instance, one’s felt emo-
tions may be affected by target characteristics (e.g., whether someone becomes angry in a
situation may depend on the likeability of the target). In addition, the contextual display
rules that individuals adopt when experiencing anger may depend on the person with
whom they are interacting. The contextual display rule for a well-liked customer (high sol-
idarity, high relative status) may involve masking the anger with a smile, whereas the con-
textual display rule for a disliked subordinate (low solidarity, low relative status) may
involve qualifying the emotion to let the person know how he/she feels without appear-
ing to be out of control. Thus, a large number of possible target-by-emotion combina-
tions may influence contextual display rules, all of which are aimed at trying to attain an
overarching prescriptive display rule.
Future research
The purpose of this chapter was to draw a distinction between two conceptualizations of
emotional display rules that have been presented in the literature (e.g., Ekman, 1973;
Diefendorff & Richard, 2003) and to develop a theory explaining their co-existence and
interrelationship. By doing so, we hope to stimulate new research on emotional display
rules that can expand our understanding of the emotional labor process. With this goal
in mind, we highlight a few such ideas for future research below.
A key question that comes to mind from having made the distinction between pre-
scriptive and contextual display rules is the level at which future research should theorize
about and operationalize display rules. That is, should researchers develop hypotheses
and measure display rules for prescriptive display rules, contextual display rules, or both?
We believe that the answer to this question will depend on the primary research question
to be addressed. For instance, if a researcher is interested in understanding how the emo-
tional demands placed on employees impact on employee well-being or sales perfor-
mance, then the focus of the study should be on prescriptive display rules. However, if a
researcher is interested in predicting the interaction-level emotional displays of employ-
ees, then contextual display rules would be more appropriate. Further, if a researcher is
interested in explaining the mechanism by which organizational expectations impact on
customer satisfaction, then he or she may wish to examine both prescriptive and contex-
tual display rules, as it may be the case that contextual display rules mediate the effect of
prescriptive display rules on customer satisfaction.
One of the first steps in this new research agenda is to ensure that there are valid mea-
sures of prescriptive and contextual display rules. Although measures of prescriptive
display rules have been developed (e.g., Schaubroeck & Jones, 2000; Brotheridge &
Grandey, 2002; Diefendorff & Richard, 2003; Diefendorff et al., 2005), no particular
measure has emerged as the best. Further, the most appropriate way to measure contex-
tual display rules is even less clear. The Display Rule Assessment Inventory (DRAI;
Matsumoto et al., 1998, 2005) may be a good place to start. Diefendorff and Greguras
(2006) showed that this measure could be adapted to work contexts. However, its ipsative
nature, response options, and dimensionality may limit its applicability in organizational
research (see Matsumoto et al., 2005). For instance, Matsumoto et al. (1998) found that
six strategies (express, amplify, deamplify, qualify, mask, neutralize) plus an ‘other’
category resided on a single dimension reflecting ‘control’ over displays using multi-
dimensional scaling. Such results suggest that these strategies are not qualitatively
different, but differ in the degree to which they involve control over one’s emotional dis-
plays. However, Matsumoto et al. (2005) could not replicate this single dimension, and
instead performed factor analytic work to reveal five dimensions of expression manage-
ment: express (which included the original ‘express’ and ‘neutralize’ items), deamplify
(which included the original ‘deamplify’ and ‘other’ items), amplify, mask, and qualify.
Yet, Diefendorff and Greguras (2006) found distinct patterns of results for all six expres-
sion management strategies, suggesting that it might be best to keep them separate rather
than combine them in some way. Further, no research has attempted to measure the
expression management strategy of simulation.
Future research also might attempt to assess contextual display rules using real-time
assessments. Contextual display rules are proposed to change over time (in response to
the changing context); therefore, it may be best to assess them in specific situations.
Memory recall is a limitation of cross-sectional assessments; thus, experience sampling
methods (ESMs) will likely be better suited for assessing contextual display rules (see Beal
& Weiss, 2003). Using palmtop computers or similar devices, researchers can have
employees respond to real-time surveys presented throughout the work day. These surveys
could inquire about the contextual display rule that the individual was following at the
time of the survey signal or during the most recent interpersonal interaction. In addition,
such assessments could collect information on the actor’s felt emotions and the target of
the interaction (e.g., relative power, solidarity).
Another area for future research concerns the relationship between prescriptive and
contextual display rules. This chapter proposes that prescriptive display rules will
influence contextual display rules in predictable ways, but empirical research is needed to
test this idea. Multi-level modeling techniques could be used to assess the extent to which
perceptions of prescriptive display rules (a between-person variable) predict within-
person variability in contextual display rules and possibly moderate the relationships of
felt emotions and target characteristics with contextual display rules. For example, strict
and/or explicit prescriptive display rules may reduce the effect of context (e.g., target, felt
emotion) on contextual display rules, compared to less strict or explicit rules.
Finally, it would be useful to consider influences on contextual display rules other than
felt emotions, targets, and the prescriptive display rules of the organization. We expect
that cultural factors may be an important influence on the contextual display rules that
individuals adopt. For example, in some countries women are expected to hide antago-
nism to a greater extent than in other countries (Fischer et al., 2004). Thus, culture may
impact on how an employee reacts to an antagonistic female customer (i.e., the contex-
tual display rule that the person adopts) above and beyond the other factors already dis-
cussed. Furthermore, we expect that work-group norms (Bartel & Saavedra, 2000) may
represent an important influence on an individual’s contextual display rules. For example,
if the prescriptive display rule is to express integrative emotions, but the employee belongs
to a work group where the norm is to be relatively serious, he or she may feel uncomfort-
able expressing felt positive emotions. The employee may therefore deamplify positive
emotions to a greater extent than an employee working in a work group where the norm
is to be very enthusiastic. Finally, individual differences (e.g., personality variables) may
predict the contextual display rules that individuals adopt. For example, individuals high
in emotional expressivity (Gross & John, 1995) may be more likely to adopt the contex-
tual display rule to express or amplify an emotion than to deamplify or neutralize it.
General summary
The purpose of this chapter was to describe and integrate two display rule conceptual-
izations, explaining how they both operate to impact on employee emotional displays at
work. Specifically, we distinguished between prescriptive display rules, which are general
guidelines for emotional display put forth by the organization, and contextual display
rules, which constantly change over time in response to the employee’s felt emotion, inter-
action target, and other situational cues. Extending the control theory explanation of
emotional labor presented by Diefendorff and Gosserand (2003), we proposed that con-
textual display rules are subgoals that serve higher-order prescriptive display rules.
Further, we discussed influences on contextual display rules by borrowing from existing
models of emotion and interpersonal relationships. Finally, we presented several possible
directions for future research on these topics.
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20 Doing emotion in service encounters: service
agents’ perceptions of emotional labor and
emotional contagion
Blake E. Ashforth, Marc A. Tomiuk and Carol T. Kulik*
All salesmen are quite emotional . . . To sell, you have to use your emotions rather than your
rationale. Some of the sales pitch is rational, obviously, because it’s mathematics. But when you
come to sell yourself – because it’s not the product you’re selling, it’s yourself . . . you have to
use your emotions and click on the right button that will light up the customer.
(Mortgage broker)
Introduction
Research on emotions in organizational life has greatly increased during the last decade
and a half (e.g., Lord et al., 2002; Härtel et al., 2005). This interest appears to be fueled,
in part, by a growing recognition of the integral role that emotions play in everyday work,
and by disenchantment with the rational and behavioral paradigms that have held sway
in psychological studies in general and organizational studies in particular. Over the same
period and for somewhat similar reasons, a stream of research on emotion in marketing
has also appeared (Bagozzi et al., 1999). It is now evident that affect is an integral part of
the consumption experience (Richins, 1997), that emotions are evoked during the service
encounter (Arnould and Price, 1993), and that emotions contribute to service evaluation
(Oliver, 1997). In addition, research on services management has also greatly increased in
recent years (Frenkel et al., 1999; Fitzsimmons and Fitzsimmons, 2000). This interest par-
allels the proportional growth of service industries and occupations in developed
economies, and the growing recognition that interpersonal interactions between service
agents and clients greatly affect the perceived quality of service and the well-being of
service agents.
These three streams are converging in studies of the emotional life of service encoun-
ters. Emotions are particularly germane to service encounters because services often
involve dynamic interactions between service agents and clients in which agents are
expected to express certain emotional states. Because services are intangible, client satis-
faction depends at least partly on the perceived authenticity of these states. Research has
revealed a great deal about how the provision of service in emotionally demanding occu-
pations often generates stress and burnout, how expressing role-appropriate emotion
affects service agents, and how the enactment of service affects clients’ reactions to service
encounters (e.g., Price et al., 1995; Brotheridge and Grandey, 2002; Côté and Morgan,
2002).
However, such research typically focuses on a single occupation or organization. What
remains less clear is a more fundamental question: how do service agents across a variety
of service occupations and industries generally perceive the role of emotion in service
encounters – how do they view ‘doing emotion’? Specifically, the present study focuses on
335
how agents view emotional labor and emotional contagion, both defined shortly.
Investigating agents’ accounts may generate new insights into the role of emotion in
service work.
As described later, this was accomplished through interviews with 105 frontline service
agents from a wide variety of service occupations and industries. The use of interviews
permitted us to focus on what it means to ‘do emotion’ from the service agent’s perspec-
tive, and the sample of diverse service occupations should yield results that are more gen-
eralizable than the typical single-occupation study.
Emotional labor
‘Emotional labor’ is the act of displaying the normatively prescribed emotion for a given
organizational situation (Ashforth and Humphrey, 1993; Glomb and Tews, 2004; see also
Hochschild, 1983). Hochschild (1983) argued that there are two means of performing
emotional labor. The first, ‘surface acting’, refers to attempts to simulate emotions that
are not felt or to modulate the expression of emotions that are, typically through facial
expression, voice, posture, gestures, and so on. The second, ‘deep acting’, refers to
attempts to summon and actually experience the emotions one wishes to express or to sup-
press the experience of emotions that one does not. According to Hochschild, deep acting
is accomplished through either exhorting feeling or trained imagination (e.g., picturing a
happy event to feel pleasant). Whereas surface acting focuses directly on behavior, deep
acting focuses indirectly on behavior through emotion. Both surface and deep acting are
forms of impression management in that the service agent is attempting to convince
clients that certain emotions are being experienced as well as expressed (Grandey et al.,
2005).
Most research on emotional labor has focused on its outcomes, particularly its impact
on the service agents and service encounters. For example, Grandey (2003) found that
surface acting but not deep acting among university administrative assistants was associ-
ated with emotional exhaustion, and Tsai (2001) found that positive emotional displays
by shoe salespersons predicted customer willingness to return to the store. Less studied is
the way that service agents view the very nature and process of complying with display
rules. Prominent exceptions include Hochschild (1983), Smith (1992), Leidner (1993),
Pierce (1995), and Tracy and Tracy (1998), but, again, they tend to focus on solitary
service occupations and industries. Given that agents’ interpretations of the nature of
service and of service delivery likely have a major impact on their behavior and the quality
of service, it is important to better understand those interpretations from a more gener-
alized perspective. Thus, our basic research issue here is how agents describe the nature
and dynamics of emotional labor. In particular: to what extent do agents’ accounts reflect
Hochschild’s distinction between surface and deep acting? How do they perform emo-
tional labor? Does it become easier to perform emotional labor over time?
Emotional contagion
McHugo et al. state that ‘[e]xpressive displays of emotion are information-laden and
evocative; they provide dispositional and situational information, and they can produce
emotional reactions in observers’ (1991, p. 19). One process through which emotional
reactions can be evoked in interaction is emotional contagion (Parkinson, 1996; Barsade,
2002), defined by Hatfield et al. as ‘the tendency to automatically mimic and synchronize
Emotion in service encounters 337
facial expressions, vocalizations, postures, and movements with those of another person
and, consequently, to converge emotionally’ (1992, p. 153–4). Emotional contagion has
been presented as a form of empathy (Levenson, 1996).
Given its automaticity (see Dimberg, 1991), Hatfield et al. describe emotional conta-
gion as ‘largely inaccessible to conversant awareness’ (1994, p. 5). However, research does
suggest that self-reports of susceptibility to contagion (e.g., ‘When someone smiles
warmly at me, I smile back and feel warm inside’, Doherty, 1997, p. 136) predict suscep-
tibility to actual contagion (Doherty, 1997), as well as stress and burnout among service
agents (Bakker et al., 2001; Le Blanc et al., 2001).
We speculate that service agents may indeed be aware not only of their clients’ emotions
but of their own tendency to ‘catch’ those emotions from their clients. The reason is that
agents’ performance is partly dependent on being aware of and responsive to the
expressed and perhaps unexpressed needs of their clients. As Strazdins put it, there is a
‘unique requirement to engage with other people’s emotions’ (2002, p. 235, her emphasis).
Thus, agents are motivated to attend to affective cues (McBane, 1995; Verbeke, 1997).
Further, it seems likely that emotional contagion (at least of positive emotions), via mir-
roring behavior and experiencing empathy, would facilitate cohesion and liking. Service
agents may sense that reciprocating the display if not the experience of certain emotions
may facilitate clients’ attraction to the agent and belief that their concerns are appreci-
ated, thereby increasing the likelihood of satisfying the client. And research indicates that
mimicking facial, vocal, and postural expressions of emotions arouses the corresponding
emotion in oneself (Hatfield et al., 1994). Thus, agents are likely to report being aware at
times of feeling what they sense their clients are feeling (although there may well be
instances of autonomic contagion of which they remain unaware).
Thus, our research question is to what extent are service agents aware of emotional con-
tagion in service encounters? Further, assuming some awareness, what impact do agents
believe contagion has on their behaviors and attitudes toward work? Do agents experi-
ence contagion more often or less often over time?
Method
Semi-structured interviews averaging one hour were conducted with 105 service agents in
a variety of frontline, face-to-face service occupations. One or more individuals were
interviewed from the following occupations: accountant, airline customer service repre-
sentative, art agent, art curator, auctioneer, bank teller, barmaid, bouncer/doorman,
cashier, chef, consultant (i.e., fashion, management, security), daycare worker, dentist,
dietician, financial advisor, flight attendant, food and beverage distributor, food service
manager, funeral director, funeral home employee, hairstylist, hockey referee, hotelier,
insurance manager, lawyer, librarian, mail carrier, medical technologist, mortgage broker,
nurse, optician, photographer, police officer, property manager, psychiatric clerk, psychic,
real estate agent, receptionist, retail owner/manager (i.e., book store, café, fruit store,
restaurant), salesperson (i.e., industrial, retail), school principal/vice-principal, social
worker, tax investigator, taxi driver, teacher, and waiter/waitress.
The most relevant interview questions for this chapter focused on the nature of the
process by which service agents conformed to normative expectations for doing service,
and the extent to which – as well as the process by which – agents ‘caught’ emotions from
clients and vice versa.
The first and third authors independently content analyzed each transcript. Our coding
relied on the constant comparative method whereby newly coded text was compared to
previously coded text to ensure that the emergent constructs maintained their integrity
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967). We compared our coding after every fifth transcript. Our goal
was to attain what Kvale terms ‘dialogical intersubjectivity’ (1994, p. 152), a form of reli-
ability via discussion regarding complex phenomena. Each coded portion of text was
compared and, if differences existed, discussed until consensus was attained. For more
detail, see Ashforth et al. (2008).
Results
Emotional labor
Our research questions regarding emotional labor focused on its nature and dynamics.
Consistent with Hochschild (1983), service agents’ descriptions of their enactment of nor-
mative expectations could indeed be categorized as surface and/or deep acting.1 Surface
acting, recall, involves simulating emotions that are not actually felt or masking those that
are. For example:
It’s very important to be able to . . . show off a pleasant, courteous, polite side, even if you don’t
feel like it. Maybe you woke up on the wrong foot or you just had a customer making you very
angry . . . you cannot let that color the interaction with your next customer. (Salesperson, retail,
clothing 1)2
In contrast, deep acting involves actively shaping one’s emotions. For instance:
I’m bouncing off the walls after a day like today, say, where it’s been nonstop from nine o’clock
and all of a sudden it just drops off at about one o’clock and you don’t have anybody but you
still have that energy and you have to calm yourself down. You have to relax so that you don’t
jump on the next client – as soon as they walk in the door, you’re ‘Hi! How are you doing?’ So,
that’s the main thing, it’s keeping your rhythm constant so that you don’t freak people out and
you don’t burn out. (Hairstylist)
It should be noted that the emotional labor literature typically focuses on managing
emotions arising from the service encounter itself. However, as suggested by the quote from
the salesperson above, many instances of acting involved role spillover (where emotions
and moods external to work intrude on service delivery) or client or situational spillover
(where emotions and moods arising from other clients or incidents intrude on service deliv-
ery). In such cases, the current client is essentially a victim of circumstance, an unfortunate
situation that the service agents recognized and usually attempted to rectify.
Performing emotional labor A review of the data pertaining to acting suggests five
intriguing observations about how agents actually perform emotional labor. First, surface
and deep acting are often discussed in the literature as reactive and static means of mir-
roring what clients are expecting. However, our data remind us of Hochschild’s (1983)
contention that surface and deep acting are often used more proactively and dynamically
as means of regulating client emotions and behavior in order to facilitate service objec-
tives. Emotional labor, in short, can be regarded as a tactical means of regulating service
encounters rather than simply as an additional job requirement imposed on beleaguered
workers. Consistent with Schaubroeck and Jones (2000), service agents typically men-
tioned either fanning clients’ positive emotions or reducing clients’ negative emotions:
Q: When you’re being stern, are you feeling stern or are you just kind of . . . playing stern?
A: A little bit of both. Sometimes I feel it and sometimes I feel I just have to be, because the
person might just need a little push . . .
Q: . . . Do you have to be a good actress to be a dietician?
A: . . . You have to convince the person that they’re going to be successful, that they can do it . . .
So you have to be very convincing.
Q: So how would you be convincing . . .?
A: . . . Just things like, ‘You’ll do this and that and it will lead to this and you’ll feel like this,
and’ – I get very dynamic with my voice and gestures and very convincing.
Q: So it’s almost like they catch your confidence.
A: That’s it exactly, yes . . . ‘If she believes it and she’s a professional, then she must be right.’
(Dietician)
You have to keep on an even keel because it’s important that they [the patients] know they can
depend on you, that you’re there for them and they know that when they’re going to be afraid in
the night or they have an episode of chest pain and they’re scared . . . that you’re there. And the
way your demeanor is reassures them that they’re going to be all right, that they’re going to get
through this. (Nurse 1)
Second, given that deep acting generally requires more psychological effort than surface
acting (see note 1), the psychological mechanisms through which deep acting is accom-
plished are of interest. In a companion paper, we noted that service agents often ‘psych
themselves up’ for role entry through pep talks and cognitive rehearsal (Ashforth et al.,
2008). One other common mechanism for deep acting, ‘role taking’ (e.g., Culbertson,
1991; cf. ‘perspective taking’, Totterdell and Holmann, 2003), was discerned once indi-
viduals are actually in their service roles. Here, one puts oneself in the other’s place as a
means of developing empathy for the other:
Q: What parts of you come out or are reflected in your work?

A: . . . An ability to care, to feel along with the patient and to put myself in their shoes and know
exactly what I would be feeling at that time – and responding accordingly instead of just going
through the mechanics . . . The ability to empathize. (Dentist 1)
I just put myself in their shoes. Sometimes it’s bad. But I know I wouldn’t want to have to suffer
what they’re suffering. So I try to understand where they’re coming from. (Salesperson, indus-
trial, account manager)
As these quotes suggest, empathy appears to have both cognitive and affective elements –
‘trying to understand where they’re coming from’ and ‘feeling along with them’ (see also
McBane, 1995).
Third, several service agents talked about postponing the experience of emotion:
Whatever was happening, whatever situation – after it was over . . . you just start shaking
because it was then the emotions came up and it was just like . . . ‘God if that didn’t happen that
way, that could have happened’ . . . You do whatever you have to do, and then it was after you
were removed from the situation, that’s when I reacted to what was happening. (Q: It’s almost
like you saved your processing of the emotions until later?) And sometimes that’s good and
sometimes that’s bad. Maybe it’s not good physically or personally, but I think it made me
effective as an airport cop. (Police officer)
Sometimes . . . I’ll shake hands with a customer [and] I feel like jumping up in the air in front of
him. I’m so happy ’cause I really got a good deal for [my company], even better than I thought.
And I don’t do it, I do it in my car. ‘I got it, I got it’ . . . Same thing when I get hell. I don’t express
all that in front of my customers . . . I get back to my car and say, ‘What a son of a bitch, what
an asshole.’ (Salesperson, industrial, account manager)
Such instances of emotion postponement clearly require emotional labor in that the
agent is manipulating the display if not the experience of emotion for impression man-
agement purposes. As these examples suggest, we speculate that emotion postponement
is most likely to occur if the emotion is potentially overwhelming and is disruptive of the
service encounter and/or contradicts normative expectations. Two interesting questions
that arise are whether such emotions can be postponed indefinitely and whether post-
ponement has similar deleterious effects on psychological and physical health as emo-
tional suppression (Gross and Levenson, 1997; Grandey and Brauburger, 2002).
Fourth, some service agents eschewed surface acting, fearing that – consistent with
experimental and field research (Hess and Kleck, 1990; Grandey, 2003) – it might be per-
ceived as fake:
I’m very careful to extend my sympathy to a family. If I don’t really feel it, then I don’t extend
it. Because the family will detect it immediately that what you’re saying you are not feeling. So . . .
it’s best to keep your mouth shut. Just one simple little word, ‘sorry,’ and then we go on with the
arrangements . . . If it’s not coming from the heart, don’t say it. (Funeral director)
It should be noted, however, that many (if not most) service agents do not have the luxury
of avoiding surface acting, regardless of their personal qualms about its inauthenticity.
Ironically, deep acting did not appear to arouse similar qualms about faking, even
though it takes more effort to muster than surface acting. This is likely because deep
acting is directed at summoning the actual emotion such that the expression is genuine,
even if the stimulus is contrived.
Fifth, the literature portrays surface and deep acting as effortful, as service agents con-
sciously labor to display or summon the required emotions. However, we found indica-
tions that even if a service agent was aware of the need to display certain emotions that
were not currently felt, the resulting surface or deep acting may have been experienced as
relatively effortless:
When I deal with a patient, I know that I have to be warm and put on my smile. And that relaxes
them – [but] it’s second nature. I don’t have to think, ‘Now put on your smile and now do this.’
It just becomes part of me. (Medical technologist)
Usually, if I’m in a bad mood and somebody comes, I’ll just start talking and I’ll start to forget
about my problems – I’ll get right back into the interviews. (Dietician)
Indeed, the data suggest that individuals may spontaneously and nonconsciously feel the
emotions they are expected to portray (Ashforth and Humphrey, 1993; Diefendorff et al.,
2005):
Q: So when you’re doing a normal [hockey] game and something happens and you’ve got to
project anger – or sternness, anyway – to a player, are you actually feeling what it sounds like
you’re feeling? Or is it a bit of play-acting?
A: . . . If I see a penalty and if it’s a severe penalty, I’m somewhat outraged myself that I see this
player committing this infraction or another. So when I speak to him, I’ll speak to him in a stern
voice and I think it’s very much part of what I’m feeling at that point. (Hockey referee)
This finding that surface and deep acting may not be particularly effortful has interest-
ing implications. First, it suggests that the association between emotional labor and
burnout may not be as strong as frequently hypothesized (Pugliesi, 1999; Brotheridge and
Grandey, 2002) – at least among individuals who habitually find emotional labor easy.
Second, it raises questions about how individuals render emotional labor relatively
effortless. Is it a matter of individual differences (e.g., emotional adaptability, Schaubroeck
and Jones, 2000)? Of developing more or less nonconscious routines or cognitive scripts
for cuing and enacting emotional labor (Humphrey and Ashforth, 1994; Tansik and Smith,
2000)? Of internalizing display rules such that emotional labor ‘feels’ natural and relatively
effortless? We speculate that the answer is a combination of all three.
Emotional labor over time In a similar vein, interviewees generally reported that per-
forming emotional labor had become easier with the passage of time:
Q: Is it easier for you to express emotion now than before?
A: Yes, it’s easier. Experience of life makes everything easier. You understand more what is a
pain, what is a joy. When somebody’s sick, you can understand more what it is to feel sick than
before. When you’re young, you think you know but you really don’t know. If you see somebody
that’s in a wheelchair in front of you when you’re 20, you think, ‘Oh, poor person.’ But when
you’re 40, you feel all the limits that goes with that . . . You can see all the different aspects of
her life. This is why your emotions are more sensitive. But, in the same way, you cannot put your
emotion on the person when you read somebody. You have to use those emotions in order to
understand the person. (Psychic)
Q: Do you find it easier to express appropriate or expected emotions now than when you first
started?
A: Again, it’s familiarity. It’s the confidence. It’s the time element. I’m 10 years with the [dental]
practice and the people so, yes, I would say yes. I’m not as withdrawn. I’m not as inhibited. I feel
very much more open. (Receptionist, dental clinic)
To the earlier list of possible reasons why emotional labor was seemingly effortless for
some, we can add one more. As the quotes from the psychic and receptionist suggest, work
experience and maturation seemed to impart an emotional grounding, deep knowledge of
and ready empathy for clients, and confidence in one’s ability to perform emotional labor.
This visceral understanding of one’s clients and one’s capacity to fulfill the service role
appears to facilitate emotional labor.
Emotional contagion
Our research questions concerning emotional contagion centered on agents’ awareness of
the phenomenon. As noted, emotional contagion is typically discussed in the literature as
an automatic and nonconscious process. However, our data suggest that individuals are
generally aware of emotional contagion. When asked if they tended to catch the emotions
of their clients, roughly three-quarters answered ‘yes’ (40 of 53; given the semi-structured
nature of the interviews, not everyone was directly asked the question and not all of those
who were asked actually answered it clearly). Emotional contagion thus appears to be
prevalent, creating both virtuous circles (usually in the case of positive emotions) and
vicious circles (usually in the case of negative ones):
Some people – like if they’re really in a good mood, you’ll go ‘wow’; you’ll really catch their vibes
and be in a better mood . . . uplifted . . . Sometimes you’ll come into work and you’re in a shitty
mood. Then you’ll have some customers that come in and they’re really nice and they joke
around with you and they lift you up and – kaboom! – you leave work and you’re in a good mood.
(Waitress)
Part of getting well and feeling well and feeling positive about yourself definitely relates to how
you feel about the person who’s dispensing that [dental] treatment to you. And it rubs off on you,
there’s a certain synergy there . . . If I stand near a person or I sit near someone and if they’re
very nervous, I get more apprehensive because the patient is apprehensive. And I’m not able to
calm them down, so I’m getting uptight and now they’re uptight and they’re getting more uptight
because they sense in your jerky motions and in your abrupt speech and – whatever it is that’s
happening, they’re getting negative body language and it’s going back and forth. (Dentist 1)
Further, consistent with our earlier discussion of emotional labor, some agents added
that contagion may spill over onto other service encounters:
Q: [in response to a statement that the interviewee takes on customers’ emotions] Which emo-
tions do you tend to take on – the positive or the negative?
A: The negative emotions. It happens without you even realizing it . . . you lose your smile – and
this is not fair, because you have another five or six tables that need your attention. (Waiter)
Our data also suggest that not only are agents generally aware of contagion, but they
may attempt to suppress undesired contagion. Another 13 interviewees reported that they
tended to catch positive emotions but not negative ones.3 Further probing revealed that
this was typically a deliberate strategy intended to avoid having the encounter adopt a neg-
ative emotional tone:
One certainly does take on the range of emotions that one is exposed to . . . In the bad news type
of studies [consulting reports] where you’re organizing something, you’ve got the fear of the
clients, you’ve got their anger, you’ve got their apprehension, and so undoubtedly you start
sensing that and it is certainly one of the challenges to realize that, hey, you’re in that environ-
ment, you’ll naturally absorb some of that but to be fully effective you can’t let yourself become
completely dragged into that. (Consultant, management 1)
These data suggest that contagion may be manipulable (Pugh, 2001). Indeed, combin-
ing the concepts of emotional labor and emotional contagion, some interviewees talked
about how they deliberately use emotion – or, more accurately, the display of emotion –
to foster desired emotional responses in their clients. For example, an auctioneer discusses
how he amplifies an existing emotion:
There are emotions that you sense in the room. There’s fear, there’s anger, there’s happiness.
(Q: Among the clients that are buying?) Yeah, and I play on that. (Q: How?) . . . By empathy, I
take the emotions; I even expand the emotion, show more than the real emotion, just to create
another emotion to another person. I think it’s very important.
And a teacher talks about how she suppresses an emotion:
Some days I tend to be ‘go, go, go, go, go,’ and some days I think I need to calm myself down
because it spills off too much onto the kids, and they might get a little hyper. So I have to just
think, ‘Okay, a quiet voice and a small voice is better right now to make them calm.’
Finally, a few interviewees sounded a cautionary note about the potential downside of
contagion:
Q: Do you sometimes feel that you take on the emotions of your customers during an encounter
with them?
A: You feel with them but you cannot carry on their mood. You will possibly find certain events
tragic, but you cannot bring it home and cry for them. You must protect yourself against absorb-
ing all their moods. (Dentist 2)
If they’re upset, then I feel it, I feel their pain. I don’t become upset. I just become empathetic
towards them and I just try to reassure them. If they’re crying or if they’re saddened then it’ll
touch me, because I know what they’re talking about. (Q: Is that okay to be touched if someone’s
sad? Or do you try to put a barrier there?) It is better to put a barrier than to take your work
home with you, to let it affect you that much. Because . . . if you do do that, after a while you
just become desensitized to it . . . You just see it so much it doesn’t affect you as much anymore.
It’s better to not get so personally involved. (Dietician)
Emotional contagion over time Interviewees generally reported that they experienced
contagion less than they used to:
Q: We talked about . . . taking on the emotions of customers. Do you feel that you do that now
more or less than when you first started?
A: A little bit less in the sense of the negative ones. About the same as the positive ones. Because
I do develop a little bit of a thicker skin. You’re able to put a little more in perspective, like ‘Well,
they’re having a bad day, I won’t let them do it to me.’ (Salesperson, retail, clothing 2)
Q: You talked about taking on the emotions of customers. Do you think you do this more or less
now than when you first started?
A: Probably a lot less. (Q: Why . . .?) . . . When I first started, it was an emergency to the
client and they were calling in a panic that everything is all wrong . . . You have a natural ten-
dency to think, ‘Oh my God, we have to change, we have to do this, we have to do that’ . . . I
probably now have much more confidence in what I’m doing that something truly isn’t an
emergency. I’m not going to kind of start doubting why we did something. (Consultant,
management 2)
As discussed for emotional labor, the accumulation of experience appears to enable

service agents to put a client’s emotional state in perspective. The agents have greater
confidence in their own abilities and are able to distance themselves from their clients’
more disruptive emotions.
Of interest, however, are two exceptions:
Q: We talked about taking on the emotions of the customers. Do you think that you do this more
or less now than when you first started?
A: More is empathy, now. Whereas before, being 20 years old and doing it, you don’t know what
they need . . . So . . . you pick up on it, you understand their situation. You can relate to it a lot.
(Daycare worker)
Q: Now we talked about taking on the emotions of your patients. Do you think that you do this
more or less now?
A: I do it more . . . Why? Because I feel more confident. I’ve encountered so many patients during
my 31 years. I know more about people psychology. I understand more about the situations of
life. (Nurse 2)
Like the salesperson and consultant above, the daycare worker and nurse believe that
experience has enabled them to better understand their clients. However, rather than use
this knowledge to buffer themselves from clients’ emotions, they appear to use it as a
means of connecting with clients, empathically reading their needs. Thus, it seems that
client emotions can lead to polar responses; crudely put, to either approach or avoid these
emotions. We speculate that two factors are largely responsible for approach/avoidance
tendencies. First, as the examples suggest, agents are likely to approach positive emotions
and avoid negative ones. Second, given that socialization in emotionally demanding occu-
pations often encourages service agents to evince only detached concern for clients
(Harris, 2002), individual differences in the willingness and ability to engage in empathy
may affect approach/avoidance tendencies. For example, Yanay and Shahar (1998)
describe how, in the absence of explicit socialization in a residential psychiatric facility,
some counselors gravitated toward detached concern whereas others gravitated toward
emotional involvement with the residents.
Discussion
Scholarly interest in emotions in organizational life has escalated during the last 15 years.
Of particular interest is the role of emotions in service encounters, given that expressions –
if not the actual experience – of emotion constitute a significant job requirement for most
service agents. Regarding emotional labor, our data suggested that: many instances of
surface and deep acting were prompted not by the service encounter itself, but by spillover
from other roles, clients, and situations; emotional labor is more than a reactive and static
means of mirroring clients’ expectations, it is often used proactively and dynamically to
regulate client emotions and behaviors; deep acting was often accomplished through ‘role
taking’, where the agent puts him- or herself in the shoes of the client; some agents
engaged in ‘emotion postponement’, where the experience of emotions that might inter-
fere with the service encounter was literally deferred until later; although deep acting gen-
erally requires more short-term psychological effort than surface acting, some agents
eschewed the latter to avoid appearing fake; emotional labor is not always effortful, as
agents may easily and even nonconsciously engage in it; and emotional labor generally
becomes less effortful over time.
The finding that emotional labor is often proactive is especially intriguing. The liter-
ature often portrays emotional labor as an imposition, as a psychologically intrusive
job requirement that threatens the integrity of the self (Hochschild, 1983; Van Maanen,
1991). The service agent is implicitly viewed as reactively acquiescing with display rules.
In contrast, the notion of proactivity suggests that at least some service agents may use
emotional labor: (i) to preemptively control service encounters, steering the direction
and emotional tone of the interaction, (ii) to resist the definition of themselves as ser-
vants at the beck and call of management and clients, and (iii) to personalize encoun-
ters, giving them a unique stamp and thus asserting authorship of the encounter
(Paules, 1991; Tolich, 1993). This argument is consistent with research indicating
that the deleterious effects of emotional labor are mitigated by autonomy (Wharton,
1993; Leidner, 1999). Given that proactivity can be used to either facilitate or under-
mine organizational service objectives, future research should focus on the situational
and individual factors that predict each scenario and on how proactivity plays out in
each.
Regarding emotional contagion, we found that: although contagion is usually

described as a nonconscious phenomenon, service agents were generally aware of conta-
gion occurring; some agents deliberately suppressed the occurrence of unwanted conta-
gion in themselves, and others deliberately used emotional labor to create desired
contagion among their clients; contagion could cause emotions to spill over onto other
service encounters; and, over time, agents used their accumulated knowledge of clients to
‘approach or avoid’ clients’ emotions.
The attempts to suppress some emotional contagion while fanning the flames of other
emotions suggest that contagion may have both negative and positive effects on service
agents and service encounters (Barsade, 2002; Strazdins, 2002). On the negative side, con-
tagion may induce agents to become ‘swept up in the moment’ and lose their role-based
perspective (Miller et al., 1988). Indeed, contagion may trigger vicious circles – particu-
larly for negative emotions such as anger – where the initial cause of the emotion becomes
secondary to the intensity of the emotion such that the service encounter degenerates
(Andersson and Pearson, 1999). In the long run, emotional contagion – again, particu-
larly for negative emotions – may foster emotional exhaustion (Bakker et al., 2001;
Le Blanc et al., 2001). These negative outcomes may be one reason why, as noted, social-
ization in emotionally demanding jobs often encourages service agents to assume a
detached concern for clients. On the positive side, emotional contagion – particularly for
positive emotions such as joy – may foster a virtuous circle where the emotions are expe-
rienced as pleasurable in themselves and facilitate rapport, entrainment, and a personal-
ized bond between agent and client. The upshot may be mutual satisfaction with each
other and the encounter, and these positive feelings may generalize to the organization as
a whole, leading to organizational commitment from the agent and continued patronage
from the client (e.g., Tolich, 1993). Thus, future research should attempt to sort out under
what conditions emotional contagion is desirable versus undesirable and determine the
psychological and behavioral means used to either suppress or fan emotional contagion.
Further, research might investigate the role of clients in contagion processes: to what
extent are they also aware of contagion and attempt to manipulate it (e.g., instilling a good
mood or flirting to get a better deal)? How does emotional contagion affect customer eval-
uations of service (Tomiuk, 2000; Tan et al., 2004)? How do emotional contagion and
more cognitively laden emotion processes serve to sustain or disrupt rapport and mutual
entrainment during the service encounter?
Linking our two topics together, the proactive use of emotional labor to influence
service encounters and the conscious use of contagion processes to suppress undesired
emotions and inflame desired ones suggests that service agents are far more than passive
rule followers. In closing, ‘doing emotion’ is provocative because we usually think of
emotions as spontaneous and unstructured, as resistant to ‘doing’. However, the expe-
rience and perceived quality of service encounters depends precisely on that doing – on
offering convincing displays of normative emotions. The present study offers some pre-
liminary suggestions regarding how service agents go about doing emotion during
service encounters.
Notes
* We thank Blair Templeton for conducting some of the interviews, and Alicia Grandey and Karen Myers for
their very helpful comments on an earlier draft. This study was funded by grants from the Dean’s Award of
Excellence Program, W.P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University, and the Social Sciences and
Humanities Research Council of Canada (410-96-0770).
1. Interviewees spontaneously mentioned surface acting more often than deep acting. This disparity may have
occurred because surface acting is simply more common, given that it tends to take less psychological effort
than deep acting (although, in the longer term, the dissonance associated with surface acting may have
greater deleterious effects; e.g., Brotheridge and Grandey, 2002; Grandey, 2003). It may also have occurred
because of the interview protocol. Discussions of surface and deep acting were often prompted by a ques-
tion about whether one had to be ‘a good actor’ to be in one’s profession: the word ‘actor’ more likely primed
thoughts about faking (surface acting) than about actively shaping (deep acting) one’s emotions.
2. The number denotes that more than one individual with the same job title will be quoted in the chapter.
3. Several other interviewees reported that they were more likely to catch strong emotions than weak emotions
and that they were more likely to catch the emotion if they knew the client well.
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21 Emotions as social entities: interpersonal
functions and effects of emotion in organizations
Shlomo Hareli, Anat Rafaeli and Brian Parkinson
Introduction
The field of organizational behavior has undergone an ‘affective revolution’ (Barsade
et al., 2003), with growing interest in the functions and influence of emotions in different
organizational contexts (Ashkanasy et al., 2000; Fineman, 2000; Brief & Weiss, 2002;
Lord et al., 2002). More and more, emotions are recognized as relevant to organizational
life on multiple levels and in different contexts, including interactions between individuals
(Rafaeli & Worline, 2001) and between or within groups (Kelly & Barsade, 2001; Bartel
& Saavedra, 2000) and organizations (Huy, 1999).
Studies of emotion in organizations have focused primarily on the antecedents and con-
sequences of affective reactions. A notable example of this trend is the idea of ‘affective
events theory’ (AET) suggested by Weiss and Cropanzano (1996) and followed up in sub-
sequent research (e.g., Fisher, 2002; Grandey et al., 2002). The underlying logic of AET is
that emotions influence behavior, so that the emotions experienced by an individual while
performing a particular task influence that individual’s performance in subsequent tasks.
In line with AET, scholars have considered the influence of individual affect on different
aspects such as behavior, motivation, creativity, and interpersonal judgments (Forgas &
George, 2001). Work on group emotion similarly suggests that the emotional tone within
a group is critical to the performance of individual group members and of the group as a
whole (Bartel & Saavedra, 2000; Kelly & Barsade, 2001; Barsade, 2002). Likewise, Huy’s
(1999) analyses connect organization-level affect to successful organizational change.
These lines of research, for the most part, share a focus on how people’s emotions shape
their behavior, whether from the perspective of the individual alone or as part of a group.
Emotions as social entities

In recent years, however, there is a growing understanding that emotions serve significant
social functions (e.g., Parkinson et al., 2005). In line with this idea, Oatley (2000) proposed
three basic social goals motivating the human activities that underlie emotions: affiliation,
protection and dominance. Emotional reactions are designed to further these goals, with
each particular emotion occupying a different ‘location’ within the space of coordinates
defined by the associated goal dimensions. Thus, for example, happiness reflects the goal
of affiliation while anger reflects the goal of domination. In contrast, fear and shame rep-
resent loss of dominance. These emotions in turn motivate behaviors intended to achieve
their corresponding goals. Leary (2000) has also suggested that specific types of emotions,
serve specific social goals. He proposed two subsets of emotions that serve such goals:
social–evaluative emotions and social–relational emotions. While social–evaluative emo-
tions have to do with how people feel about others, social–relational emotions can be seen
as emotional reactions to others’ affective reactions to oneself.
349
Others have pointed out the social communicative function of emotions. For example,
Barrett and Nelson-Goens (1997) suggest that emotions serve as social signals to others
and Parkinson et al. (2005) similarly suggest that many emotions serve interpersonal func-
tions mostly by affecting others’ reactions. For example, sadness often solicits social
support, and embarrassment deflects undue attention from someone else (Keltner &
Buswell, 1997). This view broadens the focus of attention from the effect that emotions
have on individuals experiencing the emotions, to their relations with others and their
social surroundings. Among other things it suggests that others who register another’s
emotions may be affected in various ways. In line with this social view of emotions, this
chapter embraces a perspective that considers emotions (and particularly emotions in
organizations) as ‘social entities’ (Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987; Parkinson, 1996;
Parkinson et al., 2005). That is, we view emotions as active processes shaping the unfold-
ing of organizational interactions and their consequences. Our point of departure from
more traditional work is that the emotions of an actor (a focal person) have context-
bound manifestations that are perceivable by, of relevance to, and, potentially, a source
of influence over other people (observers or target persons) (Izard, 1971; Ekman, 1975;
Fridlund, 1994).
Emotions are communicated to, and perceived by, others during social interaction
(Fridlund, 1991; Rimé et al., 1998, 1991). As such, emotions are seen as influencing
others partly by conveying information about the situation of the individual and his/her
behavioral intentions (Izard, 1971; Ekman et al., 1972; Fridlund, 1994). Perceivers are
highly sensitive to others’ emotions and extract meaning from them with relatively low
cognitive effort (Calder et al., 1996). However, emotions not only convey information
about a person’s authentic psychological situation but are also used as a strategic and
sometimes deceptive means of social influence (Fridlund, 1994). Thus intrapersonal and
interpersonal regulation of emotion presentations always needs to be factored in to our
explanations.
Our goal in this chapter is to review some available insights from existing research and
to propose a framework for the understanding and analysis of the social dynamics of
emotions in organizations as outlined above. We suggest that emotions can shape and
structure the emergent unfolding patterns of social interactions. Thus our analysis exam-
ines the dynamic functional operation of emotions in organizational interactions by ref-
erence to previous research into the cognitive, emotional and behavioral consequences of
perceiving other people’s emotions. Those who are influenced by perceived emotion may
be direct targets of an emotional communication, people with compatible relations to the
object of the emotion (e.g., by virtue of their social identity or work role), or simply unin-
volved observers. In each case registering emotion-related movements in context may
impact on ongoing response in a number of ways and at a number of levels. Our analysis
is intended not only to offer an overview of current understandings of these important
functions of emotions in organizations but also to serve as a scaffold for future research.
Perception of emotions in the workplace: a short historical note

As claimed above, emotions displayed by one person can communicate important infor-
mation to others (see also Parkinson et al., 2005). Organizational research into this func-
tion of emotions dates back to work on emotional labor (Hochschild, 1983), which
originally explored how emotions displayed by individuals as part of their work roles can
Emotions as social entities 351
influence other people’s perceptions and responses (e.g., Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987, 1989).
The primary focus of this line of research fell on how displays of emotion are used to
influence others so as to promote organizational goals, such as increased customer satis-
faction (Sutton & Rafaeli, 1988) or compliance (Rafaeli & Sutton, 1991). However, subse-
quent research into emotional labor has given more attention to underlying psychological
processes, and to the consequences of generating organizationally approved emotions
using either surface or deep acting (Grandey, 2003).
More recently, there has been a renewed focus on the social consequences of emotion
displays. For example, Côté (2005) suggested that emotions presented by a focal person
are subject to interpretation and feedback by partners to the social interaction, thereby
creating a bi-directional social process (Weick, 1979). The implication is that observation
of others’ emotions can have extensive implications across a wide range of social and
organizational situations that do not relate directly to emotional labor. The following
section reviews examples of several studies that have assessed the ways in which witness-
ing others’ emotions affects observers.
Perception of emotions in the workplace

In this section, we focus particularly on organizationally based emotional interactions
relating to achievements (i.e., successes and failures), consumers’ complaints, and nego-
tiations. Consideration of these three kinds of affective event allows us to sample from a
relatively broad spectrum of organizational contexts. Not only does this help to illustrate
the richness and complexity of the phenomena under investigation, but also it permits
assessment of how various aspects of the organizational and social setting might mod-
erate the interpersonal effects of exposure to displayed emotions. For example, we can
compare interactions between people formally belonging to the same organization (e.g.,
a manager and his/her employee) with interactions between people who are not members
of the same organization (e.g., a service agent and a customer). In addition, the chapter
examines cases in which the observer is one of the interacting parties as well as cases in
which the observer is not personally involved in the interaction. Where relevant, we also
consider additional factors that may interact with these dimensions. For example, cul-
tural processes may often be relevant to the operation of emotional influence. Our
general aim is to exemplify the complexity and richness of emotional interaction in orga-
nizations rather than to catalogue the variety of specific effects of different emotion dis-
plays in different organizational contexts. A secondary aim is to take steps toward the
development of explanatory resources. We hope that our discussion will generate further
research into this evolving topic among scientists interested in organizations and emo-
tions.
Organizational achievements
Emotions are experienced in response to significant events (Frijda, 1986; Ortony et al.,
1988; Lazarus, 1991). Achievements are likely to be perceived as significant for interested
parties within an organization including those who helped to bring them about and those
who are affected by their consequences. The nature of these consequences determines the
nature of the emotional responses experienced by those affected. For example, when the
achievement in question is a failure, people associated with the outcome are likely to
experience anger, guilt and shame. In contrast, success tends to lead to pride and happiness.
Such emotions in turn help to shape the subsequent reactions of those experiencing them
(Hareli & Weiner, 2002; Hareli et al., 2005) as well as the reactions of other people who are
exposed to them.
As well as influencing the people experiencing them, emotional responses to achieve-
ments can also affect other people who are exposed to them. Various judgments about,
and behaviors toward achievers are shaped by the emotions that are shown following a
success or failure. For example, displays of emotions such as anger, guilt and sadness can
determine the extent to which individuals associated with an organizational or personal
failure are regarded by observers as bearing blame, and the degree to which they are seen
as competent. In particular, Tiedens et al. (2000) found that employees displaying anger
following an organizational failure were seen as less responsible for the failure and as more
competent and dominant more generally than employees displaying sadness in the same
situation. Correspondingly, displays of pride following a success led to perceptions of
greater dominance than displays of appreciation. Thus, observers seem to make different
social judgments about individuals associated with a given achievement based on the way
these individuals respond emotionally.
In Tiedens et al.’s study, observers were simply witnesses of emotional responses to
achievement and had no direct link with the judged employee. In practice, other
members of the organization are often more closely involved in the achievement or its
implications. For example, they may be required to make judgments about the factors
contributing to the achievement or about its consequences for the organization and its
employees. Such observers may even have the power to determine the fate of the suc-
cessful or unsuccessful employees. This raises the question of whether emotional
responses of succeeding or failing employees exert comparable effects under these cir-
cumstances. In response to this question, Hareli and Shomrat (work in progress) asked
participants with managerial experience to assume the role of a manager interrogating
a failing employee. Participants were shown a video recording of an employee explain-
ing how a failure he was associated with had happened. In different versions of the
video, the employee presented identical explanations in contrasting emotional tones. It
was found that managers were more likely to discount explanations made in anger than
non-emotional explanations. Thus, anger seemed to decrease the perceived credibility of
the message. In addition, managers expressed greater reluctance to promote employees
who displayed either anger or shame than employees displaying no particular emotion.
This may suggest that when subordinates are evaluated by people with power over them,
decisions about changes of status such as promotion are affected by signals that bear on
the current status of the subordinates (e.g., anger as a signal of dominance, and shame
as a signal of submissiveness, Tiedens, 2001). Overall, this study suggests that manage-
rial decisions about employees can be influenced by their perceived emotional responses
to a specific failure.
Similar decisions may also be affected by reported emotional reactions to unrelated
achievements in different contexts. Two studies have assessed observers’ judgments of the
promotion chances of failing employees as a function of how these employees felt fol-
lowing a past failure. In the first study, Prat (2003) found that observers judged promo-
tion chances of employees feeling anger following failure to be higher than the chances of
employees feeling guilt in the same context. In the second, Rafaeli et al. (2006a) found that
cultural norms also affected this kind of promotion judgment. In their study, observers
from an individualistic society (Israel) judged employees who felt angry following failure
as more likely to be promoted by others than employees who felt guilty. However, this
differential judgment did not apply when they were asked to make similar decisions them-
selves. In contrast, collectivistic observers (Singaporeans) judged that the guilty employ-
ees were more likely to be promoted than the angry ones both by themselves and by others.
Thus, the relative evaluative implications of different emotions depend not only on culture
but also on the perspective from which the judgment is made.
Other kinds of organizational decisions also seem to be affected by perceived emotional
reactions. For example, Tiedens (2001) had observers watch a job interview in which an
employee was telling the interviewer how he felt following a failure in his previous job.
Observers then had to make decisions concerning the hiring of this employee and his
salary and status if hired (i.e., rank in the organization, level of independence in the job
and power). Although observers preferred to hire candidates reporting sadness following
the failure over employees reporting anger, higher status and salary were still recom-
mended for the angry employees if they were to be hired. Despite observers’ apparent
reluctance to make positive hiring decisions concerning employees who reported anger
following a failure, then, they nevertheless believed that they should get a better rank and
salary than the employees reporting feeling sad. This seeming discrepancy between hiring
decisions, on one hand, and status and salary decisions on the other can be explained by
the stereotypical connection between expressed emotions and power. Given that angry
individuals are seen as more dominant than sad ones (ibid.), their potential for being per-
ceived as ‘trouble makers’ may also seem higher, explaining the reluctance to hire them.
However, once hired, the same stereotype might encourage giving them higher status and
salary to prevent them from asserting their perceived ‘rights’.
Another study mentioned above, however, showed that managers are less willing to
promote employees expressing anger following failure (Hareli & Shomrat, work in
progress). The potential for trouble from assertive employees may increase with actual
status and hence observers may be reluctant to promote angry employees if and when they
fail. Recall that Hareli and Shomrat found that failing employees expressing shame were
also less likely to be promoted, unlike failing employees who felt sad or guilty as shown
in other studies. This may be explained by beliefs shared by observers concerning the link
between shame, guilt, sadness and ability. While shame reflects acknowledgment of inad-
equate abilities, guilt implies that one’s performance has fallen short of one’s abilities
(Hareli et al., 2005). Sadness, in contrast, does not carry direct implications about one’s
abilities. This is presumably why employees expressing shame in the context of a failure
have less chance of being promoted than employees expressing guilt or sadness.
Finally, other discussions have considered three-person situations, in which individuals
draw inferences regarding someone else based on observations of the emotion displayed
by a third person following an achievement-related outcome. For example, Weiner (2005)
describes situations in which the emotions conveyed by a supervisor belied his or her
verbal description of a subordinate’s performance. People observing a supervisor who
showed anger while describing above-average performance by the subordinate concluded
that the supervisor considered the subordinate to have high skills and low motivation. In
contrast, expressions of satisfaction with merely average performance were interpreted as
suggesting that the subordinate invested a great deal of effort and thus overcame low
ability.
Overall, this brief review shows that observers’ decisions and judgments concerning
failing or succeeding employees are strongly affected by awareness of these employees’
feelings about the achievement. The impact of expressed emotion is not only determined
by its specific nature but is also sensitive to other contextual factors such as the perspec-
tive from which the decision or judgment is made and cultural norms. Also, information
about another’s emotional experience may often have similar effects on observers to direct
exposure to their expression in real time.
Customer complaints
When service providers or products fail to live up to expectations, customers are likely to
feel dissatisfaction and complain (Oliver & Swan, 1989). A complaint is best viewed as a
means of letting others know that one is dissatisfied with a given situation (Fornell &
Westbrook, 1979; Kowalski, 1996). Often the goal of such a complaint is not only to com-
municate this dissatisfaction but also to call for remedial action (Stephens & Gwinner,
1998). From the perspective of the organization, an encounter with a complaining cus-
tomer may present an opportunity to restore the relationship with that customer and to
gain important feedback about service performance.
Encounters between complaining customers and service agents often involve strong
emotions being experienced and expressed by both sides. Each side may modulate his or
her emotional reaction in response to the emotions displayed by the other. In line with
this assertion, some recent work has linked customers’ expressed emotions while voicing
a complaint to the behaviors and reactions of customer service agents. In Hareli et al.’s
(2006) study, it was found that the perceived validity of a complaint (i.e., is there really
something to complain about?) was enhanced when the complaint was voiced in an angry
tone rather than in a neutral or affiliative tone. Emotional tone also affected the service
agent’s decisions about appropriate organizational response with angry complaints
leading to recommendation of higher levels of compensation when factual information
about the complaint’s legitimacy was ambiguous. However, anger associated with clearly
legitimate complaints seemed to lead to overjustification and an impression of ‘bullying’.
Overall, the results suggest that expressions of anger affect the credibility of the com-
plainant. When it is unclear whether the complaint is legitimate, anger increases the com-
plainant’s credibility and hence leads to higher compensation. However, when the factual
complaint itself leaves room for doubt, an angry tone reduces the customer’s credibility
and the level of compensation recommended by the service agent.
Other research has documented the more subtle effects that emotions accompanying
complaints may have on service agents that are the targets of these emotions. Rafaeli et al.
(2006b) showed that the ability of service agents to recall details of complaints voiced
by angry complainants was reduced relative to complaints made in a pleasant tone.
Further, their subsequent ability to solve problems was also diminished. This research
indicates that exposure to customers’ emotional complaints not only affects service
agents’ immediate decisions but also impacts on their subsequent ability to process rele-
vant information.
Of course, complaints about products and services involve transmission of emotion not
only from customers to service workers but also from service workers to customers (and
back again). Expressions of affect by customer service workers have been shown to
influence customers’ evaluations of overall service quality, with expressions of negative
affect associated with negative evaluations (Doucet, 2004) and positive affect associated
with positive evaluations (Pugh, 2001). Thus, emotional information conveyed during the
process of voicing a complaint and its handling by the parties involved can determine the
outcome of this process on several different levels.
Negotiations
Emotional expressions can also influence the course of negotiations in organizations. For
example, Carnevale and Isen (1986) argued that positive affect facilitates the discovery of
integrative solutions in bilateral negotiations. More recent research suggests that the
social effects of any given emotion are not unitary across different negotiation situations
but instead depend on contextual factors. Van Kleef et al. (2004a) examined the effects of
others’ anger and happiness on the outcomes of negotiations about a cellular phone con-
tract. Participants conceded more to an angry opponent than to a happy one, an effect
the researchers attributed to tracking – that is, using the emotions expressed by an oppo-
nent to infer his or her limits. Communication of anger (in contrast to happiness) by focal
persons induced fear and lowered the target persons’ demands.
In a second set of experiments (Van Kleef et al., 2004b), the same investigators refined
these findings, showing that negotiating parties were affected by the emotions of others
only under low rather than high time pressure. In addition, those of lower status or power
were more influenced by the emotions of their more-powerful opponents than the other
way around. The authors suggest that only negotiators motivated to consider their oppo-
nent’s expressed emotions are affected by them. Kopelman et al. (2006) also examined the
effects of displayed emotion in a negotiation situation, in this case between a condo-
minium developer and a carpentry contractor. In this context they found that displays of
positive as opposed to negative or neutral emotions on the part of the contractor were
more likely to lead to a future business relationship. This effect was mediated by the devel-
oper’s willingness to pay more to a negotiator who strategically displayed positive rather
than negative emotions.
Thus in negotiations too, the dynamics of the exchange of opinions and the impact of
this exchange is partly determined by the emotions expressed by the interacting negotiators.
Emotions as social entities in organizational interactions

As this brief and non-exhaustive review suggests, exposure to the emotions of others
impacts on observers at various levels and in numerous contexts within the organizational
environment. Observers’ responses to others’ emotions clearly depend not only on the
valence of those emotions but also on their more specific quality. For example, a failing
individual’s expression of anger exerts a different effect on an observer from his or her
expression of guilt or sadness, although all of these emotions are negative. The question
then is what determines the specific nature of interpersonal reactions to different emo-
tions? What aspects of one particular emotion lead to it exerting a different effect on
someone else from another emotion expressed in an otherwise similar situation?
The answer to these questions lies in the informational meaning encapsulated by each
particular variety of emotion. According to appraisal theories, particular emotions differ
from one another by the ‘story they tell’. That is, each distinct emotion embodies a par-
ticular theme reflecting the way the individual sees his/her relation with the environment
in a given situation. This idea is most explicitly reflected in the notion of core relational
themes suggested by Lazarus (1991). Thus, for example, Lazarus (p. 122) identifies ‘a
demeaning offense against me and mine’ as the core relational theme for anger and ‘facing
an immediate, concrete, and overwhelming physical danger’ as the core relational theme
for fright. Other appraisal theories share a similar view focusing on dimensions describ-
ing the person–environment relationship implied by each type of emotion (e.g., Roseman,
1984; Weiner, 1985).
Research into appraisal indicates that people share beliefs about the relationships
between emotions and the themes that they incorporate (e.g., Scherer, 1984; Smith &
Ellsworth, 1985) and make use of it as observers and interpreters of others’ emotions
(Weiner, 1995, 2005; Tiedens et al., 2000). From this point of view, emotions can be seen
as messages potentially transmitted to others who interpret them according to the themes
or person–environment relationships typical of the particular emotion that is perceived.
As our review above suggests, observers infer much more from expressed emotions than
such an analysis would suggest. For example, while sadness ‘tells a story’ about a painful
loss, observers of sadness following failure infer not only the pain of the failure-related
loss itself but also implications concerning the failing individual’s view of him- or herself
as having low competence, as lacking dominance and so on (Tiedens et al., 2000). The
question then is how observers make a variety of judgments about a specific individual
experiencing a certain emotion that go beyond the characteristic theme of that emotion.
Part of the answer is that people have access to knowledge about the relations between
particular emotions and other factors such as actions tendencies typical of each emotion
(Frijda, 1986; Frijda et al., 1989) and norms of expressing emotions (Eid & Diener, 2001).
Such knowledge also shapes interpretations of emotional expressions and the resulting
social judgments made by observers of such emotions. In particular, observers use their
implicit schemas about relationships between emotions and other factors to make all the
inferences in question. Thus, an emotion can be seen to convey a message incorporating
a set of different meanings.
In concordance with this idea, Kirouac and Hess (1999) distinguished three types of
meanings inherent in an emotional message: ‘symbolic’, ‘symptomatic’, and ‘appeal’. The
symbolic meaning of an emotion is the semantic information directed at the observer. The
symptomatic meaning refers to information about the individual feeling or displaying
the emotion. The appeal meaning suggests pragmatic information about the intended
actions of the target person (the perceiver). For example, an expression of sadness might
convey to others that the focal person has experienced an irreversible loss (Lazarus, 1991).
This would represent the symbolic meaning of the emotional message. Sadness also
reflects the psychological state of the individual, in this case, experiencing pain following
an irreversible loss. This would represent the symptomatic meaning of the message.
Finally, sadness also tells others what the person experiencing the emotion might do. S/he
may call for help or comfort. This would represent the appeal meaning of the emotion.
Each emotion conveys meanings in each of these ways and each kind of meaning is poten-
tially readable by perceivers.
However, the process of interpreting emotional messages may be more complicated
than this analysis suggests because emotion interpretations do not arise in a contextual
vacuum. Indeed, the same emotional expression may be interpreted differently depending
on the circumstances under which an encounter takes place. As the review above indi-
cated, contextual factors such as the culture, the perspective from which a judgment is
made, and the type of relations between parties to an encounter may each shape the inter-
pretation of the informational-determining judgments, beliefs and actions toward an
emotional target person. Current research is still far from understanding the details of
how these inferences might be constructed.
As is clear from this analysis, exposure to another’s emotions influences observers in
many different ways and on many different levels. First, the way an observer ‘sees things’
can be shaped dramatically by the emotions of a focal person as reflected in reported
beliefs, judgments and perceptions. Observers, however, not only ‘change their minds’ in
response to others’ emotional displays but also shape their behaviors toward these others
as evidenced by decisions relating to hiring, promotion and so on. Finally, not only the
content of observers’ minds is changed as a function of the displayed emotions of others
but also the way minds function. For example, the ability of service agents to recall details
of complaints and the tendency of negotiators to find more or less integrative solutions
in bilateral negotiations are both substantially influenced by emotions expressed by others
during the social interactions in question. Such effects, however, indicate that displays of
emotions affect not only others’ cognition and behavior but also their own emotions, just
as changes in cognitive functioning have been shown to be affected by people’s own
emotions (Carnevale & Isen, 1986).
In sum, exposure to others’ emotions in organizational interactions seems to play an
important role in determining the way such interactions unfold. Research is only begin-
ning to explore the dynamics of this phenomenon and to uncover the mechanisms that
are involved. A perspective that sees emotions not only as something that happens in a
person’s mind but also as something that occurs in a social interaction seems to open new
avenues for research into the function of emotions in organizations. Emotions shape orga-
nizational interactions in many different and complex ways that are yet to be discovered.
We hope that this chapter will increase the appetite of researchers to further examine this
important role of emotions.
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22 Affect and justice: current knowledge and future
directions
Yochi Cohen-Charash and Zinta S. Byrne
Introduction
Organizational justice and affect are major constructs that have been studied in the work-
place context, each having important organizational and personal implications. Although
it appears that most research examines justice and affect separately, there has been recent
progress toward studying both constructs simultaneously. The findings from these studies
show that the relationships between justice and affect-related variables are strong, yet
complex. Knowledge of how these major constructs interrelate has both theoretical and
practical implications, especially given their role in individual reactions and organiz-
ational procedures. To date, however, there has been no systematic summary of research
co-examining affect and justice. Our goals for this chapter are to close this gap by sum-
marizing the existing literature and research findings on the relationship between justice
and affect, and to identify future directions needed for understanding this relationship.
Our review examines the various roles (i.e., predictor, criterion, mediator, moderator)
that justice and affect play in existing research. This review is first and foremost organized
according to these roles, and when possible, is further delineated by justice types and
affective phenomena within each role.1 This framework allows us to systematically
examine existing research and identify directions for future research that will contribute
to our understanding of how organizational justice and affect operate together or upon
one another. Furthermore, this review serves as a first step toward theory development
regarding these constructs.
Justice and affect

Organizational justice2 researchers have identified three major types of fairness percep-
tions: fairness of outcomes (distributive justice: Deutsch, 1985), fairness of decision-
making procedures (procedural justice: Thibaut & Walker, 1975), and fairness of
treatment (interactional fairness: Bies & Moag, 1986). These justice types have distinct
predictors and implications on various types of organizational phenomena, and overall
have important implications for organizations (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001; Colquitt
et al., 2001). For example, research has shown that individuals demonstrate high levels of
job performance, commitment, job and pay satisfaction, trust, and organizational citi-
zenship behaviors when they feel that the outcomes they receive are fair, decision-making
processes are fair, and that they have been treated fairly. In contrast, when injustice pre-
vails, individuals react with anger, distrust, and feelings of betrayal (Bies, 2001), which
can possibly contribute to revenge and other retaliatory behaviors (e.g., Bies & Tripp,
1996, 2001).
The affective realm examined in the organizational context includes transient affect
(moods and discrete emotions) and affective traits (e.g., negative and positive affectivity.
360
Affect and justice 361
For a review of research on affect in organizations, see Barsade et al., 2003). There are
several differences between moods and emotions (Davidson et al., 1994). The most-
agreed-upon differences are those in duration (moods last longer and are always present;
emotions are short term and experienced less often than moods), intensity (moods are
mild, whereas emotions are intense), specificity (moods are broad categories, most often
of positive and negative mood; there are many emotions and each is different from the
other in terms of eliciting event, meaning to the person, and action tendencies), and elic-
iting event (moods do not have clear eliciting events and often one does not know their
source. In addition, moods are usually not directed at a particular object; emotions have
clear causes and foci).
The two most studied affective traits in the organizational context are positive and neg-
ative affectivity. Positive affectivity (PA) refers to one’s stable disposition to experience fre-
quent episodes of pleasant mood and to be cheerful and enthusiastic. When positive
affectivity is low, individuals are less happy, excited, and lack vigor and confidence
(Watson, 2002). Negative affectivity (NA) is the relatively stable tendency to be distressed,
upset, and to experience a negative view of one’s self and the environment. Individuals
who are low in negative affectivity are relatively satisfied and content with themselves and
their surroundings (Watson & Clark, 1984).
Although the relationship between fairness and emotions has been discussed by social
scientists and philosophers (e.g., Homans, 1961; Rawls, 1971; Solomon, 1989), the inter-
play between justice and emotions in the organizational context has only recently begun
to receive specific attention (e.g., Cropanzano et al., 2000; Harlos & Pinder, 2000; Bies &
Tripp, 2001; Blader & Tyler, 2002; Cohen-Charash & Byrne, 2004). The research examin-
ing these relationships is characterized by a focus on understanding why, how, and when
the relationship between fairness and emotions exists. In this chapter we shall describe and
discuss the extant research.
Affect as an antecedent/predictor of justice judgments

Although we know quite a bit about organizational practices leading to justice percep-
tions, the understanding of affective predictors of justice perceptions is also necessary.
Specifically, the known influence of affect on cognitive processes and behavioral reactions
(e.g., Bower, 1981; Isen & Baron, 1991; Forgas & George, 2001) may affect how individu-
als form perceptions of (in)justice and react to (in)justice. In fact, affect may alter the rela-
tionship between organizational practices and fairness perceptions, as well as the
relationship between fairness perceptions and organizational outcomes. Therefore,
influences that affect has on fairness perceptions could have extensive organizational
implications.
Theoretical rationale for the influence of affect on justice perceptions

The theoretical rationale supporting possible influences of moods and emotions on justice
perceptions can be found in several models that discuss the influence of affect on cogni-
tive processes, as well as in research supporting these theories. One such model is the
affect-as-information model (Schwarz & Clore, 1983), according to which individuals’
affective state may be used as a heuristic cue during judgment formation (Isen et al., 1978).
For example, Schwarz and Clore demonstrated that individuals used their current emo-
tional state to make judgments about their general happiness and life satisfaction.
Moreover according to this model, mood influences people’s motivation to scrutinize

information because different moods signal different messages about the environment.
Specifically, a positive mood suggests to individuals that the environment is safe and that
there is no need to scrutinize contextual information. This positive message of safety leads
to less systematic information processing (Murray et al., 1990; Schwarz, 1990; Bless &
Schwarz, 1999). The reverse holds for when a person is in a negative mood because the
negative mood signals that the environment is not safe or clear, additional scrutiny is
required to understand potential threats and therefore, information processing is more
systematic and involved.3
Applying this theory to the context of fairness suggests that individuals use their current
emotional state (either positive or negative) to determine whether the environment or a
situation is fair (i.e., safe and can be trusted) or unfair (i.e., needs to be scrutinized further).
Scher and Heise (1993) proposed a similar model to affect-as-information in the context
of justice judgments, where emotions influence individuals’ justice judgment of an event.
According to their model, emotions contribute to the decision of whether the event is fair
or unfair. Specifically, they proposed that ‘when people involved in a transaction feel anger
or guilt, and their emotions are not ameliorated, they may decide that the transaction is
unfair or unjust’ (p. 230). Thus, feeling angry during a transaction provides information to
the individual that the situation is unfair. However, the authors clarified that emotions
influences the judgment of fairness along with other contextual factors.
Empirical support for affect as a predictor of justice perceptions

Several studies have examined mood as a predictor of preferences for equity or equality
rules of distributive justice. For example, Sinclair and Mark (1991) proposed that mood
affects justice judgments because (a) being in a positive mood is associated with more egal-
itarianism and less concern for equity than being in a negative mood, and (b) individuals
in positive moods tend to engage in less effortful processing than when in a negative mood,
which lends itself to more egalitarian judgments. These predictions were supported, as
participants in an elated mood endorsed egalitarian or macrojustice principles, as com-
pared to those in a depressed mood. Sinclair and Mark (1992) as well as Inness et al.
(2005) also found that individuals in positive mood prefer equality and those in negative
moods prefer equity rules of justice.
Van den Bos (2003) showed that under some conditions individuals use their emotional
state as input (affect-as-information hypothesis) when forming justice judgments. In par-
ticular, van den Bos found that when individuals are forming distributive and procedural
justice judgments, yet lack all necessary information about distributive and procedural
principles to do so, they use their emotional state as input for their justice judgments.
However, when provided with relevant procedural and distributive justice information to
form a justice judgment, emotional state has no effect on justice judgments.
Byrne et al. (2003) found that individuals in positive moods rated all three forms of fair-
ness (i.e., distributive, procedural, and interactional) significantly higher than those in
negative moods. They confirmed these exploratory findings in a follow-up experiment
(Byrne et al., 2004) in which they examined the influence of emotions rather than moods.
Although their results did not support the proposition that emotions cause participants
to judge a fair event as unfair or vice versa, they did show that similar to moods, emotions
affect justice perceptions.
Whereas the studies described above report on the influence of state affect on justice
perceptions, other studies examined the influence of trait affect on justice perceptions. For
example, Ball et al. (1993, 1994) examined the influence of NA on perceptions of pun-
ishment events. They found that the higher the levels of NA, the more procedurally and
distributively unfair a punishment appeared to be. Importantly though, the effects of NA
on fairness were indirect, mediated through subordinates’ interpretation of the event (i.e.,
perceived level of harshness).
Wanberg et al. (1999) examined the role of NA in predicting justice reactions to a layoff
event. In a longitudinal study, they found that NA was negatively related to fairness per-
ceptions of the layoff, but only among layoff victims who were reemployed at Time 2. For
those still unemployed at Time 2, NA demonstrated no relationship to perceptions of dis-
tributive justice. Also in a longitudinal study, Begley and Lee (2005) found that low NA
individuals showed a larger decline in distributive justice perceptions as the gap between
expected bonus and actual bonus (assessed at Time 2) became larger. Positive affectivity
(PA) was unrelated to bonus reactions.
Taken together, the above findings show that both state and trait affect influence
justice perceptions. However, the nature of these relations is not always clear and bound-
ary conditions exist. Unfortunately, the role of trait PA as a predictor of justice judg-
ments has been examined less. Because there is an asymmetry between the influences of
positive and negative affect (Frijda, 1988; Watson et al., 1988) researchers should
examine state and trait positive and negative affect as predictors of justice perceptions.
Moreover, not many studies have examined the direct effect of discrete emotions on
justice judgments despite the amount of information that discrete emotions provide
when compared to moods (Lazarus & Cohen-Charash, 2001). Therefore, the influence
of discrete emotions on justice perceptions should be examined. We hope that future
studies will take this challenge. Finally, although the research thus far shows that state
and trait affect influences preferences for justice rules and the perceptions of justice, we
need research that will enable us to understand the underlying process behind the
influence of affect on justice perceptions. For a summary of studies reviewed in this
section, see Table 22.1.
Justice as a predictor of moods and emotions

The majority of studies examining the relationship between justice and affect look at
justice as a predictor of affective reactions. Emotion-focused theories that are used as
anchors for studies of justice as a predictor of moods and emotions include, but are not
limited to, appraisal theories (e.g., Ortony et al., 1988; Lazarus, 1991; Roseman & Smith,
2001) and affective events theory (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). Justice focused theories
include, among others, deontic justice (Cropanzano et al., 2003; Folger et al., 2005) and
fairness theory (e.g., Folger & Cropanzano, 2001).
Theoretical rationale for the influence of justice perceptions on moods and emotions
Appraisal theories assume that individuals evaluate situations according to a variety of
dimensions. As part of the appraisal process individuals might form perceptions of
justice or injustice (Weiss et al., 1999; Cropanzano et al., 2000; Krehbiel & Cropanzano,
2000; Greenberg, 2004; Offenstein et al., 2005), which in turn are hypothesized to lead to
a particular emotion. An example is provided by affective events theory (Weiss &
Table 22.1 Affect as an antecedent to justice perceptions
Affect assessed Type of justice Dependent Study design Theoretical Source

studied variables examined framework
Mood Macro vs. micro Judgments about Experimental Mood and cognitive Sinclair & Mark
justice principles income distribution processes (1991, 1992)
Mood Distributive Allocation Experimental Affect-as-information Inness et al. (2005)
(preference for decisions
equity vs. equality)
Negative emotions Procedural Negative and Experiment Uncertainty management; van den Bos (2003)
(disappointment positive affect fairness heuristic theory;
sadness) affect-as-information
NA Distributive Perceptions of Correlational Reinforcement Ball et al. (1993;
364
Procedural punishment events theory 1994)
NA Distributive Fairness of layoff Longitudinal Previous research Wanberg et al. (1999)
NA, PA Distributive Bonus satisfaction Longitudinal Met expectations Begley & Lee (2005)
Correlational
Happiness, anger Procedural Affect – discrete Correlational Mood congruency Byrne et al. (2003)
Distributive emotions
Interactional
Happiness, anger Procedural Affect – discrete Experimental Mood congruency, Byrne et al. (2004)
Distributive emotions affect as
Interactional information
Note: A comma separates discrete emotions measured separately. A plus sign designates measures that combined the respective emotion adjectives.
Cropanzano, 1996) wherein employees appraise organizational events, and based on the
appraisal they experience emotions that subsequently influence their attitudes and behav-
ior. Although affective events theory does not discuss justice in particular, it is assumed
that the fairness of an event (e.g., reward distribution) can be appraised, leading to emo-
tional reactions.
According to the deontic justice model (Folger et al., 2005) individuals experience
strong emotions when they witness unjust behavior. These emotions serve to alert the indi-
vidual to others in the environment who are dangerous because they behave in an immoral
or unfair manner, and the emotions motivate the individual to react to these others appro-
priately. As such, emotional reactions to injustice are hardwired in humans and have a sur-
vival value. Moreover, unjust behaviors do not necessarily have to be directed at the
individual or influence him or her personally; hence, deontic justice is beyond personal
interests (Cropanzano et al., 2003). The major emotion aroused by deontic injustice is
anger. However, some research has identified additional emotions that people experience
when a third party suffers injustice, such as sympathy for the disadvantaged, guilt because
of one’s better fortune, fear of losing one’s own advantages, content with one’s advan-
tages, anger about the disadvantaged, and hopelessness concerning the fortunes of the
disadvantaged (Montada & Schneider, 1989).
Another justice-focused model is fairness theory (Folger & Cropanzano, 2001), which
suggests that individuals evaluate behaviors in terms of possible alternatives presented as
questions: (a) what would have happened if the behavior had not occurred? (b) could the
perpetrator have behaved differently? and (c) should the perpetrator have behaved the way
he or she did? To the extent that the answers to these questions lead to the perception that
the behavior could have been avoided, should have been avoided, and that another behav-
ior would have yielded better outcomes, perceptions of unfairness intensify. These per-
ceptions of unfairness lead to anger, which in turn affect behavioral responses to the
unfair event.
Overall justice perceptions as leading to moods and emotions

Among the first accounts of emotional reactions to overall perceptions of injustice is the
one provided by Mikula (1986, 1987), in a series of descriptive studies designed to explore
the experience of injustice. Mikula, studying Austrian participants, found that in response
to an unjust event more than 68 per cent of his participants reported feelings of anger,
rage, and indignation. Approximately 33 per cent of participants felt helplessness, despair,
misery, self-pity, and resignation. The remaining percentages reported a number of
different emotions such as surprise and upset. Mikula et al. (1998) found in a cross-
cultural study that events perceived as unfair most frequently elicited anger, followed by
disgust, sadness, fear, shame, and guilt, and that emotional reactions to injustice were very
intense and lasted for relatively long periods. Similarly, Clayton (1992) found that
American participants responding to scenarios of injustice reacted mainly with anger, fol-
lowed by reactions of sadness and disappointment.
Fitness (2000) drew on emotion scripts to study anger in organizations. She found that
44 per cent of participants recalled an anger-eliciting event that involved being directly
and unfairly treated by another person (e.g., falsely accused of lying, cheating, and or
stealing; being unfairly criticized, or having a reasonable request denied).4 Gibson (1995)
also relied on emotion scripts and found that 48 per cent of the reported antecedents of
anger involved injustice, mainly initiated by supervisors and the organization, and less so
initiated by peers and subordinates.
Taken together, these studies show that anger is a universal reaction to injustice and the
one most often reported. However, anger is not the only reaction to unfairness. Other
emotions reported as a reaction to unfairness include envy and jealousy (e.g., Lieblich,
1971; Salovey & Rodin, 1986; Feather & Sherman, 2002; Schaubroeck & Lam, 2004;
Cohen-Charash & Mueller, 2007).
For example, Smith et al. (1994) examined injustice beliefs as predictors of hostility and
depressive aspects of envy. They differentiated between objective injustice beliefs – an
assessment by the envious person that most observers would agree that the situation
leading to the envy was unfair, and subjective injustice beliefs – an acknowledgment by
the envious that although the situation might seem unfair to him or her, others might not
see the situation as unfair. Smith et al. found that both objective and subjective injustice
beliefs were related to the hostile aspect of envy (representing the malicious nature of
envy). They further found that subjective injustice beliefs, but not objective injustice
beliefs, predicted individuals’ sense of inferiority and depression. That is, objective injus-
tice beliefs validated one’s just anger and did not lead to threats to one’s sense of self.
Conversely, subjective injustice beliefs, invalidated by the environment, might have
implied that the situation could be fair. When the situation was fair and the outcome was
still unfavorable, one’s sense of self was hurt because one’s outcomes were unfavorable rel-
ative to those of the other person, probably due to one’s weaknesses. These results are
important because they differentiate between various types of perceived unfairness (in
this case, subjective and objective), which clearly lead to different meanings of an event
to one’s sense of self, and with it different emotional reactions.
Perceptions of distributive justice as leading to moods and emotions

The assertion that perceived distributive (in)justice leads to emotional reactions has been
suggested by justice scholars such as Homans (1961) and Adams (1965). Although
Homans discussed discrete emotional reactions to justice and injustice, Adams was less
specific, mentioning that ‘inequity results in dissatisfaction, in an unpleasant emotional
state, be it anger or guilt’ (p. 283), and in tension (Adams, 1963). In keeping with this per-
spective, other equity researchers have examined affective reactions to inequity in the form
of mood, distress, and satisfaction (Walster et al., 1978).5
For example, Austin and Walster (1974a) tested their predictions that individuals will
be more content with the outcome when they are equally rewarded, as compared to when
they are either under- or over-rewarded. As expected, participants who were under-
rewarded experienced the highest levels of distress (negative mood). Similarly, Markovsky
(1988) showed heightened arousal (measured via skin conductance) in response to
inequitable pay (in both over- and under-reward conditions) as compared to a condition
in which pay was fair. In contrast, however, Hegtvedt (1990) found that over-rewarded
participants experienced less distress, resentment, and helplessness than equitably
rewarded participants. Similar to Austin and Walster, she found that under-rewarded par-
ticipants experienced the highest levels of distress, resentment, and helplessness. Thus,
whether being over-rewarded leads to high levels of negative emotions is still unclear.
Austin and Walster (1974b) further demonstrated that when individuals can attribute
an inequitable reward allocation to the decision maker’s previous experience with
inequity, individuals felt less anger and guilt, and usually more happiness, than if such
attributions were not made. That is, when individuals knew that the decision maker had
been a victim of unfair treatment prior to the current reward allocation decision, they
were more forgiving of the current unfair allocation because they realized it had been
done to maintain equity in general.
Other researchers have examined guilt as a reaction to distributive injustice (e.g., Brockner
et al., 1985, 1986; Hassebrauck, 1986; Montada & Schneider, 1989; Hegtvedt, 1990; Mikula
et al., 1998; Hegtvedt & Killian, 1999; Weiss et al., 1999; Krehbiel & Cropanzano, 2000;
Barclay et al., 2005). For example, Hegtvedt (1990) found that guilt was experienced most
strongly among over-rewarded participants, followed by under-rewarded participants, with
equitably rewarded participants experiencing the least amount of guilt. Hegtvedt and
Killian (1999) further found that in the negotiation context, the more participants’ own out-
comes were perceived to be fair, the more pleased participants were with their outcomes and
the less depressed they felt about them. These results show that reactions to justice percep-
tions can involve a simultaneous experience of negatively and positively toned emotions.
Similarly, results from studies that examined guilt as a reaction to distributive injustice in the
context of layoffs showed that survivors of layoffs experienced both guilt and gladness
(Brockner et al., 1985, 1986), as well as change anxiety (Paterson & Cary, 2002).
Van den Bos (2001b, Study 1) employed terror management theory (for a review, see
Solomon et al., 2004) to examine under what conditions distributive justice influences a
hostile mood. He hypothesized and found that mortality salience makes individuals become
more hostile in response to injustice. In a different and interesting line of research, Olson et
al. (2000) showed that when individuals publicly expressed their emotional reactions to rel-
ative deprivation, their reactions were affected by the emotional expressions of others to a
greater extent than when they privately expressed their emotional reactions to relative depri-
vation. This study has important organizational implications, showing how emotional reac-
tions to perceptions of (in)justice can be contagious (Degoey, 2000; Barsade, 2002).
In summary, the studies examining emotional reactions to distributive injustice focused
mainly on the emotion of guilt. These studies generally found that guilt results from
inequity and from receiving better or worse outcomes than those of others. Some studies
also showed that guilt is usually co-experienced with happiness about one’s favorable out-
comes. Other studies examined hostility, anxiety, and negative mood as reactions to unfair
distributions. Finally, we reviewed a study that shows that emotional reactions to per-
ceived injustice can be contagious.
Perceptions of procedural justice as leading to moods and emotions
Studies examining mood and general categories of negative and positive affect Several
studies have measured general categories of positive and negative affect as resulting from
perceived procedural justice. For example, Vermunt et al. (1996) examined how partici-
pants’ perceptions of procedures, without knowledge of outcomes, affect negative emo-
tions (operationalized as a combination of anger, irritation, insult, and fury). Vermunt
et al. used referent cognitions theory (the predecessor of fairness theory; see Folger, 1986
for a review) as their theoretical base, the referent being previously experienced proce-
dures. They found that the more inaccurate the current procedure when compared with
previous procedures, the more negative affect participants experienced.
Van den Bos and his colleagues were particularly interested in the effect of voice, a com-
ponent of fair processes. First, they examined voice in the context of referent cognitions
theory (van den Bos & van Prooijen, 2001, Study 1), and found that when no voice was
given and there was a close referent comparison other, participants expressed a higher
level of negative emotions than when there was a distant referent comparison other. In
two additional studies, van den Bos and Spruijt (2002) found that the appropriateness of
voice moderated reactions to participants receiving or being denied voice. Voice was con-
sidered appropriate when the decision was relevant to the participants and was considered
inappropriate when the decision was not relevant to the participants. In Study 1, the
researchers found that when voice was appropriate but participants were denied the
opportunity to voice their opinion, they were significantly more furious than when voice
was given to them. Furthermore, participants were significantly more furious when voice
was inappropriate yet it was offered to them, as compared to when it was denied. These
results were essentially replicated in Study 2, in which positive emotional reactions were
measured (a combination of happiness, pleasure, satisfaction, and a reverse coding of
fury).
Finally, van den Bos and his colleagues, relying on terror management theory, pre-
dicted that when individuals’ mortality is salient they react more strongly to violations
of procedural justice than when their mortality is not salient. In a series of studies (van
den Bos & Miedema, 2000, Studies 1 and 2) they found that when participants had an
opportunity to voice their opinions (fair procedure), they experienced high levels of pos-
itive emotions (a combination of happiness, contentment, and satisfaction) and low
levels of negative emotions (a combination of anger, hostility, furiousness, and dis-
appointment). Moreover, this fair process effect was significantly stronger when mortal-
ity was salient than when it was not (van den Bos & Miedema, 2000), and had its
strongest influence on negative affect when mortality was salient and participants needed
to recover their self-esteem (van den Bos, 2001b, Study 2). In Study 3, van den Bos
(2001b) showed that disappointment, anger, and positive mood in reaction to voice (or
its absence) were stronger when uncertainty was salient than when it was not salient.
These results are similar to those reported earlier for distributive justice (van den Bos,
2001a, Study 1).
Based on van den Bos and colleagues’ findings, it is clear that voice influences individ-
uals’ positive and negative moods and emotions, but only under certain conditions. With
what we know at this point, we can say that the existence of a close referent, mortality
salience, need to recover self-esteem, experiencing uncertainty, and the appropriateness of
voice influence affective reactions to voice or its absence. It is possible that these bound-
ary conditions are related to the meaning of voice for individuals and on what voice or its
absence conveys about the organization. In other words, it is possible that justice serves
as information leading to affect.
Wiesenfeld et al. (1999) examined negative self-conscious emotions (guilt and shame)
as a reaction of survivors of unfair organizational downsizing. Relying on self-affirmation
theory (e.g., Steele, 1988) they found that survivors of unfair layoffs experienced
significantly higher levels of self-conscious emotions (shame and guilt combined) as
compared to survivors of fair layoffs. Moreover, as expected, they found a three-way inter-
action demonstrating that the highest levels of shame and guilt were experienced
among participants in the unfair layoff/no self-affirmation condition. Hence, the authors
concluded that negative reactions to unfair downsizing result from threatened

self-integrity.
Hegtvedt et al. (2002) examined how perceptions of procedural justice predict feelings
of resentment among employees regarding family-friendly policies. They operationalized
inequity as extra work that some employees will have to do to compensate for the absence
of other employees due to family-friendly policies and as the special benefits received by
people who will gain from such policies. Surprisingly, their results showed that when pro-
cedural justice was operationalized as the respect one receives at work, it was positively
related to resentment with performing extra work. In another experiment, Hegtvedt and
Killian (1999) found that when participants perceived a bargaining process to be fair, they
experienced high levels of pleasure and low levels of depression. Whether these conflicting
results (i.e., a positive relationship between procedural justice and both resentment and
pleasure) are due to the different research methods used in both studies, the different oper-
ationalization of procedural justice, the different emotions studied, or the context in
which their predictions were made (family-friendly practices or bargaining) is a matter for
future research to resolve.
De Cremer examined the interaction between procedural justice and leadership on
emotional reactions of followers. In two studies (De Cremer, 2006a), he found that pro-
cedural justice and transformational leadership interacted such that the relationships
between procedural justice and anger-related emotions (anger and disappointed com-
bined) were more pronounced when the leader was transformational. In two other studies,
De Cremer (2004) found that accurate procedures led to positive emotions (a combina-
tion of satisfaction and happiness in Study 1, and satisfaction and anger in Study 2) only
when the leader was not perceived to be biased. Furthermore, De Cremer (2006b) also
found that procedural justice interacts with a sense of collective identification with one’s
group to influence disappointment: the interaction between high identification with the
group and low procedural justice led to the highest levels of disappointment. From these
studies and from the study of Hegtvedt et al. (2002) it seems that high expectations (e.g.,
from a respectful manager, from a charismatic leader or from a group one identifies with)
that are then shattered by instances of perceived unfairness might lead to higher levels of
anger and disappointment than is the case when expectations are low. This proposition
needs to be empirically examined.
Whereas the studies described above share the quest for boundary conditions of the
influence of procedural justice on affective reactions, without a doubt the most consis-
tently studied moderator of emotional reactions to procedural justice is outcome favora-
bility. We next describe some of the studies that have examined this factor.
Studies examining the interaction between outcome favorability and procedural fairness as
affecting moods and emotions According to referent cognitions theory (Folger, 1986),
resentment is maximized when people compare themselves to a referent and determine
that they were treated unfairly (called a ‘high referent’ condition). Indeed, Folger et al.
(1983) showed that when participants lost a competition and did not receive a proper
explanation for their loss, but knew about a previous scoring procedure that would prob-
ably have yielded them victory, they experienced high levels of anger and resentment (see
also Folger & Martin, 1986). Whereas the above studies manipulated what today is
referred to as ‘informational justice’ (Greenberg, 1993), Cropanzano and Folger (1989)
manipulated procedural justice using autonomy (in essence, voice). Contrary to the
studies described earlier and contrary to expectations, they did not find a significant inter-
action between being in a high referent condition and lacking autonomy when predicting
resentment, even though the situation was perceived to be unfair.
Later studies (Weiss et al., 1999; Krehbiel & Cropanzano, 2000) used as their theoreti-
cal framework a combination of a two-stage model of fairness and appraisal theories of
emotions. Two-stage models of fairness (or fair-process models) propose that outcomes
provide the initial information about justice and that procedures provide the detailed infor-
mation needed to make an evaluation of fairness of the outcome (Cropanzano & Folger,
1991; Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996). Appraisal theories usually describe two major types
of appraisal of events that lead to emotional reactions (for a review, see Roseman & Smith,
2001): primary appraisal is an overall, general appraisal of the meaning of the event for
the person (e.g., whether the event is relevant to the person and whether the event is posi-
tive or negative to the person’s goals), and secondary appraisal involves appraising the
details of the event using questions such as who is responsible for the event, can the situ-
ation be changed, and how can one cope with the event (e.g., Lazarus, 1991)? Combining
the two-stage model of fairness and appraisal theory leads to the assumption that outcome
favorability serves as input used in primary appraisal processes and procedural justice per-
ceptions serve as input for secondary appraisal processes.
Based on this rationale, Weiss et al. (1999) examined the effects of the interaction
between outcome favorability and procedural fairness (three conditions: fair, unfair
biased in favor of self, unfair biased in favor of a comparison other) on four discrete emo-
tions: happiness, anger, guilt, and pride. They found a main effect of outcomes on happi-
ness and an interaction between outcome favorability and procedural justice on anger and
guilt. Cropanzano et al. (2000, Study 1) replicated most of these findings. Similarly,
Krehbiel and Cropanzano (2000) found main effects for outcome favorability on happi-
ness and joy (when outcomes were favorable) and on disappointment (when outcomes
were unfavorable). They also found that anger and frustration were higher when outcomes
were unfavorable and procedures were unfair, than when procedures were fair. Anxiety
and guilt were experienced when outcomes were favorable and procedures were unfair as
opposed to fair.
Whereas the above results are similar across the three studies, the results differed with
regard to pride. Specifically, contrary to expectations, Weiss et al. (1999) and Krehbiel and
Cropanzano (2000) found a main effect for outcomes on pride, such that desirable out-
comes led to pride regardless of procedures. However, Cropanzano et al. (2000) found the
expected interaction between outcome favorability and procedural justice on pride, such
that pride was experienced when outcomes were favorable and the procedure was either
fair or benefited the other. Future theory and research should examine the unique aspects
of pride and of procedural justice perceptions in an effort to explain and resolve these
conflicting results.
Some studies examined the interaction between outcome favorability and procedural
justice using the attribution model of justice (van den Bos et al., 1999; Schroth & Shah,
2000; Brockner et al., 2003). According to the attribution model, unfavorable outcomes
arrived at using fair organizational processes focus blame on one’s self as the source of
the unfavorable outcome and hence harm one’s self-esteem. In contrast, unfavorable out-
comes arrived at by unfair procedures focus blame on the organization and therefore
reduce harm to one’s self-concept. Thus, the attribution model of fairness leads to oppo-
site hypotheses than those proposed by the dual models of fairness (or the fair process
effect).
In accordance with the attribution model, van den Bos et al. (1999, Study 1) found that
when outcomes were unfavorable and the procedure was fair, participants reacted to their
outcomes less positively (i.e., with lower levels of a combination of happiness, content,
and agreeableness) than when the outcome was received following an unfair procedure.
However, when participants received favorable outcomes their affective reactions were
similar regardless of the fairness of the procedure. Barclay et al. (2005) examined the
interaction between outcome favorability and procedural justice on (a) inward-focused
negatively valanced emotions – a combination of guilt and shame, and on (b) outward-
focused negative emotions – a combination of anger and hostility. Overall, their result
supported the attribution model of justice. For example, they found that when outcomes
were unfavorable and procedural justice was high, the negative relationship between anger
and hostility and outcome favorability was significant, whereas when procedural justice
was low this relationship was not significant. They further found that the relationships
between justice and emotions were partially mediated by attributions of blame.
Cohen-Charash et al. (2004) examined the joint effects of outcome favorability and pro-
cedural justice on the experience of envy. They examined competing propositions based
on the fair process effect (e.g., Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996) and the attribution models
of fairness (van den Bos et al., 1999; Schroth & Shah, 2000; Brockner et al., 2003). The
fair process effect proposes that fair procedures signal to individuals that they have been
treated similarly and equally to another person (Leventhal, 1980). Because equality is a
central concern of envy (e.g., Heider, 1958), fair procedures can reduce levels of envy when
one’s outcomes are worse than those of a comparison other. When people compare both
outcomes and the treatment they receive to others and only their outcomes are worse than
those of the other, there is less envy than when both outcomes and treatment are worse
than those of the comparison other (Cohen-Charash & Mueller, 2007). Cohen-Charash
et al. (2004) found that when outcomes were less favorable than those of a comparison
other, levels of envy were higher when procedures were unfair, as compared to when pro-
cedures were fair. These results rendered support for the fair process effect.
Offenstein et al. (2005) extended previous research examining the interaction between
outcome favorability and procedural justice by studying additional emotions and the
mechanism that leads from justice perceptions to emotional reactions, hypothesized to be
the appraisal of the situation. Overall, Offenstein et al. found that procedural justice was
not instrumental in moderating the influence of outcome favorability on appraisals or on
emotions. The only appraisal influenced by procedures was that of other-blame, which
resulted from both outcome favorability and procedural justice (but not from their inter-
action). They did find that appraisals fully mediated the relationship between outcomes
and sadness and anger, and partially mediated the relationship between outcomes and
shame.
As can be seen from the above description of research examining the interaction
between procedural justice and outcome favorability, some studies supported the two-
stage model of fairness, others supported the attribution model of fairness, the one
study that compared both supported the fair process model of fairness, and one study
found procedures to generally be irrelevant in the context of outcomes and emotions.
Future research should examine the boundary conditions for when (and maybe which)
emotional reactions to injustice follow the fair process effect or the effect of attribu-
tions. Theory should help in reconciling the different findings based on these various
theories.
A recent study examined how regulatory focus impacts on the interaction between pro-
cedural justice and outcome favorability in affecting emotions (Cropanzano et al., in
press). According to regulatory focus theory (e.g., Higgins, 1997) individuals can focus
either on accomplishments and aspirations (promotion focus) or on safety and mainte-
nance of the status quo (prevention focus). Individuals having different foci will have
different emotional reactions to similar events (Brockner & Higgins, 2001). Cropanzano
et al. predicted that achieving an unfavorable outcome despite the usage of fair procedures
should lead to negative emotions; achieving a favorable outcome despite the usage of
unfair procedures should lead to positive emotions. Which particular emotions will be
experienced depends on the focus (promotion vs. prevention) of the individual. Most of
their predictions were supported (for example, the highest level of embarrassment was
experienced when the individual was focused on prevention and received an unfavorable
outcome following a fair procedure). However, they did not find support for their hypoth-
esis that the highest levels of anger would be experienced when the individual receives
unfavorable outcomes following an unfair process, regardless of regulatory focus. This is
particularly surprising given that theory and research show anger to be a frequent reac-
tion to injustice. However, as other researchers also did not find that procedural justice
relates to anger (Offenstein et al., 2005; Stecher & Rosse, 2005) this might be a more per-
vasive phenomena than we currently know. Replication studies can shed light on these
findings regarding anger and procedural injustice.
Overall, the studies in this section show that researchers have used a variety of the-
oretical frameworks to examine the influence of procedural justice on emotional reactions
to outcomes. Interestingly, however, researchers obtained many contradictory findings
regarding the importance of procedural justice in affecting emotional reactions to out-
comes, and regarding particular emotions, such as pride and anger. Research has also
demonstrated that procedural justice sometimes leads to positively valanced emotions
and at other times to negatively valanced emotions. Thus, researchers have much to con-
tribute in understanding these complexities.
Perceptions of interactional justice as predicting moods and emotions

