THESIS 37: -Good and Happiness
and acts are good in virtue of the
GoodIN CONTEXT
 This idea is usually a concern of
Ethics, Aesthetics, and Axiology.
 Most commonly used in a broad,
Platonic context to refer to
goodness in general or the form or
property by which good things are
good have traditionally held that
the goodness of particular things
Happiness
property the Good.1
 However, the notion of the good is  All ethical theories accord some
extremely complex. Plato, in the importance to human happiness.4
Republic, claimed that the good,  The simplest doctrine is that
while being the source of being
and knowledge, is beyond
conceptual analysis. This position
was developed by Plotinus and
Aquinas.2
 Aristotle suggested that the good
is that to which everything aspires,
but argued that the word is used in
many ways and belongs to each
category.3
happiness is itself quite
straightforward, consisting for
example in occasion of pleasure;
1
Charles Talliaferro and Elsa J. Marty, A
Dictionary of Philosophy of Religion, s.v. “good,
that agents only do seek their own
happiness; and that there is no
the.”
other possible or desirable end of
2
Nicholas Bunnin and Jiyuan Yu, The action.5
Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy, s.v.
“good.” 4
Simon Blackburn, Oxford Dictionary of
Philosophy, s.v. “happiness.”
3
Ibid.
5
Ibid.
 We are no done with the definition of
the two terms. But at this point it must be
clear to us that our topic is about good
and happiness, so we will follow the line
of thinking of Aristotle.
The Highest Good: Happiness6
For Aristotle, “Every craft and every
investigation, and likewise every action
and decision, seems to aim at some good;
hence the good has been well described as
that at which everything aims.
However, there is an apparent
difference among the ends aimed at. For
the end is sometimes an activity,
sometimes a product beyond activity; and
6
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics fourth edition
ed. by Steven Cahn (Cambridge: Hackett
Publishing Company, Inc., 1995), 274.
when there is an end beyond action, the
product is by nature better than the
activity.
Since there are many actions, crafts
and sciences, the ends turn out to be many
as well; for health is the end of medicine,
a boat of boatbuilding, victory of
generalship, and wealth of household
management.
But whatever any of these sciences are
subordinate to someone capacity…..in
each end of these the end of the ruling
science is more choiceworthy than all the
ends subordinate to it, since it is the end
for which those ends are also pursued.
And here it does not matter whether the
ends of the actions are the activities
themselves, or some product beyond
them, as in the sciences we have
mentioned.
Common Beliefs about the Highest
Good are Inadequate7
For many, it is something obvious
and evident, e.g. pleasure, wealth, and
honor. Some likewise thinks other things
apart from those mentioned earlier on.
But now, let us begin again from
the common beliefs from which we
7
Aristotle, 276-277.
digress. For, it would seem, people quite
reasonably reach their conception of the
good; i.e. of happiness, from the lives
they lead; for there are roughly three most
favored lives – the lives of gratification,
of political activity, and third, of study.
The many, the most vulgar, seemingly
conceive the good and happiness as
pleasure, and hence they also like the life
of gratification. Here they appear
completely slavish, since the life they
decide on is a life grazing animals; and
yet they have some argument in their
defence, since many in positions of power
feel the same way as Sardanapallus.
The cultivated people, those active
in politics, conceive the good as honor,
since this is the end normally pursed in
the political life. This, however, appears
to be too superficial to be what we are
seeking, since it seems to depend more on
those who honor than on the one honored,
whereas we intuitively believe that the
good is something of our own and hard to
take from us.
Perhaps, indeed, one might
conceive virtue more than honor to be the
end of the political life. However, this
also is apparently too incomplete to be the
good. For, it seems, someone might
possess virtue but be asleep or inactive
throughout his life; or, further, he might
suffer the worst evils and misfortunes;
and if this is the sort of life he leads, no
one would count him happy, except to
defend a philosopher’s paradox.
The third life is the life of study.
The money-maker’s life is in way forced
on him not chosen for itself; and clearly
wealth is not the good we are seeking,
since it is merely useful, choiceworthy
only for some other end. Hence one
would be more inclined to suppose that
any of the good mentioned earlier is the
end, since they are liked for themselves.
But apparently, they are not the end
either; and many arguments have been
presented against them.
Our own view of the Good8
8
Ibid., 277-279.
Though apparently, there are
many ends, we choose some of them, e.g.
wealth, flutes and, in general, instruments,
because of something else; hence it is
clear that not all ends are complete. But
the best good is apparently something
complete. Hence, if only one end is
complete, this will be what we are looking
for; and if more than one are complete,
the most complete of these will be what
we are looking for.
An end pursued in itself, we say,
is more complete than an end pursued
because of something else; and an end
that is never choiceworthy because of
something else is more complete than
ends that are choiceworthy both in
themselves and because of this end; and
