Espina vs Zamora (2010)

Facts:

The case at bar deals with the question of constitutionality of Retail Trade Liberalization Act of
2000 which was signed by President Joseph Estrada on March 7, 2000.

Unlike its predecessor, Republic Act 1180, which absolutely prohibits foreign nationals from
engaging in retail trade business in the Philippines, the questioned law allows the said foreign
trade placing them under four categories. The petitioners filed a case assailing the
constitutionality of Republic Act 8762 as it is a clear violation to Section 9, 19, and 20 of Article
II of the 1987 Constitution. The petitioners stressed that the presence of the foreign nationals
would result in alien control and monopoly of the retail trade.

On the other hand, the respondents contended that the petitioners have no legal standing to
file the petition. Aside from that, the Constitution mandates the mere regulation but not the
prohibition of foreign investments in the country.

Issue:

Whether or not RA 8762 is unconstitutional

Ruling:

No. the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000 is not unconstitutional.

The court emphasized that the petitioners indeed have no legal standing to file the petition as
there is no clear showing that the implementation of RA 8762 prejudices the petitioners of
inflicts damage on them, either as taxpayers or legislators. Legal standing is one of the
requisites necessary before one could validly attack the constitutionality of a certain law. Legal
standing implies that one must have a personal and substantial interest and that he has
suffered or will suffer direct injury as a result of the passage of the law.

The legislative acknowledges that indeed it is integral to primarily promote the welfare of the
Filipino investors as mandated by the Constitution. Nonetheless, it is equally important that
holistic economic growth must be assured for the overall development of the country’s trade
industry. This can be done by allowing entry of foreign investors that will be allowed to engage
in business regulated by the provisions of RA 8762.
Imbong VS Comelec

FACTS:
Manuel Imbong and Raul Gonzales, filing separate cases and both interested
in running as candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention,
question the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming that it prejudices
their rights as such candidates. On March 16, 1967, the Congress, acting as a
Constituent Assembly, passed Res. No. 2 which called for a Constitutional
Convention which shall have two delegates from each representative district.
On June 17, 1969, the Congress passed Resolution No. 4 amending Resolution
No. 2 by providing that the convention shall be composed of 320 delegates
with at least two delegates from each representative district. On August 24,
1970, the Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted R.A. 6132,
implementing Res Nos. 2 and 4 and expressly repealing R.A 4914 which
previously implemented Res. No. 2. Gonzales assails the validity of Sections 2,
4, 5, and par. 1 of 8(a), and the entire law, while Imbong questions the
constitutionality of par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of said R.A. 6132.

ISSUES:
1. Does the Congress have the right to call for a constitutional convention
and set the parameters of such convention?
2. Are the provisions of R.A. 6132 constitutional?

HELD:
1. The Congress has authority to call a constitutional convention as the
constituent assembly. The Congress also has the authority to enact
implementing details, contained in Res. Nos. 2 and 4 and R.A. 6132, since
such details are within the competence of the Congress in the exercise of its
legislative power.

2. The provisions are constitutional. Sec. 4 of R.A. 6132 is merely an

application with Sec. 2 of Art. XII of the Constitution and does not constitute a
denial of due process or equal protection of the law. Sec. 2 also merely obeyed
the intent of the Congress in Res. Nos. 2 and 4 regarding the apportionment of
delegates. The challenged disqualification of an elected delegate from running
for any public office in Sec. 5 is a valid limitation as it is reasonable and not
arbitrary. Lastly, par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) which is both contested by the petitioners
is still valid as the restriction contained in the section is so narrow that basic
constitutional rights remain substantially intact and inviolate thus the
limitation is a valid infringement of the constitutional guarantees invoked by
the petitioners.

MITRA versus COMELEC (G.R. No. 191938)

Facts:

When his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan was declared cancelled,
Mitra was the incumbent Representative of the Second District of Palawan.
This district then included, among other territories,
the Municipality of Aborlan and Puerto Princesa City. He was elected
Representative as a domiciliary of Puerto Princesa City, and represented the
legislative district for three (3) terms immediately before the elections of 2010.