Turillo et al. (2002, Study 4) examined the anger level of a third party after viewing a belit-
tling behavior of a powerful figure toward a less powerful one. Results indicated that the
anger levels of the third party were at their peak when the offensive behavior was por-
trayed to the observer as intentional rather than unintentional. This is consistent with
deontic justice and fairness theory models (Folger & Cropanzano, 2001; Folger &
Skarlicki, 2005), viewing the perceived accountability and morality of the perpetrator to
be a major determinant of justice perceptions.
Stecher and Rosse (2005) conducted two experiments in which they examined whether
interactional justice could elicit the same emotional reactions as distributive and proce-
dural justice. They found that when either interactional or distributive justice was low,
ratings of negative affect (a combination of anger, resentment, and bitterness) were high.
Procedural justice showed no main effects on negative affect across both studies. Thus, the
relationship between affect and interactional justice should be examined separately and
more often, and a clear theoretical rationale for it should be developed.
Summary of research examining justice and a predictor of affective reactions

As seen, there is substantial research examining justice perceptions as leading to moods
and emotions. This research relies on several theoretical models and sometimes even com-
pares them, but results are conflicting. There is a relatively large variety of emotions exam-
ined as reactions to justice, particularly anger, envy, guilt, and pride. Few studies explicitly
examine moods, yet other studies practically do so by combining various emotions into
larger categories. We hope and believe that this trend of studies should and will continue
to identify more mediators and moderators of the relationship between perceived justice
and affective reactions, and will examine how moods and emotions influence important
personal and organizational outcomes. See Table 22.2 for a summary of existing research
reviewed in this section.
Emotions as mediators of reactions to (in)justice

Research examining the relationship between justice and emotions has also revealed that
emotions may serve as a mediator to justice judgments. This research clearly demonstrates
that no generalizations can be made from one type of justice to the other, and that various
emotions have various mediating roles. For example, Chebat and Slusarczyk (2005) found
that although anxiety, disgust, joy and hope fully mediated the relationship between per-
ceived distributive justice and loyalty of customers to their bank, only anxiety and disgust
fully mediated the relationship between perceived procedural justice and loyalty.
Interestingly, joy and hope only partially mediated the relationship between interactional
justice and loyalty.
Fox et al. (2001) found that negative mood fully mediated the relationship between pro-
cedural and distributive justice with organizational counterproductive work behaviors.
However, when the dependent variable was personal counterproductive work behaviors,
negative moods mediated only the relationship for procedural justice but not for distrib-
utive justice. Also focusing on negative emotions, Tepper et al. (2006) found that depres-
sion partially mediated the relationship between procedural justice and perceptions of
abusive supervision. Barclay et al. (2005) found that anger and hostility partially medi-
ated the relationship between the interaction between outcome favorability and interac-
tional justice (predictor) and retaliation (criterion). They did, however, fail to support
their hypothesis that anger and hostility mediate the relationship between the interaction
of outcome favorability and procedural justice (predictor) and retaliation (criterion).
Finally, Goldman (2003) found that state anger partially mediated the relationship
between a three-way interaction of procedural, distributive, and interactional justice with
legal claiming against an organization.
The studies described thus far have all been correlational, making it impossible to con-
clude that affect indeed mediated the relationship between justice and reactions. The fol-
lowing studies differ, being experimental. Van Yperen et al. (2000, Study 2) examined
whether negative mood mediates the relationship between perceived injustice and inten-
tions to behave destructively (e.g., neglect, aggression). The researchers showed that neg-
ative mood fully mediated the interaction effect between distributive and procedural
justice on destructive responses. The effects of interactional justice on destructive
Table 22.2 Justice as a predictor of affect
Justice type Affect assessed Dependent variables Study design Theoretical Source
examined framework
Overall justice Sympathy, guilt, moral Overall justice Correlational Appraisal theory Montada &
perceptions outrage, fear, content, perceptions regarding the Schneider (1989)
anger, and hopelessness faith of others
Overall injustice Anger, rage, indignation, Emotions experienced Correlational Not specified Mikula (1986,
perceptions helplessness, despair, 1987)
depression, surprise,
disappointment,
aggravation, arousal,
stress, and envy
Overall justice Anger, fear, sadness, Emotional reactions Correlational Appraisal theory Mikula et al.
perceptions disgust, shame, and guilt to unjust events (1998)
Overall Anger Anger Qualitative Emotional scripts Fitness (2000)
injustice (interviews)
374
Overall injustice Anger Anger Qualitative Emotional scripts Gibson (1995)
(surveys)
Overall justice Envy and jealousy Envy and jealousy Correlational Envy and jealousy Salovey & Rodin
theories (1986)
Overall justice Envy Hostile and depressive Correlational Envy theories Smith et al. (1994)
(objective and aspects of envy
subjective
injustice beliefs)
Distributive Anger, guilt, happiness, Reactions to inequity Experimental Equity theory Austin & Walster
and satisfaction (1974b)
Distributive Mood (satisfaction Reactions to inequity Experimental Equity theory Austin & Walster
contentment distress) (1974a)
Distributive Guilt Reactions of layoff Experimental Equity theory Brockner et al.
survivors–performance (1985, 1986)
Procedural Anxiety Reactions of layoff Correlational Affective events Paterson & Cary
Interactional survivors theory (2002)
Distributive
Distributive Distress (anger Reactions to Experimental Equity theory Hegtvedt (1990)
resentfulness inequity
helplessness guilt)
and contentment
(satisfaction
deservingness
gratefulness)
Distributive Hostility Hostility Experimental Terror management van den Bos
theory (2001b, Study 1)
Procedural Negative emotions Negative affect; intention Experimental Referent cognition Vermunt et al.
(anger irritation to protest theory (1996)
insult fury)
Procedural Negative emotions Negative emotions Experimental Referent cognition van den Bos & van
(voice) (anger fury theory Prooijen (2001)
disappointment
sadness)
Procedural Fury; positive emotions Fury; procedural justice Experimental Psychology of voice van den Bos &
(voice) (happy pleased perceptions; positive Spruijt (2002)
375
satisfied furious emotions, relational
reversed coded) reactions to experimenter
Procedural Positive emotions Emotional reactions Experimental Terror management van den Bos &
(voice) (happiness to voice theory; Miedema (2000)
contentment fairness heuristics
satisfaction); negative theory
emotions (anger
hostility furiousness
disappointment)
Procedural Negative emotions Emotional reactions Experimental Terror management van den Bos
(voice) (hostility anger to voice theory (2001b, Study 3)
fury sadness)
Procedural Negative emotions Emotional reactions Experimental Fairness heuristics van den Bos
(voice) (anger hostility to voice theory (2001a, Study 2)
fury infuriation)
Procedural Guilt shame Reactions of layoff survivors Experimental Self-affirmation Wiesenfeld et al.
theory (1999)
Justice type Affect assessed Dependent variables Study design Theoretical Source
examined framework
Procedural Resentment Reactions to inequity Correlational Equity theory; Hegtvedt et al.
group-value model (2002)
Distributive Negative emotions Reactions to Experimental Equity theory Hegtvedt & Killian
Procedural (anger agitation inequity (1999)
resentment
depression
disappointment guilt)
and positive emotions
(satisfaction)
Procedural Anger-related emotions Reactions to Experimental Leadership theories; De Cremer (2006a)
(anger disappointment) transformational leadership relational model of
and unfairness procedural justice
Procedural Disappointment Disappointment Experimental Emotions and De Cremer (2006b)
self-regulation;
376
violated expectations;
group identification
Procedural Positive emotions Fairness judgments Experimental Relational model of De Cremer (2004)
(satisfaction happiness; and positive emotions procedural justice
satisfaction anger
reversed coded)
Procedural Resentment, anger Reactions to relative Experimental Referent cognition Folger et al. (1983)
(informational) deprivation theory
Procedural Resentment anger Emotional and behavioral Experimental Referent cognition Folger & Martin
(informational) reactions to procedures, theory (1986)
referent condition, and
context
Procedural Resentment Fairness perceptions and Experimental Referent cognition Cropanzano &
resentment as reactions to theory Folger (1989)
procedures and referent
outcomes
Procedural Happiness, anger, Emotional reactions to Experimental Fair process effect Weiss et al. (1999)
guilt, pride outcome favorability and (dual-process model
procedural justice of fairness); appraisal
models of emotion
Procedural Happiness, anger, Emotional reactions to Experimental Fair process effect Cropanzano et al.
guilt, pride outcome favorability and (dual-process model (2000, Study 1)
procedural justice of fairness); appraisal
models of emotion
Procedural Happiness, joy, Emotional reactions to Experimental Fair process effect Krehbiel &
disappointment, anger, outcome favorability and (dual-process model of Cropanzano
frustration, pride procedural justice fairness); appraisal (2000)
models of emotion
Procedural Happiness content Emotional reactions to Experimental Appraisal models of Van den Bos et al.
agreeableness outcome favorability and fairness (1999, Study 1)
procedural justice
Procedural Envy Envy and harming behavior Experimental Fair process effect; Cohen-Charash
as resulting from procedural attribution models et al. (2004)
fairness and outcome of fairness
favorability
377
Procedural Sadness, shame, anger Emotional reactions to Experimental Appraisal theory; Offenstein et al.
events and to appraisals attribution model of (2005)
justice
Procedural Shame guilt Emotional reactions and Correlational Attribution models of Barclay et al.
Interactional Anger hostility attributions of layoff victims justice (2005)
Procedural Happiness, Emotional reactions and Experimental Regulatory focus Cropanzano et al.
embarrassment, anger perceived distributive and theory (in press)
procedural justice
Interactional Anger Behavioral intentions Experimental Deontic justice Turillo et al. (2002,
and emotional reactions to Study 4)
a perpetrator’s behavior
Interactional Negative emotions Emotional reactions to Experimental Three-component Stecher & Rosse
Procedural (anger resentment different types of justice; model of justice (2005)
Distributive bitterness) intentions to behave in
response to various types
of injustice
responses were only partially mediated by negative mood. Also, Vermunt et al. (1996)
found that negative affect mediated the relationship between procedural injustice and
intentions to protest, and De Cremer (2006b) found that disappointment leads partici-
pants who are highly identified with their group to undertake acts of revenge of the group
in reaction to unfair treatment.
Rupp and Spencer (2006) focused on the mediating effects of happiness and anger on
the relationship between perceived interactional injustice and emotional labor. They ran-
domly positioned participants in the injustice condition (in which they received ‘service
calls’ from research confederates trained to be interactionally unfair), or in the just con-
dition (in which they received ‘service calls’ from interactionally fair confederates).
Results confirmed the hypothesis of partial mediation of anger on the relationship
between customer interactional injustice and emotional labor: when participants felt
unfairly treated, they experienced anger and reported greater difficulty complying with
display rules (i.e., higher emotional labor) as compared with those who were exposed to
fair conditions. However, contrary to the hypothesis, happiness did not mediate the rela-
tionship between fair interactional treatment and emotion labor.
Schaubroeck and Lam (2004) collected promotion expectations at Time 1 (two months
prior to the announcement of promotion decisions), promotion envy at Time 2 (one
month after promotion decisions were announced), and perceived likability of the person
promoted at Time 3 (five months after promotion decisions were announced). The
authors found that promotion envy fully mediated the relationship between expectations
of job promotion and distributive justice perceptions. This study is particularly exciting
because of its longitudinal nature, allowing some conclusion of temporal order, although
conclusions of causal order cannot be drawn from it (Cook & Campbell, 1979).
Different from studies reviewed above are those of Tyler et al. (1996) and van Zomeren
et al. (2004), who examined perceptions of justice and emotions within the context of
groups. Based on the group-value model of justice (Lind & Tyler, 1988), results of four
studies demonstrated that pride and respect mediated the effects of relational judgments
about authorities and three types of group-oriented behaviors and attitudes: compliance
with group rules, group commitment, and citizenship behaviors. Similarly, van Zomeren
et al. found in three experiments that group-based appraisal of injustice created group
anger, which then promoted tendencies for collective action against the organization (e.g.,
participating in a demonstration against a proposal).
In summary, the research on affect as mediating reactions to (in)justice focused mainly
on undesirable behaviors and on negatively toned affect, with much less interest in posi-
tively toned affect and in desirable organizational reactions. At the same time, these
studies showed a different mediating role for positively and negatively toned affect. These
studies also showed that affect plays a different mediating role depending on the type of
justice being studied. An interesting twist is the study of affect as a mediator in the context
of groups. Overall, our understanding of affect as a mediator of reactions to injustice will
be improved when more studies have examined it. For a summary of the studies examin-
ing affect as mediating reactions to injustice, see Table 22.3.
Justice as mediating the relationship between emotions and outcomes

At least two recent studies have demonstrated that justice perceptions mediate the
effects of emotions on outcomes. Specifically, Schaubroeck and Lam (2004) found that
Table 22.3 Affect as a mediator of reactions to justice
Type of justice Affect assessed Dependent variables Study design Theoretical framework Source
studied examined
Procedural Negative (anxiety Exit or loyalty decision; Correlational Affect control theory; Chebat &
Distributive disgust) and positive did bank customer quit equity theory Slusarczyk (2005)
Interactional (joy hope) or stay with bank
Procedural Negative mood Personal and Correlational Stress/emotion as leading Fox et al. (2001)
Distributive organizational to counterproductive
counterproductive work work behavior
behavior
Procedural Depression Abusive supervision Correlational Previous research Tepper et al.
(2006)
379
Interactional Anger, hostility Retaliation Correlational Two-stage model of Barclay et al.
Procedural justice, appraisal theories (2005)
of emotions
Procedural Anger Legal-claiming against Correlational Referent cognitions Goldman (2003)
Distributive the organization theory
Interactional
Distributive Guilt; Equity restoration Correlational Equity theory Walster & Walster
retaliation distress (fear) (1975)
Procedural Negative mood Destructive responses Experimental Referent cognitions van Yperen et al.
Distributive such as exit, neglect, theory; equity theory (2000)
Interactional aggressive voice
Procedural Negative emotions Negative affect; Experimental Referent cognition Vermunt et al.
(anger irritation intention to protest theory (1996)
insult fury)
Type of justice Affect assessed Dependent variables Study design Theoretical framework Source
studied examined
Procedural Disappointment Revenge Experimental Emotions and De Cremer
self-regulation; violated (2006b)
expectations; group
identification
Procedural Happiness, anger Emotional labor Correlational Affective events theory Rupp & Spencer
Distributive (2006)
Interactional
Procedural Group pride Group commitment, extra Correlational Group-value model; Tyler et al. (1996)
Distributive role behaviors, compliance instrumental model of
380
with group rules fairness
Procedural Group-based anger Collective action Experimental Social identity theory; van Zomeren et al.
tendencies (whether to relative deprivation (2004)
take action or not) theory; intergroup
emotion; appraisal theory
Distributive Envy Promotion likeability Longitudinal Relative deprivation and Schaubroeck &
correlational social comparison Lam (2004)
Distributive Empathy, Attitudes toward decision Experimental Relational theory of Wiesenfeld et al.
schadenfreude maker justice; relational identity, (2006)
emotions as interface
perceptions of distributive injustice partially mediated the relationship between promo-

tion envy and perceived likability of the person promoted. Wiesenfeld et al. (2006) found
that fairness perceptions mediated the relationship between the interaction between emo-
tions and inequity (independent variable) and attitudes toward the decision maker
(dependent variable).
The paucity of studies examining justice as a mediator of the relationship between emo-
tions and reactions is itself a message for researchers to examine this type of relationship
further. It is important to examine the role of justice as a mediator of the relationship
between emotions and outcomes because this appears to be a realistic workplace scenario
(e.g., where employees come to work with established moods and then experience events
which they judge to be fair or unfair). Such studies will have both theoretical and practi-
cal importance. See Table 22.3 for a summary of studies discussed in this section.
The interaction between affect and justice

In this last section of our review we focus on studies where affect and justice have been
studied as an interaction affecting various outcome variables. Several studies examined
trait affect as a moderator of reactions to perceived unfairness. For example, Skarlicki et
al. (1999) found a three-way interaction between distributive justice, interactional justice,
and NA, such that retaliatory behavior (as determined by peer observations) was at its
peak among high NA individuals experiencing high levels of perceived unfairness, as com-
pared to all other participants and conditions. Interestingly, procedural justice was not a
good predictor of retaliation. Similarly, Aquino et al. (1999) found that the interaction
between interactional justice and NA was the best predictor of organizational deviance
behavior.
Irving et al. (2005) found a significant interaction between NA and procedural justice
on the relationship between procedural justice and job satisfaction. Specifically, the pos-
itive relationship between procedural justice and job satisfaction existed for individuals
low on NA but was significantly lower or nil (depending on the study) among individuals
high on NA. Goldman (2003) found that distributive, procedural, and interactional
justice (in combination and separately) interacted with trait anger to predict legal claim-
ing by terminated employees. Namely, the higher the trait anger and the perceived injus-
tice, the higher was the tendency of these employees to file a discrimination lawsuit against
the organization that had terminated them.
Other studies examined the interactions between state affect and perceived justice as
affecting reactions. For example, in the context of negotiations, Pillutla and Murnighan
(1996) demonstrated that although anger was a better predictor of rejecting offers than
was perceived unfairness (measured as an overall perception of the situation), the inter-
action between perceived unfairness and anger was the best predictor of rejecting offers
from negotiation partners. Rejections were not only of offers that were worse than outside
offers, but also of offers that were better than outside options. They concluded that ‘emo-
tional reactions provide the critical link that determines when fairness perceptions tend
to affect immediately subsequent behavior’ (1996, p. 222).
Cohen-Charash and Mueller (2007) examined the interaction between perceived justice
(overall justice) and episodic envy on behaviors intended to harm the envied other. They
found that after controlling for dispositional envy and social desirability, the interaction
between envy and unfairness explained a significant amount of variance in harming
behaviors, such that higher levels of envy and of perceived unfairness resulted in higher
levels of harming the envied other. In a second study, the above results were replicated,
but only for individuals high in self-esteem. That is, the interaction between envy and
unfairness predicted harming behaviors of individuals high in self-esteem, but not for
those individuals low in self-esteem. Interestingly, in both studies it was shown that fair-
ness was not related to harming behaviors of the envious individuals. This means that
while perceived unfairness can exacerbate harming reactions to envy, perceived fairness
does not necessarily mitigate them.
Recently, Wiesenfeld et al. (2006) found that when individuals empathize with others,
they perceive over-rewards to the other as fair, and when individuals experience schaden-
freude (i.e., being happy about someone else’s bad fortune) toward another, they perceive
under-rewards to this other as fair. Thus, empathy and schadenfreude moderated reactions
to unfair distributions. Finally, Messer and White (2006) examined whether the interaction
between mood and perceived fairness affects organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs;
see Moorman & Byrne, 2005, for a review of OCBs and justice). However, their results
showed only a main effect of fairness in predicting OCB. Mood had neither a main effect
nor an interaction with fairness in predicting OCB. These findings are consistent with the
early findings of Organ and Konovsky (1989). However, these results are qualified by
difficulties with the mood induction, hence casting doubt about the validity of these results.
Taken together, studies examining the interaction between affect and justice percep-
tions lead to conflicting results regarding the role of each variable. Whereas some studies
find the expected interactions, other studies do not. Future research is necessary for
understanding the interactive role between justice and emotions. See Table 22.4 for a
summary of studies in this section.
So what can we conclude from this review?

We introduce the final section of this chapter by expressing our excitement over the large
amount and quality of studies examining affect and justice in their various types of rela-
tionships (e.g., predictors and moderators). We are most intrigued by the vast range of
theoretical models and by the conflicting results of many of the studies. This variety
makes it very challenging, if not impossible at times, to summarize the data into a coher-
ent picture. Nevertheless, we shall attempt to do that next.
What do we currently know?

Simply put, we know that state and trait affect influence justice perceptions and that
justice perceptions influence state affect. We also know that state affect and justice mediate
reactions to each other, and that state and trait affect interact with justice to affect organ-
izational attitudes and behaviors. It appears that the relationship between affect and
justice is complex, and that moderating and mediating variables are of paramount impor-
tance in understanding this relationship. Thus, just as Cropanzano et al. (2000) and others
have concluded, justice and affect are indeed related and understanding their complex
relationship is worthwhile for both theoretical and practical reasons.
Among the more robust findings we uncovered are those demonstrating that state affect
influences the relative importance of various justice rules and justice perceptions in
general. It is also clear that justice triggers an affective reaction. However, the nature of
the affective reaction is less clear, especially with regard to procedural justice. Even with
Table 22.4 The interaction between justice and affect
Justice type Affect assessed Dependent variables Study design Theoretical framework Source
examined
Distributive Trait NA Retaliation Correlational Affective Skarlicki et al.
Procedural dispositions (1999)
Interactional
Procedural Trait NA Job satisfaction Correlational The interactional Irving et al. (2005)
approach to job
satisfaction
Distributive Trait anger Legal claiming against Correlational Referent cognitions Goldman (2003)
Procedural the organization theory
Interactional
Overall justice Anger Rejecting offers from a Experimental The wounded pride/spite Pillutla &
383
perceptions negotiation partner model Murnighan (1996)
Overall justice Envy Harming an envied other Correlational The fair process effect; Cohen-Charash &
perceptions attribution models of fairness Mueller (2007)
Procedural Envy Harming an envied other Experimental The fair process effect; Cohen-Charash et al.
attribution models of fairness (2004)
Distributive Empathy, Attitudes toward decision Experimental Relational theory of justice; Wiesenfeld et al.
schadenfreude maker relational identity, emotions (2006)
as interface between the self
and social life
Overall justice Mood OCB Experimental Affect infusion model; social Messer & White
perceptions exchange theory (2006)
respect to anger, the most widely theorized and examined reaction to injustice, we found
that some studies showed anger to be related to procedural injustice (e.g., Weiss et al.,
1999) and others failed to show such a relationship (e.g., Cropanzano et al., in press).
Another salient set of conflicting results was found regarding pride as resulting from the
interaction between outcome favorability and procedural justice (Cropanzano et al.,
2000), or as resulting from outcome favorability alone (Weiss et al., 1999; Krehbiel &
Cropanzano, 2000; Offenstein et al., 2005). That guilt is an emotional reaction to distrib-
utive injustice (over-rewarding), and that it is often co-experienced with positive emotions
such as happiness, was a repeated finding, as is the co-experience of emotions that have
opposing affective tones.
The largest set of results relates to the boundary conditions surrounding the relation-
ships of procedural justice and affect. Multiple studies have examined various boundary
conditions using different theoretical perspectives, resulting in such a wide array of
boundary conditions (e.g., the availability of a reference, appropriate voice, mortality
salience, opportunities to self-reaffirm, leadership style, group identification, and
outcome favorability) that we can only say with certainty that the nature of the relation-
ship between procedural justice and affect depends on other factors. We hope future
theory and research will help in forming a coherent picture of these boundary conditions.
What do we still need to study?

In addition to some directions for future research that we have described throughout
this chapter, we would like to suggest a few more here. First and foremost is the resolu-
tion of some of the conflicting findings that we identified throughout this chapter. We
believe that a good theory can help in this regard, and can serve as an exciting research
agenda for a long time. Second, we need further study on interactional justice and its
components: informational and interpersonal justice. Third, there is little study of the
interaction between justice and affect, of affect as an antecedent to justice or as a medi-
ator, or with justice as a mediator to affect on outcomes. More studies examining these
issues are of great importance if we are to understand organizational processes more
thoroughly.
Furthermore, an area receiving no attention thus far is cross-cultural research on affect
and justice. That is, with one exception (Mikula et al., 1998), none of the studies reviewed
examined the potential for culture to influence the affect/justice relationship. Current
research and theory show cultural influences on justice perceptions (e.g., Brockner et al.,
2000; Gelfand et al., 2002; Leung, 2005) and on emotions (e.g., Markus & Kitayama,
1991; Mesquita, 2001), but none examined the effects of culture with both justice and
emotions in the same study. We believe that this is a productive area for future research.
Finally, many studies examine reactions to unfairness and negatively toned affect.
Therefore, studying positively toned affective phenomena and justice and injustice can be
of great interest and importance.
Some specific suggestions for future research

The extant research on affect and justice has contributed greatly to our understanding of
the relationship between justice and affect in the organizational context. More than any-
thing, the research has highlighted the importance and complexity of this relationship and
we are positive that our review of that research will inspire new work. As such, we would
like to share some aspects of the current research that we hope will be addressed in the
future. These include: (a) the lack of differentiation between the various affective phe-
nomena, (b) the use of many theories without enough convergence of support to any, and
(c) moderators and mediators.
First is the lack of differentiation between the various affective phenomena. We often
found it very difficult to conclude which affective phenomena were actually examined: was
it mood or an emotion, and if the latter, which emotion was actually examined? This con-
fusion often resulted from the operationalization of state affect in many of the studies.
Researchers have examined emotions by asking participants to rate lists of emotion terms
(not from validated work) that were then summarized to form an overall measure of ‘neg-
ative’ and ‘positive’ emotions, the nature of which was unclear. It has already been sug-
gested (Lazarus & Cohen-Charash, 2001) that research in the organizational context
should focus on discrete emotions due to the unique relational themes, antecedents, and
outcomes of various discrete emotions of similar positive or negative valence. Although
several studies did examine discrete emotions, many to date have ignored this recommen-
dation, and others have used measures that have not been validated or measures with no
clear theoretical grounding, leading to a difficulty in understanding the nature of the state
affect actually studied. That being said, however, we do recognize the importance of
studying moods due to their theoretical and practical importance, and unique features
regarding decision making. Thus, we encourage researchers to examine the relationship
of both mood and discrete emotions with justice, using valid and theoretically based mea-
sures.
Second, with regard to theory, we have reviewed many theories that have been used to
explain the relationship between justice and affect, theories that have been confirmed or
validated (e.g., affect as information), and still others that may apply but have not been
explicitly tested (e.g., associative network theory, Bower, 1981). Moreover, some theories
have not been examined systematically, making it difficult to arrive at conclusions regard-
ing their applicability. Further, the examination of other theories yielded conflicting
results. Thus, although we encourage a continued expansion of the theoretical bases for
the examination of affect and justice, we do hope that researchers will also continue the
challenging work of deeply examining the theories we reviewed in this chapter and getting
to convergence regarding their relative importance and validity in the context of affect
and justice.
Third, our chapter reveals a vast array of variables studied in the context of affect and
justice. One can conclude from our review that some organization to the future study of
affect and justice is necessary (a) if researchers wish to conduct meta-analyses on the field,
(b) if researchers are to draw overall conclusions regarding the relationship, and (c) if the-
oretical development is to occur. Therefore, researchers should take the dual challenge of
expanding the list of variables examined so as to account for the wide array of emotional
experiences and justice perceptions in organizations, and at the same time reach conver-
gence regarding existing variables.
In conclusion, after completing this review chapter we are more inspired than ever to
advance research in the area of examining affect and justice. This chapter can serve as a
good review for many already in the field and for those just starting out. It is our hope
that others reading this chapter feel enthused to launch new research in this area, and con-
tinue to do so for many years to come.
Notes
1. For length considerations, we focused only on studies that examined pure affective and justice constructs.
For this reason, we omitted many studies such as those examining stress and satisfaction as affective phe-
nomena, and deservingness as a type of justice. We also refrained from discussing studies that were clearly
unrelated to the organizational world.
2. We use the terms ‘justice’ and ‘fairness’ interchangeably.
3. Research findings are not always in accordance with the theory, however. For example, although often
research finds that positive mood leads to less systematic information processing (e.g., Forgas, 1998), other
research shows that positive mood increases information processing (e.g., Wegener et al., 1995). Similarly,
although some research demonstrates that negative mood leads to more scrutiny when individuals process
information (e.g., Elsbach & Barr, 1999), other research shows that negative mood does not always lead to
careful information processing (e.g., Bohner & Weinerth, 2001). Moreover, at times, careful information pro-
cessing impairs judgment (Ambady & Gray, 2002). Finally, the nature of the information can also change
mood (e.g., Raghunathan & Trope, 2002), which implies a reverse causation to that described by ‘affect-as-
information’.
4. Immoral behavior (e.g., being lazy, telling lies, taking advantage of others, or having sexual relations with a
boss or subordinate) made up the next category recalled with 23 per cent, and disrespect was recalled 11 per
cent of the time.
5. Although today satisfaction is considered a job attitude (Weiss, 2002), at the time equity theory was devel-
oped and extensively examined, job satisfaction was considered an emotion (Weiss & Brief, 2001). Still, some
researchers (e.g., Austin & Walster, 1974b) did differentiate between cognitive reactions to equity (i.e., job
satisfaction) and affective reactions to equity (i.e., mood).
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23 Emotion in conflict and negotiation: introducing
the emotions as social information (EASI) model
Gerben A. Van Kleef
Introduction
Conflict is omnipresent in organizational life. One of the most common and constructive
ways of resolving conflict is through negotiation, which can be defined as a discussion
between two or more parties aimed at resolving a perceived divergence of interests (Pruitt
& Carnevale, 1993). For example, members of a work team may negotiate the division of
labor, employees may negotiate with their bosses about a salary raise, and CEOs may
negotiate the terms of a merger. As we all know from personal experience, conflict
and negotiation often bring about intense emotions, which may in turn strongly influence
negotiation behavior and conflict development (Barry et al., 2004). But how do emotions
influence conflict behavior? In this chapter I review research that is pertinent to this ques-
tion, and I introduce a model that accounts for the interpersonal effects of emotions in
conflict and negotiation: the emotions as social information (EASI) model.1
When thinking about the role of emotions in conflict and negotiation, it is helpful to
distinguish between intra- and interpersonal effects (see Morris & Keltner, 2000; Van
Kleef et al., 2004a). Intrapersonal effects refer to the influence of an individual’s emotions
on his or her own behavior. Among other things, positive moods and emotions have been
shown to increase concession making (Baron, 1990), stimulate creative problem solving
(Isen et al., 1987), increase joint gains (Carnevale & Isen, 1986; Allred et al., 1997),
increase preferences for cooperation (Baron et al., 1990), reduce the use of contentious
tactics (Carnevale & Isen, 1986), and increase the use of cooperative negotiation strate-
gies (Forgas, 1998). By contrast, negative affect has been shown to decrease initial offers
(Baron et al., 1990), decrease joint gains (Allred et al., 1997), promote the rejection of ulti-
matum offers (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996), increase the use of competitive strategies
(Forgas, 1998), and decrease the desire for future interaction (Allred et al., 1997). Because
this research has recently been thoroughly reviewed elsewhere (see Barry et al., 2004), I
will not go into detail here. Let it suffice to say that a substantial number of studies have
now consistently demonstrated that individuals experiencing positive affect tend to be
more cooperative and conciliatory, whereas individuals who are in a negative affective
state tend to be more competitive and reluctant to make concessions.
The purpose of this chapter is to review and integrate research on the interpersonal
effects of emotions, that is, the way one party’s emotions may affect other people’s behav-
ior. After two decades of an almost exclusive focus on intrapersonal effects, recent years
have witnessed a rapidly growing attention to this topic. Scholars working in this new area
of research have asked themselves questions such as: how do negotiators respond to their
counterpart’s emotions? Can emotions be strategically used to extract concessions? If so,
which emotions would be most effective in eliciting compliance? And, how do negotiators
react to their opponent’s expressions of anger? Will they be intimidated and give in, or
392
Emotion in conflict and negotiation 393
will they feel affronted and become intransigent? These and other questions will be
answered in this chapter, which unfolds as follows. First, I briefly discuss relevant theo-
retical perspectives on the interpersonal effects of emotions in general, which will facili-
tate understanding of the effects of emotions in conflict and negotiation. I then review the
rapidly growing body of empirical findings, and identify consistencies and inconsistencies
among these findings. After that, I introduce the EASI model of the interpersonal effects
of emotions in social and organizational life, which aims to integrate the research that has
been conducted so far and reconcile apparently inconsistent findings by distinguishing
two distinct paths of emotional influence and identifying two sets of key moderators. The
chapter closes with suggestions for future research.
Interpersonal effects of emotions

In his 1996 article, ‘Emotions are social’, Parkinson proposed that emotions are best
viewed as social rather than individual phenomena. Indeed, inspired by the early writings
of Darwin (1872), researchers have identified a number of important social functions of
emotions (e.g., Frijda, 1986; Oatley & Jenkins, 1992; Keltner & Haidt, 1999). At the inter-
personal level, emotions convey information to others about an individual’s feelings
(Ekman, 1993), social intentions (Fridlund, 1992; Van Kleef et al., 2004a), and orienta-
tion toward the relationship (Knutson, 1996). Further, emotional expressions may evoke
reciprocal or complementary emotions in others that may in turn help individuals respond
adaptively to social events (Keltner & Haidt, 1999). For example, expressions of anger
have been demonstrated to elicit fear in observers (Dimberg & Öhman, 1996; Van Kleef
et al., 2004a), and displays of distress have been shown to elicit sympathy (Eisenberg et
al., 1989). Finally, emotions have been argued to serve as positive or negative reinforcers
for other individuals’ behavior (Klinnert et al., 1983). More specifically, positive emotions
may encourage others to continue their course of action, whereas negative emotions may
serve as a call for behavioral adjustment (Averill, 1982; Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999; Van
Kleef et al., 2004a).
Through these various mechanisms, emotional expressions may influence interpersonal
behavior and regulate social interaction. In the context of conflict and negotiation, the
vast majority of studies focused on the effects of anger and, sometimes, happiness. My
review of the empirical literature starts with these studies, not only because they are more
numerous than studies on other emotions, but also because they marked the beginning of
this new, burgeoning area of research.
Studies on anger and happiness

In the first empirical study of the interpersonal effects of emotions in negotiations, Van
Kleef et al. (2004a) investigated the effects of anger and happiness. In the course of a com-
puter-mediated negotiation, participants received information about their (simulated)
opponent’s emotional state. For example, participants would read messages from their
opponent saying: ‘this negotiation pisses me off’ or ‘this offer makes me really happy’. The
results showed that participants with an angry opponent made larger concessions than
did participants with a non-emotional opponent (control condition), whereas partici-
pants with a happy opponent made smaller concessions. A second study revealed that
negotiators used their opponent’s emotions to identify his or her limits, and subsequently
used this information to make a counter-offer. Negotiators who were confronted with an
angry opponent estimated the opponent’s limit to be high, and to avoid a costly impasse
they made relatively large concessions. Conversely, negotiators with a happy opponent
judged the opponent’s limit to be low, felt no need to concede in order to avoid an impasse,
and accordingly made relatively small concessions. This experiment further revealed that
the effects of anger and happiness are mitigated when the opponent makes large conces-
sions and thereby undermines the focal negotiator’s motivation to take the other’s
emotion into account. Finally, a third study indicated that the effects of anger and hap-
piness are diminished when the focal negotiator’s attention is distracted from the oppo-
nent’s emotion.
Compatible findings were obtained in two experiments by Sinaceur and Tiedens (2006).
In a scenario study and in a face-to-face negotiation experiment in which one of the nego-
tiators was instructed to display either anger or no emotion, they found that participants
conceded more to angry as opposed to non-emotional counterparts. Furthermore, and in
line with Van Kleef et al.’s (2004a) finding that negotiators use their opponent’s emotions
to infer the other’s limit, Sinaceur and Tiedens demonstrated that the effects of anger and
happiness are mediated by the focal negotiator’s appraisal of the opponent’s toughness,
with angry opponents appearing tougher and therefore eliciting larger concessions than
non-emotional counterparts.
These studies suggest that emotions provide important strategic information (e.g.,
limits, toughness), which may in turn influence observers’ behavior. Building on this idea,
Van Kleef et al. (2004b) examined whether the effects of anger and happiness depend on
the focal negotiator’s motivation to consider the information that is provided by the
other’s emotions. In three experiments they found strong support for this idea.
Experiment 1 revealed that negotiators’ tendency to concede more to an angry opponent
than to a happy one was moderated by individual differences in the need for cognitive
closure (see Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Participants with a low need for cognitive
closure (high motivation) were strongly affected by the opponent’s emotion, whereas
those with a high need for cognitive closure (low motivation) were unaffected. Experiment
2 revealed a similar pattern for a situational manipulation of motivation. Participants
who negotiated under low time pressure (high motivation) were strongly influenced by the
other’s emotion, whereas those under high time pressure (low motivation) were not.
Furthermore, this moderating effect of time pressure was mediated by information pro-
cessing – participants who negotiated under high time pressure engaged in less thorough
information processing, which rendered them impervious to the information about their
counterpart’s emotional state. Finally, in keeping with other research showing that power
reduces the motivation to consider information about other people (e.g., Fiske, 1993; De
Dreu & Van Kleef, 2004), a third study showed that low-power negotiators conceded more
to an angry counterpart than to a happy one, whereas high-power negotiators were
unaffected by the other’s emotion.
In a study on online negotiation, Friedman et al. (2004) obtained compatible findings.
They argued that responses to another’s anger expressions depend on one’s position in the
negotiation. Negotiators who are in a weak position, they argue, are more likely to
respond in a conciliatory fashion to an opponent’s anger than are negotiators with a
strong negotiation position. In line with this reasoning, Friedman et al. found that expres-
sions of anger elicited concessions when observers had a vulnerable position (i.e., an unfa-
vorable reputation). However, when observers had a strong position (a good reputation),
the other’s anger expressions triggered anger in the observing party, and thereby reduced
the likelihood of settlement.
The importance of the negotiator’s (power) position in determining the interpersonal
effects of emotions is underscored by a number of other studies as well. Sinaceur and
Tiedens’s (2006) study revealed that only negotiators who had few alternatives to a nego-
tiated agreement (i.e, low power) conceded more to an angry opponent than to a non-
emotional one; participants who had ample alternatives (high power) were unaffected by
the other’s emotion. Replicating and extending these findings, Van Kleef et al. (2006b)
showed that the moderating influence of power generalizes across different samples
(undergraduate students, general population, managers), research methods (laboratory
experiment, field simulation, scenarios), and power bases (number of alternatives, quality
of best alternative, managerial support, and legitimate power). In a series of five studies
in the Netherlands and Italy, the authors showed that negotiators with few or poor alter-
natives to a negotiated agreement, little support from their management, or low legitimate
power (i.e., power based on one’s position in an organization) were strongly affected by
their opponent’s anger. In contrast, negotiators with many or highly attractive alterna-
tives, strong support from management, or high legitimate power were immune to their
counterpart’s emotional state.
The studies discussed so far point to what one might call the beneficial effects of anger
(and the disadvantageous effects of happiness). However, as one might expect, research
has also documented negative effects of anger. First, a number of studies have found detri-
mental effects of anger on interpersonal liking and related constructs. Negotiators dealing
with an angry (as opposed to a happy or non-emotional) opponent have been shown to
develop a more negative impression of the other and to be less satisfied with the negotia-
tion (Van Kleef et al., 2004a), to become angry themselves (Friedman et al., 2004; Van
Kleef et al., 2004a), and to be less willing to engage in future interaction (Van Kleef et al.,
2004b; Kopelman et al., 2006). Furthermore, two of these studies provide support for the
intuitively plausible idea that expressing anger may also have aversive consequences for a
negotiator’s immediate economic outcomes. Friedman et al. found that negotiations are
more likely to break down when negotiators express anger toward an opponent with a
strong negotiation position. Additional evidence is provided by a series of studies by
Kopelman et al. (2006). In a first study, they showed that negotiators who displayed neg-
ative affect (or no emotion) were less likely to incorporate a future business relationship
in the contract than were those who expressed positive affect. In a second study,
Kopelman et al. found that negotiators who strategically displayed negative affect were
less likely to close a deal than were those who expressed positive affect, because counter-
parts were less willing to pay a negotiator who expressed negative (rather than positive)
affect. Finally, in a third experiment, negotiators made more extreme demands when
facing a partner who strategically displayed negative (rather than positive or neutral)
affect.
In sum, a number of studies have documented beneficial effects of anger, showing that
negotiators make larger concessions when confronted with an angry opponent as com-
pared to a happy or non-emotional one. However, these studies also generated negative
effects of anger on experienced emotions, impressions of the partner, and willingness to
engage in future negotiation. Moreover, some studies provided evidence that expressions
of negative emotions may backfire, decreasing the likelihood of successful deal-making
and impairing negotiation outcomes. These inconsistent effects of anger versus happiness
on conflict and negotiation behavior and outcomes suggest that one or more moderators
are at play. Before discussing some candidate moderators I first review the sparse research
on other emotions.
Studies on other emotions

Although the number of studies on the interpersonal effects of anger (and, to a lesser
degree, happiness) is growing rapidly, the amount of research that has focused on other
emotions is severely limited. Nevertheless, the studies that have been done provide some
important insights into the workings of emotions in conflict and negotiation. For
example, Thompson et al. (1995) investigated how an opponent’s signs of disappointment
versus happiness affect a focal negotiator’s judgments regarding negotiation success. They
found that, independent of objective negotiation performance, negotiators felt more suc-
cessful when the opponent was disappointed rather than happy. This finding indicates that
negotiators take the other’s disappointment as a signal that the other was hoping for more,
suggesting that they themselves did a good job in extracting concessions from the other.
In a similar vein, Van Kleef et al. (2006a) addressed emotions that may arise as a result
of the appraisal that one has taken too much or received too little from one’s opponent.
Specifically, the authors focused on the interpersonal effects of disappointment, worry,
guilt, and regret on demands and concessions in negotiations. In a first experiment they
showed that participants whose opponents expressed emotions of appeasement (guilt or
regret) developed a positive impression of their opponents but were non-conciliatory in
the level of their demands. By contrast, participants whose opponents showed supplica-
tion emotions (disappointment or worry) rated their opponents less positively, but they
made larger concessions in the course of the negotiation.
These findings were replicated and extended in a second experiment, which considered
the role of trust. The data revealed that individuals with low levels of dispositional trust
were more likely to discount the other’s emotions rather than take them into account when
forming their negotiation strategy. Accordingly, negotiators high in trust responded with
high demands to a guilty opponent and with low demands to a disappointed opponent,
whereas negotiators low in trust did not respond differentially to their opponent’s emo-
tions. This experiment also shed light on the processes underlying the effects of guilt and
disappointment. Results pertaining to participants’ interpretation of their counterpart’s
emotions indicated that guilt is interpreted to mean that the other has claimed too much,
whereas disappointment is taken as a signal that the other has received too little.
The experiment further showed that negotiators with high levels of trust made smaller
demands to a disappointed opponent than to a guilty one because the other’s disap-
pointment led them to lower their goals, whereas the other’s guilt led them to raise their
goals. In a third experiment, Van Kleef et al. manipulated trust by varying participants’
expectations regarding the opponent’s cooperative versus competitive orientation (see
Van Kleef & De Dreu, 2002; Steinel & De Dreu, 2004), and the results of Experiment 2
were replicated. Participants who expected a cooperative opponent exhibited higher levels
of trust and made larger concessions to a disappointed opponent and smaller concessions
to a guilty opponent. By contrast, subjects who were led to believe that the opponent had
a competitive orientation were less trusting and did not respond differentially to the
opponent’s disappointment versus guilt.
In short, the few studies that have addressed emotions other than anger and happiness
indicate that emotions such as guilt, regret, disappointment, and worry, too, have theo-
retically meaningful interpersonal effects on negotiation behavior and conflict develop-
ment. These discrete emotions signal specific information that may subsequently feed into
negotiators’ strategic decision making, and thereby affect their cooperative versus com-
petitive tendencies.
The EASI model

As is clear from the above, research on the interpersonal effects of emotions in conflict
and negotiation has produced considerable converging evidence regarding the effects of
discrete emotions on conflict behavior and outcomes. However, we have also seen incon-
sistent findings, expecially with regard to the effects of anger. In order to integrate previ-
ous findings and resolve the apparent inconsistencies, I now introduce the EASI model
(see Figure 23.1), which was developed to account for the interpersonal effects of emo-
tions in social and organizational life. Below I discuss the main propositions of the model.
One of the core foundations of the EASI model is the idea that emotions provide infor-
mation. As alluded to earlier, the idea is that emotional expressions convey information
about an individual’s thoughts, feelings, and intentions (Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Van Kleef
et al., 2004a). In this way emotions may influence others’ behavior by informing them
about the individual’s wishes and possible future course of action. Emotions also tend to
evoke complementary or reciprocal emotions in others, which may in turn inform their
behavior (Keltner & Haidt, 1999). Finally, emotions can serve as incentives or deterrents
for others’ behavior (Klinnert et al., 1983; Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999).
Although the relationship between emotion and information is also featured in other
models, such as the affect-as-information model (Schwarz & Clore, 1983), the affect
priming model (Bower, 1981), and the affect infusion model (Forgas, 1995), the EASI
model is notably different in a number of respects. First, in contrast to other models, EASI
is a model of interpersonal (rather than intrapersonal) effects. That is, the purpose of the
Affective reactions
Emotional Processing Social–

motivation relational Behavior
expression
factors
Strategic inferences
Figure 23.1 The EASI model

EASI model is to predict how one person’s emotional expressions affect other people’s
behavior. Thus, unlike other models, EASI can explain how negotiators are affected by
their counterparts’ emotions. Second, EASI focuses predominantly on discrete emotions,
as opposed to more diffuse mood states. As such, the EASI model moves beyond the
valence approach that characterizes many other models, and posits that – just as each
emotion has a specific appraisal pattern (see, e.g., Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991) – each dis-
crete emotion conveys specific information, the interpretation of which may depend on
the situation. For example, in a negotiation an opponent’s anger may signal that one has
to moderate one’s claims in order to reach an agreement. Finally, EASI distinguishes two
distinct paths through which emotions may exert interpersonal influence: the ‘strategic
information’ path and the ‘affective reactions’ path. The key assumption is that emotional
expressions may elicit both strategic inferences and affective reactions, both of which may
feed into behavior.
The strategic information path

The EASI model posits that one of the two main processes through which emotions may
exert effects on the interpersonal level is by providing strategic information. For example,
as mentioned earlier, in a negotiation an opponent’s anger may indicate that s/he has
ambitious goals and is ‘hard to get’ (Van Kleef et al., 2004a, b; Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006),
implying that one needs to make a better offer in order to reach agreement. As another
example, an opponent’s expressions of guilt or interpersonal regret may signal that the
opponent feels s/he has asked too much or conceded too little, which would imply that
one can adopt a tough stance. Conversely, expressions of disappointment or worry may
signal that the other has not received enough, which would mean that one may have to
give in (Van Kleef et al., 2006a). In short, the model posits that each discrete emotion
conveys unique information, which observers may use to draw strategic inferences to
determine their behavior.
The affective reactions path

According to the EASI model, emotions may also exert interpersonal influence through
a more affective route. Research has documented that, much in agreement with lay intu-
ition, positive affect is more conducive to positive impressions, interpersonal liking, and
constructive interpersonal relationships than negative affect (Isen, 1987; Fredrickson,
1998). Compatible effects on impressions have been found in negotiation research. As
indicated earlier, negotiators’ expressions of anger (compared to neutral or positive
expressions) have been found to produce negative impressions, low satisfaction, negative
feelings, and a reduced willingness to engage in future negotiation (Friedman et al., 2004;
Van Kleef et al., 2004a, b; Kopelman et al., 2006), which promote competitive behavior.
The association between emotional expressions and affective reactions is not confined to
anger and happiness, for other emotions, too, have been found to affect interpersonal
impressions. For instance, Van Kleef et al. (2006a) showed that expressions of guilt and
regret contribute to more favorable impressions than expressions of disappointment and
worry. In sum, in addition to affecting negotiators’ behavior by providing strategic infor-
mation about a counterpart’s intentions and aspirations, emotions may also influence
behavior by eliciting affective reactions.
Strategic inferences compete with affective reactions

The foregoing discussion suggests that individuals’ reactions to another person’s emo-
tional expressions may be fueled by two different motivations: (i) to act strategically and
(ii) to act on their ‘gut feelings’. In some situations these motivations may be congruent,
but in many other cases they are likely to conflict. For example, when faced with an angry
opponent, one’s gut feelings may motivate one to retaliate, whereas strategic considera-
tions may advise one to give in. Conversely, when faced with a happy opponent, positive
affective reactions may motivate affiliation and cooperation, while strategic considera-
tions may invite competitive behavior. As a final example, expressions of guilt or regret
may motivate one to reciprocate with cooperative behavior, but they may also promote
exploitation. The EASI model proposes that the interpersonal effects of emotions on
behavior depend on the relative strength of these two, often conflicting, motivations. In
some situations strategic considerations may be so powerful that they completely over-
shadow affective reactions, while in other situations the reverse may be true. What, then,
determines the relative predictive strength of the two motivations? The EASI model pro-
poses two sets of moderators to answer this question: variables affecting individuals’
information processing motivation and social–relational factors.
Information processing As pointed out above, a core assumption of the model is that
emotions provide strategic information. Building on this idea, and drawing on models of
information processing (see, e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993;
Chaiken & Trope, 1999), the EASI model posits that the interpersonal effects of emotions
depend on the extent to which the emotion-perceiving individual is motivated to process
the information that is inherent in those emotions. More specifically, the stronger the
motivation to process the information, the stronger will be the relative predictive power
of the strategic information path. Conversely, the relative predictive power of the affective
reactions path is assumed to increase to the extent that information processing motiva-
tion decreases.
Information processing motivation differs as a function of individual differences and
characteristics of the situation (see De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003, for a review). Personality
characteristics that promote information processing include, among other things, need for
cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) and fear of invalidity (Thompson et al., 2001).
Examples of personality variables that are associated with a reduced processing motiva-
tion are need for cognitive closure (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996) and personal need for
structure (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993). Situational factors that increase information pro-
cessing motivation include attractiveness of and personal involvement in the task (Petty
& Cacioppo, 1986; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993), accountability (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986;
Tetlock, 1992; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993), and framing of outcomes in terms of losses
(Dunegan, 1993). Conditions that have been shown to decrease processing likelihood
include environmental noise (Kruglanski & Webster, 1991), mental fatigue (Webster et al.,
1996), time pressure (Heaton & Kruglanski, 1991; Van Kleef et al., 2004b), and power
(Fiske, 1993; Goodwin et al., 2000).
The EASI model predicts that individuals are more likely to act on the strategic infor-
mation conveyed by others’ emotions to the degree that they are motivated to pay attention
to and process this strategic content. In line with this prediction, research has found that
negotiators exhibit stronger strategic responses to their counterpart’s emotions (i.e., more
concessions to an angry opponent than to a happy one) when they have a low rather than
a high need for cognitive closure, when there is low rather than high time pressure (Van
Kleef et al., 2004b), and when they have low rather than high power (Sinaceur & Tiedens,
2006; Van Kleef et al., 2006b). Apparently, factors affecting individuals’ information pro-
cessing tendencies moderate their reactions to the strategic information provided by others’
emotions. As a further illustration of this point, Van Kleef et al. (2004b) demonstrated that
the moderating influence of time pressure on negotiators’ responses to their counterpart’s
emotions was mediated by the depth of their information processing.
Social–relational factors The second class of moderators that determine the relative
impact of the affective reactions path and the strategic inferences path concerns
social–relational factors. Among other factors, these include status relations (e.g., equal
or different), the structure of interdependence (e.g., who depends more on whom), organ-
izational or cultural norms pertaining to the expression of emotion (e.g., the presence or
absence of ‘display rules’; Matsumoto, 1993), the way the emotion is expressed (e.g.,
whether the intensity of the expression is commensurate with the significance of the situ-
ation), and the appropriateness of the emotion in light of its cause (e.g., whether the
emotion is warranted given what happened). The idea is that emotional expressions are
more likely to elicit strong affective responses (and thereby trigger the affective reactions
path) when they are in some way unfitting given the situation. As the power of the affective
reactions path thus increases, the relative predictive power of the strategic information
path decreases, and negotiators should be less likely to act on the strategic implications of
their counterpart’s emotions.
Some initial support for this prediction comes from a recent study by Steinel et al.
(2008), who showed that negotiators responded in a conciliatory fashion to angry (as
opposed to happy) opponents when the anger was directed at their offers, whereas they
responded with competitive behavior when the anger was directed at them personally.
According to the EASI model, directing negative emotions at a negotiator’s behavior
rather than at them personally might be advisable for two reasons. First, directing nega-
tive emotions at someone’s behavior may be seen as more acceptable and less affronting,
resulting in less powerful affective reactions. As a result, the affective reactions path
should have relatively low power in driving the target’s behavior. This idea fits nicely with
the famous advice to ‘separate the people from the problem’ and direct negative feedback
at a negotiator’s offers rather than at them personally (Fisher & Ury, 1981). Second, emo-
tions may be more informative when they are specifically targeted toward a person’s con-
crete behavior. As a result, the predictive strength of the strategic information path should
be higher when anger is directed at a negotiator’s offers rather than at their behavior. In
support of this idea, Steinel et al. found that the opponent’s expressions of anger affected
negotiators’ appraisals of the opponent’s limits (and thereby their behavior) when the
anger focused on the negotiator’s offers, but not when it focused on them as a person.
In another recent study, Van Kleef and Côté (2007) examined the interplay between the
two classes of moderators that determine the power of the strategic information path and
the affective reactions path. They varied participants’ power (high or low) and manipu-
lated the appropriateness of the counterpart’s emotion by installing a display rule that
prohibited expressions of negative emotion (or not). They found that low-power nego-
tiators (i.e., those with a relatively high information processing motivation) conceded
more when the opponent expressed anger than when the opponent expressed no emotion.
In contrast, high-power negotiators (those with a relatively low processing motivation)
did not give in to their counterpart’s anger. Moreover, when the opponent’s anger violated
a display rule, negotiators developed a strong desire to strike back at the opponent. As a
result, high power (but not low power) negotiators with an angry opponent became more
competitive than negotiators with a non-emotional counterpart. This study illustrates
that the effects of anger can be accurately predicted and understood by considering mod-
erating variables that influence the relative impact of the strategic information path and
the affective reactions path on conflict and negotiation behavior.
Contributions
Applying the EASI model to the area of conflict and negotiation is useful for two main
reasons. First, it helps integrate and organize current scientific knowledge pertaining to the
interpersonal effects of emotions in conflict and negotiation. The idea that emotions
provide strategic information, which is a central assumption of the model, serves as an
organizing principle that helps to integrate and understand the effects of a great diversity
of emotions, including anger, happiness, guilt, regret, disappointment, and worry.
Furthermore, this notion may serve as a guiding principle in developing new research and
generating hypotheses about the effects of other emotions which have not yet been studied.
According to the model, the effects of any emotion can be predicted and understood by
considering its specific meaning and the strategic and social information it conveys.
The second main contribution of the EASI model is that it helps to explain seemingly
inconsistent findings by distinguishing two distinct paths of emotional influence and iden-
tifying two classes of moderators that determine the relative importance of each. For
example, we can now begin to understand why anger sometimes has beneficial effects
while at other times it has detrimental effects. To understand the disparate effects of anger,
we must consider social–relational factors, such as the appropriateness of the anger
expression, as well as considering individual and situational factors that determine nego-
tiators’ information processing tendencies.
Directions for the future

As became clear from the literature review, most research on the interpersonal effects of
emotions in conflict and negotiation has focused on anger and happiness. In stark con-
trast, only a few studies have addressed the effects of other emotions, and as a result we
know very little about their impact on conflict and negotiation behavior. There is a lot of
room for fruitful research in this area. It would be interesting, for example, to investigate
the workings of the strategic information path and the affective reactions path with other
emotions such as guilt and disappointment. Can the interpersonal effects of guilt and dis-
appointment on concession making be reversed by manipulating social–relational
factors? For example, would disappointment backfire in a situation where such an
emotion is inappropriate? And would expressions of guilt play out more favorably when
the situation puts a strong emphasis on the importance of the interpersonal relationship,
thus rewarding expressions of guilt? Furthermore, future research could invest in study-
ing the interpersonal effects of emotions that have not yet been addressed in the context
of conflict and negotiation, such as fear, sadness, embarrassment, and contempt, to name
but a few.
Another avenue for future study concerns the long-term consequences of emo-
tions. For example, how does anger influence the relationship between parties in conflict
over time? Do the beneficial effects of anger persist over time, or do they diminish or
even backfire in the long run? And how long or how often can one express anger
without risking negative consequences? The EASI model would suggest that the
effects of emotional expressions depend at least in part on the perceived appropriate-
ness of the expression. One possible hypothesis that could be derived from the
model would be that the favorable effects of anger persist for as long as the anger is
deemed appropriate, and fade away or possibly reverse when the anger is perceived as
inappropriate.
A final suggestion for future research concerns the role of conflict issues in negotiations.
Negotiations may involve interests, factual issues, and normative issues (Harinck et al.,
2000). The conflict issue at hand influences the extent to which parties reach win–win
agreements, and how they communicate with each other. For instance, negotiators are less
likely to yield to the other party when normative issues rather than interests are at stake.
The idea is that individuals are personally attached to their norms and values, and that
making trade-offs on issues related to norms and values is inappropriate (Tetlock et al.,
2000; Wade-Benzoni et al., 2002). Based on the EASI model it can be expected that anger
will be less effective or even harmful when the negotiation centers around normative issues
rather than interests, because in the former case people are more likely to perceive others’
expressions of anger as unacceptable.
Conclusion
The review of research presented in this chapter shows that the study of interpersonal
effects of emotions is burgeoning. Over the last 10 years or so, a considerable number of
studies have been conducted, which have contributed in important ways to our under-
standing of the social effects of emotions in organizational life. Now that there is a solid
amount of empirical data, the time is ripe to start thinking about ways to integrate our
current knowledge. In this chapter I made a first attempt to do so by introducing the EASI
model. Using a number of simple and testable assumptions, the model helps to integrate
the knowledge we have accumulated so far, reconcile seemingly inconsistent findings, and
guide future research endeavors. Beyond providing an overview of the current state of the
art of research on the interpersonal effects of emotions in organizations, I hope that this
chapter will stimulate future investigations in this fascinating and important area of
research, which I expect to blossom for years to come.
Note
1. The emotions as social information (EASI) model is a general model of the interpersonal effects of emo-
tions in social and organizational life. Since a great deal of support for the model stems from research on
conflict and negotiation, it provides a useful framework to organize and synthesize current knowledge about
the interpersonal effects of emotions in conflict and negotiation.
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24 The power of presence: strategic response to
displayed emotions in negotiations
Shirli Kopelman, Ilan G. Gewurz and Vera Sacharin
Introduction
Negotiators constantly manage emotions. They manage their own emotions – both those
they experience and those they display – as well as the emotions displayed by others.
Emotions experienced by a negotiator during the negotiating process may be integral to
the given task or merely the result of an unrelated event where the emotional impact has
spilled over to the current situation (Lerner & Keltner, 2000). Such integral and inciden-
tal emotions may emerge unintentionally and be displayed mindlessly. Alternatively,
negotiators may consciously adjust their emotional display to serve their objectives, by
amplifying or suppressing an authentically experienced emotion, or altogether feigning a
desired emotion (Hochschild, 1983; Rafaeli & Sutton, 1991). Emotions are considered
authentic when internally experienced and externally displayed emotions align (Côté,
2005). A growing body of empirical literature has documented how displays of emotion
influence both financial and relational outcomes in negotiations (for a review, see Barry
et al., 2006; Li & Roloff, 2006). However, the empirical literature has not addressed the
choices negotiators face when responding to emotions displayed by other individuals.
Whether integral or incidental, subconscious or mindful, authentic or feigned, emo-
tions that have a strategic impact on the negotiation process and outcome – strategic emo-
tions – can be advantageous or counterproductive to the individual displaying
the emotions (Frank, 1988; Barry, 1999; Kopelman et al., 2006). Strategic display of pos-
itive emotion helps the development of reciprocal long-term relationships in potentially
integrative settings and increases the likelihood of closing a favorable deal in distributive
settings (Kopelman et al., 2006). While pounding one’s fist on the table and displaying dis-
content and anger might lead someone to make concessions during the negotiating
process (e.g., Rafaeli & Sutton, 1991; Van Kleef et al., 2004a; Sinaceur & Neale, 2005),
such a display may boomerang. Rather, displayed anger may reduce the likelihood that
an offer will be accepted by increasing the likelihood of a spiteful response (e.g., Pillutla
& Murnighan, 1996; Kopelman et al., 2006). Skilled negotiators must consider not only
their own strategic displays of emotions, but also how to strategically respond to the emo-
tions displayed by others.
This chapter extends the research on the strategic display of emotions during the nego-
tiating process and investigates how negotiators can optimize both relational and eco-
nomic outcomes through strategic response to displayed emotions. First, we consider
what information can be gained from observing the emotional display of another indi-
vidual during negotiations. Next we review what the negotiation literature suggests one
should do when faced with someone displaying emotion – either positive or negative. We
conclude by suggesting that future research needs to account for both the behavioral strat-
egy a negotiator adopts and the personal qualities of the negotiator. We suggest that the
405
recommendations in the literature overemphasize strategic tactics and underemphasize

the person employing those tactics. We argue that the success or failure of a strategic
response to displayed emotions during the negotiating process pivots on the responding
negotiator’s ability to balance strategic tactics with his or her authentic presence.
Emotional displays as a source of information

Prior to responding, a negotiator can observe and identify the emotional displays of the
other parties and thereby gain a number of important insights. Emotional displays are
defined as relatively short-lived affective episodes. In contrast, moods are more general,
stable, and diffuse and are either triggered by an identifiable event or brought on as a
means to achieve an aspired end1 (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 1996; Barry, 1999). The ability
to recognize both positive and negative displays of emotion in social interactions is con-
sidered an evolutionary adaptive human characteristic (Ekman, 1993), which can have
strategic implications for negotiators during the negotiation process. Research suggests
that people across cultures recognize six basic facial displays of emotions: anger, disgust,
fear, sadness, surprise, and happiness (Ekman et al., 1972). In order to strategically
respond to displayed emotions during the negotiating process, it is important to identify
the emotions people display during negotiations, along with understanding what infor-
mation they convey (Van Kleef, 2008).
A growing body of empirical research has documented the influence of emotions on
negotiation outcomes (e.g., Carnevale & Isen, 1986; Sutton & Rafaeli, 1988; Baron, 1990;
Rafaeli & Sutton, 1991; Allred et al., 1997; Kumar, 1997; Barry, 1999; Thompson et al.,
1999; Van Kleef et al., 2004a, 2004b; Sinaceur & Neale, 2005; Kopelman et al., 2006;
Kopelman & Rosette, 2008). Although negotiators may experience and display mixed
emotions during the negotiation process (Larsen et al., 2001; Peters et al., 2004), the nego-
tiation literature has predominantly focused on singular emotional displays and drawn a
relatively sharp distinction between positive and negative emotion, especially anger and
happiness. Displayed emotion can provide insights about how an individual cognitively
processes information, what the individual thinks about the situation, and the social rela-
tionships that develop between negotiators during the negotiating process.
How an emotional negotiator cognitively processes information

How negotiators think has implications for both the negotiation process and the outcome.
Emotions influence what information a negotiator will cognitively attend to, what is per-
ceived as important, and how much thought is likely to be exerted on a given task.
First, during the negotiation process, negotiators interpret information differently
depending upon whether the information is congruent or incongruent with the emotion
the negotiator is experiencing. Information which is congruent with the emotion will be
processed more effectively. For example, sad negotiators will identify sadness-congruent
words faster and will perceive arguments with a sad tone as more persuasive than argu-
ments with an angry tone, because sad emotions are congruent with their current personal
reality; Niedenthal et al., 1997). Likewise, a negotiator experiencing positive emotion is
more likely to notice and remember positive information, and may even interpret ambigu-
ous information in a positive light ( Forgas & Bower, 1987; Bower, 1991; Forgas, 1995).
When experiencing positive as opposed to negative emotion during negotiations, nego-
tiators may think and process information more broadly. Breadth of thought refers to
The power of presence 407
what one sees as possible, the number of perceived alternatives, and level of creativity.
From an evolutionary perspective, negative emotion is theoretically linked to narrowing
in on specific behavioral options, which is necessary for survival in life-or-death situations
(Tooby & Cosmides, 1990), whereas behaviors associated with positive emotion are rela-
tively vague and underspecified. Consequently, negotiators experiencing negative emotion
such as anger or disgust are likely to focus narrowly on information that relates to the
source of the emotion (Daly, 1991). This reduces the negotiator’s ability to think broadly
and generates a wide range of solution-oriented options, which may lead angry negotia-
tors to achieve lower joint gains (Allred et al., 1997). In contrast, positive emotion is more
likely to occur when people feel safe and satiated (Frijda, 1986; Fredrickson & Levenson,
1998). Positive emotion increases breadth of thought, creativity, flexibility in ideas, inno-
vative problem solving (Isen, 1987; Isen et al., 1987; Fredrickson & Levenson, 1998;
Fredrickson, 2001), more integrative offers in negotiations, and better joint outcomes
(Carnevale & Isen, 1986).
Finally, emotions influence not only breadth of thought, but also depth of thought; that
is, how much cognitive effort is exerted on processing the current task. According to
Tiedens and Linton (2001), the degree to which a situation is perceived with high certainty
is particularly important for understanding how deep or superficial information is
processed. Both anger and happiness are considered high-certainty emotions (e.g.,
Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003). Thus, despite their differing valence, both anger and happi-
ness lead to stereotypical information processing (Forgas, 1992) that relies on heuristics
and scripts (Forgas, 1992; Bodenhausen et al., 1994; Tiedens, 2001). Information that is
processed when one is in a happy mood is not necessarily worse than under a neutral
mood but merely more script driven, which under some circumstances can also be
beneficial (e.g., in multi-tasking situations where cognitive resources are limited; Bless
et al., 1996; Forgas & Fiedler, 1996; Forgas, 1998). In contrast to anger and happiness,
sadness is a low-certainty emotion, which can lead to more careful information process-
ing (Bless et al., 1996; Forgas & Fiedler, 1996). It is interesting to note that both angry
and happy negotiators may process information more deeply during negotiations if
aroused and motivated by the need to repair or maintain their mood (Wegener & Petty,
1994).
What an emotional negotiator thinks about the situation

Emotional display provides insights to observers, not only about the processing of infor-
mation, but also about the content of the emotional negotiator’s thinking. According to
appraisal theories (e.g., Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1984; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Frijda,
1986), emotions result from immediate evaluations of a given situation. Thus, an emo-
tional display signals information about how someone is interpreting a situation. It is
interesting to note that similar appraisals occur whether emotional displays are experi-
mentally manipulated or naturally expressed (Keltner et al., 1993), which suggests that
feigned emotional display can lead to appraisals similar to those of authentic emotional
display (Van Kleef et al., 2004b). Emotions can be differentiated along several appraisal
dimensions, such as responsibility, control, and urgency (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003). For
example, anger, sadness, and happiness differ with regard to whom the emotional nego-
tiator holds responsible for the situation, how much personal control they feel, and
whether they experience a sense of urgency to act.
Anger, which is an especially common and potent emotion during negotiations, has
been the focus of more research than other negative emotions (e.g., Allred, 1999; Van
Kleef et al., 2004a, 2004b; Sinaceur & Neale, 2005). Research suggests that angry people
have a tendency to blame others (Quigley & Tedeschi, 1996) and are likely to attribute
higher responsibility to other parties when situations are ambiguous and open to inter-
pretation (Keltner et al.,1993). Disregarding the original source of their anger, they tend
to evaluate others in a more negative light (DeSteno et al., 2004a) and view these indi-
viduals as less trustworthy than those who are happy or sad (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005).
Furthermore, angry negotiators may have a strong desire to take action against others
(Mackie et al., 2000), which may lead them to take punitive actions against those who may
not be the source of their anger (Lerner et al., 1998; Goldberg et al., 1999). Anger is also
associated with a sense of personal control and high certainty about the course of events
(Frijda et al., 1989; Lerner & Keltner, 2001). Studies show that angry negotiators are more
likely to engage in risk-seeking choices (ibid.) during negotiations, have a tendency to be
optimistic about the likelihood of future positive events, and perceive less risk of future
negative events (Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Lerner et al., 2003). In negotiations, angry nego-
tiators are more likely to reject ultimatum offers (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996), use com-
petitive strategies (Forgas, 1998), and are likely to over-retaliate (Daly, 1991; Allred,
1999).
According to the appraisal tendency framework (e.g., Lerner & Keltner, 2000), emo-
tions experienced in one situation can lead to appraisal tendencies that carry over to novel
situations and shape subsequent decision making. For example, the propensity for risk
seeking can carry over to subsequent but unrelated situations (Lerner et al., 2003) and is
mediated by appraisals of control and certainty (Lerner & Keltner, 2001). In negotiations,
displays of anger can signal that a negotiator is adamant about his/her position (Daly,
1991). Furthermore, a negotiator may have learned based on personal experience that dis-
plays of anger lead the responding party to make concessions – the squeaky wheel often
gets the grease (Singelis, 1998); and these experiences may reinforce the negotiator’s
display of negative emotion.
A happy negotiator feels relatively certain about the course of events during the nego-
tiation process, feels in control, and may feel personal responsibility for the outcome
(Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003). Thus, with respect to appraisals of control and to some
extent certainty, happiness is similar to anger. It differs, however, with respect to the ten-
dency to take action in that a happy negotiator would not attribute responsibility of the
situation to others and may therefore sense little urgency for change. A happy negotiator
also is less likely to take high risks (Isen & Patrick, 1983). Although there is no sense of
urgent action, a happy negotiator is likely to engage in prosocial helping behavior (Batson
et al., 1979; Batson, 1990). In negotiations, happy negotiators are more likely to share
information and have an increased preference for and adoption of cooperative negotia-
tion strategies (Baron, 1990; Forgas, 1998), which are associated with value creation and
better joint outcomes (Carnevale & Isen, 1986).
Insights about how negotiators appraise situations with respect to personal responsi-
bility, control, and certainty thus can help devise a different strategic response to dis-
played emotions, which might be very different in the case of negative versus positive
emotion.
How do emotional displays influence interpersonal dynamics?