hence an end that is always choiceworthy,
and also choiceworthy in itself, never
because of something else, is complete
without reservation.
Now happiness more than
anything else seems complete without
reservation, since we always choose it,
and also choose it because of itself, never
because of something else.
The same conclusion that
happiness is complete also appears to
follow from self-sufficient, since the
complete good seems to be self-sufficient.
Anyhow, we regard something as
self-sufficient when all by itself it makes
a life choiceworthy and lacking nothing;
and that is why we think happiness does.
Moreover, the complete good is
most choiceworthy, and we think
happiness is most choiceworthy of all
goods, since it is not counted as one good
among many. If it were counted as one
among many, then, clearly, we think that
the addition of the smallest goods would
make it more choiceworthy; for the
smallest good that is added becomes an
extra quantity of goods so creating a good
larger than the original good, and the
larger of two goods is always more
choiceworthy. But we do not think any
addition can make happiness more
choiceworhty; hence it is most
choiceworthy.
Happiness, then, is apparently
something complete and self-sufficient,
since it is the end of the things pursued in
action.
The Good and Happiness in Aquinas’s
Thoughts
Everything has an end: there is no
action without an end. Yet this end does
not only apply to man alone. But rather,
irrational nature also tends to an end but
led by another. On the other hand, what is
peculiar to the spiritual creature is not just
to act for an end but to direct himself to
an end.
Meaning to say, there is a
deliberation of the will. All actions that
gears towards its end is human acts
because they flow from the free will of
man. But every human acts is not done for
nothing but rather it is done with a view
to an end or object. Meaning to say, all
human acts are for the sake of their end.
Therefore those actions are properly
called human which proceed from a
deliberate will. And if any other actions
are found in man, they can be called
actions "of a man," but not properly
"human" actions, since they are not
proper to man as man. Now it is clear that
whatever actions proceed from a power,
are caused by that power in accordance
with the nature of its object. But the
object of the will is the end and the good.
Therefore all human actions must be for
an end.9
There should be an end as St.
Thomas asserted because it is impossble
to go on ad infinitum, since if there is no
first end in the intention nothing would be
desired and nothing will move. Having no
en d is tantamount to denying also the real
motivation for human activity.
9
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (United
States of America: Benzinger Brothers, Inc.,
1947), 777. Henceforth, this will be abbreviated as
ST.
Consequently, on neither side is it
possible to go to infinity since if there
were no last end, nothing would be
desired, nor would any action have its
term, nor would the intention of the agent
be at rest; while if there is no first thing
among those that are ordained to the end,
none would begin to work at anything,
and counsel would have no term, but
would continue indefinitely.10
Furthermore, the will desires the
fullness of goodness, the real of goodness.
What we look for is a complete good
which means a perfect one. This complete
goodness is found only in God. He is the
Supreme Goodness who is the final cause
and final end
Now, in this life, as human being
acts towards his end which is the
complete one, he also achieves happiness
but it is not as such the last end, but only
consequence of loving God, who is the
real end. Now, the question is, can we
achieve perfect happiness in this life? We
can only achieved happiness in this life
only imperfectly.
Final and perfect happiness can
consist in nothing else than the vision of
the Divine Essence. To make this clear,
two points must be observed. First, that
10
STh I-II, q.1, a.4.
man is not perfectly happy, so long as
something remains for him to desire and
seek: secondly, that the perfection of any
power is determined by the nature of its
object. Now the object of the intellect is
"what a thing is," i.e. the essence of a
thing, according to De Anima iii, 6.
Wherefore the intellect attains perfection,
in so far as it knows the essence of a
thing. If therefore an intellect knows the
essence of some effect, whereby it is not
possible to know the essence of the cause,
i.e. to know of the cause "what it is"; that
intellect cannot be said to reach that cause
simply, although it may be able to gather
from the effect the knowledge of that the
cause is. Consequently, when man knows
an effect, and knows that it has a cause,
there naturally remains in the man the
desire to know about the cause, "what it
is." And this desire is one of wonder, and
causes inquiry, as is stated in the
beginning of the
Metaphysics (i, 2). For instance, if a man,
knowing the eclipse of the sun, consider
that it must be due to some cause, and
know not what that cause is, he wonders
about it, and from wondering proceeds to
inquire. Nor does this inquiry cease until
he arrive at a knowledge of the essence of
the cause.
If therefore the human intellect,
knowing the essence of some created
effect, knows no more of God than "that
He is"; the perfection of that intellect does
not yet reach simply the First Cause, but
there remains in it the natural desire to
seek the cause. Wherefore it is not yet
perfectly happy. Consequently, for perfect