Emotional display not only provides information about how and what the other party
thinks and feels during the negotiating process, but also impacts the social relationship
between negotiating parties. Negotiators unconsciously mimic and synchronize behav-
ioral expressions of emotion (Hatfield et al.,1992), such that a smile will likely generate a
smile in the other party. Likewise, negative emotion in one negotiator is often responded
to by negative emotion in another negotiator. Thus, one negotiator’s emotion may recip-
rocally influence others’ experienced and displayed emotions, whether or not the respec-
tive negotiators are mindful of these emotions – their own or others’. Such emotional
contagion (ibid.) naturally occurs regardless of whether displayed emotion is authentic or
feigned.
Emotional contagion impacts the rapport between negotiators, as well as the likelihood
of developing a productive long-term relationship. Good rapport is essential in negotia-
tions since it predicts mutual cooperation (Drolet & Morris, 2000). Experts suggest that
‘the first thing negotiators should address during the information exchange stage is the
mood or atmosphere at the table – the rapport between the negotiators’ (Shell, 2006,
p. 140). In fact, it may be even more beneficial to establish rapport before negotiators
actually meet. One of the central functions of the pre-negotiation period is to address the
emotional and psychological barriers that impede official negotiations and create an
atmosphere of common understanding (Gewurz, 2000). During the negotiation, inap-
propriate expression of emotion – whether negative or positive – can destroy trust (Adler
et al., 1998) and harm rapport. Negotiators will consider emotional display as appropri-
ate depending on their cultural background (Rafaeli & Ravid, 2005; Kopelman & Rosette,
2008) and the given professional context of the negotiation (Sutton & Rafaeli, 1988;
Rafaeli & Sutton, 1991).
In professional settings, display of negative emotion is often considered inappropriate;
negotiators who display such emotion risk harming rapport during the negotiating
process. Because negotiators often have biased perceptions of who instigated a conflict
(Sillars, 1981; Bies et al., 1997), often blaming the other party and retaliating in response,
conflict spirals are likely to emerge (Ury et al., 1988). Displayed anger can lead to nega-
tive spirals or vicious cycles (Kumar, 1997) such that positive rapport is harmed and trust
destroyed. Consequently, displayed anger may decrease negotiators’ willingness to work
together in the future (Allred et al., 1997).
In contrast to anger, displayed happiness can be beneficial for rapport because positive
mood is associated with initiating conversations (Batson et al., 1979) and a preference for
collaboration over avoidance (Baron, 1990). In negotiations, the display of positive
emotion is associated with better rapport, as well as lower rates of impasse ( Moore et al.,
1999; Thompson et al., 1999; Drolet & Morris, 2000; Kopelman et al., 2006). Cooperative
behavior increases trust (Weingart et al., 1993), and trust is instrumental in enabling
future interactions (Crosby et al., 1990). In fact, negotiators who strategically display pos-
itive emotion are more likely to include in their agreements provisions for future business
relationships that increase joint outcomes (Kopelman et al., 2006).
Tactics for strategically responding to emotional display

Recognizing an emotional display and understanding its likely influence on the emotional
party’s mindset, appraisal of the situation, and the potential interpersonal dynamics can
help a negotiator devise a strategic response that will optimize both the relational and eco-
nomic negotiation outcomes. However, responding to displays of emotion during negoti-
ations is a complex and dynamic process. Noting this, Adler et al. (1998, p. 168) followed
their recommendations for how to deal with emotions with the following disclaimer: ‘In
some situations, the best course of action may well be to do the opposite of what we
counsel. Because of the complexity of life and human interaction, the only rule that works
in all instances is “it depends” ’. Despite this complexity, the negotiation literature has
produced an array of strategic advice for responding to emotional display during the
negotiation process.
Responding to negative emotional displays

The most common advice regarding strategic response to negative emotion offered within
the negotiation literature is: ‘Whether you’re negotiating with someone who is danger-
ously angry or only mildly annoying, the same skills are helpful in getting the results you
want. Find out what your opponent wants . . . If you’re successful, you can turn your
adversaries into your partners’ (Hackley, 2004, p. 5; see also Ury, 1993). There are numer-
ous ways to achieve this objective: allowing the other party to vent their emotion, taking
a break in the process in order to cool down, shifting the focus toward non-emotional
interest-based discussion, or going ‘into’ the negative emotion in order for the party to
recognize the unproductive consequences and shift their behavior. Regardless of the
tactic, there is essentially one basic premise at the core of all these approaches. The under-
lying assumption is that in order to reach optimal outcomes, negotiators must overcome,
one way or another, negative emotion (e.g., Fisher & Shapiro, 2005). This is premised on
the assumption that positive emotion tends to enhance negotiators’ ability to develop
trust, expand the pie, and build long-term relationships, whereas negative emotion is gen-
erally seen as a barrier.
One approach for getting past unproductive negative displays of emotion is to get the
underlying issues out into the open. The idea is that once negotiators vent hostility and
tension, an interest-based solution can more easily be pursued, because ‘allowing the
other party such a catharsis will clear the air and may permit negotiators to return to a
calmer pace’ (Lewicki et al., 1999, p. 415). For example, the literature on conflict man-
agement and conflict resolution suggests that hostility may diminish significantly if an
individual’s anger, resentment, and frustration are vented in front of the blamed party
(Ury et al., 1993). Research on procedural justice indicates that having a chance to express
their disappointment often helps people take a significant step forward in the healing
process (Lind & Tyler, 1988). The effectiveness of venting can be increased if the blamed
party acknowledges the validity of these emotions or offers an apology (Goldberg et al.,
1987). Ury et al. (1993) suggest that properly designed negotiations can structurally incor-
porate venting as a stage before actively engaging in other conflict management efforts.
For venting mechanisms to be effective, that is, to avoid falling into a trap of emotional
contagion and vicious cycles, negotiators must be able to remain unaffected by an indi-
vidual’s display of negative emotion. In order to do so, negotiators can learn from the
experience of mediators who are trained to do just that. To this end, a mediator’s ability
to anticipate anger is extremely valuable. In an interview addressing how mediators
handle anger, Larry Susskind explained that he actually expects an emotional blow up and
plans around it: ‘I expect it to happen. I expect someone to blow up, even though blowing
up at their ally is stupid, but they’ll do it anyway’ (Forester, 1997, p. 350). Furthermore,
mediators often absorb and deflect negative emotion: ‘The person will be glad you did it
[let them vent], because they’ll be the first to tell you that emotion overwhelmed logic at
the time. They won’t say it that way, but that’s what happens. They’ll say, “The guy just
ticked me off” I expect that’ (ibid., p. 350). Thus, the emotional individual may appreci-
ate the opportunity to vent, but it is important to carefully allow the person to subse-
quently save face.
Perhaps, as neutral third parties, it is easier for mediators to provide a stage for display
of negative emotion because the emotion typically is not targeted at them. Nonetheless,
like a mediator, a negotiator directly confronted with a display of anger might imagine
that the other person’s anger is targeted at someone else, incidental to the current negoti-
ation. Negotiators are sometimes coached to imagine that an angry opponent is yelling at
the wall behind them, not at them. Such metaphors or idioms like ‘let it slide off you, like
water off a duck’s back’ help negotiators deflect anger that may or may not be targeted at
them. Thompson (2005) noted that it is important not to react instinctively or behave
defensively, no matter how misinformed or wrong one believes the other party to be.
Instinct-based responses may lead to negative emotional contagion (Hatfield et al., 1992)
and escalation of conflict, whereas a more mindful and emotionally incongruent response
could be more constructive. A negotiator may also need to strategically repeat his or her
response. Because angry negotiators process information both in a superficial manner and
in a mood-congruent fashion, as discussed earlier, it may take several statements until
what is being said actually penetrates so that it can be heard in a neutral and well-
intended way.
Although in some situations verbal venting may be productive, Carver et al. (1989)
caution that venting is not the best way to move beyond the displayed negative emotion.
Focusing on the negative could serve to highlight the barriers to resolution, thus result-
ing in additional obstacles in the negotiating process. Whether after venting or in its place,
taking breaks in the process is another approach suggested for dealing with disruptive
emotions in order to help parties reflect on their behavior. In negotiations between man-
agement and union, cooling-off periods are sometimes institutionally incorporated into
agreements to help avert costly strikes (Ury, 1993). Likewise, in interpersonal conflict, cues
can be adopted to signal that one party needs a ‘time out’. ‘In the Noel Coward play
Private Lives, a bickering couple agrees that whenever an argument threatens to get out
of control, one person will shout “Solomon Isaacs,” which will bring all conversation to
a halt for five minutes while each tries to calm down’ (Ury et al., 1993, p. 55). Eventually,
rather than result in a cooling-off period, the signal itself may have instantaneous calming
effects or even transform into a cue for comic relief, since it provides a mirror to how child-
like the argument might seem to an outside observer. Indeed, the use of humor, whether
a witty remark or a joke that brings on laughter, can be another way to reduce tension
during negotiations.
Whereas venting and breaks may keep the displayed negative emotion from derailing
the negotiation process, the negotiation literature suggests that what will ultimately propel
the process forward toward an optimal resolution is understanding the other party’s core
concerns and ‘underlying interests’. Thus, when the displayed negative emotion is per-
ceived to be ‘the problem’, Fisher et al. (1991) would advise that it is necessary to sepa-
rate the person from the problem in order to shift from positional negotiations to
interest-based negotiations. Separating the person from the problem, as well as the
emotion from the issue, allows negotiators to show respect, understanding, and empathy
for the displayed emotion without giving in or making unnecessary concessions. It also
transitions a negative negotiation process back to a more even-toned and rational process
of information exchange that can be leveraged to find win–win solutions.
In their comprehensive framework for dealing with emotions in negotiations, Fisher
and Shapiro (2005) suggest expressing appreciation for the core concern underlying the
expressed emotions in order to get at each party’s underlying interests: ‘Rather than
getting caught up in every emotion you and others are feeling, turn your attention to what
generates these emotions’ (p. 15). First and foremost, feeling appreciated is an important
need that can be addressed by understanding the other party’s point of view, finding merit
in what another individual thinks, feels, or does. It is important to communicate one’s
understanding of the issue a negotiator identified through words or actions. For example,
‘It sounds like you feel worried that if you sell your shares of stock, your relationships with other
members of the board would be damaged’ demonstrates understanding and can be followed by
showing that the negotiator sees merit in the person’s reasoning. ‘I can appreciate your concern,
especially given that you want to keep working in this industry’. (p. 33)
Fisher and Shapiro point out that it is important to appreciate the emotional concern
negotiators display; that is, address the concern, not the emotion. Addressing the core
concerns will help stimulate positive emotion and overcome negative emotion:
The difference between having a core concern ignored or met can be as important as having your
nose underwater or above it. If, for example, you are unappreciated or unaffiliated, you may feel
as if you are drowning, alone, ignored, and unable to breathe. Your emotions respond, and you
are prone to adversarial behavior. On the other hand, if you feel appreciated or affiliated, it is as
if you are swimming with your head above water. You can easily look around, and are free to
decide what to do and where to go. Your positive emotions are there with you, and, as a result,
you are prone to cooperate, to think creatively, and to be trustworthy. (pp. 17–18)
According to Fisher and Shapiro, there are four concerns that stimulate emotions and
must be appreciated: affiliation, autonomy, status, and role. The relationship between
expressing appreciation and achieving results in negotiations is straightforward. If unap-
preciated, negotiators tend to feel worse; if properly appreciated, they are more likely to
feel better. Fisher and Shapiro suggested that if affiliation is properly built, autonomy
respected, status acknowledged, and a fulfilling role is chosen, then positive emotion will
be stimulated and better agreements negotiated.
Thus, improving each party’s understanding of the other’s perspective through
enhanced communication and establishing a common ground on which the parties can
find a basis for agreement can help to rebuild trust between parties and enhance the desir-
ability of the creative options and opportunities to create value for both parties.
According to Lewicki et al. (1999), once tension has been reduced and the de-escalation
of hostility has been managed, it is critical to control the number and size of issues in the
negotiation so that new issues are not added. This includes dividing large issues into
smaller, more manageable ones to contain the negotiation and proceed toward resolution
of the underlying interests. Thompson (2005) suggested a series of specific steps for
repairing trust that could help when responding to a display of negative emotion. These
steps include suggesting a personal meeting, placing the focus on the relationship, apolo-
gizing, letting the other party vent, not getting defensive, asking for clarifying informa-
tion, testing for understanding, formulating a plan acceptable to both sides, thinking
about ways to prevent the problem in the future, and doing a relationship check. Once
these issues have been addressed, one can then return to the content of the negotiation
itself.
The ‘breakthrough’ approach (Ury, 1993) is a philosophically different and counterin-
tuitive way of getting beyond the barrier of negative emotion by encouraging its display.
This approach resembles ‘paradoxical therapy’ (Weeks, 1991) in that it gets past the dis-
played emotion, not by avoiding or venting it, but rather by allowing the other party to
go further into it. Instead of confronting the displayed behavior, a negotiator encourages
the other party to delve deeper into the source of the negative emotion and explore the
path that would result from engaging it. Although risky, making the consequences of the
displayed behavior feel tangible, concrete, and explicit is intended to lead the individual
to see the extremity of his or her own behavior and/or position and to lead him/her to take
the first step in a different direction. Once the other party initiates a move that will help
break through and circumvent the issue at hand, the responding negotiator joins this path.
Ury’s breakthrough approach includes a five-step process for responding to displayed neg-
ative emotion: (i) don’t react – go to the balcony; (ii) disarm them – step to their side;
(iii) change the game – don’t reject, reframe; (iv) make it easy for them to say yes – build
them a golden bridge; and (v) make it hard to say no – bring them to their senses, not their
knees. This approach sees obstacles set by another party as challenges that can be
engaged, addressed, and transformed into a favorable negotiating environment.
The breakthrough approach may be successful because it generates even stronger neg-
ative emotion than that originally expressed by an individual, thus highlighting the unpro-
ductive nature of the extreme emotion and motivating a paradigm shift in strategy. This
was among the strategies adopted by former US President Jimmy Carter in 1978 during
the Camp David talks between Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime
Minister Menachem Begin. When negotiations appeared to be at a devastating impasse,
Carter strategically led Begin to ‘the abyss’, generating extremely strong emotions by per-
sonalizing the stakes. Sadat and Begin were offered a token gift – a photo of the three
leaders autographed by Carter. Begin received one for each of his grandchildren. As Begin
looked down at the photo and saw his granddaughter’s name ‘he [Begin] spoke it aloud,
and then looked at each photograph individually, repeating the name of each grandchild
I [Carter] had written on it. His lips trembled, and tears welled up in his eyes . . . We were
both emotional as we talked quietly for a few minutes about grandchildren and about war’
(Carter, 1982, p. 399). The displayed emotion in this case was associated with the bleak
prospects that would result from an impasse, and provided a personal angle that pur-
portedly strengthened Begin’s motivation to overcome the obstacles and reach a future-
oriented peace accord. Thus, displayed negative emotion can actually play a constructive
role when channeled in the appropriate manner. An interesting empirical question is
whether certain negative emotions, such as sadness, guilt, or anger, can be more effectively
leveraged than others as part of a paradoxical breakthrough response tactic.
Regardless of the approach taken – whether one allows the other party to vent, takes a
break in the process, tries to shift the discussion away from an emotion-based focus or
face it straight on – it is important that the negotiator fully listens to other individuals.
Active listening (Rogers, 1961) can help facilitate the negotiation process. To actively
listen, one is advised to focus on showing attention verbally and nonverbally, to encour-
age the other individual to continue, and to use restatement and paraphrasing to show
understanding. A negotiator should express empathy in order to connect with both the
words the other individual is using and the emotions and mindset that are reflected in their
choice of language; and then use probes to draw the person out further and synchronize
interaction (Yukl, 1990). Responses may include: ‘You see the facts this way’, ‘You feel
strongly about this point’, and ‘I can see that if you saw things this way, you would feel
threatened and upset by what I have said’ (Lewicki et al., 1999, pp. 415–16).
In this way, displayed negative emotion that is integral to the negotiation process can
be embraced, or at least acknowledged. Listening openly to someone express negative
emotion ‘does not mean liking them or even agreeing with them, but it does mean
acknowledging that you understand their [expressed] viewpoint’ (Hackley, 2004, p. 5; see
also Ury, 1993). Even if one does not agree with what another is saying, one might try to
reflect on how they would react had they been in the other person’s shoes. Engaging in
perspective taking (Drolet et al., 1998; Galinsky & Ku, 2004) or trying a role reversal can
help engender a feeling during the negotiation process that emotions are being acknowl-
edged, which can help to shift the dynamic toward one conducive to achieving a negoti-
ated agreement.
Responding to positive emotional displays

The prescriptive negotiation literature generally suggests that positive emotion is linked
with interest-based solutions and therefore should be embraced to enhance optimal agree-
ments. Happiness, for example, is associated with cooperative tactics and creativity that
can generate higher joint gains (e.g., Carnevale & Isen, 1986). However, as discussed
earlier, the empirical literature on decision making cautions that this may not always be
the case. For example, happiness is associated with superficial processing of information
and thus can be counterproductive when deep processing is necessary to reach a beneficial
agreement. If it leads to heuristic behavior associated with a fixed pie perception, or if it
leads negotiators to set less ambitious goals and ‘satisfice’ – be satisfied with less (Simon,
1955) – display of positive emotion can actually be detrimental to negotiations.
If so, how should a negotiator strategically respond when another expresses joy, hap-
piness, and pleasure? The basic assumption in the negotiation literature is that only neg-
ative emotion is problematic and serves as an obstacle to successful negotiations. It also
indirectly suggests that positive emotion indicates that the underlying concerns of the
other party have been addressed. For example, of the elements addressed by Fisher and
Shapiro (2005), when a negotiator is expressing positive emotion it would suggest that
affiliation has been properly established, autonomy respected, status acknowledged, and
a fulfilling role has been chosen. And therefore beneficial agreements are likely to follow.
However, empirical research suggests that in some situations where these core concerns
are met, such as when negotiating in the context of close relationships (McGinn, 2006),
negotiators may be more focused on dividing resources equally and thus less focused on
expanding the pie (Messick, 1993; Thompson & DeHarpport, 1998). Their need to avoid
relationship conflict (Jehn, 1995) may lead them to make a priori concessions and miss
opportunities to discover task-level differences in priorities that could be leveraged to
expand the pie.
Whereas with negative emotion a negotiator affected by emotional contagion may get
angry and walk away from a good deal, a negotiator facing positive emotion may be too
eager to accept a deal and thus leave value on the table. Indeed, research has demonstrated
that negotiators’ willingness to pay is higher when they face a negotiator strategically dis-
playing positive emotion, in contrast to a neutral or negative counterpart (Kopelman et
al., 2006). Another instance where positive emotion conveys suboptimal outcomes is if
one sees the other party gloating toward the end of the negotiation (Thompson et al.,
1995) or if the other party immediately accepts an initial offer, the negotiator may expe-
rience a sinking feeling commonly associated with the ‘winner’s curse’ (Akerlof, 1970;
Neale & Bazerman, 1991). Such a bittersweet feeling of success can leave one feeling
unhappy with an agreement they may otherwise have been satisfied with. In Ury’s (1993)
terminology, one may need to go to the balcony and assess the situation before succumb-
ing to it. It is often not too late to reopen the discussion and explore alternative
configurations of a deal to ensure a fair distribution of a truly expanded pie. One may
need to creatively craft a face-saving statement that enables both parties to reengage in the
negotiation process. Thus, positive emotion is not always associated with negotiated out-
comes that are economically and relationally optimal.
We suggest that a strategic response to displayed positive emotion need not undermine
the positive emotional tone of the negotiations. To leverage positive emotion, a negotia-
tor could simultaneously respond by: (a) reciprocating the positive emotion with the goal
of building the relationship, acknowledging common goals, communicating trust, and
building assurances that a win–win solution can be found; and (b) accompany this rela-
tional reciprocity with diagnostic questions that ensure the positive emotional display is
leveraged toward value creation, rather than heuristic thinking and avoidance of task
conflict.
Discussion
The negotiation literature suggests an array of coherent and insightful approaches on how
to strategically respond to displayed emotions during the negotiation process. Despite the
fact that there has been relatively little empirical testing, experienced mediators and
skilled negotiators have found these techniques to be useful for strategically responding
to emotionally charged negotiating processes. Strategic responses such as venting and
cooling-off periods and addressing core concerns often appear to move beyond negative
emotion to achieve more collaborative and successful win–win negotiated outcomes and
direct positive emotion toward constructive information exchange and mutually
beneficial outcomes.
Although the recommendations in the negotiation literature provide useful insights on
the negotiation process, they fall short of explaining why these strategies are likely to
work in some circumstances but not others. For example, one can imagine that even the
intuitive advice to express understanding for the other party and find merit in their point
of view, as suggested by Fisher and Shapiro (2005), can result in increased animosity
rather than a constructive process. More specifically, saying something like: ‘It sounds
like you are frustrated that we haven’t yet come to an agreement. Given how much time
you’ve invested in this new draft, I can understand why you feel like that’ (ibid., p. 153)
does not necessarily result in the desired outcome of overcoming negative emotion.
Instead, the emotional negotiator may feel patronized and respond with even more
aggression: ‘You have no idea what is really going on for me, you are just trying to be
manipulative’.
A broader theoretical framework than offered in the current negotiation literature is
necessary to understand such boundary conditions. We suggest that there is something
else at play within the negotiation process, which accounts for why these tactics are some-
times successful and at other times fall far short; it is not only about what strategies are
employed but also about the person employing the strategy. The recommendations in the
literature provide many tactical suggestions for what a negotiator should do when faced
with an emotional individual and underemphasize the internal reality of the person
employing those tactics. That is, the underlying mechanism driving the success or failure
of a strategic response to an emotional display may have as much to do with the state of
being of the responder during the response to the display of emotion as with the tactic
used.
To be effective at responding to both negative and positive displayed emotions, a nego-
tiator needs to balance the attention paid to the self and other parties. Focusing exclu-
sively on his or her own emotional experience, a negotiator can be swept away with
emotional contagion during negotiations, and thus be unable to effectively address
another individual’s emotional response in a constructive manner. However, focusing all
one’s attention on what to do about someone who is displaying either positive or negative
emotion can come across as tactical, disingenuous, and even patronizing. There is a
balance to strike between focusing on one’s own internal state of being and the external
behaviors and language being expressed by others during negotiations.
We suggest that the success or failure of a strategic response to displayed emotions
pivots on striking this balance through a negotiator’s ‘authentic presence’. Presence is not
an easy concept to define. According to Kahn (1992, p. 322), psychological presence
means being fully there as when ‘people feel and are attentive, connected, integrated and
focused in their role’. In a recent book, Senge et al. (2005, pp. 13–14) explain how their
thinking about presence evolved:
We first thought of presence as being fully conscious and aware in the present moment. Then
we began to appreciate presence as deep listening . . . we came to see the importance of letting
go . . . Ultimately, we came to see all these aspects of presence as leading to a state of ‘letting
come,’ of consciously participating . . .
Likewise, Halpern and Lubar (2003, pp. 3–4) discuss theater actors who describe stage
presence as ‘the ability to connect authentically with the thoughts and feelings of others’.
Yet, paradoxically, these authors stress that ‘presence comes from within. It begins with
an inner state which leads to a series of external behaviors’. We suggest that existing
within this paradox of focusing fully on both self and other is authentic presence, which
enables a negotiator to respond to displayed emotions in an effective manner.
In this state of authentic presence, the strategic tactics of the responder are a natural
expression of the negotiator during the negotiating process. Authentic presence is a mech-
anism that drives the success or failure to strategic responses to emotional displays. There
are, for example, people in whose presence it is difficult to be angry. Being in their
company feels like looking into a mirror and noticing how unproductive perhaps even
silly, childish or melodramatic, one’s expression of emotion may be without feeling
patronized or feeling the need to be defensive. It has the effect of deflating negative
consequences of the displayed emotion and re-orienting negotiators back to the task at
hand. It is this quality of being fully there for the self and the other – authentic presence
that we can all strive to develop – that may enable the successful adoption of the strate-
gic tactics suggested in the negotiation literature.
Note
1. Due to the relative paucity of research on emotions in negotiation, we review both the literature on emo-
tions and the literature on mood as it relates to the topics discussed.
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PART IV
EMOTION AS A GROUP-LEVEL
PHENOMENON
25 Kindling fires and extinguishing candles: the wind
of mood contagion in work groups
Richard Saavedra
In everyone’s life, at some time, our inner fire goes out. It is then burst into flame by an encounter
with another human being. We should all be thankful for those people who rekindle the inner spirit.
(Albert Schweitzer, philosopher, physician, and musician, 1875–1965)
Introduction
As the members of the management department filed into the conference room, it was
clear that the afternoon promised a checkered experience. Mike, the group’s chair, was
sulking. He could barely acknowledge the others as they sat around the table. When he
did speak, his tone belied a coming storm. His eyebrows were furrowed, he was leaning
toward the table, and his lips formed a tight line as he waited for the meeting to start. He
was red, angry, and anxious to unfurl his dissatisfaction. Everyone knew it was going to
be a taxing afternoon unless Mike was appeased. Appeasement could mean that the group
had to abide by Mike’s every wish or it could mean that Mike would choose someone upon
which to vent his rage. Members looked at one another and shuffled papers hoping he or
she would not be the target of the day. People did not talk to one another for fear it would
draw Mike’s attention, yet they all could sense the group’s mood. The goals for the
meeting were all but forgotten because the primary goal was personal survival. To survive
in this work group required that members pay attention to Mike’s moods, but as they
monitored his behaviors, they signaled their reactions, and, in the process, they became
frequent prisoners of Mike’s mood swings. Did Mike ‘infect’ faculty members with his
unpleasant mood displays? Is this an inescapable fate for the members of this department?
The foregoing example could have been cast in a variety of work contexts, each of
which has the potential to influence mood. In this chapter, I focus on emotional conta-
gion as a tendency to automatically mimic (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; van Baaren et al.,
2003, 2004) and ‘synchronize expressions, vocalizations, postures, and movements with
those of another person’s and, consequently, to converge emotionally’ (Hatfield et al.,
1994, p. 5). Accordingly, after being exposed to an emotionally expressive person, people
would be expected to exhibit behavior and cognition consistent with the expressed
emotion. Research by Chartrand and Bargh (1999) shows convincingly that mimicry
occurs automatically, even among strangers. Recent work by these authors corroborates
that moods can be influenced non-consciously (Chartrand et al., 2006). Below, I describe
pertinent features of the emotional contagion process using a fire or flame metaphor. The
metaphor came to mind as I considered familiar references to mood-inducing situations.
So let us proceed to ‘fan the flames’ of emotional contagion.
Light that candle!

A fire requires an initial flame. So where is the spark? Neural processing provides a starting-
point. The left hemisphere is more closely associated with language and sequential
423
thought, whereas the right is more closely associated with spatial representations and par-
allel forms of processing (Hellige, 1993). EEG (electroencephalogram) studies indicate
greater left hemisphere activation in positive emotional states, and greater right hemi-
sphere activation in negative states (Davidson & Sutton, 1995; Davidson, 1998). In addi-
tion, the right hemisphere is also involved in high-arousal emotional states (Heller, 1993),
playing a specialized role in modulating cardiac (Wittling, 1995) and electrodermal
(Johnsen & Hugdahl, 1993) activity in response to emotional stimulation.
Transient increases in emotional arousal activate the right hemisphere systematically,
thereby facilitating connections with the body’s arousal systems and the potential for
rapid action in circumstances that might warrant it. Emotionally arousing conditions
dictate vital vigilance for new information in the environment (Heller, 1993). Stimuli that
prime the right hemisphere are likely to induce more physiological arousal, vigilance, ori-
enting behavior, and defensive motivation (Heller et al., 1995; Lang et al., 1997; Öhman,
1997). Thus, the two ‘sparks’ for the contagion process involve either negative emotions
or emotions with high arousal. Unpleasant, arousing emotional states (e.g., fear, anxiety,
distress) make excellent fire starters, and for good reason as they provide crucial evidence
about environmental conditions. On the whole, emotional reactions have been selected
through evolution for their high probability of dealing successfully and efficiently with the
problems posed by a particular situation (Levenson, 1999).
The mood thermometer

Our moods reflect the valence of our environment. In this light, moods may be seen as a
‘barometer’ (Jacobsen, 1957) or ‘thermometer’ for the purposes of this chapter as in the
familiar metaphor ‘feeling the heat’. Specifically, moods give us information about the
status of our environment and we subsequently adjust our information processing, judg-
ments, and behavior in a manner that is best suited for the situation (Chartrand et al.,
2006). A positive mood signals that the environment is safe and unproblematic, whereas
a negative mood indicates potential problems (Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz & Bohner, 1996;
Schwarz & Clore, 1996; Clore et al., 2001). In terms of making choices regarding either
tasks or goals, positive mood promotes behavior maintenance while negative mood pro-
motes behavior repair (Saavedra & Earley, 1991). Without question, mood has a sub-
stantial effect on information processing and judgments (Damasio, 1994).
Mood serves a regulatory function with regard to information processing style, atten-
tion, and the use of heuristics (Forgas, 1994). With respect to processing style, negative
mood is conducive of conscious, deliberative information processing accompanied by a
narrow focus of attention. We are more analytical and process information with greater
effort when we feel badly and life is problematic. In contrast, a positive mood fosters an
intuitive processing style, accompanied by a broad span of attention. We think more
holistically and automatically when we feel ‘life is good’. With a wide span of attention,
individuals experience an enhanced susceptibility to environmental cues that are outside
the range of their direct focus of attention. Conversely, in a negative mood the sensitivity
for and responsiveness toward peripheral environmental cues tend to be reduced and,
hence, behaviors potentially associated with such cues will be reduced as well (Kuhl,
2000). A negative mood induces cautious behaviors, to ‘think before one acts’, while a pos-
itive mood facilitates spontaneous, automatic behavioral tendencies allowing one ‘to act
on impulse’.
Mood contagion in work groups 425
When we are in a positive mood, our environment seems to pose no threat and we are
more likely to rely on existing knowledge structures, such as stereotypes and scripts (Bless
et al., 1996) resulting in heuristic processing (Bless et al., 1990; Bodenhausen et al., 1994).
In contrast, a negative mood signals that the environment is problematic and that there-
fore one needs to be on guard, resulting in an information processing style that is rela-
tively analytical, demanding, and cautious (Schwarz & Bless, 1991; Bless et al., 1992;
Bodenhausen et al., 1994; Schwarz & Clore, 1996; Dovidio et al., 2000). In sum, a posi-
tive mood elicits a more holistic, expansive, possibly more creative, and less analytic way
of perceiving and processing information about the environment than a negative mood.
The lightning storm of ANS

The autonomic nervous system (ANS) plays a critical role in emotion, providing meta-
bolic support for adaptive action, generating appearance changes that convey powerful
information, and producing visceral sensations that shape subjective emotional experi-
ence. The autonomic architecture of human emotion has evolved to provide us with a rich
set of tools that help us communicate and indicate the nature of our emotional experi-
ences, understand the emotions of others, relax ourselves and others, and give us some
control over harmful and unproductive emotions (Levenson et al., 1990). Cardiovascular,
gastrointestinal, electrodermal, respiratory, endocrine, and exocrine autonomic responses
help us know and label our moods. In many respects, the primary ingredients of our sub-
jective emotional experience are visceral and somatic reflecting our underlying state of
autonomic activation (Levenson, 2003a).
There are immeasurable advantages to having a mechanism by which emotions can be
transferred quickly and efficiently across individuals. According to Levenson (2003a), emo-
tional contagion serves a number of functions in humans including: (a) alerting, (b)
calming, and (c) empathizing. In the case of alerting, the emotion of an individual who has
directly experienced a dangerous situation can be transmitted quickly to others who have
not experienced the danger directly. When this works well, a group can be quickly mobilized
to act. A powerful example is the unforgettable drama of September 11, 2001 aboard United
Airlines Flight 93. On that flight, a disparate group of strangers banded together to under-
stand the situation and to formulate a common goal of wresting control of the hijacked
plane from the terrorists before it crashed in rural Pennsylvania. Nevertheless, if a group’s
response is out of proportion to the original threat, it can lead to inappropriate group behav-
ior such as panic or violence. In the case of calming, signs of positive affect (e.g., smiles,
laughter) in the face of potentially dangerous situations can defuse group activation.
Group contagion provides information not only about how the group is doing in its envi-
ronment (Frijda, 1988; Parkinson, 1996; Hess & Kirouac, 2000), but also about events or
conditions within the group such as ‘group cohesion (e.g., smiles as semiotic for acceptance,
approval, and bonding) and group survival (e.g., fearful facial displays and vocalizations as
a means for alerting other members of the group to imminent danger)’ (Levenson, 1999,
p. 486). Essentially, the ANS plays an important role as a marker of states of shared and
interconnected emotion. Senders’ public displays of emotion communicate rich and impor-
tant information to receivers during interpersonal encounters (Darwin, 1872 [1965];
Plutchik, 1980; Ekman, 1993; Izard, 1993; Frijda & Mesquita, 1994; Keltner & Haidt,
2003). Facial and bodily changes play an important role in communicating to others that
we are feeling similarly in response to their feelings.
Emotional communication represents an efficient mode of adaptation to changing

environmental demands. When the ANS physiology of two people shows ‘linkage’ (i.e.,
one person’s patterns of activation and deactivation across the ANS mirror those of
another person), there is emotional involvement. In research regarding the interactions of
married couples, high levels of physiological synchrony between spouses when discussing
marital problems were most likely to be found in the most unhappily married couples
(Levenson & Gottman, 1983). Physiological linkage is an indicator of a high level of con-
tagion relative to negative emotions that occur in unhappy marriages. This ebb and flow
of emotion produces concomitant parallel patterns of ANS activation and deactivation
in spouses (Levenson, 2003a). Understanding the interaction between neural and per-
ceptual sources of emotional contagion provides further insight into how the contagion
process may unfold in a group setting (Levenson et al., 1992).
In studies of empathic accuracy in strangers (i.e., the extent to which one person can
know the emotions of another), higher accuracy in detecting the negative emotions of
another person was associated with higher degrees of physiological linkage between two
individuals (Levenson & Ruef, 1992). This physiological linkage results in part from a
process of emotional contagion through which observers who rate the emotions of others
most accurately have emotions that are similar in type and timing. Generally, individuals
who are most accurate at rating the emotions of others do in fact show the most facial
evidence of emotion. ANS linkage among individuals may prove to be a significant non-
verbal marker of emotional contagion (Levenson, 2003a).
The case for the non-volitional control of emotional contagion is a strong one. In one
study, observed pupil size was mirrored by an observer’s own pupil size. This empathetic
contagion engaged the brainstem pupillary control nuclei in proportion to an individ-
ual subject’s sensitivity to this effect (Harrison et al., 2006). In a second reaction study
of individuals high and low in emotional empathy (Sonnby-Borgström, 2002a), subjects
were exposed to pictures of angry or happy faces. Facial mimicry reactions, as repre-
sented by electromyographic (EMG) activity, were compared to their self-reported feel-
ings. Comparisons were made at different stimulus exposure times to elicit reactions at
different levels of information processing. High-empathy subjects had higher degrees of
mimicking behavior than low-empathy subjects, a difference that emerged at short expo-
sure times (17–40 ms) representing automatic reactions. The high-empathy group indi-
cated significantly higher correspondence between facial expressions and self-reported
feelings. Interestingly, the low-empathy group showed inverse zygomaticus muscle
reactions – they ‘smiled’ when exposed to angry faces. No differences were found
between the high- and low-empathy subjects in their verbal reports of their feelings
when presented with a happy or an angry face. Thus, the differences between groups in
emotional empathy appeared to be related to differences in automatic somatic reactions
to facial stimuli rather than to differences in their conscious interpretation of the emo-
tional situation. Automatic mimicking may be an early component involved in the for-
mation of emotional empathy (Sonnby-Borgström, 2002b). In contrast, autism creates
such fundamental and profound difficulties for individuals given that a lack of eye
contact short-circuits mimicking, interpersonal affective learning, and empathy (Davies
et al., 2007).
In a creative study utilizing virtual characters, investigators compared neural activ-
ity when subjects were personally involved in social interaction to a situation in which
subjects were passive observers of social interaction. In dynamic animations, virtual char-
acters demonstrated socially relevant facial expressions as they would appear in greeting
and approach situations or they expressed arbitrary facial movements. Neural activity
was measured by fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging). The results demon-
strate that activation of the medial prefrontal cortex underlies both the perception of
social communication indicated by facial expressions and the feeling of personal involve-
ment indicated by eye gaze. Moreover, differential activation of a more dorsal part of
medial prefrontal cortex occurs during the detection of self-relevance (Schillbach et al.,
2006). In a study of therapist empathy, Marci et al. (2007) report that the ventral medial
prefrontal cortex is involved in the analysis of social content when interaction partners
mimic gestures. Moreover, differential activation of a more dorsal part of medial pre-
frontal cortex is involved in the detection of personal relevance. Together, these two
studies point to the medial prefrontal cortex as the ‘control center’ for evaluating com-
municative signals related to emotional contagion.
In terms of behavioral consequences, how does emotional contagion influence job per-
formance? Based on data gathered from registered nurses at two hospitals, investigators
examined the extent to which empathy variables contributed to nursing stress and occu-
pational commitment. Analyses revealed that high emotional contagion contributed
significantly to reduced personal accomplishment and that it explained a significant pro-
portion of the variance in emotional exhaustion, significantly reducing occupational
commitment (Omdahl & O’Donnell, 1999).
In a nursing environment, empathetic contagion led to emotional exhaustion and
reduced commitment. In another study of occupational emotional contagion (Verbeke,
1997), the transmission and reception of emotions were examined in a sales environment.
Results suggest that a salesperson’s ability to communicate emotionally (transmission and
reception) is an asset in generating sales. However, empathic contagion is also a liability
because it leads to emotional exhaustion, diminished occupational commitment, and
lower performance over time. To borrow a line from Robert DeNiro in the film, Taxi, ‘Are
you talking to me?’ has a distinct place in emotional contagion. Personal involvement
apparently generates both neural and social consequences. For difficult work such as
nursing, sales, or crab fishing, disheartening social outcomes can result in emotional
exhaustion and commitment withdrawal. By the same token, the emotional highs of
saving a life, winning a major contract, or bringing in a big catch may be powerful anti-
dotes for emotionally taxing professions – wins are necessary.
Group emotional contagion: kindling fires

The concept of group emotion has been shown to be recognized reliably by group
members and observers, both on-site and through video ratings (Totterdell et al., 1998;
Bartel & Saavedra, 2000; Barsade, 2003). Affective transfer processes, such as emotional
contagion, feeling affect vicariously, and behavioral entrainment lead to the spread of
individual-level moods and emotions to other group members. Subconscious ‘primitive
emotional contagion’ occurs through a very fast process of automatic, continuous, syn-
chronous nonverbal mimicry and physiological feedback (Hatfield et al., 1992, 1994;
Neumann & Strack, 2000). In a test of the latency of primitive emotional contagion, Wild
and colleagues presented photos on a PC varying the affective content (happy and sad),
the expressive strength, and the duration of presentation. After each photo, subjects rated
the strength of their experienced happiness, sadness, anger, disgust, surprise, fear and
pleasure. Feelings of happiness or sadness were significantly, specifically and repeatedly
evoked in the viewer – even with presentations lasting only 500 ms. Stronger expressions
evoked more emotion. The gender of the viewer had weak effects. Clearly, this fast and
repeatable reaction is likely to have a ‘prewired’ neural basis (Wild et al., 2001).
As a relatively non-conscious process, most groups are unaware of the origins and con-
sequences of emotional contagion (Barsade, 2003). However, when the need to judge
mood is made salient, there is much evidence that group members (and members outside
the group) are able to judge group mood accurately (Totterdell et al., 1998; Bartel &
Saavedra, 2000; Totterdell, 2000; Kelly & Barsade, 2001; Opie et al., 2006). Considering
the non-affective aspects of groups’ environments, Bartel and Saavedra (2000) found that
membership stability, and task and social interdependence were positively related to
mood convergence, highlighting the importance of examining the interplay between
affective and non-affective factors.
In an example consistent with Schachter’s (1959) ‘emotional similarity hypothesis’, a
contemporary study reported that threat increased affiliation and did so particularly with
affiliates believed to be facing the same situation. From this perspective, behavioral
mimicry and emotional contagion were enhanced through shared perceptions of the
context (Gump & Kulik, 1997). However, non-interpersonal stimuli do not have the con-
tinuously reinforcing and reciprocal properties that interpersonal stimuli offer (Hackman,
1992), leading Kelly (2001) to suggest that inductions of group mood must necessarily
involve group interaction. Possibly, one difference between primitive emotional contagion
and social comparison is the role of personal involvement which instigates automatic reac-
tions – a finding highlighted earlier. It is also probably the case that non-affective factors
moderate convergence while interpersonal factors are main effects for group mood states.
Furthermore, Bartel and Saavedra (2000) found that work groups demonstrated more
convergence regarding unpleasant moods than pleasant moods. Given these findings, the
literature suggests that unpleasant mood creates more-focused attention and a tendency
to respond to the negative rather than to the positive, and that this attention and response
create an opportunity for automatic mimicry and emotional contagion. Prior theoretical
work indicates that, given its automaticity, people do not necessarily know that emotional
contagion is happening or, more importantly, how it is influencing them (Hatfield et al.,
1994; Ashkanasy, 2003). This point offers opportunities for both constructive interven-
tion as well as tolerance that sometimes these occurrences provide a necessary ebb and
flow to living systems.
Blowing out the candles

Emotions are involved both in rapidly activating and deactivating physiological systems.
The ANS regulates the deactivation of bodily systems when action is no longer needed.
On the one hand, positive emotions play an important role in deactivating or ‘undoing’
physiological arousal (Levenson, 2003a). In a sense, they hasten the restoration of ANS
equilibrium in the aftermath of ANS activation produced by negative emotions
(Fredrickson & Levenson, 1998). A classic example of this is the laughter that often
follows the most shocking moments in a horror film. These intrusions of positive emotion
may be quite functional, taking advantage of their capacity to calm physiology and reduce
tension (Levenson, 2003b). Positive emotions play an important role in rapidly restoring
physiological calm. This kind of tension reduction is enormously reinforcing and plays an
important role in building attachment bonds when relationships are experienced as sooth-
ing and emotionally positive (Fredrickson, 1998; Isen, 1999).
On the other hand, increased risk taking may explain the link between bad moods and
self-defeating behavior. People who feel upset may be prone to pursue high-risk courses
of action that usually produce costly or harmful outcomes. Bad moods foster risk taking
by impairing self-regulation. Risky tendencies are limited to unpleasant moods accom-
panied by high arousal (Leith & Baumeister, 1996; Gehring & Willoughby, 2002). In the
workplace, employees often attempt to deflect powerful initial emotional tendencies in the
service of their own welfare and that of others (Geddes & Callister, 2007). To do so, emo-
tions can be controlled in one of two primary ways: (a) changing the way we appraise
incoming information or (b) altering the tendencies to respond in a given way (Gross et al.,
1997; Gross, 1998a).
Emotional suppression is a regulation strategy that attempts to reduce the visible signs
of emotion. Research indicates that participants can dramatically reduce the visible signs
of emotion, and that this reduction has little effect on the strength of their self-reported
emotional experience. However, this voluntary suppression of emotion produces large
increases in cardiovascular activation and this effect persists long after the suppression
attempt. These cardiovascular changes indicate that stopping the behavioral manifesta-
tions of an emotion once it has been set in motion requires significant levels of effort,
exacting a substantial metabolic cost (Levenson, 2003b). These strategies are very costly
in terms of additional ANS activation. Suppression disrupts communication and
increases blood pressure in both regulators and their partners. Suppression also has a neg-
ative impact on regulators’ emotional experience, reduces rapport and inhibits relation-
ship formation (Scherer, 1989). Levenson (2003a) contends that although a sustained life
of chronic activation of unpleasant emotions will be autonomically costly, it may be even
more detrimental to live a life in which negative emotions are chronically suppressed.
Comparing emotional suppression with emotional reappraisal (e.g., subjects adopt a
‘detached and unemotional attitude’ so they ‘don’t feel anything at all’), Gross (1998b)
found that reappraisal reduces the behavioral manifestations of emotion (but not as com-
pletely as suppression) and reduces the level of subjective emotional experience without
exacting the large physiological cost that suppression generates. Although reappraisal is not
as effective as suppression in eliminating the behavioral signs of emotion, its relatively low
metabolic cost makes it an effective way to control emotion. Moreover, reappraisal also has
an advantage over suppression in reducing subjective emotional experience (as in the case
of unpleasant emotions). Preemptive strategies that involve trying to look at things from a
broader perspective, considering contextual factors, and being more accepting of the short-
coming of others may have tangible health benefits when they are part of reappraisal
strategies of emotion regulation (Levenson, 2003a). However, given how quickly emotion-
eliciting events occur, emotional suppression is usually the most viable alternative.
Fire signals
The face is most telling

The face has a remarkable capacity to initiate subjective emotional experience (Wild et al.,
2001, 2003). Accordingly, the design of the face and the facial muscles evolved to
communicate social signals (Darwin, 1872 [1965]; Öhman, 2002). If the face is the beacon
of emotional communication, are women better than men at detecting emotional signals?
Specifically, do males and females differ in facial muscle reactivity when exposed to facial
expressions? Furthermore, does the sex of stimulus faces differentially influence the
response patterns to facial stimuli? In a study to answer these questions, sex was manip-
ulated in a 2 2 factorial design by exposing males and females to slides of angry and
happy faces displayed by both sexes. Facial EMG activity was measured from the corru-
gator and zygomatic muscle regions. The subjects were also required to rate the stimuli on
different dimensions. As expected, the results showed that angry faces evoked increased
corrugator activity whereas happy faces evoked increased zygomatic activity. However,
these effects were more pronounced for females, particularly for the response to happy
faces. Interestingly, there were no facial EMG effects for gender of stimulus. In terms of
perceptions, males and females perceived the stimuli similarly. Generally, previous
findings indicate that females are more facially reactive than are males (Dimberg &
Lundqvist, 1990).
That people tend to mimic emotional facial expressions spontaneously using distinct
facial EMG reactions in emotion-relevant facial muscles is a well-established finding.
Whether these reactions can be elicited when people are unconsciously exposed to happy
and angry facial expressions is another question. Using a backward-masking technique,
researchers prevented subjects from consciously perceiving 30-ms exposures of happy,
neutral, and angry target faces, which immediately were followed and masked by neutral
faces. Despite the fact that exposure to happy and angry faces was unconscious, subjects
reacted with distinct facial muscle reactions that corresponded to the happy and angry
stimulus faces. In this research, results indicated that both positive and negative emotional
reactions can be unconsciously evoked, suggesting that particularly important aspects of
emotional face-to-face communication can occur on an unconscious level (Dimberg et al.,
2000).
In human communication there is often a close relationship between the perception of
an emotionally expressive face and the facial response of the viewer him-/herself. Whereas
perception and generation of facial expressions have been studied separately with func-
tional imaging methods, one study examined their interaction. Investigators combined the
presentation of emotionally expressive faces with the instruction to react with predeter-
mined and assigned facial movements. fMRI was used to examine healthy subjects who
had been instructed to simultaneously move the corners of their mouth (a) upwards or (b)
downwards, or (c) to refrain from movement while they perceived happy, sad, or neutral
faces. Subjects’ facial movements were recorded with an MR-compatible video camera.
Movement latencies were shortened in congruent situations (e.g., the presentation of a
happy face combined with upward movements) and delayed in non-congruent situations.
Dissonant more than congruent stimuli activated the inferior prefrontal cortex and the
somatomotor cortex bilaterally. The congruent condition, in particular when seeing a
happy face, activated the medial basotemporal lobes (hippocampus, amygdala, parahip-
pocampal region). Wild et al. (2003) concluded that this region facilitates congruent facial
movements when an emotionally expressive face is perceived as part of a system for non-
volitional emotional facial movements.
Incongruent reactions require cognitive processing either as an actor or as an observer.
One can feign emotional displays, but this behavior requires immense metabolic energy
and cognitive attention. In addition, incongruent reactions from interaction participants

most probably serve to jolt social rhythms. To ‘engage’ with those who are anxious or
depressed requires effort and, unfortunately, a dip into the pool of unpleasant moods. The
interaction would then be intensely focused on either the anxious or depressed instigator,
or the relationship between the two interaction partners. In a group situation, group
members may ignore or shun the consistently discordant group member. However, when
a discordant individual is powerful or in a high-status role, the tables turn as described in
the opening vignette for this chapter. Faculty were prisoners of Mike’s unpleasant moods
and behavior.
The moving body

Darwin regarded emotions as predispositions to act adaptively, thereby suggesting that
characteristic body movements are associated with emotional states. Generally, investi-
gations of emotional contagion have predominantly concentrated on processes associated
with viewing facial expressions. However, expressive body movements may be just as
important for understanding the neurobiology of emotional behavior. Certainly canines
use bodily expressions to signal fear, aggression, and excitement. A familiar example is
the sport of basketball. Basketball teams are highly interdependent and they are involved
in complex group work requiring effort, coordination, and strategy. Emotional commu-
nication is critical for real-time assessments of collective will and task feedback. Fans of
the NCAA (National Collegiate Athletic Association) basketball tournament are witness
to the ‘thrill of victory and the agony of defeat’ as teams vie for a national championship.
In a study of the perception of bodily movement, researchers used fMRI to examine
whether the brain recognizes happiness or fear based on body movements. The results
indicate that observing fearful body expressions produces increased activity in brain areas
narrowly associated with emotional processes and that this emotion-related activity
occurs together with activation of areas linked with representation of action and move-
ment. While fear contagion automatically prepares the brain for action, the results were
not replicated for expressions of happiness (De Gelder et al., 2004).
Finally, recent research notes that perceived attractiveness covaries with body shape and
motion because they co-specify social percepts that are either compatible or incompati-
ble. The body’s shape and motion provoke basic sexual perceptions such as masculinity
and femininity, respectively. The compatibility of these basic percepts predicts perceived
attractiveness (Johnson & Tassinary, 2007). A woman who sways her hips as she walks
suggests femininity and attractiveness because only those with a parsimonious body shape
can walk in that manner. Familiar television commercials for women’s apparel make fre-
quent use of shape and motion to signal attractiveness. On the whole, both facial appear-
ance and body movements are crucial sources of emotional communication. Body
movement is particularly important for signaling negative mood, while the face indicates
both positive and negative moods.
Feeling the flames

Are there those who are particularly adept at feeling the ‘heat’ from a fire? Imagine a
human fire detector – a fire alarm if you will. Hatfield and her colleagues (1992, 1994)
have proposed that people ‘catch’ the emotions of others through a two-step process in
which mimicry of the emotional expressions of others and the afferent feedback
generated by the mimicry produce a matching emotional experience. Simply, subjective

experience is influenced both by cues generated by afferent feedback and by cues arising
from the situation. We infer our emotional state by observing our expressive behavior and
the context in which it occurs (James,1890; Bem, 1972; Laird & Bresler, 1992).
Individual differences in responsiveness to internal and external cues reliably predict
susceptibility to emotional contagion (Laird et al., 1994). People whose subjective expe-
riences are more influenced by self-produced cues are more likely to feel the emotions of
those they mimic. These individual differences in responsiveness to afferent feedback are
stable over time and across emotional conditions (Laird & Crosby, 1974; Kellerman &
Laird, 1982; Laird & Bresler, 1992). This corresponds to Hatfield’s view that exposure to
another’s emotional expression can cause the viewer to mimic the expression and, conse-
quently, to experience the associated feeling state.
Prevailing research indicates a consistent relationship between responsiveness to
afferent feedback produced by emotional expressions and behavior congruent with the
mood of the stimulus person to which participants were exposed. Moreover, following
exposure to an emotionally expressive individual, participants exhibit selective attention
and perception, selective memory, and biased evaluations in a mood-congruent manner.
Hatfield et al. (1992, 1994) proposed that certain characteristics make some people more
susceptible to emotional contagion than others. However, we may be more affected than
not, and more pervasively than we imagine (van Baaren et al., 2006). It appears that expo-
sure to an emotional expression involves an immediate, and congruent, affective reaction
and even mild, implicitly perceived affective stimuli can shape our moment-to-moment
perceptions and preferences (Schwarz & Bless, 1991). Nevertheless, is there anybody who
is immune to emotional contagion?
The fire retardants: anxiety and depression

Individuals with a dismissing-avoidant pattern of attachment are assumed to repress
anxiety-related signals, a disposition hypothesized to interfere with facial mimicry and
emotional contagion. Further, they are assumed to have one internal working model asso-
ciated with anxiety, operating out of awareness at early, automatic stages of information
processing, and another model involving positive affect operating at later, cognitively con-
trolled stages of processing. Sonnby-Borgström and Jonsson (2004) set out to compare
facial mimicry in dismissing-avoidant and non-dismissing subjects at different levels of
information processing. In this study, dismissing-avoidant subjects scored significantly
lower on emotional empathy than the non-dismissing subjects.
Pictures of happy and angry faces were exposed to 61 subjects at three different expo-
sure times (17, 56, and 2,350 ms) to elicit facial muscle reactions, first at automatic levels
and then at more controlled levels. Corrugator activity (‘frowning muscles’) represented
negative emotions and zygomaticus activity (‘smiling muscles’) positive emotions. At the
automatic level, dismissing-avoidant subjects showed ‘normal’ corrugator responses (neg-
ative emotions) upon exposure to angry faces. At a cognitively controlled level of pro-
cessing (2,350 ms) a significant interaction effect occurred among Faces Muscles
Attachment. The dismissing-avoidant subjects showed no corrugator response and an
increased zygomaticus response (‘smiling reaction’) to the angry face, whereas the non-
dismissing subjects reacted with a significant mimicking reaction. The dismissing-
avoidant subjects’ tendency to ‘smile’ in response to the angry face at the controlled level
(2,350 ms) may be interpreted as a repression of their earlier, automatically evoked (56
ms) negative emotional reaction (ibid.). The dismissing-avoidant subjects responded sim-
ilarly as the low-empathy group reported earlier in this chapter (Sonnby-Borgström,
2002a) in that both groups ‘smiled’ when exposed to angry faces. Consequently, empathy
measures may provide accurate predictions regarding which individuals will be more
likely to mimic and, thereby, fuel emotional contagion.
In further examination of the role of anxiety, researchers examined subjects either low
or high on public speaking fear in a study that measured facial EMG reactions to nega-
tive and positive social stimuli. Selected by questionnaire, high- and low-fear subjects
observed slides of angry and happy faces while facial EMG reactions from the corruga-
tor and zygomatic muscle regions were measured. Subjects also rated the stimuli on
different emotional dimensions. On the one hand, low-fear subjects reacted with increased
corrugator activity to angry faces and increased zygomatic activity to happy faces. The
high-fear group, on the other hand, did not distinguish between angry and happy faces.
Rating data indicated that the high-fear group perceived angry faces as being more emo-
tionally intense. Seemingly, anxiety interferes significantly with both mimicking behavior
and contagion (Dimberg & Christmanson, 1991). A similar pattern has been reported for
conformity to aggressive and risky behavior. In that study, socially anxious participants
were influenced by others regardless of status, whereas non-socially anxious participants
responded only to high-status peers (Cohen & Prinstein, 2006).
Generally, socially anxious participants are vigilant principally for unpleasant emo-
tional information. In addition, they may repress their initial reactions with ‘inappropri-
ate’ emotional displays much like the anxious individual who laughs at a torture
documentary. This bias for anxiety is also seen for depression. In a study of depression,
depressed subjects perceived more rejection/sadness in ambiguous faces (displaying less-
intensive emotions) and less invitation/happiness in clear faces. In addition, subjects per-
ceived more fear in clear faces that expressed-less intense emotions. These results show a
depression-related negative bias in the perception of facial displays (Schillbach et al.,
2006).
Finally, in a study of emotional regulation and depression, participants were asked to
view a series of emotionally positive and negative images and then indicate their reaction
to each one (Johnstone et al., 2007). Four seconds after the presentation of each picture,
participants were asked to increase their emotional response (for example, imagining a
loved one experiencing what was depicted in the image), to decrease it, or simply to con-
tinue watching the image. During the test, a functional magnetic resonance imaging
scanner detected changes in neural activity. Johnstone et al. also recorded levels of emo-
tional excitement by measuring pupil dilation. The data showed distinctive patterns of
activity in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) and the right prefrontal cortex
(PFC), areas that regulate the emotional output generated from the amygdala. The
VMPFC is compromised in depression, likely because of the inappropriate engagement
of right PFC circuitry in depressed individuals. Brain imaging revealed a breakdown in
normal patterns of emotional processing that impairs the ability of people with clinical
depression to suppress negative emotional states. Johnstone suggests that these findings
underscore the importance of emotional regulation deficits in depression.
The implications for emotional contagion in a group setting are that both anxiety
and depression serve to confuse emotional communication and disrupt the emotional
contagion of pleasant mood. These are individuals whom others may shun or ignore as
perpetually miserable or pessimistic. An important exception is the case when the anxious
or depressed individual is in an authority position or otherwise commands high status.
The opening case for this chapter illustrates the situation where a leader’s emotional con-
dition creates powerful emotional contagion. In the case of Mike, his anxiety and depres-
sion disrupt social communication, create an environment of high vigilance for mood
signals, and dictate personal caution to ‘think before one speaks’, especially in the
presence of a sensitive and potentially volatile leader. The influence of a leader’s mood
on both collective mood and group processes demonstrates robust contagion effects (Sy
et al., 2005).
On average, mood linkage is greater when group members are in a pleasant affective
environment and engaged in physical collective activity (Totterdell, 2000). The therapeu-
tic effects of physical activity for both anxiety and depression have been well documented.
Numerous studies have shown that exercise stimulates the neurotransmitters serotonin,
dopamine, epinephrine, and beta-endorphin, all of which elevate mood and reduce
depression and anxiety. It is not unreasonable to hypothesize that mental health will be
best and emotional communication most effective in situations where the group task
requires action. The popular attraction to team-building sessions where group members
engage in physical activities intended to demonstrate the benefits of cooperation, coordin-
ation, solidarity and communication are, in part, due to both movement and playfulness.
Finally, Wilson et al. (2007) have noted recently that those who most often are anxious
or depressed are 40 times more likely to develop mild cognitive impairment, a form of
memory loss that is often a transitional stage between normal aging and dementia.
Clearly, chronic or profound depression and anxiety are serious obstacles in the commu-
nication of emotion. For group work, mental health is an important criterion for mem-
bership. To expect members to ‘try harder to assimilate’ or to expect a group to assist the
anxious or depressed individual are demanding orders in work group design. Nonetheless,
anxious or depressed group members could serve as ‘natural’ bellwethers of caution while
presenting the ‘worst-case scenario’ for a group to consider and solve through systematic,
focused analysis.
The fire accelerants: laughter and humor

Evolutionary theorists consider laughter to have been a preadaptation that was gradually
elaborated and co-opted through both biological and cultural evolution. Specifically,
current thinking is that Duchenne laughter became fully ritualized in early hominids
between four and two million years ago as a medium for playful emotional contagion. This
mechanism would have coupled the emotions of small hominid groups and promoted
resource-building social play during the short-lived periods of safety and satiation that
characterized early bipedal life (Spoor & Kelly, 2004). Under these circumstances, a gener-
alized class of nonserious social incongruity would have been a reliable indicator of safe
times and thereby came to be a potent distal elicitor of laughter and playful emotion. This
class of stimuli had its origins in primate social play and is the foundation for formal human
humor (Gevais & Wilson, 2005). It is worth considering the cognitive framework that guides
both laughter and humor to understand their influence on emotional contagion.
Laughter (and humor) involves the gradual build-up of expectations (a model) fol-
lowed by a sudden twist or anomaly that entails a change in the model – but only as long
as the new model is non-threatening – so that there is a deflation of expectation (ibid.).

The loud explosive sound that is produced may be to inform others that there has been a
‘false alarm’, to which they need not orient. The same logic may underlie tickling (men-
acing approach followed by a light non-threatening contact). Thus tickling may serve as
‘play’, a rehearsal for adult laughter. Finally, when one human encounterd another, he/she
may have always initiated the interaction with a threat gesture – baring his/her canines –
but upon recognizing the individual as kin he/she may have stopped the grimace halfway
and ‘smiled’ (ibid.). Paradoxically, when the insular cortex is damaged, patients giggle in
response to pain, presumably because they can still sense the pain (‘danger’) but the pain
is no longer aversive (‘false alarm’), thereby fulfilling the two key requirements for laugh-
ter (Ramachandran, 1998).
Laughter and humor may be adaptive for group work by enhancing mood and defus-
ing perceptions of crisis or threat. Principally, laughter or humor serve to reset the emo-
tional thermometer of group. Afferent feedback resulting from mimicking behavior can
improve the mental health of group members as well as build social cohesion. In turn,
divergent thinking in a playful, harmonious context can generate creative solutions.
Moreover, positive moods may serve to improve some aspects of group performance
(Sy et al., 2005). Finally, creating a mix of positive and negative mood could serve to
improve group creativity (George & Zhou, 2007).
Summary
This chapter has reviewed pertinent literature regarding the emotional contagion process
in work groups. Here I shall summarize the major findings. On the whole, the primary
ingredients of our subjective emotional experience are visceral and somatic, reflecting our
autonomic nervous system. The ebb and flow of emotion produces concomitant parallel
patterns of ANS activation and deactivation in interaction partners.
Emotional contagion process

Several features emerged regarding the emotional contagion process. First and foremost,
the research confirms convincingly that mimicry occurs automatically, suggesting that
crucial aspects of emotional face-to-face communication occur on an unconscious level.
In terms of mood valence and intensity, right hemispheric stimulation following negative
emotional states or emotions with high arousal modulates cardiac and electrodermal
reactions. High-arousal emotions produce vigilance and orienting behavior. Unpleasant-
arousing emotions are exceptional kindling for the contagion process, in part because they
signal perilous circumstances.
Neural processing under normal circumstances allows two individuals to synchronize
their moods and subsequent cognition and behavior. Successful linkages are the building
blocks of relationships. The greater the contagion process, the more that individuals are
drawn together. ANS linkage among individuals may prove to be a significant nonverbal
marker of emotional contagion with the medial prefrontal cortex as the most likely
‘control center’ for evaluating communicative signals related to emotional contagion.
Individual differences regarding emotional contagion reflect differences in automatic
somatic reactions to facial stimuli rather than differences in conscious interpretation of
the emotional situation. Emotion regulation strategies are costly metabolically, awkward
socially, and generally inhibitory to relationships and personal experience.
A central tenet is that emotional contagion is an automatic function. While primitive

in its origins, its role in adjusting and maintaining interpersonal relations is both elegant
and necessary. Congruency provides balance and interpersonal rewards. The medial
basotemporal lobes facilitate congruent facial movements when an emotionally expres-
sive face is perceived and they are part of a system for non-volitional emotional facial
movements. The role of self-relevance is registered in neural processing and in subse-
quent mimicking behavior. Individuals with chronic mental illnesses who exhibit deficits
in neural processing such as anxiety and depression find emotional regulation and
interpersonal accommodation difficult and incongruous. Despite their difficulties
depressed or anxious individuals can, at times, contribute to problem-solving and task
conscientiousness.
Emotional contagion in work group contexts

Emotional contagion in groups is a necessary condition for group behavior. Familiar
social psychological concepts such as ‘group polarization, group cohesion, and deindi-
viduation’ may have their origins in emotional contagion. Specifically, group–individual
relations may be predicated on attachments that are formed based on empathic facets of
group life. For example, group cohesion may reflect a state of shared and interconnected
collective emotion regarding group activities.
The contagion process may be more robust at the collective level than at the interper-
sonal level. This is conjecture, but one of the most fascinating aspects of the Bartel and
Saavedra (2000) study of collective mood was that groups converged on all octants of the
mood circumplex. This would include difficult to observe octants such as ‘low activated
pleasant and unpleasant mood’. Bartel and Saavedra also reported that non-affective
factors such as membership stability, and task and social interdependence were positively
related to mood convergence. Specifically, behavioral mimicry and emotional contagion
were enhanced through shared perceptions of the context. One difference between prim-
itive emotional contagion and social comparison may be the role of personal involvement
which instigates automatic reactions – a finding highlighted earlier. Thus, the context
(group work, organizational settings, work roles) may promote greater mood convergence
by way of enhancing mimicking of congruent and consistent mood displays. Clearly, the
context differentiates laboratory research on emotional contagion and research in organ-
izational settings where context varies.
Influencing the contagion process could produce dramatic organizational results. A
part of work-group context is its leader. Experimental research by Sy et al. (2005) demon-
strates that, for interdependent work, certain mood states facilitate work-group behavior.
Using an emotional contagion model, this research indicated strong contagion effects
from leaders to followers in both positive and negative mood domains. Practically, posi-
tive mood facilitated group coordination while negative mood facilitated group effort and
the influence of negative mood on strategy development was in the hypothesized direc-
tion, offering a promising lead.
Starting an escape fire

Is the situation in the opening vignette such that Mike’s wrath is inescapable? Is it possi-
ble to create an ‘escape fire’ to weather the firestorm of emotion? An escape fire is a fire
lit to clear an area of vegetation in the face of an approaching wildfire when no escape
exists. Escape fires are not attempts to control or stop a wildfire. The principle of an escape
fire became popular after the Mann Gulch disaster in Montana in 1949 where 13 smoke
jumpers lost their lives. In Weick’s (1993) description of the disaster, Wagner Dodge
cleared an area large enough for him to survive unharmed when the main fire was less than
one minute away.
Laughter and humor may be the escape fire that the members of the department can
use to enhance collective mood and defuse the chair’s volatility and negativity. This tactic
will not permanently change Mike’s disposition but it will serve to neutralize a maladap-
tive situation. By using contextual references to coalesce attention, the goal is to defuse
negative emotional contagion and promote contagion relative to positive and arousing
mood. Given the cyclical nature of group work, laughter or humor may serve to reset the
emotional thermometer of the group for the afternoon’s tasks. For this strategy to work,
it must involve all the members of the department. Having two or three people share a
joke prior to the meeting would not serve the same purpose. Rather, arousing shared
humor may save the members of the management department from being prisoners to the
disposition and displays of one individual. A funny story may indeed provide a necessary
escape.
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26 Group-level emotional intelligence
Vanessa Urch Druskat and Steven B. Wolff*
Introduction
Work tasks are assigned to teams when team member information sharing and interaction
are necessary for optimal performance. Many factors can influence the quality of team
member information sharing and interaction – one of the most elusive is emotion. In fact,
every interaction between and among team members produces emotion (Kemper, 2000).
Moreover, within the team context, this emotion is contagious; it instantly and uncon-
sciously spreads among team members and affects subsequent team dynamics (Barsade,
2002; Sy et al., 2005). For the past five decades, researchers have been showing that
emotion influences the quality of group interactions, the motivation of team members,
and team performance (Homans, 1950; Boyd, 1964; Edmondson, 1999; Kelly, 2004).
However, research and theory have seldom addressed how to turn emotion into an asset
for a team. The primary focus of group theorists has been aimed at guarding against the
negative aspects of emotion such as destructive conflict. In the 1970s and 1980s, group
theorists argued that emotion should be managed by reducing the amount of member
interaction during team decision-making processes (Delbecq et al., 1975) and through the
use of strategies such as structuring discussion principles or appointing a ‘devil’s advo-
cate’, that is, a person whose mission was to provide the negative feedback or raise the
difficult issues so that members would not fear having to disappoint or anger the group
(ibid.; Janis, 1982).
While these strategies are effective at muting emotion in groups, they also reduce the
team’s ability to exploit the constructive benefits of emotion. Negative emotions can pre-
occupy the attention of team members; nevertheless, they are commentaries on team
members’ honest concerns and can provide valuable information (Archer, 2004) about the
adequacy of team processes or the correctness of team decisions. Positive emotions can
also play a useful role in team environments by engaging members in the team or the task
(Homans, 1950; Bales, 1953). The positive emotions that emerge from caring, respectful,
or enjoyable interactions among members can also lead to the development of bonds that
boost cooperation (Dirks, 1999), the synergistic integration of ideas, and the effectiveness
of group processes (Hackman, 1987; Dirks, 1999). However, theory or research have
seldom examined how teams can best take advantage of both negative and positive
emotion in the team environment and use it to improve performance (Reus & Liu, 2004).
In this chapter, we present a working theory developed by the authors to propose how
awareness and management of emotion in groups can be used to harness the positive side
of emotion and produce ‘process gains’ (Druskat & Wolff, 2001a). Process gains are
defined as boosts to a team’s productivity due to high-quality interaction processes in the
team (Steiner, 1972). We argue that process gains are the result of ‘emotionally competent
group norms’ that build social capital and improve task-focused behaviors and interac-
tions. Our theory is an extension of emotional intelligence theory (Goleman, 2001; Mayer,
2001) and its application in team environments (Huy, 1999). So, we begin by defining the
441
construct of emotional intelligence and discussing how researchers have conceptualized

its application in team environments.
Emotional intelligence
Emotional intelligence (EI) is one of the most intriguing yet controversial concepts
emerging from psychology in the last few decades. When it first emerged, the concept
received immediate attention because social scientists, educators, managers, and the
general public all saw face validity and utility in the idea of a form of intelligence that
combines emotion and cognitive reasoning. Although beyond the scope of this chapter,
it is worth noting that the controversy over EI stems mostly from the abrupt speed with
which it entered the literature, which was due to its almost instant popularity. Additional
theory and research are necessary to sort out problems that grew out of that, such as the
lack of a consistent definition, the quality of EI measures, and whether EI measures tap
into something new that personality and cognitive intelligence tests do not already
provide (Murphy, 2006). Nevertheless, a growing amount of theory and research on EI
links it to behaviors relevant in team environments (Druskat et al., 2006).
In terms of definition, EI involves thinking and acting intelligently about emotion.
Specifically, it requires the ability to recognize and differentiate one’s own emotions and
emotions in others, to understand how these specific emotions influence behavior, and to
anticipate and manage one’s own and others’ behavioral reactions to specific emotions.
Those who study EI agree that, like cognitive intelligence (IQ), it is defined by a set of abil-
ities. The exact abilities that define EI are debated by theorists whose theories differ in
seemingly slight but important ways (Mayer, et al., 2000; Druskat et al., 2006). Recently,
strong empirical support was found for a six-factor model supporting six distinct EI abil-
ities including: (a) emotional self-awareness; (b) awareness of others’ emotions; (c) emo-
tional self-regulation; (d) management of others’ emotions; (e) emotional expression; and
(f) emotional reasoning (Palmer et al., in press).
The first two abilities, emotional self-awareness and awareness of others’ emotions,
involve recognizing or perceiving one’s own feelings and those of others in their facial
expressions, voice tones or postures, and then accurately labeling them. The second two
abilities, emotional self-regulation and management of others’ emotions, are seen when
one is able to calm down oneself or others’ during stressful times, or when one anticipates
and avoids stress before it occurs. Alternatively, it can involve cheering up oneself or
others when needed – the critical attribute is the ability to manage the emotion. The fifth
ability, emotional expression, is the ability to accurately express the emotion one feels. The
sixth ability, emotional reasoning, involves the ability to accurately analyze emotions such
as when they arise, their typical trends, and their typical outcomes.
Research consistently shows that when work requires social interaction, EI abilities are
positively linked to high performance (Druskat et al., 2006). This makes sense because
emotions are primarily social phenomena (McCarthy, 1989; Leach & Tiedens, 2004). The
emotional system is triggered by events occurring outside of our physical bodies and fre-
quently these events are connected to social interactions and social relationships, as seen
in the case of greed, anger, rage, or tenderness (McCarthy, 1989). The stronger the mutual
dependence, that is, interdependence, among individuals, the more likely they are to
invoke emotions in one another and the more inextricably linked are their emotions (Clark
et al., 2004), producing ‘shared emotions’ (Kelly & Barsade, 2001). In team environments,
Group-level emotional intelligence 443
interdependence among members is usually high because members need one another to
complete their work. Decades of research provides ample evidence that emotion is a
central and inevitable part of life in work teams (Bales, 1953; Tuckman, 1965; Barsade &
Gibson, 1998).
Two features of EI make it particularly relevant to the productive use of emotion in
team environments. First, as mentioned above, emotions are commentaries on concerns
(Archer, 2004) and can be early indicators of problems in teams. Thus, attention to
member emotions can enable a team to recognize problems before they evolve into larger
problems. Second, EI enables one to regulate and manage destructive emotions. Given
that conflict is a natural part of group life (Deutsch, 1973), this ability would likely be
useful for tempering destructive conflict in a team. In sum, EI could be an asset in team
environments because it has the potential to enable team members to notice and under-
stand one another’s emotions, manage destructive emotions, recognize emotions as com-
mentaries and feedback, and use emotion information to improve team processes,
decisions, and outcomes.
Emotional intelligence in team contexts

The clear association between EI and behavior that might be productive in team contexts
has led theorists and researchers to examine its application in work teams. This applica-
tion has been characterized and examined through the use of three different approaches.
The most common approach is to measure each team member’s EI and to average the
scores to compile a team EI score. The assumption is that the higher the average score, the
more emotionally intelligent the team (Feyerhem & Rice, 2002; Day & Carroll, 2004;
Offermann et al., 2004; Frye et al., 2006).
A second approach to examining team EI is through the use of a specialized measure
focused on behavior in team contexts. This approach was initiated by Peter Jordan and
his colleagues who developed the ‘Workgroup Emotional Intelligence Profile’ (WEIP) to
assess individual emotional intelligence expressed in a team context (Jordan et al., 2002;
Jordan & Troth, 2004). The items in the WEIP ask members to rate the extent to which
they can do things such as ‘explain the emotions they feel to team members’, ‘overcome
anger that is felt toward a team member’, and so on. A second version of the survey, the
Peer-WEIP, asks team members to assess whether their teammates exhibit these EI abil-
ities in the team. For both the WEIP and the Peer-WEIP, team EI is measured as the
average level of individual EI in a team. Teams with members who score higher on EI are
considered to be more emotionally intelligent.
Finally, some theorists, including my colleagues and I, define team emotional intelli-
gence as a group- (Druskat & Wolff, 2001a; Gnatt & Agazarian, 2004; Reus & Liu, 2004)
or even organization-level (Huy, 1999; Gnatt & Agazarian, 2004) construct. We argue that
just as emotion in an organizational context occurs at multiple levels (Ashkanasy, 2003),
EI can also occur at multiple levels. In fact, teams (or organizations) are well known to be
‘greater than the sum of their individual parts’ (Tziner & Eden, 1985). In other words,
behavior in teams is not random and does not occur in a vacuum; behavior is influenced
by the surrounding context and the range of behaviors considered acceptable within the
team (Morgeson & Hofmann, 1999). A team’s emergent norms and culture interact with
and can easily prevail over the abilities or behaviors of individual members. Research has
consistently revealed that other than task ability, individual member characteristics are
weak predictors of team processes and outcomes (Vraa, 1974; Barry & Stewart, 1997).
Thus, we argue that if EI is to have a significant influence in a team, it must exist as some-
thing more than an individual team member ability that may or may not make a
difference – it must exist as a norm or expectation about how team members should
behave in a team. Understanding how EI can exist as a group-level norm requires under-
standing how group norms emerge.
Research and theory provide evidence of a four-phase process that occurs as norms
emerge (Festinger, 1954; Feldman, 1984; Bettenhausen & Murnighan, 1985). In the first
phase, members come together and base their behavior and expectations on their prior
experience in similar situations. Thus, for EI behaviors to emerge as norms, some
members need to arrive with the abilities required for EI and a belief that behaving in emo-
tionally intelligent ways will serve the group.
The second phase starts as soon as team members begin to interact. It involves a series
of actions, observations, and reflections through which members begin to create and make
sense out of common experiences that start shaping their expectations (Bettenhausen &
Murnighan, 1985). According to Festinger’s (1954) social comparison theory, the ambi-
guity experienced in this phase causes members to turn to one another to compare behav-
iors and gauge the acceptability of their behaviors and beliefs in the team.
In phase three of the norm development process, members start challenging the emerg-
ing expectations and patterns of behaviors and begin voicing alternative preferences
(Bettenhausen & Murnighan, 1985). It is important to note that norms develop only for
those behaviors and attitudes that are viewed as important by most group members
(Hackman, 1987). Thus, in this phase, if group EI norms are emerging, they are likely to
be challenged and must eventually get supported by a majority of group members if they
are to endure. Alternatively, if group EI norms have not emerged, this is a critical period
for group members to make interventions in support of them.
We propose five forces that can leverage the importance of emotionally intelligent
behavior in the eyes of the group majority. These involve the influence of: (i) external team
leaders, (ii) informal team leaders, (iii) courageous followers who are not necessarily
treated as informal leaders in the team, (iv) training, and (v) organizational culture. The
first three involve interventions by individuals who believe in the importance of emo-
tionally intelligent behavior and champion the relevance of emotion to team processes
and outcomes. Training programs provided early in a group’s development can advocate
developing emotionally intelligent norms and have the added advantage of enabling
members to build the skills and abilities needed to support such norms (Hackman, 1987).
Finally, an organizational culture that supports emotionally intelligent behavior can
support the emergence of emotionally intelligent norms.
In phase four, members start behaving according to group expectations instead of those
with which they entered the team (Bettenhausen & Murnighan, 1985). Deviations from
norms are sanctioned. Group norms have been discussed as the most invisible, but most
powerful form of influence in teams (Feldman, 1984).
Defining emotionally intelligent group norms

But clearly group norms cannot sanction a team member to develop EI abilities. In other
words, most groups cannot simply insist that their members display abilities they may not
have, such as awareness of their own emotions or empathy for other members’ emotions.
Therefore, while our model grows out of the theory of emotional intelligence, it involves
a set of nine emotionally competent norms that sanction behavior that, while not emo-
tionally intelligent in and of itself, leads to awareness and management of emotion in the
team environment. Awareness and management of emotion are selected because they are
central ability dimensions in most theories of EI (Salovey & Mayer, 1990; Goleman, 2001;
Bar-On et al., 2006). Importantly, these behaviors can be demonstrated by any team
member, regardless of a member’s own level of EI.
We formally define group emotional competence (GEC) as the ability of a group to
create norms that sanction member awareness and/or management of emotion in a way
that builds, rather than depletes, what we refer to as ‘group social capital’. In turn, group
social capital leads to group effectiveness. Below, we define group social capital. First we
define and discuss GEC.
A distinguishing feature about the group context is that it elicits and embodies emotion
at multiple levels (i.e., individual, group, intergroup), all of which can significantly
influence member behavior and group outcomes (Barsade & Gibson, 1998). Thus, GEC
must evoke emotionally competent behavior at multiple levels: (i) awareness of and man-
agement of the emotion of individual members, (ii) awareness and management of group-
level emotion, and (iii) awareness and management of emotion expressed by relevant
groups and individuals external to the group.
Individual member emotion

GEC norms must support behavior that attends to the emotional needs of each individ-
ual member. Thus as can be seen in Figure 26.1, the first dimension of GEC focuses on
awareness and management of emotions in individual team members. Therefore, it must
create a balance between attending to and understanding individual member emotions
with managing or regulating them so as to induce desirable member behavior in the team
that will not break trust. We propose the first two dimensions of GEC to be: (i) group
awareness of members (i.e., members’ feelings, needs, and concerns), and (ii) group man-
agement of members. We also suggest three specific norms that would support these
dimensions: interpersonal understanding (Druskat, 1996), caring orientation (Kahn,
1996; Wolff, 1998), and confronting members who break norms (Lawrence & Lorsch,
1967; Murnighan & Conlon, 1991; Druskat, 1996).
Group awareness of members This GEC dimension represents group norms that encour-
age team members to learn and recognize the needs, feelings, preferences, and resources of
the other members. The group provides a culture within which members interact and form
relationships. Understanding of the spoken and unspoken feelings, interests, concerns,
strengths and weakness of group members allows members to better understand one
another’s day-to-day behavior and contributions to the group. This enables an individual
to support a fellow group member when needed, validate members by recognizing and uti-
lizing their strengths, and by being respectful of their feelings, all of which have been shown
to build relationships (Wolff, 1998). We propose a norm of ‘interpersonal understanding’
as representative of a norm that encourages group members to understand each other.
Group management of members This dimension of GEC represents two norms that
influence group member response to emotion and encourages building respectful
Group emotional Dimensions of group Group social

competence norms emotional competence capital
Individual focused
• Interpersonal understanding Group awareness of members
• Confronting members who

break norms Group management of members
• Caring behavior
Group focused
• Team self-evaluation Group self-awareness • Trust

• Group identity
• Creating resources for • Group efficacy
working with emotion • Networks
• Creating an optimistic Group self-management
environment
• Proactive problem solving
Cross-boundary focused
• Organizational awareness Group social awareness
• Building relationships with Group social skills

stakeholders
Source: Adapted from Druskat and Wolff (2001b).
Figure 26.1 Dimensions of group emotional competence and GEC norms
relationships. There is great tension in groups between creating norms that ensure pre-
dictable group member behavior, and at the same time creating leeway to allow members
a sense of control and enable them to speak their mind and experience their individual-
ity. Theorists have argued that, paradoxically, the more a group allows its members
to exert their individuality, the more its members will be open to placing their individu-
alism aside for the good of the group (Smith & Berg, 1987). Group management of
members must walk the fine line between encouraging desired behavior and promoting
individuality.
To promote both desired behavior, and the honest expression of emotion, group norms
need to encourage members to speak up when a member does something considered unac-
ceptable. Research suggests that in successful teams, rather than avoiding conflict,
members speak up when another member steps out of line or breaks norms (Lawrence &
Lorsch, 1967; Murnighan & Conlon, 1991). We propose a norm of ‘confronting members
who break norms’ as representing group norms that encourage honest discussion of
behaviors that are thought to be unacceptable to group members.
As group members speak up and interact in general, it is important to communicate

positive regard, appreciation, and respect. This illustrates to members that their presence
and contribution are valued. In a study of 67 work groups, Wolff (1998) found that ‘caring
behaviors’ such as validating group members, attention to members, empathy, and
support contributed to group effectiveness by increasing members’ sense of safety, cohe-
sion and satisfaction, which in turn, facilitated member engagement in the task. Kahn
(1996) argues that a caring orientation builds workplace relationships that provide a
‘secure base’ for individuals, which allows them to take risks that facilitate personal learn-
ing and development. Caring does not necessitate close personal relationships, it requires
communicating care and respect. We propose a norm of ‘caring behavior’ to represent the
norms that guide individual team members to treat each other with care and respect.
Group-level emotion
LeBon (1977) was the first to propose that emotion in a group context can create a pow-
erful force that overwhelms individual differences in emotion and creates a collective
group character. At the core of LeBon’s controversial theory was the proposition that
there exists a group-level construct greater than the sum of its individual parts (Barsade
& Gibson, 1998). GEC norms focused on group-level emotion must encompass a cate-
gory of behaviors that seek to become aware of group-level emotion and to manage or
regulate it. We propose two dimensions of GEC under this category: (i) group self-
awareness, and (ii) group self-management.
Group self-awareness Self-awareness involves two complementary processes. First, to

become self-aware, the group must look inward to examine its emotions, needs, processes,
and preferences. Second, the group must look outward to collect information that allows
it to assess the effectiveness of its current state. Research shows that groups vary with
respect to the degree that they encourage these processes (Druskat, 1996). Druskat found
that high-performing teams were much more likely than average teams to seek evaluative
information and to use the information to discover their strengths and weaknesses. We
propose that a norm of ‘team self-evaluation’ would ensure that a team collect informa-
tion and reflect on it to build its self-awareness.
Group self-management Group self-management represents the set of group norms that
influence the ability of the group to face emotionally challenging situations and respond
in a productive manner. This dimension complements group self-awareness by increasing
the group’s ability to cope with the emotions that emerge from generating self-awareness
and by guiding the group’s emotional response in a productive direction.
Group self-management increases the group’s ability to cope with emotionally chal-
lenging situations in three ways. First, the perceived emotional threat can be reduced
through positive interpretations of the situation surrounding the emotion-eliciting event.
Many situations are ambiguous and their meaning is derived through group member
interaction and discussion. Creating positive, optimistic interpretations of events helps to
reduce the negative emotions associated with the event (Cooperrider, 1990; Miller &
Yeager, 1993), and thus, increases a group’s ability to cope with the event. We propose a
group norm labeled ‘creating an optimistic environment’ that influences the group to
think positively about the challenges it faces.
Second, a team’s ability to work with emotion can be built by the provision of
resources that enable the group to process and utilize the emotion as information.
Organizations and groups have cultures that vary widely in their willingness to encour-
age and support expression and discussion of emotional states (Martin et al., 1998).
When norms discourage emotional expression and discussion, the emotion does not
disappear; it frequently emerges as dysfunctional behavior, for example, unproductive
conflict or self-deception and avoidance of potentially threatening situations (Fineman,
1993; Holmer, 1994). Levy argues that culture provides resources for processing
emotion (Levy, 1984). In a group setting this would encompass norms that encourage
expression of emotion, provide time for it, and a language for efficient discussion. We
propose the norm of ‘creating resources for working with emotion’ as representing
a group’s facilitation of emotional expression and discussion through providing
resources.
Third, a group’s capacity to cope with emotional arousal can be influenced through
norms that directly guide behavior. Druskat (1996) found that highly effective teams took
control of difficult situations. For example, one team that was experiencing frequent
equipment breakdowns took the situation into their own hands. Rather than wait for the
maintenance crew to make repairs, they watched the mechanics repair the problem and
the next time did the repair themselves. Other highly effective teams designed their own
parts rather than tolerate equipment that hindered their performance. These actions
increase the sense of control over the environment, which reduces the emotional challenge
of the situation. We propose the norm of ‘proactive problem solving’ to represent norms
that encourage taking proactive action in dealing with situations that would otherwise
lead to negative emotion.
Cross-boundary emotion
Groups in organizations are not islands. Their work involves interacting with and meeting
the needs of stakeholders outside of the team. Indeed, Ancona and her colleagues have
long argued that the cross-functional, cross-boundary communication required for
smooth group functioning is a primary team responsibility (Gladstein, 1984; Ancona,
1990). Thus, the third dimension of GEC involves an awareness of the feelings, needs, and
concerns of individuals and stakeholders and relevant groups in the external boundary.
We propose two dimensions of GEC related to cross-boundary emotion: (i) group social
awareness, and (ii) group social skills. Two group norms support this dimension of GEC:
organizational awareness (Ancona, 1990; Druskat, 1996) and building relationships with
stakeholders (Argote, 1989; Ancona, 1990).
Group social awareness Group social awareness represents norms that encourage a
group to be aware of its context as well as the needs, feelings, preferences, and resources
of other individuals and groups with which it interacts or that it considers to be its stake-
holders. Research shows that an effective group is awareness of the social and political
system of which it is a part (Druskat, 1996). This boundary-spanning activity allows the
group to gather information and resources that it can use to accomplish its task more
effectively (Yan & Louis, 1999). We propose a norm of ‘organizational awareness’ to rep-
resent the group’s encouragement of attending to and understanding the organizational
system of which it is a part.
Group social skills Understanding the organizational system, however, is insufficient for
developing relationships with other groups and individuals. Group social skills represent
norms that encourage building relationships with stakeholders. It is through the develop-
ment of constructive relationships that a group can convert its awareness into influence
and the engagement of external resources.
In a study examining group boundary management, groups who did not engage in
cross-boundary activities – labeled ‘isolationists’ – performed significantly worse than
those who did (Ancona & Caldwell, 1992). Druskat (1996) also found that highly effective
groups built good relationships with other groups. We propose a norm of ‘building rela-
tionships with stakeholders’ to represent a group’s focus on building constructive rela-
tionships with other groups and relevant individuals.
Constructive emotion in groups

Emotionally competent group norms enable a group to take advantage of both negative
and positive emotion in the team environment. We argue that by building awareness and
management of emotion they enable process gains in groups through their facilitation of
‘group social capital’. Social capital represents the value added by the structure and
quality of relationships held by an individual or social unit (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998).
Unlike other forms of capital (e.g., financial or human), social capital is jointly held by
the parties in a relationship, yet, ‘like other forms of capital, social capital is productive,
making possible the achievement of certain ends that in its absence would not be possible’
(Coleman, 1988, p. 98).
We propose that GEC norms lead to the development of four dimensions of social
capital which are all rooted in emotion: trust, group identity, group efficacy, and
network ties. These dimensions of social capital each boost group processes in unique
ways.
Trust
Trust involves the willingness to make oneself vulnerable to the actions of others because
of the belief and expectation that those actions will be favorable to one’s interests (Mayer
et al., 1995). Theorists have defined trust as growing out of affect and friendship (i.e.,
stemming from reciprocal interpersonal care and concern), and/or out of calculus-based
cognitions (i.e., I trust that you can and will do what you say) (Rousseau et al., 1998).
Despite its form, the experience of trust and its ongoing evolution are dependent on pos-
itive behavioral exchanges between parties. If such exchanges are continuous, trust can
grow from a level of trustworthy impressions to a deeper level of unconditional trust.
Jones and George (1998) propose three conditions necessary for the development of
unconditional trust in a group setting: (i) confidence in each other’s values and trustwor-
thiness, (ii) favorable attitudes toward each other, and (iii) positive affect in the context of
the relationship.
The individual-focused GEC norms characterizing both emotional awareness and
management of member behavior support group members in feeling understood,
respected, and cared for while enforcing predictable and fair behavior. Together they help
build trust by facilitating trustworthiness, favorable attitudes toward one another, and
positive affect (ibid.).
Group identity
A second form of social capital is group identity, which involves a perception of oneness
with a group because of the feeling that the group represents oneself (Ashforth & Mael,
1989). The concept of group identity grows out of social identity theory, which contends
that individuals define their self-concepts through their associations with social groups
(Tajfel, 1982). It has been argued that individuals are motivated to identify with specific
groups because they fulfill a desire for affiliation (Kelman, 1958) and because that
affiliation enhances one’s self-esteem (Turner, 1975).
Thus, we argue that group identity grows out of the group member-focused dimension
of GEC, which involves awareness and management of member behavior, and the group-
focused dimension, which involves group self-awareness and group self-management. The
individually focused norms create a sense of being understood, respected and cared for
while reinforcing the rules or conditions of group membership. The group-focused norms
ensure that members will be proud to belong to that particular group.
Group efficacy
Group efficacy involves the collective belief within a group that the group can perform
effectively (Lindsley et al., 1995). Group efficacy grows out of group member interactions
focused on the acquisition, organization, and exchange of information about each other,
and about the group’s task context, process, and past performance (Gibson, 1999). Such
interactions permit the development of a shared sense of the group’s potential for success.
We argue that group efficacy develops from group-focused GEC norms that promote
group self-awareness and group self-management including: team self-evaluation, creat-
ing resources for working with emotion, creating an optimistic environment, and proac-
tive problem solving. These GEC norms support group efficacy through two paths. The
first is through assessment, which as discussed above is a prerequisite for group efficacy
beliefs. Lindsley et al. argue that assessment facilitates group efficacy by enabling timely
self-correction and adjustment. The second path is through a focus on the future and
taking control of that future, both of which are evident in norms such as creating an opti-
mistic environment, and proactive problem solving
Network ties
Network ties are relational bonds developed with individuals or groups outside of the
group’s boundary. Theory and research indicate that network ties can be instrumental
through their ability to provide resources including information and influence (Burt,
1997). Through the GEC norms of organizational awareness and building relationships
with stakeholders, a group is able to tap into the emotional issues and priorities faced by
stakeholders and to address those priorities.
Conclusions and future directions

Our conception of group-level emotional intelligence proposes that a group’s ability to
develop norms that support emotionally intelligent behavior influences its ability to gen-
erate social capital, which is beneficial because it boosts team processes and team
effectiveness (i.e., it creates process gains). This conception of group EI holds numerous
implications for research and practice. First, our theory suggests that researchers
embark on a renewed and more thorough examination of the role of emotion in groups
so that the constructive side of emotions is more clearly documented and supported. As
a starting place, we present specific norms and causal connections that we propose
enable a group to use awareness and management of emotion to facilitate positive
outcomes.
Our model has several implications for managers. First, we provide a clear direction
that involves two main destinations: group-level EI and social capital. We suggest that
managers work to develop the EI of their group members, and to develop GEC norms in
their work groups. We also suggest that managers keep the purpose for GEC in full view:
the development of social capital. Second, we provide a detailed map for getting to those
destinations that outlines the dimensions of GEC, group behaviors to support those
dimensions, and the elements of social capital.
In sum, we believe that emotions in group contexts are relevant to creating conditions
that build team effectiveness. Moreover, we believe that groups play a role in creating their
own context by choosing and constructing social norms that prescribe how members will
treat one another and work together. By incorporating norms that build group-level
emotional intelligence, groups can create self-reinforcing spirals of heedful interrelating,
strong emotional attachments, effective task processes, and group effectiveness.
Note
* We wish to thank Neal Ashkanasy for his inspiration and patience.
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27 Research trends in emotions and leadership
Ronald H. Humphrey, Janet B. Kellett, Randall G. Sleeth
and Nathan S. Hartman
Introduction
The last few years have seen an explosive growth in the number of publications on emo-
tions and leadership. Emotions and affective variables have been incorporated in to vir-
tually all of the major leadership approaches. Even attributional and sense-making
models of leadership – which traditionally have taken a purely cognitive approach – now
have some researchers including affective variables in their models. In this chapter we shall
outline some of the more promising research trends in the area of emotions and leader-
ship. We start by discussing how researchers have related core emotional traits/compe-
tencies to traits traditionally studied by leadership researchers, such as intelligence. These
studies show that emotional intelligence/competencies add additional explanatory value
over and above that of previously studied traits and skills. The next sections will explain
the basic concepts behind emotion research while linking these concepts to important
leadership roles. For example, we shall explain the core concepts behind affective events
theory (AET) and show how researchers have related AET to leaders’ influence over team
members’ moods and emotions. The last sections of the chapter will then discuss specific
leadership models, such as transformational leadership theory or LMX, and talk about
how researchers have incorporated emotions into these models. We shall also discuss how
leading with emotions contributes to ethical behavior. Throughout the chapter, we shall
suggest research areas that offer promising chances for new breakthroughs and research
streams.
Emotions and leadership traits and abilities
Emotions and IQ
The early research on emotions was marred by conflicts over whether emotional intelli-
gence (EI) even existed. In part, this conflict was ignited by Goleman’s (1995) initial claim
that EI matters far more than the traditional IQ (intelligence quotient) in explaining
success in life. To be fair to Goleman, he was reacting to the almost total omission of
affective variables in prior research (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1993). As Daus and
Ashkanasy (2005) argue, empirical research that uses the most current measures of EI
provides ample evidence that it exists and that it influences important organizational out-
comes. Chapter 26 goes into this topic in greater depth.
We have previously included both cognitive and affective variables in our research on
leadership (e.g., Humphrey, 1985), so we are glad to report that many researchers are now
taking a more balanced approach, and including both types of variables. For example,
Lord et al. (1986) had published one of the most influential reviews demonstrating that
intelligence is an excellent predictor of leadership emergence. In this meta-analysis, done
before the research on emotional intelligence, IQ was the best predictor of leadership
455
emergence (see also the recent meta-analysis of the correlations between IQ and leader-
ship by Judge et al., 2004). Now Lord has co-edited one of the best books on emotions in
the workplace (Lord & Kanfer, 2002), and much of his current work is on the relation-
ship between emotions and cognitions (Lord & Hall, 2005). For example, Lord and Hall
propose that emotion regulation (along with identity and meta-cognitive processes) plays
a critical role in organizing cognitive structures behind leadership expertise. Thus instead
of a single-minded focus on either IQ or EQ (emotional quotient), leadership researchers
are now realizing that the real questions concern the relationship between these abilities.
In our own research (Kellett et al., 2002), we found that there are two separate routes
to leadership emergence, with one route emphasizing emotional skills (in particular,
empathy) and the other more cognitive abilities. Côté and Miners (2006) found a similar
effect. They hypothesized and found that the relationship between emotional intelligence
and job performance becomes more positive as cognitive intelligence declines. This again
suggests that many people tend to rely on either emotional skills or cognitive skills as their
routes to success. Whether people rely more on cognitive or emotional skills may also
depend on the type of task involved. Offermann et al. (2004) found that cognitive ability
explained greater variance in individual tasks, but that emotional competencies explained
more in team performance.
In a later article (Kellett et al., 2006), we found that empathy predicted both task and
relationship leadership, whereas cognitive intelligence and complex task performance pre-
dicted task leadership but not relationship leadership. Empathy mediated the effects of
both the ability to express emotions and the ability to recognize emotions in others. In
addition, the ability to express emotions also had a direct influence on task leadership.
The fact that both empathy and the ability to express emotions had such direct effects
demonstrates that emotional variables are not simply another way of looking at relation-
ship leadership. Instead, they play an important role in task leadership as well.
The relationship between emotions and cognitive intelligence is complex and needs
further study. Although in our study we found that empathy and emotional expressive-
ness directly related to task leadership, both were unrelated to our measure of cognitive
intelligence (ibid.). However, as suggested by Lord & Hall’s (2005) article, some dimen-
sions of EI or competencies are likely to be related to cognitive intelligence and related
leadership skills. In a meta-analytic study, Van Rooy and Viswesvaran (2004) found that
EI correlated 0.22 with general mental ability. In a study of pre-eminent achievement,
superior performers were high in both IQ and EQ (Aydin et al., 2005). Similarly, Hoffman
& Frost (2006) found that a multiple intelligence perspective that included both cognitive
and emotional components explained the most variance in perceptions of transforma-
tional leadership. Thus the balanced approach is to recognize that both emotional and
cognitive intelligence contribute to effective leadership. However, more research is needed
to determine which emotional competencies aid in the development of task leadership,
leadership expertise and other leadership skills traditionally associated with cognitive
intelligence.
Emotions and other personality traits

One of the early criticisms of the emotions research is the claim that measures of emo-
tional competencies and EQ overlap with other well-established personality traits, in par-
ticular the ‘Big Five’. Daus and Ashkanasy (2005) discuss this issue and acknowledge that
Research trends in emotions and leadership 457
some scales do overlap with the Big Five. However, they provide evidence that the later
scales most closely related to Mayer and Salovey’s (1997; see also Mayer et al., 2000) EI
model have appropriate discriminant and predictive validity. In their meta-analysis, Van
Rooy and Viswesvaran (2004) found that EI measures correlated with three of the Big Five
measures, with correlations of 0.23 for both agreeableness and openness to experience,
and 0.34 for extraversion. The size of these correlations demonstrates that EI is correlated
with related constructs – as one would expect – but that the correlations are not large
enough to indicate that EI is simply a proxy or redundant measure of the Big Five. With
regard to other traits, Jordan and his colleagues (Jordan, 2001; Jordan et al., 2002) demon-
strate that the Workgroup Emotional Intelligence Profile has discriminate value
with regard to the 16 personality factors, revised self-monitoring, and the personal style
inventory.
Studies also demonstrate that emotion-related variables predict performance ratings
over and above that explained by the Big Five or other personality variables. For example,
Law et al. (2004) found that peer ratings of employees’ EI predicted job performance (as
measured by supervisors) after controlling for the Big Five personality measures. In a
similar vein, Semadar et al. (2006) compared four variables that on theoretical grounds
should contribute to social effectiveness and managerial job performance: self-monitoring,
leadership self-efficacy, EI, and political skill. In their study only self-monitoring did not
predict managerial job performance.
Overall, current research has demonstrated that affective variables are not simply old
variables disguised in new clothing. Thus instead of arguing whether the Big Five or emo-
tional competencies are more important, we should examine how emotional traits and
abilities interact with other characteristics to influence leadership. This should be a fruit-
ful research area for many years.
Affective events theory, leadership, and managing others’ emotions
Affective events theory

AET has become one of the most influential theories in the area of emotions (Weiss &
Cropanzano, 1996; Weiss et al., 1999; Ashkanasy & Daus, 2002). According to this
theory, individuals have a baseline, or typical emotional tone. Some individuals may be
high on positive affectivity and experience positive moods most of the time, whereas
others may be high on negative affectivity and experience negative feelings predom-
inantly. Events in the workplace, however, can cause disturbances to an individual’s base-
line level. For example, an angry customer can disrupt a normally cheerful employee’s
mood, or a successful project can elevate team members’ moods. A good example of how
work-group mood influenced performance is provided by Jordan et al. (2006). They
found that team members’ moods influenced their work-group processes such as team
cohesion, workload sharing, interpersonal and task conflict, and process conflict. Mood
influenced performance through these group processes, but also had a direct and unmedi-
ated influence on performance. Their study demonstrated that team members’ moods are
just as important as these other well-studied and accepted influences on performance.
The other chapters in this book will explain AET in more detail, so we shall turn our
attention to describing the research that demonstrates how leaders influence affective
events at work.
Leaders’ influence on affective events

There are several ways in which leaders can influence affective events and thus employees’
moods. First, leaders can be a major source of affective events through their own behav-
iors, particularly those directed toward the employees. In other words, leaders can be the
original source of an affective event. Second, leaders can either help or hinder employees’
ability to respond to positive or negative work events that originated from customers,
peers, work-flow processes, or other non-leader origins. In particular, leaders can either
help employees cope with other frustrating work events, for example, by intervening on
the employees’ behalf during disputes with customers; or they can add to employees’ frus-
tration, for example, by yelling at the employees when problems occur.
Dasborough (2006) argued that leader-originated negative events may be particularly
influential on employee moods. She based her argument on the asymmetry effect of
emotion, which states that people are more likely to recall negative events than positive
ones. Consistent with her hypotheses, she found that employees’ remembered more nega-
tive events than positive ones; moreover, they recollected the negative events more
intensely and in greater detail. Her study suggests that managers need to pay particular
attention to their negative interactions with employees, and to be careful to have a high
ratio of positive to negative interactions.
Other studies have examined how leaders either help or hinder employee’s ability to
cope with negative workplace events. Pirola-Merlo et al. (2002) argued that the workplace
is filled with obstacles to performance, and that it is the leaders’ job to help employees
overcome these problems. They argued that leaders have a strong influence on group
affective climate. Their theoretical model also drew upon transformational leadership
theory (Bass & Avolio, 1994). They found that transformational and facilitative leaders
helped their employees to overcome the mood-damaging effects of work frustrations;
moreover, these mood effects translated into better performance.
Another study, by McColl-Kennedy and Anderson (2002), studied optimism as well as
feelings of frustration. They also used transformational leadership theory (Bass & Avolio,
1994) as part of their theoretical model, and argued that part of a leader’s job is to instill
feelings of confidence, particularly in the face of potential threats to performance. They
found that (i) transformational leaders were able to increase subordinates’ feelings of opti-
mism, and that (ii) these increased feelings of optimism translated into higher perfor-
mance.
De Cremer and van Knippenberg (2004; De Cremer, 2006) studied how leaders can
influence employees’ moods by performing either self-sacrificing leader behaviors, or by
acting in an autocratic manner (e.g., by pushing their opinions on subordinates). Their
studies further demonstrate that leaders can have strong effects on subordinates’ motiva-
tions to work with the leader by influencing moods and affective events.
Together, the above studies provide excellent support for the notion that one of a
leader’s most important roles is to manage the moods of his/her employees (Humphrey,
2002; Pescosolido, 2002). Either leaders can be the original source of an affective event,
such as by acting autocratic or self-sacrificing, or they can help or hinder employees’
ability to cope with other affective events at work. Although these studies have shown the
utility of taking this approach, much more research is needed to confirm the degree to
which leaders influence employees’ moods, and to demonstrate how this in turn influences
job satisfaction and productivity. Thus this should remain a productive research area.
Empathy, emotional expressiveness, and identity
The key role of empathy

It is our belief that empathy plays a key role in emotionally intelligent leadership.
Empathy is related to other key skills needed by leaders, such as emotional expressiveness
and the ability to recognize the emotions and needs of followers. These skills help leaders
develop and communicate their vision. Even more important, empathy helps leaders
establish an emotional bond that creates a common identity between the leaders and other
organizational members. Empathy is also likely to motivate ethical behavior.
Salovey and Mayer (1990, pp. 194–5) also believed that empathy is central to emotion-
ally intelligent behavior, and they defined it as ‘the ability to comprehend another’s feel-
ings and to re-experience them oneself’. Plutchik’s (1987, p. 43) definition emphasized the
emotional bond that is created among people as a result of the sharing of positive and
negative emotions. In their best-selling book, Goleman et al. (2002, p. 50) stated that
empathy is ‘the fundamental competence of social awareness’ and of ‘social effectiveness
in working life’. Empathy plays a central role in their concept of resonance. In their model,
resonance is a type of empathic bond in which leaders share and are in tune with the emo-
tions of their followers. Through this bond, leaders are able to guide their followers to
more productive emotional states (see also Pescosolido, 2002).
As we mentioned earlier in this chapter, in our study we hypothesized and found that
the ability to identify emotions and the ability to express emotions are core abilities that
contribute to the development of empathy (Kellett et al., 2006). Empathy in turn was an
excellent predictor of leadership emergence. Below, we summarize some additional
research while relating these three abilities to traditional leadership concepts such as
charisma, vision, and identity.
Emotional expressiveness and charisma

George (2000), in her article on emotions and leaders, argued that the ability to be emo-
tionally expressive helps leaders both to communicate their goals and to establish
beneficial relationships. Charismatic leaders are more effective, for example, De Hoogh
et al. (2005) found that charismatic CEOs increased subordinates’ work attitudes. Another
example is provided by Groves (2005), who tested whether leader emotional expressivity
skills predicted charismatic leadership in a sample of 108 leaders from 64 organizations.
Groves also looked at the 325 direct reports’ openness to change, and found that emo-
tional expressivity (along with leader social control) predicted charismatic leadership. The
effect of charismatic leadership on effectiveness was mediated by follower openness to
change.
Leaders may communicate their emotions through deliberate attempts to communicate
and express their emotions (Gardner & Avolio, 1998). Many theories of leadership have
emphasized the need for leaders to be great communicators. This is particularly true of
theories about charismatic and transformational leaders (e.g., Bass and Avolio, 1994;
Waldman and Yammarino, 1999). Leaders must not only be willing to express their emo-
tions, but they must also be skilled at doing so, for example, by using metaphors and other
emotionally engaging language (Mio et al., 2005). Mio et al. found that charismatic pres-
idents used almost twice as many metaphors as non-charismatic presidents. Strange and
Mumford (2005) used an experimental approach that had participants develop vision
statements about schools, which were then evaluated by students, parents, and teachers.
They found that strong vision statements were more affectively engaging.
Although much of the research on charisma has concerned political leaders, everyday
managers and leaders can also be emotionally expressive. For example, Samra-Fredericks
(2004) audio-recorded managerial elites’ interactions. Samra-Fredericks argued that
everyday interactions can also include ‘mini-speeches’ of oratory, which included the four
elements thought to be components of ‘rhetoric as emotion’. These elements are:
empathic matter/great theme, stance, utterance design and utterance relation.
Another study also pointed out how mundane conversations contribute to leadership
effectiveness (Alvesson & Sveningsson, 2003). Alvesson and Sveningsson interviewed
managers, who reported that informal chatting and listening to their subordinates made
subordinates feel more respected and visible. They argue that everyday conversations
have a special emotional value, and that leadership consists of making the mundane
extraordinary.
Emotional displays may also play a large role in subordinates’ attributions about their
followers (Dasborough and Ashkanasy, 2002). Dasborough and Ashkanasy argued that
organizational members are particularly concerned about the sincerity of their leaders.
Many leaders could be excellent speakers but ill-intentioned, as shown by the recent
Enron scandal. According to their model, we use leaders’ emotional displays to make
attributions about their sincerity. Studies of presidential candidates, for example, have
emphasized the need for leaders to be seen as empathic, charismatic, and trustworthy;
these perceptions of the leaders influence voting behavior (Pillai et al., 2003).
Newcombe and Ashkanasy (2002) provided one of the best examples of the importance
of emotional displays in their study of facial expressions and feedback – they demon-
strated that the emotional expressions were even more important than the facts in the
message. Their study design had actors provide either positive or negative feedback to a
subordinate. By using films, the study was able to vary the extent to which the emotional
expressions were congruent with the positive or negative feedback given to subordinates.
Observers’ ratings of the actors’ leadership skills were more influenced by the actors’ facial
expressions than by whether the actor delivered positive or negative feedback.
Leaders’ emotional expressiveness is likely to continue to be an important research
topic. As these studies have demonstrated, these emotional displays have important
influences on ratings of leaders. Although studies of communication skills have been
around for a long time, there is a need for studies that use the newer measures of the
ability to recognize emotions in others and the ability to be emotionally expressive.
Moreover, these studies need to be related to the recent advances in our understanding
about emotions.
Empathy and a common identity

Empathy and emotional expressiveness may help in large part because they allow leaders
to develop a common identity with their followers. Empathy is the sharing of emotions,
and organizational members who have shared affective events at work are likely to develop
a common identity as well as an emotional bond. As we have argued previously, emotions
are central to people’s identities (Ashforth and Humphrey, 1993). The approach we have
taken here fits in well with the work by Van Knippenberg and Hogg (2003). They devel-
oped a social identity model of leadership that emphasizes that leaders are group
members who share prototypical characteristics with group members, and who are also
perceived as acting on the group’s behalf. They also relate their model to theories of
charisma and leader–member exchange. Their linkage to these theories makes sense
because charismatic, emotionally expressive leaders are better at creating empathic iden-
tity generating relationships, and having fair leader–member exchanges demonstrates that
the leader is acting in the best interests of the group.
From an empirical standpoint, Dvir et al. (2004) examined emotional bonds between
leaders and followers using a sample of high-tech employees. They found that trans-
formational leaders’ vision formulation, social-oriented values, and assimilation were
positively related to affective commitment but not to cognitive commitment. Their
study demonstrates the importance of the emotional bond between leaders and group
members.
The perspective that leaders are group members with a common identity fits in well with
Pearce and Conger’s (2003) theories of shared leadership. This approach also fits in well
with the theories of team-based organizations (Day et al., 2006) and team–member
exchange (Ford and Seers, 2006). These approaches all emphasize that leadership is a
shared process. Empathy is also a shared process, whereby the empathic person is
influenced by the emotions of the others. A truly empathic leader not only influences
others, but is influenced by them. This is why the most compassionate and authentic
leaders act ethically, because they are affected by the suffering of others. They take
subordinates’ interests into account when making decisions because they share their
subordinates’ emotional experiences – a decision that hurts their subordinates will there-
fore hurt themselves through the empathic bond. Shared leadership and team member–
exchanges are new but growing areas, as witnessed by the recent special issue of
Leadership Quarterly (2005) on this topic. Thus these topics should be growth areas for
emotions researchers as well.
Transformational leadership and authentic leadership

Much of the research that has linked emotions to specific leadership theories has focused
on transformational leadership. We have already cited several of these articles elsewhere
in this chapter; one additional study is by Rubin et al. (2005), who demonstrated that
emotion recognition and positive affectivity predicted transformational leadership behav-
iors in a sample of biotechnology/agricultural managers. Many of the researchers who
formerly studied transformational leadership are now investigating authentic leadership.
Bruce Avolio, who played a leading role in the development of transformational leader-
ship theory (Bass & Avolio, 1994), is now taking the lead in examining authentic leader-
ship. He co-edited, with Bill Gardner, the special issue of the Leadership Quarterly on
authentic leadership (Avolio & Gardner, 2005; see also Avolio et al., 2004). In this issue
Michie and Gooty (2005) argued that other directed emotions cause leaders to behave eth-
ically. In other words, some leaders have other directed emotions, such as compassion,
sympathy, and empathy, that mediate self-transcendant values and behaviors. Ilies et al.
(2005) focused on self-awareness, a critical component of emotional intelligence/
competence, and related it to leaders’ impact on follower well-being. As Cooper et al.
(2005) note, there are a number of research issues that must be addressed if we are to
develop a valid theory of authentic leadership; these issues can be fruitfully addressed by
researchers in the area of emotions.
Conclusions
As we can see from this brief overview of the literature on emotions and leadership, there
are many exciting research opportunities in this area. Some of the new emerging areas in
leadership research, such as shared leadership and authentic leadership, are philosophi-
cally compatible with an emphasis on emotions. Together, these research trends bode well
for researchers interested in emotions.
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28 Leadership, affect, and emotions
Daan van Knippenberg, Barbara van Knippenberg,
Gerben A. Van Kleef and Frederic Damen*
Introduction
Leadership has a long history in research in psychology and organizational behavior. The
core issue in this research has always been the question of what makes leaders effective in
influencing and mobilizing followers (Bass, 1990; Chemers, 2001; Yukl, 2002; van
Knippenberg et al., 2004). In this chapter, we address the role of affect and emotion in
this process. The chapters in this Research Companion testify to the myriad roles emo-
tions may play in organizations, especially in social interaction, and as the dynamics of
leadership essentially revolve around leader–follower relationships and interaction, lead-
ership is one of the areas in which the influence of emotions should be clearly visible (Brief
& Weiss, 2002; Humphrey, 2002; Lord & Brown, 2004). Somewhat surprisingly, however,
despite its long history, leadership research has only relatively recently started to empiri-
cally investigate the role of leader and follower affect and emotions. Accordingly, this
chapter reviews a field of research that is emerging much more than it is established.
The empirical literature in leadership, affect, and emotions has mainly revolved around
three issues: the influence of leader affect in leadership effectiveness, the role of follower
affect engendered by leadership, and the role of leaders’ ability to adequately respond to
followers’ (and own) affective states. Accordingly, this chapter is structured around a dis-
cussion of these three issues, each of which is introduced in turn in the following sections.
First, however, a few words on how we conceptualize affect and emotion for the current
purposes.
Emotions refer to discrete feeling states that manifest themselves both physiologically
and psychologically (e.g., Frijda, 1986). They have a relatively clear cause, beginning, and
endpoint. Affect, in contrast, is more broadly defined to encompass not only discrete emo-
tions but also more diffuse mood states (e.g., feeling good, a bad mood; Forgas, 1995;
Russell & Barrett, 1999) and dispositional tendencies toward certain feeling states (i.e.,
positive and negative affectivity; Watson & Clark, 1984; Lazarus, 1991). Due to its
broader conceptualization, the concept of affect compared to emotions is less clearly dis-
tinct from more evaluative judgments that may also play a role in leadership effectiveness
such as liking (e.g., Brown & Keeping, 2005), and evaluatively laden expectations that may
also be relevant to leadership effectiveness such as optimism (e.g., Chemers et al., 2000).
While we recognize that evaluations and expectations may be associated with affect, we
should be careful not to equate feeling states with more evaluative judgments, and in this
chapter, we limit ourselves to studies that are more unequivocally associated with
affective–emotional states.
While, especially for emotions, distinctions with much more nuance may be used (see
Russell & Barrett, 1999), the state of the art in leadership, affect, and emotions, seems to
be adequately captured by the two dimensions highlighted in affect circumplex models.
Research in the psychology of affect has resulted in affect circumplex models that identify
465
two core dimensions underlying differences between affective states (Russell, 1980;
Watson et al., 1988; Larsen et al., 2002): a psychological (valence, pleasantness) and a
physiological component (arousal, activation). Most, if not all, affective states can be
placed somewhere along the circumplex formed by these two orthogonal dimensions of
valence and arousal. Some positive affective states are associated with relatively high levels
of arousal (e.g., enthusiasm), whereas others are associated with relatively low levels of
arousal (e.g., relaxation). In similar vein, some negative affective states are characterized
by higher arousal (e.g., anger) than others (e.g., sadness). As will become evident in the
course of our review of the state of the art, this differentiation between affective states
along the valence and arousal dimensions works well to describe research on leadership,
affect, and emotions.
Leader affect and leadership effectiveness

Feeling is for doing. Emotions are functional – they can be signals for action readiness,
focus attention on specific stimuli (e.g., the cause of anger), and guide thinking and action
(Zajonc, 1980; Frijda, 1986; Forgas & Bower, 1987; Schwarz & Clore, 1993; Damasio,
1994; Forgas, 1995; LeDoux, 1996). Affect may thus consciously and unconsciously
inform our judgments, attitudes, and behavior. This influence of affect is not limited to
intrapersonal processes. In social interaction others’ feelings, as they may be observed
from others’ verbal and nonverbal communication, may convey information that
influences the further course of the interaction (Keltner & Haidt, 1999). People, for
instance, tend to attribute higher status to an angry person than to a sad person (Tiedens,
2001), and the expression of anger in negotiation tends to engender more attractive
counteroffers than the expression of happiness (Van Kleef et al., 2004a, 2004b).
Moreover, under certain conditions, affect may be ‘contagious’ – it may transfer from one
person to another (Hatfield et al., 1994) – and thus inform the ‘recipient’s’ perceptions,
attitudes, and behavior.
This evidence for the role of others’ affect in social interaction raises the question of
whether leader’s affect may influence followers in ways that impact on leadership
effectiveness. For a variety of reason, leaders may experience positive or negative affective
states in the workplace. Conflict or poor performance may give rise to anger and frustra-
tion, achievements may engender feelings of happiness, challenging opportunities may fill
a leader with enthusiasm, and for no particular reason leaders may just be in a good or
bad mood. While some people may be quite adept at hiding their feelings from others,
often our feelings show to a greater or lesser extent, and there is no reason to expect this
to be different for leaders. Thus, in their interaction with followers, leaders may con-
sciously or unconsciously, verbally or nonverbally, express how they feel, and such
affective displays may impact on their effectiveness in motivating followers. Potentially
such affective displays may influence followers, and research in leader affect and leader-
ship effectiveness shows that they indeed may, although the relationship is less clear-cut
than one perhaps would hope for.
Research in leader affect has been driven by the notion that leaders’ display of positive
affect may be motivating either because it conveys positivity or because it is contagious
and engenders positive affective states in followers that guide their subsequent behavior.
Consistent with these straightforward predictions, some studies indeed show that the
display of positive affect may add to leadership effectiveness. Bono and Ilies (2006)
Leadership, affect, and emotions 467
manipulated and measured leader displays of positive affect, and showed that such dis-
plays were associated with both higher ratings of charismatic leadership and more posi-
tive affect among followers. Charismatic and transformational leadership is generally
presumed to be a particularly effective form of leadership (Bass, 1985; Conger &
Kanungo, 1987; Shamir et al., 1993; see also Ashkanasy & Tse, 2000), and we may thus
take these results to suggest that affective displays may add to leadership effectiveness. In
a similar vein, Awamleh and Gardner (1999) found that leaders who are smiling when
giving a speech are perceived as more charismatic than leaders who are not smiling, and
Rubin et al. (2005) showed that leaders higher in positive affectivity were rated as more
transformational by their followers. George and Bettenhausen (1990) found that leader
positive mood predicted prosocial behavior (positively) and turnover (negatively) for sales
employees. In related vein, George (1995) observed a positive relationship between leader
positive mood and group performance.
Positive versus negative leader affect

Other studies compared the effectiveness of leader positive as compared with negative
affect. Newcombe and Ashkanasy (2002) studied the effects of positive versus negative
affective displays accompanying positive or negative feedback. They observed that leaders
displaying positive and message-congruent affect were rated more favorably. Also study-
ing affective displays accompanying performance feedback, but focusing on negative feed-
back only, Gaddis et al. (2004) found that displays of positive affect were generally
associated with higher leadership effectiveness (both rated and in terms of follower per-
formance). However, when leader affect was negative, followers with a prevention goal
(i.e., focused on preventing negative outcomes) reported more positive perceptions of
leader effectiveness than did followers with a promotion goal (i.e., focused on achieving a
positive outcome). Whereas the Newcombe and Ashkanasy and Gaddis et al. studies
suggest that leader displays of positive affect are more effective than leader displays of
negative affect, other studies suggest that the issue may be more complicated.
In an experiment, Sy et al. (2005) manipulated leader mood (positive, negative, neutral)
before the leader guided a group in performing a task. They found that leaders’ mood was
contagious. Groups led by a leader in a positive mood adopted a more positive mood
themselves, whereas groups led by a leader in a negative mood experienced a more nega-
tive mood themselves. Effects on task performance were less straightforward, however:
whereas positive mood was associated with higher coordination, negative mood was
actually associated with higher effort. Damen et al. (2005) manipulated whether a leader
displayed enthusiasm or anger, and found that follower positive affect moderated the
relationship between leader affective display and follower performance. Follower
performance was higher when the valence of the leader’s affective display was more in line
with the level of follower positive affect (i.e., enthusiasm for high positive affect, anger for
low positive affect). Van Kleef et al. (2006) studied the influence of leader positive (happy)
versus negative (angry) affective responses to prior team performance on subsequent team
performance in an experimental setting. They argued and found that groups whose
members were higher in the dispositional tendency to process information (operational-
ized as personal need for structure; Neuberg & Newsom, 1993) would more carefully con-
sider the implications of their leader’s affective state and perform better with an angry
leader than with a happy leader. Conversely, groups that were less disposed to carefully
consider information were expected and found to be more motivated by the happy than
by the angry leader. Moreover, Van Kleef et al. showed that while the effect of leader emo-
tional display was mediated by performance appraisals for groups disposed to process
information in depth, liking for the leader mediated responses of groups lower in the dis-
position to carefully consider information.
While all these studies show that leader affective displays may influence leadership
effectiveness, they also indicate that there is no straightforward answer to the question
whether displays of positive affect are more effective than displays of negative affect.
Work by Damen et al. (2005), Sy et al. (2005), and Van Kleef et al. (2006) points to some
of the contingencies of the relative effectiveness of displays of positive versus negative
affect, but an integrative model capturing these contingencies is still lacking. Here, then,
lies a clear challenge for research in leadership, affect, and emotions.
A caveat is in order regarding some of the evidence for the role of leader affect. While
most of the studies reviewed in this section focus on leader affective displays, often also
keeping other aspects of leadership under experimental control, studies by George and
Bettenhausen (1990), George (1995), and Sy et al. (2005) focused on leader mood per se,
and provide no evidence regarding how this mood affected leader behavior. The most
straightforward interpretation would be that leader mood was visible to followers, and
that these affective displays are responsible for the observed relationships. It is possible,
however, that leader mood also informed other aspects of leader behavior and that these
other influences also contributed to the observed relationships. From that perspective, it
would be valuable if research on leader mood would explore the influence of leader mood
on leader behavior and leadership effectiveness in more detail. In related vein, while some
studies find evidence for the role of affective contagion (e.g., Sy et al., 2005), others point
to other processes (e.g., Dasborough & Ashkanasy, 2002; Damen et al., 2005; Van Kleef
et al., 2006). More attention to mediating processes in general seems therefore in order.
Displays of high- versus low-arousal affect

While most people tend to think about affect and emotions primarily in terms of their
valence, there are meaningful differences in the extent to which affective states are asso-
ciated with arousal and activation (e.g., Larsen et al., 2002). High-arousal affective states
such as anger and enthusiasm may suggest a higher need for action than low-
arousal affective states such as sadness or relaxation (see Frijda, 1986). Accordingly, fol-
lowers may respond differently to leader displays of high-arousal affect than to
leader displays of low-arousal affect. Empirical evidence seems to generally support this
conclusion.
A study by Tiedens (2001), although not a leadership study, suggests that the display of
high-arousal affect may be more effective, because the higher level of arousal is associated
with competence and status. She found that perceivers associated others’ display of anger
with higher competence and status (but less likeability) than the display of sadness.
Findings by Lewis (2000) are partly in line with these findings. In a study of perceivers
(not subordinates), Lewis investigated perceptions of male and female leaders’ displays of
anger and sadness (as compared with a control condition). She found that for a male
leader, anger was more effective than sadness, though not more effective than no display
of affect. For a female leader, in contrast, affective displays were associated with less pos-
itive reactions regardless of arousal level. (A study by Damen et al., 2005, however,
obtained similar results for responses to male and female leaders’ enthusiasm versus
anger, so conclusions concerning the role of leader gender are far from clear-cut.)
Bringing together the study of the valence of affective displays and of the arousal asso-
ciated with affective displays, Damen et al., (2006b) argued that it is the combination of
positive valence (conveying positivity) and high arousal (conveying energy and action
readiness) that is most likely to lead to attributions of charisma. In support of this finding,
they showed in a scenario experiment and a cross-sectional survey comparing leader dis-
plays of enthusiasm (positive, high arousal), relaxation (positive, low arousal), anger (neg-
ative, high arousal), and sadness (negative, low arousal) that displays of enthusiasm were
associated with stronger attributions of charisma. This effect was mediated by both the
transfer of arousal and the transfer of positive feelings. Damen et al. (2006a) focused on
the moderating role of follower arousal in this process, arguing that higher follower
arousal (e.g., stress) would render followers less sensitive to the leaders’ affective state, and
thus attenuate the greater effectiveness of high-arousal/intensity affective displays as com-
pared with lower arousal/intensity displays. In an experimental study and cross-sectional
survey, they provide evidence for this proposition for the display of positive affect, and in
the survey also for the display of negative affect.
The available evidence thus seems to support the proposition that higher-arousal
affective displays are more effective in influencing and mobilizing followers. Given the
limited number of studies focusing on the arousal dimension in leader affect, however, we
should be careful not to reach too bold conclusions, and be open to the possibility that
under certain circumstances displays of lower-arousal affect may actually be more
effective. The findings for the role of arousal also show that it is worthwhile to move
beyond the distinction between positive and negative affective states. Research in emo-
tions in social interaction outside the leadership arena suggests that it may also be worth-
while to move beyond the valence by arousal framework provided by affect circumplex
models. Emotions with similar valence and associated arousal (e.g., frustration vs. ner-
vousness, sadness vs. shame) may convey quite different messages and accordingly impact
on leadership in quite distinct ways (see Van Kleef et al., 2006). While affect circumplex
models provide a framework that is valuable in making sense of some of the differences
between affective displays (e.g., Damen et al., 2006b), they may only take us so far (see
Russell & Barrett, 1999), and complementing research from simple valence or valence-
arousal frameworks with research that explores the unique influence of discrete emotions
may prove indispensable for a true understanding of the role of affect and emotions in
leadership effectiveness.
Leadership and follower affect

Because moods and emotions may have such pervasive influence on attitudes, decisions,
and behavior, leadership that engenders follower emotions potentially has great influence
on followers. An obvious question for research in leadership, affect, and emotions there-
fore is how leadership may influence follower affective states and, through its influence on
follower affect, follower attitudes and behavior. In the previous section, we addressed the
proposition that leaders may through displays of their own affective states engender
similar affective states in followers. As discussed, there is support for this proposition (Sy
et al., 2005; Bono & Ilies, 2006; Damen et al. 2006b). Leader affective displays may not
be the only aspect of leadership that may engender follower affect, however.
Conceptual analyses of charismatic and transformational leadership have proposed

that one of the things that adds to charismatic and transformational leaders’ effectiveness
is their ability to emotionally engage followers (Shamir et al., 1993; Bass, 1998; Conger &
Kanungo, 1998; Ashkanasy & Tse, 2000). A number of studies indeed show that charis-
matic and transformational leadership may be associated with more positive and less neg-
ative affect among followers than non-charismatic and transactional leadership (see Bono
& Ilies, 2006). Although not a study of followers, Cherulnik et al. (2001) showed that
leaders that were seen as charismatic elicited more positive affect. McColl-Kennedy and
Anderson (2002) found that frustration (lower with more transformational leadership)
and optimism (higher with more transformational leadership) mediated the relationship
of transformational leadership with performance. In related vein, Dvir and Wenger (2004)
experimentally show that transformational leaders elicit more positive and less negative
affect, and higher performance than transactional leaders.
These findings suggest that it may be worthwhile to explore the affective consequences
of other aspects of leadership too to advance our understanding of leadership
effectiveness. There is, for instance, a growing interest in leader fairness (van Knippenberg
et al., 2007). Leaders’ decisions and actions may be judged in terms of their distributive,
procedural, and interactional fairness (see Lind & Tyler, 1988), and unfair treatment may
elicit strong emotional responses on the side of followers. Some leaders may also make
great personal sacrifices on behalf of the collective (e.g., Choi & Mai-Dalton, 1998; van
Knippenberg & van Knippenberg, 2005), and such instances of self-sacrifice may engen-
der positive emotions in followers. We still know very little about the role of follower affect
in these respects, but the available evidence suggests that our understanding of leadership
processes may benefit from a more thorough consideration of the role of follower affective
responses in leadership effectiveness.
Follower affect may not only be influenced by leadership, however, it may also inform
responses to leadership. Affective states influence our responses to others (see Forgas &
George, 2001), and it would seem worthwhile to also explore the role of follower affect as
a moderator rather than as a mediator of leadership effectiveness. As a case in point,
Damen et al. (2005) found that follower positive affect moderated responses to leader dis-
plays of anger and enthusiasm (see the previous section). While Damen et al. emphasize
the ‘match’ between leadership and follower affect, a study by Hui et al. (1999) suggests
that follower affect may also more directly color responses to leadership. They found that
follower negative affectivity was negatively related to follower ratings of the quality of
their relationship with their leader, operationalized as leader–member exchange (also see
Day & Crain, 1992). Findings like these point to the possibility that follower affect may
impact on responses to a wider range of aspects of leadership.
Leaders’ ability to manage emotions

The evidence that leader affective displays and followers’ affective responses to leadership
may feed into leadership effectiveness gives rise to the question of whether leaders may
differ in the extent to which they are able to use these processes to their advantage. That
is, part of leadership effectiveness may derive from leaders’ ability to strategically use own
emotions in interaction with followers, and to adequately respond to follower emotions.
Pescosolido (2002), for instance, proposes that in self-managing groups (i.e., groups
without a formal leader) group members who are more able to make sense of emotion-
ally ambiguous situations are more likely to emerge as informal leaders (see van
Knippenberg & Hogg, 2003). Notions like this have led leadership researchers to focus on
the role of emotional intelligence as well as on variables that may be assumed to be related
to emotional intelligence.
Emotional intelligence refers to a specific form of intelligence. The concept captures the
ability to perceive emotions in self and others, to use emotions to facilitate performance,
to understand emotions, and to regulate emotions in self and others (Mayer & Salovey,
1997). In short, more emotionally intelligent people should be more able to manage emo-
tions, both in self and others. This should lead more emotionally intelligent individuals
to be more adept at showing or not showing particular emotions, to get to know and
understand others through their emotional displays, to respond adequately to others’
emotions, and to proactively engender certain emotions in others (e.g., creating a positive
affective climate in the group). In view of the evidence discussed in the previous sections,
this should as a consequence make more emotionally intelligent people more likely to
emerge as leaders and to be effective as leaders. While these and similar conceptual analy-
ses have been advanced by several authors (e.g., George, 2000; Zhou & George, 2003;
Brown & Moshavi, 2005), and the popular literature seems to take the relationship
between emotional intelligence and effective leadership as a given, the actual empirical
evidence for these propositions is very scarce (Côté et al., 2006).
Part of the problem here seems to be that several studies have relied on self-reports or
peer reports of emotional intelligence or presumed proxies of emotional intelligence (e.g.,
Sosik & Megerian, 1999; Wong & Law, 2002). These studies suggest that these measures
may be related to transformational leadership and leadership effectiveness. However, the
most commonly embraced perspective on emotional intelligence seems to be that emo-
tional intelligence should be seen an intelligence – a capability – that should not be mea-
sured through self-assessment or peer assessment, but through an intelligence test just like
other forms of intelligence (Mayer et al., 2000; Côté & Miners, 2006). Thus findings from
studies relying on self-reports or peer reports of (proxies of) emotional intelligence give
rise to the question of whether they really pertain to emotional intelligence. The perspec-
tive we adopt here is that they should not be taken to concern emotional intelligence until
validating evidence is available that unambiguously links these measures to emotional
intelligence.
From that perspective, there actually is surprisingly little evidence that emotional intel-
ligence predicts leadership emergence and effectiveness. An important exception is a study
of emergent leadership by Côté et al. (2006). In two samples of self-managing groups, they
show, controlling for cognitive intelligence (i.e., ‘IQ’) and other aspects of personality, that
emotional intelligence predicts leadership emergence. Clearly, however, more research is
needed to address the relationship between on the one hand, emotional intelligence and on
the other, leadership emergence, leadership behavior (e.g., transformational leadership,
leader fairness), and leadership effectiveness, to reach firmer conclusions about the role of
emotional intelligence in leadership effectiveness.
Not working from a strict emotional intelligence conceptualization, other researchers
have focused on indicators of individuals’ ability to respond adequately to own
and others’ emotions (i.e., which arguably should be related to emotional intelligence).
Rubin et al. (2005) assessed leaders’ ability to recognize emotions through a short test.
They found that this ability for emotion recognition predicted follower ratings of
transformational leadership. This relationship was only observed for leaders who were rel-
atively extraverted, however, suggesting that there are factors that moderate the extent to
which leaders act on their emotional abilities.
Kellett et al. (2002) focused on the role of empathy – the ability to experience others’
emotional state and respond to it. They showed that peer-rated empathy predicted peer
leadership perceptions (i.e., attributions of leadership) in self-managing groups indepen-
dent of indicators of cognitive and task ability (i.e., leadership may follow not only from
task skills, but also from emotional skills; see Wolff et al., 2002).
In sum, then, while the proposition that emotional intelligence and related capabilities
should be positively related to leadership emergence and effectiveness holds great intuitive
appeal, the actual empirical support for this proposition is quite modest. Systematic
research into the relationship between emotional intelligence and leadership will have to
shed more light on this issue. Ideally, such research would assess not only the predicted
outcome (i.e., leadership emergence, leadership effectiveness) but also the presumed medi-
ating processes (e.g., more appropriate use of affective displays, more adequate responses
to follower emotions).
Conclusion
The role of emotions is receiving increasing attention in leadership research – and rightly
so, as the research reviewed in this chapter shows. Evidence that affect and emotions play
a role in leadership effectiveness is accumulating, especially for the relationship between
leader affective displays and leadership effectiveness. This evidence is far from straight-
forward, however, and there are several unresolved issues that invite future research atten-
tion. Indeed, the field of leadership, affect, and emotions appears to be at a more emerging
state than the frequent reference to the role of emotions in leadership in the academic and
popular literatures would suggest. In that sense, it would seem important that leadership
research has a clear understanding of what has, and has not, been proven in research that
meets internationally accepted scientific standards.
We have already pointed to some of the issues that we believe research should address.
Among these are the effectiveness of leader positive versus negative affect, the role of the
level of arousal associated with affective states, and the ways in which leader affect may
influence leader behavior (instead of influencing followers through affective displays) and
the relationship of these behaviors with leadership effectiveness. We also pointed to the
psychological processes on the follower side that mediate the relationship between leader
affective displays and follower behavioral response, to the relationship between other
aspects of leadership and follower affect, and to the role of emotional intelligence (and
related concepts) in leadership effectiveness. To this list we might add a couple of other
questions for future research.
Leader affective displays can be effective in mobilizing followers, but they need not be.
This raises the question of what determines whether leaders will express, and suppress,
affect in appropriate and effective ways. Clearly, emotional intelligence as an individual
difference factor may provide one of the answers to this question, but there may also be
situational determinants of leaders’ effective display (and refraining from display) of their
affect (e.g., organizational culture). More attention to the social psychology of emotion
regulation (see, e.g., Gross, 1998) to complement the call for more attention to the role of
individual differences in this respect may prove valuable.
Another question is how follower affect may influence leadership. Follower affect has
been highlighted as an outcome of leadership, and there is some evidence that follower
affect may also influence responses to leadership. But how do leaders respond to follower
affective displays, and how does the nature of the leader’s response impact on leadership
effectiveness? Just as followers may regularly be exposed to their leader’s affective states,
leaders may be confronted with the affective states of followers. Conceptual analyses of
the role of emotional intelligence suggest that some leaders will be more adept at handling
such situations, but it is generally unclear what this would mean in practice. Also, in add-
ition to the role of individual differences, social psychological factors likely play a role in
this respect (e.g., the nature of the leader–follower relationship).
Côté and Miners (2006) show that emotional and cognitive intelligence interact in pre-
dicting job performance and extra-role behavior. The higher employees are in emotional
intelligence, the less predictive cognitive intelligence is of in-role and extra-role perfor-
mance and vice versa – the one intelligence compensates for the other. We may raise the
question whether the same principle also applies in leadership effectiveness. That is,
effective leadership may derive from emotional as well as from cognitive competence (see
Kellett et al., 2002; Rubin et al., 2005), and it is possible that the more a leader possesses
the one capability, the less the leader needs the other capability to be effective.
Research in leadership has a long history, and especially the more recent decades have
taught us a lot about the cognitive processes underlying effective leadership (e.g., Lord &
Brown, 2004; van Knippenberg et al., 2004). It is high time that this cognitive focus is com-
plemented by a focus on the role of affective processes, and as this research is gaining
momentum we see increasing evidence of its promise. The next decades will have to say
the conclusive word about the viability of affective-emotional perspectives on leadership.
Note
* We thank Stéphane Côté, Ard Beg and Gros Oiseau for their valuable contributions to this chapter.
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29 Leadership and emotional expression
Debra L. Nelson, Susan Michie and Timothy DeGroot
Introduction
Contemporary theories of leadership seek to explain why leaders who have exceptional
influence on followers and organizations are successful. These theories share a focus on
the inspirational side of leadership, examining leaders who inspire followers to new and
exceptional levels of satisfaction, commitment and performance and the process through
which these effects occur. Various styles of leader behavior are encompassed by the new
theories, including visionary (House and Podsakoff, 1994), charismatic (Conger and
Kanungo, 1987; Shamir, 1995), transformational (Avolio and Bass, 1995; Bass, 1997) and
authentic (Avolio et al., 2004; Gardner et al., 2005). In addition to a shared focus on the
inspirational side of leadership, the new genre of theories emphasizes the emotional
aspects of leadership.
Within this focus, the emotional attachment of leaders and followers is paramount.
Leaders use emotion to inspire followers and to motivate them to perform exceptionally
well. Inspirational leaders display positive, other-directed emotions such as gratitude,
compassion and respect for their followers (Michie and Gooty, 2005). In addition, the
contemporary theories highlight symbolic leader behavior, including nonverbal aspects of
communication (Shamir et al., 1993). Because the inspirational theories are relatively new,
there is little research on the specific processes whereby leader behaviors translate into fol-
lower outcomes (Kark et al., 2003).
The emerging theory and study of emotional intelligence has generated considerable
interest, especially as it pertains to leadership (Ashkanasy and Daus, 2005). Emotional
intelligence involves awareness and management of one’s own emotions as well as the
emotions of others (Salovey and Mayer, 1990). It has been suggested that emotional intel-
ligence is a critical component of the inspirational leadership theories described earlier.
In particular, transformational leaders are proposed to have higher levels of emotional
intelligence (George, 2000; Ashkanasy and Daus, 2005). Central to emotional intelligence
is the ability to understand and manage others’ feelings (Salovey and Mayer, 1990). Part
of managing the emotions of others includes using one’s own emotions in a situationally
appropriate manner to communicate and to convey emotion in an effective way. Despite
the suggestions that emotional intelligence and emotional competencies are critical to
leader effectiveness, there is still a dearth of research on how emotional expression by
leaders affects followers (Lewis, 2000).
Our chapter addresses these voids in the literature by examining the content and process
of leader expression of emotion and its potential effects on followers. We begin by exam-
ining emotional expressivity in terms of the broad types of emotion displayed by leaders
and the functions of emotion expressivity, along with potential influences on followers.
We then turn to the means by which emotions are conveyed in terms of research on vocal
and nonverbal cues. Finally, we present an agenda to guide future research that elevates
emotional expression to a central role in the study of leadership.
476
Leadership and emotional expression 477
Emotional expressivity
Emotions involve neural processes that give rise to affective states and expressive behav-
iors, and serve both adaptive and motivational functions (Scherer and Ekman, 1984;
Oatley and Jenkins, 1992). According to modern theorists, emotions have two primary
functions. They operate within persons to influence goal priorities and between persons
as a form of social communication (ibid.). Trevarthen (1984) argued that an essential bio-
logical adaptive function of emotions is to develop and regulate interpersonal engage-
ments and mental cooperation. Emotions communicate and give value to the probable
action of a person in relation to other people (ibid.). Emotional communications can
transform relationships and can even change patterns of joint action (Oatley and Jenkins,
1992). Given these important functions of emotions, it seems likely that the most effective
leaders would express emotions to motivate collective and cooperative efforts in their fol-
lowers. In this section, we explore the broad types of emotions leaders may express (self-
and other-directed) and the processes through which emotional expressions (EEs)
influence follower emotions, beliefs and actions.
Emotional expressivity reflects the extent to which individuals outwardly display emo-
tions (Kring and Gordon, 1998) and includes verbal, vocal and nonverbal cues. A pivotal
discovery in modern theories of emotion is that EEs are not sent out to any and all indi-
viduals, but are directed at specific receivers and are intended to influence them in ways
beneficial to the sender (Russell et al., 2003). Receivers may obtain from EEs information
about the sender’s valence, current situation, future actions, social attitude and cognitive
state. Although in this chapter we imply that a leader’s expressive behavior reflects genuine
emotional experiences, we must acknowledge that emotion research indicates that EEs
may be contrived as well as genuine (Ekman and Friesen, 1974).
Several leadership scholars have theorized that leaders use emotional expressivity to
influence the affective states of their followers. For example, in the charismatic and trans-
formational literatures, scholars have consistently argued that leaders convey strong emo-
tions to arouse similar feelings in their audiences (for example, Bass, 1985; House and
Podsakoff, 1994; Conger and Kanungo, 1998; Waldman and Yamarino, 1999). George
(1996) asserted that leaders who feel excited, enthusiastic and energetic are likely to evoke
similar feelings that energize their followers, whereas leaders who feel distressed and
hostile are likely to negatively affect follower behavior. In support of these theories, Lewis
(2000) found that followers observing a leader expressing anger felt more nervous and less
relaxed than followers observing a leader expressing sadness or no emotion. In contrast,
followers observing a leader expressing sadness felt less enthusiasm and more fatigue than
followers observing a leader expressing anger or no emotion. In the same study, followers
perceived leaders expressing sadness as less effective than leaders expressing anger or no
emotion. Group mood is also affected by the mood of the leader. Sy et al. (2005) found
that positive leader mood was related to individual member positive mood and positive
group affective tone.
Other researchers have demonstrated how a leader’s expressive behavior can influence
follower perceptions of the leader. For example, experimental studies have shown that
actors who project a powerful, confident and dynamic presence through their vocal, facial
and other nonverbal expressive behaviors are more likely to be perceived as charismatic
leaders (Holladay and Coombs, 1993, 1994; Awamleh and Gardner, 1999). In addition,
leaders were rated more positively by followers when giving positive feedback if their
facial expressions were congruent with the message. Leaders were rated least positively
when giving positive feedback and displaying negative facial affect (Newcombe and
Ashkanasy, 2002). These studies have focused primarily on positive/negative or
active/passive emotion dimensions to emphasize the importance of leaders expressing
emotions to motivate group members’ collective efforts (actions) by transforming their
affective states (emotions) and their impressions of the leader’s personal image (beliefs).
This view of leadership reflects the propensity of Western psychologists to focus on
internal attributes (feelings, beliefs and traits) as the universal referents for expressive
behavior and to emphasize self-focused emotions. As such, this view fails to address the
possibility of the follower as the primary referent for EEs and thus ignores the possibil-
ity or effects of other-focused emotions. In contrast to ego-focused emotions (proud,
strong, inspired angry), other-focused emotions refer to emotions that create and foster
interdependence such as appreciation, respect, compassion, goodwill, gratitude, obliga-
tion and other feelings of interpersonal communion. Emotions of this type are often
described as emotion blends because they do not fall neatly into established emotion cat-
egories. In a study examining cultural differences in emotion, Kitayama and Markus
(1990) identified two dimensions that correspond closely to the activation and pleasant-
ness dimensions of emotion. In addition, they discovered a third dimension that repre-
sents the extent to which people are engaged in or disengaged from interpersonal
relationships. Emotions in the third dimension were labeled ‘other focused’ because they
typically resulted from being sensitive to others, taking their perspective and attempting
to promote a collective self-orientation. According to Markus and Kitayama (1991),
people with collective or interdependent self-views must be adept in the expression and
experience of other-focused emotions in order to function and operate effectively.
Markus and Kitayama contend that self-views or identities can occur at the individual
or social level. Individualists view the self as autonomous or independent from groups
and define themselves according to their personal attributes. Collectivists view the self as
interdependent with others and define themselves in terms of the groups to which they
belong. The nature of the self-system influences not only which emotions will be experi-
enced or expressed, but also the level of intensity and frequency with which they are expe-
rienced and expressed. Those with collectivist self views may inhibit the experience and
expression of some ego-focused emotions and at the same time exhibit a heightened
capacity for the experience and expression of emotions that derive primarily from focus-
ing on others (Kitayama and Markus, 1990). Although individual and collective self-
orientations are typically associated with cultural differences, researchers have found
considerable within-culture variation on these dimensions (Earley and Gibson, 1998).
This distinction between an internally focused, individual or personal self and an exter-
nally focused, collective or social self is particularly relevant to leadership influence.
Theories of inspirational leadership have a common focus on establishing a collective
self-orientation within subordinates. Markus and Kitayama (1991) argued that other-
focused emotions can motivate genuine, other-oriented, cooperative behaviors without
any conscious or unconscious attention to individual payoffs and thus are a core compo-
nent of interdependent relationships. Their position is in keeping with the idea that fol-
lowers of inspirational leaders feel strongly connected to the organization and the people
with whom they work, which in turn encourages them to put the interests of the collec-
tive above their own individual self-interests. Thus it seems likely that such leaders would
encourage the expression and experience of other-focused emotions by their subordinates

in order to maintain and reinforce a construal of the self as an interdependent and col-
lective entity.
Several researchers have emphasized that individuals hold multiple self-views or
-identities that may be activated across different times and contexts (Markus and Wurf,
1987; Lord and Brown, 2004; Howell and Shamir, 2005). Because humans have relatively
limited capacity to attend to memories and behavioral information associated with the
many alternative self-identities they possess, one self-identity tends to predominate at
any given time. Markus and Wurf (1987) referred to this salient identity as the ‘working
self-concept’ (WSC) and maintained that it signals a particular set of cognitions,
affective reactions and context-appropriate behaviors. Thus salient aspects of the self
guide a person’s thoughts, feelings and behaviors, which ultimately impacts on individ-
ual, group and organizational functioning (Lord and Brown, 2004).
Researchers have demonstrated that leaders can prime different aspects of a subordi-
nate’s WSC and have proposed that leaders influence subordinates by developing new
aspects of their self-concepts or by shifting the salience of their existing self-concepts
(Paul et al., 2001; Lord and Brown, 2004). Leaders may influence their subordinates’ WSC
in a number of ways, including goals, policies, performance evaluations, compensation,
visions and values. Activating different sets of values in particular has been associated
with a leader’s ability to change the WSC of subordinates (ibid.; Howell and Shamir,
2005). Theoretical work and empirical research suggest that different self-identity levels
may be tied to specific value structures (Oishi et al., 1998; Rohan, 2000; De Cremer, 2002;
Komar and Brown, 2002). Komar and Brown (2002) conducted two experimental studies
to test the theory that leader behaviors activate different value structures in subordinates.
The results of both studies indicated that an inspirational style of leadership activated
self-transcendent values in the participants. In a study examining self-sacrificing versus
self-benefiting leader behaviors, De Cremer (2002) found that self-sacrificing behavior
activated collective versus individual identities and prosocial versus proself goals, respec-
tively. Together these studies suggest that leader behaviors can activate self-transcendent
values in subordinates, which in turn will activate collective aspects of their WSC.
Emotions strongly indicate not only what is important to a person but how important
it is; thus they provide ‘hot’ information about the person’s values and motives (Batson
et al., 1995; Frijda et al., 2000). Gooty et al. (2006) found that frequent experiences of
other-focused emotions were associated with a leader’s self-transcendent values, whereas
experiences of ego-focused emotions were associated with self-enhancing values. Because
EEs are important social cues that provide information about the values, motives and
behavioral intentions of others (Russell et al., 2003), subordinates are likely to be espe-
cially sensitive to the expressive behaviors of leaders and use them as a basis for
constructing a reflected self-identity (Lord and Brown, 2004). When leaders express
other-focused emotions, they are likely to evoke similar emotional experiences in their
followers via emotional contagion processes involving facial mimicry and the effects of
facial expressions on felt emotions (Russell et al., 2003). Research in the self-identity lit-
erature has shown that repetitive experiences of emotions strongly contribute to the for-
mation of self-concepts and the internalization of standards (Abe and Izard, 1999).
Experiencing other-focused emotions accentuates one’s interdependence, motivates rec-
iprocal exchanges of well-intended actions and activates cooperative social behavior, all
of which promote a form of self-validation for interdependent selves (Markus and

Kitayama, 1991). Thus other-focused emotions should play a key role in activating self-
transcendent values and developing collective identities among leaders and their organ-
izational members.
Expressions of other-focused emotions are also likely to be an important factor in fol-
lower perceptions of a leader’s personal image. Previous research indicates that individu-
als associate the emotions displayed by others with desirable or undesirable character
traits (Andersen and Guerrero, 1998; Depaulo, 1992; Oakley, 1992). In addition, research
on impression formation reveals that people can be unexpectedly accurate in their judg-
ments about the characteristics of others based on observing very ‘thin slices’ of their
expressive, nonverbal behavior (Ambady and Rosenthal, 1993). When leaders display an
emotion, they convey an impression of themselves that followers may use to infer specific
traits associated with that emotion. For example, Michie and Nelson (2005) found that
leaders who displayed compassion during a layoff announcement were perceived as more
ethical and esteemed in comparison to leaders who displayed no emotion. In addition, the
compassionate leaders were rated significantly lower on Machiavellian characteristics
than the noncompassionate leaders. In a field study examining the effects of leader values
and emotions on follower perceptions of leader authenticity, Gooty et al. (2006) found
that leaders who frequently experienced and expressed other-focused emotions were more
likely to be viewed as authentic leaders by their subordinates. These studies suggest that
in addition to influencing follower emotions, leader expressions of other-focused emo-
tions may also influence follower beliefs via their perceptions of the leader’s character,
motives and intentions.
In summary, leaders’ expression of emotion is a mechanism that serves several func-
tions in the communication process, and it has profound influences on followers’ emotions
and cognitions. Followers’ affective states are influenced by their leaders’ emotional
expressions through the process of emotional contagion. Followers also base their impres-
sions of leaders and their attributions of leader behavior on emotional expressions by the
leader. Values and motives are communicated through emotional expression, and leader
traits are then inferred by the follower. Such emotional expression is particularly power-
ful when it is other-directed, sensitive to others’ needs and empathetic. Emotional expres-
sion also serves to create a collective identity within the work group or organization, thus
constituting a mechanism for influencing followers in multiple and significant ways. In the
next section, we explore the process of leader of emotional expression by focusing on
vocal and nonverbal cues.
Vocal and nonverbal expression of emotions

To this point, we have argued that the effects of leadership are strengthened by emotional
expression, but the process by which this effect occurs has not been fully defined.
Although words and actions are the mechanisms through which emotional expression
commonly occurs, the ability to accurately recognize emotions through nonverbal expres-
sions is critical to the relationship-building process in which leaders must engage (Rubin
et al., 2005). Furthermore, people can accurately decode emotions that nonverbal cues
represent within and across cultures for facial cues (Ekman and Oster, 1979) and vocal
cues too, though for some emotions there are major differences in expression (Scherer,
2003). Consider the emotion ‘joy’. While joy is almost perfectly recognized in the face, it
is difficult to reliably decode in the voice (ibid.). This section describes the nonverbal cue’s
effect on leadership outcomes as driven by emotions.
One might think that the use of nonverbal cues to express emotion is saved only for
those who have more intimate knowledge of each other. It seems intuitive that until you
know someone relatively well, it can be difficult to know what that glance suggests or what
the tone of voice is supposed to convey. However, there is recent evidence that strangers
can be as accurate as friends at recognizing emotions in others (Sternglanz and DePaulo,
2004), and there are many ‘zero acquaintance’ studies that generally indicate that raters
can make trait inferences with very little exposure to the subject (for example, Borkenau
and Liebler, 1992). Since leaders are typically in a position of having few close friendships
with subordinates, the way in which verbal and nonverbal cues are commonly understood
among all parties is of utmost importance. The degree to which a subordinate correctly
understands the emotions in nonverbal cues likely relates to the perception dimension of
emotional intelligence (EI; Mayer and Salovey, 1997). EI refers to the ability to be aware
of one’s emotions, identify them and express them accurately to others in addition to the
ability to accurately perceive others’ expressed emotions (ibid.). Emotional expression can
occur through both verbal and nonverbal channels, and effective managerial and leader
functions require an understanding to respond to such communication. Thus the impact
of nonverbal cues in emotional expression is as important in distal relationships as it is in
proximal relationships.
There is a paucity of research examining nonverbal cues and leadership. Sullivan (1996)
examined French and American political leaders and found that emotional responses
were similar across cultures for facial displays of the leaders’ nonverbal cues, a finding that
supports Ekman’s (1992) contention that discrete emotions are universally decoded
through facial cues. DeGroot and Moynihan (2003) examined the vocal cues of US presi-
dents and Canadian prime ministers and found that the cues accounted for significant
variance in performance above that previously shown for personality motives and
charisma. In a study that asked American raters to rate political leaders from three coun-
tries, physical nonverbal cues seemed to account for raters’ affective responses to the
leaders (Warnecke et al., 1992). Though little additional research directly examines the
effects of leader nonverbal cues, ample research shows in general how the cues are tied to
emotions and reliably gauged by others.
The conveyance of emotion through facial nonverbal cues has a long research history.
Several discrete emotions are reliably identified by facial movement (Ekman, 1992).
Sadness, happiness, fear, anger, surprise and disgust are as close to universal facial expres-
sions of emotion as possible. Indeed, the channel through which the emotion is revealed
causes some discrete emotions to be more easily recognized. For example, happiness is
easiest to recognize with facial expressions rather than with vocal cues (Juslin and
Laukka, 2003). In addition to discrete emotions, dimensionality of emotions has been
examined, though multiple ideas of the number and nature of the dimensions are found
(for example, Tellegen et al., 1999; Laukka et al., 2005). For instance, direct gaze is likely
involved in the communication of increased emotional intensity, regardless of the partic-
ular emotion being expressed (Adams and Kleck, 2005). Direct gaze does in fact enhance
the processing efficiency of identity information conveyed by the face (Macrae et al.,
2002). Because facial expressions are used to estimate emotion-related activities, separate
provisions must be made for visual and vocal information synchronization because events
using both channels do not occur simultaneously and may affect one another (Ioannou
et al., 2005). A recent meta-analysis revealed that trait anxiety was identified best from
visual cues, but state anxiety was best identified from vocal cues (Harrigan et al., 2004).
To what degree are the two channels of information orthogonal in their capacity to allow
others to recognize emotions?
Scherer (2003) reported that facial expression studies report an average accuracy rate
of emotion recognition that is somewhat higher than that found in vocal studies. Among
the reasons for this is that basic muscle patterns seem to identify the major emotions
facially (Ekman, 1992), while emotion families are more distinct from each other in vocal
as compared to facial expression (Scherer, 2003). Outside of anger, all of the discrete emo-
tions are more easily recognized with the face (see Table 2 in Scherer, 2003). Nonetheless,
there could be different information processed toward understanding how the vocal
channel operates in its relationship with organizational outcomes such as leadership
effectiveness. For instance, in one study the vocal signal was shown to be more important
than the visual signal in the communication of social status and dominance (Gregory
et al., 2001).
Vocal cues are only recently being studied to the degree that physical cues have been
examined. This is likely due to the infusion of new technology that has allowed
researchers to measure vocal characteristics objectively with computer programs. Before
such programs, researchers wanting to study vocal cues had to rely upon raters giving per-
ceptual responses to items about voice quality, attractiveness and so on. Of course, for the
impact of vocal cues on leadership to be meaningful, perceptions from followers (and
other listeners) need to be understood since it is through personal reactions to the speaker
that the effects of nonverbal cues on performance measures exists (DeGroot and
Motowidlo, 1999). DeGroot and Motowidlo found that both visual and vocal cues were
related to job performance in multiple studies with managers. They found that these rela-
tionships were driven by personal reactions to the speaker, and this mechanism was
stronger for vocal cues. It is not much of a stretch to conceive personal reactions to be
emotional reactions to a degree since the scale items in that study measured ‘likeability’
and ‘trust’ among others. Whereas trust (for example) is not an emotion itself, its presence
(or absence) creates emotional response. For example, state anxiety was recognized with
greater accuracy by observers using vocal cues because it is an emotional response subject
to changes that occur rapidly and is best transmitted using the vocal channel (Harrigan
et al., 2004).
In order to argue that emotions act as mechanisms to explain relationships between
nonverbal cues and leadership, significant relationships must occur between the cues and
leadership and also between the cues and emotions. Previous research has established the
relationship between visual cues and managers’ performance (DeGroot and Motowidlo,
1999), vocal cues and leadership (Gregory and Gallagher, 2002) and emotions and lead-
ership (Rubin et al., 2005). The final step is to establish the emotions–nonverbal cues
relationships.
Associations between vocal cues and emotions have been both dimensional and dis-
crete. While dimensions of emotions refer to the underlying facets of all emotions, namely
activation, intensity, valence and potency, discrete emotions normally studied in emotions
work include joy, happiness, sadness, anger, fear and disgust. A brief review of specific
vocal cues and their relationships with both discrete emotions (for example, Banse and
Scherer, 1996; Sternglanz and DePaulo, 2004; Laukka, 2005) and emotion dimensions
(for example, Breitenstein et al., 2001; Laukka et al., 2005) is next. In addition to the
studies that have examined vocal cues and emotion, there are many that have examined
personality characteristics related to these discrete emotions and emotion dimensions. To
the extent that visual and vocal cues are related to these personality characteristics
(Scherer, 1979), the cues should be related to the discrete emotions. These findings will
also be illuminated with each vocal cue below.
Although many vocal cues can be measured objectively with computer programs, most
studies are limited to three vocal cues: fundamental frequency and its variability, energy
or loudness (and its variability) and speech rate (Scherer, 2003), though pausing is studied
at times. Fundamental frequency represents the pitch of a voice, or how ‘high’ or ‘low’ a
voice is. Examining emotion dimensions, Laukka et al. (2005) found that mean pitch was
strongly related to both activation and intensity. Scherer et al. (1973) found that higher
pitch levels increased impressions of competence, dominance and assertiveness. Recent
research by Gregory and Gallagher (2002) found that spectral analysis of candidates’ non-
verbal vocal communications predicted US presidential election outcomes. Acoustic
analysis of the fundamental frequency of presidential candidates’ voices showed that non-
verbal frequency below 0.5 kHz can reveal the debating candidate’s relative social domi-
nance (ibid.). Candidates’ nonverbal vocalizations provided a precise metric of their
relative dominance. When this metric was compared statistically with the candidate’s
popular vote percentages for the US presidency, it accurately predicted the popular
vote outcomes for the eight elections under analysis. Gregory and Gallagher suggest that
the frequency analysis can reveal a commanding presence, possibly due to confidence
from previous success. Social information processing theory suggests that people make
summary judgments of suitability for leadership based on observations of prototypical
attributes (Hollander and Offermann, 1993), and vocal pitch is likely one of these
attributes.
Another frequently studied vocal cue is the variability of pitch. Variation in pitch is
strongly related to activation, potency and intensity of emotions (Laukka et al., 2005).
For discrete emotions, Scherer (2003) reviewed the literature and indicated that anger and
joy were positively related to pitch variability while sadness and boredom were negatively
related. While a person is sad or bored, pitch does not change much from the mean but
while he/she is angry or happy, it is quite dynamic. This vocal cue has also been studied
with personality dimensions. Scherer (1979) found that greater pitch variability is linked
to perceived speaker dynamism, potency, extroversion and benevolence (sociability).
Those who use a small pitch range would sound monotone, and thus the positive rela-
tionship with the charged emotions occurs.
Range in vocal intensity (loudness) seems to be closely related to pitch variability. All
four emotion dimensions are strongly related to loudness variability, though in the nega-
tive direction for valence (Laukka et al., 2005). Gregory and Webster (1996) found that
celebrities with the highest social status showed the greatest variety in intonation (varia-
tion in amplitude between frequencies) and the less dominant celebrities accommodated
to them in their speech patterns. Burgoon et al. (1990) found that intonation with more
variety was a key factor in truly achieving persuasion. They concluded that confident
voices evoked more compliance from others in both public and interpersonal contexts,
and loudness range indicates confidence.
Speech rate is positively related to anger and fear and negatively related to sadness and
boredom (Breitenstein et al., 2001; Scherer, 2003). Most studies have found that faster
speech rates increase competence, social attraction and extroversion perceptions (e.g.,
Mehrabian and Williams, 1969; Pearce and Brommel, 1972; Buller et al., 1992; Feldstein
et al., 2001). Brown et al. (1973) found that slowing the speech rate makes the voice sound
less competent. Those who speak more slowly may be perceived as less intelligent or ‘dis-
advantaged’ (Williams, 1970). However, speech rate is negatively related to the emotion
dimensions activation, potency and intensity (Laukka et al., 2005). This seems to indicate
that speech rate is one of the easiest vocal cues to recognize with both types of emotion
measures and also with personality traits.
Although pauses are not studied as often as other vocal cues, it is mentioned here since
it has been examined in situations to which leaders can relate well. For example, effective
use of pauses can call attention to particular ideas, and unfilled pauses used in strategic
locations can enhance speech (Feldman and Rime, 1991). If the pauses are used such that
they contribute to the speaker becoming more fluent, then pausing is effective. On the
other hand, pause proportion was negatively related to all four emotion dimensions,
though statistical significance was reached for only activation and intensity (Laukka et al.,
2005). This indicates that pausing may not be as strongly associated with emotions as
other vocal variables.
Taken together, the research shows that vocal cues are indicators of emotion and per-
sonality traits. If one combines all these vocal variables, a proxy for vocal attractiveness
is created. Zuckerman and Driver (1989) found that senders with more attractive voices
were rated more favorably than senders with less attractive voices. Vocal attractiveness had
greater effects on attributions of dominance in one study but larger effects on likeability
in their second study. In an effort to elaborate upon these findings, Zuckerman et al. (1990)
used the NEO Personality Inventory (Costa and McCrae, 1985). Results from this study
indicate that an attractive voice is one that judges find lacks tension but has the presence
of confidence without giving an indication of whether the person is good-natured
(Zuckerman et al., 1990). These characteristics can be inferred from vocal cues. The mes-
sages from the cues are delivered through emotions that trigger leader outcomes discussed
in this chapter. Thus a combination of vocal cue variables that form an index of vocal
attractiveness leads to leader performance. Moreover, whether vocal cues are taken
together as an estimate of vocal attractiveness or examined separately, the effect of the
voice on leadership effectiveness is through emotions.
In summary, leaders express emotions using multiple channels of communication,
including vocal and nonverbal cues. Facial expressions, vocal frequency and variability,
pitch, loudness, speech rate and pauses all serve to communicate emotions, which in turn
affect follower affect and cognitions. We now turn to some suggestions for future studies
of leader emotion expression.
New directions for research on leaders’ emotional expression

Although emotional expression by leaders is integrated in many of the foundational and
contemporary theories of leadership, its role has not been fully investigated. We need to
know more about how leaders express emotion and what follower outcomes are affected
by this process. In particular, we need to know more about how vocal and nonverbal cues
are used to communicate different emotions, specifically within the context of the
leader–follower dynamic. Do the existing general findings hold within this important rela-
tionship? Such future studies should include both proximal and distal leaders. Leaders at
the top of the organization form different relationships with followers from supervisors
who work with followers on a daily basis, and communication content and process differs
in these two forms of relationship.
There is room in future research to study the dynamic interplay of emotional expres-
sion between leaders and followers. One particularly fruitful avenue would be to explore
followers’ emotional expression when directed upward (toward the leader) and how this
in turn affects the leaders’ emotional expression. Do followers mimic or pattern their emo-
tional expression in terms of vocal and nonverbal cues after their leaders? What effect
does this have on leaders’ impressions of these followers?
In this chapter we have concentrated on leader emotional expression and its effects on
followers. Leaders, especially those at the top of the organization, communicate with mul-
tiple constituents, including other leaders, board members and the general public in terms
of creating and maintaining desired identity images for themselves and for the organiz-
ation. Research should examine these recipient groups as well as followers, and determine
how leaders’ uses of emotional expression differ among these targets in terms of both the
communication process and its effects.
As indicated earlier in the chapter, the most frequently studied discrete emotions
include joy, happiness, sadness, anger, fear and disgust. We propose that a broader range
of emotions be included in studies of leader emotional expression. Compassion, for
example, is one such emotion, and it presents a host of possibilities for future research.
Through what vocal and nonverbal means is compassion communicated by leaders? How
do followers perceive whether compassion expressed by leaders is genuine or contrived?
Do followers perceive compassion displays differently when the leader is female compared
to when the leader is male? Along with compassion, there are many other emotions that
can be studied within the context of leadership research, including relief, surprise, pride,
guilt, amusement, contempt and excitement, to name only a few.
Studies of leaders’ emotional expression need to focus on gender differences. Are men
and women evaluated differently by followers when they display or fail to display partic-
ular emotions? Sadness is an expressed emotion that may be evaluated differently accord-
ing to the gender of the leader. Male leaders who express sadness within the work context
might be evaluated favorably because they are brave enough to display behavior that goes
against the sex role stereotype. Women who display sadness at work may be viewed as
weak. The converse of these arguments could be the case as well; these are empirical ques-
tions that warrant investigation.
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30 Leaders as emotional managers, across cultures
Joyce E. Bono and Laura G. Barron
Introduction
Historically the study of leaders and leadership has focused on leader traits and behav-
iors that predict leadership effectiveness and emergence (see Judge et al., 2002; Judge &
Piccolo, 2004). Over the past few decades, there has been increasing interest in the mech-
anisms by which leader behaviors influence employees, with particular interest in emo-
tional processes. The notion that leaders influence workers’ emotions is not new (see Redl,
1942). Nevertheless, a resurgence of interest in emotions in the leadership process has
recently occurred, motivated in part by the increasing popularity of neo-charismatic the-
ories of leadership, which focus on emotional connections between leaders and followers
(Bass, 1985; Shamir et al., 1993). Recent research on leaders as managers of employee
emotions has focused on two broad research questions: First, do transformational and
charismatic leaders differ emotionally from those leaders who do not behave in charis-
matic or transformational ways? Research in this area has focused on both the extent to
which transformational leaders are aware of and manage their own and others’ emotions
(emotional intelligence) and the extent to which transformational leadership is associated
with the experience and expression of positive emotions. Second, how do leaders’ emo-
tional expressions affect others, especially subordinates and other members of the work
group? Research in this area has focused on the transfer of emotions between leaders and
others, especially the effects of leaders’ emotions on work group members (e.g., emotional
contagion).
In this chapter, we briefly review existing research in these two areas. We also discuss
the role of emotions as symbolic communication, including leaders’ strategic use of emo-
tions to communicate with employees about important goals and values. We then extend
our discussion of leadership and emotions to include the influence of culture. Specifically,
we examine potential cross-cultural differences in the meaning and interpretation of emo-
tional displays by leaders, by comparing the US and Japan.
Do transformational and charismatic leaders differ emotionally from those leaders who do
not behave in charismatic or transformational ways?
One clear differentiation between charismatic and transformational leadership theories
and other leadership theories (e.g., two-factor theories, which focus on leader behaviors
such as structuring the work and showing consideration for others) is the explicit focus on
emotional links between leaders and followers. In his initial work on transformational
leadership, Bass (1985) explicitly mentioned the presence of an emotional component.
Shamir et al. (1993) focused directly on this emotional component, suggesting that charis-
matic leadership involves both an emotional attachment between leaders and followers and
emotional arousal of followers. Furthermore, George (2000) suggested that leader posi-
tivity would influence group affective tone and Ashkanasy and Tse (2000) developed a
model in which they suggested that transformational leadership involves the management
489
of both leaders’ and employees’ emotions. In this model, Ashkanasy and Tse explicitly
linked transformational leadership to emotional intelligence.
Emotional intelligence typically refers to the skill or ability of an individual (a leader)
to understand and manage his or her own and others’ emotions, but the concept of emo-
tional intelligence has been surrounded by controversy both with respect to its nature
(e.g., definition, status as a personality trait or ability), and measurement (self-report of
‘style’ vs. test of ability; see Daus & Ashkanasy, 2005 and Locke, 2005). Despite a lack of
consensus about the meaning and measurement of emotional intelligence, its role in the
leadership process has received much attention in the literature. The vast majority of
journal articles focused on emotional intelligence and leadership have been non-empirical
(i.e., theory development, case studies, and practical tips for managers). Fewer than 40
empirical studies have examined emotional intelligence in the leadership process, and even
fewer have been published in rigorous, peer-reviewed journals. (A PsychInfo search for
keywords ‘leadership’ and ‘emotional intelligence’ revealed no published empirical arti-
cles in the Academy of Management Journal, the Journal of Applied Psychology, Personnel
Psychology, or Administrative Science Quarterly; six articles were published in Leadership
Quarterly).
The fundamental question addressed in empirical research on leadership and emo-
tional intelligence is whether or not reports of transformational and charismatic leader-
ship obtained from subordinates, peers, and supervisors are correlated with leaders’
self-reports of emotional intelligence (using a broad range of measures, with a broad
range of validity evidence). Although findings are not perfectly consistent across studies,
most report modest, significant positive correlations between leaders’ self-reports of emo-
tional intelligence and self and others’ ratings of transformational leadership. A reason-
able conclusion from this research is that leaders who perceive themselves to be skilled at
understanding and managing emotions tend to be viewed as more charismatic by others
and also tend to engage in transformational leadership behaviors such as intellectual stim-
ulation, individualized consideration, and inspirational motivation. Only one study exam-
ined the link between emotional intelligence and perceptions of leadership after
controlling for the effects of other well-established leadership traits, such as cognitive
ability and the ‘Big Five’ personality traits (Offerman et al., 2004); this study reported
significant contributions of emotional competencies to perceptions of leadership.
Another way of examining emotional differences between leaders is to examine their
felt and expressed emotions. For example, Spreitzer and Quinn (1996) found that trans-
formational leaders tended to have positive feelings toward their environment. Bono and
Ilies (2006) examined leaders’ emotional expressions, analyzing vision statements and
speeches of leaders by counting the number of positive emotion words used by leaders
and by obtaining observers’ ratings of leaders’ positive emotional expressions. They found
significant differences in emotional expressions between leaders who were rated high and
those who were rated low on transformational leadership by subordinates and peers.
Leaders who scored high on transformational leadership (especially the inspirational
motivation dimension) tended to use more positive emotion words and express more pos-
itive emotions, such as enthusiasm and optimism, than did leaders who scored low on
transformational leadership.
Considered as a whole, results from this line of research suggest that transformational
leaders (a) view themselves as more skilled at managing and understanding their own and
Leaders as emotional managers, across cultures 491
others’ emotions, (b) tend to have a more positive outlook, and (c) tend to use positive
emotions in their written and verbal communications. Despite these insights into the role
of emotions in the leadership process, most studies in this line of research tell us little
about how leaders use emotions to influence followers, how they arouse emotions in
others, or how they form emotional attachments with followers.
How do leaders’ emotional expressions affect others, especially subordinates and other
members of the work group?
One way that leaders’ emotions might influence others is through the direct transfer of
emotions from one person to another, a process referred to as ‘emotional contagion’.
Primitive emotional contagion (Hatfield et al., 1994) occurs when people unconsciously
synchronize and mimic others’ facial expressions and movements, leading them to experi-
ence the emotions of the other person. Fredrickson (2003) suggested that the positive
emotions of leaders may be especially contagious because they hold positions of power
in the organizational hierarchy.
A number of studies document the transfer of emotions from one group member to
another (e.g., Totterdell, 2000; Barsade, 2002). Recently, Sy et al. (2005) focused explicitly
on emotional contagion, whereby leader moods are transferred to followers. In an experi-
mental study, they manipulated the mood of group leaders and then assessed the mood
of group members, finding that leaders’ moods influenced aggregate group mood.
Similarly, in a series of studies, Bono and Ilies (2006) linked leaders’ expressions of posi-
tive emotions (e.g., enthusiasm and optimism) to followers’ positive moods and positive
reactions to leaders.
Another line of research suggests that charismatic or transformational leaders may be
more able than those who score low on charismatic and transformational leadership to
influence others’ emotions. Friedman and Riggio (1981) found that charismatic individ-
uals were more apt to infect others with their emotions. Cherulnik et al. (2001) found that
when research participants watched tapes of charismatic and non-charismatic leaders,
they mimicked leaders’ facial expressions (e.g., smiles) only with charismatic leaders. The
notion that transformational or charismatic leaders have an influence on employees’ emo-
tions has been supported in recent field research as well. In an experience sampling study
in which healthcare employees reported on their experienced emotions four times a day
for two weeks, subordinate ratings of leaders’ transformational leadership behaviors were
found to correlate positively with the day-to-day emotions experienced by a set of ran-
domly selected employees. Employees who reported to transformational leaders tended
to experience more optimism, enthusiasm, and happiness – throughout the course of the
work day – than did employees who reported to less transformational leaders (Bono et al.,
in press).
Considered as a whole, these studies confirm that leaders’ positive emotions (felt and
expressed) influence employees’ mood states. Furthermore, this effect appears to be
stronger for transformational and charismatic leaders. However, few of these studies
explicitly test whether primitive emotional contagion is the process by which leaders’ emo-
tions influence worker emotions. Indeed, it is plausible that leaders’ emotional expression,
both positive and negative, may act as signals to employees. For example, leaders’ expres-
sions of optimism and enthusiasm may lead employees to believe that (a) the leader is pas-
sionate about and truly committed to the work and the organization, (b) the leader is
empathetic and concerned about employees, or (c) the work group or the organization
focusing on important goals are performing well. Similarly, leaders’ expressions of anger
may (a) communicate important information to employees about the leaders’ perfor-
mance expectations, or might (b) be used to create group cohesion and identification by
focusing expressions of anger toward a low performer or an outside competitor. Leaders
may use emotions to communicate information about success and failure as well as to
indicate the importance of goals, values or priorities. Thus, leaders’ emotional expressions
may be an important part of the ‘sensemaking’ process for employees.
In a special issue of Leadership Quarterly, several studies examine the role of formal
and informal leaders as managers of employee emotions. Humphrey (2002) argues that a
key function of leaders is to manage the emotions of group members. Pescosolido (2002)
further suggests, based on observation of 20 work groups, that emergent leaders, perhaps
more than formal leaders, take on the role of managing group emotions. He found that
when ambiguous events occur, informal leaders model appropriate emotional responses
to the situation. Similarly, research by Pirola-Merlo et al. (2002) suggests that one of the
jobs of leaders is to help team members cope when negative events occur. McColl-
Kennedy and Anderson (2002) conclude that leaders’ ability to control employees’ feel-
ings of both optimism and frustration is related to performance (however, as this study
was cross-sectional, an alternative model in which high performance leads to optimism,
which causes favorable ratings of employees, is equally plausible).
Overall, existing research suggests that managers play a key role in managing employ-
ees’ emotions by expressing optimism, by helping employees cope with adverse events, and
by using emotions to help employees make sense of their environment. However, most of
this research was conducted in the US and the UK. For this reason, we devote our next
section to examining potential cross-cultural differences in both leaders’ expression of
emotions, and in the meaning attributed to their emotional expressions.
Can we apply what we know about leadership and emotions across cultures?
For the purposes of considering cross-cultural issues in managers’ use of emotions, we
explicitly compare Japan and the US because these two countries represent cultures that
have been used as models of business effectiveness, because these cultures vary on several
cultural dimensions examined by Hofstede (1980) and the GLOBE Project (House et al.,
2004), and because there is an existing body of research comparing emotional perceptions
and tactics of persons who grew up in the US and Japan. Although the research we review
was not conducted in the context of leadership, we find it informative in considering how
leaders and employees in the US and Japan may manage workplace emotions differently.
We argue that US managers are apt to make greater use of their emotions as conscious
tactics than are Japanese managers. Furthermore, we suggest that differences in tactical
use of emotion by managers in the US and Japan might be explained by underlying cul-
tural differences in assertiveness.
A central concept in cross-cultural work on emotions has been that of cultural display
rules. First coined by Ekman and Friesen (1969), ‘display rules’ are defined as
societal norms or values for situational emotional regulation. That is, cultural norms
dictate which types of situations call for the expression of certain emotions, regardless of
what emotions are experienced. Situations that dictate certain emotions may be types of
events (e.g., promotions or layoffs) or interactions between certain types of people
(e.g., higher- and lower-status individuals). Although display rules exist in all cultures,
they may be more widely agreed upon – and thus more restricting – in some cultures than
in others. In the classic display rule study, Ekman (1972) showed that when alone,
Japanese and US undergraduates did not differ in their emotional displays; when watch-
ing gruesome film clips, all showed expressions of disgust, anger, fear, and sadness. When
in the presence of the experimenter (perhaps seen as a higher-status other), however,
Japanese students were more likely to smile to mask negative feelings, whereas the dis-
played emotion of the American students was not altered.
Given the administrative difficulty of cross-cultural study of live emotional expression,
much of what is known about cross-cultural differences in the use of emotions is based
on self-report data. This research generally supports the notion that North Americans
report being more aware of their emotions than do Japanese. Americans report experi-
encing their emotions longer and more intensely than the Japanese, and also report more
bodily symptoms, as well as more expressive and verbal reactions to their emotions
(Matsumoto et al., 1988). As compared to the Japanese, North Americans more readily
attribute the cause of their emotions to other people rather than to chance or fate (ibid.;
Mauro et al., 1992).
Another methodology used in the cross-cultural study of emotions is to have individ-
uals rate standardized emotional expressions of others. In this paradigm, photographs of
posed headshots, designed to display emotional expressions that are universally recog-
nized, are shown to participants in different cultures. Most typically, participants are
asked to judge the intensity of the emotion that is portrayed, however, in some cases par-
ticipants are also asked to judge the appropriateness of the given emotional expression
when the portrayer of the emotion is alone or in the presence of others.
Early studies using the posed headshot paradigm, in which emotional intensity was
rated, concluded that individuals from Japan and other Asian countries (i.e., Hong Kong,
Indonesia) rated the emotional intensity in the photographs lower than did individuals
from the US and Europe (Ekman et al., 1987). Although this finding was initially attrib-
uted to the fact that the photographs were of Caucasian faces, lower ratings of posed emo-
tional expressions among Japanese, as compared to Americans, was replicated when
photos of both Caucasian and Japanese posers were used, and when controlling for cul-
tural response sets (Matsumoto & Ekman, 1989).
Although several studies conclude that stronger emotional intensity ratings are made
by Americans than Japanese, the meaning of this finding is not clear, as participants may
have rated either the intensity of posers’ emotional display or the intensity of posers’ inter-
nal experience. Recent research (Matsumoto et al., 1999) suggested that whereas
Americans indicate higher intensity of expression for all emotions, Japanese indicate
higher intensity of felt emotions only for expressions of anger, contempt, disgust, and
fear. Underlying the interpretation of these studies is the assumption that Americans
differentiate the internal experience of emotions from their emotional displays to a greater
extent than do Japanese. Thus, results from this line of research, along with results of the
early Ekman (1972) study, are consistent with common beliefs that Japanese suppress or
mask negative emotion (anger, contempt, disgust, and fear) more than do Americans. The
finding that Americans rate displayed negative emotions as stronger in intensity than felt
emotions suggests that not only do Americans not suppress the expression of negative
emotions, but they may even exaggerate the display of negative emotions.
A picture of Japanese as suppressers of emotion and Americans as exaggerators of all

their felt emotions is not complete, however. The research discussed thus far used posed
facial expressions that were intended to show high intensity emotional expressions. Later
research by Matsumoto et al. (2002) employed computer morphing technology to create
neutral, low, high, and very high intensity facial expressions of emotions, which were
then judged by Japanese and American college students. In replication of Matsumoto
et al. (1999), it was found that Japanese did not rate either high or very high intensity
expressions significantly differently for external display than for internal experience,
although the trend was toward higher ratings of external display for very high intensity
expressions (effect sizes: d 0.06 and 0.31, ns). Americans, in contrast, rated external dis-
plays of high and very high intensity expressions significantly higher than internal experi-
ence (effect sizes: d 0.60 and 0.55, p 0.01). When Japanese and Americans make
judgments of low intensity expressions, however, the pattern of findings is opposite to
that found for high intensity expressions (ibid.); Americans rate displays of low intensity
expressions as no different from internal experiences (but in the direction of higher
ratings for external display than for internal experience; effect size: d 0.20, ns),
whereas Japanese rate external display significantly lower than internal experience (effect
size: d 0.36, p 0.05).
Considering these results as a whole, it appears that Americans employ emotions more
tactically (by amplification) than Japanese, and that Japanese mask and suppress emo-
tional expressions more than Americans. The findings of Matsumoto et al. (2002) suggest
that in Japan, because the expression of emotions at a high intensity does not typically
confer any social advantage, if someone is expressing emotion at a high intensity level, he
or she must truly be feeling that emotion strongly. In other words, because there is no
social motivation to exaggerate emotions, intensely expressed emotions must be intensely
felt. Emotions displayed at a low intensity, however, may reflect either truly felt low inten-
sity, or they may represent a suppression of high intensity felt emotions. In contrast, in
the US, because the expression of emotions may have social value as a signal to others of
one’s pleasure or displeasure, emotion expressed at a high or very high intensity may not
represent one’s true emotion, but may instead represent an amplification of felt emotion,
such that signal of one’s pleasure or displeasure will be more readily discernible to others.
Trompenaars writes, ‘In a culture in which feelings are controlled, irrepressible joy or grief
will still signal loudly. In a culture where feelings are amplified, they will have to be sig-
naled more loudly still in order to register at all’ (1994, p. 69).
Applying this research to leaders’ use of emotions, it appears that leaders’ emotional
displays may communicate different information to employees in the Japan and the US.
Specifically, American leaders may exaggerate their expressions of emotions such as opti-
mism and frustration as a signal to the work group as to the appropriate emotion (e.g.,
Pescosolido, 2002) or to signal pleasure or displeasure with performance or results.
Moreover, American employees are likely to interpret intense emotional expressions as
exaggerated, concluding that a message is being sent. In contrast, Japanese leaders may
be less likely to exaggerate emotional expressions. Since modest intensity emotions in
Japan may mean that the leader experienced the emotions at a low intensity or that the
leader is suppressing strongly felt emotions, employees will be less able to interpret
leaders’ emotional expressions as signals about what emotions are appropriate for the
situation or as symbolic information about performance.
One possible interpretation of this research is that Japanese leaders will be less-effective
managers of group emotions than will American managers, because they are less aware
of their own and others’ emotions, because less emotional contagion will occur, and
because they will be less likely to use intense emotional expressions as signals. What is not
clear from existing research is whether emotional management is less important in
Japanese culture. For example, it may be that North American leaders manage employee
emotions in a way that is effective for North American employees, who expect to receive
emotional signals from their managers. In Japan, appropriate reactions to specific events
and important information about expectations, performance, or values may tend to be
communicated in non-emotional ways. Clearly, this is an important issue for future
research. Meanwhile, considerable caution should be exercised in generalizing the results
of US- and UK-based research on leaders as emotional managers across the globe.
Looking beyond Japan to consider underlying cultural dimensions

Because much of the research on emotional display rules has focused on a Japan–US com-
parison, that was our focus as well. However, to better apply these research findings across
the globe, we now turn our attention to defining the broad features that might distinguish
cultural differences in the tactical use of emotions.
Collectivism may be the most popularly cited explanation when cross-cultural
differences are found between the US and Japan. However, it is not clear that Japan is truly
a more collectivistic society, as meta-analysis suggests that the US is on a par with Japan.
Across 17 comparative Japanese–American studies, Japanese individuals were found to
be equally as collectivistic as Americans (d0.06; 95% CI: 0.002 to 0.11; Oyserman
et al., 2002). The caveat is that most studies in this meta-analysis compared college stu-
dents. This is of particular concern because, whereas the average level of collectivism of
American college students may not differ from that of American working-age adults, the
same cannot be said of Japanese college students. Matsumoto et al. (1996), for example,
sampled both Japanese college students and working-age adults (mean age 39), and found
that although only 29.2 per cent of Japanese students were classified as collectivists, by
the same criteria, 67.9 per cent of Japanese working-age adults were labeled collectivistic.
Two large-scale studies of working-age adults found Japan to be more collectivistic than
the US, even though these studies still showed Japan to be less collectivistic than com-
monly believed (Hofstede, 1980; House et al., 2004). The recent GLOBE project (ibid.)
based on about 17 000 managers in 62 societies, found Japan to be substantially higher
than the US on only one of two aspects of collectivist practices, institutional collectivism
practices (Japan: 5.19; US: 4.20; nation-level SD 0.42). Since research on US and
Japanese differences in expression and interpretation of emotions used college student
samples – where no differences in collectivism have been found – it is unlikely that collec-
tivism can explain emotional differences between the countries.
In the classic Ekman study, power distance was initially suggested as a possible reason
for differences between students from the US and Japan in emotional expression (recall
that Japanese students suppressed emotional expression in the presence of the experi-
menter, who may have been perceived to be a powerful other). However, power distance
explanations do not help us understand differences between Americans and Japanese
found in the paradigm that gathers emotional intensity ratings of photographed head-
shots (of individuals who are typically college age). More importantly, research on
working-age samples in the US and Japan reveals nearly identical scores on power dis-
tance, both for values and practices (values: Japan: 2.86; US: 2.85; practices: Japan: 5.11;
US: 4.88; nation-level SD: 0.35; House et al., 2004).
Another potential feature that may distinguish Japan and the US is the degree to which
individuals are assertive, confrontational, and aggressive in their relationships with others.
In the GLOBE study, Japan scores among the lowest of all countries on assertiveness,
whereas the US scores among the highest (Japan: 3.59; US: 4.55; SD: 0.37; d2.59; ibid.).
Scores on the assertiveness dimension were based on items that asked respondents to
indicate where members of their society and work organization fell along continua such as
assertiveness–nonassertiveness and toughness–tenderness. Further support for Japanese–
US differences on assertiveness emerges when one considers that assertiveness loads highly
on two Big Five personality traits in both Japanese and American samples: extraversion
(positive) and agreeableness (negative) (McCrae & Costa, 1997). In studies of college stu-
dents, managers, and executives, the Japanese (and other Asians) are generally shown to
be less extroverted and more agreeable than Americans, at least when controlling for cul-
tural response sets by using ipsative scores (college students: Allik & McCrae, 2004; man-
agers and executives: Lewis, 2005).
Assertiveness has been defined as a ‘style of responding that involves making one’s
wants known to others and in no uncertain terms’ (House et al., 2004, p. 403). Thus, evi-
dence for national differences on assertiveness can also be drawn from the broader litera-
ture on direct versus indirect cultural communication styles. Indirect language usage is
negatively related to assertiveness (at the intra-national individual level: Holtgraves, 1997)
as are other aspects of nonverbal communication, such as tone, eye contact, touch, and
speaking distance. Conscious amplification of felt emotions in the presence of others so
as to clearly signal pleasure and displeasure represents one component of assertiveness.
Based on the GLOBE assertiveness practices index, Confucian Asian nations tended to
score among the lowest (with some exceptions among those nations that have been colo-
nized in their recent history, such as Hong Kong and Singapore). Germanic and Anglo
nations were generally the highest on assertiveness.
Despite the finding that assertiveness practices tend to vary between Japan and the US,
it is important to note that Japan scores higher than all other cultures on the value placed
on assertiveness (Japan: 5.56; US: 4.32). Indeed, across both Confucian Asian and
Southeast Asian cultures – and in these cultures only – respondents indicated that they
want more assertiveness, dominance, and aggression in their relationships with others,
suggesting cultures in flux.
Future research on leaders as emotional managers