happiness the intellect needs to reach the
very Essence of the First Cause. And thus
it will have its perfection through union
with God as with that object, in which
alone man's happiness consists, as stated
above (AA[1],7; Q[2], A[8]).11
Eastern Happiness and Western
Happiness
Contrast/s:
On one hand, for the Westerners,
happiness is the perfect good which
satisfies the desire of man that the world
cannot give. If man wants to achieve
perfect happiness, he must seek the
ultimate Good that will complete his own
desire. Furthermore, he can only seek this
11
STh.I-II, q.3, a.8.
perfect happiness if he is in union with
God.
On the other hand, the Easterners
have also their view of happiness,
especially on a famous school of thought
– Buddhism. In the Buddhism, they have
this concept of suffering as “an essential
facts of life on earth.”12 Thus, in order for
man to liberate from suffering, he must
learn the Eightfold Path for it is the means
to end suffering. Once suffering is ended,
man will attain Nirvana, the “summum
bonum of Buddhism.”13 If man is able to
reach this Nirvana, then he will be called
Arhat. Thus, “happiness for Buddhism is
achieved through the control of all
hankering for the world (of sense
pleasure) and a dejection of all craving for
its false values, by a realization of the
impermanence of things in the world.
Complete elimination of this hankering is
achieved only with the attainment of
Nirvana.”14
Comparison/s:
12
Magdalena, Villaba Philosophy of the East,
(Manila: UST Publishing House, 2005), 86.
13
Ibid., 95.
14
Ibid.
 The two sides concerning
happiness aims for good. This good is
also seen on pleasures and desires. But
then, they both aim for a perfect
happiness that is beyond seeking pleasure
and desire. Hence, they go for an end –
telos – that is, to attain happiness.
Furthermore, they both show that man
must accept the fact that the world is
imperfect and the only happiness that they
can attain are not enough to attain the
perfect happiness. Hence, happiness is
achieved to something that is the end – a
blissful state.
Common Good and Private Good.
A coherent concept of common good also
excludes an extreme version of holism, as
represented, for instance, by the idealism
of Plato or hegel, considering the state as
the ultimate end of the individual, who
exists for the sake of the whole. In reality,
good citizens are supposed to like the
community they belong to because the
goal at which it aims – virtuous activity is
the ultimate good at which human beings
should aim.15 nevertheless, in the ancient
15
Richard Kraut, Aristotle: Political
Philosophy. Oxford, Oxford University Press,
2002. 353.
and medieval Aristotelian way of thinking
the common and the individual good were
seen as typically existing in harmony with
one another rather than in a state of
conflict.16
For while the good of an individual is
a desirable thing, what is good for a
people or for cities is a nobler and more
godlike thing. This argument combines
what might otherwise be seen as
mutually exclusive alternatives: the
statement that the common good is the
same as the individual good, and the
principle that the common good is
superior to the individual good.
16
Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights:
Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law and
Church Law, 1150–1625. Atlanta, Scholars, 1997.
313.
Friendship and Contemplation
Aquinas begins by arguing for the
primacy of the contemplative over the
active
life. The contemplative life has more
value for reasons that come very close to
the list in Aristotle: the contemplative life
involves reason, is divine and the most
self-sufficient, and can be continuous.
Contemplation provides delight and
leisure Aquinas connects charity to love
of God and friendship with God. Within
this question on the relationship of the
virtues, Aquinas addresses whether or not
charity can exist without faith and hope.
He uses the image of human friendships
applied to our friendship with God to
answer the question. Charity indicates
mutual friendship as a communion of love
with God.
In summary, Aristotle considers activities carried out in light of the question and explicitly states that all
friendships of equals to be mutually friendship. The contemplative life is the friends come from God and that
benevolent and to involve spending time highest form of life and requires friends, friendship should be rooted in pursuit of
together in shared contemplation and partly because people contemplate God. God builds and transforms our
study. Virtue friendship includes the themselves through their friends.
forming of the self through virtuous Augustine adds a Christian element to the
Friendship through grace
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. 4th Edition. Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1995.

Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica. United States of America: Benzinger Brothers, Inc., 1947.

Secondary Sources

Blackburn, Simon.. Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. 2nd Edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Bunnin, Nicholas and Jiyuan Yu. The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2004.

Talliaferro, Charles and Elsa J. Marty. A Dictionary of Philosophy of Religion. New York: Continuum, 2010.

Villaba, Magdalena A. Philosophy of the East. Manila: UST Publishing House, 2005.

Kraut, Ricahrd. Aristotle: Political Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Tierney, Brian. The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law and Church Law. Atlanta: Scholars, 1997.