Our review and discussion of leaders as emotional managers points out the need for a
more focused and methodologically rigorous agenda for future research. Whether
effective or transformational/charismatic leaders differ from their less effective and less
transformational/charismatic counterparts cannot be determined from self-reported
surveys at single points in time. Quasi-experiments, careful long-term observational
studies, longitudinal studies, multiple sources of measurement, and experience sampling
studies that ‘catch’ emotions as they occur are critical if we are to gain a better under-
standing of the process by which leaders manage their own and others’ emotions and
how they tactically use emotional expressions and emotional responses to improve both
organizational productivity and employees’ quality of work life. Although one might
argue that methodological rigor is important for all research, we are especially concerned
with methodological rigor in the study of emotions because it is known that there is not
perfect congruence between experienced and expressed emotions, because we know that
retrospective reports of emotions tend to be biased, and because emotional experiences
can be fleeting. Although much progress has been made in the past 5–10 years on under-
standing the role of leaders as emotional managers, we agree with Brief and Weiss’s (2002,
p. 289) conclusion that, ‘the organizational literature is populated with many more ideas
about the leader’s role in the production of moods and emotions than it is with relevant
data’. Furthermore, given existing research on differences across cultures in the tactical
use of emotions and in interpretations of others’ emotional expressions, a leader’s role in
the production of mood emotions may vary across cultures. Nonetheless, existing theory
and research converge in concluding that emotions are an important part of the leader-
ship process.
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31 The role of affect in vertical and lateral exchange
relationships in teams
Herman H.M. Tse and Neal M. Ashkanasy*
Introduction
Past research suggests that there is ongoing reciprocity between individuals, their super-
visors and co-workers at work (George, 2000, 2002), and this social interaction evokes
different kinds of emotions within the individuals. This involves individuals with different
affect to interact with each other, and this in turn, triggers and transfers emotions within
the interpersonal exchange process (Barsade, 2002). Recent research has demonstrated
that affect may play an important role in leader–member (LMX) and team–member
exchange (TMX) relationships due to increased proximity and frequency of interactions
in teams (see Ashkanasy, 2003; Tse et al., 2005; Dasborough, 2006). Given that the impli-
cations of affect for LMX and TMX relationship development are significant, it is
arguable that affect can be studied in an integrated context, linking both types of exchange
relationships together. Little attention, however, has been directed to exploring the under-
lying role of affect in exchange processes between supervisors, subordinates and co-
workers in teams.
LMX theory advocates that leaders develop differentiated relationships with subordin-
ates within work teams (Dansereau et al., 1975). TMX refers to the exchange relationship
quality between an individual and his/her team members (Seers, 1989; Seers et al., 1995).
Research has shown that both LMX and TMX relate to employees’ work attitudes and
behaviors (e.g., Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995; Gerstner & Day, 1997; Liden et al., 2000). The
research findings are inspiring and have advanced the literature; however, understanding
the underlying role of affect in the relationship between LMX and TMX remains under-
developed (Tse et al., 2005). LMX research suggests that supervisors, in their position,
have the authority to decide how organizational resources and psychological support are
distributed to subordinates based on their quality of relationships with their subordinates
(e.g., Dienesch & Liden, 1986). Individuals’ perceptions of their supervisor’s behaviors in
respect to differential relationships have also been found to influence their affective reac-
tions (e.g., Erdogan, 2002). The quality of LMX relationships creates a perception of
unfairness, indicating to members their relative standing within a group. This in turn
determines how subordinates perceive the exchange relationships with other team
members (Sias & Jablin, 1995; Tyler & Blader, 2000). On this basis, social exchange theory
(SET) (Blau, 1964) and affective events theory (AET) (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996)
provide strong theoretical foundations to explain why and how the supervisor–subordi-
nate dyadic relationships will influence subordinates’ perceptions of relationship devel-
opment with other team members. Adopting the perspective of AET, we suggest that
affect influences the relationship between LMX and TMX (see Tse et al., 2005).
In this chapter, therefore, we seek to explore the implications of how affect can play a
role in facilitating the development of LMX and TMX relationships and linking both
499
exchange relationships together. This chapter begins by presenting an overview of

research on LMX, emotions in teams and TMX, and their own theoretical basis.
Following this, we review and discuss how social exchange and affective events theories
underpin the development of effective interpersonal exchange relationships in teams. We
then propose a research model outlining the underlying role of affect in the LMX–TMX
relationship.
Literature review
Leader–member exchange
LMX theory is a dyadic leadership theory proposing that leaders use different leadership
styles to develop differential interpersonal relationships with individual subordinates
within a work group (e.g., Dansereau et al., 1975). This definition was derived from ver-
tical dyad linkage (VDL) theory, which assumes that leaders treat each subordinate
differently because each subordinate is unique, with different needs, personalities, atti-
tudes, and behaviors (Dansereau et al., 1973). LMX theory focuses on the way leaders and
subordinates form unique relationships over time as they influence each other and nego-
tiate their roles in the relationship (Yukl, 2006). According to the theory, the relationship
between supervisors and subordinates is a reciprocal exchange and continuous role-
making process, influenced by the expectations of both leaders and subordinates
(Dansereau et al., 1973, 1975; Graen, 1976).
LMX theory also suggests that leaders have difficulty forming high-quality relation-
ships with every member of a work group because of the leader’s limited resources, time,
and abilities (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995). Thus, leaders tend to develop high-quality rela-
tionships with a few employees who in turn can act as ‘trusted assistants’. The leaders then
form only low-quality relationships with other subordinates. These subordinates, in effect,
act as ‘hired hands’ in the group. The relationship quality between a leader and his or her
subordinates has strong implications for both parties. A high-quality LMX relationship
is characterized by mutual trust, respect, and influence that go beyond the formal employ-
ment contract (ibid.). Both parties in this quality exchange relationship report higher job
satisfaction and better work performance (e.g., ibid.; Gerstner & Day, 1997). Gerstner and
Day argue that leaders focus on developing, challenging, supporting, and satisfying
employees in high-quality relationships by delegating more interesting tasks, providing
access to important resources, and giving them increased autonomy and responsibilities.
On the other hand, a low-quality relationship develops based on the terms and conditions
of a formal employment contact. Subordinates in this form of relationship often receive
less supervisory attention and have poorer access to organizational resources, and fewer
empowerment opportunities; this potentially leads to job dissatisfaction and lower organ-
izational commitment (ibid.). It is argued that in such relationships, leaders emphasize the
use of formal authority and power to assign job responsibilities to their subordinates
based on their formal job descriptions. This differential quality of LMX relationships
thus results in different employee work attitudes and behaviors, which in turn help to
maintain relationships with the leader (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995; Gerstner & Day, 1997).
Over the last three decades, a great deal of research has been conducted to advance
LMX theory. This research can be classified into three major areas. The first area involves
an exploration of the antecedents of LMX quality. There is some evidence that suggests
Affect in vertical and lateral exchange relationships in teams 501
that perceived similarity between leaders and subordinates in terms of values, attitudes,
and personalities contributes to LMX development (e.g., Philips & Bedieian, 1994; Bauer
& Green, 1996; Ashkanasy & O’Connor, 1997). Furthermore, impression management
behaviors of subordinates and demographic factors such as age, race, and sex have also
been found to be positively related to the development of high-quality LMX relationships
(e.g., Wayne & Ferris, 1990; Deluga & Perry, 1994; Bauer & Green, 1996; Pelled & Xin,
1997). More recent research supports the idea that levels of interactional justice, distrib-
utive justice, transformational leadership, mastery goal orientation and performance goal
orientation also predict LMX relationships (Janssen & Van Yperen, 2004; Wang et al.,
2005; Erdogan et al., 2006).
The second area of research focuses on identifying the consequences of LMX rela-
tionships. LMX quality has been shown to impact on a wide range of employees’ attitudes
and behaviors. These include job satisfaction, satisfaction with the leader, organizational
commitment, stress, goal commitment, task performance, organizational citizenship
behaviors (OCBs) and turnover intention (e.g., Dansereau et al., 1975; Graen & Uhl-Bien,
1995; Settoon et al., 1996; Gerstner & Day, 1997; Wayne et al., 1997; Klein & Kim, 1998;
Harris, 2004; Janssen & Van Yperen, 2004; Harris et al., 2005; Wang et al., 2005).
The third area of LMX research is the investigation of situational and process variables
that help to explain the relationship between LMX and other independent or dependent
variables of interest. In this respect, Erdogan et al. (2006) reported that organizational
culture is a relevant contextual variable which determines the intensity and magnitude of
the relationship between employees’ justice perceptions and their LMX relationship
quality. Similarly, Erdogan and Liden (2006) demonstrated that the relationship between
organizational justice and LMX is moderated by employees’ perceptions of collectivism.
Other research has shown that LMX is unrelated to employee job performance and actual
turnover intentions only for those employees high in extraversion, but is related to those
outcomes for employees low in extraversion (Bauer et al., 2006). This study suggests that
extraversion is a moderator of the relationships between LMX quality, job performance
and turnover intentions. Sparrowe et al. (2006) recently also found that leaders’ use of
downward influence tactics including inspirational appeal, exchange and consultation is
related to subordinates’ helping behavior, and the direction and strength of these rela-
tionships are contingent upon the quality of the LMX relationship between supervisors
and subordinates.
In addition to the moderation effects described above, LMX relationship quality has
been conceptualized as a process variable mediating the relationship between transfor-
mational leadership and employees’ task performance and OCBs (Wang et al., 2005).
Another field study by Lam et al. (2007) showed that the quality of LMX relationships
mediated the relationship between employees’ feedback seeking behavior and objective
performance collected from two companies in the People’s Republic of China. Finally,
Janssen and Van Yperen (2004) found that LMX also acted as an underlying variable that
mediated the positive relationship between employees’ master goal orientation and leader-
rated in-role job performance, leader-rated innovative performance, and job satisfaction.
Affective reactions
Terms such as mood, emotions, affect and feelings have been used in different ways by
different researchers, thereby creating conceptual confusion about how the terms should
be defined and interpreted (Frijda, 1986; Fiedler & Forgas, 1988; Forgas, 1991a, 1991b;
Ashkanasy, 2003). It is therefore important to review some of the interpretations and
clarify how the terms will be used in this research. According to Russell and Barrett
(1999), trait is defined as comprising ‘the most elementary consciously accessible affective
feelings that need not be directed at anything’ (p. 806). State affect, on the other hand, has
been defined by Forgas (1992) as ‘low intensity, diffuse, and relatively enduring affective
states without a salient cause’, and emotions ‘are more intense, short-lived and usually
have a definite cause and clear cognitive content’ (p. 230). In addition, Ashforth and
Humphrey (1995) conceptualize and define affect as a subjective feeling state that includes
both intense emotions and diffuse moods. This definition is consistent with what Weiss
and Cropanzano (1996) defined in AET and has also been used to underpin this research.
Affective states are used to represent the terms of diffuse moods, intense emotions and
subjective inner feelings.
Research by Basch and Fisher (2000) revealed that employees experience a wide range
of affective reactions in their organizations. For example, these researchers found that
employees reported feeling positive emotions such as pleasure, happiness, pride, enthusi-
asm, optimism, and affection. The negative emotions reported by the employees in the
Basch and Fisher study were frustration, worry, disappointment, annoyance, anger,
unhappiness, embarrassment, sadness, disgust, and fear. The authors further demon-
strated that these ranges of positive and negative emotions in the workplace were associ-
ated with specific events, which is similar to the theoretical basis of AET (Weiss &
Cropanzano, 1996). The focus of this theory is that affective states of individuals at work
are determined by the frequency and intensity of discrete work events, particularly the
daily hassles and uplifts that employees experience in working lives. Specifically, in AET,
factors in the organizational environment constitute different affective events which gen-
erate a wide range of specific affective reactions that in turn influence employees’ work
attitudes and behaviors.
A review of the body of research continues to reveal that effective leadership behavior
(George, 2000; Dasborough, 2006), team member relationships (Tse & Dasborough,
2006, in press), perceptions of organizational fairness (Krehbiel & Cropanzano, 2000;
Byrne et al., 2003), job characteristics (Saavedra & Kwun, 2000), and emotional intelli-
gence (Fox & Spector, 2000) are all determinants of an individual’s affect. In addition,
research has found that affect predicts a number of employees’ attitudes such as job sat-
isfaction (Connolly & Viswesvaran, 2000; Fisher, 2000), justice perceptions (Byrne et al.,
2004), turnover intention (Shaw, 1999), decision making (Forgas & George, 2001), and
organizational commitment (George & Brief, 1992). More specifically, positive affect has
been shown to be associated with desirable employee behavior such as better job perfor-
mance (Wright & Staw, 1999), more helping behavior (Isen & Baron, 1991), stronger cre-
ative performance (George, 2002), higher trust and creativity (George & Zhou, 2007),
improved service performance (Pugh, 2001), higher-quality LMX relationships (Tse &
Dasborough, 2006) and better group performance (Bartel & Saavedra, 2000; Kelly &
Barsade, 2001). Negative affect, on the other hand, was found to be related to creativity
(George, 2002), more withdrawal behavior, and lower job satisfaction (George & Brief,
1992). In summary, affect appears to be determined by a wide range of organizational
events and also to be related to different important employee and group outcomes in
organizations.
Team–member exchange
TMX has been defined as the quality of social exchange among team members (Seers,
1989). It reflects an individual’s perception of his or her exchange relationship with team
members as a whole (Seers et al., 1995). Thus, TMX is measured by the level of willing-
ness that individuals engage in assisting other members and sharing ideas and feedback
with them, that in turn influences how they provide information, assistance and recogni-
tion to each other (Seers, 1989). Because TMX is regarded as a theoretical extension of
LMX, the development of TMX also draws on the assumptions of social exchange theory
(Homans, 1961; Blau, 1964; Jacobs, 1970) and organizational role theory (Katz & Kahn,
1978). The theories suggest that the role set of each team member is interconnected and
embedded within a team. In this sense, the team becomes a platform on which roles set
for exchange with each other are modified and reinforced based on the reciprocal actions
of members (Jacobs, 1970). Specifically, if an individual member is able to meet the
expectation of team members, high-quality exchanges are created among team members.
On the other hand, if an individual team member always fails to fulfill the expectations
of other team members, the quality of exchange among team members is likely to be low
(Katz & Kahn, 1978). With respect to this, individual team members’ beneficial acts
toward other team members create obligations that are necessarily reciprocated by the
members because of the role expectations set by the individual members. Therefore, TMX
represents the reciprocity between an individual member and other team members, and is
used to indicate the effectiveness of team member relationships (Seers, 1989; Seers et al.,
1995).
A review of the empirical research suggests that a number of important variables
including organizational justice, team temporal scope, communication mediation, emo-
tional reactions and supervisor–subordinate relationships and social identification have
been found to be associated with TMX quality (Liden et al., 2000; Sherony & Green, 2002;
Alge et al., 2003; Tse & Dasborough, 2006). For example, Tse and Dasborough found that
social identification, LMX and positive emotions were positively related to TMX.
Erdogan (2002) and Murphy et al. (2002) also revealed that LMX and procedural, dis-
tributive and interactional justice had positive impacts on TMX. Other studies have pro-
vided increasing evidence to support the idea that high-quality TMX relationships
enhance employees’ job satisfaction, organizational commitment, empowerment, and job
performance at work (Liden et al., 2000; Wech, 2001, 2003; Erdogan, 2002; Sherony &
Green, 2002; Hiller & Day, 2003; Susskind et al., 2006). In addition, high-quality TMX
was found to be positively associated with team performance and team identification,
respectively (Howard, 1995; Mohrman et al., 1995; Jordon et al., 2002).
Underlying theories
Two theories provided the theoretical foundations for this research. The first theory is
social exchange theory (SET), which was developed by Blau (1964). It is used to describe
how exchange relationships between leaders, subordinates and team members can be
related to explain the effects of LMX on affect and TMX. The second theory is affective
events theory (AET), which was developed by Weiss and Cropanzano (1996). It explains
why and how the differential relationships of LMX can be regarded as affective events
that evoke individuals’ emotions and such emotions in turn determine their work attitudes
and behavior toward the development of exchange relationships with other members. In
the following subsections, we explain how each of these theories relates to LMX and
TMX relationships.
Social exchange theory applied to LMX and TMX relationships

According to Blau (1964), social exchange ‘refers to voluntary actions of individuals that
are motivated by the return they are expected to bring and typically do in fact bring from
others’ (p. 91). This exchange process is reciprocal in nature, and when reciprocations do
not occur as expected, the other member may withdraw his or her services (Blau, 1964).
Therefore, social interactions based on these exchanges are guided by norms of reciproc-
ity (Gouldner, 1960) that help to create an obligation for an individual to return a favor
when he/she receives a benefit. In the LMX context, leaders and subordinates engage in a
give-and-take process where they exchange resources, information and work-related
benefits. If both leaders and subordinates value what they receive from each other, then
the leader will offer more organizational resources to increase the likelihood that subor-
dinates will also return favors that are expected by the leaders.
According to Katz and Kahn (1978), roles are a patterned sequence of learned actions
performed by individuals in an interaction situation. Role playing in a formal organiza-
tion requires an actor and a functionally interdependent other to negotiate, through rec-
iprocal reinforcement, an agreed set of behaviors against certain norms, standards or
expectations. Graen and Cashman (1975) suggest that the interdependence between a
person in a leader position and one in a follower position is a special type of relationship.
The relationship development of LMX is built gradually over a period of time through
role expectation and adjustment in phases: role taking, when members are evaluated; role
making, when relationships begin to formalize; and role routinization, when LMX rela-
tionships become affect-laden (Graen & Scandura, 1987). Specifically, role taking is
described as the first or initial dyadic exchange whereby the relationship between leaders
and subordinates is based on economic and contractual transactions (ibid.). As the term
implies, leaders and subordinates focus on relevant resources and responsibilities to com-
plete a task. Rewards and task involvements are specific and clear, and both supervisors
and subordinates understand what they will receive and return within the transactions
(ibid.; Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995). The role-taking process also serves as a platform for
supervisors and subordinates to test each other in terms of their commitment and moti-
vation to the exchanges. For example, supervisors attempt to identify abilities, competence
and personalities of subordinates through the ongoing exchanges, whereas subordinates
also observe the behaviors and the resources given by the supervisors.
The next stage is the role-making process, whereby supervisors describe and commu-
nicate role expectations to members, who in turn receive these expectations and decide
how to respond to them (Graen & Scandura, 1987; Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995). After
several repeated exchanges, the relationship between the supervisor and subordinate will
become stronger and stable, and they start enjoying what they have developed. The
exchanges in this process are not all contractual, and both parties may exchange some-
thing which may not be specifically described.
Finally, after the supervisors and subordinates have negotiated their respective roles
and have developed a shared understanding of the relationship, the stage of role rou-
tinization is reached. This stage is marked by a relationship that is effective, and in which
supervisors and subordinates are interdependent and interlocked. The exchanges in this
stage go beyond the expected roles, and supervisors and subordinates engage in exchang-
ing personal resources and performing discretionary behaviors (Graen & Scandura,
1987).
Based on the tenets of social exchange theory, we argue that SET provides a theoreti-
cal basis to explain how the quality of LMX relationships between leaders and subordin-
ates will impact on subordinates’ perceptions of TMX. Reasons as to why the LMX
relationship facilitates subordinates’ affect are elaborated in the following subsection.
Affective events theory applied to LMX and TMX relationships

AET can be applied to explain the role of affect in facilitating LMX and TMX relation-
ships in teams. The central idea of AET, as originally postulated by Weiss and
Cropanzano (1996), is to emphasize the importance of affect and emotions in organiza-
tions, and the significance of specific affective job events in determining employees’ work
attitudes and behaviors. AET researchers focus on the structure, causes and consequences
of affective experience in the workplace through studying the antecedents of individuals’
experience of affective work events and the emotional, attitudinal and behavioral reac-
tions to the events (Wegge et al., 2006). Hence, factors in the workplace are regarded as
affective events, stimulating a wide range of emotional reactions of individuals in a variety
of contexts, and these reactions in turn influence their job attitudes and behaviors (Weiss
& Cropanzano, 1996). In other words, individuals will often experience and display
different kinds of emotions and their work attitudes and behaviors are often influenced
by the frequency and intensity of discrete affective events in organizational settings
(Wegge et al., 2006).
According to Weiss and Cropanzano (1966), specific characteristics of organizational
factors such as work, supervisors, and co-workers can constitute positive and negative
affective events (daily hassles and uplifts) that have impacts on employees’ emotional
states or feeling about their work. The uplifts result in positive emotions including joy,
interest, excitement, enjoyment and enthusiasm; whereas the hassles generating negative
emotions include anger, frustration, distress, sadness and resentment (Ashkanasy et al.,
2002). Research suggests that both uplifts and hassles have a cumulative nature and the
frequency rather than intensity of uplifts and hassles will lead to positive and negative
emotional reactions of individuals at work (Fisher, 2000).
In the context of this research, the quality of LMX relationships may be perceived by
subordinates as sources of affective events which create uplifts, positive emotional expe-
rience or hassles or negative emotional experience for subordinates to experience in teams.
These affective experiences arising from the quality of LMX relationships may continu-
ously impact on how individuals perceive and interact with each other, and determine
whether they cooperate or not, and their willingness to engage in the development of
social exchanges (Tse et al., 2005; Tse & Dasborough, 2006). For example, individuals
would feel pleased, joyful or proud if their supervisor recognizes their potential, under-
stands their problems and needs, uses available power to solve their problems or shows
confidence in them based on their relationship quality. Conversely, individuals would feel
jealous, upset or resentful if they perceive their supervisor showing favoritism to other
team members who are better at flattering and ingratiation than making contributions to
the team. As a result, individuals in the LMX relationships experiencing positive emo-
tions are more likely to engage in positive work attitudes and productive behaviors,
whereas individuals experiencing negative emotions are more likely to engage in negative
work attitudes and counterproductive behaviors.
We argue that subordinates who enjoy high-quality LMX relationships with their
leaders are likely to perceive the leader behaviors as uplifts, and therefore experience posi-
tive emotions such as joy, excitement, comfort or enthusiasm. This group of subordinates
in turn tends to develop and maintain high-quality TMX relationships with other team
members (Tse et al., 2005). By the same token, subordinates who have low-quality LMX
relationships with their supervisors are likely to see the same leader behavior as hassles and
experience negative emotions such as distress, resentment, jealousy or sadness because of
unfairness perceptions and social comparison effects. This group of subordinates would
be less interested or even reluctant to form and keep high-quality TMX relationships with
those subordinates who have good LMX relationships with their supervisors (ibid.).
With respect to this, Dasborough (2006) conducted a qualitative study to explore the
specific leader behaviors that lead to employees’ positive and negative emotional
responses (i.e., low–high intensity) using the critical incident interview technique. She
asked her respondents to describe specific events involving interaction with their leaders
after which they recall having a strong positive emotional reaction (a lift) or a strong neg-
ative reaction (a hassle). Her results found that leader behaviors are sources of positive
and negative emotional responses in employees, and the different emotional experiences
change their attitude toward the leader. The findings provide evidence for the assumptions
of AET that explain how and why perceived LMX relationships can evoke subordinates’
emotional reactions, that in turn determine their attitudes and behaviors toward rela-
tionship development with their team members (ibid.).
Theoretical and practical implications

This research contributes to our understanding of the role of affect in interpersonal rela-
tionship development. Our discussion provides insights into social exchange theory,
where the various interpersonal exchange relationships that exist between leaders, subor-
dinates and co-workers have been neglected in the past (Sias & Jablin, 1995; Graen & Uhl-
Bien, 1995; Sparrowe & Liden, 1997, 2005). While it is arguable that the dyadic
relationship between supervisors and subordinates determines subordinates’ perceptions
about relationship development with other team members, no research has previously
been conducted to explore how vertical supervisor–subordinate exchange relationships
influence how subordinates perceive and establish lateral exchange relationships with their
team members (e.g., Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995). In addition, our discussion contributes to
identifying the role of individual affect in facilitating LMX and TMX exchange relation-
ships using AET theory (Tse et al., 2005; Tse & Dasborough, 2006). For example, if an
individual experiences positive or negative emotions from ongoing interactions with a
leader, this may influence how s/he forms relationships with other team members in
reality. As Dasborough (2006) revealed, leader behaviors are sources of positive and nega-
tive emotional responses in employees, and such emotional experiences affect their sub-
sequent work attitudes and behaviors. The added value of this study is therefore to explain
and outline individuals’ affect as a mechanism linking LMX and TMX. This signifies that
individuals who experience high-quality relationships with their supervisors are likely to
experience positive affect, which in turn influences their perceptions of and reactions to
team member relationship development and vice versa.
A practical implication of this research relates to the development and maintenance of

high-quality TMX relationships. Research on TMX emphasizes the outcomes of high-
quality of TMX relationships, paying little attention to the process of how leaders can
establish high-quality exchange relationships among team members (Seers, 1989; Seers
et al., 1995). The literature on emotions in teams suggests that both positive and nega-
tive emotions are important for team development (e.g., George, 2002; Van der Vegt
et al.,2003). Our discussion suggests that team member affect is a mechanism that can be
used by leaders to promote differential quality of TMX relationships. An implication of
this is that strategies for understanding and enhancing employees’ emotional experiences
in relation to supervisor–subordinate exchange relationships should be incorporated into
leadership development programs. The programs will be useful in helping supervisors to
develop effective team member exchanges, ultimately leading to team and organizational
effectiveness.
Proposed model for future research

In line with the literature review and theoretical discussion relating to the role of affect
in vertical and lateral exchange relationships in teams, we outline a theoretical model
(Figure 31.1) for future research. In this research, we did not collect data to test the rela-
tionships between LMX, emotions and TMX in this model so experimental and field
work could be conducted to examine the proposed relationships in the future. As shown
in the model, the path from differential quality of LMX relationships to positive or neg-
ative emotional experiences (Paths A and B) are underpinned by SET and AET (Blau,
1964; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). Different emotional experiences to differential quality
of team member relationships (Paths C and D) are supported by AET (ibid); and the path
from LMX relationships to TMX relationships (Path E) is driven by SET and research on
LMX and TMX (see Seers, 1989; Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995). This model explains and
describes why and how the differential quality of LMX relationships between supervisors
and individual subordinates influence how the subordinates develop and maintain rela-
tionships with other team members.
Positive
A affect C
Differential Differential
quality of LMX quality of TMX
relationships relationships
Negative
B D
affect
Note: Sources of proposed pathways: A & B: Social exchange and affective events theories; C & D:
Affective theory and research on emotions in teams; E: Social exchange theory, LMX and TMX research.
Figure 31.1 A proposed model for future research

Conclusion
In this chapter, we discussed the implications of affect in interpersonal exchange rela-
tionships among supervisors, subordinates and co-workers in teams by providing a review
of research into LMX, emotions in teams and TMX, and discussing how social exchange
and affective events theories can be applied to the development of vertical and lateral
exchange relationships in organizations. Following this, we proposed a model, outlining
how affect facilitates vertical and lateral exchange relationships, serving as an underlying
variable to link LMX and TMX relationships in team contexts. Specifically, SET justifies
how the LMX relationship is conceptualized as an independent variable evoking, emo-
tional experiences of subordinates and TMX relationship quality. In addition, AET
explains how emotional experience of subordinates serves as a process variable that
influences the LMX–TMX relationship. Given that vertical and lateral exchange rela-
tionships in teams is a new area in leadership and teamwork, our review and discussion
in relation to the role of affect in the LMX–TMX relationships is important and
unique. Future research should direct more attention to the specific emotions that exist in
LMX–TMX contexts, and test the potential benefits and harmful consequences of affect
for interpersonal exchange relationships in order to maximize individual potential for
team and organizational effectiveness.
Note
* An earlier version of this chapter was accepted for presentation at the 2006 annual meeting of the
International Congress of Applied Psychology Conference, Athens, Greece, 16–21 July. The authors would
like to thank the conference reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this book chapter, and
the University of Queensland Business School for funding this research.
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32 An interactive, process model of emotions and
leadership
Rebecca J. Reichard and Ronald E. Riggio
I have four words for you . . . I LOVE THIS COMPANY! YEAAAAH!

(Steve Ballmer, CEO of Microsoft)
Introduction
It is rare to see a corporate leader running across a stage, screaming hysterically in an
effort to pump up his employees like Steve Ballmer, CEO of Microsoft, has done (in a
now-famous video clip1). For the most part, the use of emotions in organizational lead-
ership is more subtle and subdued. Yet, we argue that emotions are an important element
in all types of leadership. Leaders use emotions, as Steve Ballmer has, to try to inspire and
motivate followers. Emotions are also important in establishing leader–follower relation-
ships that go beyond mere transactional exchanges of labor or services for compensation.
Good leader–follower relationships are important for building commitment to the group
or organization and can have positive impact on work-group performance (Wang et al.,
2005). Followers, in turn, can use emotional pleas or expressions of support to try to
influence leaders. Importantly, effective leadership involves the regulation of one’s own
emotions and the ability to control the emotional climate of the work group or organiz-
ation. Despite the importance of emotions to the leader–follower relationship, there has
not been a great deal of attention given to the complexity of emotions and emotional
communication in leadership until quite recently (e.g., special issue of Leadership
Quarterly, 13(5), 2002). The purpose of this chapter is to describe an interactive, process
model of the emotional exchange between leaders and followers.
Emotional intelligence frameworks

The dominant paradigm surrounding emotions research focuses on one of two models of
emotional intelligence – the ‘abilities’ model and the ‘mixed’ model. First, the abilities
model of emotional intelligence created by Salovey, Mayer and their colleagues (e.g.,
Salovey & Mayer, 1989; Salovey et al., 2004a, 2004b) has been used to capture the role of
emotions in leadership. According to Salovey and Mayer (2004), emotional intelligence
refers to one type of cognitive ability which involves the processes surrounding the recog-
nition, use, understanding, and management of one’s own and others’ emotional states.
According to the abilities model, emotional intelligence is composed of four factors: iden-
tifying emotions, using emotions to facilitate thinking, understanding emotions, and
managing emotions. In research, this four-factor structure of emotional intelligence is
typically measured with the Mayer–Salovey–Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test
(MSCEIT; Salovey et al., 2004b).
A second framework for emotional intelligence is referred to as the ‘mixed model’,
which is represented by the work of Goleman, Bar-On, and others (e.g., Goleman, 1995;
512
An interactive, process model of emotions and leadership 513
Bar-On, 1997; Bar-On et al., 2006). The term ‘mixed’ refers to the mixing of emotional
abilities and certain relevant personality traits, such as empathy, optimism, and stress tol-
erance. Goleman (1995) proposed that emotional intelligence involves abilities that can be
categorized as self-awareness, managing emotions, motivating oneself, empathy, and han-
dling relationships. Measures of the mixed model of emotional intelligence typically
resemble self-report personality assessments (e.g., Bar-On Emotional Quotient Inventory;
Bar-On, 1997).
Emotional intelligence controversy

Previous researchers have debated the importance of emotional intelligence for leadership
effectiveness. Emotional intelligence has been theoretically connected to important lead-
ership outcomes, such as leader and group/team performance, group member satisfaction,
and loyalty (George, 2000; Caruso et al., 2002; Prati et al., 2003). For example, Goleman
et al. (2002) contend that emotional intelligence is a critical component of leadership
effectiveness and underlies such leadership traits as adaptability and flexibility, conflict
management, and team building. Prati et al. (2003) added that emotional intelligence is a
key foundation for effective leadership and that leaders with high emotional intelligence
are essential for effective team interaction and productivity. However, we were unable to
find significant empirical research linking emotional intelligence directly with leadership.
Furthermore, while the concept of emotional intelligence is quite popular and has stim-
ulated a great deal of research, there is controversy over the use of the term ‘intelligence’
and the impact of emotional intelligence on leadership (e.g., Mayer et al., 2004;
Ashkanasy & Daus, 2005; Locke, 2005). For example, Locke pointed out that because the
definition of emotional intelligence is both constantly changing and all-inclusive it is
unintelligible. Further, Antonakis (2003) provided an in-depth review of the various
factors related to emotional intelligence and why it is not necessarily associated with lead-
ership effectiveness. Specifically, he argued that emotional intelligence adds little to the
prediction of leadership effectiveness above and beyond general intelligence (‘g’) and per-
sonality. Antonakis also pointed out that there is a lack of scientific evidence linking emo-
tional intelligence directly to leadership effectiveness.
Taken together, both the abilities model and the mixed model of emotional intelligence
are limited in terms of their contribution to understanding the process of the emotional
exchange between leaders and followers. The purpose of this chapter is not to review all
the previous research on emotional intelligence and the validity of its impact on leader-
ship. However, we must acknowledge that some valid criticisms regarding the construct
have been raised and this propelled us to propose an alternative framework: an interac-
tive, process model reflecting the emotional exchange between leaders and followers.
A process model of emotions and leadership

In order to tailor our conceptualization of emotions to the study of emotions and lead-
ership, we rely on an interactive definition of leadership and followership. Over the years,
the definition of a leader has evolved from one’s traits, behaviors, or position to the inter-
play between the leader’s characteristics and the environmental circumstances. More
recently, leader–member exchange theory (e.g., Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995) has defined
leadership as the quality of the relationship between leader and followers. While leader-
ship has been defined in many ways, we view leadership as an interaction between a leader
Leader emotional expression/follower

emotional sensitivity
Leader P&A
Follower
emotional
emotional
awareness,
awareness,
experience, and
experience, and
regulation
regulation
P&A Follower emotional expression/leader
emotional sensitivity
EMOTIONAL CONTEXT
Figure 32.1 Interactive, process model of leader and follower emotional interaction
and followers (Yukl, 2006). Interaction implies a bi-directional influence. In other words,
leaders impact on followers just as followers impact on leaders.
Based on prior work by Riggio and his colleagues (Riggio, 1986; Riggio & Carney,
2003; Riggio et al., 2003) and the interactional definition of leadership, we present a
process model for understanding leadership and emotions (see Figure 32.1). According to
this conceptualization, the continuous process of leader emotional awareness, experience,
and regulation impacts on the follower via the leader’s emotional expression and the fol-
lower’s emotional sensitivity. Through the follower’s perception and attribution process,
the follower engages in the continuous process of emotional awareness, experience, and
regulation. In turn, the follower’s emotional expression and the leader’s emotional sensi-
tivity impact on the leader’s awareness and so on. As illustrated in Figure 32.1, important
components of the process model include the leader–follower interaction, with both the
leader and the follower experiencing and regulating their emotions, and with emotional
expression and corresponding sensitivity to each other’s emotional messages providing
the communicative ‘connection’ between the two parties.
In addition, we propose that this emotional communication process is dependent on
the perceptions and attributions (‘P&A’) made by both the leader and the followers. While
effective emotional communication depends on the ability of the interactants to accu-
rately perceive emotional messages, the interpretation of these messages is influenced by
the attributions that interactants make about the emotional message and its source. For
example, a leader might be unable to perceive that followers are upset about a directive
requiring them to work overtime during a holiday, leading followers to attribute that the
leader is uncaring. Or, if the leader does indeed perceive the followers’ collective anger, the
leader may make the attribution that the followers are feigning anger – the leader con-
cludes that they are ‘complaining out of habit’ and are ‘dissatisfied, but not actually
angry’. Effective communication in this situation would involve the leader correctly
perceiving and interpreting the followers’ anger, regulating his/her own emotions, and
then responding to the situation. Any misstep along this cycle might result in a damaged
leader–follower relationship.
Also critical to the model is the notion of emotional regulation and control over emo-
tional expression. There are many times in the leader–follower relationship where it is
important for the leader and/or the follower to stifle the expression of felt emotions (i.e.,
emotional labor). In the work setting, for instance, there are often norms against displays
of strong emotions, particularly negative affect (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1993; Grandey,
2000). In certain instances, especially in service work, both leaders and followers are
required to cover any felt emotional states (including boredom) with positive affect –
‘service with a smile’. Indeed, there may be very different display rules for leaders and fol-
lowers, depending on the circumstances (Diefendorff & Gosserand, 2003). For example,
in certain leader–follower situations it is acceptable for a leader to express anger to a fol-
lower yet inappropriate for the follower to express anger in return. Thus, regulation and
control of emotions are very important in leader–follower interactions.
Finally, the interactive emotional exchange between leader and follower is embedded
within a specific emotional context, which can heighten or dampen leader and follower
emotional expression, emotional sensitivity, and emotional regulation. In other words,
some situations are more emotionally charged than others. For example, the emotional-
ity of a typical day in the office versus the day that the organization announces widespread
layoffs is likely quite different and likely to impact on the leaders’ and followers’ emotional
interaction. In addition to such shared emotional events, both leaders and followers bring
with them an emotional context from their personal life experiences. The leader who just
lands a big account or the follower who just lost a loved one will experience, express, and
be sensitive to other emotions differently given the emotionality of the situation they are
currently experiencing. Finally, different situations bring with them different expectations,
or norms, regarding emotional interaction. For example, followers may be more receptive
to an emotional outburst such as yelling and cursing by a leader on a playing field rather
than in a boardroom. Taken together, the emotional context may be a critical factor
influencing the emotional exchange between leaders and followers.
Regarding the components of our communication model, the greatest research atten-
tion has been given to leaders’ expression of emotions. For instance, previous research has
examined how charismatic leaders use emotions to inspire and motivate followers and to
build support for themselves and their causes (Shamir et al., 1993). Less attention has
been paid to sensitivity to emotions and regulation and control of emotions. Yet all three –
the expression of emotions, sensitivity to emotions, and regulation of emotions – are crit-
ically important to leadership. In the following subsections, we explain the role of emo-
tional expression, emotional sensitivity, and emotional regulation on the part of both
leaders and followers.
Three model components

Before describing the dynamics of our theoretical model, we shall first define the three
major components of the model: (i) emotional expression, (ii) emotional sensitivity, and
(iii) emotional regulation. Expression, in general, refers to the process by which individ-
uals communicate or send message to others. More specifically, ‘emotional expression’
refers to the process by which individuals communicate nonverbally, particularly in
sending emotional messages, this includes accurately expressing felt emotional states
(Friedman et al., 1980; Burgoon & Bacue, 2003; Riggio & Carney, 2003).
The other side of the coin from emotional expression is emotional sensitivity. In
general, sensitivity refers to the process by which individuals receive and interpret the
communicated messages of others. Specifically ‘emotional sensitivity’ refers to the process
of receiving and interpreting the nonverbal communications of others (Bernieri, 2001;
Riggio & Carney, 2003). Individuals who are emotionally sensitive attend to and accu-
rately interpret the subtle emotional cues of others.
Finally, both leaders and followers engage in some level of emotional regulation.
‘Emotional regulation’ is the process by which individuals influence their own emotions,
not another’s emotions (Gross, 1999). Emotional regulation occurs when an individual
influences which emotions he/she has, when he/she has them, and how he/she experiences
and expresses the emotions. It includes a continuum of processes ranging from conscious
regulation which is controlled and effortful to unconscious regulation which is automatic
and effortless. According to Gross, an individual can regulate emotions through situa-
tion selection, situation modification, attention deployment (i.e., distraction, rumina-
tion), cognitive change, and response modulation. The last includes conveying particular
emotions on cue and hiding feelings behind an assumed ‘mask.’ Laughing appropri-
ately at a joke or putting on a cheerful face to cover sorrow are examples of emotional
regulation.
Leader expression and follower sensitivity

People who are highly expressive emotionally are animated and emotionally charged and
are able to arouse or inspire others from their ability to transmit feelings (Riggio &
Friedman, 1986). A large body of research suggests that emotionally expressive individ-
uals are better liked in initial encounters (Friedman et al., 1988) and are rated as more
physically attractive (Riggio et al., 1991), presumably because they are able to convey
emotions more authentically and because they appear poised and graceful (Riggio &
Friedman, 1986). Furthermore, emotionally expressive persons are viewed as more honest
and trustworthy because they express positive emotions, maintain eye contact, and are
‘fluid’ and natural in their expressive style (ibid.; Riggio et al., 1987).
Perhaps the most obvious linkage between leadership and emotions is the relationship
between the emotional expression a leader exhibits and followers’ emotional experience.
In fact, major leadership theories have at least subtley acknowledged the impact of
leaders on followers’ emotional states. For example, the historical dichotomy of task-
oriented/initiating structure leaders and people-oriented/considerate leaders alludes to
the focus of the latter on building social and emotional support of followers (Bass, 1990).
In addition, the new-genre theories of charismatic and transformational leadership focus
on the emotional arousal of followers to achieve the leader’s inspiring vision (Conger &
Kanungo, 1998). Therefore, previous leadership theories have acknowledged, in at least
a modest way, the emotional impact of leaders on followers.
More recently, other authors have overtly recognized the influence that leaders have on
followers’ emotions. Pescosolido (2002) argued that leaders manage group emotions.
McColl-Kennedy and Anderson (2002) demonstrated that transformational leaders have
a direct influence on reported follower optimism, which in turn impacted on follower per-
formance. According to affective events theory, Weiss and Cropanzano (1996) proposed
that leaders shape the affective events that determine followers’ attitudes and behaviors.
Dasborough (2006, p. 165) went as far as to say that leaders may be considered the ‘archi-
tects of affective event’. For example, leaders impact on follower emotions by assigning
tasks, requesting favors, and providing feedback. Taken together, perhaps the most
written about and researched linkage in our model concerns the impact of leader’s emo-
tional expression on followers’ emotional experience. In this subsection, we describe the
process by which the emotional expression of charismatic leaders, in particular, impacts
on and motivates followers.
Examples of charismatic leaders of nations or social movements come naturally to
mind – leaders who passionately expressed emotions to build support for their causes.
Martin Luther King, Jr, John F. Kennedy, and Fidel Castro are examples of charismatic
leaders who motivated the masses through the intense expression of emotions. Similarly,
charismatic CEOs of large companies, such as Apple Computer’s Steve Jobs or Virgin
Atlantic’s Richard Branson, can reach celebrity status and are noted for their ability to
emotionally charge and inspire their firm’s employees, customers, and shareholders.
The ability to express emotions is a key component of charismatic leadership, and may
be its most distinguishing feature (Bass, 1990; Riggio, 1998). Experimental studies that
have manipulated the emotional expressiveness of speakers (e.g., greater facial expres-
siveness, variations in voice tone, forceful gesturing) have found that more expressive
speakers are rated as more charismatic (Howell & Frost, 1989; Holladay & Coombs, 1993;
Awamleh & Gardner, 1999). Similarly, leaders who convey positive emotions effectively
are evaluated as more competent (Newcombe & Ashkanasy, 2002). It is the ability to
express emotions that is important in the charismatic leader’s attraction to followers and
to the leader’s ability to inspire and motivate followers. But what is the process?
We propose that the impact of charismatic leadership is a function of the interactive
relationship between leader emotional expressiveness and follower emotional sensitivity.
Charismatic leaders tend to be very high on emotional expressiveness. Effective charis-
matic leaders are able to connect with the audience on an emotional level and motivate
the audience to act. They provide a compelling vision which is often emotion laden
(Conger & Kanungo, 1998). Mio et al. (2005) found, for example, that charismatic US
presidents relied on the use of metaphors more than non-charismatic presidents and that
these metaphors were important for inspiring followers. Furthermore, Bono and Ilies
(2006) suggested that mood contagion may be one of the psychological mechanisms by
which charismatic leaders influence followers. They found that both ratings of charisma
and mood states of followers were linked to leaders’ positive emotional expressions and
that both leaders’ positive emotional expressions and follower mood influenced ratings of
leader effectiveness and attraction to the leader.
In turn, the emotional sensitivity of the followers also has an impact on the effectiveness
of charismatic leaders’ emotional expressiveness. Followers who are highly sensitive emo-
tionally may be susceptible to becoming emotionally aroused by charismatic leaders,
empathically experiencing the leader’s emotional states (Riggio, 2005). Furthermore, this
process may be enhanced, depending on the emotional context within which the
leader and followers find themselves (e.g., crisis). While empirical research is needed to
demonstrate this proposed effect, we believe that to fully understand the process of
leader–follower emotional interaction, both leader expression and follower sensitivity
must be considered.
Follower attributions
Humphrey (2002) argued that a follower’s emotional reaction to a leader plays a critical
role in the leader–follower relationship. As shown in the model, the mediator between
leader expression/follower sensitivity and the actual emotions experienced by the follower
are the attributions made by the follower. According to Green and Mitchell (1979, p. 429),
an attribution refers to ‘people’s naïve causal explanations of why other people behave as
they do’. Perceptions and attributions create a lens through which a follower interprets a
leader’s emotional expression.
The perceived authenticity of a leader’s emotional expression can also have an impact
on followers’ attributions. In discussing follower emotional reactions to authentic and
inauthentic leadership influence, Dasborough and Ashkanasy (2005) proposed that dis-
engagement and unpleasantness are associated with inauthentic leadership and pleasant-
ness and arousal are associated with authentic leadership. In fact, Bucy (2000)
manipulated the appropriateness of presidential reactions to news events and found that
inappropriate nonverbal leader expressions resulted in negative emotional reactions on
the part of followers, whereas appropriate expression resulted in positive follower emo-
tions. Further, Newcombe and Ashkanasy (2002) found that a follower’s perception of a
leader was associated with the level of congruence between the leader’s verbal and non-
verbal expressions. Not only is it important for leaders to express the appropriate emo-
tions in relation to the situational circumstances, but it is also vital that emotional and
nonverbal expressions are consistent with verbal expressions or the leader’s legitimacy
may be questioned (see Friedman, 1979).
The old adage, ‘actions speak louder than words’, could not be truer than when applied
to one of the most effective techniques of leadership, the Pygmalion effect (Reichard &
Avolio, 2005). The Pygmalion effect, or self-fulfilling prophecy, occurs when an individ-
ual is able to subtly convey an expectation regarding another’s performance that actually
affects the other’s performance (Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968). In a leadership scenario a
leader may hold positive (or negative) expectations about a follower’s performance and
through expression of positive (or negative) affect (e.g., tone of voice, facial expressions)
may induce positive (or negative) outcomes (Eden, 1990).
Therefore, the Pygmalion effect occurs when a leader expresses raised expectations of
followers, these expectations are genuinely perceived by followers such that they incorpo-
rate heightened expectations into their belief structure, which in turn results in enhanced
performance (ibid.). Meta-analyses of Pygmalion training suggest that it is a very effective
leadership technique for improving performance, with better outcomes in military as
opposed to business settings (Kierein & Gold, 2000; McNatt, 2000). More recently,
Reichard and Avolio (2005) have demonstrated that leadership interventions based on the
Pygmalion effect have larger effects than those based on other leadership theories (e.g.,
new-genre theories, behavioral theories, contingency theories).
It is important to emphasize, however, that the success of the Pygmalion process
requires that leaders accurately express positive expectations – and ‘authentic’ and posi-
tive emotional expressions – to create the positive state in the target followers. When a
‘Pygmalion leadership style’ was taught to leaders, the effects on performance outcomes
were much lower than when leaders were deceived and truly believed that certain follow-
ers were high-performers (Eden et al., 2000). This finding indicates that if, for instance, a
leader voices positive expectations but actually does not believe that the follower will be
able to improve, then the true expectations might be subtly revealed to the follower and
the leader’s efforts either will be ineffective, or may backfire.
This process of revealing true, felt states, as opposed to those intended to be conveyed
has been termed emotional, or nonverbal ‘leakage’ (Ekman & Friesen, 1969). This implies
a nonverbal component to the Pygmalion effect (Riggio, 2005) and reiterates the findings
that followers can perceive the level of sincerity of the leader (Dasborough & Ashkanasy,
2002; Humphrey, 2002; Newcombe & Ashkanasy, 2002). Therefore, when a leader expe-
riences a true belief in followers and expresses those heightened expectations through
verbal and nonverbal communications, then followers sense this and incorporate it into
their own feelings and beliefs.
Follower expression and leader sensitivity

The notion that leaders need to be sensitive to the emotions of followers is not a new one.
For decades, leadership scholars have stressed the importance of leader empathy. For
example, Bass (1960) mentions the importance of a leader’s ability to read followers’ facial
expressions and their ‘restlessness’ (p. 168). Mintzberg (1973) listed empathy and under-
standing of others as critical managerial/leadership skills. Kenny and Zaccaro (1983) sug-
gested that ‘the ability to perceive the needs and goals of a constituency’ (p. 678) was
critical to leadership. Other authors have added that empathy plays an important role in
the perception of someone as a leader (Kellett et al., 2002) and leader emergence (Wolff
et al., 2002).
Although there is still interest in leader empathy (Kellet et al., 2002, 2006), in recent
years increasing attention has been paid to leaders’ abilities to accurately recognize and
‘decode’ the emotional expressions of others. This core element, represented as leader
‘sensitivity’ in our model, is important in terms of the leader’s ability to read the emotions
and emotional climate of followers, as discussed earlier, but is also important in estab-
lishing effective relationships.
Because sensitivity to emotions, or ‘identification of emotions’ in the Salovey and Mayer
emotional intelligence model, is relatively easy to measure, there is a growing body of
research on this emotional ability. For example, Elfenbein (Elfenbein et al., 2002; Elfenbein,
2006) has suggested that emotional sensitivity is a core element of emotional intelligence,
and some authors have used emotional sensitivity as a substitute for measuring more global
emotional intelligence (e.g., Rubin et al., 2005). Rubin et al. found that emotional sensitiv-
ity was positively related to transformational leadership behavior. This makes sense because
a critical element of transformational leadership, referred to as ‘individualized considera-
tion’, involves the leader getting to know each individual follower in a meaningful way in
order to respond to his or her needs and emotional concerns. Therefore, the more emo-
tionally sensitive the leader is to the follower’s emotional expression, the better the devel-
opment of the interpersonal bond between the leader and follower.
Followers, on the other hand, need to accurately express their feelings to leaders if the
group or organization is going to operate effectively. The work of Kelley (1988, 1991) and
others (e.g., Chaleff, 2003) suggests that to be effective, followers need to express them-
selves and their concerns to leaders. The best work teams are those that have engaged and
active followers who are willing to express themselves in terms of their needs and feelings,
and who provide valid input to help guide the team; they share the leadership (Pearce &
Conger, 2003).
Leader attribution process

Just as followers make attributions regarding the cause of a leader’s emotional expression,
leaders also make attributions regarding followers’ emotional expression (Green &
Mitchell, 1979). While this process has been clearly explained by Green and Mitchell and
was expanded by Martinko and Gardner (1987) in terms of performance attributions, we
feel that it is equally important to understand the influence of attributions on the
leader–follower emotional interaction. A leader’s ability to recognize pertinent follower
emotional expressions is dependent on both the extent to which the follower effectively
expresses emotion and also the leader’s knowledge of a particular follower’s typical level
of emotional expression as well as contextual factors.
Building upon Feldman’s (1981) theory of person perception, we argue that a leader’s
perception and attribution of follower emotional expression is based on a two-stage
process: (i) automatic categorization and (ii) controlled process of attribution. When
emotions are expected or when leaders are pressed for time or lack the motivation to
engage in the controlled attribution process, they may instead rely on automatic catego-
rization (ibid.) or causal schemata (Martinko & Gardner, 1987). By relying on patterns of
assumptions when interpreting followers’ emotions, stereotype effects, such as gender bias
(Ashkanasy, 1994), may impact on the attribution process. For example, a leader may
make an assumption that because a specific follower is a woman and women express a
wide range of emotions, any variation in emotional expression from the follower would
be attributed to the follower, herself, and not to the task or situation.
Alternatively, when emotional expression is unexpected or the leader is motivated, the
controlled attribution process, or ‘covariation analysis’, may be activated. Similar to
Green and Mitchell’s (1979) performance attribution model which was empirically vali-
dated by Ashkanasy (1989), leaders may attribute follower emotional expression to one
of three sources: the follower him-/herself, the task, or the emotional situation. Building
upon attribution theory, the leader determines the cause of the follower’s emotional
expression by determining which of these three sources varied in the specific situation, or
what is referred to as the ‘principle of covariation’. The leader determines this by asking
the following questions regarding the distinctiveness, consistency, and consensus of the
situation (Kelley, 1967): was the follower’s emotional expression distinctive in response to
a specific task? To what extent is the follower’s emotional expression consistent with the
follower’s emotion in other contexts or at other times? Is one follower’s emotional expres-
sion in consensus with other followers’ emotional expressions? A leader who knows his or
her followers can distinguish when an emotional expression or lack thereof is legitimate
or not. For example, a leader who knows that a particular follower is typically cheerful
and outgoing yet observes withdrawal behavior is able to attribute the follower’s emo-
tional expression to circumstances outside of the follower (i.e., the task or situation).
By engaging in either automatic categorization or covariation analysis, leaders attribute
the cause of a follower’s emotional expression. The attributions that a leader makes
regarding a follower’s emotional expression has consequences for how the leader experi-
ences, regulates, and expresses his/her own emotions. For example, a leader who attributes
a follower’s sadness to the follower him-herself may feel sorry for the follower and express
emotional concern toward that follower. While a leader who attributes a follower’s sadness
to the redundancy of a work task may experience guilt and express positive, upbeat emo-
tions toward the follower to try to motivate him/her. Therefore, the process of emotional
regulation on the part of both the leader and follower both ends and begins the cycle of
leader–follower emotional interaction.
Emotional regulation and control

While the expression of emotion is one way in which emotions are important in leader-
ship, a leader’s ability to ‘read’ the emotions of followers and others is critical, as well as
the leader’s ability to regulate and control his or her emotions. Effective emotional leaders
are highly aware of their own and their followers’ emotions and understand how these
emotions interact and impact on performance. They are able to simultaneously experience
and regulate their emotions and project those emotions that can positively influence
followers.
Emotional regulation was previously discussed with regard to an individual’s motiva-
tion for demonstrating helping behavior. According to a study by Salovey et al. (1991),
not only was mood a motivator of helping behavior, but helping behavior was also a reg-
ulator of mood by prolonging joy, preventing guilt, and relieving sorrow. In fact, emo-
tional intelligence as initially presented by Salovey et al. (1993, 2001) was conceptualized
with regard to affect regulation, which refers to how individuals try to control their own
feelings. People high in emotional regulation may tend to control against the display of
felt emotions (Riggio & Carney, 2003).
There are a variety of reasons why one might attempt to regulate the expression of
emotion. First, Ekman (2003) and others (Weick, 1985; Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987; Fineman,
1993; Flam, 1993; Bucy, 2000; Cropanzano et al., 2000) have suggested that people control
their emotional expression in an attempt to adhere to emotional display rules. For
example, a leader may need to suppress negative emotions when the behavioral response
to that emotion is no longer useful (Gross, 1999), such as anger toward an individual fol-
lower when in a group environment in order to avoid detrimental conflict or confronta-
tions (Clark & Brisette, 2000). On the other hand, a leader may need to suppress such
positive emotions as liking or attraction in order to avoid sexual harassment. Leaders may
also need to exaggerate or fake positive emotions, or even emotional ‘neutrality’, espe-
cially under crisis situations where the leader is expected to display a calm and controlled
demeanor (military – Ashkanasy & Dasborough, 2003; civilian – Ashforth & Humphrey,
1993; Putnam & Mumby, 1993).
Emotional regulation may also take the form of impression management, depending
on the status of the target of the emotional expression. Tiedens (2000) suggested that it
is acceptable for leaders to express emotions to peers but not to subordinates. On the other
hand, followers may want to carefully regulate their emotional expression toward leaders
in order to protect their own self-interests, given that leaders often control the
rewards/punishments of the follower (Fitness, 2000). Lastly, leaders may want to regulate
their emotional expression for strategic purposes. For example, a leader may need to exag-
gerate praise of followers to build their confidence after a success or failure in order to use
these positive emotions to motivate followers to produce more work (George, 2000;
Dasborough & Ashkanasy, 2002; Humphrey, 2002).
The consequences of emotional regulation have been discussed in terms of emotion
work (Grandey, 2000; Callahan & McCollum, 2002; Zapf, 2002) and emotional labor
(Ashforth & Humphrey, 1993). Research on emotional labor by Hochschild (1983) sug-
gested that individuals can regulate emotional expression through surface acting and deep
acting. In surface acting, the actor expresses emotions that he/she does not actually feel
(Ashforth & Humphrey, 1993), for example, when a leader expresses a calm demeanor
during crisis even though his/her true felt emotion is fear. Deep acting, on the other hand,
occurs when a person actually experiences the emotion he/she wants to express (Ashforth
& Humphrey, 1993). Individuals can engage in deep acting either by exhorting feeling,
which refers to actually evoking or expressing the emotion, or by trained imagination,
which refers to actively thinking about instances that bring out the emotion (Hochschild,
1983). Emotional regulation in terms of faking and suppressing emotions (Gross, 1998)
may have some negative consequences such as poor performance, withdrawal, job dissat-
isfaction, and poor health (Goldstein et al., 1988; Pennebaker, 1995; Kennedy-Moore &
Watson, 1999; Brotheridge & Lee, 2002; Totterdell & Holman, 2003).
In sum, there are a variety of reasons why leaders and followers are motivated to regu-
late their emotions. Furthermore, individuals use different techniques to regulate their
expressed emotions, such as deep acting and surface acting. The ability for both leaders
and followers to engage in emotional regulation is an essential part of the process of
effective leader–follower emotional communication.
Emotional context
Finally, the emotional context of a situation will influence the interactive, process of emo-
tional interaction between the leader and follower(s). Specifically, we expect that under
times of crisis charismatic leadership takes hold because both the leader’s emotional
expression increases and followers’ emotional sensitivity is heightened (Bass & Riggio,
2006). For example, Bligh et al. (2004) demonstrated that President George W. Bush’s
rhetorical language (emotional expression) increased following the terrorist attacks of
September 11th and simultaneously the media became more receptive to displaying the
new charismatic style of the president. These heightened levels of leader emotional
expression and follower emotional sensitivity allow the leader to influence the shared
emotional experience of the group. Pescosolido (2002) argued that in times of uncertainty,
leaders manage followers’ emotions by modeling a specific emotion that gives the group
shared understanding. In this way, leaders manage followers’ emotions and provide
meaning and direction for the group. Therefore, the charismatic leader is likely to have
optimal influence on followers in times of crisis.
Conclusion
Various authors have debated the validity of emotional intelligence and its relationship
to leadership effectiveness (Goleman et al., 2002; Antonakis, 2003; Prati et al., 2003;
Locke, 2005). In this chapter, we proposed an alternative framework for thinking about
emotions and leadership in the form of an interactive, process between leaders and fol-
lowers. By doing so, we hope to provide researchers with an alternative paradigm for con-
ceptualizing and examining the role of emotions in leadership. We focused on three
components of emotional interaction – emotional expression, emotional sensitivity, and
emotional regulation – on behalf of both leaders and followers. In addition, we discussed
the importance of both leader and follower attributions and the emotional context on the
emotional interaction.
In conclusion, we propose that important outcomes of the emotional interaction model
are the quality of the leader–follower relationship and the emotional climate. Although it
seems quite clear that emotional expressiveness is critical to charismatic leaders and their
ability to emotionally arouse and inspire followers, the ability to express emotions accu-
rately is also important in developing good leader–follower relationships. For example,
many of the more recent, ‘new wave’ leadership theories, particularly leader–member
exchange (LMX) theory (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995), transformational leadership (Bass &
Avolio, 1997; Bass & Riggio, 2006), and authentic leadership development (Avolio &
Gardner, 2005) are predicated on the close interpersonal relationships between leaders
and followers. It is these high-quality relationships that have been shown to be positively
correlated with important work outcomes including commitment, satisfaction, and per-
formance of followers, and of the larger team or group (Gerstner & Day, 1997). We argue
that effective emotional communication in leader–follower relationships is actually
important for both leaders and followers if a more positive relationship is to develop.
Second, it has also been demonstrated that emotionally expressive individuals can
‘infect’ others with their own moods/emotions in a process that is known as ‘emotional
contagion’ (Friedman & Riggio, 1981; Hatfield et al., 1994). Studies by Halverson (2004)
and Sy et al. (2005) demonstrated that through this emotional contagion process, leaders’
positive affect was transmitted to followers, resulting in increased positive affect in fol-
lowers, which in turn led to higher levels of follower performance. Importantly, and often
overlooked, is the fact that followers’ emotionality can play an important part in the lead-
ership process. The leader’s emotions are conveyed to followers, and through the conta-
gion process this leads to follower arousal. In turn, the followers’ emotional reactions are
displayed back to the leader. The arousal process becomes a cyclical process leading to
higher and higher levels of emotionality. Perhaps this was the case when Steve Ballmer
was pumping up the Microsoft employees or when Howard Dean let loose his famous
‘Howard Dean Scream’ in the 2004 US presidential race. Not only do leaders’ emotional
expressions impact on followers’ emotional experiences, but followers’ emotional expres-
sions also impact on leaders. Therefore, we have come full circle in explaining the inter-
active process of leader–follower emotional interaction.
Note
1. Available on Google video, known as the Steve Ballmer ‘Monkey Dance’.
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PART V
ORGANIZATIONAL-LEVEL
EMOTION RESEARCH
33 Establishing positive emotional climates to advance
organizational transformation
Leslie E. Sekerka and Barbara L. Fredrickson*
Introduction
This chapter describes how positive emotional climates can help create and support trans-
formation in organizations. With prominent contributions from positive psychology
(Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000), academics and practitioners across scholarly disci-
plines have turned their attention toward the emotional dimensions of workplace enter-
prise. Emotions, as an integral part of human experience, are inextricably linked to social
interaction. We are therefore drawn to examine the impact that positive emotions have
on how people relate to others to create new and useful relationships in organizational
environments.
Our discussion explains how the broadening and building capacities of positive emo-
tions can sustain organizations as they purposively evolve. We consider how strength-
based organizational development and change (ODC) processes can be used to evoke
positive emotions in support of a particular form of transformation. Such efforts, hereto-
fore referred to as ‘transformative cooperation’, are believed to emerge through collec-
tively beneficial processes. We begin with a description and definition of this phenomenon
and continue with an explication of the term. To do so, we use research that applies the
broaden-and-build theory of positive emotions (Fredrickson, 2000a). Our summary con-
cludes with implications for practice and questions for future research that will advance
positive psychology and associated fields such as positive organizational scholarship and
positive organizational behavior.
Transformation and cooperation

As people engage in ODC, they are a part of a unique experience, given the moment,
context, circumstances, and individuals involved. We turn our attention toward a
particular form of organizational change, one that is distinct from those set forth in
existing typologies (e.g., Golembiewski, 1976; Bartunek & Moch, 1987). This form,
referred to as ‘transformative cooperation’, emerges when efforts to infuse organiza-
tional rejuvenation and evolution are employed. It involves a unique kind of coopera-
tion, marked by the continuous flow of ongoing growth and development toward new
and dynamic organizational forms. Prior descriptions of organizational transformation
have referred to this phenomenon as ‘second-order’, ‘radical’, or ‘gamma’ change
(Golembiewski et al., 1979). In general, transformation is portrayed as a fundamental
shift in how people view, understand, interpret, or make sense of their organization and
job role. We too consider transformative cooperation as second-order change, con-
tributing to a shift in how people see their organization and their function within it. But
unlike prior descriptions, we view transformative cooperation as sustained or ongoing
movement.
531
The dynamic nature of this process is manifest in the establishment of new relation-
ships and social connections that create emergent and evolving associations, which con-
tinue to progress over time and provide ongoing positive change. As people participate in
events that stimulate transformation, they must continually work to suspend judgment
and let go of prior assumptions. Instead of employing reactionary measures to problem
solve, alleviate dysfunction, and overcome barriers that thwart goal achievement, a
focused mindfulness is directed toward strengths already present within the system (for a
definition, see Bishop et al., 2004). Targeting these positive forces serves as the focal point
to stimulate awareness and evoke interest. In so doing, appreciation and the desire to
create more goodness becomes a resource to generate well-being and innovation.
This form of organizational change is kindred to deep change (Quinn, 2000), transfor-
mation viewed from a positive psychological perspective. In this chapter we speak about
the relational aspect of this process and consider its sustainability. Transformative coop-
eration is a shared act of co-creation rather than an effort aimed at changing individuals
or existing practices and routines. To understand how this cultivates and benefits from
positive emotions and the associated factors that help drive transformation (e.g., engage-
ment, interest, determination), we must define our term more fully. What exactly do we
mean by transformative cooperation?
To advance a deep change that stimulates collective innovation, workers must apply
their knowledge, skills, and passion to the art of conceptualizing something novel. This
implies a deliberate new approach to work. Therefore, events must be generated that signal
a major shift from existing processes and that alter the nature and function of their pre-
existing behaviors. This is not a change made through diagnosis and remedy application.
Nor is it declared, ordered, or implemented via mandate and then labeled as transforma-
tion. It is change established through the development of value that stimulates new
growth, performed in concert with others.
Operari, the Latin root word for cooperation, describes it as the act of working together.
But the meaning goes further, in that the shared actions must establish mutual benefit
(Agnes & Laird, 1996). Thus, collaborative inquiry with shared meaningful engagement
involves an association of people who come together to produce output that provides
everyone involved with something of value. Central to this effort is that the process is
deemed worthwhile by its participants. Combining cooperation with what we know about
second-order change, transformative cooperation is therefore defined as: a dynamic
process that brings organizational members together to create innovation through social
interaction, where positive change emerges through new organizational forms that
provide benefit for all who participate. With this as our starting-point, we now describe
how positive emotions contribute to this process, explicating their benefits. To relate this
to the workplace, we discuss how generating positive emotions promotes ODC by stimu-
lating useful cognitive and social capabilities, setting forth propositions to illustrate our
claims. We argue that positive emotions foster transformative cooperation in the work-
place by building relational strength, thereby expanding capacity at both the individual
and organizational levels.
Benefits of positive emotions

Central to many current theorists’ models is the proposition that emotions are associated
with specific action tendencies – urges to act in particular ways (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus,
Establishing positive emotional climates 533
1991). It has been argued that this is what made emotions evolutionarily adaptive – in that
their promotion of specific life-preserving actions in life-threatening situations served to
increase the odds of our ancestors’ survival. While models based on specific action ten-
dencies provide sound descriptions of the form and function of many negative emotions,
Fredrickson (1998) has argued that many positive emotions do not fit such models. While
negative emotions and their functions have been well researched, the functions and
benefits associated with positive emotions have generally received less scholarly attention.
Thus, Fredrickson asked, ‘What good are positive emotions?’, and introduced the
broaden-and-build theory (1998, 2000a).
The theory proposes that positive emotions serve to ‘broaden’ an individual’s momen-
tary thought–action repertoire, which, in turn, over time, has the effect of ‘building’ that
individual’s physical, intellectual, and social resources (Fredrickson, 1998, p. 300).
According to this model, the form and function of positive and negative emotions are dis-
tinct, yet complementary. Negative emotions narrow an individual’s momentary
thought–action repertoire toward specific actions that served the ancestral function of
promoting survival. By contrast, positive emotions broaden an individual’s momentary
thought–action repertoire, which in turn can build his/her enduring personal resources.
The implications are that positive emotions can enlarge people’s capacity to generate
ideas, increase their alternatives for action, and contribute to their overall well-being.
Moreover, positive emotions have an undoing effect on negative emotions. A range of
intervention and coping strategies have been presented and tested, showing how positive
emotions can contribute to optimized health and well-being. Cultivated positive emotions
not only counteract negative emotions, but also broaden individuals’ habitual modes of
thinking and build their personal resources for coping. Research reflects the fortitude of
positive emotions, fueling resiliency in times of stress, difficulty, or peril (Fredrickson et
al., 2003) and in helping people build enduring personal resources (Fredrickson and
Joiner, 2002), which can be particularly useful for coping and recovery (Tugade et al.,
2004) and to support individual change (Fosha, 2004).
The broaden-and-build theory of positive emotions provided a catalyst for scholars to
advance the field of change management. Rather than focusing on the influences of neg-
ative reactions and how to alter them, both researchers and practitioners began to
examine positive emotions, finding that their adaptive benefits go beyond survival mech-
anisms (Sekerka et al., 2006). Important for transformative cooperation, positive emo-
tions signal both present-moment (Diener et al., 1991) and long-term optimal functioning
(Fredrickson, 1998, 2000a). However, a key corollary of the broaden-and-build theory is
that the benefits of positive emotions extend beyond simply feeling good at any given
moment. Positive emotions and their associated cognitions and behaviors are not simply
end-states: rather than merely signaling optimal functioning, they actually help to gener-
ate individual and organizational growth and enduring improvements in performance
over time.
Scholars have already linked positive emotions with work achievement and high-
quality social environments (Staw et al., 1994) and continue to investigate how positive
approaches are associated with enhanced satisfaction, motivation, and productivity
(Martin, 2005). Positive emotions have been associated with multiple favorable outcomes,
such as greater persistence, favorable reactions to others, and helping actions (Haidt,
2000). Wadlinger and Issacowitz (2006) have even shown how the broaden-and-build
theory is demonstrated via visual perception. They found that people with positive
moods, generated from positive emotions, experienced a broadened visual acuity toward
peripheral images and movement to seek out the positive. This illustrates how positive
feelings at work may help guide people to experience their environment in a different
manner, finding that it is more positive and ‘staying happy because of what they find’
(p. 99).
The influence of a positive affective disposition has also been linked longitudinally to
higher income and job satisfaction and less likelihood of unemployment in later years.
Diener et al. (2002) explain how positive mood is likely to be linked to motivational
factors that help individuals anticipate success and be more willing to tackle challenges.
For example, cheerful people might interpret obstacles or failures as temporary setbacks
with external causes; hence they are more prone to persevere. This is important in the
workplace, as positive demeanor combined with persistence and a ‘can-do’ spirit are
highly valued, typically reflected in favorable performance ratings. We know that positive
affect is not only associated with greater work achievement but authentic positivity is also
associated with having an extensive and high-quality social milieu. The positive emotional
climates generated by these people are known to contribute to enhanced performance,
with their presence increasing customer and company sales (George, 1998). Given that
positive emotions are the means to achieve such organizational performance-related out-
comes, we believe that their capacity to broaden and build may also be influential in cre-
ating transformative cooperation.
With the extensive benefits of positive emotions, cultivating their presence in the work-
place is warranted. But this is easier said than done. In part, this is because people gener-
ally consider themselves mildly positive, providing for their adaptation and long-term
survival (Cacioppo et al., 1999). Given that this is so, how much positive emotion is
needed to generate the benefits to broaden and build? To answer this question, studies
show how the ratio of people’s experiences of positive to negative emotions in daily life
predict their overall level of subjective well-being (Fredrickson & Losada, 2005). Overall,
high ratios of positivity to negativity are associated with doing well, whereas low positiv-
ity ratios (lower than 1:1) are associated with doing poorly. Examining the ratio of
people’s good to bad feelings – positivity ratios – bears direct application to the workplace.
For example, high positivity relates to health and well-being (Schwartz et al., 2002), more
stable relationships (Gottman, 1994), and profitability (Losada, 1999). Losada, for
example, found that profitable and well-regarded business teams have positivity ratios of
over 5:1 in their meetings, whereas less profitable and regarded teams have ratios have less
than 1:1.
While people tend to be positive, seeing most moments as good, they also carry a strong
negativity bias that considers bad as stronger than good. This helps explain why positiv-
ity ratios for doing well and doing badly tend to emerge as 5:1 and 1:1, respectively. What
does this mean? Consider that if negative states hold more power than positive states,
although a ratio may be near 1:1 (representing equal time for the opposing state), this does
not translate into the same or equal impact. Rather, such ratios actually portend a down-
ward spiral toward doing poorly. Taken together, researchers have learned that positivity
ratios must be demonstratively increased if we intend to develop upward spirals toward
optimal functioning in the workplace. Therefore, to create transformative cooperation, we
need a vigorously positive event followed by workplace routines that bolster positive
emotions through ongoing activities. What can be done to engender such an immediate
infusion of positivity, followed by recurrent positive emotional experiences in workplace
settings?
Building a positive workplace

Dehler and Welsch (1994) describe work as an emotional experience. Yet management
theorists have tended to neglect the impact of emotions, moods, and feelings in their
analyses, with cognitive perspectives dominating much of the field (Tichy & Sherman,
1993). That is, until recently. In the past several decades, emotions have become a legiti-
mate topic of inquiry (Kemper, 1990). A pronounced focus on positive emotions has
become a feature of many studies, spurred by the advent of positive psychology in the late
1990s (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). As Fineman (1993, p. 1) remarked, when we
remove the ‘façade of rationality’ from organizational goals, purposes, tasks, and objec-
tives, we can find a ‘veritable explosion of emotional tones’. With scholars showing a
greater willingness to go beyond the scientific management paradigm, both managers and
practitioners continue to garner a deeper understanding of organizational dynamics.
The broaden-and-build theory, and studies testing it, have deeply affected the ODC com-
munity, providing a more informed starting-point for change. But scientific management-
based programs, characterized by the restructuring and engineering processes of strategic
change, are still used as the frequent response to instill ODC. While prevalent change strate-
gies tend to employ functional and structural solutions, they have come up short, never fully
achieving projections of optimal efficiency or effectiveness (Miles et al., 1993). Such sur-
vival tactics in response to competitive pressures are unlikely to improve organizational per-
formance over time (Dehler & Welsch, 1994). In part, this is because they are not really
intended to be transformational, but are reactions to dysfunction.
As a result, scholars and practitioners have continued to press for the means to gener-
ate enduring positive change in the workplace. While traditional practices tend to achieve
short-term goals for survival, structural approaches to ODC represent a limited perspec-
tive toward addressing the complex challenge of transformation. The role that emotions
play in this process offers the missing link between the rational and non-rational dimen-
sions of behaviors that support change. While both are integral components in success-
fully creating, accepting and implementing change, we view positive emotions as key
resources to energize and sustain transformation. Therefore, if transformative coopera-
tion is desired, the power to create deep change resides in the emotional dimension of the
workplace enterprise.
Research to understand positive emotions has deepened our understanding of the
importance of affect in the workplace, providing clues about how their cultivation con-
tributes to positive emotions in organizations (Sekerka & Goosby Smith, 2003). We know
that positive emotions are associated with helping individuals establish positive meaning
in their job and organizational role (Wrzesniewski & Dutton, 2001) and to stimulate com-
petence, achievement, involvement, significance, and social connection (Folkman, 1997;
Ryff & Singer, 1998; Fredrickson, 2000a). We know that when individuals support others
to seek positive meaning in their work, bringing forward what they value most, gratitude
and enthusiasm emerge. And, by creating experiences that foster collective positive emo-
tional environments, practitioners can stimulate cooperation in route to change (Sekerka
et al., 2006).
But what type of change? Two fundamental levels of change were distinguished by
Watzlawick et al. (1974), referred to as first and second order. A distinction was made
between adjustments to the system and a deeper or more qualitative level of change to the
system itself. Given that first-order functional changes are not sufficient for establishing a
transformational shift, second-order processes are necessary to alter how the organization
and one’s work are perceived, construed, or understood (Bartunek & Moch, 1987).
However, even if some form of transformation is achieved, sustaining this change, alter-
ing the way people feel about their work, is rare (Bushe & Kassam, 2005). In part, this is
because full adoption of any kind of change is very difficult. For second-order change,
the creation and assimilation of new routines and practices are essential. So how might
transformative cooperation become ongoing, self-directed and adopted as a continuously
perpetuated effort? How can we frame organizational change as a process of ongoing
growth and development, a process that is designed for evolution – even after the initial
shift occurs? We believe that sustained transformational movement requires the impacts
derived from individual and collective positive emotional experiences, ensuring that work-
place environments support an atmosphere conducive to producing a 5:1 or greater pos-
itivity ratio. How do we create this very positive emotional climate in the workplace?
We argue that strength-based collaborative inquiry is a pathway to cultivate positive
emotional experiences, which can be used to build relational strength within the organ-
ization (Cooperrider & Sekerka, 2006). Such engagements embolden collectively experi-
enced positive emotions that support personal and organizational growth and expansion.
A robust positive emotionally charged effort such as an appreciative inquiry (AI) summit,
followed by ongoing practices that support positive interactions, can be used to build
capacity on a sustained basis. Given that positive emotions are associated with well-being
and effectiveness, participation in a whole-scale organizational intervention such as AI
(Cooperrider & Srivastva, 1999), can vitalize positive emotions to commence transfor-
mative cooperation. From there, strength-based processes can become part of the work-
place routine by linking to strategy, inculcating a focus on positive change into employees’
organizational objectives and goals.
Through a variety of collaborative exercises, strength-based ODC techniques encour-
age people to share positive memories through stories, testimonials, and discussions that
outline what they appreciate about their work life. With AI, workers engage in conversa-
tional activities in pairs, small groups, and in organization-wide forums, bringing every
stakeholder into the process. Sekerka and her colleagues found that engagement in AI
conversations produce immediate positive psychophysiological changes in participants,
including a reduction in negative affect, lowered heart rate, and favorable changes in heart
rate variability (Sekerka & McCraty, 2004). When engaged in AI, people collaboratively
highlight, observe, and define their organization’s positive core. By identifying what is
most valued, workers cooperatively develop new strategies to design their shared vision
for the future. Building from existing strengths, the positive core of the organization, they
begin a process of self-directed organizing (Cooperrider & Whitney, 2001).
Throughout this process, workers align themselves in new ways by forming groups
and taking on new roles and functions. They rally around shared strengths, generating
positive energy (via emotions such as enthusiasm, appreciation, hope) and, as a result,
new forms of organizational relationships emerge. The action of working collabora-
tively, using positive experiences as levers for ODC, supports the creative thinking nec-
essary for envisaging an innovative future. This process is explicit, establishes joint own-
ership from the onset, and initiates transformative cooperation. Cooperrider (2001)
explains that such events are triggered by the duality of positive images and positive
action. By elevating the positive, fostered by mutual inquiry into what workers collec-
tively value, there is an expansion of relating to others. This process is described in the
theory of positive change (Cooperrider & Sekerka, 2003), with positive emotions
serving as the initiators.
Because many positive emotions have distinctive social origins, people generally expe-
rience them as they interact with others (Watson et al., 1992). It is no surprise, then, that
AI participants feel good during the engagement. We believe that it is the generation of
positive emotions in community with others that initiates this process of deep change.
Moreover, to the extent that workplace practices inculcate an ongoing strength-based
process, sustainability is also achievable. This is especially visible during later phases of
AI, when self-identified groups emerge around mutual areas of interest, as new roles
emerge. From here, enthusiasm and creativity build, as a cascade of ideas stimulate activ-
ity and innovation, which contributes to the development of new organizational forms
and the new roles that are associated with them.
As workers use their own experiences as fodder for building the future, the process
affirms, empowers, and encourages self-efficacy and the valuing of others. The concept of
‘energy in action’ (Quinn & Dutton, 2005) can be observed as people talk about when they
were most effective and then take ownership of their collaboratively driven plan for
change. The positive emotions that surface in the initial phases of strength-based inquiry
are not static, but spread throughout the organization. This is similar to the phenomenon
of emotional contagion (Hatfield et al., 1994). In this sense, positive emotions move via
sequential events that carry positive meaning for others. Therefore, when strength-based
inquiry, conversations, practices, and interactive work continue to be cultivated after the
ODC event, we expect the following:
Proposition 1 Workers who come together to achieve a shared goal with mutual
benefit will experience positive emotions that contribute to a more positive organiz-
ational emotional climate.
Figure 33.1 illustrates our propositions. The figure depicts how transformative coopera-
tion can be started with strength-based inquiry, followed by the beneficial influences of
broadening and building that stem from positive emotional climates.
Cognitive broadening
Because positive emotions broaden our scope of attention (Fredrickson & Branigan,
2005) and habitual modes of thinking and acting (Isen, 1987), they influence how we see
ourselves, giving us a broader scope of self-perception. In this way, positive emotions help
people come together and grow closer. And, as this occurs, the line between the self and
others can become blurred and harder to delineate (Waugh & Fredrickson, 2006). To the
extent that people view co-workers or their organization as a part of themselves, resource
allocation can be perceived as shared ownership, and the differences between self and
others can become less pronounced. As this happens, people adopt the characteristics of
others internally and begin to view those characteristics as their own.
Organizational
relational
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Source: Sekerka and Fredrickson (2008), by permission of Oxford University Press.
Figure 33.1 Positive emotional climates and transformative cooperation
The inclusion of others in how we see ourselves offers us a wider perspective and, when
we focus on others appreciatively, people are more at ease in social contexts. Conversely,
when we focus on organizational problems, negative emotions may be elevated and an ‘us-
versus-them’ mindset can be promulgated (Gilmore et al., 1997). This is often followed by
blaming and finger-pointing as people try to target the causes of problems (Sekerka &
Smith, 2003). A positive approach using AI helps facilitate a reframing process (Bolman
& Deal, 1997), which is necessary for prompting the shift required for transformation. In
short, it helps people alter the way they currently see their organization and how the roles
they previously assumed can be recast in a meaningful and favorable light.
For example, those who may currently use a political frame, in which resources are
scarce and generate competition, can shift perceptual understanding by adopting different
assumptions. Beliefs that were once associated with competition can shift to alternative
views, now based on valued assumptions that see achievements as providing benefits to
all involved. The cognitive broadening that positive emotions trigger may contribute to
this process, bringing a wider view into focus, one that is more inclusive and represents a
more cooperative stance. This can also be a turning-point, with the organization moving
from the reactive stance – where problem solving and a functional orientation are directed
toward survival – to a more generative one. Positive emotions coupled with collaborative
values can help an organization thrive, in that its members are motivated to create new
organizational forms that benefit both the individuals and their organizations. Given that
positive emotions contribute to an expansion of self-concept, experiences associated with
gratitude, appreciation, and other positive emotions may be linked to people increasing
their identification with their co-workers and organization (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991;
Dutton et al., 1994). This expectation is expressed as:
Proposition 2 A positive organizational emotional climate will contribute to increases

in organizational identification.
This increased organizational identification may be a catalyst that helps to extend rela-
tional support in the workplace, which we now describe.
Relationship building
As positive emotions help broaden the mindset of workers, they may also affect social
interactions and ultimately contribute to transformative cooperation through increases in
relational strength. For example, during an AI intervention, this form of transformation
is visible in the creation of self-organized project teams, coalitions, and opportunity
circles, all of which cultivate new ideas and learning. Broadened mindsets carry short-
term benefits, but they also instill indirect and long-term adaptive benefits. We propose
that the act of cognitive broadening, cultivated by positive emotions, helps to build endur-
ing relational resources.
We know that assets accrued during positive emotional states are durable and outlast
the transient state that led to their acquisition (Fredrickson, 2000b). Consequently, the
incidental effects of positive emotional experiences serve to increase personal resources.
Individuals can draw from these stores in subsequent moments and while in different emo-
tional states. This describes the link between positive emotions and their known role in
helping to transform individuals to become more creative, knowledgeable, resilient,
socially integrated, and healthy over time. People who regularly experience positive emo-
tions are not stagnant. Instead they continually grow toward further optimal functioning
(Fredrickson & Joiner, 2002; Fredrickson, 2003). We suggest that this same principle
holds true when using strength-based approaches to instill organizational efforts to estab-
lish transformative cooperation.
Evidence from social psychological experiments have shown that people induced to feel
positive emotions become more helpful to others than those in neutral emotional states
(Isen, 1987). Subsequent organizational studies have demonstrated that salespeople who
experience more positive emotions at work are more helpful (George, 1998). This occurs
because people experiencing positive emotions are more flexible, creative, empathic, and
respectful. But being helpful not only springs from positive emotional states, it can also
produce them. For example, those who give help may feel proud of their actions, and this
experience not only creates a momentary boost in self-esteem but can also prompt people
to envisage future achievements in similar domains (Fredrickson, 2000b). Thus, to the
extent that helping others instills positive emotions, it may motivate people to help again
in the future.
Just as the person who gives help experiences positive emotions, the one who receives
it is also likely to feel gratitude. Gratitude not only feels good but also produces a myriad
of beneficial social outcomes (McCullough et al., 2001). According to McCullough et al.,
gratitude motivates and reinforces social actions in both the giver and the receiver of help.
It motivates positive action because grateful people often feel the urge to repay those who
have helped them. And, gratitude reinforces positive action because giving thanks or
acknowledgment rewards help-givers, making them feel appreciated and more likely to
help others in the future. These findings reflect a robust reciprocal association between
positive emotions and social support, which serves to build social and relational strength.
This expectation is expressed as:
Proposition 3 A positive organizational emotional climate will contribute to increases

in organizational relational strength.
The scenario on helping also illustrates how positive emotions can spread throughout
organizations, among members, and to customers, and how the effects of positive emo-
tions can accumulate, compound, and add value to the collective. Add to this rich picture
studies that show how positive emotions curb conflict by promoting constructive inter-
personal engagement and encourage trust, predicting effective and integrative negotiations
(e.g., Anderson & Thompson, 2004). This gives us a sense of the capacity-building poten-
tial, outcomes associated with positive emotional experiences. Important to note, positive
emotions propagate within organizations not simply via facial mimicry, but because these
emotions stem from and create meaningful interpersonal encounters. Accordingly, the
broaden-and-build theory predicts that positive emotions in the workplace serve to
support both individuals and organizations in their ability to function at higher levels.
Thus, positive emotions are both an individual and a collective resource that reinforces the
promotion of social interaction, instills responsibility, and advances achievement.
With the use of nonlinear dynamics to depict a model of team performance, we previ-
ously described how positivity ratios at or above 2.9 characterize flourishing health
(Fredrickson & Losada, 2005). Such findings suggest that there are principles to describe
relationships between positive emotion and individual and organizational flourishing.
These principles relate to the movement toward optimal organizational functioning in
that positive emotions fuel individuals to contribute to the effectiveness of their organ-
ization (Fredrickson, 2000b). A range of empirical evidence supports this prediction,
albeit indirectly. For instance, researchers at the Gallup Organization frequently examine
links between employee engagement and favorable business outcomes, such as employee
turnover, customer loyalty, net sales, and financial revenues (Fleming, 2000a, 2000b;
Harter, 2000). Evidence continues to emerge, reflecting how employee engagement is asso-
ciated with positive emotional experiences.
Given that positive emotions contribute to the relational strength of the organization
(Proposition 3), this adds value to the organization by increasing relational expansion,
which in turn increases social capital. The presence of this resource can contribute to
growth and favorable performance outcomes, an antecedent for organizational
effectiveness. This expectation is expressed as:
Proposition 4 Increases in organizational relational strength will contribute to organ-

izational growth and performance.
Building strong community

An underlying assumption in our work is that organizations are uniquely positioned to
help build a better society. At present we view their role and associated contribution, pre-
viously known as ‘corporate responsibility’, as going through a transformation of its own.
We see movement away from a problem-centric approach as the motivational driver for
corporate social action. Our contention is that this transformation is fueled by the posi-
tive emotional climates of organizations where transformative cooperation has extended
outward to include the greater community.
The frames that previously drove organizational change looked at resources as scarce
commodities. But today’s strength-based approaches use relational assets as levers for cre-
ating more value and capacity, and the edification of new resources. It is therefore
expected that when organizations set aside their former win–lose survivalist modalities for
a more dynamic, collective capacity-building focus, strengths can be leveraged ubiqui-
tously and limitations become outdated social constructs. This transformation alters
the view of the organization from being a fixed, concrete, and finite entity where self-
preservation is the reality. It shifts prior underlying assumptions so that a novel view can
emerge; one that depicts workers and the organization as images of the greater good – the
larger whole. In short, organizational identities are broadened to a unified collective that
extends beyond the confines of traditional organizational boundaries. No longer is social
action based on the need to resolve issues and problems; rather, it is based on actions
resulting from the view that the community is part of the organization and vice versa.
With this expansion comes the creation of a reality in which everyone is viewed as a
part of the larger whole (Barros & Cooperrider, 2000). It is a picture that continually
evolves through sustained rejuvenation. We propose that this evolution is resourced by
positive emotions, which energize a more holistic stance through acts of kindness, com-
passion, giving, and helping others. It is sustained by renewed belief, focus, and trust in
the goodness of the universal infinite whole. We believe that as this cycle – one of contin-
uous value creation – is established, individuals, organizations, institutions, and govern-
ments can be transformed into more compassionate and harmonious environments, as
reflected in new designs of transformative cooperation.
The benefits of positive emotions and their association with expansion of relational
capacities are boundary free. This is the very essence of creating new designs in transfor-
mative cooperation: positive emotions provide the foundation for optimal organizational
functioning, which have unlimited potential to extend outward to society. The expansion
of relatedness is not bound by the confines of an organization. It is a capacity uncon-
strained by time or space. Our contention is that positive emotions energize new organ-
izational forms that emerge from transformative cooperation, which sets the stage for
growth and development that can move outwardly into the community at large. We
express this idea as:
Proposition 5 Increases in organizational relational strength will contribute to the

community’s growth and development.
Taken together, our propositions edify the theory of positive organizational change
(Cooperrider & Sekerka, 2006) by explicating how positive emotions serve as the corner-
stone for transformative cooperation.
Implications and future research

In this chapter we described how transformative cooperation can be created through
ODC techniques that stimulate, generate, and support positive emotions. As people work
together to create change through strength-based techniques such as AI, value is tapped
to expand existing strengths. The implications of the research cited and the propositions
we set forth suggest that transformative cooperation can broaden and build workplace
capacity. More specifically, when positive emotion climates are generated in the work-
place, they can potentially increase:
● individuals’ organizational identification;

● individuals’ organizational relational strength;
● organizational growth and performance; and
● community growth and development.
The overarching implication of this discussion is that the positive emotions of workers’
momentary experiences can be both long-range indicators and, generators of optimal
organizational functioning. Once initiated, as cycles of transformative cooperation con-
tinue, we believe that nurturing positive emotional experiences in the workplace will help
generate outcomes that contribute to upward spirals of growth, reverberating outward,
beyond the confines of the organization. This progression, as represented in individual
well-being and organizational optimal functioning, is expected to continue to expand,
toward the edification of stronger communities.
To potentially achieve such robust outcomes, we must not only support the cultivation
and extension of positive emotions in the workplace, but also understand how to
effectively address and draw strength from negative emotions as well. As Linley et al.
(2006) comment, if positive psychology and its specialized disciplines hope to achieve
long-term success, we must examine how to integrate disorder and dysfunction with
achievement, aspirations, and performance. This suggests a research path to create and
test techniques that not only build value from strength, but also cultivate strength from
weakness.
How might we address this concern? Drawing from strength- and deficit-based change
management theory, practices can be woven together to create a more balanced approach
(Sekerka, 2007). To generate sustainable transformative cooperation, hybrid techniques
need to be developed that generate positive emotions while also educating individuals on
how to manage negative ones (Cryer et al., 2003). Research is needed to study hybrid
forms, to ascertain how strength-based interventions can be woven with diagnostics to
generate the necessary positive emotions for transformative cooperation, while also
attending to immediate concerns for survival. If we want to understand how positive emo-
tions are associated with the relational capacity to broaden and build, it seems likely that
workers must leverage both strengths and weaknesses if upward spirals of positive change
are to endure. This presents a variety of research questions, such as:
● What inquiry strategies are effective in drawing upon organizational strengths,

evoking positive emotions while managing negative ones, given the organizational
context and situation?
● What quantifiable practices can be inculcated into workplace routines that help
build and sustain positive emotional experiences over time?
● What ODC techniques are useful to instill transformative cooperation, given
worker attitudes, personalities, gender, and cultural differences?
● How can we measure transformative cooperation, demonstrating short- and long-

term impacts?
Perhaps the greatest challenge is to directly link positive emotions with sustainable
transformative cooperation. To begin this research trajectory, studies can employ a variety
of techniques and methodologies to explore how individuals work together to achieve a
shared goal with mutual benefit. Both short- and long-term performance objectives can
be tracked, along with employee emotions and affective experiences. Because the act of
recording positive events or reframing negative ones can be used both as an intervention
and as a measurement tool, perhaps this is a viable means to impact on and track mood
and attitudes over time. This underscores the need for fieldwork and cross-disciplinary
efforts to fully understand the benefits of positive emotions, and how they can be sus-
tained for optimal health, functioning, and well-being in the workplace. Positive psychol-
ogy along with its associated disciplines will be enriched as we learn more about how
positive emotions and performance are intertwined.
In conclusion, we see that the goal of transformative cooperation holds great promise
for creating sustained positive change. If we develop this capacity within our organiza-
tions, it can then extend beyond the confines of our workplace settings, and into the life
of the community. Such efforts portend an unlimited capacity and sustainable resource to
serve the greater good.
Note
* Special thanks to Michael A. Cohn who provided thoughtful insights that added value toward the devel-
opment of Figure 33.1.
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34 How contrasting emotions can enhance strategic
agility
Quy Nguyen Huy
Introduction
In this chapter, I seek to nuance the predominantly negative view of emotion in the strat-
egy literature by highlighting certain conditions under which emotion can enhance the
organization’s adaptive ability. A growing dynamic capability literature suggests that com-
petitive advantage could accrue to organizations that develop routines that enable change
rather than routines that maintain operational stability (e.g., Blyler & Coff, 2003; Helfat
& Peteraf, 2003). Dynamic capability refers to ‘the firm’s ability to integrate, build and
reconfigure internal and external competencies to address rapidly changing environments’
(Teece et al., 1997, p. 516). Dynamic capability enables the firm to innovate and change
its strategies to match or create environmental changes (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). The
firm is likely to gain competitive advantage if it can realize adaptive change more reliably
and rapidly and with less cost than its competitors (Zott, 2003).
At least two strategic processes contribute to dynamic capability: (i) the firm’s ability to
reduce the cost of strategic change (Greve, 1999); and (ii) organizational learning
(Szulanski, 1996). Together, these processes enable strategic agility, which refers to the
firm’s ability to adapt to changing environments or to shape them.
I choose these strategic processes for four reasons. First, they are inherent to the definition
of dynamic capability. Second, they have been argued by strategy scholars to enable sus-
tainable superior performance (see Zott, 2003). Third, the link between emotion and these
capabilities can be substantiated by recent advances in the literature. Fourth, these capabil-
ities complement one another. Organizations can change dramatically and constantly in a
chaotic and mindless way and thus accelerate their decline; organizational change could
happen without organizational learning and creativity (Huy & Mintzberg, 2003).
Building on advances in research on emotion, organizational theory, and strategy
process, I propose a prescriptive theory of how emotion management can enhance these
strategic processes. I suggest illustrative organization-based emotion management rou-
tines (Winter, 2003) that facilitate the firm’s strategic agility. These routines elicit con-
trasting emotions to prime three strategic processes: reducing the cost of strategic change
and organizational learning. Focusing on the beneficial effects of both positive and neg-
ative emotions departs from previous research that tends to emphasize one type of emo-
tions – positive or negative (e.g., Fredrickson, 1998; Huy, 1999). Before discussing how
specific contrasting emotional states help strategic processes, I first discuss how patterns
of emotions in organizations arise.
Patterns of emotions in organizations

There are a number of mechanisms that help aggregate individual emotions into
collectively shared emotions, or patterns of emotions (Bartel & Saavedra, 2000). First,
546
How contrasting emotions can enhance strategic agility 547
emotions aroused by major organizational events are seldom felt only at the personal,
idiosyncratic level. Faced with such events, a large number of employees in different work
roles could feel similar emotions. Employees who share a common organizational culture
tend to have similar beliefs, leading to similar appraisals and ways of feeling (Schein,
1992). Perceived threats (e.g., a hostile takeover) could increase the need for social
affiliation, particularly among people who believe they are confronting the same situation
(Gump & Kulick, 1997).
In a large organization, however, not every individual is likely to experience the same
emotions when faced with an event (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). Members typically
belong to different work groups, and these groups usually have different work roles, power,
and privileges (Cyert & March, 1963 [1992]). As a result, the same organizational event
might affect groups very differently and elicit very different patterns of emotions. Similar
emotions are more likely to be experienced by individuals belonging to the same group
than across groups.
Several mechanisms cause members of a group to feel similar emotions. First, group
members who identify strongly with one another are more likely to feel each other’s emo-
tions than members who do not, for synchrony conveys empathy. The group’s emotional
charge amplifies through mutual interaction which promotes group cohesion (Hatfield
et al., 1992). A group translates tendencies into collective expressions more easily than
individuals acting alone, because group membership boosts people’s feelings of power,
making them bolder through anonymity (Barsade & Gibson, 1998).
In addition, emotional contagion can aggregate individual into group emotions
(Maitlis & Ozcelik, 2004). Individuals deliberately or unconsciously respond to others’
emotional displays by imitating and exaggerating them, because emotions can spread
through unconscious or conscious processes or both. Unconscious emotional contagion
occurs through a very fast process of automatic and synchronous nonverbal mimicry and
feedback (Hatfield et al., 1992), a behavior posited to come from an innate human ten-
dency toward mimicking the behavior of others (Wild et al., 2001). By contrast, conscious
processes involve cognitive social comparison in which people compare their feelings with
those of relevant others in their social environment and then respond according to what
seems appropriate for the situation. The recipient uses the emotion as a type of social
information to understand how he or she should be feeling (Sullins, 1991).
Once group members feel similar emotions toward specific organization events, these
emotions influence the group’s cognitive processes (Kelly & Barsade, 2001) and motivate
collective action (Totterdell, 2000). Emotions that are shared by many group members
may influence their cognition and behavior more than emotions felt by any single member
(Jehn, 1997; Barsade, 2002). These patterns of emotions could potentially be managed in
organization settings. This is discussed in the next section.
Managing patterns of emotions in organizations

Managing patterns of emotions in organizations refers to ‘an organization’s ability to
acknowledge, recognize, monitor, discriminate, and attend to its members’ emotions’
(Huy, 1999, p. 325). Such ability is rooted in the aggregate ability of various organization
members who cooperate with one another. Furthermore, whereas a person relies mainly
on his/her own personal resources, including his/her own emotional competence to
manage his/her and others’ emotional states, emotion management in organizations can
be practiced through organizational routines that attend to patterns of emotions, includ-

ing contrasting emotional states. Routines refer to organization ‘behavior that is learned,
highly patterned, repetitious, or quasi repetitious, founded in part on tacit knowledge –
and the specificity of objectives’ (Winter, 2003, p. 991). Through routines related to
feeling, organization members attempt to influence which patterns of emotional states
members feel and how they collectively display these emotions to achieve shared organ-
izational goals. Emotion management routines elicit patterns of specific emotional states,
which prime distinct group cognitive processing and behavior.
Because the same event can elicit different patterns of emotions in various groups as
explained above, emotion management in organizations cannot be mechanical and
uniform, but must be adapted to the specific group and individual needs in their specific
contexts. In a resource-constrained environment, it would seem counterproductive to
elicit the same emotions among all employees at the same time without regard to their
individual needs and task expectations. For example, some groups may already be pro-
moting change, so it might be counterproductive to elicit more fear to incite them to
change more. While research and development groups may need to experience specific
emotions such as passion and enjoyment to stimulate their creative thinking and innovate
rapidly, the same high creative need may be less urgent and important for maintenance
crews in charge of operational stability (e.g., maintenance of nuclear power plants) who
are expected to apply exacting security routines.1 Such tailoring of emotion management
likely enhances organization effectiveness (achievement of desirable organizational goals)
and efficiency (optimal use of resources including time and money).
In addition, it seems unrealistic to expect all organization members to possess a wide
range of technical, business, and personnel management skills and to display high emo-
tional competence. More flexibility exists, however, at the organizational level, where
many members pool their complementary competences to compensate for each other’s
limitations and achieve shared goals. Members who recognize the importance of emotion
management in organizations but feel they do not possess all the necessary skills, energy,
or time could cooperate with other members and hired outside professionals. Training,
coaching, and mutual assistance in emotion management could help compensate in part
for individuals’ differences in ability to manage their own and others’ emotions; such
differences could arise from various factors, such as innate emotional competence and
particular situations or stages of life (Bagozzi, 2003). As Huy’s (2002) research shows,
some members can elicit emotions related to change, while others elicit emotions related
to continuity on members of a given work group, and in the aggregate help that group
achieve beneficial outcomes.
This distributed emotional capability helps transcend the need for a large number of
emotionally intelligent individuals in influential positions who might work at cross-
purposes and apply their emotional skills to maximize their personal benefit (Jackall,
1988). Thus, emotional competence at organizational level may be more malleable and
can be developed more easily and rapidly than that at the individual level. It remains
unclear whether individual emotional intelligence can be improved significantly (Salovey
et al., 2000). While a person may have to rely mainly on his/her personal or innate
resources to manage his/her own and others’ emotions, an organization can develop,
refine, and diffuse its emotion-attending routines through regular training and monitor-
ing practices that help members help each other to manage their own and others’ emo-
tional states. The higher the level of organizational attention and resources allocated to
the development, diffusion, and refinement of emotion-attending routines over time, the
greater the organization’s emotional capability is likely to be.
In sum, emotion management in organizations can be developed collectively, enacted
in a distributive manner, and can provide aggregative adaptive outcomes because of com-
plementary competencies, interests, and resources. In contrast, emotion management at a
personal level may be more difficult to develop and enact, in part because of less bounti-
ful resources such as emotional competence, training, personal energy or time.
How patterns of contrasting emotional states facilitate strategic processes

I shall specify one positive discrete emotion and one negative emotion to illustrate how
eliciting contrasting emotional states can facilitate a strategic process. However, I do not
seek to argue that these specific states are the most or the only important emotions that
can facilitate a given strategic process. In the concluding section, I shall suggest how future
research can test the empirical validity of my propositions and propose other discrete
emotions and strategic processes. As mentioned, very few studies have explored how both
positive and negative discrete emotions can facilitate an organizational process, and prob-
ably no study has investigated in an integrative way the link between contrasting emo-
tional states and the strategic processes that shape dynamic capability. More specifically,
I discuss how (i) fear of organizational decline/death and pride in one’s contribution to
organizational success reduce the costs of strategic change; and (ii) how dissatisfaction
with work unit performance and feeling safe in work interactions help organizational
learning.
Reducing the cost of strategic change

The costs of strategic change include emotionally laden intraorganizational conflicts that
represent important barriers to implementing changes to a firm’s bundle of strategic
assets (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993). Many firms seem able to change slowly and incre-
mentally within their existing strategies, mindset, and routines (Quinn, 1980), but find it
more difficult to adjust to rapidly shifting environments and to realize important changes
to the firm’s strategy, product markets, and organizing systems (Tushman & Romanelli,
1985). These kinds of contemplated changes are subject to the receptivity of organization
members, that is, their willingness to consider, individually and collectively, the proposed
changes to elements of the strategy and organizing system. Receptivity denotes an inter-
pretative, attitudinal state (both cognitive and emotional) to accept the legitimacy of such
proposals (Huy, 1999).
If the proposed change is perceived as affecting certain important aspects of self, this
will trigger strong emotional responses, which affect how the change is construed and
the nature of ensuing actions (Lazarus, 1991). For example, employees may be fearful that
the proposed changes could disrupt familiar and ‘proven’ routines, personal privileges, or
the company’s norms and values with which they personally identify (Argyris, 1990).
Personal construct theory (Kelly, 1955) predicts that if a proposed change is perceived
as contrary to esteemed values, individuals’ negative emotions would be more intense than
emotions aroused by a lack of cognitive understanding of the proposed change.
Oppositional concepts are likely to elicit intense negative emotions such as anger or fear
and lead employees to oppose the proposed changes (Festinger, 1957). This opposition
could have different active manifestations, such as strikes and sabotage or could be
passive, with withdrawal syndromes characteristic of learned helplessness (Seligman,
1975). Once negative feelings and mistrusting behavior take root, restoring a cooperative
climate is likely to be long, and costly (Zand, 1972). Thus, receptivity to change influences
the costs of change and embeds an emotional component that could be dealt with by skill-
ful handling of emotions.
To the extent that the ‘perceived’ costs of change differ across firms at any given point
in time, firms may reach different conclusions about the kind of change they could real-
istically attempt (Zott, 2003). Furthermore, even if a firm, through careful strategic
analysis, were to know the ideal industry and position it should be in, it might still hesi-
tate to carry out the desirable strategic changes if it perceived the cost to be too high from
either a material or an emotional perspective (Burgelman, 1994). The fear of risky and
costly change may lead firms to adopt different business practices or strategic positions
that can influence their subsequent performance (Porter, 1991). As a result, the focal
firm’s ability to reduce the cost of strategic change enhances its flexibility to realize new
strategic positions.2 Firms with a lower cost of change than their competitors are likely
to be more flexible in adapting to or creating new market changes and technologies.
Receptivity to major change is necessary to increase the quality of organizational learn-
ing and creativity.
To reduce the high barriers of resistance to strategic change, the sources of fear cited
above – for example, threats to personal interests – need to be set against other heretofore
less salient sources in order to focus members’ attention toward a more immediate and
greater danger, the prospect of organization decline and death. This is akin to reminding
the Romans to stop arguing among each other about who is to be the next emperor,
because foreign invaders are burning the city. Research has shown that people often fail
to recognize threats, often with disastrous consequences (Starbuck et al., 1978).
This failure probably occurs because threat cues do not initially penetrate easily into
organization members’ awareness (Jackson & Dutton, 1988, p. 385). As a result, by the
time threats are recognized, they may in fact be serious. Alternatively, this could also imply
that in order for fear of organization death/decline to mobilize on a sustainable basis,
members must perceive the source of fear as credible and authentic. ‘Manufacturing’ a
crisis to create a false sense of urgency and needless mobilization is likely to backfire in
the long run and increase resistance to future changes if and when the manipulative intent
is discovered.
Fear of organization decline and death

Fear differs from more generalized anxiety in that it has a specific object (Öhman, 2000).
Fear is a future-directed emotion, which helps people respond to existential threats by
focusing their personal resources on the threat, to avoid unwanted dangers, and giving
them the extra energy to act if required (LeDoux, 1995). The functional value of fear is
not merely existential but also social: it keeps people aware of our social values and alerts
us to the dangers related to what we cherish (Ben-Ze’ev, 2000). Thus, to the extent that
people identify with their organization (Dutton et al., 1994), an existential threat to the
organization could be experienced as an existential threat to self, therefore eliciting fear.
Here, the concern is less with one’s physical survival, rather with one’s self-esteem, a
person’s material and emotional well-being shaped by one’s social environment.
Because most people tend to attach greater importance to events in the present than in
the future, fear functions to amplify the effects of future threats and make them more
salient in our present imagination. The impact of the future tends to appear less urgent
and important because many people tend to be more preoccupied with the short term
(Ben-Ze’ev, 2000). The intense and unpleasant experience of fear primes people to attend
to the future.
In the context of strategic change, people often resist change because of fear of poten-
tial negative consequences or simply of the unknown. Strategic change not only causes a
pervasive redistribution of resources and power, it also demands a ‘paradigm shift’ that
challenges members’ basic assumptions about the organization (Bartunek, 1984). The
proposed change could be construed as an attack on both individual and organizational
identity, thus triggering strong defense mechanisms such as fear and defensiveness
(Schein, 1992).
Although fear could channel an individual’s attention to the perceived threat, thereby
reducing his/her cognitive resources devoted to other tasks, this individual-level outcome
is less likely to be as dysfunctional in an organization with various groups sharing diverse
roles and interests. For example, when Intel experienced serious performance decline, top
management and various groups of middle managers had different interests and champi-
oned different solutions, debating these openly (Burgelman, 1994).
Research on threat rigidity (Staw et al., 1981) found that organization members cope
with perceived ‘threats’ through means such as wishful thinking, passive resignation, or
narrowed search when they expect loss and perceive a lack of control. In contrast,
members perceive ‘opportunities’ in events in which they associate an expectation of gain
and ‘feelings of control’ (Jackson & Dutton, 1988, p. 384). Such ‘feelings’ stem from a
perceived autonomy about how to respond and freedom to choose whether to respond,
access to resources and means for resolving the issue, and feelings of personal compe-
tence. Interpreting an issue as a ‘threat’ or an ‘opportunity’ has been found to lead to very
different actions: compulsory versus voluntary behavior, or modest versus significant
changes in company offerings. Thus, feelings of control under uncertainty discriminate
differences in interpretations and subsequent strategic actions (Barr & Glynn, 2004).
It can be reasoned, then, that if members who experience fear also feel that they have
the means to control and remove the source of fear if they choose to act on it, paralyzing
fear (or flight) can be transformed into energizing fear (or fight). The fear of competition,
bankruptcy, or losing can motivate organization members to work harder to reduce the
odds of undesirable outcomes. The fear of organization death could help members
become more vigilant to competitors and responsive to customer feedback, employee
morale, or progress in product development (Grove, 1996). Fear prevented Intel managers
from being complacent and sharpened the company’s survival instincts. Starbuck et al.
(1978) also found that companies on the verge of death may realize that they have little to
lose by conducting bold experiments and, as a result, discover new solutions allowing
renewed growth. When people are caught in a desperate situation, fear of embarrassment
resulting from failure is significantly reduced, and ambitious change becomes possible
(Flam, 1993).
To the extent that such fear is present, members should not deliberately intensify and
prolong fear alone, as this has its side-effects. Fear risks being self-fulfilling as it could
inhibit hope, that is, the belief that desirable events are unlikely to happen in the future
(Ben-Ze’ev, 2000). Experiencing another, contrasting emotional state helps to remind

members that they are able to improve their future and increase ‘feelings of control’ that
are crucial to transforming a paralyzing perception of threat into an enabling perception
of opportunity (Jackson & Dutton, 1988, p. 384). Under uncertainty, a track record is a
good predictor of the future, and members could elicit pride in their contribution to
organizational success by reminding themselves that they succeeded in the past and could
do so again in the future.
Pride of contributing to organizational success

Pride is pleasure aroused when a person believes that a positive outcome can be attributed
to one’s own specific actions (Weiner, 1985; Lewis, 2000). Whereas fear is elicited by evalu-
ation of an unpleasant future situation, pride emerges from the positive evaluation of past
actions. Pride is a self-conscious and retrospective emotion. It can also be experienced
when things did not go well even though one tried very hard but still did not achieve one’s
set aspiration levels (Weiss et al., 1999). This happens because an emotion can be aroused
for many reasons. Thus, one is not proud of failing, but is proud of one’s persistence in
the face of adversity. Therefore, the selected object of comparison for one’s perceived
achievements is important in eliciting pride (Ben-Ze’ev, 2000). Pride serves a social com-
municative function inasmuch as this emotion helps people to enhance their identity by
taking credit for an achievement and their desire for others to adjust their opinions
upward in accordance with the achievement. Other people’s appraisals can enhance or
validate our pride, and organization members can express these appraisals to one another.
Feeling pride after feeling fear of organizational decline/death can help reduce
members’ resistance to change and learn from feedback because many people in organ-
izations fear receiving negative information about themselves (Ashford & Cummings,
1983). When they do, they may try to ignore the message, dismiss it as inaccurate, or attack
the credibility of the source (Ilgen et al., 1979). By restoring feelings of control between
deliberate actions and positive outcomes, people feel less helpless and defensive. As their
self-esteem rises, members become more confident to experiment and learn from both
negative and positive feedback (Peterson et al., 1993).
As Albert (1984) noted, a proposed change can be resisted not only because the future
is unknown and feared, but because the past is underappreciated. In addition, organiz-
ation members can be reticent about participating in new change initiatives, not because
the latter or the change agents are intrinsically bad, but because members have become
cynical about change. This translates into a loss of trust in the change agents and is a
response to a history of change attempts that failed to meet members’ expectations. To
reduce such cynicism, change agents have to deal with the past, acknowledge mistakes,
apologize, and make amends. Then, they can act in a way that demonstrates that employ-
ees can play a central role in the management of change, which will increase employees’
self-esteem and pride.
Albert also suggested that organization members should present their proposed change
in part as an addition to or expansion of existing values, which elicits pride.3 However, to
the extent that certain proud elements from the past organizational culture must be
deleted, mourning may help ease the transition with rituals to mark the ending of values
that are no longer appropriate, while extolling values that will be preserved. Change man-
agers could, for example, set up mourning rituals to precede the closure of employees’
cherished work sites. In Huy (2002), recipients of change were more sympathetic toward
change managers because they felt that they had been treated with respect.
In summary, the fear of losing personal comfort or privileges in strategic change is
directed onto another source – organizational decline/death that primes members who
identify strongly with the organization to de-emphasize their personal interests. However,
prolonged intense fear could elicit feelings of hopelessness, low self-esteem and self-
confidence, and even shame in some employees. These dispositions, if prolonged, could
further cause apathy, depression, and helplessness and, in the extreme, energize destruc-
tive actions of anger and rage against other members (Tangney, 1999).
Pride helps mitigate the extreme effects of fear. One way is to remind people that they
do have some control over the situation and can make desirable events happen. Under
uncertainty, the best predictor of the future is track record (Bower, 1970 [1986]). To the
extent that people have achieved in the past, previous successes could be resurfaced to
elicit pride and boost self-confidence. Open acknowledgment of members’ successes,
when done in a credible and authentic way, shows them that change agents are respectful,
knowledgable, and sensitive to their particular context, and this reduces members’ mis-
trust and resistance to change.
In the long run, however, prolonged and excessive pride risks turning into hubris, com-
placency, and increased resistance to change. Alternating experiences of contrasting emo-
tional states such as fear and pride could help reduce the extreme dysfunctional effects of
each emotion and maintain organizational alertness and dynamic adaptation.
Individual differences are likely to moderate the influence of emotional states on
members’ behavior. For example, to the extent that leaving the company represents a
viable option for some members, fear of organizational death is likely to lead them to
abandon the ‘sinking ship’. Exit, however, will not be an attractive option for members
with high costs of leaving. These costs can include an inability to find alternative
employment with equivalent benefits, loss of job security, or being tied to a geographi-
cal area. This type of commitment resulting from necessity has been referred to as ‘con-
tinuance commitment’ (Meyer & Allen, 1990) and is distinct from the commitment of
members who stay despite exit options because they identify strongly with the organ-
ization (Dutton et al., 1994). Thus, for various reasons, members who stay with the or-
ganization are likely to reduce their resistance to strategic change because they believe
that improved organization adaptation will also improve their material and/or emo-
tional benefits.
Proposition 1 Groups in which members feel alternating fear of organization

decline/death and pride about their contribution to organizational success are likely to
show less resistance to strategic change than groups in which members feel either emo-
tional state alone. This outcome is likely to apply to members who remain with their
group after feeling this kind of fear.
However, organizations are often reluctant to abandon their past competences completely
until they have found viable alternatives to secure their future (Chandler, 1962 [1990]).
This requires an organizational learning and creativity process to develop innovative and
potentially competing offerings to provide the organization with a range of feasible
options from which to select to chart its future strategic trajectory.
Organizational learning
In dynamic environments, two aspects of resource deployment may be crucial for dynamic
capability: the speed with which new capabilities are integrated into a firm’s existing
knowledge base, and the frequency with which capabilities, once integrated into the firm,
are reevaluated and realized (Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995). Organizational learning deals
with the tension between exploitation and exploration, and involves processes linking
individual intuition to a group’s interpretation of new ideas, development of shared
understanding, taking collective action, and institutionalizing these actions as organiz-
ational routines (Crossan & Berdrow, 2003). Organization learning often involves power
and political activities such as influencing, forcing, dominating, and disciplining (see
Lawrence et al., 2005) by groups who share diverse interests and values. To the extent that
these political actions affect the relative power of individuals or groups within the organ-
ization, they could arouse strong emotions.
Organizational learning depends in part on members learning from experience and
sharing this with one another. Innovation is by nature risky, and the odds of initial mis-
takes and failures are high (Kanter, 1983). Yet, an innovative product that failed on short-
term economic measures could contribute to knowledge about the feasibility of a new
technology or the attractiveness of a new market (Danneels, 2002). Knowledge gained
from failed products has often been instrumental in achieving subsequent success (King
and Tucci, 2002).
Unfortunately, an organization’s culture or reward system may discourage sharing of
learning from mistakes (Argyris, 1990). Fear of humiliation and sanctions not only deters
potentially creative champions, but also makes their observing colleagues more risk averse
and fearful of sharing full and honest narratives about their past failures and successes with
others. Discomfort about real or imagined group pressures for conformity could lead to dys-
functional groupthink (Janis, 1972), especially when such discomfort is elicited in the context
of extreme uncertainty about appropriate responses and the need to maintain good feelings
with other group members (Turner et al., 1992). Open sharing of failures and in-depth learn-
ing from failed strategic attempts can be encouraged in a climate in which a wide range of
honest feelings and thoughts could be expressed by all parties involved in the failed attempts
without fear of penalty, embarrassment, or shame. Thus, the organizational learning process
embeds an emotional component that could be dealt with using emotion management.
Proposition 2 Reducing members’ fear of sanctions, embarrassment, or humiliation

related to learning increases the firm’s ability to learn from its failed or underperform-
ing strategic attempts and improves the odds of success of its subsequent attempts.
Research on employees’ dissatisfaction with their job has found that those who remain
with the organization out of necessity (continuance commitment) can still be proactive in
their work and show high creativity, which implies a high learning ability, if they receive
support from co-workers and the organization (Zhou & George, 2001). This leads me to
explore more fully the relation between dissatisfaction and organization learning.
Dissatisfaction with work unit performance

Schein (1996, p. 29) noted that ‘all forms of learning and change start with some form
of dissatisfaction or frustration generated by data that disconfirm our expectations’. In
addition, more fundamental or double-loop learning that requires changes in underlying

assumptions often starts by arousing uncomfortable emotions in recipients by
disconfirming their prior beliefs and creating cognitive dissonance (Lewin, 1947). Unlike
fear, dissatisfaction represents a mild form of anger or unhappiness that is aroused when
people recognize that their important goals or aspiration levels are not or will not be met
(Ortony et al., 1988). These aspiration levels could vary among organizations and are set
according to a particular comparison group or set of benchmarks that an organization
has chosen to be measured against at any point in time (Elsbach & Kramer, 1996).
Organization members’ dissatisfaction with their work unit performance could inspire
further assessment and learning (Schein, 1996) and motivate members to become more
cautious, narrow their attentional focus, and put more effort into problem analysis and
information acquisition (Schwarz, 1990). A person’s own work unit performance is more
likely to elicit his or her attention and emotion than the larger organization’s performance
because it is more within most members’ realm of responsibility and action possibility,
eliciting the strong ‘feelings of control’ I discussed earlier (Jackson & Dutton, 1988).
Negative feelings facilitate rejection of existing beliefs and a new reframing of the
problem (Kaufmann & Vosburg, 1997). Cultivating dissatisfaction could prime members
to be less optimistic in future outcomes and motivate them to work harder and be more
alert to interim signals to learn and adjust (Parrott, 1993). Dissatisfaction caused by
difficulties with a current plan promotes review and problem solving (Bagozzi et al., 1998)
and is adaptive to the extent that it enables members to increase their efforts and to main-
tain an attitude of humility to reflect and learn from feedback, preventing members from
pursuing unreflective and costly actions (Staw & Ross, 1987).
Alternatively, reluctance to elicit dissatisfaction could discourage group members from
considering and expressing divergent opinions in problem-solving tasks. Tension and dis-
satisfaction motivate creative problem solving (Runco, 1994). Actively eliciting discom-
fort and acceptance of such discomfort during strategic debates could spur organizational
learning. Eliciting such discomfort requires courage to express potentially unconventional
or unpopular perspectives, to enter a debate one may lose, suffer embarrassment, and face
social sanctions (Grove, 1996, p. 115).
Making organization members dissatisfied about their work unit performance alone, if
prolonged, could cause pessimism or apathy. Beyond pride, people already subject to long
periods of fear and dissatisfaction need to feel safe in interacting with other members in
order to propose and debate new business ideas.
Feeling safe in work interactions

Feeling safe in work interactions refers to the emotional state relating to the belief in psy-
chological safety at work (Edmondson, 1999) and, ‘feeling able to show and employ one’s
self without fear of negative consequences to self-image, status, or career’ (Kahn, 1990,
p. 708).4 Organization members are likely to feel safe when their work interactions reflect
mutual respect of their and others’ distinctive contributions and self-worth (Edmondson,
1999). Feeling safe allows organization members to explore novel or unpopular ideas free
from excessive worry about the risks, in contrast to fear which tends to narrow people’s
thinking and actions (Öhman, 2000). A feeling of safety facilitates cognitive flexibility and
problem solving because people who are calm are more likely to make associations among
ideas and to see more complex relations than those in an agitated state (Isen, 2000). In
work interactions, feeling secure causes members to be more relaxed, so that they can
debate and explore ideas with less defensiveness. Individuals who feel safe in taking inter-
personal risks tend to be more effective learners because they are more open to sharing
and discussing each other’s mistakes (Edmondson, 1999).
In sum, organizational learning sometimes needs to be initiated with dissatisfaction
about work unit performance that is below organization members’ aspirations or their key
stakeholders’ (e.g., customers) expectations. To be adaptive, this shared dissatisfaction
needs to be directed into improving work elements that members feel they have control
over, and thus can do something about. However, prolonged and heightened dissatisfac-
tion can sap morale and reduce learning efforts. Experiencing a contrasting emotional
state such as feeling safe allows members to openly share and learn from their mistakes,
propose unpopular viewpoints, and challenge each other’s perspectives, all of which facil-
itate organizational learning.
Proposition 3 Groups in which members feel dissatisfaction about their work unit per-
formance and safety in work interactions are likely to experience greater group learn-
ing than those where members feel either type of emotional state alone.
Summary of contributions and research implications

The strategy literature has often treated emotion as fostering organizational inflexibility
and inertia. I seek to nuance a predominantly negative view of emotion in the strategy lit-
erature by highlighting several conditions under which it can enhance the organization’s
dynamic capability. I propose a number of organization-based emotion eliciting actions
that could help generate patterns of positive and negative discrete emotions that prime
specific cognitive processing and collective action, facilitating the two strategic processes
that contribute to strategic agility: reducing the cost of strategic change and organiz-
ational learning.
Although I discuss these emotion pairs separately for conceptual clarity, in practice
various emotions could interact to facilitate one strategic process. I do not necessarily
suggest that these specific emotional states represent the most or the only important emo-
tions that facilitate a given strategic process. By articulating several illustrative links
between micro emotions and macro strategic processes, I invite other organizations and
strategy scholars to help explore the various ways in which many patterns of discrete
emotions could hinder or facilitate a variety of further strategic processes. Showing the
interaction between emotion, cognition, and organizational action supplements a predom-
inantly cognitive view of strategy (e.g., Porac et al., 1995; Zott, 2003).
I contribute to the strategy literature by proposing how emotion-eliciting actions can
enhance the two dynamic capability processes that shape the firm’s strategic agility.
Patterned emotion-eliciting actions can shape strong emotional capabilities performed by
members at all levels of the organization that, in turn, enhance the organization’s overall
dynamic capability to change, learn, and innovate. Very few studies have examined how
both positive and negative emotions can benefit organizational adaptation. The present
research departs from previous research on emotion management in organizations, which
has often relied on broad categories of positive and negative emotions (Staw et al., 1994;
Huy, 2002). A discrete emotion elicits distinct cognitive and action tendencies (Izard,
1993) and promises greater texture and predictive accuracy in our theorizing.
Future research
The model linking emotion to strategic agility could open new avenues for research in the
underexplored intersection of emotion management, organizational theory, and strategy
process. I suggest that beyond self-reported questionnaires and lab experiments that have
advanced our knowledge on emotion, the study of emotions at work can be enriched by
a repertoire of measurement tools that complement each other. Emotion management in
natural work settings and, more importantly, the organizational consequences of such
actions, can be studied in a number of different ways – both objective and subjective. For
instance, the level of organizational attention to the development of emotion manage-
ment practices may be measured by the proportion of organizational resources allocated
to emotion-attending routines such as budget, support groups, emotion training and
monitoring.
In addition, the overt nature of emotion management actions lends itself more easily
to outsider and peer observation and assessment (and thus to enhanced construct valid-
ity) via triangulation of private interviews, survey methods, company reports, and ethno-
graphic research in natural settings, all of which allow researchers to validate and enrich
participants’ self-reports (see Huy, 2002). While I posit that certain actions are more likely
to elicit the specified discrete emotion based on cognitive appraisal influenced by
social–psychological assumptions, I have also discussed the risk that, depending on the
context, various groups could appraise the same action differently and experience
different emotions (Hochschild, 1979). Put differently, the effectiveness of each emotion-
eliciting action can be assessed both by the desirable emotional state and by the resulting
behavior that state is intended to prime.
Notes
1. This does not imply that these groups should not have some autonomy to deal with various contradicting
situations and unpredictable events (Marcus, 1988).
2. The costs of change could include those relating to retraining and development of new competences, the
compensation costs of abandoning existing assets and people, the potential costs to external image, declin-
ing morale and productivity during transition periods (Tushman & Romanelli, 1985), downsizing costs
(Freeman & Cameron, 1993), and decline in innovation (Dougherty & Bowman, 1995).
3. In one case study of the merger between two large organizations with very different value systems (Huy &
Ramina, 2002), managers organized formal sessions with employees from both organizations. Employees
from each company group were asked first to articulate the traditional norms and values that they were proud
of and would like to maintain and those they felt embarrassed by and would like to abandon. Then the results
were shared with the other group. Employees discovered, much to their surprise, that the norms they were
proud of and embarrassed by resembled very much those of the other group. A shared understanding
between the two cultures was thus established about abandoning certain negative elements of each culture.
4. According to Elster’s (1998) and Russell’s (2003) definitions of emotions the emotional state of ‘feeling safe’
can be construed as psychobiological responses that link (i) belief of psychological safety about work rela-
tions, (ii) a core affect involving a modest level of pleasure, (iii) low physiological activation, and (iv) action
tendencies of relaxed, less vigilant or mistrusting behavior. These characteristics make ‘feeling safe’ close to
other emotional states such as ‘calmness’, ‘serenity’, or ‘being relaxed’ (see Seo at al., 2004, p. 426).
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35 Contested meanings and emotional dynamics in
strategic alliances
Rajesh Kumar
Introduction
Strategic alliances are a preferred organizational form for many companies in a competi-
tive global environment (e.g., Kumar & Nti, 1998; Das & Teng, 2000; Ariño et al., 2001;
Shenkar & Reuer, 2005). Alliances permit a firm to share risk, accelerate entry into new
markets, and/or learn from their partners, An alliance, as Luo (2005, p. 55) notes ‘is a
loosely coupled system in which the investing parties interdependently share existing
resources or jointly develop new resources while maintaining their respective parental
identities and resource control’. Alliances encompass a wide variety of alternative organ-
izational forms, ranging from non-equity ventures, to joint ventures. The popularity of
alliances goes hand in hand with their instability (e.g., Das & Teng, 2000). Alliance insta-
bility refers to the unplanned termination of the alliance by one or more of the partners
in the alliance (Inkpen & Beamish, 1997). A recent survey by Duysters et al. (2003) sug-
gests that the instability rate could be in the range of 40–70 per cent.
The issue of alliance instability has garnered a lot of attention in the literature and
scholars have proposed a multitude of variables to explain instability. Hamel (1991) pro-
posed that differences in the learning capability of the alliance partners created instabil-
ity. Thus, a firm which was able to outlearn its partner would have no qualms in dissolving
the alliance. Scholars have also recognized the importance of opportunistic behaviour
among potential competitors and have noted that this is a precursor of instability (e.g.,
Kogut, 1988; Das & Teng, 2000; Park & Ungson, 2001). Opportunistic behaviour, as Das
& Teng (1998, p. 482) note, manifests itself as ‘cheating, shirking, distorting information,
misleading partners, providing substandard products/services, and appropriating part-
ners’ critical resources’. The threat of opportunism may lead partners to restrict their
cooperation with their counterparts, and this restriction may in itself invite a self-fulfilling
prophecy. Instability has also been linked to the problem of attaining and maintaining
effective coordination among alliance partners (e.g., Gulati & Singh, 1998; Dekker, 2004;
White & Lui, 2005). Coordination is made difficult by differences in national culture (e.g.,
Kumar & Nti, 2004), and/or differences in level of alliance capability (e.g., Dyer et al.,
2001).
Although these explanations have merit, they are limited by the fact that they ignore
the interactional dynamics among managers (Leung & White, 2005). It must be noted that
managerial decision making plays an important role in determining alliance evolution.
This decision making need not always or consistently be embedded in notions of ratio-
nality. As De Rond (2003, p. 33) notes ‘A strong rationality whether assumed within single
alliances or at the population level may be less successful in accounting for the relative dis-
order, heterogeneity, and unmanageability of alliances, and the role of human agency in
shaping their evolution’. Leung and White (2005) identify a number of social cognitive
561
variables, such as personality traits, individual/group identity and affectivity, that may
play a role in compromising alliance rationality. Although their work is useful in reori-
enting the literature to a more micro organizational behaviour focus, and while affectivity
and affective outcomes are variables that they give attention to, the authors do not explic-
itly address the issue of emotional dynamics and how these dynamics may shape alliance
functioning.
The focus of this chapter is to delineate the role that emotions play in influencing
alliance development. Why should emotions be accorded an important place in alliance
theorizing? First and foremost, the study of affect in an organizational context is gaining
in importance (e.g., Brief & Weiss, 2002; Barsade et al., 2003; Ashkanasy, 2004) and in so
far as alliances represent an interorganizational context that is often complex and messy,
the importance of emotions in this context cannot be ignored. Second, alliances often
bring together partners with conflicting cultures (corporate/national), and/or conflicting
goals, and operate in an environment which is often turbulent. The potential for conflict,
is therefore always present, and given that emotions and conflict are closely intertwined
(Bodtker & Jameson, 2001) emotional dynamics are not likely to be far from the surface.
It is also worth noting that while emotions (unlike moods) are of a short duration, they
can nevertheless be profoundly disruptive to a relationship, and especially to fragile rela-
tionships such as alliances. Finally, scholars have also begun to highlight the concept of
emotional capability of organizations (Huy, 1999). Emotional capability is defined by
Huy (p. 325) as ‘an organization’s ability to acknowledge, recognize, monitor, discrimi-
nate, and attend to its members emotions, and it is manifested in the organization’s norms
and routines related to feeling Schein (1992)’. We could surmise that if alliance partners
have different levels of emotional capability they may experience difficulties in coordinat-
ing their activities and this difficulty may itself give rise to more emotions in the process.
The chapter begins by providing a brief overview of the concept of emotions and the
manner in which emotion has typically been studied in an organizational context. I then
outline the origins and consequences of emotions at the different stages of alliance devel-
opment. Although both positive and negative emotions can occur in an alliance setting,
negative emotions appear to be more commonplace given the competitive nature of many
alliances. This is not to say that positive emotions are unknown, and I shall provide an
illustrative example of the role that positive emotions can play. I conclude by discussing
the methodological challenges of studying the origins and consequences of emotions in
an alliance setting.
The concept of emotions

Emotions are high intensity affective states that are associated with a particular object
specific stimuli (e.g., Kumar, 1997; Barry et al., 2004). Emotions are not often controllable
by the different actors (e.g., Lawler & Thye, 1999) and therefore may disrupt any ongoing
activity. Positive emotions arise when the actors are able to attain their goals and negative
emotions reflect such an inability. The argument has been made that both positive and
negative emotions have positive as well as negative consequences (e.g., Kumar, 1997). For
example, positive emotions may induce the actors to avoid contentious behaviour
(Carnevale & Isen, 1986) and they may induce them to strengthen their commitment to a
relationship (Lawler & Yoon, 1993). At the same time, however, a positive emotional state
may lead to a less-careful information processing (Bless et al., 1988) and may be
Contested meanings and emotional dynamics 563
detrimental to an actor’s strategic interests (Parrott, 1994). Negative emotional states may
create a vicious circle in which the actors enact behaviours that escalate conflict (Kumar,
1997). On the positive side, negative emotional states signal clearly that the existing situ-
ation is untenable thereby inducing the actors to change their behaviour (Schwarz, 1990).
Emotion researchers have sought to study emotions from one of the two perspectives,
namely the dimensional or the categorical approach. The dimensional approach, which
is represented by the work of Russell (1980), argues that emotions can be characterized
on the basis of two dimensions, namely (a) pleasure versus displeasure; (b) high versus
low level of arousal. The alternative model postulates that emotions are better studied as
discrete states. It has been argued that there exist a set of basic emotions such as anger,
fear, sadness, disgust, surprise and happiness that have evolved over time to help indi-
viduals cope with their environment (e.g., Izard, 1992). It has been maintained that the
discrete affect approach allows us to make better sense of qualitatively different phe-
nomenological states (e.g., Lazarus, 1991; Lawler & Thye, 1999). For example, while
anger and fear may be very similar in terms of the circumplex framework proposed by
Russell (1980), they are qualitatively very different in that while anger leads to aggres-
sion, fear leads to withdrawal. A third approach to studying emotions is exemplified in
the social constructionist approach which maintains that emotions are a product of
negotiated meaning among the different actors (e.g., Barsade et al., 2003). Central to this
approach is the recognition that ‘as emotions are contextually defined, there are poten-
tially as many emotions, as there are situations’ (Kemper, 1978). Although the different
approaches to studying emotions may differ in their focus, or on locating the origins of
emotions, they are all united in their recognition that emotions have distinct behavioural
implications (Frijda, 1986). In their review, Barsade et al. (2003) note that much of
organizational research has not so far focused on the consequences of discrete emotions,
and even when discrete emotions have been looked at, the focus has been mainly on neg-
ative emotions.
Organizational scholars have, however, started to recognize that emotions can exist at
different levels within an organization (e.g., Ashkanasy, 2003). Ashkanasy draws a dis-
tinction between emotions that exist within an individual, those that exist between
persons, emotions that arise in interpersonal interactions, and group-level and organiz-
ation-wide emotion. The multi-layered character of emotion in an organizational setting
attests to the complexity of the phenomenon, and in particular, to the mutual interpene-
tration of emotions at different organizational levels. The complexity of this issue
increases when we expand our horizon to the interorganizational level, with few studies
so far looking at the role played by emotions in an interorganizational context (for excep-
tions, see Gould et al., 1999; Andersen & Kumar, 2006).
Recent work may, however, be seeking to overcome some limitations of existing
research. First, Andersen and Kumar in a theoretical contribution assessed the impact of
emotional states on buyer–seller relationships. The authors distinguish among the
different stages of the relationship (initiation, development, voluntary termination, forced
termination, re-establishment) and outline how the emotional states differ as a function
of the relationship stage. For example, at the initiation stage there is a certain element of
anxiety while at the forced termination stage there is anger. Anxiety is understandable at
the onset of any relationship as there is uncertainty concerning both the process and the
outcome of the relationship. Forced termination invites anger and may invite retaliation
from the other party as well as unfavourable attributional judgements. The authors also
relate the similarity or the dissimilarity of emotional states experienced by partners to the
nature of the interdependence that exists among the partners. Negative interdependence
implies dissimilarity of emotional states while positive interdependence implies similarity
of emotional states.
Maitlis and Ozcelik (2004) in a qualitative study assessed the role played by emotions
in the decision-making process at three symphony orchestras. This stream of work also
focuses on decision making, although the focus is more intraorganizational rather than
interorganizational as in Andersen and Kumar’s study. The authors distinguish between
three phases, namely inertia, detonation and containment, and suggest that different types
of discrete emotions are associated with each of the different phases. For example, inertia
leads to anxiety, detonation is associated with anger, fear and/or humiliation, while con-
tainment is associated with guilt and defensiveness. They characterize the decision-
making process that generates emotions as a toxic one.
Emotions have been studied by scholars from a variety of disciplinary backgrounds
(e.g., Ben-Ze’ev, 2000) and while there is undoubtedly a difference in emphasis among the
different approaches, they are united by the fact that in one form or another, they are
studying exchange processes of some sort (Lawler & Thye, 1999). It is this commonality
which unites the study of emotions, whether it emanates from studying exchange
processes between individuals, groups or organizations. This represents the departure
point for our study in which we seek to delineate the impact of emotions on alliances.
Emotions and the alliance developmental path

Scholars note that alliances evolve in a sequential manner over time (e.g., Ring & Van de
Ven, 1994; Kumar & Nti, 1998; Das & Teng, 2002). Ring and Van De Ven distinguish
between the stages of negotiations, commitments and execution. If the negotiation
process is successful, partners begin the process of implementing their commitments, and
if the process proceeds well then the partners either expand or lessen their commitment
to the venture. Kumar and Nti (1998) suggest that the evolution of the alliance is depen-
dent on how the partners are able to manage the process and outcome discrepancies that
often arise in an alliance. These discrepancies pose a problem when they are unfavourable.
Unfavourable process discrepancies are reflective of a problem in the way that the part-
ners interact with each other while unfavourable outcome discrepancies represent the
failure of the alliance partners to achieve their expected outcomes. In a more recent con-
tribution, Das and Teng (2000) suggest that alliances go through the stages of formation,
operation and outcome. The formation stage is essentially the negotiating phase of the
alliance, that is, when the alliance partners initiate discussions to explore the feasibility of
forming such an alliance. The operation stage is when the partners begin the process of
making the alliance operational while the outcome phase involves the alliance partners
assessing how the alliance has progressed. Although the frameworks differ in terms of
how they label the different stages, all of them address the fundamental issue of the
dynamics of an interdependent relationship.
For the purposes of this chapter I shall be relying on the framework developed by Das
and Teng. I choose this framework for several reasons. First, the framework describes in
a neat fashion the different stages through which the alliance evolves over time. Second,
the framework has an explicit temporal perspective embedded in it. Third, the framework
while drawing a distinction between the different stages also emphasizes the interdepen-
dence that exists among the three stages.
The origins and consequences of emotions in alliances: a developmental view
Formation stage At the formation stage, the potential partners initiate the process of
negotiation. Scholars have drawn a distinction between two contrasting approaches to
negotiation, namely the integrative versus the distributive approach (e.g., Walton &
McKersie, 1965; Lax & Sebenius, 1986). Integrative approaches involve information
sharing and the construction of new alternatives that may satisfy the interests of either
party. By contrast, distributive approaches involve the use of threats and/or positional
commitments to get the other party to concede or back down. Although the integrative
approach is often held to be the normative ideal, it is often difficult to attain because of a
variety of negotiator biases that the negotiators are often subject to (e.g., Bazerman &
Neale, 1992); constituency pressures (e.g., Lewicki & Litterer, 1985); or cultural and/or
institutional differences (e.g., Kumar & Worm, 2004). Emotions have the additional con-
sequence of further impeding such a process (e.g., Barry & Oliver, 1996; Kumar, 1997).
Negative emotions may create a negative vicious circle, heighten intergroup conflict, and
increase the rigidity of the parties.
If negotiation is a difficult process, it gets even more so in the context of alliances.
Alliance relationships are often forged among potential competitors (Ariño et al., 2001;
Hamel, 1991) and in an environment that is ever changing. There is always the fear, perhaps
an exaggerated one, that one may be taken advantage of by one’s potential partner. These
relationships also invite the partners to surrender some degree of control, albeit with the
recognition that this may yield benefits in the future. The surrender of control is not easy
for an individual; much less so for a large organization that may have historically preferred
to do things on its own. Alliance partners also represent different groups, and there is the
possibility that intergroup paranoia may develop (Kramer, 2004). Intergroup paranoia is
defined by Kramer (p. 221) as ‘beliefs – either false or exaggerated – held by members of
one group that cluster around ideas of being harassed, threatened, harmed, subjugated . . .
or vilified by a malevolent out-group or out-groups’. Each of the factors that has been
alluded to above is capable of generating emotion on its own and/or contributing to the
amplification of emotion that may initially have had other origins.
In other words, the situational context of an alliance may itself generate what Barry
and Oliver (1996) describe as ‘anticipatory negative emotional states’. Anticipatory emo-
tional states are a product of the alliance negotiators’ prior history, the situational context
of the exchange, and the dispositional affect of the alliance negotiators. Alliance nego-
tiators are, therefore, likely to enter the negotiation process with a negative emotional
tone, and this makes a positive negotiation outcome more difficult than might otherwise
have been the case.
The negotiation process is also likely to be circumscribed by the fact that relationship
initiation is inherently an ambivalent process. Emotional ambivalence is reflected in the
presence of two competing tendencies: approach and avoidance. Approach is associ-
ated with the prospect of positive emotions such as happiness which the actors hope will
emerge in interaction with their counterparts. By contrast, avoidance is associated
with negative emotions such as tension, anxiety or fear, whose presence signals the
potentiality of negative outcomes in the interaction. Thus, when the negotiators consider
the possibility of initiating a relationship they are likely to do so with an inbuilt positivist
and an inbuilt negativity bias (Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999). Without an inbuilt positivist
bias there may be little inclination to even consider the possibility of initiating a new rela-
tionship. Likewise, an inbuilt negativity bias is essential to prevent the actors from being
taken advantage of by their counterparts. There is a considerable amount of evidence to
suggest that individuals react more strongly to negative stimuli than they do to positive
stimuli (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994). This is consistent with a central premise of
Bowlby’s (1969) attachment theory that individuals need to feel secure to engage in
exploratory behaviour. Insecurity generates anxiety, compelling the individuals to dis-
tance themselves or withdraw from the situation. Theorists have often maintained that
attachment processes are likely to be particularly operative in unusual or challenging sit-
uations (Kobak & Duemmeler, 1994). The initiation of a strategic alliance with a poten-
tial competitor is one such situation.
The intergroup character of the negotiating situation is also a potential elicitor of
emotions in the negotiating phase (e.g., Williams, 2001; Kramer, 2004). Williams makes
the observation that intergroup relationships can be characterized in terms of whether
there exists a competitive outgroup interdependence or a cooperative outgroup interde-
pendence. Competitive outgroup interdependence implies that the other group repre-
sents a potential threat to the attainment of one’s goals, whereas cooperative outgroup
interdependence has the implication that the goals of both of the groups are positively
intertwined. Alliance relationships are likely to contain both of these elements, and the
relative balance of the two opposing elements determines the type of emotions that arise
in the interaction. Negative emotions may arise if there is intense competition among
the potential partners to attain the best possible outcome and/or there are conflicts
stemming from the partners’ different ways of doing things (ibid.). Kramer (2004) the-
orizes that intergroup paranoia may often generate moral aggression. This refers to the
negativity of emotional states and emerges when people feel that they have been treated
in an unjust manner by their counterparts. The consequences of moral aggression are
often severe. Moral aggression generates a desire for revenge and retaliatory actions
(ibid.).
A good example of this is provided by the negotiations that took place between Alpha
Shanghai and their partner Sun Yu Moped (Everatt, 1999). Alpha Gearing Systems
Shanghai represented a joint venture between Alpha Gearing Systems, a US-based
company that was engaged in the production of products/services geared towards motor-
ized vehicles, and Kai Li Machine Systems, which was one of China’s major manufac-
turers of moped/motorcycles gearing systems. San Yu Moped was also a joint venture
between San Yu of China and an American company, Excel Motors, with the Chinese
holding an 80 per cent stake in the company. The tensions between the two companies
revolved around the shipment of parts from Alpha Shanghai to San Yu Moped. At the
beginning the relationship was convivial, with Alpha Shanghai willing to go out of its way
to help San Yu. Subsequently a six-month contract was signed without a clear agreement
on the price. This was followed by a further three-month extension with the price issue
continuing to remain unresolved. This represented the tipping-point in the relationship,
and Julie Nelson the General Manager, finally lost patience. She suspected her partner
San Yu of acting in ways that benefited Alpha Shanghai’s competitors. It was also the case
that until this point, San Yu had still not made any payments for the parts that had been
shipped. This led Nelson to finally issue an ultimatum to San Yu that if the companies
were unable to sign a contract, the relationship was over.
This example illustrates several of the arguments that we have made earlier. First, the
interaction over time took on the characteristics of a paranoid intergroup relationship
with suspicions feeding on each other. Second, in any alliance, there is always the fear that
one may be taken advantage of by one’s partner, and this relationship was no exception
to this trend. Third, in all new relationships there is the tension between approach and
avoidance and the participant’s behaviour exemplified this well.
The presence of negative emotions at the formation stage of the alliance impacts on
alliance development by influencing the nature of the negotiating process. If negative
emotions are of high intensity and occur frequently during the negotiating process, the
probability of a successful negotiation outcome is diminished. Alternatively, even if the
parties are able to arrive at an agreement, the residual negative sentiment generated by
negative emotions may adversely affect the stability of the negotiated agreement over
time. Finally, the emergence of negative emotions may, at the very least, prolong the nego-
tiation process, thereby increasing the transaction costs of forming an alliance. In sum,
while negative emotions may not automatically deliver a death blow to the negotiating
process, they are, without question, likely to impact on the process negatively. The
difficulties experienced by the Dutch telecommunications operator KPN in negotiating
an alliance with a Curacaon telecom operator illustrate these observations. A Curacaon
consultant noted:
I think that his style [the KPN negotiator] made no good impression. He contributed to the neg-
ative image of European Dutch. The person is European Dutch, he is arrogant – you take a
dislike to him because he is European Dutch. Coincidentally, he is in telecommunications, so you
have something against telecommunications. (Interview with Curacaon consultant). (Cited in
van Marrewijk, 2004, p. 307)
Operation stage This is when the alliance partners begin the task of making the alliance
a concrete reality. The partners start sharing information, defining their respective roles
and responsibilities, and establishing a managerial mechanism for implementing their
stated strategic intent. The operational stage of an alliance raises problems of oppor-
tunism and coordination (e.g., Gulati & Singh, 1998; Park & Ungson, 2001; Luo, 2005).
Opportunistic behaviour or the threat of one is potentially present in all alliances as the
partners are more often than not engaged in mixed-motive interaction (e.g., Luo, 2005).
Opportunistic behaviour heightens the saliency of private control at the expense of col-
lective control. Private control, as Luo (p. 57) suggests, is characterized by ‘covert mea-
sures and hidden tactics, such as manipulating board decisions, dominating critical value
chain activities, blocking technology transfer, and controlling cash flows’. Collective
control, by contrast, is always overt and is ‘executed jointly by all parties to guide,
monitor, and oversee alliance activities, and pursue joint profit’ (ibid.). Coordination
problems in alliances stem from the fact that alliance partners may have different cultures
(corporate/national), different levels of alliance capability, differential capability of
dealing with uncertainty/ambiguity, and/or agency problems stemming from the fact
that the interests of the alliance managers and the parent organization may not be per-
fectly aligned (e.g., Park & Ungson, 2001). The presence of opportunism and/or
difficulties in coordination is a condition that often gives rise to negative emotions. First,
both opportunism and lack of coordination disrupt the goal-oriented activity of the
alliance partners and, as scholars have noted, disruption of goal-oriented activity is a pre-
cursor for the emergence of negative emotions (e.g., Mandler, 1975; Lazarus, 1991).
Second, opportunism may invite attributions of betrayal and/or the perception that one
has not been treated fairly, and the lack of fairness gives rise to negative emotions (e.g.,
Kumar, 1997). Third, the coordination problems, and the inability of the partners to deal
with them effectively, may also fuel frustration, and especially so if the problems have per-
sisted for a significant period. These problems may be magnified by the emergence of emo-
tional contagion in either alliance member (Hatfield et al., 1992). Emotional contagion
refers to the transmission of emotions among organizational members without the medi-
ating role of interpretation. The dominant coalition in either partner firm that makes
judgements about their partner’s intentions may be susceptible to influences emanating
from how emotionally expressive some members of that coalition are. Although studies
have yet to confirm conclusively that the emotional contagion effects of negative emotions
are stronger than those of positive emotions (Barsade, 2002), given the high stakes that
are involved in entering into an alliance, the possibility that the contagion effects of neg-
ative emotions are likely to be stronger than those of positive emotions may well hold true
in this context.
A good example of a relationship where opportunistic behaviour or the perception of
opportunism derailed the alliance was the Meiji–Borden alliance. The companies had
been partners for more than 20 years, with Meiji distributing Borden’s products in Japan
in exchange for technological assistance from the company. The relationship began to
experience problems when the sales of Borden’s products in Japan started slowing down.
Borden company executives accused the Japanese of destroying the relationship between
the parties. Senior executives at Borden were extremely angry. The perspective of the
Japanese partner, by contrast, was radically different. Meiji attributed the problem to
overoptimistic market projections and denied their role in shaping Borden’s outcomes in
the Japanese market. It is perhaps not a coincidence that not long after this Meiji brought
out a product that was in direct competition with Borden’s brand (Cauley de la Sierra,
1995). The relationship was subsequently dissolved amidst bitter acrimony. The intense
anger experienced by Borden’s executives at what they perceived as a treacherous betrayal,
coupled with Meiji’s total non-recognition of the issue, made the dissolution all but
inevitable.
Another dramatic example of an alliance that was impeded by perceptions of oppor-
tunism and/or poor coordination is the Robotic Artificial Intelligence Design Group joint
venture (Gould et al., 1999). This alliance brought together three potential competitors,
namely Advanced Robotics, General Robotics and R-Tech International. The project was
viewed as critical to the success of the US manufacturing industry and was enthusiasti-
cally supported by the US government. As Gould et al. (p. 702) note: ‘Each had a different
level or type of experience in robotics and/or artificial intelligence, and each brought a
different corporate culture, and mode of operating to the Design Group organization’.
The authors point out that the initial conditions were not conducive to creating a positive
climate. For example, General Robotics considered itself to be the most qualified in robot-
ics, and yet the leadership of the project was handed over to Advanced Robotics. These
initial conditions, coupled with the interactional dynamic that developed, created tensions
at numerous organizational levels within the alliance. The venture was characterized by a
lot of ambivalence and anxiety, and the initiation of social defence mechanisms. A high
degree of paranoia had developed among the alliance members. As the authors note
(p. 708): ‘These behaviours, in which staff from three companies engaged, often led to
intense and chronic squabbling, as each projected all of the difficulties onto the others,
and accused them of withholding, being uncooperative, wrong minded, obstinate, not up
to the task and worse’. This paranoia was a reflection of the fact that the partners felt that
their collaborators may act opportunistically which, in turn, not only impeded coordina-
tion but also intensified their paranoid concerns. The authors also make the interesting
observation that the pattern of emotional dynamics was different at different organiz-
ational levels. For example, while the project staff often displayed paranoid concerns, the
top management maintained a very cordial relationship with one another. Furthermore,
even when they were cognizant of the differences that existed among them, these conver-
sations were conducted in a very polite manner. Gould et al. point out that the alliance
partners had seemingly developed a set of defences against anxiety as manifested in the
fight/flight tendency.
Although negative emotions may well be commonplace in alliances, positive emotions
are not necessarily a rarity. The alliance between Renault and Nissan has attracted a lot
of attention in the business press as it has been by many accounts a very successful alliance
(Segrestin, 2005). This is especially surprising in view of the fact that there was a huge cul-
tural gap between the parties. These potential difficulties were exacerbated by Nissan’s
precarious financial situation at the onset of the alliance, and the failure of Renault’s pre-
vious alliance with Volvo. Indeed, conventional wisdom held that this alliance would not
succeed. However, much to the surprise of everyone, the alliance has surpassed expecta-
tions and the personal chemistry between the different groups has been a very positive
one. Scholars note that one of the unique aspects of this alliance was the fact that the part-
ners were able to construct/create a collective identity. Perhaps it was this joint construc-
tion that created such a positive emotional climate among the organizational members.
This is both remarkable and unique as theorists note that identities in an alliance emerge
fairly early on in the process and do not change that easily (Salk & Shenkar, 2001). Positive
affect is likely to facilitate the construction of this new identity as it broadens the linkages
between thought and action, lessens the impact of negative emotions, helps the different
actors to strengthen their personal resources, and creates an upward spiral of emotional
well-being (Fredrickson, 2001). The broaden-and-build theory of positive emotions sug-
gests ‘that positive emotions, although fleeting, also have more lasting consequences’
(ibid., p. 224). It has been argued that positive emotions are not only a signal of well-
being, but rather that they also promote well-being. When considered in conjunction with
emotional contagion, it is perhaps not surprising that the generation of positive affect can
have powerful consequences.
A major theme to emerge from our review is that the negative emotions that emerge
during the operational stage of the alliance can decisively influence how the alliance
develops over time. Negative emotions may cause the partners to distrust each other
(Jones & George, 1998); may reduce their desire to interact with each other (Allred et al.,
1997); and may reduce affective satisfaction (Shapiro, 2005). Affective satisfaction refers
to the degree to which the actors feel satisfied with the emotions that were generated
during the interactional encounter. It may also promote retaliatory actions on the part
of either party, which may have the additional consequence of either creating and/or
strengthening the perception of procedural injustice. The emergence of procedural injus-
tice may intensify the negative emotions that emerged in the first instance, and the greater
the emotional contagion the greater the potential impact of these emotions. Of course,
I do not wish to imply that negative emotions will ipso facto lead to the collapse of the
alliance. Negative emotions also serve an important social information function
(Schwarz, 1990), and if their informational value is processed by the participants in a
functional way, then these emotions may help the alliance partners to strategically
restructure the alliance in a timely way. If, by contrast, emotional dynamics are ignored
or explained away as happened in the Robotics Artificial joint venture, the alliance will
surely not prosper. Although negative emotions may well be highly salient in alliance
functioning, positive emotions may not necessarily be absent altogether, as the Renault–
Nissan alliance suggests. In sum, the operational stage of the alliance is that crucial stage
in the alliance life cycle which often has an important impact on the dynamics of alliance
evolution.
Outcome stage The outcome stage involves the evaluation of the alliance outcomes in
relation to each partner’s expectations for the alliance. This is a subjective as well as a
political process that is inherently emotional in character. The alliance partners may have
different criteria for evaluating the success or failure of an alliance. Some may focus on
learning, others on short-term profitability, and still others on using alliances as a way of
building their alliance capability. Different criteria have the implication that the alliance
may be a success for one of the partners but a failure for the other, with differing emo-
tions occurring in different organizations. Evaluation of alliance outcomes is also a
process that occurs at multiple organizational levels (Kumar & Andersen, 2000). The
functional managers may evaluate the alliance one way; alliance general managers may
evaluate it in another, while the top-level management may have an altogether different
perspective. Alliance evaluation is a highly messy process in that the emotional dynamics
that occur here may be generated not only by how the alliance does in an ‘objective sense’
but also by the intraorganizational dynamics in each of the partner firms. When coupled
with the fact that managers in the partnering firms may or may not have similar emotional
reactions to alliance outcomes, a second-order emotional reaction may occur, as the part-
ners try to make sense of their counterpart’s reaction. In other words, the outcome stage
involves the emergence of emotions at multiple levels within and across organizations, and
this creates a feedback dynamic that may either amplify or dampen the effect of emotions.
Implicit in our line of reasoning is the recognition that emotional and political dynamics
are often closely intertwined (Vince, 2006). Expression of emotional reactions among
organizational members may have powerful political consequences, and likewise political
structures may constrain the ways in which organizational members enact or manage their
emotions. The undoing of the Volvo–Renault alliance came about in large part because
of the dissatisfaction of middle and junior management in the Swedish organization,
notwithstanding the strong positive synergies that existed at the top-management level
(Bruner & Spekman, 1998). When negative emotions are highly salient, the partner(s) may
not only decide to exit the alliance, but also consider the possibility of changing their
alliance strategy. At one extreme, this may involve deciding to give up on alliances, but at
the other spectrum, it may lead them to greater selectivity both in terms of the partner
and the organizational form that they choose. This decision process, and in particular the
impact of emotions on it, has not as yet been studied in any great depth by alliance
researchers, but it is a line of inquiry well worth pursuing.
Studying emotions in an alliance setting: the key methodological challenges

The study of emotions is methodologically challenging (e.g., Barry et al., 2004; Kumar,
2004). Scholars have often used mixed motive simulations in a lab setting to study the
impact of emotions in a negotiation setting, but concerns remain as to whether these set-
tings can adequately capture the full range of emotions that participants may experience
in a real-life setting. There is the additional issue as to whether it is possible to detect with
reliable certainty ‘the full range of emotional expression and experience that occurs’
(Barry et al., 2004, p. 87). It is also worth bearing in mind that emotional dynamics unfold
over time and measures of emotions are most accurate when measured at the onset of the
emotional cycle (Levenson, 1988). The problem is that in real time it is hard to know when
the emotional cycle begins and when it ends (Kumar, 2004). These problems are exacer-
bated when one studies emotions in an intercultural context, as cultures vary both in
terms of the kind of emotions they experience and how they might express them (ibid.).
Studying emotional dynamics in alliances invites all of the above-mentioned problems,
in addition to creating new ones. First, alliances are a complex interorganizational phe-
nomenon, with intricate patterns of feedback embedded within them. This means that while
one could explicitly study emotional dynamics at a particular interorganizational interface,
assessing its full impact would require a detailed multi-level study of the organization.
Second, alliances evolve over time, and with the exception of cases where emotions have an
immediate impact on the alliance, emotional dynamics may play themselves out over time.
But as time elapses, so do emotions, and the partners’ interpretation of the alliance may
consequently change. Many alliances often involve more than two partners, and untangling
the emotional dynamics in these alliances is likely to get a little trickier. In addition, if one
considers the fact that many alliances cross national boundaries, we have a further compli-
cation. One must also consider the possibility that while the emotions experienced by part-
ners may be genuine enough, there is the likelihood that in some instances, the actors may
deliberately feign emotions to extract concessions from their counterparts.
While I recognize the difficulties facing alliance researchers in untangling the impact of
emotions, this is a challenge that should be confronted. However, doing this may require
us to reorient the way in which we approach the study of emotions. The use of ethno-
graphic approaches may be as relevant in the alliance context as it is in other social set-
tings such as negotiation (Barry et al., 2004). Qualitatively oriented studies may enable us
to get a better sense of how the different actors construe the situation. Given that alliance
partners often impose their own meaning on the situation, and that these meanings are
often shaped by emotions, an interpretative understanding of the alliance is surely helpful.
Just as political dynamics may both mobilize as well as constrict the unfolding emotional
processes, in a similar vein, emotional processes may create their own political dynamic,
and exploring the richness of these dynamics is surely a worthwhile exercise.
New directions
This chapter has made the case for the necessity of studying emotions in an alliance
setting. Drawing on a line of inquiry which suggests that micro variables should be better
integrated with macro variables in the study of alliances, I have highlighted the role and
the consequences (both positive and negative) of emotions in this strategic context. The
argument has been made that alliances evolve through a series of stages, and that the
origins and the consequences of emotions are somewhat distinct at these phases.
This approach to studying alliances has important theoretical as well as methodologi-
cal implications. From a theoretical perspective, the incorporation of emotions represents
a trend towards an interpretative or a symbolic approach for studying alliances. This is
especially useful in view of the fact that the different alliance partners bring with them
different cultures (national/corporate) which they enact in their capacity as an alliance
partner. In other words, the symbolic element is always strongly present in alliances,
whether or not the alliance partners acknowledge that to be the case. If the alliance is per-
forming well, the symbolic element may well remain partially hidden, but if not, it is likely
to make its presence felt directly. Such an approach to studying alliances has only been
infrequently attempted so far, and apart from its novelty, has the intrinsic merit of pro-
viding us with a good understanding of how alliances evolve over time. This is an essen-
tial complement to the macro-oriented approaches that have been dominant in the extant
literature. I hope that this chapter provides the impetus for scholars to extend work along
these lines.
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36 How to build a healthy emotional culture and
avoid a toxic culture
Charmine E.J. Härtel
Introduction
The recognition of organizational cultures as shadow systems that nurture and buttress all
other organizational systems has urged the need for a more humanistic approach to man-
agement. As organizations ultimately consist of individuals, it is futile to contemplate
management of organizations without giving due consideration to their human aspects
such as emotions, moods, relationships and well-being. Nevertheless, it remains the under-
lying purpose of managing the human side of organizations to engender emotional com-
mitment which eventuates in financial gain (Barley & Kunda, 1992). The increasing
recognition of problems associated with negative work environments and toxic emotions is
leading organizations to rethink and refocus their organizational culture in order to obtain
the benefits associated with a highly engaged workforce and a positive work environment.
The proliferation of literature on emotions and emotional processes at work attests to
the surge of interest on individuals’ experiences, moods, and expression of emotions at
work (Ashkanasy et al., 2000; Fredrickson, 2001; Herkenhoff, 2004). Similarly, within the
area of social psychology, there is a growing body of literature that discusses how culture
influences the way in which individuals experience, express and respond to emotions at
work (Triandis, 1994; Tiedens, 2000). However, such discussions are largely limited to
analysing national cultures, and have thus overlooked the impact that organizational
culture has on emotions at work. To this end, this chapter aims to evaluate organizational
culture in relation to emotions experienced at work, and further elaborates on how a
healthy emotional culture can be built in an organization by ensuring the function of a
positive emotional learning cycle.
The link between emotions and culture
Application of affective events theory (AET)

Weiss and Cropanzano’s (1996) affective events theory postulates that specific work events
produced by environmental features can provoke either positive or negative affective expe-
riences in a person. These experiences can subsequently interrupt an individual’s current
behaviour and lead to specific action tendencies and attitudinal changes. The way in which
organizational culture adds into this equation can be explained by the intrinsic influence
that culture has on the work context through shaping artefacts, espoused values and
underlying assumptions (Schein, 1992). Thus, organizational culture has a pivotal role in
determining what affective events take place in an organization, and how they will be
interpreted and responded to by organizational members.
In establishing a connection between affective events experienced by employees
and organizational culture, it is important to understand the concept of an affective
575
experience. Affective experiences, as described in AET, are complex phenomena that

encapsulate both the moods and the emotions of individuals. Therefore, when establish-
ing the link between affect and organizational culture, a distinction should be made
between moods as affective states, and emotions as affective states. Moods and emotions
can be conceptually differentiated. Moods are diffuse, low-intensity, long-lasting states
without any particular object or focus, even without a known antecedent. On the other
hand, emotions are episodic and event/object specific, usually with a definite cause and a
cognitive content that leads to specific behavioural and attitudinal implications (Frijda,
1993; Scherer, 2000). For this discussion, the study of emotions is more relevant because:
(i) the cognitive component of emotions enables the study of the impact that different
meaning structures have on people, (ii) the action tendencies attached to emotions allow
the study of behavioural and attitudinal changes, (iii) the neuropsychological effects of
emotions lead to the subsequent analysis of employees’ physical and psychological well-
being, and (iv) the communicative function of emotions permits the evaluation of how
cultural norms and display rules regulate emotional expression or suppression in organ-
izations (Stratton, 2005). In addition to the AET perspective, the relationship between
emotion and culture has been evaluated from divergent standpoints, some of which are
presented next.
Culture as an emotional need

According to Trice and Beyer (1993), cultures are infused with emotion and meaning for
individuals as they provide them with psychological safety when coping with the uncer-
tainties and anxieties of life. These authors argue that culture is ‘emotionally charged’ as
people relish established cultural beliefs and practices, and often react emotionally when
certain cultural norms are infringed. In a similar vein, Halloran (2007) argues that culture
fulfils a person’s emotional need for belonging and defines one’s purpose for existing. Thus,
the commitment that individuals show in their allegiances to cultural ideologies is more a
result of emotional needs than a result of rational decision making (Beyer & Niño, 2001).
Culture as a regulatory tool of emotions

Anthropologists have long suggested that cultures have conventions and norms that
influence the management of emotions and create commonality and predictability among
individuals in their interpretation and response to emotional stimuli (Ekman, 1980; Lutz,
1988; Herkenhoff, 2004). For example, Triandis argued that culture has important impli-
cations for the type of emotions most likely to be experienced and expressed by individ-
uals. To illustrate this, Triandis (1994) hypothesized that collectivists who resist isolated
attention will experience more positive emotions than individualists when they express
modesty in acknowledging personal achievement. In contrast, individualists who like to
be singled out from the crowd when acknowledging their achievements will feel more pos-
itive emotions than collectivists. Such a view is also postulated by Parkinson (1995) who
argues that ‘an individual emotion is not something basic and essential that could sens-
ibly exist apart from its interpersonal manifestations or the cultural categories that allow
it to be interpreted’ (p. 12). For this reason, emotions should be studied in relation to the
culture and context in which emotion-eliciting events take place.
Adopting an anthropological perspective on emotions, Cherniss and Goleman (2001)
explained that culture influences the emotional process by first influencing how an
How to build a healthy emotional culture and avoid a toxic culture 577
emotion-eliciting event is interpreted and then influencing the response. For example, a
simple prank played on a co-worker can be considered as highly offensive, embarrassing
and inappropriate in a stringent work culture; however, the same prank played in a more
collegial work culture may only result in light-hearted humour. For instance, Middleton
(1989) states: ‘each culture produces a lexicon of emotions words that orders the emo-
tional experiences of individuals’ (p. 192). Therefore, an individual’s interpretation of an
affective event, and the subsequent strength of the emotions experienced, are largely
dependent on how that particular event was assessed previously in the same cultural
context.
In line with this argument, the first point at which culture influences an individual’s
emotional process is at the interpretation stage. The interpretation of an affective event
based on cultural norms leads to the fact that there is a degree of emotional learning on
the part of an individual in a given cultural context. To explain this further, Ortony et al.
(1988) state that emotions can be reactive, routine or reflective. Reactive emotions are
those that are hard-wired, which require minimal or no amount of cognitive interpreta-
tion. These are universally interpreted emotions, such as fear when a person is confronted
with a tiger. Emotions that are routine and reflexive on the other hand are those that
individuals learn to interpret in a given cultural context. Routine emotions have well-
institutionalized interpretations and require little cognitive appraisal. Reflective emotions
require self-reflection, learning and higher-order cognitive appraisals.
As interpretations of routine and reflexive emotions are both influenced by culture, it
is evident that culture has an impact on whether such interpretations lead to functional
or dysfunctional emotional states. For example, in an unhealthy or toxic work culture, a
simple gesture of friendliness can be interpreted with scepticism and doubt due to a lack
of trust. Therefore, in a toxic culture where doubt and scepticism are the prevalent cul-
tural norms, the most obvious outcomes would be toxic emotions such as fear and anxiety.
Moreover, even the individuals who newly join such work cultures will complete an emo-
tional learning cycle which would acculturate them into knowing how to interpret events
that happen in the organization according to prevalent cultural norms. In such a scenario,
the end state would be a self-reinforcing negative emotional learning cycle that could lead
individuals, groups and organizations to dysfunctions.
A second important point at which organizational culture impacts the emotional
process of individuals is the response stage. Organizational cultures have implicit emo-
tional display rules that imply what are socially desirable emotions in a given context
(Hochschild, 1983; Morris & Feldman, 1996). This leads to the concept of ‘emotional
labour’, which refers to the way in which individuals change or manage emotions to make
them appropriate or consistent with a situation, a role, or an expected organizational
behaviour such as those dictated by organizational culture (Mumby & Putnam, 1992).
Emotional labour is intrinsically linked to the concept of display. Display rules are the
social norms that dictate which emotions can be expressed when, by whom and to whom
(Triandis, 1994). One of the main reasons why individuals engage in emotional labour is
because people who deviate from culturally accepted display rules may have to face neg-
ative social sanctions (Hutson-Comeaux & Kelly, 2002). Also, according to Tiedens
(2000), such display rules can become embedded in cultures, so that the culture itself will
reflect how an event is supposed to be appraised over time. This is evident in Mumby and
Putnam’s (1992) discussion on emotional labour, where the authors state: ‘regarding the
cultural management of emotions, feelings are not only stripped away from the personal
and private, they are also “objectified” as part of an organizational system that members
treat as inevitable and immutable’ (p. 473). The regulatory power that organizational
culture has on emotional experiences and expressions effectively acts as an implicit control
mechanism over employees.
Cultures that advocate emotional labour to the extent that it disengages a person from
his or her own self-identity could be psychologically demeaning. Emotional expression
is also found to be an important aspect of an individual’s physical and mental health
(House et al., 1988; King & Emmons, 1990). For instance, research indicates that dis-
sonance between a person’s will to express emotions and cultural norms against it could
lead to possible physical symptoms and even illnesses such as arthritis, asthma, breast
cancer and coronary heart disease (King & Emmons, 1991; Pennebaker, 1995). Despite
this, it is essential that individuals exert a reasonable degree of emotional regulation to
effectively collaborate in groups and work cohesively. Côté et al. (2006), termed this
‘wise emotional regulation’. Wise emotional regulation is a process which has an emo-
tional regulation goal, a strategy, an implementation plan, and most importantly, it is
adaptable to a given cultural context. A healthy emotional culture has a degree of emo-
tional regulation that is similar to Côté et al.’s notion of wise emotional regulation. It
is sufficient for individuals to function effectively in collaboration with others, yet does
not deprive the individual of his or her authentic self in the workplace. Most import-
antly, it does not affect a person’s physical, psychological or emotional well-being
adversely.
Emotional culture as a subset of organizational culture

Emotional culture represents the emotional ambience in an organization and can be
viewed as a subset of the overarching organizational culture. Depending on the affective
events that take place in an organization, and how those events are interpreted and reacted
to, the emotional culture of an organization can transpire to be healthy or toxic for its
members.
In describing a healthy emotional culture, certain analogies can be made between
organizations and families as social institutions where people interact and form relation-
ships on a daily basis. To this end, the literature on family contributes to the understand-
ing of a ‘healthy, emotional culture’ in organizations. For instance, Hill et al.’s (2003)
description of a functional family that is supportive of individual growth has direct rele-
vance to the notion of a ‘healthy emotional culture’. Hill et al. argue that, in a family,
effective interpretation and responses to emotions should be underpinned by a confidence
that there is a shared interpretative frame held in common by family members. That is to
say, humour is interpreted as humour not criticism, and sadness is interpreted as sadness
and not anger. When the members feel confident in relating to the shared interpretative
frame, they can also be confident that differences in the way they think and feel are real
(ibid., p. 216):
[I]ndividuality grows within an environment of family connections and is dependent upon this
experience of family membership. Family interactions that accurately appreciate an individual’s
developmental status and personal experiences provide the foundation for a coherent sense of
self and reinforce the individual’s personal contribution to family life. When communication can
be trusted, individuals will have a confident sense of self within family.
In an organization, the ‘shared interpretative framework’ is provided by the organiz-

ational culture as was explained before. This becomes the basis for interpretation of
affective events in an organization and subsequent emotional responses. As in the context
of a family, it is necessary that individuals are willing to place their confidence and trust
in the shared interpretative framework of an organization. This provides individuals with
psychological safety, enabling them to express their emotions without fear of being vul-
nerable to others, misinterpreted or misrepresented to their own disadvantage.
A second implication that can be drawn from a healthy family climate is that it allows
for a person’s self-identity and growth. This means that the collectiveness in a healthy
family does not suffocate its members with in-group conformity, nor does the individual-
ism create isolation and a lack of belongingness. Extreme collectivism and extreme indi-
vidualism in a family culture are equally bad for a person’s growth and well-being. Thus,
the crux of a healthy family lies in the fact that it is in a balanced state of individualism
and collectivism. To that end, individual members of a family are accepted as unique indi-
viduals who have their own identities and growth potentials that belong to one unified
social entity. Similarly, it is argued that both cultural suffocation and isolation engender
toxic emotions in very different ways, and thereby represent unhealthy states of an organ-
ization’s culture. A healthy emotional culture on the other hand occurs in between these
two states where the intensity of the organization’s culture is felt by the individual at
moderate levels (see Figure 36.1).
In further explaining this concept, the two extreme stages where toxic emotions are
experienced by individuals will be looked at first.
Extremely collectivist cultures

Cultures that advocate extreme collectivism can create a work climate that produces toxic
emotions for a number of reasons. In highly collective cultures, individuality gets sup-
pressed by the need to fit into a single template of a ‘typical’ employee from a certain
company, such that employees repress their own personality styles at work. Repression of
true personality traits could lead to cognitive and emotional dissonance and even the loss
of self-identity at work (Simpson & Stroh, 2004). Highly collectivist cultures are charac-
terized by co-dependence, which can limit a person’s individual growth initiative and self-
leadership. To this end, when culture superimposes itself on people to become one
collective entity, it can retard the potential of the individual and undermine individual
achievement. In such a context, individuals are bound to experience toxic emotions. First,
individuals feel anxious due to not being able to reveal their authentic self at work.
Second, they feel frustrated due to the limited growth potential. And third, they feel
worthless due to a lack of personal recognition.
Cultures that exert extreme collectivism also encourage individuals to exercise emotional
labour. Deci and Ryan (1985) differentiate between two types of self-regulation: (i)
autonomous and (ii) controlled. Autonomous self-regulation is where behaviour is regu-
lated by a person’s own choice and has an internal locus of causality. Controlled self-
regulation on the other hand is pressured or coerced by external forces (such as
organizational culture) and has an external locus of causality. Although autonomous self-
regulation has been associated with well-being and other positive outcomes such as edu-
cation (Grolnick et al., 1991) and relationships (Blais et al., 1990), coerced self-regulation
has been linked to a number of negative repercussions. For example, in a study conducted
Extreme individualism Extreme collectivism

Unhealthy emotional culture Healthy emotional culture Unhealthy emotional culture
(toxic emotions present) (toxic emotions absent) (toxic emotions present)
Emotion evoking cultural attributes Emotion evoking cultural attributes Emotion evoking cultural attributes
High independence– High trust Co-dependence
low group identity Interdependence High group identity, low personal
Neglect Justice identity
Lack of/poor communication Good quality LMX and TMX Suffocation
Poor LMX and TMX Psychological safety Coerced self-regulation
Isolation Wise emotional regulation Group think
Lack of belongingness Emotional expression without fear Lack of whistle-blowers
No support network Self-identity and growth allowed In-group conformity pressure
Lack of shared interpretative Balanced state of individualism and Repression of true self
framework collectivism Cognitive dissonance
Lack of psychological safety Confidence in shared interpretative Emotional dissonance
Competitive framework Lack of personal growth
Uncooperative No outgroups Low self-efficacy
Destructive conflict High subjective well-being Low subjective well-being
Self-interest-driven action Personal resilience Lack of self-leadership
Low subjective well-being High self-efficacy Low morale
Low morale Low destructive conflict Suppression of dissent
Low organizational citizenship High cooperation Diversity closed
behaviour High socio-emotional support Energy draining
Dysfunctional coping strategies High compassion Dysfunctional coping strategies
Energy draining Positive appraisal
Problem-focused coping
Organizational citizenship
behaviour
Diversity open
Participative safety
Energy giving
High learning
Functional coping strategies
Emotional experience over time Emotional experience over time Emotional experience over time
Infrequent experience of Frequent experience of Infrequent experience of
positive emotions and frequent positive emotions (such as positive emotions and
experience and/or unresolved optimistic, trustful, hopeful, frequent experience and/or
negative emotions (such as lonely, enthusiastic, caring, content, unresolved negative emotions
angry, afraid, dejected, distrustful, happy, proud, self-fulfilled, (such as anxious, frustrated,
depressed, hopeless, discontented, satisfied) and constructive resentful, depressed, humiliated,
envious, frustrated, irritated, management of negative emotions bitter, remorseful, afraid, hurt,
miserable, nervous, jealous, unfulfilled, discontented)
bitter, contemptuous)
Healthy for
Healthy for individual Healthy for groups
organization
Figure 36.1 Conceptualization of a healthy emotional culture

by Simpson and Stroh (2004), it was found that women who were compelled to adapt fem-
inine display rules that required them to suppress negative emotions and stimulate positive
emotion at work, suffered from emotional dissonance and personal inauthenticity at work.
In an extremely collectivist work setting, emotional regulation is most often coerced by
the culture. Hence, individuals tend to be reluctant to express emotions, especially nega-
tive emotions that could damage the team spirit, or attract too much attention to oneself
as being ‘difficult’ to work with. Although a degree of emotional regulation is a prereq-
uisite to function effectively in groups, emotional labour at a higher level could have
significant adverse effects on the individual. For example, studies have related repression
of negative emotions to heart disease and suppressed immune functioning (Goldstein
et al., 1988; Schwartz, 1990). At a macro-organizational level, extreme levels of collec-
tivism could discourage whistle-blowers and individuals who stand up to organizational
injustice and prejudice. Many studies have demonstrated that the need to belong compels
people to obey the group they want to be part of and to hide their true feelings. The neg-
ative emotions people feel when they are being excluded can be used to pull them back
into the culturally accepted framework (Härtel & Panipucci, 2007). In a sense, extremely
collectivistic organizational cultures replace an individual’s own voice and expression.
Extremely individualistic cultures

In contrast to extremely collectivist cultures, extremely individualistic cultures display a
very different set of cultural attributes that could provoke toxic emotions at work. Overly
individualistic cultures are characterized with excessive independence, which makes it
hard for employees to identify themselves with their work group or organization. As such,
it is hard to establish a collective identity or belongingness in the workplace. This in turn
could lead to people feeling neglected and isolated at work.
Overly individualistic work cultures do not provide ideal conditions for relationships to
form and flourish. This is especially due to the fact that there is no ‘shared interpretative
framework’ that people can cohesively place their confidence and trust in when commu-
nicating with others. In highly individualistic cultures, employees may not find the psy-
chological safety and the support network needed to express their emotions. Therefore, in
contrast to extremely collectivistic cultures, the toxic emotions that are felt in individual-
istic cultures are feelings of isolation, loneliness, vulnerability, fear, dejection and distrust.
For example, Wright (2005) hypothesized a negative emotional climate as being compet-
itive and uncooperative, where individuals pursue their own interest. In subsequent analy-
sis, Wright found that these attributes have an adverse effect on the experience of
loneliness in workers. The findings support the present argument that highly individual-
istic cultures can engender toxic emotions as well. It was also found in Wright’s study that
highly individualistic work cultures are characterized by a climate of fear, and a lack of
social and work support.
Work cultures that display extreme individualism could also deprive employees of both
resources and opportunities to act (Barbalet, 1996). Relationships people form at work
can be career defining (Gersick et al., 2000); even more, such relationships provide indi-
viduals with a sense of collective coping when faced with workplace stress (Länsisalmi
et al., 2000). Highly individualistic work places do not provide a good social basis for rela-
tionship development and hence it is difficult for workers to develop collegial relationships
with their co-workers. Under such conditions, the quality of team–member exchange
(TMX) and leader–member exchange (LMX) can deteriorate due to a lack of communi-
cation and participation. This can make work an unpleasant and impersonal task. In the
long term, consequences of a psychologically distressing workplace could extend to job
burnout, relationship distancing and even depression.
How to build a healthy emotional culture

A healthy emotional culture is characterized by interdependence as opposed to co-
dependence or independence. Underpinned by the ideology advocated by positive organ-
izational scholarship, a healthy emotional culture could well be conceptualized as a
positive emotional culture. However, this is not to say that in a healthy emotional culture,
individuals do not experience negative emotions. On the contrary, negative emotions are
as much valid as positive emotions, especially as they have a stronger and longer-lasting
effect than positive emotions (Baumeister et al., 2001). For instance, the anger a coach
expresses to a poorly performing sports team can have drastically positive effects on the
end result. As such, both positive as well as negative emotions can be channelled in func-
tional as well as dysfunctional avenues in an organization. The difference between a
healthy and an unhealthy emotional culture therefore lies more in the functionality of the
emotional learning cycle in the two cultures than the types of emotions that are experi-
enced. This concept is developed next.
Emotional learning cycle

Individuals go through an emotional learning cycle from the first day they join a new
organization. In most cases, the initial emotional features of a culture are set by the
founders, who also establish the initial cultural norms, and the vision and mission of a
company (see Figure 36.2). When employees are confronted with affective events in the
process of everyday work, they refer to the established emotional features of a culture for
interpretation and guidance. The subsequent coping strategies that people employ can be
functional or dysfunctional, depending on the established cultural norms, individual
motivations and individual emotional intelligence (Paterson & Härtel, 2002). However,
the end results of both functional and dysfunctional coping strategies feed into the overall
organizational culture, reshaping its initial emotional features. A healthy emotional learn-
ing cycle occurs when individuals utilize functional coping strategies that feed into the
Founder
Gap
Emotional Actual
features of moment-to-
Vision/meaning
culture moment
emotional
Norm setting experiences
Positive feedback loop
Figure 36.2 The emotional learning cycle

overall emotional culture of an organization. This positive feedback loop means that the
affective events that take place in an organization will tend to become more and more
positive as the cycle progresses. In a toxic emotional culture, the emotional learning cycle
operates in the opposite direction. This could ultimately result in a downward spiral with
more negative emotion-eliciting events taking place in an organization. An excellent
example of such a negative emotional learning cycle can be seen in the following excerpt,
which describes workplace bullying in the nursing profession.
[T]raditional approaches to nurse education have helped entrench bullying behaviours, so that
each new generation of nurses becomes socialised to regard it is as normal. Bullying and its
effects on self-esteem are perpetuated by practices within nursing . . . this situation will only be
changed if nurses and educators transform their practice and the context in which bullying
occurs. Otherwise, each new generation of nurses will continue to be socialised into negative
practices which undermine both their own feelings of self-worth and standards of nursing care.
(Sweet, 2005, p. 16).
In the case of workplace bullying, the coping strategies that the victim of the bully
adopts can be functional such that it discourages further bullying, or dysfunctional such
that it encourages further bullying. It is obvious that in the above example, workplace bul-
lying was encouraged by the negative coping strategies adopted and thus became a cul-
tural norm due to the negative emotional learning that was operating.
According to Paterson and Härtel’s (2002) cognitive model of employee responses to
downsizing, the choice between functional and dysfunctional coping strategies is largely a
function of a person’s emotional intelligence and available systematic support. The model
identifies establishing socio-emotional support, and the use of employee counselling ser-
vices as functional coping strategies, while withdrawal and absenteeism are dysfunctional
coping strategies. Moreover, Folkman and Moskowitz (2000) identified three kinds of
coping strategies that can result in positive affect during times of stress: positive appraisal,
problem-focused coping, and the infusion of ordinary events with positive meaning.
Fundamentals of a healthy emotional culture

As much as a healthy emotional culture is a product of functional coping strategies, indi-
viduals their adoption of functional coping strategies is in turn influenced by a healthy
emotional culture.
A healthy emotional culture is based on fundamentals such as confidence, trust, justice,
psychological safety, and good LMX and TMX – all of which have been linked to posi-
tive emotions at work. For example, Barbalet (1996, p. 77) stated: ‘confidence is the emo-
tional basis for action and agency [and] trust is the emotional basis of cooperation’. This
view is similar to Hill et al.’s notion of a ‘shared interpretative framework’ that people
should be confident to rely upon when interpreting and responding to affective events in
families. Trust and confidence are two intrinsically linked fundamentals that facilitate
psychological safety. The features of psychological safety that interpersonal trust can
engender are well encapsulated in Mayer et al.’s (1995, p. 712) definition of trust – it is the
‘willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expec-
tation that the other will perform a particular action important to the truster, irrespective
of the ability to monitor or control that other party’. To this end, an obvious result of
trusting your co-worker to express your emotions authentically is the knowledge that you
will not be reprimanded in the workplace or retaliated against by your co-workers for
being emotionally expressive. Supporting this contention, studies have also found that
trust can enable effective communication and encourage participation in people (Carson
& Griffeth, 1990; Antonioni, 1994).
Similar to trust and confidence, another important aspect that ensures a healthy emo-
tional culture is organizational justice, which has been defined by Folger and Cropanzano
(1998, p. xii) as ‘the conditions of employment that lead individuals to believe that they
are treated fairly or unfairly’. Research has found organizational justice to be related to
positive emotions, quality TMX and LMX (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996; Pirola-Merlo
et al., 2002; Tse et al., 2005). When individuals perceive that they are being treated unfairly
by the organization or its members, they are bound to feel toxic emotions such as anger,
outrage and resentment (Skarlicki & Folger, 1997). Therefore, organizational justice
remains a fundamental characteristic underlying a healthy emotional culture.
Organizations can take a number of actions to build a healthy emotional culture and
avoid a toxic emotional workplace (see Figure 36.1). First, at the organizational level, they
can monitor and review those features of the work environment which are related to
healthy and toxic emotional cultures. This would include measuring the relationship
quality between leaders and followers and between co-workers, employee well-being,
organizational justice, diversity openness, and workgroup emotional climates. HR poli-
cies should be a driving force in creating a positive work environment in the organization.
For example, HR policies are founded on principles of organizational justice and include
strategies for ensuring positive workplace relationships, constructive conflict manage-
ment, and diversity openness. Second, at the management level, the organizational strate-
gies and policies relating to nurturing a healthy emotional culture are implemented by
managers fully trained and supported in the underpinning skills and practices. In particu-
lar, managers undertake performance management in ways that develop, evaluate, moti-
vate and discipline staff to support high-quality workplace relationships and behaviours
guided by diversity openness and procedural, distributive and interactional justice.
Moreover, managers place an emphasis on training as a means to cultivate and promote
skills and awareness in diversity openness, high-quality relationships, organizational
justice and organizational policies relating to ensuring a healthy emotional culture. Third,
organizations need to monitor employee experiences and attitudes to identify areas
requiring additional attention and support. In particular, ongoing assessment of employ-
ees’ perceptions of the workplace environment as positive, respectful, inclusive and psy-
chologically safe; leaders and co-workers as trustworthy, fair and diversity open; and
policies and decision making as interactionally, procedurally and distributively just.
A multi-level analysis of the benefits of a healthy emotional culture

As a healthy emotional culture helps foster positive emotions at work, it offers a range
of benefits to all levels of the organization. At the intra-individual level, research has
associated positive emotional experiences with task performance (Isen, 2004), subjective
well-being (Diener et al., 2003), motivation (Ilies & Judge, 2005), voluntary behaviour
(Spector & Fox, 2002) and job satisfaction (Thoresen et al., 2003). According to
Fredrickson’s (2001, p. 218) broaden-and-build theory: ‘experiences of positive emotions
broaden people’s momentary thought–action repertoires, which in turn serves to build
their enduring personal resources, ranging from physical and intellectual resources to
psychological resources’. Fredrickson bases her theory on findings that have associated
positive emotions such as contentment, love, interest and pride with thought–action ten-
dencies to explore, savour, integrate, and achieve (e.g., Izard, 1977; Lewis, 1993).
Fredrickson argues that negative states of emotions such as anger, fear and anxiety can
significantly narrow a person’s scope of attention, while positive emotions such as opti-
mism and subjective well-being can broaden it. Not only that, positive emotions have the
capacity to loosen the hold that negative emotions have on people and build psycholog-
ical resiliency towards negative events (Tugade & Fredrickson, 2004). As such, positive
emotions may fuel psychological resiliency in people which, in turn, can lead to individ-
uals adopting functional coping strategies when dealing with affective events, especially
when they are negative.
Between individuals and between groups, positive emotions are associated with
improved cooperation, perceived task performance and decreased conflict (Barsade,
2002). For example, a study conducted by Sy et al. (2005) linked positive affective group
tone (i.e., shared affect in a group) to increased group effort and coordination. Such
findings are also reported in a study conducted on first year college students by Waugh
and Fredrickson (2006), which found that positive emotions predicted a more complex
understanding of room-mates due to increased self–other overlap. In an organizational
context, this could mean greater diversity acceptance and better-quality TMX and LMX.
Other studies have also indicated that positive emotions can cause people to be more
sociable and have better social interactions (Isen, 1970; Cunningham, 1988), greater
involvement in social activities (Burger & Caldwell, 2000) and closer friendships (Berry
et al., 2000). Another beneficial outcome of a healthy emotional culture in a group context
is that it allows for collective coping of stress. For example, Länsisalmi et al. (2000) argue
that a good work culture in one’s own work group may relieve all kinds of stress produced
in everyday life. To that end, positive affect in group environments provides the partici-
pative safety that individuals need in order to function effectively in collaboration with
others.
In addition to the horizontal linkages between individuals and groups being affected,
there is evidence of vertical linkages, too. For instance, Totterdell’s (2000) study on two
professional cricket teams showed significant associations between the average of the
team-mate’s happy moods, and the players’ individual moods and subjective performance.
The transfer mechanism of individual affect to the group level can be attributed to the
concept of mood contagion (Neuman & Strack, 2000). Totterdell’s study also found that
the relationship between individual and team moods was stronger when players were
happier; thereby suggesting that positive affect is more contagious than negative affect
(Totterdell, 2000).
The overall organizational benefits of having a healthy emotional culture encapsulate
individual- and group-level benefits. However, at a macro-organizational level, positive
emotions create a good learning environment for employees. According to Domagalski
(1999), emotion is a construct of social cognition, and therefore a crucial element in
organizational learning. It is also widely known that people learn best in positive physi-
cal, emotional and social environments that provide a sense of wholeness, safety, interest
and enjoyment to the individual. As individual and group productivity ultimately result
in better organizational performance, effects of a healthy emotional climate could reflect
in all levels of an organization.
Conclusion
This chapter sought to address a gap in the literature by conceptualizing the link between
organizational culture and emotions experienced at work. It was argued that culture
influences the emotional process of individuals at two stages: when interpreting an
affective event and when responding to an affective event. In reality, culture fulfils an emo-
tional need for the individual, while simultaneously functioning as a regulatory tool of
emotions. For this reason, the emotional culture in an organization may have an intrinsic
relationship with the type of affective events that take place in an organization, and the
way they are interpreted and responded to. Hence, the chapter emphasized the importance
of avoiding development of a toxic emotional culture and cultivating a healthy emo-
tional culture underpinned by the notion of a positive emotional learning cycle. The
benefits of adopting such an approach are expected to manifest at multiple levels within
an organization.
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37 An identity-based view of emotional ambivalence
and its management in organizations
Lu Wang and Michael G. Pratt*
I am very ambivalent about Wal-Mart. On the one hand, I recognize that they are not paying a
livable wage. On the other hand, I have to recognize their business efficiency and their ability to
drive down prices.1
Introduction
Although many characterizations of employee attachment to organizations have tended
to describe the individual–organization bond in terms of positive (e.g., affective commit-
ment, identification, loyalty) or negative (e.g., low engagement, alienation) affect-laden
terms, recent research suggests that the bond between employees and their organizations
is often characterized by emotional ambivalence (Meyerson & Scully, 1995; Pratt &
Doucet, 2000; Pratt & Rosa, 2003). Some might even argue that competing forces are at
the heart of the individual–organizational relationship: employees want to satisfy their
own needs, but also often need to subjugate these same needs for the good of the organi-
zation (e.g., Stewart, 1996; Magretta, 2002). Thus, the central aim of aligning individual
and organizational interests may involve attempts to manage ambivalence.
Notwithstanding these basic pressures, ambivalent attachments are likely to only
become more common in the coming years. Such increases are likely to stem from emerg-
ing organizational practices and intensifying needs from employees. First, as the composi-
tion of groups comprising an organization’s internal and external constituencies become
increasingly diverse, organizations may attempt to be ‘more things to more people’. The
company in the epigraph is a good example. Central to how Wal-Mart defines itself is its
aim to be a ‘low-cost provider’ that will do ‘whatever it takes’ to ensure low prices. However,
in addition to this utilitarian aspect, Wal-Mart has also attempted to appeal to those who
are environmentally conscious by adopting a normative stance toward being ‘green’ –
despite the potential increase in operation costs (Gunther, 2006). While such corporate
efforts may indeed be motivated to appeal to a broader set of constituents, they may also
send conflicting messages to employees which may, in turn, increase the potential for mixed
feelings toward the organization. Second, employees appear to be increasingly insistent
that their organizations meet or accommodate various ‘non-organizational’ demands, such
as those posed by family and faith. In response, some organizations are initiating practices
aimed not only at ‘work–family’ demands, but spiritual ones as well (Ashforth & Pratt,
2002). As these competing life domains come to legitimately vie for employees’ attention
at work, the potential for ambivalence increases as well.
But emotional ambivalence is a bit like nitroglycerine: it is powerful and can be useful,
but needs to be managed very carefully. Ambivalent emotions have been argued to exert
a strong and unstable influence on how individuals behave (Katz & Glass, 1979; Weigert
& Franks, 1989; Smelser, 1998). For example, individuals may become unable to act (i.e.,
paralysis), may act inconsistently (i.e., vacillate), or even come to hate the target of their
589
ambivalence in response to their ambivalent emotions toward it. By contrast, Brickman

(1987) argues that ambivalence is the critical ingredient in creating commitments, sug-
gesting a functional side of ambivalence that may be desirable to some collectives, such
as organizations.2 This dual nature of the potential of ambivalence is captured in ambiva-
lence amplification theory (AAT). AAT suggests that feeling ambivalent toward a target
(e.g., an organization) amplifies an individual’s behavioral and attitudinal responses
toward that target. Moreover, these amplified responses can be manifested in extremely
positive or extremely negative ways (Katz & Glass, 1979; Smelser, 1998). Katz and Glass
(p. 56) state, ‘ambivalence creates a tendency toward behavioral instability, in which
extremely positive or negative responses may occur toward the object of ambivalence’.
Despite the potentially significant impact of emotional ambivalence on employees’
behaviors and attitudes toward their organizations, only a relatively small, but growing
body of work has addressed the role of ambivalence in organizations (Meyerson & Scully,
1995; Pratt & Barnett, 1997; Piderit, 2000; Pratt & Dutton, 2000; Fong & Tiedens, 2002;
Pratt & Rosa, 2003; Fong, 2006). Of these, even fewer have looked primarily at the role of
emotional ambivalence in an individual’s bond with his/her organization (Pratt & Doucet,
2000). If we are correct in asserting that the individual–organizational relationship is
characterized by ambivalence, and that such ambivalence may be increasing, then we need
to better understand both the sources of this ambivalence, and how it can be managed.
Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to address these concerns. Specifically, we address
three interrelated questions. First, why do employees develop ambivalent feelings toward
their organization? Second, given the unstable nature of emotional ambivalence, what
general strategies can managers use to respond to employees’ emotional ambivalence?
And third, what are some specific tactics managers employ to manage ambivalence?
This chapter is structured in the following way. We begin by briefly reviewing past treat-
ments of ambivalence – primarily in psychology and sociology – and argue that identity
is a common feature of both areas. Extending this argument, we then offer an identity-
based perspective on emotional ambivalence, and apply this perspective to discussing two
primary identity-related sources of ambivalence in organizations. Building on these two
identity-related sources of ambivalence, we suggest that both human resource manage-
ment and structural change practices (i.e., organizational identity management) can be
brought to bear to manage emotional ambivalence by either reducing/eliminating or
enhancing/creating such ambivalence.
Emotional ambivalence and identities: a brief review and application to organizations

Despite general consensus on the conceptualization of emotional ambivalence as holding
both positively and negatively valenced affective states in relation to an object, there is
considerable divergence among theorists regarding its origins. Early psychologists such as
Freud and Horney saw parent–child attachments as the source of ambivalence (Freud,
1920 [1950]; Horney, 1945 – see also Sincoff, 1990 and Smelser, 1998). Other psycholo-
gists have tended to view ambivalence in terms of individual differences; that is, individ-
uals differ in their general ambivalence propensity (King & Emmons, 1990; Thompson &
Zanna, 1995). Taken together and extended to organizations, both would suggest that
some individuals are predisposed toward ambivalence before they enter the organization;
thus, the presence of emotional ambivalence in organizations would be influenced by who
are selected into organizations (e.g., individuals with a high ambivalence propensity).
An identity-based view of emotional ambivalence 591
Sociologists, by contrast, have viewed norms and roles as critical sources of ambiva-
lence (e.g., Merton & Barber, 1976; Coser, 1979). Specifically, organizations that prescribe
conflicting norms (e.g., physicians should be both neutral and caring – that is, have
‘detached concern’), or have employees engage in conflicting role demands (e.g., student
and professional roles in medical residents), will create ambivalence. Thus, the origin of
ambivalence in organizations stems from specific organizational structures and practices.
By extension, ambivalence in employees would result as members are socialized into or
learn about these competing norms and demands.
While compelling, we argue that neither perspective alone is sufficient to explain the
sources of emotional ambivalence in organizations. Following their basic disciplinary foci –
and their resultant strengths and weaknesses – sociology largely overlooks an individual’s
unique experiences and other individual differences as a source of ambivalence; and psy-
chology undervalues structural sources of ambivalence. We argue that both perspectives,
however, hold a key piece of the ‘puzzle’ regarding the sources of emotional ambivalence
in organizations, and suggest a need to integrate insights from both disciplines.
Further, we have three primary reasons to believe that identity may be an ideal concept
to help integrate and extend these perspectives. First, both ‘camps’ already implicate iden-
tity in their discussions of ambivalence. Psychology, especially psychoanalytical
approaches, implicates the importance of ‘who I am’ in understanding ambivalence. As
Horney (1945, p. 25) notes of ambivalent conflicts, they come from values and beliefs that
are ‘part of us’:
Since conflicts often have to do with convictions, beliefs, or moral values, their recognition would
presuppose that we have developed our own set of values. Beliefs that are merely taken over and
are not part of us hardly have sufficient strength to lead to conflicts . . .
Through their invocation of roles in conceptualizing ambivalence, sociologists more

directly implicate identity, namely ‘role identities’. Role identities serve as the cornerstone
for ‘identity theory’ or structural symbolic interactionism; and constitute a significant
portion of an individual’s identity (McCall & Simmons, 1978; Stryker & Serpe, 1982).
Second, identity can exist across levels of analysis – at both individual and organiz-
ational levels (see Pratt, 2003 for review) – making it viable for integrating both psycho-
logical and sociological perspectives on emotional ambivalence. Furthermore, this
linkage also aligns with a body of research on organizational identification – where indi-
viduals see organizations as self-defining. While ambivalence is often not the focus of this
research, some work in this area has implied that some identifications may be ambivalent
(e.g., Pratt, 1998, 2000; Dukerich, et al., 1998; Elsbach, 1999; Kreiner & Ashforth, 2004).
Third and finally, as we discuss below, identity has been linked to the concept of emotion,
thus making it a plausible conduit for emotional ambivalence.
Identity(-ies) and emotions and emotional ambivalence

Identity has been treated by many as a central force in arousing emotional reactions in
individuals (Cooley, 1902 [1964]; Powers, 1973; Burke, 1991; Turner & Stets, 2006).
According to Burke’s identity control theory (ICT: Burke, 1991; Stets & Tsushima, 2001;
Burke & Harrod, 2005; Stets, 2005), emotions arise as a result of identity verification and
identity nonverification processes. In its most general form, when an individual’s identity
is verified by a third party, the individual is likely to experience positive emotions toward
that party (Burke, 1991). Conversely, when an individual’s identity is nonverified, the indi-
vidual is likely to experience negative emotions. Extending this to the organizational
context, when an employee’s identity is verified by his/her organization, he/she is likely to
experience positive emotions toward the organization. When his/her identity is
nonverified, such as when the organization promotes values and practices that are in
opposition to his/her identity beliefs, frustration and other types of negative emotions
toward the organization are more likely to ensue. For instance, when a female executive’s
feminist identity is verified and strengthened by the practices of her organization, she is
likely to feel positive about her organization. In contrast, when the organization engages
in unfair recruiting practices biased against females, who she is as a feminist will be chal-
lenged and nonverified, and she is likely to feel negative about her organization.
While ICT has been linked to single-valenced emotions, it has not to our knowledge
been linked to emotional ambivalence. We argue that the reason for this may be due to the
fact that ICT has focused primarily on the verification or nonverification of a single iden-
tity. Theorists in psychology (e.g., James, 1890; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Markus & Nurius,
1986), sociology (Mead, 1934; McCall & Simmons, 1978; Stryker & Serpe, 1982), and
organizational studies (e.g., Meyerson & Scully, 1995; Pratt & Doucet, 2000), however,
have argued that individuals – and even collectives like organizations (Albert & Whetten,
1985; Pratt & Foreman, 2000; Albert & Adams, 2002) – may best be conceptualized as
having multiple identities. Extrapolating from ICT, one may expect that when employees
develop and hold multiple identities that prescribe opposing standards (McCall &
Simmons, 1978; Feldman, 1979; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Markus & Nurius, 1986),
verification of one identity may be accompanied by the simultaneous nonverification of
another held identity, causing employees to feel ambivalent and torn.
Indeed, the verification of one identity may make the nonverification of another one
more salient to an employee. Meyerson and Scully (1995, p. 587) argue that ‘in most
situations, the pull of each identity only makes the opposite identity all the more appar-
ent, threatened, and painful’. For example, a professor who identifies with his ‘capitalis-
tic’ business school – but who is also a radical humanist that embraces values directly at
odds with capitalist corporations – may feel especially torn (Meyerson & Scully, 1995). In
this case, ambivalent emotions are likely to be evoked as the organization verifies a
member’s organizational identity while simultaneously failing to verify a personal,
‘non-organizational’ identity.
To summarize, when organizational members hold multiple identities that contain
conflicting values and expectations, identity verification and nonverification from an
organization may occur at the same time, causing employees to feel torn and ambivalent
about their organization. While there are likely many identities that potentially could
come into play in producing ambivalence, for the sake of parsimony, we focus on two
major identity-related sources of emotional ambivalence in organizations: (i) where an
individually internalized ‘organizational’ identity is in conflict with internalized non-
organizational identity, and (ii) where two organizational identities at the collective level
collide – as in the case of hybrid organizational identities.3
Conflicting organizational and non-organizational identities

It has long been established that one’s workplace can be a powerful shaper of identity,
with individuals coming to view themselves on the basis of their organizations. However,
individuals navigate in a complex social world that often requires them to develop and
hold multiple identities that are both organizational and non-organizational (e.g.,
Thoits, 1983, 1986). With regard to non-organizational identities, we have noted that
organizations are increasingly attempting to accommodate family and religious needs
(Ashforth & Pratt, 2002). For example, SAS places highchairs in their cafeterias to
promote families eating together (Fishman, 1999), and Taco Bell and Pizza Hut have
hired chaplains to administer to employees’ spiritual needs (Conlin, 1999). This would
suggest that these traditionally non-organizational identities may be more, rather than
less, salient at work. While these identities may all be central to an individual, they
may be incompatible and/or conflicting (Markus & Nurius, 1986). Hence, one primary
source of emotional ambivalence in organizations may be the internalization of conflict
between an organizational and a non-organizational identity. All else being equal,
employees who have internalized a non-organizational identity that conflicts with
their internalized organizational identity are more likely to feel ambivalent about their
organizations.
This conflict between organizational and non-organizational identities assumes that
individuals define themselves both by their organizations, as well as by something
outside of the organizations (see Meyerson & Scully, 1995; Pratt & Dutton, 2000). As we
describe in the following subsection, organizational self-definition (i.e., organizational
identification), can come about by at least two ways for an individual: either by selecting
organizations that reflect one’s values or becoming socialized into an organization’s
values. Non-organizational identities can likewise be important prior to being selected by
an organization (e.g., may be a committed ‘family man’), or priorities may change or shift
to make a non-organizational identity more important (e.g., starting a family after being
employed). Thus, as we shall discuss, different human resource management practices
(i.e., selection and socialization) can serve to exacerbate – or ameliorate – this type of
identity conflict. For example, overtime practices that make one ‘choose between’ work
and family may serve to heighten ambivalence between one’s organizational and non-
organizational identities (Pratt & Rosa, 2003).
Hybrid organizational identities

Drawing from sociology, a second fundamental source of ambivalence may come from
the organization itself. In particular, we argue that the organization’s identities – that is,
what members believe are central, enduring, and distinctive about the organization
(Albert & Whetten, 1985) – may serve as a potent standard for expectations. This is espe-
cially true when the organization has hybrid organizational identities. Hybrid organiza-
tional identities refer to organizational identities that are perceived as inviolate,
incompatible, and indispensable (Albert & Adams, 2002). Specifically, hybrids are often
an amalgamation of normative and utilitarian interests. For example, universities are
hybrids in that they need both to enlighten minds and also to stay financially
solvent (Albert & Whetten, 1985). Hybrid organizational identities have been found to be
associated with a number of positive organizational outcomes. For example, they can help
organizations adapt and respond to a diverse environment (ibid., 1985); they can also help
organizations attract people with diverse talents, an ability that is crucial to organiz-
ational learning and innovation (Pratt & Foreman, 2000). Albert and Adams (2002, p. 46)
even went so far as to suggest that hybrid organizational identities are a ‘necessary
incompatibility’ that are responsible for sustaining the survival of certain forms of organ-
izations (e.g., law firms).
However, the impact of hybrid organizational identities is not only shown through
organizational level outcomes, such as the ability to adapt and innovate, but also felt by
organizational members at the individual level (Pratt & Corley, 2007). We argue that
ambivalence is most likely to occur when members come to identify with the conflicting
set of values at the heart of hybrid organizations. Such identification can come via two
‘paths’ central to the human resource management function of organizations: selection
and socialization.
First, individuals can seek out organizations that have values that they already possess.
This is referred to as ‘affiliation identification’ (Pratt, 1998) and is similar to Schneider’s
(1987) notion of attraction. Here, member identification becomes strongly influenced by
selection – joining an organization that reflects a person’s own values. Selection can
further influence emotional ambivalence in two ways. First, selection can influence emo-
tional ambivalence when organizations hire individuals whose conflicting values and
beliefs reflect the organization’s own. Thus, an individual who as a business person
believes that corporations can do anything legal to make a profit, but as a politically
liberal person also believes in being environmentally ‘green’, may resonate with and apply
to organizations like Wal-Mart as they view the organization as struggling with similar
issues. To the degree that these employees are then hired, selection can impact on ambiva-
lence. Alternatively, selection can influence emotional ambivalence when hiring individ-
uals who identify strongly with only one identity of the organization (e.g., the normative
part of a for-profit organization). Such strong identification with one aspect of the organ-
ization may come into conflict with other organizational identities after the person is
hired. As a result, an individual may strongly identify with one part of an organization,
and dis-identify with – defining one’s self in opposition to – another part of the organ-
ization (Dukerich, et al., 1998; Elsbach, 1999; Pratt, 2000; Elsbach & Bhattacharya,
2001).
Identification may also come about via member socialization whereby an individual’s
sense of self comes to reflect core organizational values (Ashforth & Mael, 1989). This
process is referred to as ‘emulation’ identification (Pratt, 1998). One or more sets of iden-
tity beliefs can be gained via socialization. For example, a new doctor may start out having
only a ‘healer’ identity, but through socialization process, he/she may also internalize a
‘business’ identity that cares about making a profit for his/her organization. As a result,
he/she may become very ambivalent about patient care (e.g., should I be effective in terms
of health outcomes or cost outcomes?). It is also possible that members’ socialization can
encourage them to identify with two sets of identity beliefs that were not held prior to
employment. Thus, people in Amway are socialized into both ‘wanting to help others’ by
distributing and ‘wanting to make big profits’, even though these two sets of values may
ultimately conflict (Pratt & Rosa, 2003).
In sum, a second source of emotional ambivalence in organization is identification with
hybrid organizational identities. When viewed in conjunction with our discussion of inter-
nalized organizational and non-organizational identities, we can begin to see both com-
monalities (e.g., importance of selection) and differences (e.g., changes in collective-level
belief systems vs. internalized non-organizational beliefs) in how ambivalence from these
two sources can be managed. It is to these managerial issues that we now turn.
Management of emotional ambivalence in organizations

As stated earlier, emotional ambivalence in the individual–organizational relationship is
akin to nitroglycerine: potentially useful, but powerfully unstable. As Smelser (1998, p. 5)
suggests, people who are ambivalent often express themselves ‘in different and sometimes
contradictory ways as actors attempt to cope with it’. Thus, we have noted that responses
to emotional ambivalence in organizations range from strong commitment, to indeci-
siveness, vacillation, and paralysis, to the formation of strongly negative attitudes. Given
the wide variety of consequences associated with emotional ambivalence in organizations,
organizational leaders may be especially interested in actively managing such ambiva-
lence, just as they have been found to manage other emotions (Huy, 2002, 2005). While
little attention has been paid to how organizations can manage and influence emotional
ambivalence in their organizations, we can extrapolate from the various literatures
reviewed thus far to suggest two key considerations: management strategies and manage-
ment tactics.
Ambivalence management strategies

With regard to management strategies, we draw from work in multiple disciplines to offer
two basic ambivalence management strategies: ambivalence reducing/eliminating and
ambivalence enhancing/creating strategies. Ambivalence reducing/eliminating strategies are
used to neutralize emotional ambivalence and its resultant instability, and to increase
member predictability. Parsons (1951) proposes that organizations employ a number of
social control mechanisms to counteract the effects of sociological ambivalence. One such
mechanism involves the enactment of rituals whose purpose is to allow the release of emo-
tional tensions (e.g., Sarbin & Adler, 1970; Parsons, 1951; Greil & Rudy, 1983). For
example, mass gatherings and rallies of Amway distributors – who have been conceptual-
ized as being ambivalent (Pratt & Rosa, 2003) – serve as an ‘appropriate’ channel for emo-
tional release (see also Butterfield, 1985; Biggart, 1989). Parsons (1951, p. 308) suggests that
such rituals are not actually used to resolve sociological ambivalence; rather, they are used
as ‘insulation’ in order to ‘prevent the conflicting elements from a direct confrontation with
each other, resulting in the transformation of a latent into an open conflict’. Other per-
spectives suggest that ambivalence may be more amenable to resolution. While not focused
on organizational employees, one purpose of psychoanalysis is to actually resolve individ-
uals’ ambivalence, especially when it reaches unhealthy levels (e.g., Horney, 1945).
A second, and less commonly addressed, ambivalence management strategy involves
enhancing/creating ambivalence. Drawing upon Brickman’s work, Pratt and Rosa (2003)
argue that multi-level marketing organizations enhance and create emotional ambiva-
lence for the purpose of transforming it into commitment. For example, Amway often
selects individuals with families and then socializes them to (a) reinforce the belief that
family is more important than business, and (b) reinforce the importance of spending time
away from the family (e.g., rescheduling birthdays, working nights and weekends) to build
the business. These practices create and enhance emotional ambivalence employees
experience toward Amway, which can then be transformed into commitment.
Ambivalence management tactics

We have discussed both the sources of emotional ambivalence in organizations and the
general strategies organizations may adopt in managing emotional ambivalence. Now, we
turn our attention to some specific ambivalence management tactics that organizations
may implement to support their general ambivalence management strategies. Depending
on the sources of ambivalence, organizations may implement different tactics to either
reduce/eliminate or enhance/create emotional ambivalence in their employees. To facili-
tate our discussion, we group these tactics in terms of those with a human resource man-
agement (HRM) focus, such as selection and socialization (see Pratt & Rosa, 2003), and
those that focus on managing broader structural changes, such as altering organizational
identities. Examples of these tactics can be found in Table 37.1 and some are illustrated
below.
HRM practices As noted earlier, HRM practices, such as selection and socialization,
can be used to either reduce/eliminate or enhance/create emotional ambivalence.
However, depending on the sources of emotional ambivalence (e.g., internalized organ-
izational and non-organizational identities vs. hybrid organizational identities) we argue
that these practices can take on different forms.
Managing emotional ambivalence from internalized organizational versus non-

organizational identities From an HRM perspective, managing this source of ambiva-
lence may take the form of managing the organizationally relevant identity or the
non-organizational identity. Moreover, it may involve selection, socialization, or other
HRM practices (see Table 37.1).
The main thrust of selection is to recruit people who will identify with the organization
but who are either low (to reduce/eliminate ambivalence) or high (to enhance/create
ambivalence) in their susceptibility toward emotional ambivalence due to their non-
organizational identities. For example, to reduce ambivalence caused by conflicting work
and family identities, organizations may target people who are young and unmarried as
potential recruits, since they are less likely to have developed a strong family identity that
can potentially conflict with the organizational identity. However, to enhance or create
ambivalence, organizations may deliberately recruit those who are married and have
developed a strong family identity.
Once an employee is within the organization, managers may further use different
HRM practices to reduce/eliminate or enhance/create emotional ambivalence. For
example, an organization may implement ‘family-friendly practices’ such as daycare and
work-at-home practices for its existing employees who have a strong family identity (Batt
& Valcour, 2003; Rothbard et al., 2005). However, it is important to note that these
‘family-friendly practices’ do not eliminate ambivalence – the basic source of the ambiva-
lence still remains. Rather, the HRM practices help insulate members from it. By con-
trast, to enhance/create emotional ambivalence, organizations may use HRM practices
to make more salient the potential conflict the organizational identity has with members’
non-organizational identity. In Pratt and Rosa’s (2003) study, for instance, the multi-level
marketing organizations not only specifically recruit people with strong family identities,
they also deliberately make salient to these employees the potential clash between the
organization’s identity and members’ non-organizational identity, in this case family
identity, by frequently reminding employees of this conflict (e.g., starting a meeting with,
‘I know you would rather be home with your kids’). As a result, employees in these organ-
izations are likely to become even more aware of their multiple identities and the
Table 37.1 Strategies and tactics for managing emotional ambivalence
Conflicting organizational and non-organizational identities Hybrid organizational identities

Ambivalence Ambivalence Ambivalence Ambivalence
reducing/eliminating enhancing/creating reducing/eliminating enhancing/creating
HRM Create practices that buffer Highlight and emphasize Select individuals who are Select individuals who
practices employees from ambivalence controversial aspects of less likely to incorporate have similar
organizational identity organizational values into their conflicting values into
own self-concepts (e.g., job organizations
orientation)
Select individuals who do not Select individuals with Socialize individuals to identify Socialize individuals
hold potentially conflicting non-organizational identities with one organizational to internalize
597
non-organizational identity that are in conflict with the identity competing
organizational identity organizational
identities and values
Convert people into dropping Socialize people into adopting
non-organizational identity in a non-organizational identity
favor of organizational
identity
Managing Change organizational Adopt conflicting and Structure hybrid identities Structure hybrid
organizational identity to be non-‘offensive’ controversial organizational ideographically identities
identity(-ies) (e.g., delete identity) identity holographically
Note: Examples in this table are meant to be illustrative, not exhaustive.

associated conflicting standards, increasing their likelihood of feeling ambivalent about

their organizations.
Organizations may also attempt to manage more directly employees’ non-
organizational identities. Deaux (1991), for example, suggests that individuals are more
likely to abandon identities that they deem to be negative and inappropriate. By exten-
sion, organizations can try to reduce or eliminate ambivalence by making employees’ non-
organizational identities less attractive. A key means of influencing members’ identities is
through socialization practices (Van Maanen & Schein, 1979; Greil & Rudy, 1983; Pratt
et al., 2006). Specifically, organizations leaders may use persuasive rhetoric to negatively
influence employees’ perception of those non-organizational identities that conflict with
the organization’s identity (Greil & Rudy, 1983). At the extreme, organizations may
remove individuals who have non-organizational identities that conflict with organiz-
ational ones. For example, the Jacobs Engineering Group recently fired an employee for
religious proselytizing at work (Hall et al., 2006). Such a practice also has consequences
for those who remain; it sends a powerful message about the role of non-organizational
identities at work. By contrast, to enhance/create emotional ambivalence, organizations
may try to help ‘create’ potentially conflicting non-organizational identities in their
employees to foster emotional ambivalence. In the aforementioned study by Pratt and
Rosa (2003), for example, the multi-level marketing organizations encouraged single dis-
tributors to marry and start families. This, in turn, makes these distributors more vulner-
able to emotional ambivalence stemming from conflicting organizational and family
identities.
Managing emotional ambivalence from hybrid organizational identities HRM prac-

tices can also be applied to manage emotional ambivalence engendered by hybrid orga-
nizational identities. However, the form of the specific practices is slightly different in this
case. For example, rather than selecting individuals who will identify with the organiz-
ation and then manage their emotional ambivalence, the organization may attempt to
recruit individuals who are not likely to identify with one or both of the organizational
identities at all – thus buffering them from organizational-identity-related emotional
ambivalence. For instance, individuals who approach their work as either a job (i.e., see
work primarily as a means for economic support) or as a career (i.e., those who are moti-
vated by status and advancement) are not likely to form strong bonds with their organ-
ization (Bellah, et al., 1985; Wrzesniewski et al., 1997). Cardador et al. (2007) have found
some empirical support for these assertions. In a study of medical professionals, they
found that those with a job orientation (i.e., ‘low callings’) were significantly less likely to
identify with the organization, and those who focused on their career had significantly
higher intentions to quit. Hence, to reduce or eliminate emotional ambivalence aroused
from hybrid identities, organizations may target their recruitment toward those who have
a job or a career orientation. By contrast, to enhance or create emotional ambivalence,
organizational leaders and managers may choose to recruit individuals with similar iden-
tity conflicts at the individual level (Pratt, 1998). For example, a healthcare organization
may try to recruit physicians who have already developed the identity beliefs that they
should be both a ‘healer’ and a ‘business person’ (e.g., physicians with MBAs).
For existing employees, organizational leaders may attempt to reduce emotional
ambivalence by socializing employees to identify strongly with only one organizational
identity, as opposed to both organizational identities. In other words, organizational

leaders may attempt to increase the salience of one aspect of what the organization is
while downplaying the importance of other attributes in defining the organization. For
example, although a hospital can have both a normative and a utilitarian identity, it may
choose to overemphasize and advocate its normative identity to its physicians, and the
utilitarian side to its administrators. Conversely, to enhance/create emotional ambiva-
lence, organizational leaders may attempt to socialize members into the competing iden-
tities that are at the heart of their organization. Therefore, it may be that the individual
in our epigraph may have become socialized into internalizing both the normative and
utilitarian aspects of Wal-Mart, thus leading to emotional ambivalence.
Managing organizational identity(-ies) In addition to HRM practices, organizations

can also manage emotional ambivalence through structural changes surrounding the
content and management of organizational identities. By managing organizational iden-
tities, organizations’ leaders may be able to change members’ internalized beliefs about
the organization and, hence, influence how they feel about the organization.
Managing emotional ambivalence from internalized organizational versus non-

organizational identities To reduce/eliminate emotional ambivalence at the structural
level, organizational leaders may attempt to remove or alter the organizational identity
that is ‘offensive’. For example, they may ‘delete’ the part of the organizational identity
that conflicts with members’ non-organizational identity (Reger et al., 1998; Pratt &
Foreman, 2000). More specifically, when one of the conflicting organizational identities
comes from a specific business unit of an organization, the organization may delete this
identity by selling off the business unit associated with it. Thus, if a conglomerate or
holding company wants to appeal more to employees who are environmentally friendly,
it might wish to divest itself of companies that harm the environment (e.g., those with
large carbon dioxide emissions) and retain those that are more ‘green’. By contrast, to
enhance/create emotional ambivalence from this source, we believe that organizations
could change or even add an organizational identity to be in conflict with a critical non-
organizational identity for an employee or employees.4
Managing emotional ambivalence from hybrid organizational identities Structural

practices for managing internalized hybrid organizational identities involve managing
existing organizational identities rather than adding or subtracting them. For example, to
help reduce or eliminate ambivalence aroused when collective-level organizational ident-
ities conflict, organizations can structure their hybrid identities ideographically (Albert &
Whetten, 1985). Ideographic hybrids are organizational identities that are associated with
different units that exist in different parts of the organization (ibid.). In their study of a
rehabilitation unit, Pratt and Rafaeli (1997) found that a rehabilitation unit of a hospital
comprised two conflicting identities: a rehabilitation identity and an acute care identity.
These identities, however, were advocated by distinct groups of nurses in different shifts.
Hybrid organizational identities structured ideographically insulate members from
ambivalence by keeping the conflicting identities separate and not expecting any given
member to identify with both of them. Rather, any given member is expected to identify
only with the organizational identity espoused by his or her unit (see also Glynn, 2000).
Alternatively, managers can enhance/create ambivalence stemming from the internal-

ization of hybrid identities by structuring organizational identities holographically (Pratt
& Corley, 2007). Holographic identities occur when the identities that conflict at the
organizational level are housed within each individual, rather than across different units
(Albert & Whetten, 1985). For example, Golden-Biddle and Rao’s (1997) study of the
‘Medlay’ organization shows how each board member internalized competing organiza-
tional values: that the organization is a ‘family of friends’ whose members should behave
as friends and as a ‘volunteer-driven organization’ whose members should act as ‘vigilant
monitors’. Similarly, Pratt and Dutton (2000) found that librarians needed to act both as
‘guardians’ of a sacred learning space and as ‘democratic’ gatekeepers that allow broad
access to library resources. When hybrid identities are structured in this way, employees
are expected to internalize and enact conflicting identities. Hence, the different values and
demands espoused by organizations are more likely to be salient and self-referential to
individual employees, enhancing emotional ambivalence.
Conclusion
As emotional ambivalence is likely to become an increasingly important feature in organ-
izational life, it is not surprising that a growing body of research has started to examine
the influence of this complex emotional experience on both individual and organizational
behavior (e.g., Meyerson & Scully, 1995; Piderit, 2000; Pratt & Doucet, 2000; Fong &
Tiedens, 2002; Pratt & Rosa, 2003; Fong, 2006). In this chapter, we have attempted to
extend this literature by examining the sources of emotional ambivalence in individual–
organizational relationships, as well as how it can be managed. Toward this end, we
contend that multiple identities (both at the individual and organizational levels) play a
key role in influencing emotional ambivalence in organizations; moreover, we argue that
viewing ambivalence as identity related suggests specific tactics to either reduce/eliminate
or enhance/create employees’ emotional ambivalence in their relationships with
their organizations. These management tactics involve both human resource practices
(e.g., selection, socialization) and structural interventions (i.e., managing organizational
identities).
We hope that our research generates new interest in examining both the ‘antecedents’
and potential ‘outcomes’ of emotional ambivalence, as well as how to manage those out-
comes. We also hope that future research further explores some of the assumptions and
assertions made here. For example, by proposing an identity-based perspective on emo-
tional ambivalence, we suggest that concepts such as identification are key players in
employees’ experience of emotional ambivalence. Such a focus may be warranted when
examining employee attachment, but how necessary is it for other outcomes such as cre-
ativity, change, and learning (e.g., Pratt & Barnett, 1997; Piderit, 2000; Fong, 2006)?
Following Pratt and Corley (2007), we have also assumed that the structure of the organ-
izational identity (e.g., ideographic or holographic) will differentially influence members’
experience of emotional ambivalence. This of course assumes that organizational iden-
tity structures influence members’ emotions. However, empirical validation of this
assumption is needed.
We also hope that the broad strokes of our arguments may become more nuanced and
detailed in future research. For example, we have distinguished organizational from non-
organizational identities. This bifurcation may need considerable refining. To illustrate,
do conflicts that stem from the professional versus organizational identity result in the
same quality (e.g., content of emotions) and intensity (magnitude of emotions) of emo-
tional ambivalence as those that stem from organizational versus family identities? In a
related vein, we have argued that one’s work and non-work life play a role in one’s ambiva-
lence at work. However, little is known about whether emotional ambivalence directed at
the organizations can have a spillover effect. That is, do employees who feel ambivalent
about their organizations displace and misattribute their mixed feeling toward other
targets? Might ambivalence about one’s organization get transferred to ambivalence
toward one’s boss (and vice versa)? How might work-related ambivalence influence one’s
time outside of work? Moreover, given recent research supporting the positive effect of
transient emotional ambivalence on creativity (Fong, 2006), can the mixed feelings that
employees develop toward their organizations affect employee performance in other con-
texts and beyond those mechanisms we have discussed?
In addition, we have suggested two main strategies for managing emotional ambiva-
lence in organizations – enhancing/creating emotional ambivalence to reap its potential
benefits and reducing/eliminating it to avoid its potential harms. But should we lump
together enhancing with creating strategies and reducing with eliminating strategies? Are
there others (e.g., ambivalence maintenance)? Moreover, what are the myriad of factors
that may go into a decision to increase or decrease ambivalence? To illustrate, future
research may examine what organizational and managerial characteristics, such as orga-
nizational leaders’ risk averseness, may influence the strategy that organizations adopt to
manage emotional ambivalence.
Finally, research should explore the scope and limits of ambivalence management prac-
tices. For example, in addition to those tactics mentioned here, by what other means might
organizations attempt to manage emotional ambivalence? Given the advent of new
human resource practices that attempt to bridge work and non-work domains (e.g., reli-
gious and family), it will be interesting to see whether these practices serve to decrease
emotional ambivalence by insulating members from its effects, or enhance them by
making non-work identities more salient. More generally, should organizations be in the
business of managing ambivalence at all? Are some sources of ambivalence more legiti-
mately within the domain of organizations? Should – and if so, how might – organiza-
tions want to manage members’ ambivalence that stems solely from non-organizational
sources? Is ignoring such ambivalence a prudent course? To the degree that sustained
emotional ambivalence may result in health concerns, this may be a non-trivial issue for
organizations. If it is as we argue – that employees’ attachments to their organizations are
only likely to get more ambivalent – then we may need the answers to these questions
sooner rather than later.
Notes
* We would like to thank Lorna Doucet for her insightful comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.
1. See http://www.imaginaryplanet.net/weblogs/idiotprogrammer/?p=83398003.
2. Brickman (1987) suggests that all commitments come from transformed ambivalence: that is, commitment
involves binding positive and negative elements inherent in relationships, such as the individual organizational
relationships. In other words, for an individual to be committed to an organization, he/she accepts negative
aspects of the relationship as well as the positive. Further, to bind these elements, members must freely choose
to enter into a relationship with the organization and create justifications to rationalize this choice.
3. These sources of emotional ambivalence are similar to role conflict (see Biddle, 1986 for review) in that iden-
tities may be sources of competing expectations. However, this type of identity-based conflict differs from
role conflict in two ways. First, we believe that the concept of identity is broader than roles. For example,
social identity theory argues that identities are based on group membership (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979;
Ashforth & Mael, 1989) – such as being a member of the organization Coca-Cola – rather than on more
narrowly defined roles such as middle manager. Further, these memberships may, or may not, come with
clear behavioral expectations that are associated with roles (e.g., being a ‘white male’). Second, and perhaps
more importantly, not all competing expectations necessarily lead to emotional ambivalence. If roles are
low on a ‘salience hierarchy’ and are not very self-defining, we would not expect that role conflict would lead
to emotional ambivalence. Ambivalence is most likely to occur when role identities are salient and strongly
self-defining.
4. While we believe that both scenarios are theoretically possible, we also believe that they are unlikely. Deleting
an organizational identity is incredibly difficult (Albert, 1992). Moreover, while adding an organizational
identity is easier, it may not be worth the effort. Incorporating or adding a contradictory identity (e.g., a
family-friendly conglomerate that buys a ‘work first’ company) may increase ambivalence among some
members, but only if this purchase is done in conjunction with other HRM practices (e.g., hiring people for
that organization with strong family identities). Otherwise, the impact on employees may be too distal. It
may, therefore, be easier to simply manage via HRM practices (as above) rather than adding the additional
step of incorporating a new organizational identity.
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38 Functions of emotion from an organizational
perspective
Agneta H. Fischer and Antony S.R. Manstead
Emotions from an organizational perspective

Emotions are part and parcel of our working life, as can be witnessed in the present
volume and in many other recent publications on emotions in organizations (e.g.,
Ashkanasy et al., 2000; Fineman, 2000; Payne & Cooper, 2000). Whereas the presence and
significance of emotions at work has been disregarded in the past, no one would argue
any more that emotions are left at home when people go to work. Current research and
theorizing further suggests that emotions are not only elicited as a reaction to a specific
job or task, but that they are incorporated in work relations, and thus produced and
managed in an organizational culture. Organizations that do not include any emotions are
as lifeless as individuals or relationships without any emotions. Emotions produce energy
and involvement, convey meaning, signal goals and concerns, and reflect the moral atti-
tudes in an organization. As a consequence, unemotional organizations should not expect
much motivation, commitment, or moral involvement from their employees.
These observations suggest that emotions have a function in organizations. This implies
that emotions have beneficial consequences not only for an individual employee, but also
for the organization at large. There are different levels at which emotions in general, and
emotions in organizations more specifically, can be conceptualized. First of all, emotions
are experienced and expressed by individuals (individual level). There is ample evidence
showing that employees experience a huge diversity of emotions as part of their job.
Research on stress, job satisfaction, emotional dissonance, or other social interactions
at work show an abundance of work-related emotions at the individual level (e.g.,
Hochschild, 1983; Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987, 1989; Van Maanen & Kunda, 1989; Morris &
Feldman, 1996; Basch & Fisher, 2000; Humphrey, 2000; Zerbe, 2000; Van Kleef et al.,
2004).
However, emotions are not solely individual states of mind (see also Sandelands &
Boudens, 2000; Waldron, 2000; Parkinson et al., 2004; Tiedens & Leach, 2004). Although
it is common to theorize and measure emotions as momentary, discrete individual reac-
tions (‘I am angry’) to discrete events (‘He did not promote me’), we should acknowledge
that emotions often develop over a longer period (‘He has done this to me so often’) and
against a social relational backdrop (see, e.g., Fischer et al., 2003). Emotions are part of
someone’s role, implying scripts and rules about how to feel and express emotions in rela-
tion to for example, customers, patients, colleagues, or superiors (e.g., Ashforth and
Tomiuk, 2000). Such emotions are usually not elicited in one shot, and the initial stages
of these emotions may have been slumbering for a longer period. The discrete emotion
that is consciously experienced therefore may result from a sequence of appraisals (see
also Manstead & Fischer, 2001; Parkinson, 2001) not only of one event, but also of one’s
relationship with other persons in these events or of one’s relation with the management
605
or the organization at large. Emotions are thus elicited in and shaped by our relationships
with other people at work (interpersonal level; see, e.g., Tiedens, 2000; Waldron, 2000).
Third, at the group level emotions can be considered in relation to our social or profes-
sional identity as members of a team within an organization (see also George, 1989, 1990;
George & Brief, 1992; De Dreu et al., 2000; Totterdell, 2000; Barsade, 2002). Various
studies on group-based emotions outside the field of organization research (e.g., Doosje
et al., 1998; Dumont et al., 2003; Spears & Leach, 2004; Gordijn et al., 2006) have shown
that group-based emotions can be elicited when one’s group membership (rather than
one’s personal identity) is made salient; the activation of these emotions in turn may affect
the identification with and involvement in the group.
As a specification of the group level, employees of an organization may experience and
express emotions in response to events related to the organization and modified by the
organizational culture (organizational level). These emotions in turn shape our professional
identity, our attitudes toward and behavior in the organization. In this chapter we shall con-
sider emotions at the organizational level and refer to these as ‘organizational emotions’.
Organizational emotions are first, based on one’s membership of a professional organiz-
ation, and second, shared by members of this organization. These emotions are thus not
only based upon one’s organizational identity, but they are also collective in nature. They
are elicited in reaction to organization-related acts or events, they are experienced, expressed
and shared in an organizational context, and they have consequences for that organizational
context. Of course, we acknowledge that there are within-organizational differences, for
example, between different divisions, or different management levels, and thus especially in
the case of large organizations it may not always be accurate to talk about the organiz-
ational culture as a whole. However, the goal of this chapter is to explore the notion of
organizational emotions, and how these can be conceptualized, identified and studied.
How organizations elicit and shape emotion

Because emotions are generally conceived of as individual reactions to discrete events, it
is important to consider how organizations can elicit emotions, and subsequently, how
they shape and regulate these emotions. First, organizational emotions can be the result
of the behavior of colleagues or managers. This simply means that behaviors or attitudes
by colleagues or superiors may form the eliciting antecedent of the emotion. A study by
Basch and Fisher (2000), for example, shows that a substantive number of incidents elic-
iting positive, and even more negative emotions involve acts of colleagues (37%) or acts
of management (22%), or issues that involve the organization as a whole, such as the lack
of receiving recognition (1.5%), the lack of influence (6%), or company policies (3%).
Other studies have also provided evidence for the fact that organizational policies and
behaviors by colleagues may elicit a diverse range of emotions, such as anger, envy, hap-
piness, fear, contempt, pride, frustration or concern (see, e.g., Frost et al., 2000; Harlos &
Pinder, 2000). One study on prison guards (Waldron, 2000) even reports that the guards
mention organizational relations as being much more emotion eliciting than the work
with their clients, who are violent criminals, basically because the task-related emotions
can be more easily controlled and managed than the organizational emotions.
A second way in which organizations may influence emotions is through the organiz-
ational context. Relationships at work are often stretched over a longer period, and
therefore emotions elicited by colleagues or managers form the emotional setting in which
Functions of emotion from an organizational perspective 607
new work-related emotions are experienced and developed. One’s anger toward the man-
agement because they took wrong measures in a period of financial difficulties, for
example, will never completely dissolve and will always be remembered. It will form the
background of assessing these managers and may develop into negative judgments or
even stronger emotions like anger or contempt toward the organizational management.
Further, emotions elicited in reaction to the negative transactions of colleagues or supe-
riors will never wholly disappear, and will always lay the groundwork for new emotions.
Thus, organizational contexts provide an emotional setting. Employees in the same
organizational context use the same interpretation framework to appraise new events and
therefore their emotional reactions may also tend to converge over time, in the same way
as this is the case in more intimate relations (see, e.g., Anderson et al., 2003).
A third way in which an organization influences emotion is as a regulator: the way in
which employees’ emotional reactions to events are appraised will be affected by the way
an organization evaluates and deals with such emotions (e.g., Grandey, 2000). A short his-
torical sketch on organizational emotion management (Mastenbroek, 2000; Wouters,
1986, 1990) may serve as illustration for this idea of organizational emotion management.
Mastenbroek argues that in medieval times there were few constraints on emotional
behaviors during meetings or other formal gatherings: people would throw themselves on
the ground, while sobbing or groaning, and a fight would easily be started at any time over
any thing. Self-control was not something that was expected or imposed. During the fol-
lowing centuries, two global developments resulted in a general change in emotion man-
agement, namely an increasing emphasis on suppressing one’s urges and adjusting to
stringent behavioral codes on the one hand, and a growing informalization of all kinds of
social relations on the other hand (Wouters, 1986, 1990). Whereas the relation between,
for example, men and women, or between a boss and an employee used to be formalized
to a great extent (speaking turns, how one should address the other person, topics of con-
versation, dress codes, etc.), the importance of more informal, natural and spontaneous
behavior was increasingly emphasized in later centuries.
From the 20th century onwards this resulted in what Wouters (1990) has called ‘con-
trolled decontrolling’ in many areas of social interaction, among which emotion manage-
ment. The controlled decontrolling of emotions refers to the paradox that we are forced to
act emotionally authentic, and to put as few restraints on our natural emotions as possible.
Because strict conventions on how and when to express our emotions in social relations have
slowly disappeared, making room for an emphasis on individuality and authenticity, we
have to find out for ourselves which emotions are best to experience and express.
This ambivalence toward emotions and emotional control still characterizes many
organizations today. Whereas the presence of emotions is acknowledged and the poten-
tial positive effect of emotions is applauded with the arrival of the concept of emotional
intelligence (e.g., Salovey & Mayer, 1990; Barrett & Salovey, 2002), many organizations
are still silent about the way in which emotions should be managed and controlled. Before
considering the role of emotions in organizational cultures, we shall first briefly describe
the organizational functions of emotion.
Organizational functions of emotion

We propose two functions of organizational emotions. First, the experience of shared
emotion in organizations helps to establish organizational boundaries by creating and
enhancing commitment toward the organization (see Keltner & Haidt, 1999). Emotions –
especially positive, but also negative – lead to involvement in one’s work, connectedness
with others in the organization, and identification with the organization. The importance
of feeling connected or the need to belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995) applies not only
to employees who belong to the leadership of the organization, but also to employees at
lower levels. For example, the desire to feel connected is nicely shown in a study in which
employees – mostly low-level workers – were interviewed about their work and how
they felt about their job (Sandelands & Boudens, 2000). According to Sandelands and
Boudens these workers were not so much concerned about personal growth or self-
actualization – basically because their work was rather boring and repetitive – but they
were very concerned about the meaningful relations with others at work (see also Clark
et al., 2004). In addition, a study on prison guards showed that the emotions evoked by
the relations with their colleagues were more stressful and thus had more impact than the
emotions evoked by the interactions with their clients, who were violent criminals
(Waldron, 2000).
Commitment can be enhanced both by stressing positive feelings toward one’s own
organization, and by stressing negative feelings and dissimilarities with other groups or
organizations (see, e.g., West & Patterson, 1999; Totterdell, 2000; Kessler & Hollbach,
2005). Several studies have shown the effects of positive emotions on group feelings and
group behavior (see, e.g., De Dreu et al., 2000). For example, emotions in sport or work
teams may help to create a team spirit and strengthen the motivation to win as a team
(e.g., Totterdell, 2000). Emotions in work teams also enhance cooperation by group
members (Bartel & Saavedra, 2000; Barsade, 2002), and reduce levels of conflict (ibid.).
In particular, dispersion of positive emotion leads to greater cooperation and reduces
conflict in the group, whereas dispersion of negative emotion is associated with the oppo-
site outcomes. George and her colleagues have also shown that group affective tone is
related to group outcomes as diverse as absenteeism (George, 1989), pro-social behavior
toward customers (George, 1990), and organizational spontaneity (George & Brief,
1992).
A cooperative work environment provides support for the organization’s employees by
the sharing of positive emotions in reaction to positive events, but also by expressing pos-
itive emotions in reaction to more negative events. An interesting study on compassion
narratives by Frost et al. (2000) illustrates how, for example, compassion creates feelings
of connection and belongingness in organizations. Compassion is an other-oriented
feeling and implies not only a concern for the welfare of others, but also the willingness
to give priority to another person’s emotional needs rather than remaining engaged in
your own tasks. It may be expressed in many different ways, ranging from small gestures
such as buying gifts for someone’s birthday, or sending flowers when someone is ill, to
taking into account a person’s problems when assigning tasks, or making time and lis-
tening to what someone has to say. These can of course be seen as individual acts, but an
organization may help people to be compassionate by creating a culture of caring, a
culture in which there is attention for another person’s pain, difficulties or failures. As
Frost et al. (2000) report, people may be explicitly thanked for their compassionate acts
or an organization may install rituals that make compassion a desirable and normal daily
practice. Employees who receive compassion will feel more connected with their col-
leagues and with their organization and are thus less likely to quit their jobs.
In addition to compassion, receiving praise for outstanding achievements also produces

feelings of connectedness, because it shows respect on the part of the organization for an
employee’s achievements. Narratives from a study on relational experiences and emotions
at work provide many examples of the positive effects of expressing support, sympathy or
praise by supervisors or colleagues (Waldron, 2000).
Organizational life, however, not only consists of cooperation, support, praise and
compassion, but can be seen as a balancing act between cooperation and competition. A
second function of organizational emotions is to promote ambition, achievement orien-
tation and even competition between employees in order to perform at a maximum level.
Positive emotion expressions by leaders, such as praise and paying respect, are likely to
enhance positive emotions toward the organization and as a consequence may further
increase employees’ ambition to improve their performances and to outperform others.
Likewise, the (expected) expression of anger may have similar effects, for example, when
an employee has not met the organization’s expectations. It should be noted, however, that
anger in reaction to failures, may as easily result in lowered self-esteem, or feelings of frus-
tration as in increased ambition. Indeed, some studies have shown that anger on the part
of managers or supervisors may result in fear, dread, or panic (ibid.). We would argue
therefore that anger can have positive implications only if the target of the anger perceives
the anger as justified, which may lead to feelings of guilt, and changes of behavior (see
Baumeister et al., 1994). In addition, whether the effects of anger are positive or negative,
and whether they actually lead to more competition and better achievement, or to more
frustration and turnover, also depends on the type of organizational culture. We shall
return to this issue below.
In summary, emotions experienced in organizational contexts have a number of
beneficial effects on the organization as a whole. Organizational emotions may help to
promote organizational commitment and a cooperative climate. In particular, positive
emotions can help to sharpen boundaries with other organizations, either by helping to
establish shared evaluations of outside competitors or by enhancing organizational
identification. Second, emotions may motivate better performances and lead to competi-
tion with others, both inside and outside the organization.
Emotion in organizational culture

Organizational emotions are elicited and shaped in an organizational context and thus are
part of the organizational culture, which promotes specific norms and values and rejects
others (e.g., Schein, 1985; Quinn, 1988; Furnham & Gunter, 1993). The way in which emo-
tions are conceived, evaluated and managed is thus an integral aspect of an organizational
culture. Interestingly, emotions have been surprisingly absent in studies on organizational
culture. For example, in Schein’s (1985) famous writings on organizational culture, he
mentions among other things language, customs, traditions, groups norms, mission,
climate, embedded skills, habits of thinking or acting, shared meanings, and metaphors
or symbols. It is clear that emotions are implied in many of these characteristics, but they
are rarely explicitly mentioned.
One way in which an organizational culture may promote or inhibit specific emotions
in its members is by imposing specific scripts or rules on how employers should interact
within the organization. By this we do not mean emotion display rules that are associated
with the strain of a specific task (i.e., being empathic toward a patient, or sympathetic
toward a client), but rather the behavioral and emotional style that extends beyond these
demands and characterizes social interactions among employees within the organization.
An example of a rather explicit emotional culture can be derived from a study of the
Body Shop culture (Martin et al., 2000), which suggests that this firm is famous for its
rather explicit promotion of emotional intimacy by encouraging employees to disclose
their private lives and to discuss their emotions. As Anita Roddick, founder of the Body
Shop, once said: ‘The word “love” is as threatening in business as is talking about a loss
on the balance sheet’ (ibid., p. 122). Thus, managers are selected on the basis of their emo-
tional competence, and all employees are trained to be sensitive not only to the customer’s
needs, but also to each others’ needs. As one employer said: ‘It means that you do not give
negative feedback before you go on holiday, as you will not be there to pick up the pieces’.
Martin et al. refer to this culture as one of ‘bounded emotionality’, a culture that pro-
motes emotional disclosure, but also takes into account its costs is referred to as ‘bounded
emotionality’ (see also Mumby & Putnam, 1992). Bounded emotionality emphasizes both
the experience and expression of authentic emotions at work, but also the constraints of
these expressions in order to protect relationships. Emotions thus should not be
expressed, just because they are felt and a person feels like expressing them. Individuals
should respect each other’s feelings, but also differences in value orientations.
Although the emotional culture of the Body Shop and a few other organizations may
be rather explicit, this seems to be the exception rather than the rule. Most organizations
only have tacit scripts on what one is allowed to feel, and how one should deal with emo-
tions between colleagues or leaders. One way in which emotions may be implicitly
managed is through environmental cues, such as the interiors of a building, dress codes
among employees and so on. For example in a study on the relation between aesthetic
symbols and emotions, Wasserman et al. (2000) asked subjects to write a story of an imag-
inary visit to variously designed bars and restaurants depicted on photos. The interiors of
the bars and restaurants on the photos were classified as monomorphically (clearly one
style) or eclectically (a combination of styles) designed, European or Middle Eastern, and
warm or cold. The narratives were coded on the basis of three dimensions: pleasantness
(e.g., beautiful vs. ugly), arousal (overloaded, active vs. relaxed), and power (dominance,
control vs. submission or threat). They found that eclectic designs elicited pleasant, but
only moderate emotions, whereas monomorphic designs elicited more extreme emotions:
cold and European designs elicit distant and more intense emotions, such as chilliness,
fear and shame (whether dressed properly); warm and Middle Eastern designs on
the other hand elicited warm, sensual and impulsive emotions. This study suggests that
the interior of offices may also reflect the emotional style that is promoted in a specific
organization.
In addition to such environmental cues, organizations often have tacit or implicit
behavioral codes on how to respond emotionally. For example, in one of our studies (Van
Vianen & Fischer, 2002), we asked employees of a large financial company whether they
were ever angry at work, and they all answered that they never were angry and that they
could not even think of any instances of anger or conflict in their organization. These
answers may suggest that everything went smoothly in that organization and that there
was no basis for any conflict, but we were informed that not everyone was satisfied and
that there were conflicts, for example about the way women were treated. The answers
therefore may more likely suggest the operation of a tacit emotion rule that work is no
place to feel or express any intense emotion. Once an emotion was elicited in that organ-
izational context, it probably was downplayed to such an extent that it was not even stored
in memory as an emotional incident.
Tacit emotion rules are thus generally hardly noticeable, until they are transgressed. In
such cases, transgressors will be negatively evaluated, or even socially excluded, because
their emotional reactions differ from what is seen as the general norm in the organization.
The problem is that individuals transgressing those rules may not know exactly why they
are not liked, or why they are excluded from social networks. The question then is how to
recognize these implicit emotion rules. One way to infer tacit emotion rules is to examine
organizational cultural values. On the basis of studies on organizational culture, two
dimensions have been identified (Quinn, 1988; Furnham & Gunter, 1993) that we consider
relevant with respect to organizational emotions.
The first is often referred to as ‘rational goal’, reflecting a task orientation, and empha-
sizing productivity, efficiency, control and competition, whereas the other dimension has
been referred to as ‘human relations’, reflecting a people orientation, and emphasizing
cooperation, loyalty, team spirit, but also individual motivation and development. Other
labels that have been used for these different dimensions are power- versus people-oriented
cultures or power and achievement cultures versus support and role cultures (Schein,
1985).
Obviously, each organizational culture can be described on the basis of both dimen-
sions, but cultures differ in the balance between the two. In addition, organizational cul-
tures are also likely to differ in the way in which they promote and permit emotions that
support particular organizational values and inhibit emotions that undermine these
values. In this respect it is useful to distinguish emotions on the basis of their social impli-
cations, namely the effects they have on one’s relations with others and on the impression
or signals the emotion conveys to other people (see Fridlund, 1994). Two relevant, and
related, dimensions are the difference between socially engaging versus socially disengag-
ing emotions (Markus & Kitayama, 1991) or between powerful and powerless emotions
(Fischer, 1993; Tiedens, 2001). Social engagement or disengagement reflects the reduction
or enhancement of social distance between two people (e.g., contempt increases social dis-
tance, whereas shame decreases social distance). In addition, powerful emotions convey
that one is able to cope with the situation and thus promotes one’s status and dominance
in the relation, whereas powerless emotions convey weakness, powerlessness and the lack
of ability to cope with the situation.
Emotions that reflect social disengagement and signal an impression of power or dom-
inance are anger, contempt, disgust and pride. These emotions have in common that they
create distance between people by suggesting superiority, dominance or power in relation
to another person. Anger for example has been shown to belong to the attack family
(Fischer & Roseman, 2007) and can be characterized by the emotivational goal to con-
front other people and impose change upon them. Anger often (though not always)
implies an appraisal of other blame and control and can be expressed both in a direct and
indirect way. Anger is more often directly expressed (e.g., verbal or physical aggression or
criticism) toward persons with lower status, whereas it is more often suppressed toward
higher-status targets (e.g., Kuppens et al., 2004). Anger thus can be seen as trying to main-
tain or regain control over the other person, by correcting this person, demanding apolo-
gies, and so on. Especially when the anger is expressed in a direct way, it conveys an
impression of someone who is in charge. Empirical evidence for this idea is provided by
Tiedens (2001), who has shown that the expression of anger or pride (in contrast with
sadness or guilt) leads to higher ratings of status.
Contempt and socio-moral disgust are similar to anger in that they involve a negative
appraisal of another person, but they are also different from anger in that the emotiv-
ational goal of contempt and socio-moral disgust is to exclude rather than attack other
people from one’s social environment (see also Williams, 2001; Williams et al., 2005),
because the other person is seen as inferior (contempt) or even disgusting (e.g., Fischer &
Roseman, 2007). Our own research has shown that contempt is particularly elicited when
one expects not to be able to exert control (as is the case in anger). Contempt, resulting in
social exclusion, conveys the signal that one feels superior to another person.
Because rational goal cultures emphasize productivity, efficiency and control, emotions
may generally be seen as primitive and irrational phenomena, which have to be curbed as
much as possible, especially when they undermine one’s status and control. The only emo-
tions that may support the values of the rational goal culture are powerful emotions
(though its expression should be constrained). Indeed in one of our studies we asked
which emotions would fit with the participants’ leadership ideals and they rated anger,
contempt and pride as the only emotions that were permitted by leaders.
Socially engaging emotions on the other hand are emotions that decrease social dis-
tance and thus enhance affiliation, which is obviously the case for all positive emotions.
Powerless emotions in addition are emotions that imply uncertainty, doubt, failure, or
more generally a lowered self-esteem, and also serve an affiliation function. Emotions
such as concern, worry and fear are characterized by threat appraisals and situational
attributions, thus implying that the situation is seen as risky or even dangerous, and the
emotivational goal of these emotions is not to change, but rather to abandon the situ-
ation. The impression that these emotions convey to others is one of helplessness and
powerlessness, as one does not seem able to cope with the situation at hand, leading to
brooding over a problem rather than solving it.
In addition, shame, guilt and regret are also emotions that support this view, because
these emotions imply an acknowledgment of one’s own mistakes. In many organizational
cultures, making mistakes is taboo, and something to be concealed as quickly as possible.
In particular, leaders in rational goal cultures are expected not to admit their faults and
not to show any guilt, shame or regret, because that would decrease their status and credi-
bility. Guilt, shame and regret, however, serve an important appeasement function
(Barrett, 1995; Goffman, 1967; Keltner & Buswell, 1997; Miller, 2004), reducing conflicts,
anger, or irritation by admitting and acknowledging that one is to blame. In human rela-
tions cultures where loyalty, cooperation, individual development and motivation are
emphasized, powerless emotions may thus be more readily permitted and expressed
because they show a person’s emotional needs and concerns that may be shared with
others.
In sum, emotions can be distinguished on the basis of their social effects, suggesting
that some emotions fit better with particular cultures than others. Rational goal and
human relation cultures are assumed to differ in the tacit emotion rules they impose upon
their employees. Rational goal cultures generally would not allow any strong emotion
expression, or any emotional disclosure, and the only emotions that are permitted, if
expressed in an appropriate and mild way, are powerful emotions. Presumably, these
expressions would not even be recognized as reflecting emotions, because the emotions
are hidden in giving warnings, reprimands, or negative feedback. Moreover, in a rational
goal culture, emotions are likely not to be expressed or shared in public meetings, but
rather individually (see also Ollilianen, 2000). Human relation cultures on the other hand
would allow powerless emotions, at least to a certain extent, and would put more con-
straint on the expression of powerful emotions, as these may result in undesirable com-
petitive and hierarchical relations.
Managing organizational emotions

So far, we have mostly described the beneficial side of organizational emotions. We have
described many examples of emotions that serve an organization’s aims, such as an enthu-
siastic atmosphere, or a cooperative and supportive management team, but to what extent
are organizational emotions always functional? Obviously, there are also examples of
emotions that are clearly very dysfunctional to the organization (see also Parrott, 2001,
2002), like the greed of its management, envy between employees, contempt for col-
leagues, or fear for superiors. How can we think of such emotions as being functional for
the organization? We cannot.
Emotions, whether experienced by one employee, or groups of employees, or managers,
are not in themselves functional for the organization, but should be made functional and
effective. Organizational emotions are based on one’s professional identity and thus
elicited when organizational concerns are touched. If, however, one’s professional iden-
tity becomes weaker, either for individual reasons, or for reasons due to the state of affairs
in the organization, then self-enhancing rather than organization-related motives may
become more important. In such circumstances one may start to appraise the leadership,
one’s colleagues, or the organization as an institute in a more negative way. Further, neg-
ative emotions may start dominating an organizational culture, because an organization
is unable to reach the goals of the organization, or is unable to deal with new challenges,
or treats groups of employees in an unfair way so that they feel disrespected by their
organizations, leading to resentment and envy.
These can all be reasons why especially negative emotions like anger, contempt, or
resentment may overrule the more positive aspects of one’s work. The lure of various
types of negative emotions is still present, and the downsides of emotion management
and failures of emotion regulation have not disappeared from organizations, despite all
our knowledge on emotion management and emotional intelligence (e.g., Salovey &
Mayer, 1990; Barrett & Salovey, 2002; Gross & John, 2002; Lopes et al., 2005). Because
organizational emotions should be treated as collective emotions, it is the task of the man-
agement of an organization to deal with such emotions and to turn them into more
beneficial emotions. There are indeed examples of collective efforts by leaders to force a
collective charge up or fire up in order to motivate everyone to do their utmost in order
to meet set goals, or to avoid financial bankruptcy (see, e.g., Waldron, 2000).
It is more difficult, however, to deal with an overall negative atmosphere that concerns
the management itself. This is where the concept of emotional intelligence should be
applied to groups or organizations rather than to individuals. Managers should be able to
recognize a negative emotional atmosphere and to find out what its causes are. This is not
as easy as recognizing specific emotions in individuals, because the collective nature of
these emotions should be the focus of this search. When some insight into these causes
has been gained, the next step is to deal with them and to change employees’ appraisals
of the situation. In line with research on emotion regulation at an individual level (e.g.,
Gross & John, 2003), regulation at an organizational level is likely to be more successful
and have fewer costs, if one changes the appraisal of the situation rather than if one is
forced to suppress certain emotions. For example, in a culture dominated by threat and
control, failures should be appreciated differently rather than suppressing shame or anger
responses; in a culture where there is anger toward the way in which the management pro-
motes or rewards, the management should probably change the system, but more impor-
tantly, should try to have employees reappraise the system in order to avoid envy and
resentment. Organizational cultures can only be changed by changing employees’ organ-
izational emotions. These organizational emotions determine not only organizational
outcomes, but also individual well-being. An organizational culture that is not based on
distrust, envy, resentment or indifference, but on cooperation, compassion, and ambition
results in better performance and more satisfaction.
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Index
Abbott, A. 280 affect and justice

Abe, J. and C. Izard 479 affect as antecedent of justice judgements
Abelson, R. 19, 122, 265, 266 361–3
Abraham, R. 288 affect control theory 379
absenteeism 66, 74, 187, 286 affect-as-information model 361–2
Ackermann, P. 130, 228 appraisal theories 363–4, 370, 371, 374, 377,
Adams, J. 172–3 380
Adams, R. and R. Kleck 481 attributional model 370–71
Adams, S. 366 cross-cultural research see cultural
Adelmann, P. 252, 287, 290 differences
Adler, N. 293, 595 deontic justice model 365, 372, 377
Adler, R. 409, 410 discrete emotions 363, 364, 366
affect distributive justice 366–7, 373, 374–7,
affective states and work outcomes 141–5 379–80, 381, 383, 384
affective traits and states 136–8 emotions as mediators of reactions to
affective traits and work outcomes 138–41 (in)justice 373–8
circumplex model 17, 19–22, 27, 29, 34–8, fairness theory 360, 365, 367, 370–71, 372,
176, 326, 465–6, 469 375, 376, 377
congruence, differences and research future research 363, 370, 372, 384–5
implications 25–8, 35–8 group-value model 378, 379, 380, 384
discrete emotional experiences 28–9, 30, 31, interactional justice 372–8, 380–84
32, 36, 37 justice as mediator between emotions and
dispositional 136–41, 152–3 outcomes 378–81
emotions and moods, difference between justice perceptions, influence on moods and
153, 175–6, 197 emotions 361–5
future research 36–8 justice as predictor of moods and emotions
Job Affect Scale (JAS) 29, 31 363–73
and job satisfaction 138–9, 142–3, 155–8, overall justice perceptions, influence on
163, 502 moods and emotions 365–6, 383
literature review 28–36 procedural justice 367–73, 374–7, 378,
measurement philosophy 27, 29–34, 38 379–80, 381, 383, 384, 410
PA/NA (positive action/negative action) and regulatory focus theory 372, 377
model 17, 18, 22–7, 35–8, 136–45, 153, self-affirmation theory 375, 384
155, 156, 160, 198, 361–3, 367–9, 465 and terror management theory 367, 368,
PA/NA model, and emotion research in 375, 384
organizations 28–36 voice psychology 368, 370, 375
PA/NA model, popularity of 29–34 affective events theory (AET) 82, 114–15, 142,
PANAS (Positive and Negative Affect 154–6, 349, 363–5, 374, 380, 457–8, 499,
Schedule) 23, 26, 27, 29–37, 153, 502–3, 505–7, 575–6
199–200 aggression 62, 67, 141, 185, 187, 373, 433
and personality 136–41 Agnes, M. and L. laird 532
self-reported 22–3, 25, 139 Akerlof, G. 415
state 31, 34, 136–8, 141–6, 363, 381, 382 Albert, S. 552, 592, 593, 599, 600, 602
structure of 17–44 Alge, B. 503
trait affect 136–45, 153, 363, 381, 382 Allcorn, S. 63
valence/arousal dimension 17, 18, 19–22, 23, Alliger, G. and K. Williams 122
25–38, 55, 162–3, 231 Allik, J. and R. McCrae 496
see also individual affects and emotions Alloy, L. 45, 46, 47, 49
affect infusion model (AIM) 103–4, 155, 163 Allport, F.H. 249
617
Allred, K. 31, 67, 392, 406, 407, 408, 409, 569 anxiety
Alvesson, M. and S. Sveningsson 460 counterproductive work behavior (CWB)
Amabile, T. 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 110, 111, 189–90
113, 115, 129 and emotion regulation 286, 296
Amason, A. 47, 55, 56 and emotion scripts 267
Ambady, N. 386, 480 and emotional contagion 432–4
Amit, R. and P. Schoemaker 549 and emotional dissonance 288
Ancona, D. 448, 449 and (in)justice 14, 75, 367, 370, 373, 374, 378
Andersen, P. 480, 563, 564, 570 and innovation 104, 110–11, 112
Anderson, C. 30, 540, 607 and negotiation 565–6
Anderson, N. 103, 104, 108, 115 neurobiological measurement 204
Andersson, L. and C. Pearson 183, 193, 345 and organizational alliances 563, 564, 566–7,
anger 568–9
behavioral responses to 187, 610 and performance 124–5, 128, 129, 130–31,
and counterproductive work behavior 141, 158, 180, 253
187, 188, 189–90 and physiological reaction 482
cultural differences 493 and stress 109, 306
and customer service 246, 278, 354, 457 see also fear; stress
and decision making 67 Aquino, K. 189, 381
and emotion regulation 190, 285, 292 Archer, M. 441, 443
in emotion scripts 266, 267, 269, 270, 271, Argote, L. 448
273, 275–7, 278, 279 Argyris, C. 549, 554
and emotional contagion 345, 428, 430, Ariño, A. 561, 565
432–3, 457 Arkes, H. 46, 47, 48, 54
and emotional display rules 326, 328, 329 Armor, D. and S. Taylor 96, 99
and emotional intelligence 214, 250, 442 Arnould, E. and L. Price 335
and emotional suppression 79, 80, 493 Aronson, E. 49
and failure 123, 351–3 Arvey, R. 138, 139, 141, 316
and fear 355, 356, 393 Ashby, F. 162, 198
feature and functions of 62–5 Ashford, S. and L. Cummings 552
feigning 514 Ashforth, Blake E. 80, 107, 152, 153, 305, 316,
and gender differences 273–4, 275, 276, 317, 325, 335–48, 460, 502, 515, 521, 522,
279 589, 593, 594, 602, 605
and (in)justice 67–8, 74, 75, 360, 362, 365–7, Ashkanasy, Neal M. 1–14, 17, 77, 80, 82, 170,
369–80, 381, 383, 384, 606–7 175, 211, 212, 349, 428, 443, 467, 499–511,
and innovation 104, 109, 110–11 520, 562, 563, 575, 605
interpersonal effects on 393–6 and C. Ashton-James 1, 75, 84, 104, 106, 115
and intimidation 69, 285 and M. Dasborough 460, 468, 518, 521
and leadership 467–9, 470, 477, 492, 514–15 and C. Daus 197, 216, 245, 476, 513
management 250 and M. Newcombe 478, 519
and motivation 178–80 and B. Tse 107, 113, 467, 470, 489, 490
and negotiation 355, 381, 393–6, 397, 398, Ashton-James, C. 1, 75, 84, 104, 106, 115
399, 400, 401, 402, 405, 406, 407–8, 409, Atkinson, J. 130
410, 411, 414, 466 Au, K. 30, 34
and organizational change 549–50 Austin, J. and J. Vancouver 265
physiological reaction 187, 191, 430, 432–3, Austin, W. and E. Walster 366–7, 374, 386
481, 482, 484 Averill, J. 113, 270, 272, 273, 393
and power 79, 82, 278, 611–12 Avolio, B. 458, 459, 461, 476, 518, 523
and risk-taking 67, 292 Awamleh, R. and W. Gardner 467, 477, 517
and stress 109 Aydin, M. 456
suppression 78, 292
antisocial behaviors 62, 63, 183 Baer, M. 104, 108
see also counterproductive work behavior Bagozzi, R. 31, 125, 287, 292, 293, 294, 335,
Antonakis, J. 513, 522 548, 555
Antonioni, D. 584 Bakker, A. 337, 345
Index 619
Baldwin, M. 265, 268, 273 Bellah, R. 598

Baldwin, T. and J. Ford 239 Bem, D. 432
Bales, R. 441, 443 Ben-Ze’ev, A. 201, 550, 551, 553, 564
Ball, G. 363, 364 Bennett, R. 160, 183, 184, 205
Ballou, R. 241 Bernardin, H. 252
Bandura, A. 122, 124, 163, 173, 306, 307 Bernieri, F. 516
Banse, R. and K. Scherer 482–3 Bernoulli, D. 45
Bar-On, R. 214–16, 217–18, 220, 221, 227, 237, Berry, D. 585
247, 445, 512–13 Bettenhausen, K. 444, 467, 468
Barbalet, J. 581, 583 Beyer, J. and D. Niño 576
Barbas, H. 22 Bies, R. 64, 360, 361, 409
Barclay, L. 32, 64, 75, 84, 367, 371, 373, 377, Biggart, N. 595
379 Bishop, S. 532
Barger, P. and A. Grandey 158–9, 287 Blader, S. and T. Tyler 361, 499
Bargh, J. and T. Chartrand 13, 263 Blais, M. 579
Barley, S. and G. Kunda 575 blame 75, 83, 129, 371, 408, 410, 538
Barling, J. 218 Blattberg, R. and S. Hoch 46
Baron, R. 62, 105, 106, 158, 165, 183, 361, 392, Blau, P. 10, 499, 503, 504, 507
406, 408, 409, 502 Bless, H. 46, 54, 362, 407, 425, 432, 562
Barr, P. and M. Glynn 551 Bligh, M. 522
Barrett, K. 124, 350 Block, J. 19
Barrett, Lisa Feldman 17–44, 77, 84, 199, 607, Blyler, M. and R. Coff 546
612, 613 Bodenhausen, G. 407, 425
Barrick, M. 140, 253 Bodtker, A. and J. Jameson 562
Barron, Laura G. 489–98 Bohle, P. and A. Tilley 50
Barros, I. and D. Cooperrider 541 Bohner, G. and T. Weinerth 386
Barry, B. 33, 140, 392, 405, 406, 444, 562, 565, Bolman, L. and T. Deal 538
571 Bond, F. and D. Bunce 109, 110
Barsade, S. 1, 27, 30, 34, 36, 159, 280, 312, 317, Bono, Joyce E. 139, 147, 305, 307, 309, 310,
336, 345, 361, 367, 427, 441, 491, 499, 563, 311, 466–7, 469, 470, 489–98, 517
568, 585, 606, 608 Booth, J. and S. Mann 69
and D. Gibson 443, 445, 446, 547 Booth-Butterfield, M. and S. 201
and J. Kelly 114, 349, 428 boredom 109–10, 111, 191, 482, 484, 515
and B. Staw 47, 55, 56, 106 Borkenau, P. and A. Liebler 481
Bartel, C. and R. Saavedra 30, 34, 35, 36, 37, Bovey, W. and A. Hede 251
317, 331, 349, 427, 428, 436, 502, 546, Bower, G. 256, 265, 361, 385, 397, 406, 466
608 Bower, J. 553
Bartneck, C. 202 Bowlby, J. 566
Bartunek, J. 531, 536, 551 Boyatzis, Richard E. 216, 217, 219, 220, 221,
Basch, J. and C. Fisher 303, 502, 605, 606 222, 226–44
Bass, B. 458, 459, 461, 465, 467, 470, 476, 477, Bradburn, N. 23
489, 516, 517, 519, 522, 523 Bradley, M. and P. Lang 203
Batson, C. 408, 409, 479 Bradshaw, J. 73
Batt, R. and P. Valcour 596 Bray, D.W. 226, 228
Battista, J.M. 234 Breitenstein, C. 484
Bauer, T. 501 Brickman, P. 590, 595
Baumeister, R. 49, 158, 174, 180, 290, 306, 429, Bridewell, W. and E. Chang 187
582, 608, 609 Brief, A. 1, 29, 36, 50, 107, 110, 120, 136, 139,
Bazerman, M. 46–7, 49, 55, 415, 565 146, 153, 154, 155, 200, 203, 349, 465, 497,
Beach, L. and T. Mitchell 178 562
Beal, D. 33, 112, 120, 142, 143, 144, 154, 158, and J. George 104, 105, 106, 110, 159, 502,
286, 287, 331 606, 608
Beattie, J. 97 Brockner, J. 30, 47, 49, 55, 56, 127, 367, 370,
Begley, T. and C. Lee 363, 364 371, 372, 374, 384
Bell, D. 46, 50, 51, 92, 94 Brody, L. 69, 201
Brotheridge, C. and A. Grandey 80–81, 84, Caruso, D. 70, 82, 218–19, 234–7, 247, 512, 513
286, 287, 302, 304, 306, 309, 310, 316, 318, Carver, C. 23, 90, 122, 126, 129, 173, 175, 254,
319, 330, 335, 341 306, 324, 411
Brotheridge, C. and R. Lee 80, 81, 84, 252, Cauley de la Sierra, M. 568
284, 286, 287, 289, 301, 304, 305, 307, 309, Cervone, D. 143
311, 312, 522 Chaiken, S. 153, 399
Brotheridge, D. 219 Chaleff, I. 519
Brown, B. 484 Chandler, A. 553
Brown, D. 465, 473, 479 Chang, E. 129, 187
Brown, F. and D. Moshavi 471 Chartrand, T. 13, 263, 423, 424
Brown, J. 45, 129 Chebat, J.-C. and W. Slusarczyk 373, 379
Brown, K. 33, 129 Chemers, M. 465
Brown, R. 328 Chen, P. and P. Spector 187
Brown, S. 32, 125, 287 Cherniss, C. 239, 576–7
Bruk-Lee, V. and P. Spector 188 Cherulnik, P. 470, 491
Bruner, R. and R. Spekman 570 Clair, J. and R. Dufresne 73
Bryant, F. 125, 129 Clark, M. 62, 69, 80, 278, 281, 306, 442, 521,
Buck, R. 270, 281 608
Bucy, E. 518, 521 Clayton, S. 365
Buller, D. 484 Cliff, N. and F. 19
bullying 62, 64, 69, 79–80, 583 Clore, G. 120, 161, 185, 205, 361–2, 397, 406,
Bunce, D. and M. West 109, 115 424, 425, 466
Burgelman, R. 550, 551 Cohen, G. and M. Prinstein 433
Burger, J. and D. Caldwell 585 Cohen-Charash, Yochi 160, 279, 360–91
Burgoon, J. 483, 516 Cole, M.S. 32
Burke, M. and R. Day 239 Coleman, J. 449
Burke, P. 591–2 Collins, R. 275
Burkle, M. 234 Colquitt, J. 74, 160, 360
burnout 305, 318, 337 conflict 392–404
Burt, R. 450 see also negotiation
Bush, L. 19 Conger, J. 461, 467, 470, 476, 477, 516, 517,
Bushe, G. and A. Kassam 536 519
Büssing, A. and J. Glaser 308 Conlon, D. 47, 48, 54, 160, 445, 446
Butler, E. 79, 83, 85, 306 Connolly, J. and C. Viswesvaran 502
Butt, A. 32 Connolly, T. 54, 98
Butterfield, S. 595 contempt 65–6, 68, 69, 326, 328, 493, 612
Byrne, Zinta S. 360–91, 502 Cook, T. and D. Campbell 378
Cooley, C. 591
Cabanac, M. 22, 122 Cooper, Cary L. 1–14, 74
Cacioppo, J. 17, 25, 140, 147, 393, 397, 399, Cooper, C.D. 461
532, 566 Cooper, R. and A. Sawaf 212, 213, 216
Cage, Tiffani G. 245–60 Cooperrider, D. 447, 536, 537, 541
Calder, A. 350 Cornelius, R. 113
Callahan, J. and E. McCollum 521 Cortina, L. 183
Cameron, A. 217 Coser, R. 591
Campbell, D. 227, 378 Cosmides, L. 61, 407
Campbell, J. 226, 239 Costa, P. 23, 50, 217, 484, 496
Campos, J. 80 Côté, Stéphane 80, 83, 84, 284–300, 301, 305,
Cantor, N. and J. Kihlstrom 265 306, 308, 312, 313, 351, 400, 405, 471, 578
Cardador, T. 598 and C. Miners 456, 473
Carmeli, A. and S. Colakoglu 114 and L. Morgan 81, 285, 286, 287, 335
Carnevale, P. 355, 357, 392, 399, 406, 407, 408, counterproductive work behavior (CWB)
414, 562 and anger 141, 187, 188, 189–90
Carroll, J. 23, 26, 37, 153, 198 and anxiety 189–90
Carson, K. and R. Griffeth 584 avoidance behaviors 65–6, 97, 175–6
Index 621
and cognitive appraisal theories of emotion Cuceloglu, D. 202

184–90 Culbertson, H. 339
definition 183–4 cultural differences/norms 37–8, 75, 267–9,
emotion regulation 190–93 272, 352–3, 478, 578
and emotional contagion 193 and anger 493
and emotional intelligence 193 and creativity 113
future research 192–3 and emotion measurement 201, 202, 204,
and individual differences 187–8, 192–3 205
information-processing models 184 and emotion regulation 287, 293–4
interpersonal deviance 184, 185, 187–8, 189, emotional display rules 331, 492–3
190 and guilt 201
Job-Related Affective Well-Being Scale leadership and emotional management
(JAWS) 188 492–6
and justice perception 189 and negotiation 409
negative affectivity 186–8, 189, 193 organizational strategic alliances 561, 565
offensive behavior, repetitive nature of 65 and performance 287
positive affectivity 186, 188 and shame 147, 201, 294
workplace studies, evidence from 187–8 Cunningham, M. 65, 66, 585
see also individual behaviors customer service
creativity and emotional display rules 158–9, 317–18,
affect-creativity model 106 319, 323, 329, 336
cross-cultural differences 113 and emotional intelligence 246, 252, 255,
and decision making 106–7 256, 354–5
discrete emotions, impact of 110–13 performance 158–9, 287
and emotion control 114 Cutter, H. 238–9
and emotion scripts 279 Cyert, R. and J. March 547
and emotional ambivalence 104, 110
and emotional contagion 114–15 Dailey, C. 229
future research 106, 107, 110, 111, 112, Dalal, R. 160
113–14, 115–16, 165 Daly, J. 407, 408
and intrinsic motivation 105 Damasio, A. 12–13, 22, 46, 138, 144, 263, 424,
literature review 30, 31 466
and minority dissent 113, 115 Damen, Frederic 465–75
negative affect, impact of 107–10, 161–2 Danneels, E. 554
positive affect, impact of 105–7, 110, Dansereau, F. 499, 500, 501
160–62, 251 Darwin, C. 202, 204, 268–9, 393, 425, 430, 431
and promotion 108 Das, T. and B. Teng 561, 564
and risk-taking 106 Dasborough, Marie T. 75, 197–208, 458, 460,
and self-conscious emotions 112 468, 499, 502, 503, 505, 506, 517, 518, 519,
stress effect 108–10 521
superviser-rated 108, 161 D’Augelli, A. 220, 222
and transformational leadership 107–8, 111, Daus, Catherine S. 6, 197, 212, 216, 245–60,
114 455, 456–7, 476, 490, 513
Creyer, E. and J. Kozup 32 David, J. 145
Cropanzano, R. 17, 26, 28, 35, 36, 37, 75, 76, Davidson, K. 79
270, 302, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 361, 377, Davidson, R. 204, 231, 233, 361, 424
382, 384, 521 Davies, M. and L. Stankov 228
and R. Folger 363, 365, 369–70, 372 Davison, M. 21
and T. Wright 253 Dawda, D. and S. Hart 217, 221
Crosby, L. 409 Day, A. and S. Carroll 443
Crossan, M. and I. Berdrow 554 Day, D. 461, 470, 499, 500, 501, 503, 523
Crowne, D. and D. Marlowe 222 De Cremer, D. 32, 369, 376, 378, 380, 396, 458,
Cryer, B. 542 479
Csikszentmihalyi, M. 111, 121, 123–4, 129, De Dreu, C. 113, 394, 396, 399, 606, 608
131, 142, 178, 205, 531, 535 De Hoogh, A. 459
de Jonge, J. 253 Depue, R. and P. Collins 175

De Rivera, J. 124, 276 Desmet, P. 203
De Rond, M. 561 DeSteno, D. 54–5, 408
de Sousa, R. 302 Deutsch, M. 360, 443
Deaux, K. 598 Diefendorff, James M. 8, 301, 302, 316–34, 340
Deci, E. 121, 122, 127, 172, 306, 579 and J. Gosserand 301, 302, 310, 311, 316,
decision making 318, 319, 321, 515
accountability 48 and G. Greguras 304, 312
affective influences 45–6, 144 and E. Richard 80, 81, 83, 252, 287, 289,
and anger 67 290, 309
cognitive dissonance perspective 49, 50, 51, 54 Diehl, M. and W. Stroebe 112
coping and escalation situations 48–50, 51 Diener, E. 17, 23, 37, 90, 153, 198, 199, 201,
depressive realism perspective 47, 49, 50, 51, 205, 533, 534, 584
144 Dienesch, R. and R. Liden 499
dissonance reduction strategies 100 Dijksterhuis, A. 296
and emotion regulation 292 Dimberg, U. 337, 393, 430, 433
escalation situations 48–50, 54–5 Dirks, K. 441
and future optimisticity 49, 50 disappointment
future research 54–6 antecedent-focused regulation 96
happier-and-smarter hypothesis 47, 56 counterfactual thinking 94–6, 99
and information integration 46 definition 90–94
and (in)justice 360, 366–7 and expectation 91, 93, 96–7
and innovation 106–7 and future behavior 93
literature review 30, 31, 32, 33, 47 and (in)justice 365, 369, 370, 374, 376, 378,
managerial 46–7 380
and negative affect 47, 48–50 and job satisfaction 143
and neuroticism 48, 50, 55 and motivation 179
and positive affect 46, 251 negative outcome, dealing with 91–2, 98–100
practical implications for organizational 55 and negotiation 396, 398, 401, 407, 410
problem framing 48 and performance 128, 130
and regret see regret regulation 96–100
and risk preference 46, 179 ‘silver lining’ strategy 99
sadder-but-wiser hypothesis 45, 47, 56 see also regret
self-efficacy 46–7, 48, 49, 173 disgust
and sunk costs 47, 48 in emotion script 269, 276
see also motivation; leadership; negotiation and emotional display rules 326, 493, 612
Degoey, P. 367 and emotional suppression 79
DeGroot, Timothy 476–88 and facial expression 430, 432–3, 433, 481
Dehler, G. and M. Welsch 535 features and functions 65–6, 69
Dekker, H. 561 and (in)justice 74, 365, 373, 612
Delbecq, A. 441 dishonesty 63, 278
Deluga, R. and J. Perry 501 Dittmann, A. 19
Demerouti, E. 305, 306, 307 Doherty, R. 337
Depaulo, B. 480, 481, 483 Dollard, M. 253, 310, 311
depression Domagalski, T. 585
and creativity 107, 110–11 Donovan, R. and J. Rossiter 203
depressive realism perspective 47, 48, 49, 50, Doosje, B. 606
144 Dormann, C. and D. Zapf 303
and emotional contagion 431, 432–4 Doucet, L. 355, 589, 590, 592, 600
and emotional dissonance 288 Dougherty, D. and E. Bowman 557
and emotional exhaustion 309 Douglas, C. 218
and emotional suppression 79 Douglas, S. and M. Martinko 67, 186
and (in)justice 366, 369, 373, 374, 376, 378 Dovidio, J. 425
and performance 45–6, 124, 125, 131 downsizing 2, 75, 363, 368–9, 374, 381, 480,
and stress 306 583
Index 623
Drolet, A. and M. Morris 409 and gender 201–2, 205

Druskat, Vanessa Urch 441–54 Job Affect Scale (JAS) 29, 31, 200
Dube, L. 203 Job Emotions Scale (JES) 30, 32, 199–200
Duclos, S. 290 Job-Related Affective Well-Being Scale
Duffy, M. 183 (JAWS) 188, 200
Dukerich, J. 591, 594 PAD (Pleasure, Arousal and Dominance)
Dumont, M. 606 scale 200, 203
Duncan, S. 21, 22, 25 PANAS (Positive and Negative Affect
Dunegan, K. 399 Schedule) 23, 26, 27, 29–37, 153,
Dunham, R. and J. Herman 202 199–200
Dunn, J. and M. Schweitzer 408 physiological changes 203, 204, 269, 272,
Dutton, J. 535, 537, 539, 550, 551, 553, 555, 285
590, 593, 600 Product Emotion Measurement Instrument
Dutton, K. and J. Brown 129 (PrEmo) 203
Duysters, G. 561 Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM) 203
Dvir, T. 461, 470 self-report 199–200, 200–203, 204, 205
Dweck, C. 127 emotion regulation
Dyer, J. 561 adaptive 287
amplification of 95, 285–7, 289–91, 293, 303,
Eagly, E. and S. Chaiken 153, 399 304, 308, 309, 319, 326–9, 331, 493–4,
Earley, P. 106, 424, 478 496
Eden, D. 518 automatic versus conscious 295–6
Edmondson, A. 441, 555, 556 conceptual mechanisms, understanding
Eich, E. 185 291–2
Eid, M. and E. Diener 356 counterproductive work behavior (CWB)
Einarsen, S. and M. Gemzoe 79 190–93
Eisenberg, J. and K. James 107 and cultural differences 287, 293–4
Eisenberg, N. 393 and decision making 292
Eisenberger, R. 30 deep acting 80–81, 191, 219, 285, 287, 301,
Eisenhardt, K. 546, 554 303–5, 307–11, 338–41, 522
Ekman, P. 80, 153, 175, 203, 268, 272, 286, definition 284–5
290, 291, 302, 318, 326, 330, 393, 406, 425, dimensions 285–6
481, 482, 495, 521, 576 and effort 289–90
and D. Matsumoto 202, 204, 493 and emotional dissonance 288–9, 292, 304,
and H. Oster 480 305
and M. O’Sullivan 249 and emotional intelligence 295
and E. Rosenberg 316 and emotional labour 284–5, 301
and W. Friesen 202, 204, 249, 269, 316, 317, facial feedback 290
319, 320, 323, 324, 477, 492, 493, 519 future research 146–7, 286, 291–7, 472
Elfenbein, H. 114, 202 individual differences 289, 293, 310, 478–9
Elliot, A. 126–7, 129, 130 and organizational culture 284–300, 302–3,
Elliot, E. and C. Dweck 172 614
Ellsworth, P. 198, 356, 407, 408 and performance 287–8
Elovainio, M. 74 research findings 286–8, 289, 290, 292, 293
Elsbach, K. 30, 34, 198, 386, 555, 591, 594 self-report measures of emotional
Elster, J. 557 dissonance 288
embarrassment 79, 123, 124, 180, 372 and social interaction 290–91, 301, 302, 305,
Emmons, R. 23, 146, 199, 578, 590 350
emotion measurement suppression of 285, 286, 289, 303–4, 308,
Affect Grid 203 309, 319, 493–4, 522
and cultural differences 201, 202, 204, 205 surface acting 80–81, 219, 285–8, 301, 303–5,
definitions 197–8, 270 307–11, 338, 340, 341, 522
Differential Emotions Scale (DES) 200 training 294–5, 296
and emotional intelligence 201, 203, 205 and workplace outcomes, mechanisms
future research 204–5 linking 288–91
emotion scripts emotional display rules

and anger 266, 267, 269, 270, 271, 273, and affective events 323, 324
275–7, 278, 279 contextual 319–20, 321–4, 325–31
antecedents 266, 267–8, 275, 276, 277–8 cultural factors 331, 492–3
biological 267, 268–70, 272, 275 and customer service 317–18, 319, 323, 329,
cognitive 267–8, 270–71, 272–3, 274, 275, 336
279, 280 definitions and background 316–18
future research 278–81 discrepancies 321, 322–4
and individual personalities 266, 267, 271, dynamics of 320–25
272–3, 276–7, 279–80, 478–9 emotional simulation 320
as methodology 276, 280–81 and employee harmony 317, 318, 322, 323,
multi-level model 267–78, 279 324–5, 329, 330
organizational 268, 274–8, 279, 280 facial expressions 317, 319, 323, 325
prototype approach 270–71, 273, 275, 277 feedback mechanism 323–4
relational 268, 272–4, 275, 279 felt emotions 325–8, 331, 340–41
script definitions 264–5 future research 330–31
self-control procedures 266, 271 integrative 317–18, 328–9
social 268, 271–2, 280–81 ‘leaking’ emotion 326, 328
theory 265–7, 272 masking emotions 80–81, 147, 318, 319, 329,
emotional ambivalence in organizations 331
ambivalence amplification theory (AAT) 590 negative feedback loops 322
ambivalence enhancement 595 and organizational goals 317, 322–3, 324,
conflicting identities 592–4, 597, 598–600, 325, 328–9, 331
601 prescriptive 318–19, 321–4, 325, 326, 328,
family-friendly practices 369, 596–8 330–31
future research 600–601 situational influences 323–4
human resource management 596–9 and social interaction 317, 328–9, 330, 351
hybrid identities 593–4, 597, 598–600, 601 emotional exhaustion 81, 307, 308, 309, 310,
identity control theory (ICT) 591–2, 600 336, 345
literature review 30 emotional intelligence
management of 595–600, 601, 607 ability perspective 245–6, 253, 512, 513
and organizational rituals 595 and anger 250, 314, 442
overview 590–94 behavioral evidence 222–3
emotional contagion competencies 229–31, 233–7
and anger 345, 428, 430, 432–3, 457 competency development 238–41
and attractiveness 431 controversy 513
and automatic nervous system (ANS) 425–7, and customer service 246, 252, 255, 256
428, 429, 435 definition 212–16, 227, 228, 442–3
avoidance of 432–4 and emotion regulation 295
and emotional reappraisal 429 Emotional Barometer 247
and emotional suppression 429 Emotional Competence Inventory 360 (ECI
encouraging 423–4 360) 219–20, 221, 238
feigning emotional displays 430–31 Emotional Competence Inventory (ECI-2)
future research 345 234–7
group contagion 423–40 emotional facilitation 240–41
and laughter 434–5, 437 Emotional Intelligence Self Descriptive
mood judging 424–5 Inventory (EISDI) 247
and organizational strategic alliances 568, Emotional IQ Test 219
569 emotional needs 251–6
physiological changes 158–9, 425, 426, Emotional Quotient Inventory (EQi)
428–32, 434–5, 437 217–18, 220, 237, 247
and power 423, 434, 436 emotional recognition 248–9, 250
and service agents 336–7, 341–3, 345 emotions research 211–12
and social interaction 426–7 and empathy 229–30, 232, 234, 237, 250,
susceptibility to 431–2 442, 444, 445, 446, 456, 459
Index 625
future research 220, 222–3, 252–3, 442, emotions from an organizational perspective
450–51 ambition and competition 609
and leadership 444, 456, 471–2, 473, 476, behavioral codes 610–11
481, 490, 512–13, 519 compassion and praise 608–9
managerial 218, 228, 250, 251, 252, 255–6, cooperative work environment 608–9
613–14 emotional display rules 83, 145
Mayer–Salovey–Caruso Emotional emotional management 606–7, 610, 613–14
Intelligence Test (MSCEIT) 218–19, functions of 605–16
221, 234–7, 247, 248, 512 literature review 33
Multi-factorial Emotional Intelligence Scale organizational functions of emotion 607–9
(MEIS) 218 power, efects of 611–12
negative perception of emotions 44, 251–2, emotions as social entities
448 customer complaints 354–5
performance 212, 216, 251–2, 442, 456, 457 emotional messages, meanings of 356–7
and personality theory 231–2, 238, 253–4, social–relational emotions 349, 350, 355–7
255, 457, 513 workplace emotions, history of 350–51
physiological evidence 21, 222, 248–9, 442, workplace emotions, perception of 351–5
444 empathy
and power motive 231 definition 459
self-assessment 216–18, 220, 221, 222, 490, and emotional intelligence 229–30, 232, 234,
513 237, 250, 442, 444, 445, 446, 456, 459
and self-awareness 233, 235, 237, 256, 442, and (in)justice 380, 382
450, 461 and negotiation 411, 414
and social interaction 442–3, 444, 445, 447, Endler, N. and J. Parker 48
448, 450 enthusiasm 143, 468–9, 470, 477, 491
task analysis measures 217, 218–21 envy 279, 366, 371, 374, 377, 378, 380, 381–2,
and teams see teams 383
training 239–41, 245–60, 444, 451 Epstein, R. 253
and trust 449 Erdogan, B. 499, 501, 503
Workgroup Emotional Intelligence Profile Erevelles, S. 201
(WEIP) 246–7, 443, 457 Erez, A. and A. Izen 30, 143, 162, 163
see also social intelligence Estrada, C. 46, 104, 105, 144, 161
emotional labour Everatt, D. 566
antecedents of regulation 302–3 extraversion 23, 137–8, 139, 140, 141, 253, 496,
consequences of 307–10 501
Diefendorff and Gosserand model 320–21
display rules see emotional display rules facial expression
and emotion regulation 303–4, 308–9, and anger 430, 432–3, 481
339–40, 521–2 and disgust 430, 432–3, 433, 481
emotion regulation 284–5, 301 emotion regulation 290
and emotional dissonance 303, 307–8 and emotional contagion 158–9, 425, 426,
and employee well-being 305–11 429–31, 432, 434–5, 437
fake emotional displays 303, 304–5, 306–10, emotional display rules 317, 319, 323, 325
312, 340–41 and emotional intelligence 21, 248–9, 442
future research 313, 344 and fear 430, 433, 481
individual and contextual effects 310–11 and happiness 430, 433, 481
performing 338–41 and leadership 460, 477–8
process model 302–5 and sadness 481
resources and demands on 305–7 see also physiological changes; smiling
and self-authenticity 306, 307, 309, 310, family-friendly policies 164, 369, 596–8
340 Farr, J. and C. Ford 104, 109, 114
and service agents 336, 338–41 Fay, D. 109, 110, 114, 115
and social relationships 306–7 fear
and task perfomance 304–5 and anger 355, 356, 393
unique effects of 310 and creativity 110, 111, 112
in emotion scripts 266, 269, 270, 275, 276, Forgas, J. 54, 163, 197, 264, 278, 280–81, 386,
277, 279 392, 397, 407, 408, 424, 465
and emotional display rules 62, 326, 328, 493 and G. Bower 406, 466
and facial expression 430, 433, 481 and J. George 33, 107, 120, 155, 159, 349,
of failure 124–5, 126, 129, 130–31 361, 470, 502
and (in)justice 74, 365, 374, 379 Fornell, C. and R. Westbrook 354
and motivation 349 Forrest, J. and A. Abbott 280
and organizational alliances 565, 566–7, Fortunato, V. 253
581 Fosha, D. 533
and organizational change 549–50, 555 Fox, S. 1, 74, 152, 159, 160, 183, 184, 185, 186,
of organizational decline 550–52 188, 189, 192, 373, 379, 502
and performance 82, 124–5, 128 Frank, M. 249
and speech rate 484 Frank, R. 405
see also anxiety; stress Fredrickson, Barbara L. 105, 131, 158, 186,
Feather, N. 97, 366 284, 286, 398, 407, 428, 429, 491, 531–45,
Fee, R. and J. Tangney 67 546, 569, 575, 584–5
Fehr, B. 265, 268, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 279 Freeman, S. and K. Cameron 557
Feldman, D. 81, 284, 288, 307, 320, 444, 577, Frenkel, S. 335
605 Frese, Michael 103–19, 104, 106, 306
Feldman, J. 520 Fridlund, A. 350, 393, 611
Feldman, L. 19, 21, 27 Friedman, H. 491, 516, 518, 523
Feldman, R. and B. Rime 484 Friedman, R. 32, 394, 395, 398
Feldman, S. 592 Frijda, N. 61, 64, 84, 90, 91, 93, 111, 122, 126,
Feldstein, S. 484 153, 198, 199, 211, 263, 270, 271, 272, 284,
Fessler, D. 32 351, 356, 363, 393, 398, 407, 408, 465, 466,
Festinger, L. 100, 444, 549 468, 479, 502, 532, 563, 576
Feyerhem, A. and C. Rice 443 and B. Mesquita 75, 80, 147, 267, 291, 425
Fiedler, K. 407, 502 Frost, P. 73–4, 82, 83, 517, 606, 608
Fillenbaum, S. and A. Rapaport 19 frustration 74, 80, 187, 188, 370, 470
Fineman, S. 1, 17, 45, 46, 55, 349, 448, 521, Frye, C. 443
535, 605 Fuller, J. 33, 142, 157–8
Fischer, Agneta H. 265, 267, 275, 280, 331, Furnham, A. and B. Gunter 609, 611
605–16 future research
Fischhoff, B. 45 affect 36–8
Fishbein, M. and I. Ajzen 172 affect and justice 363, 370, 372, 384–5
Fisher, Cynthia D. 1, 17, 30, 75, 78, 111, affective states and situations 145–6
120–35, 143, 153, 154, 199–200, 203, 211, counterproductive work behavior (CWB)
222, 280, 349, 505 192–3
and J. Basch 303, 502, 605, 606 creativity 106, 107, 110, 111, 112, 113–14,
Fisher, R. 400, 410, 411, 414, 415 115–16, 165
Fiske, S. 394, 399 decision making 54–6
Fitness, Julie 1, 32, 61–72, 75, 79, 187, 192, emotion measurement 204–5
268, 270, 273, 276–7, 278, 279, 280, 365, emotion regulation 146–7, 286, 291–7, 472
374, 521 emotion scripts 278–81
Fitzsimmons, J. and M. 335 emotional ambivalence in organizations
Flam, H. 521, 551 600–601
Flanagan, J. 229 emotional contagion 345
Fleming, J. 540 emotional display rules 330–31
Flett, C. and P. Hewitt 129 emotional intelligence 220, 222–3, 252–3,
Folger, R. 62, 185, 363, 365, 367, 369–70, 372, 442, 450–51
376, 584 emotional labour 313, 344
Folkman, S. 84, 90, 124–5, 254, 535, 583 job satisfaction 164–5
Fong, C. 30, 104, 110, 590, 600, 601 leadership 458, 461–2, 468–73, 476, 481,
Ford, L. and A. Seers 461 484–5, 495, 496–7, 517
Forester, J. 411 motivation 178–80
Index 627
negotiation 401–2 Goleman, D. 1, 6, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216,

organizational transformation 541–3, 556–7 219, 226, 227, 228, 231, 234, 441, 445, 455,
performance 144–5, 164–5 459, 512–13, 522, 576–7
pride 370 and R. Boyatzis 217, 221, 222, 233
teams 507 Golembiweski, R. 531
toxic emotions in the workplace 84–5 Goodwin, S. 399
Gooty, J. 461, 476, 479, 480
Gable, S. 129 Gordijn, E. 605
Gaddis, B. 467 Gosserand, R. and J. Diefendorff 80, 301, 302,
Gallagher, D. 137 310, 311, 316, 318, 319, 321, 515
Ganster, D. and M. Fusilier 289 Gottman, J. 534
Gardner, H. 227 Gould, L. 563, 568–9
Gardner, W. 393, 397, 459, 461, 467, 476, 477, Gould, S. 147
517, 520, 523, 566 Gouldner, D. 504
Geddes, D. 288, 289, 290, 429 Graen, G. 499, 500, 501, 504, 506, 507, 513, 523
Geertz, C. 272 Grandey, A. 191, 249, 251, 252, 254, 284, 285,
Gehring, W. and A. Willoughby 429 292, 294, 301, 303, 305, 311, 317, 321, 336,
Gelfand, M. 384 351, 515, 521, 607
gender 63, 64, 68, 69, 201–2, 205, 273–6, 279, and A. Brauburger 286, 289, 310, 340
428, 430, 485, 520, 581, 610 and C. Brotheridge 80–81, 84, 286, 287, 302,
George, J. 114, 152, 449, 459, 467, 468, 476, 304, 306, 309, 310, 316, 318, 319, 330,
477, 489, 499, 507, 513, 521, 534, 539, 554, 335, 341
569 gratitude 145, 538, 539–40
and A. Brief 104, 105, 106, 110, 159, 502, Gray, J.A. 175
606, 608 Green, D. 23, 38, 205
and J. Forgas 33, 107, 120, 155, 159, 349, Green, R. and N. Cliff 19
361, 470, 502 Green, S. 501, 503, 518, 520
and J. Zhou 29, 30, 37, 103, 104, 108, 109, Greenberg, J. 74, 82, 83, 84, 172, 183, 363, 369
110, 115, 161–2, 255, 435, 471, 502 Greenhaus, J. and G. Powell 164
Gergen, K. 272, 273 Gregory, S. 482, 483
Gerhart, B. 138 Greil, A. and D. Rudy 595, 598
Gersick, C. 581 Greve, H. 546
Gerstner, C. and D. Day 499, 500, 501, 523 Grolnick, W. 579
Gewurz, Ilan G. 405–20 Gronroos, C. 245
Ghashghaei, H. and H. Barbas 22 Gross, J. 77, 80, 81, 83, 96, 190, 256, 263, 271,
Gianakos, I. 64 284, 285, 288, 303, 429, 472, 516, 521, 522
Giardini, A. and M. Frese 252, 253, 293, 311, and L. Barrett 84
312 and O. John 78, 79, 85, 192–3, 306, 307, 308,
Gibson, C. 450, 478 310, 311, 331, 613
Gibson, Donald E. 69, 263–83, 365–6, 374 and R. Levenson 340
Gilmore, T. 538 and J. Richards 79, 290, 307, 309
Gilovich, T. 51, 91, 92, 99, 100 group emotion see teams
Giocolone, R. and J. Greenberg 183 Grove, A. 551, 555
Gioia, D.A. 263, 274–5, 280 Groves, K. 247, 459
Gladstein, D. 448 Guilford, J. 249
Glomb, T. 63, 80, 81, 141, 144, 187, 192, 252, Guillen, L. 234
286, 288, 289, 292, 308, 309, 312, 319, guilt
336 and cultural differences 201
Glynn, M. 551, 599 and emotional scripts 279
Gnatt, S. and Y. Agazarian 443 and failure 352–3
Goffman, E. 302, 612 guilt-proneness 67–8
Goldberg, S. 408, 410 and (in)justice 74, 75, 365, 366, 367, 368–9,
Golden-Biddle, K. and H. Rao 600 370, 371, 374–7, 379, 384
Goldman, B. 373, 379, 381, 383 and leadership 520
Goldstein, H. 522, 581 and mistake admission 612
and negotiation 396, 398, 399, 401 Heckhausen, J. and R. Schulz 146–7
and performance 180 Hegtvedt, K. 366, 367, 369, 376
and shame, difference between 124 Heider, F. 371
see also regret Hektner, J. and M. Csikszentmihalyi 205
Gulati, R. and H. Singh 561, 567 Helfat, C. and M. Peteraf 546
Gump, B. and J. Kulik 428, 547 Heller, D. and D. Watson 30
Gunther, M. 589 Hennig-Thurau, T. 305
Gutek, B. 138, 329 Henry, R. and C. Hulin 143
Guttman, L. 19, 20–21, 27 Herkenhoff, L. 73, 254, 255, 575, 576
Hersey, R.B. 1
Hackley, S. 410 Herzberg, F. 1
Hackman, J. 121, 128, 179, 428, 441, 444 Hess, U. 340, 356, 425
Haidt, J. 317, 393, 397, 425, 466, 533, 608 Heuven, E. 293
Hall, J. 201, 328, 329, 456, 598 Higgins, E. 30, 45, 56, 127, 128, 140, 372
Hall, M. and R. Hampson 73 Higgins, L. 103, 104, 108, 110–11, 113
Halloran, M. 576 Hill, J. 578, 583
Halverson, S. 523 Hiller, N. and D. Day 503
Hamel, G. 561, 565 Hirt, E. and K. Markman 55
Hand, H. 239 Hobfoll, S.E. 289–90, 305, 306
happiness Hochschild, A. 80, 81, 191, 202, 211, 251, 267,
and emotion regulation 290, 291, 293, 306 272, 284, 285, 286, 288, 289, 301, 303, 305,
and emotion scripts 269, 279 316–17, 319, 324, 336, 338, 344, 350, 405,
and emotional contagion 428, 430, 432, 433 521–2, 557, 577, 605
and emotional display rules 326 Hodes, R.L. 203
and facial expression 430, 433, 481 Hoffman, B. and B. Frost 456
and (in)justice 367, 369, 370, 371, 374, Hofstede, G. 293, 492, 495
375–7, 378, 380, 384 Hogan, J. and R. 183
interpersonal effects on 393–6 Holbrook, M. and M. Gardner 203
and leadership 467–8 Holladay, S. and W. Coombs 477, 517
and motivation 349 Hollander, E. and L. Offermann 482
and negotiation 355, 381, 393–6, 397, 398, Holman, David 80, 254, 284, 286, 287, 288,
399, 400, 401, 402, 405, 406, 407–8, 409, 289, 292, 301–15, 339, 522
410, 411, 414, 466 Holmer, L. 448
and success 352 Holtgraves, T. 496
Harackiewicz, J. 130 Homans, G. 361, 366, 441, 503
Hardy, G. 144 hope 113, 373, 378
Hareli, Shlomo 201, 349–59 Hoppock, R. 138
Harlos, K. and C. Pinder 361, 606 Horn, J. and R. Catell 212
Harrigan, J. 482 hostility 68, 75, 78, 141, 187, 410, 477
Harris, C. 78, 79, 288, 290 and (in)justice 366, 367, 371, 373, 374, 375,
Harris, K. 501 377, 379
Harris, L. 344 House, J. 578
Harrison, D. 164 House, R. 476, 477, 492, 495, 496
Harrison, N. 426 Howard, A. 226, 503
Härtel, Charmine E.J. 1, 75, 83, 136, 319, 335, Howell, J. 107, 479, 517
575–88 Hsee, C. and R. Abelson 122
Harter, J. 540 Huelsman, T. 197, 199
Hartman, Nathan S. 455–64 Hulin, C. 63, 139, 142, 143
Hassebrauck, M. 367 human resource management 596–9
hate 61, 62–5, 69, 589–90 Humphrey, Ronald H. 1, 9, 80, 107, 152, 153,
Hatfield, E. 159, 336–7, 409, 411, 423, 427, 305, 316, 317, 336, 340, 341, 455–64, 465,
428, 431–2, 466, 491, 523, 537, 547, 568 492, 518, 519, 521, 605
health issues 2, 3, 67, 74, 77–8, 81, 83, 84, Hutson-Comeaux, S. and J. Kelly 577
140–41, 289, 340, 578, 581 Huy, Quy Nguyen 27, 31, 46, 112, 113, 114,
Heaton, A. and A. Kruglanski 399 349, 441, 546–60, 562
Index 629
Ilgen, D. 177, 546, 552, 557 and positive emotion amplification 287, 533,
Ilies, Remus 31, 137, 142, 143, 152–69, 461, 534
466–7, 469, 470, 490, 491, 517, 584 and self-evaluation 139
Inkpen, A. and P. Beamish 561 state affect 156–8
Inness, M. 362, 364 and stress 157–8, 306
innovation see creativity and trait affect 155–6
intimidation 69, 285 see also performance
Ioannou, S. 482 Johnson, E. and A. Tversky 185
Ironson, G. 156 Johnson, K. and L. Tassinary 431
Irving, P. 381, 383 Johnson, P. and J. Indvik 63, 67
Isen, A. 29, 45, 56, 104, 107, 108, 110, 123, Johnstone, T. 433
131, 140, 144, 146, 165, 250, 251, 398, 407, Jones, E. and T. Pittman 279
429, 537, 539, 555, 584, 585 Jones, G. and J. George 449, 569
and R. Baron 105, 106, 361, 502 Jordan, Peter J. 1, 2, 31, 211–25, 443, 457
and P. Carnevale 355, 357, 392, 406, 414, Jordon, M. 503
562 joy 266, 276, 277, 373, 480–81, 482
and K. Daubman 47, 160 Judge, Timothy A. 32, 136–51, 139, 153, 154,
and A. Erez 30, 143, 162, 163 155, 156, 157, 158, 163, 187, 192, 456, 489
and R. Patrick 46, 408 Juslin, P. and P. Laukka 481
Issacs, N. 73 Jussim, L. 129
Iverson, R. 253 justice see affect and justice
Izard, C. 153, 200, 249, 350, 425, 479, 556, 563,
585 Kahn, B. and A. Isen 46
Kahn, W. 445, 446, 555
Jackall, R. 548 Kahneman, D. 45, 46, 52, 94, 95
Jackson, S. and J. Dutton 550, 551, 553, 555 Kammeyer-Mueller, John D. 136–51
Jacobs, R. 231, 233 Kanfer, F. 173, 177, 238
Jacobs, T. 503 Kanfer, Ruth 114, 130, 136, 141, 170–82, 186,
Jacobsen, E. 424 456
James, K. 103, 105, 107, 110 Kanter, R. 554
James, N. 252 Karasek, R. 286
James, W. 190, 211, 263, 432, 592 Kark, R. 476
Janis, I. 441, 554 Katz, D. and R. Kahn 503, 504
Janssen, O. and N. Van Yperen 501 Katz, I. and D. Glass 589, 590
jealousy 68, 366, 374 Kaufmann, G. and S. Vosburg 104, 107, 555
Jehn, K. 414, 547 Keashly, L. 183, 192
Jex, S. and T. Beehr 286 Keenan, A. and T. Newton 187
Jin, Sirkwoo 17–44 Kehr, H.M. 126, 174
job characteristics theory (JCT) 179 Keller, M. and R. Nesse 187
job satisfaction Kellett, Janet B. 455–64, 472, 519
and affect 138–9, 142–3, 155–8, 163, 502 Kelley, R. 519, 520
construct definition 153 Kelly, G. 549
decreased 62, 81, 108, 143 Kelly, J. 33, 80, 114, 349, 428, 441, 442, 502,
dispositional nature of 138–9 547, 577
and emotion regulation 288, 289, 290, 292 Kelman, H. 450
and emotional exhaustion 308, 309 Keltner, D. 67, 292, 317, 350, 392, 393, 397,
Facet-Free Job Satisfaction Scale 156 405, 407, 408, 425, 466, 608, 612
future research 164–5 Kemper, T. 202, 268, 272, 275, 279, 441, 535,
and intraindividual variations 153, 154, 563
156–7, 160, 501, 503 Kennedy-Moore, E. and J. Watson 522
Job In General Scale 156 Kenny, D. and S. Zaccaro 519
and justice 74, 360, 381, 383 Kernis, M. 130
and leadership 500 Kessler, T. and S. Holbach 608
literate review 30, 31, 32, 33 Kiefer, T. 32, 74, 111
and managerial emotional intelligence 218 Kierein, N. and M. Gold 518
Kilgore, W. 203 Lawrence, T. 554

King, A. and C. Tucci 554 Lax, D. and J. Sebenius 565
King, L. and R. Emmons 578, 590 layoffs 2, 58, 75, 363, 368–9, 374, 381, 480
King, N. and N. Anderson 106, 111, 114 Lazarus, R. 111, 113, 122, 123, 126, 178, 179,
Kirby, S. and M. Davis 48, 54 265, 271, 279, 325, 351, 356, 370, 398, 465,
Kirouac, G. 356, 425 532–3, 549, 563, 568
Klein, H. and J. Kim 501 and Y. Cohen-Charash 63, 68, 363, 385
Kleinginna, P. and A. 197 and S. Folkman 84, 124–5, 190, 254
Klinnert, M. 393, 397 and C. Smith 185
Kluger, A. 122 laziness 63, 278
Knutson, B. 393 Le Blanc, P. 337, 345
Kobak, P. and S. Duemmeler 566 Le Doux, J. 213
Koehler, J. 32, 55 Leach, C. and L. Tiedens 442
Kogut, B. 561 leadership
Kogut, T. and I. Ritov 32 abusive supervision 373
Komar, S. and D. Brown 479 affect and emotions 457–8, 465–75, 489, 514,
Kopelman, Shirli 147, 278, 281, 355, 395, 398, 516–17
405–20 and anger 467–9, 470, 477, 492, 514–15
Kotter, J. 226, 228 authenticity 480, 518
Kowalski, R. 354 charisma 459–60, 461, 466, 469, 470, 477,
Kramer, R. 555, 565, 566 489–91, 515, 516, 517
Krehbiel, P. and R. Cropanzano 363, 367, 370, common identity 460–61
377, 384, 502 and communication 514–15
Kreiner, G. and B. Ashforth 591 compassionate 480
Kring, A. and A. Gordon 202, 477 crisis situations 521, 522, 547
Kringelbach, M. and W. Rolls 22 cross-cultural emotional management 492–6
Kruglanski, A. and D. Webster 394, 399 delegation 500
Kruml, S. and D. Geddes 288, 289, 290 effectiveness and leader affect 466–9, 501,
Kuhl, J. 424 513
Kulik, Carol T. 335–48 and emotion intelligence 444, 456, 471–2,
Kumar, Rajesh 406, 409, 561–74 473, 476, 481, 490, 512–13, 513, 519
Kunin, T. 156, 202, 203 and emotion management 470–72
Kuppens, P. 611 and emotional contagion 466–7, 468, 491–2,
Kurek, K. 50, 205 517, 523
and emotional expression 476–88, 492,
Laird, J. and S. Bresler 432 515–17, 519–22
Lam, W. 501 and emotional regulation 515, 516, 521–2
Landman, J. 92 emotional sensitivity 515, 516–17, 519, 522
Landy, F. 212, 222, 245 and empathy 456, 459, 460–61, 472, 492, 519
Lang, P. 19, 203, 424 and facial expression 460, 477–8
Langhorn, S. 218 and fairness 470, 471, 480
Langley, A. 46 and follower affect 469–70, 473, 477–8, 479,
Länsisalmi, H. 581, 585 481, 482, 485, 489, 491, 501, 514–15,
Lanzetta, J.T. 288, 290 516–19, 521
Laros, F. and J. Steenkamp 200, 201 future research 458, 461–2, 468–73, 476, 481,
Larrick, R. and T. Boles 92 484–5, 495, 496–7, 517
Larsen, J. 406 gender differences 485, 520
Larsen, R. 17, 23, 31, 37, 137, 153, 155, 198, GLOBE project 492, 495, 496
201, 466, 468 and group mood 461, 477, 489, 491, 492
Larson, R. 70, 142, 205 high- versus low-arousal affect 468–9
Latham, G. 122, 145, 163, 239 leader attribution process 460, 514, 520–21
Laukka, P. 481, 483, 484 and motivation 468, 478–9, 521
Lawler, E. 562, 563, 564 nonverbal communication (sensitivity) 516,
Lawrence, P. and J. Lorsch 445, 446 519
Lawrence, Sandra A. 73–89, 246 and organizational power 491
Index 631
perceptions and attributions 460, 514 Locke, E. 122, 155, 157, 163, 212, 222, 245,
and performance 467–8, 492, 518–19, 520 490, 513
personality traits 456–7, 490 Locke, K. 328, 329
physiological changes 460, 477–8, 480–85 London, E. 204
positive versus negative affect 467–8, 470 Long, E. 250
process model 513–22 Loomes, G. and R. Sugden 46, 50, 51, 92, 94
Pygmalion effect 518–19 Lopes, P. 219, 246, 613
research trends 455–64 Lord, R. 1, 136, 141, 186, 191, 265, 274, 295,
and self-interest 470, 521 320, 321, 323, 335, 349, 455–6, 465, 473,
and self-managing groups (emergent 479
leadership) 470–72 Losada, M. 534, 540
and sexual harassment 521 love 61, 62, 266
and social interaction 466, 477, 485, 500, loyalty 2, 373, 379
513–14 Luo, Y. 561, 567
superiors and subordinates 63–4, 65, 66, Luthans, F. 226, 228
68–9, 70, 75, 180, 187, 191, 329, 352–3, Lutz, C. 576
606–7 lying 63, 65, 66
transformational see transformational Lyons, J. and T. Schneider 219
leadership Lyubomirsky, S. 279
vertical dyad linkage (VDL) theory 500,
506 McBane, D. 337, 339
vision statements 459, 490 McCall, G. and J. Simmons 591, 592
see also decision-making McCarthy, E. 442
Leary, M. 68, 349, 608 McClelland, D. 130, 170, 174, 178, 228, 229,
Leathers, D. 202 231, 232, 237, 238
Leban, W. and C. Zulauf 219, 254 McColl-Kennedy, J. and R. Anderson 458,
LeBon, G. 447 470, 492, 516
LeBreton, J. 141, 144, 174, 245, 252, 253 McCrae, R. 23, 50, 217, 484, 496
LeDoux, J. 267, 269, 272, 466, 550 McCullough, M. 539–40
Lee, K. and N. Allen 29, 31, 37, 140, 141, 159, McEnrue, M. 245, 247
188 McGinn, K. 414
Leidner, R. 336, 344 McGregor, H. and A. Elliot 130
Leigh, T. and P. McGraw 263 McHugo, G. 336
Leith, K. and R. Baumeister 429 McIntosh, W. 126
Lerner, J. 61, 67, 292, 405, 408 Mackie, D. 46, 408
Leung, K. 384, 561–2 McNatt, D. 518
Levenson, R. 37, 78, 79, 81, 288, 290, 337, 340, Macrae, C. 481
407, 424, 425, 426, 428, 429, 571 Madjar, N. 31, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108
Leventhal, G. 371 Magretta, J. 589
Levine, G. 296 Maitlis, S. and H. Ozcelik 32, 73, 74, 564
Levy, R. 448 management see leadership
Lewicki, R. 410, 411, 414, 565 Mandell, B. and S. Pherwani 218
Lewig, K. and M. Dollard 310, 311 Mandler, G. 263, 568
Lewin, K. 555 Mann, S. 69, 80
Lewis, K. 31, 70, 468, 476, 477, 585 Mano, H. and R. Oliver 200
Lewis, M. 552 Manstead, Antony S.R. 605–16
Lewis, R. 496 March, J. 46, 547
Leymann, H. 183 Marcus, A. 557
Li, S. and E. Roloff 405 Markman, K. 55, 99
Lichtenstein, E. and W. Brewer 265 Markovsky, B. 366
Liden, R. 499, 501, 503, 506 Markus, H. 384, 478, 479, 480, 592, 593, 611
Lieblich, A. 366 Martin, A. 533
Lind, A. and T. Tyler 378, 410, 470 Martin, J. 448, 546, 610
Lindsley, D. 450 Martin, L. 108, 120, 125, 204
Linkh, D. and S. Sonnek 250 Martinez-Iñigo, David 301–15
Martinko, M. 67, 185, 186, 192, 520 Moorman, R. and Z. Byrne 382
Martoccio, J. and D. Jimeno 141 morale 2, 62, 69, 75
Maslach, C. 307 Morgeson, F. and D. Hofmann 443
Mastenbroek, W. 607 Moriarty, P. and F. Buckley 246
Matheny, J. and R. Smollen 75, 84, 111 Morris, J. 81, 203, 284, 288, 307, 320, 577, 605
Matsumoto, D. 286, 293–4, 304, 317, 319, 320, Morris, M. and D. Keltner 392
321, 325, 326, 329, 330, 331, 400, 494, 495 Morrison, E. and S. Robinson 69
and P. Ekman 202, 204, 493 Morrow, C. 238, 239
Matthews, G. 124, 211, 293 motivation
Mauro, R. 493 affect and emotions, influence of 175–8
Mauss, I. and J. Gross 78, 79 and anger 178–80
Mayer, J. 211, 216, 217, 218–19, 220–21, 227, approach-oriented goals 172, 180
228, 234–7, 245, 247, 249–50, 253, 254, avoidance-oriented goals 172, 177, 180
256, 441, 442, 449, 456, 513, 583 and collective action 547
and P. Salovey 110, 113, 193, 212, 213, 214, and competence 122
215, 218, 221, 222, 227, 246, 248, 249, expectancy-value models 172, 173
250, 295, 445, 456, 459, 471, 476, 481, explicit systems 171–3, 174, 176–7
512, 519, 607, 613 future research 178–80
Mead, G. 592 goal choice 171–3, 177, 180
Medvec, V. 51, 91, 92, 95, 99 implicit 173–4
Mehrabian, A. 200, 203, 484 and job insecurity 176
Mellers, B. 45, 46, 56 and job satisfaction see job satisfaction
Merton, R. and E. Barber 591 and leadership 468, 478–9, 512
Mesquita, B. 75, 80, 147, 267, 291, 384, 425 literature review 30, 31, 32, 33
Messer, B and F. White 382, 383 organizational justice models 172, 173,
Messick, D. 414 178–9
Metts, V. and C. Daus 247 and personality 172, 174, 175–6, 232, 478–9
Meyer, G. and J. Shack 22, 23 and positive affective state 106, 144, 534
Meyer, J. 106, 553 and power motivation training 238–41
Meyerson, D. and M. Scully 589, 590, 592, self-regulatory theories 173, 174, 176, 177,
593, 600 178–9, 180
Michalek, J. 174 Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) 174
Michie, Susan 461, 476–88 threat appraisal 175–6, 178–80
Middleton, D. 576 universal motive models 172–3
Mikula, G. 74, 365, 367, 374, 384 and work events 177, 179, 180
Miles, G. 535 see also decision-making; motivation;
Miller, A. and R. Yeager 447 negotiation; transformational
Miller, K. 292, 345 leadership
Miller, R. 612 Motowildo, S. 154, 482
Miller, S. 48 Muchinsky, P. 152
Miner, A. 157 Mumby, D. and L. Putnam 78, 211–12, 263,
Miners, Christopher T.H. 284–300, 456, 473 521, 577–8, 610
Mintzberg, H. 519, 546 Muraven, M. 158, 306, 307
Mio, J. 459, 517 Murensky, C. 234
Miron, D. and D. McClelland 238 Murnighan, J. 381, 383, 392, 405, 408, 444,
Mischel, W. 292 445, 446
Mittal, V. and W. Ross 31 Murphy, K. 211, 217
Mohrman, S. 503 Murphy, S. 503
Montada, L. and A. Schneider 365, 367, 374 Murray, J. and S. Lawrence 246
Montgomery, A. 80, 81 Murray, N. 362
moods and emotions, difference between 153,
175–6, 197 Nadal, L. and M. Mosovitch 38
Moon, H. 47, 48, 54, 56 Nahapiet, J. and S. Ghoshal 449
Moon, Sue 284–300 Nauta, W. 22
Moore, D. 409 Naylor, J.C. 172
Index 633
Neale, M. 405, 406, 408, 415, 565 Ng, Carmen K. 45–60

Necowitz, L. and M. Roznowski 155 Niedenthal, P. 406
negotiation Noe, R. and N. Schmidt 239
active listening 413–14 Norem, J. and S. Smith 129
affective reactions path 381, 398, 399, Nygren, T. 46, 185
400–401
and alliance developmental path 564, 565–7 Öhman, A. 393, 424, 430, 550, 555
anger and happiness, interpersonal effects of Oakley, J. 480
355, 381, 393–6, 397–402, 405, 406, Oatley, K. 349, 350, 393, 477
407–8, 409, 410, 411, 414, 466 O’Brien, T. and A. Delongis 48
and appreciation 411, 414 O’Connor, K.M. and J.A. Arnold 32
breakthrough approach 412 Offenstein, J. 363, 371, 372, 377, 384
and close relationships 414 Offermann, L. 220, 443, 456, 482, 490
and competitive behavior 396, 398, 400, 408 Oishi, S. 201, 479
and conflict issues 392–404 O’Leary-Kelly, A. 183, 185
and cooperation 396, 399, 408, 409 Oliver, R. 335, 354
cultural background 409 Ollilianen, M. 613
displayed emotions 147, 405–20 Olney, T. 203
emotion in 392–404 Olson, J. 367
and emotional contagion 409, 411, 415 Omdahl, B. and C. O’Donnell 427
emotions as social information (EASI) Ongur, D. 22
model 397–402 Opie, T. 428
future research 401–2 Organ, D. 159, 205, 382
information processing 399–400, 406–7, 409 organizational citizenship behaviors (OCB) 74,
intergroup relationships 566 83, 360, 382, 383, 501
literature review 30, 31, 32, 33 organizational culture
and mediation 411 and affective events theory 575–6
and motivation 394 collectivist cultures, extreme 579–81
negative affect 395, 400, 406–7, 409, 410–14 and commitment 74, 114, 501, 608
and organizational strategic alliances 564, culture and emotional regulation 576–8,
565–7 579–81
and personality characteristics 399 decision-making see decision-making
positive affect 07, 409, 411, 414–15 and emotion regulation 284–300, 302–3, 614
power status 394–5, 400, 401, 405–20, 408 and emotional contagion 585
and risk-taking 408, 413 emotional culture as subset of 576–9
situational factors 399 and emotional labour 577–8, 579
social–relational factors 400–401 and emotional training 582–3, 584
strategic information path 398, 399, healthy 580, 582–5
400–401, 409, 409–15 individualism, extreme 580, 581–2
and time pressure 394, 400 monitoring 577, 584
venting mechanisms 410–11 and organizational change 31, 32, 74, 251,
‘winner’s curse’ 415 549–50
see also decision-making; motivation and organizational justice 584
Nelson, Debra L. 476–88 and positive emotions 584–5
Neuberg, S. and J. Newsom 399, 467 and relationships 609–10
Neuman, J. and R. Baron 62 response stage 577–8
Neumann, R. and F. Strack 427, 585 rituals 595
Neumeister, K. 123 and self-identity 579
neuropsychological research 77, 78, 82, 162, strategies and policies 584, 606
177, 269 organizational strategic alliances
neuroticism 23, 48, 50, 55, 129, 137–8, 139, and affective satisfaction 569–70
140, 141, 218, 253, 310 alliance formation stage 565–7
Newcombe, M. and N. Ashkanasy 460, 467, alliance instability 561
478, 517, 518, 519 alliance operations stage 567–70
Newsome, S. 218 alliance outcome stage 570–71
and buyer–seller relationships 563–4 Ormel, J. and T. Wohlfarth 137

collective control 567, 576 Ortony, A. 91, 175, 222, 351, 363, 555
control, loss of 565 Osgood, C. 19
coordination problems 567–8 Oyserman, D. 495
cultural differences 561, 565
and decision-making 561, 564 Palmer, B. 442
and emotional contagion 568, 569 Panksepp, J. 61
emotions and alliance development path Papageorgiou, C. and A. Wells 125
564–71 Park, S. and G. Ungson 561, 567
and emotions concept 562–4 Parker, S. and T. Wall 77, 306
future research 571–2 Parkinson, Brian 17, 272, 294, 302, 306, 312,
and instability 561 336, 349–59, 393, 425, 576, 605
methodological challenges 571 Parrott, W. 555, 562, 613
negative emotions 564–7, 568–70 Parsons, T. 202, 595
and negotiation 564, 565–7 Paterson, J. 75, 83, 367, 374, 582, 583
opportunistic behavior 561, 567–9 Paul, J. 479
positive emotions 569 Paules, G.F. 344
and procedural injustice 570 Pearce, C. and J. Conger 461, 519
organizational transformation Pearce, W. and B. Brommel 484
appreciative inquiry (AI) 536, 537, 538, 539, Pedersen, N. 137
542 Pekrun, R. and M. Frese 109, 111, 112, 113
cognitive broadening 537–9, 547, 556 Pelled, L. and K. Xin 501
and competitive advantage 546 Pennebaker, J. 141, 253, 522, 578
and continuance commitment 540–41, 553, Penney, Lisa M. 183–96
554 performance
dissatisfaction with work unit performance achievement motives 130
554–5 and affect 139–41, 143–5, 154, 158–65
emotion management training 548–9 appraisal interviews 265, 274–5
emotional climates to advance 531–45 approach–avoidance systems 128–9
and emotional contagion 537, 547 and autonomy 127, 128, 140
and emotional intelligence 548–9 brain behavioral systems 129–30
emotional patterns 546–9 and competence 121, 122, 126, 127
and employee engagement 540, 541, 542, and confusion 124
547, 548–9, 554 construct definition 153–4
and ‘energy in action’ 537 and culture 287
feeling safe in work interactions 555–6 customer service 158–9, 287
flexibility in 548, 550 and deviant behavior 144, 305, 308
future research 541–3, 556–7 and emotion regulation 158, 229–31, 287–8,
negative emotions 538, 542 292, 293, 522
organizational decline, fear of 550–52, 553 and emotional display rules 320
organizational development and change emotional experience, reasons for 121–3
(ODC) 531, 535, 536–7, 542 and emotional intelligence 212, 216, 251–2,
and organizational learning 554–6 442, 456, 457
and personal construct theory 549–60 emotions before and after 124–6
and positive emotions 532–7, 539–40, 541, 543 and extraversion 140
receptivity to change 549, 550, 552 fear of failure 124–5, 126, 129, 130–31
relationship building 539–40 and feedback 122–3, 126, 130, 131, 163
and risk-taking 550, 554 future research 144–5, 164–5
and strategic ability 546–60 goal orientation 126, 126–8, 140, 163,
strength-based collaborative inquiry 536–7, 171–3
538–9, 541, 542 and health 140–41
success, pride in contributing to 552–3 job characteristics theory 121, 128
transformative cooperation 531–2, 533, literature review 31, 32, 33
534–5, 536, 542, 543 maximum, and tipping point 237–8
see also performance; teams and motivation see motivation
Index 635
negative affect 122, 124–5, 128–31, 140, Pillutla, M. and J. Murnighan 381, 383, 392,
158–61, 180, 253, 287, 458 405, 408
and neuroticism 140 Pirola-Merlo, A. 104, 110, 114–15, 458, 492,
organizational citizenship and 584
counterproductive work behavior Planalp, S. and J. Fitness 67
159–60 Plutchik, R. 153, 198, 267, 269, 276, 425, 459
and personality 128–31, 253 Podsakoff, P.M. 205, 476, 477
positive affect 122–4, 125, 129–30, 140, 158, Poole, P. 263, 274, 280
159, 160–62, 163, 287–8, 305, 533 Porac, J. 556
power motivation programs 238–41 Portello, J. and B. Long 50
and profits 237–8 Porter, M. 550
and self-determination theory 122, 127, 158, Poulson, C. 66, 83, 84, 279
287 Powell, M. 220, 222
and self-esteem 129–31 power
and social intelligence competencies 229–31 and anger 79, 82, 278, 611–12
and stress 140–41 and emotional contagion 423, 434, 436
and success 123–4, 129 and emotional intelligence 231
task characteristics 120–21, 128, 130, 158 motivation training 238–41
team see teams and negotiation 394–5, 400, 401, 405–20,
threats and spatial working memory 158 408
and workload 63, 145 and social intelligence 231, 238–9
see also creativity; job satisfaction; Powers, W. 591
organizational transformation; teams praise 608–9
Perrewé, P. and K. Zellars 32 Prat, N. 352
Perrone, J. and M. Vickers 74, 79 Prati, M. 513, 522
personal initiative (PI) 104, 106, 108–9 Pratt, Michael G. 589–604
personality Price, L. 335
and affect 23, 136–41 pride 75, 104, 112–13, 123, 352, 370, 378, 380,
and emotional intelligence 231–2, 238, 383, 552–3
253–4, 255, 457, 513 procrastination 67, 251
and leadership 456–7, 490 promotion 351–4, 378
and social intelligence 231–3, 238 Pruitt, D. and P. Carnevale 392
Perugini, M. and R. Bagozzi 125 Pugh, S. 31, 158, 190, 192, 193, 286, 289, 295,
Pescosolido, A. 458, 459, 470–71, 492, 494, 317, 318, 342, 355, 502
516, 522 Pugliesi, K. 286, 289, 309, 310, 311, 313, 319,
Peters, E. 45, 406 341
Peterson, C. 552 Pusey, M. 212
Petitmengin-Peugeot, C. 198 Putnam, L. and D. Mumby 78, 211–12, 263,
Petty, R. 198, 399 521, 577–8, 610
Philips, A. and A. Bedieian 501
physiological changes Quigley, B. and J. Tedeschi 408
emotion measurement 202, 203, 204, 269, Quinn, J. 549
272, 285 Quinn, R. 156, 532, 537, 609, 611
and emotional contagion 158–9, 425, 426,
428–32, 429–31, 432, 434–5, 437 Rafaeli, Anat 249, 252, 349–59
and leadership 460, 477–8, 480–85 and M. Pratt 599
see also facial expression; vocal pitch and S. Ravid 409
physiological cues, and anxiety 482 and R. Sutton 80, 145, 146, 211, 288, 289,
physiological evidence, emotional intelligence 302, 304, 316, 317, 323, 324, 405, 406,
222, 442, 444, 482 521, 605
Picard, R.W. 251 Raghunathan, R. 33, 386
Piderit, S. 251, 590, 600 Randell, P. 64
Pierce, J.L. 267, 278, 336 Rank, Johnnes 103–19
Pieters, R. and M. Zeelenberg 33, 98 Rapisarda, B. 220
Pillai, R. 460 Ratner, R. and K. Herbst 33
Raven, J. 217 Rosier, R.H. 233

Rawsthorne, L. and A. Elliot 127 Rothbard, N. 31, 164, 596
Redl, F. 489 Rotundo, M. and P. Sackett 140, 153
Reger, R. 599 Rousseau, D. 449
regret Rozin, P. 63, 65, 66, 124
antecedent-focused regulation 97 Rubin, D. 229
anticipated 51–3, 55, 92–3 Rubin, R. 461, 467, 471, 473, 480, 482, 519
aversion to 92 Rupp, D.E. and S. Spencer 311, 378, 380
bad decision avoidance 97–8 Russ, S.W. 103, 104, 107
behavior-focused counterfactuals 95–6 Russell, J. 17, 19, 22, 26, 27, 34, 39, 75, 121,
and decision justification 92, 100 170, 203, 204, 264, 268, 272, 276, 327, 466,
definition 90–91, 92–3 477, 479, 557, 563
literature review 33 and J. Carroll 23, 153, 198
and mistake admission 612 and B. Fehr 265, 270, 271, 273, 279
and negotiation 396, 398, 399 and L. Barrett 21, 29, 37, 176, 326, 329, 465,
net, and escalation of commitment 54 469, 502
and responsibility 92, 93 and M. Yik 201
and risk-taking 92–3, 98 Russell-Bennett, Rebekah 197–208
and second chances 93 Ryan, L. and K. Macky 74
see also disappointment; guilt Ryan, R. 121, 122, 127, 129, 172, 306, 325,
Reich, J. 17, 25 579
Reichard, Rebecca J. 512–27 Ryback, D. 213
Reis, H. 127, 130 Ryff, C. and B. Singer 535
Reisenzein, R. 19
Reissland, N. 123 Saarni, C. 227
relationships see social interaction Saavedra, Richard 31, 106, 177, 423–40, 424
Remington, N. 20 and C. Bartel 30, 34, 35, 36, 37, 317, 331,
Renninger, K. 121 349, 427, 428, 436, 502, 546, 608
Repetti, R. 145 sabotage 62, 64, 184, 187, 188, 191–2, 251, 550
resentment 80, 369, 372, 376 Sacharin, Vera 405–20
resource allocation theory 69, 143, 172 sadness
resource conservation theory 289–90, 305 in emotion script 269, 276, 279, 350
retaliation 75, 191, 381, 383 and emotional contagion 428
Reus, T. and Y. Liu 441 and emotional display rules 62, 319, 326,
revenge 62, 63, 64, 183, 187, 360, 380 328, 356
Richard, Erin M. 80, 81, 83, 252, 287, 289, and emotional suppression 79
290, 309, 310, 316–34 and failure 353, 356
Richard, R. 55, 93 and (in)justice 74, 75, 365, 375, 377
Richards, J. and J. Gross 79, 290, 307, 309 and leadership 468, 469, 477, 485, 520
Richins, M. 198, 200, 201, 335 and negotiation 406, 407, 408
Riggio, Ronald E. 491, 512–27 and performance 129, 180, 188
Rimé, B. 350, 484 physiological signs 481, 482, 484
Ring, P. and A. Van de Ven 564 Saffrey, C. and N. Roese 91
Ritov, I. 32, 93 Salk, J. and O. Shenkar 569
Robbins, S. and T. 12 Salovey, P. 82, 201, 202, 203, 216, 218–19,
Roberts, A. 204 234–7, 295, 366, 374, 512, 521, 548, 607,
Robinson, M. and G. Clore 205 613
Robinson, S. 160, 183, 184, 193 and J. Mayer 110, 113, 193, 212, 213, 214,
Roddick, A. 610 215, 218, 221, 222, 227, 246, 248, 249,
Roese, N. 94, 95 250, 295, 445, 456, 459, 471, 476, 481,
Rogers, C. 414 512, 519, 607, 613
Rohan, M. 479 Samra-Fredericks, D. 460
Rosch, E. 270 Sandelands, L. and C. Boudens 605, 608
Roseman, I. 93, 271, 356, 363, 370, 407, 612 Sansone, C. 126, 130
Rosenthal, R. 480, 518 Sarason, Y. 165
Index 637
Sarbin, T. and N. Adler 595 and (in)justice 74, 75, 365, 368–9, 371, 375,
Sayegh, L. 46 377
Schachter, S. 428 literature review 31
schadenfreude 201, 382 and mistake admission 612
Schank, R. and R. Abelson 265 and organizational failure 554
Schaubroeck, J. 81, 289, 290, 309, 310, 311, and performance 180
316, 318, 319, 321, 330, 339, 341, 366, shame-proneness 67
378–81 Shamir, B. 467, 470, 476, 479, 489, 515
Scheff, T. 66 Shand, A. 91
Schein, E. 547, 551, 554, 555, 562, 575, 598, Shapiro, D. 410, 411, 414, 415, 569
609, 611 Sharma, A. and M. Levy 159
Scher, S. and D. Heise 362 Shaver, P. 198, 200, 201, 265, 267, 270, 271,
Scherer, K. 185, 186, 264, 268, 271, 279, 284, 273, 275, 279, 280
325, 356, 407, 408, 429, 477, 480, 482–3, Shaw, J. 502
484, 576 Sheldon, K. 122, 126–7, 305, 307
Schimmack, U. and E. Diener 90 Shell, R. 409
Schleicher, D. 163 Shenkar, O. 561, 569
Schlosberg, H. 19 Shepard, R. 19, 21
Schneider, B. 594 Shepperd, J. 97
Schroth, H. and P. Shah 370, 371 Sherony, K. and S. Green 503
Schultheiss, O. 174, 232 Shiv, B. and A. Fedorikhin 33
Schutte, N.S. 217 Shomrat, N. 352, 353
Schwarz, N. 46, 90, 250, 397, 555, 562, 570, Shore, L. 220, 222
581 Sias, P. and F. Jablin 499, 506
and H. Bless 54, 362, 432 Sillars, A. 409
and G. Clore 161, 185, 361–2, 397, 406, 424, Silvia, P.J. 121
425, 466 Simon, H. 45, 46, 414
Schwarz, R. 534 Simon, R. and L. Nath 201, 202
Schwenk, C. 55 Simonson, I. 46, 51, 55
Scollon, C. 113 Simonton, D.K. 105
Scott, B. and T. Judge 143 Simpson, P. and L. Stroh 579, 581
Seers, A. 499, 503, 507 Sinaceur, M. 394, 395, 398, 400, 405, 406,
Segrestin, B. 569 408
Sekerka, Leslie E. 531–45 Sinclair, Marta 197–208
Seligman, M. 93, 531, 535, 550 Sinclair, R. and M. Mark 362, 364
Seo, Myeong-Gu 17–44, 120, 131, 162, 176–7, Singelis, T. 408
557 Sivanathan, N. and G.C. Fekken 218
service agents Skarlicki, D. 83, 185, 189, 372, 381, 383, 584
and burnout 337 Sleeth, Randall G. 455–64
and emotional contagion 336–7 Smelser, N. 589, 590
and emotional labour 336, 338–41 smiling
research methodology 337–8 and charismatic leadership 467
research results 338–44 and customer satisfaction 158–9
and stress 337 and emotional contagion 337, 409, 425,
Settoon, R. 501 432–3
sexual harassment 521 and emotional display rules 266, 319, 329,
Shackman, A. 158 493
Shalley, C. 115 and emotional regulation 515
shame laughter 434–5, 437
and behavior motivation 349 see also facial expression
cultural differences 147, 201, 294 Smith, C. 185, 198, 325, 356, 363, 370, 407
and emotional scripts 279 Smith, K. and D. Berg 446
and failure 123, 352, 353 Smith, P. 336
features and functions 65–6, 69 Smith, R. 366, 374
and guilt, difference between 124 Smith, T. 140
social intelligence Staw, B. 27, 31, 34, 47, 48, 49, 54, 55, 56, 106,
Behavioral Event Interview (BEI) 229 138, 139, 502, 533, 551, 555, 556
competencies as behavioral manifestations Stecher, M. and J. Rosse 372, 377
of talent 226–8 Steele, C. 368
competencies and performance theory Steele-Johnson, D. 33
229–31, 236, 237–8 Steinel, W. 396, 400
competency development 238–41 Steiner, I. 441
definitions 226–7, 228 Stenross, B. and S. Klienman 305
empathy 229–30, 232, 234, 237 Stephens, N. and K. Gwinner 354
humanistic operating philosophy 232 Sternberg, R. 212–13, 217, 219, 227
and influence 230, 234, 237 Sternglanz, R. and B. DePaulo 481, 483
and management effectiveness 228 Stets, J. 591
organizational awareness 234 Stewart, T. 589
and parasympathetic nervous system Stone, D.N. and K. Kadous 31
(PSNS) 232–3 Storm, C. and T. 198, 199
and personality theory 231–3, 238 Strange, J. and M. Mumford 459–60
and power motive 231, 238–9 Stratton, M. 576
relationship management cluster 234, 235–6, Strazdins, L. 337, 345
237 stress
and SNS (sympathetic nervous system) and anger 109
231 coping strategies 583
social awareness cluster 233–4, 235 and creativity 108–10
training programs 238–41 and emotion regulation 190–91, 289, 290,
see also emotional intelligence 292, 293, 442
social interaction and emotional spiral 186
dealing with emotions of others 147 and extraversion 137
and emotion regulation 219, 290–91, 301, and (in)justice 374
302, 305, 309, 350, 393–7 and job satisfaction 157–8
and emotional contagion 426–7 literature review 32, 33
and emotional display rules 317, 328–9, 330, and neuroticism 48, 50, 109, 137, 306
351 and organizational culture 585
and emotional intelligence 442–3, 444, 445, and performance 140–41, 145, 253
447, 448, 450 and positive emotions 533
and emotional suppression 79, 81 recovery from 164
and individualism, extreme 581–2 and service agents 337
interpersonal deviance 184, 185, 187–8, 189, see also anxiety; fear
190 strikes 550
and organizational culture 609–10 Stryker, S. and R. Terpe 591, 592
relationships away from work 164 Stubblebine, Patrick C. 170–82
Sokolowski, K. 174 Sullins, E. 547
Solomon, R. 175, 367 Sullivan, D. 481
Solomon, S. 361, 367 Suls, J. 129
Sonnby-Borgström, M. 426, 432, 433 surprise
Sonnentag, S. 109, 110, 115, 164, 179 and creativity 113
Sosik, J. 111 in emotion scripts 269, 276
Spangler, W. 174 and emotional display rules 326
Sparrowe, R. 501, 506 and facial expression 430, 432–3, 433, 481
Spears, R. and C. Leach 606 and (in)justice 374
Spector, Paul E. 1, 6, 74, 109, 152, 159, 160, and success 123
183–96, 253, 360, 502, 584 Susskind, A. 503
Spencer, L. and S. 226, 228, 229, 233 Sutherland, V. and C. Cooper 74
Spielberger, C. 186, 187, 189 Sutton, R. 108, 252, 278, 305, 351, 409
Spreitzer, G. and R. Quinn 490 and A. Rafaeli 80, 145, 146, 211, 288, 289,
Stanley, R. and G. Burrows 69 302, 304, 316, 317, 323, 324, 405, 406,
Starbuck, W. 550, 551 521, 605
Index 639
Sweet, M. 583 Terry, D. 48

Sy, T. 31, 435, 436, 441, 467, 468, 469, 491, Tetlock, P. 399, 402
523, 585 Tett, R. 253
sympathy 32, 305, 365, 374, 393 Thayer, R. 17
Szulanski, G. 546 theft 62, 63, 184, 187, 188, 191–2
Thibaut, J. and L. Walker 360
Tajfel, H. 450, 592, 602 Thoits, P. 593
Tan, H. 137, 145, 345 Thompson, L. 30, 112, 396, 406, 409, 411–12,
Tangney, J. 66, 67, 112, 113, 286, 553 414, 415, 540
Tansik, D. and W. Smith 341 Thompson, M. 399, 590
Tauer, J. and J. Harackiewicz 130 Thoresen, C. 136, 139, 142, 143, 155, 156, 584
Taylor, K. and J. Shepperd 97 Thorndike, E. 226, 227
Taylor, S. 45, 96, 99 Thornton, G. and W. Byham 226, 228
teams Tichy, N. and S. Sherman 535
and affective reactions 499, 502, 503, 505–6, Tiedens, L. 63, 68–9, 82, 352, 353, 356, 394,
507 395, 398, 400, 466, 468, 521, 575, 577, 606,
affective reactions 501–2 611, 612
and cooperation 608 and C. Fong 590, 600
emotional contagion in 423–40 and C. Leach 442, 605
emotional intelligence, group-level 441–54 and J. Lerner 61, 67
future research 507 and S. Linton 407
group awareness of members 445, 446, 448 and M. Sinaceur 395, 400
group brainstorming 112 Tolich, M. 344, 345
and group conflict 443, 446 Tombs, Alastair 197–208
group conflict 27 Tomiuk, Marc A. 325, 335–48
group constructive emotion 449–50 Tomkins, S. 267, 290
group contagion 423–40 Tooby, J. 61, 407
group emotion, collective character of 30, Totterdell, Peter 30, 31, 254, 284, 287, 289, 292,
445–8, 450 294, 301–15, 339, 427, 428, 434, 491, 522,
group emotion, muting 441 547, 585, 606, 608
group emotional competence (GEC) 445–51, toxic emotions in the workplace
457 definition 82–4
group self-awareness 447–8 emotional suppression 77–83
group social skills 449 environmental factors 84–5
individual affect 506, 585 extreme tolerance point 84
leader–member exchange (LMX) 499–502, future research 84–5
503–6, 507, 513, 519, 582, 584, 585 organizational events, emotional responses
literature review 30, 31, 33, 500–503 and employee outcomes 73–6, 82
and organizational role theory 503 regulation strategy 84
profitability and positive affect 534, 540 research 76–7, 78–81, 93
and social exchange theory (SET) 499–500, understanding 76–81
503, 504–5, 506, 507 see also workplace, fear and loathing in
team–member exchange (TMX) 499, 503–7, Tracy, S. and K. 336
582, 584, 585 training
theoretical and practical implications 506–7 emotion management training 548–9
trust in 500 emotion regulation 294–5, 296
underlying theories 503–6 emotional intelligence 239–41, 245–60, 444,
see also emotional contagion; organizational 451
transformation; performance power motivation 238–41
Teasdale, J. and S. Fogarty 163 transformational leadership
Teece, D. 546 and authentic leadership 461–2
Tellegen, A. 3, 17, 22, 23, 29, 37, 175, 198, 481 confidence building 458
Tepper, B. 62, 69, 183, 373, 379 and creativity 107–8, 111, 114
Terkel, S. 1 and emotional contagion 491
terror management theory 367, 368 emotional expressivity 477, 490–91, 516
and emotional intelligence 219, 471–2, 476, Van Kleef, Gerben A. 68, 278, 281, 285, 355,
489–91 392–404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 465–75,
and follower affect 470, 501 605
and performance 458, 467 van Knippenberg, Barbara 465–75
and procedural justice 369 van Knippenberg, Daan 460–61, 465–75
see also motivation Van Maanen, J. 280, 344, 598, 605
Trevarthen, C. 477 Van Rooy, D. and C. Viswesvaran 456
Triandis, H. 575, 576, 577 Van Vianen, A. and A. Fischer 610
Trice, H. and J. Beyer 576 Van Winkle, E. 77, 79, 82, 83
Trimboli, A. and M. Walker 202 van Yperen, N. 373, 379, 501
Trompenaars, F. 494 van Zomeren, M. 378, 380
Trope, Y. 130, 386, 399 Vancouver, J. 265, 320
trust VandenBos, G. and E. Bulatao 62
betrayal 273, 279 VandeWalle, D.M. 172
and communication 584 Verbeke, W. 337, 427
and downsizing 75 Vermunt, R. 367, 375, 378, 379
and emotional intelligence 449 Vince, R. 570
and emotional labour 306 vocal pitch 368, 370, 375, 442, 444, 480–85
and fairness 75, 360 see also physiological changes
lack of 74, 251 Vosburg, S. 104, 107, 110, 555
and negotiation 396, 409, 410 Vraa, C. 444
and organizational alliances 569–70 Vroom, V. 162, 172
and organizational change 251, 540, 552
and organizational culture 578, 581, Wade-Benzoni, K. 402
583–4 Wadlinger, H. and D. Issacowitz 533–4
in teams 500 Wagner, David T. 152–69
Tsai, J. 37, 294, 305, 317, 318, 336 Waldman, D. and F. Yammarino 459, 477
Tsai, W. and Y. Huang 159, 305 Waldron, V. 605, 606, 609, 613
Tse, Herman H.M. 499–511, 584 Walker, E. 248
Tuckman, B. 443 Walsh, J.P. 46
Tugade, M. 533, 585 Walster, E. 366–7, 374, 379, 386
Tunstall, M. 188, 192 Walton, R. and R. McKersie 565
Turillo, C. 372, 377 Wanberg, C. 363, 364
Turner, J. 450, 591, 592, 602 Wang, H. 501, 512
Turner, M. 554 Wang, Lu 589–604
turnover of staff 69, 74, 81 Warnecke, A. 481
Tushman, M. and E. Romanelli 549, 557 Warr, P. 23
Twenge, J. 63 Wasserman, V. 610
Tycocinski, O. 99 Watson, D. 3, 17, 27, 104, 110, 136, 145, 152,
Tyler, T. 361, 378, 380, 410, 470, 499 198, 199, 200, 310, 363, 466, 537
Tziner, A. and D. Eden 443 and D. Heller 30
and L. Clark 22, 23, 50, 137, 153, 186, 189,
Ury, W. 400, 409, 410, 411, 413, 415 361, 465
and J. Pennebaker 141, 253
Vaidya, J. 204 and A. Slack 155
van Baaren, R. 423, 432 and A. Tellegen 3, 17, 23, 198
van den Bos, K. 362, 364, 367, 368, 370, 371, Watzlawick, P. 536
375, 377 Waugh, C. 537, 585
van der Pligt, J. 92 Wayne, S. 501
Van der Vegt, G. 507 Webb, S. 246
van Dijk, E. and M. Zeelenberg 33 Webster, D. 399
van Dijk, Wilco W. 90–102 Webster, J. 123
Van Dyne, L. 106, 108, 109, 110 Wech, B. 503
van Harreveld, Frenk 90–102 Wegener, D. 386, 407
Van Katwyck, K. 188, 200 Wegge, J. 505
Index 641
Weick, K. 324, 351, 521 Wood, J. 130

Weigert, A. and D. Franks 589 Woodworth, R. 19
Weiner, B. 123, 179, 201, 352, 353, 356, 552 workplace, fear and loathing in
Weingart, L. 409 anger and hate, feature and functions of
Weisinger, H. 212 62–5
Weiss, H. 1, 17, 29, 30, 33, 34, 36, 50, 75, 142, and humiliation 64, 79
152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 184, 331, 363, 367, impact of emotional states on cognitions
370, 376, 384, 386, 457, 552 and behaviors 67–8
and R. Cropanzano 5, 10, 29, 75, 82, 122, managing problematic emotions 68–70
142, 152, 154, 155, 156, 170, 177, 178, and organizational justice 75, 79
197–8, 211, 303, 323, 349, 363–5, 457, power abuse 64, 79
499, 502, 503, 505, 507, 516–17, 547, unfair treatment 63
575, 584 and withdrawal 64, 66, 68
Weitz, J. 139 see also toxic emotions in the workplace
West, M. 104, 109, 113, 115, 608 Worline, M. 112, 113, 349
Westbrook, R. 200, 354 Worrall, L. and C. Cooper 2
Wexley, K. and W. Memeroff 239 Wouters, C. 607
Wharton, A. 317, 322, 344 Wright, S. 581
Wheeler, J. 240–41 Wright, T. 27, 31, 34, 253, 502
White, G. 264, 269, 271 Wrzesniewski, A. 535, 598
White, S. 561–2 Wundt, W. 17, 19
Whitesell, N. and S. Harter 274
Whyte, G. 48, 54 Yan, A. and M. Louis 448
Wichroski, M. 252 Yanay, N. and G. Shahar 344
Wierzbicka, A. 268 Yang, L. 188
Wiesenfeld, B. 368–9, 370, 371, 375, 380, 382, Yik, M. 20, 26, 201
383 Young, D. and N. Dixon 239
Wiggins, J. 221 Yukl, G. 414, 465, 500, 514
Wild, B. 427–8, 429, 430, 547
Wilk, S. amd L. Moynihan 252, 311 Zabel, R. 248
Williams, K. 122, 612 Zajonc, R. 199, 466
Williams, M. 484, 566 Zand, D. 550
Williams, R. 233 Zapf, D. 80, 183, 192, 252, 286, 288, 289, 301,
Willmott, H. 212 302, 303, 305, 306, 307, 309–10, 311, 312,
Wilson, R. 434 521
Wilson, T. and T. Gilbert 125 Zeelenberg, M. 33, 46, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 56,
Winter, D. 231, 238 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 97, 98
Winter, S. 138, 546, 548 Zeidner, M. and G. Matthews 124
withdrawal 48–9, 64, 66, 68, 74, 144, 184, 187, Zellars, K. 253
191 Zerbe, W. 289, 292, 307, 308, 309, 312, 605
Wofford, J. 50 Zevon, M. and A. Tellegen 22, 23
Wolff, Steven B. 216, 220, 233, 234, 441–54, Zohar, D. 33, 265
472, 519 Zott, C. 546, 550, 556
Wong, Kin Fai Ellick 31, 45–60, 144 Zuckerman, M. 288, 290, 484

Neal M Ashkanasy - Cary L Cooper-Research Companion To Emotion in Organizations-Edward Elgar (2008)

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RESEARCH COMPANION TO EMOTION IN

Cary L. Cooper, CBE

NEW HORIZONS IN MANAGEMENT

Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc.

A catalogue record for this book

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data

Research companion to emotion in organizations / edited by Neal Ashkanasy, Cary L. Cooper.

ISBN 978 1 84542 637 8 (cased)

List of figures viii

PART I EMOTION AND AFFECT AS WITHIN-PERSON PHENOMENA

PART II EMOTION AS AN INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCE VARIABLE

13 The use of emotional intelligence in business: resolving varying deﬁnitions

PART III EMOTIONAL EFFECTS IN DYADIC INTERACTIONS

16 Emotion scripts in organizations: a multi-level model 263

PART IV EMOTION AS A GROUP-LEVEL PHENOMENON

25 Kindling ﬁres and extinguishing candles: the wind of mood contagion in

28 Leadership, aﬀect, and emotions 465

PART V ORGANIZATIONAL-LEVEL EMOTION RESEARCH

33 Establishing positive emotional climates to advance organizational

1.1 Schematic representation of aﬀective space 18

1.1 Summary of literature review results according to aﬀect construct, theory,

Neal M. Ashkanasy, UQ Business School, University of Queensland, Australia.

Lisa Feldman Barrett, Department of Psychology, Boston College, USA.

Laura G. Barron, Department of Psychology, Rice University, USA.

Joyce E. Bono, Department of Human Resources and Industrial Relations, University of

Richard E. Boyatzis, Weatherhead School of Management, Case Western Reserve

Zinta S. Byrne, Department of Psychology, Colorado State University, USA.

Tiﬀani G. Cage, Department of Psychology, Saint Louis University, USA.

Yochi Cohen-Charash, Department of Psychology, Baruch College and Graduate Center,

Stéphane Côté, Joseph L. Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, Canada.

Marie T. Dasborough, Department of Management, University of Miami, USA.

Catherine S. Daus, Department of Psychology, Southern Illinois University Edwardsville,

Timothy DeGroot, Spears School of Business, Oklahoma State University, USA.

James M. Diefendorﬀ, Department of Psychology, University of Akron, USA.

Vanessa Urch Druskat, Whittemore School of Business and Economics, University of

Agneta H. Fischer, Department of Social Psychology, University of Amsterdam, The

Cynthia D. Fisher, School of Business, Bond University, Australia.

Julie Fitness, Psychology Department, Macquarie University, Australia.

Barbara L. Fredrickson, Department of Psychology, University of North Carolina at

Michael Frese, Department of Psychology, University of Giessen, Germany.

Ilan G. Gewurz, Ross School of Business Executive Education, University of Michigan,

Donald E. Gibson, Dolan School of Business, Fairﬁeld University, USA.

Shlomo Hareli, Graduate School of Business, University of Haifa, Israel.

Charmine E.J. Härtel, Department of Management, Monash University, Australia.

Nathan S. Hartman, Boler School of Business, John Carroll University, USA.

David Holman, Institute of Work Psychology, University of Sheﬃeld, UK.

Ronald H. Humphrey, School of Business, Virginia Commonwealth University, USA.

Quy Nguyen Huy, INSEAD, France.

Sirkwoo Jin, Robert H. Smith School of Business, University of Maryland, USA.

Peter J. Jordan, Griﬃth Business School, Griﬃth University, Australia.

Timothy A. Judge, Warrington College of Business Administration, University of

John D. Kammeyer-Mueller, Warrington College of Business Administration, University

Ruth Kanfer, School of Psychology, Georgia Institute of Technology, USA.

Janet B. Kellett, School of Business, Virginia Commonwealth University, USA.

Shirli Kopelman, Ross School of Business, University of Michigan, USA.

Carol T. Kulik, School of Management, University of South Australia, Australia.

Rajesh Kumar, Business School, University of Nottingham, UK.

Sandra A. Lawrence, Griﬃth Business School, Griﬃth University, Australia.

Antony S.R. Manstead, School of Psychology, Cardiﬀ University, UK.

David Martinez-Iñigo, Department of Social Science, University Rey Juan Carlos,

Susan Michie, School of Business Administration, University of Evansville, USA.

Christopher T.H. Miners, Joseph L. Rotman School of Management, University of

Sue Moon, Joseph L. Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, Canada.