On March 26, 2007 (or before the end of Mitra’s second term as
Representative), Puerto Princesa City was reclassified as a "highly urbanized
city" and thus ceased to be a component city of the Province of Palawan. The
direct legal consequence of this new status was the ineligibility
of PuertoPrincesa City residents from voting for candidates for elective
provincial officials.

On March 20, 2009, with the intention of running for the position of
Governor, Mitra applied for the transfer of his Voter’s Registration Record
from Precinct No. 03720 of Brgy. Sta. Monica, Puerto Princesa City, to Sitio
Maligaya,Brgy. Isaub, Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan. He
subsequently filed his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan as a
resident of Aborlan.

Soon thereafter, respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr.

(the respondents) filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel Mitra’s COC.

Issue:
Whether or not Mitra is qualified to run for Governor of Palawan.

Held:

YES. Mitra is qualified to rum for the position as Governor of Palawan. The
Supreme Court ruled that Mitra did not misrepresent himself and that he met
the residency requirement as mandated by the Constitution.

The election of Abraham Kahlil Mitra as governor of Palawan in the May 10,
2010 elections was upheld in a vote of 11-3. The respondents were not able to
present a convincing case sufficient to overcome Mitra’s evidence of effective
transfer to and residence in Aborlan and the validity of his representation on
this point in his COC. Likewise, the "COMELEC could not present any legally
acceptable basis to conclude that Mitra’s statement in his COC regarding his
residence was a misrepresentation."

Republic VS Sandiganbayan

Facts: The Presidential Commission on Good Governance created an AFP Anti-Graft Board
tasked to scrutinize the reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by any AFP personel,
active or retired. The AFP Board inverstigated various reports of alleged “ill-gotten” wealth of
respondent Maj. Gen. Josephus Ramas. Along with this, the Constabulary raiding team served a
search warrant on the premises of Ramas’ alleged mistess, Elizabeth Dimaano. The Board then
concluded that Ramas be prosecuted for violating the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Thereafter, they filed a petition for forfeiture against him before the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan dismissed the case on several grouns one of which is that there was an illegal
search and seiure of the items confiscated.

Issue:

Whethter or not the PCGG has the authority to investigate Ramas and Dimaano

Ruling:

The petition was dismissed.

Even in the absence of a COnstituiton, the right against unlawful seiure can be found in the
Unversal declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenaant on the Civil and Political
Rights.

Nevertheless, even during the interregnum, the Filipino people under the covenant and
declatation continued to enjoy almost the same rights found in tge Bill of Rights of the 1973
Constitution. As stated in Article II(1) of the Covenant, the State is required “to respect and to
ensure to all individuals within the territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in
the Covenant.”

WIGBERTO R. TAÑADA, JR. Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ANGELINA D. TAN, AND ALVIN
JOHN S. TAÑADA, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for certiorari1 under Rule 65 in relation to Rule 64 of

the Rules of Court is the Resolution2 dated April 25, 2013 of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc declaring respondent Alvin John S. Tañada
not a nuisance candidate.

The Facts

Petitioner Wigberto R. Tañada, Jr., (Wigberto) and respondents Angelina D.

Tan (Angelina) and Alvin John S. Tañada (Alvin John) were contenders for the
position of Member of the House of Representatives for the 4th District of
Quezon Province in the just concluded May 13, 2013 National
Elections.3 Wigberto ran under the banner of the Liberal Party; Alvin John was
the official congressional candidate of Lapiang Manggagawa; while Angelina
was fielded by the National People’s Coalition.4

On October 10, 2012, Wigberto filed before the COMELEC two separate
petitions: first, to cancel Alvin John’s CoC;5 and, second, to declare him as a
nuisance candidate.6 The said petitions were docketed as SPA Nos. 13-056
(DC) and 13-057 (DC), respectively.

In a Resolution7 dated January 29, 2013, the COMELEC First Division

dismissed both petitions for lack of merit. On Wigberto’s motion for
reconsideration,8 the COMELEC En Banc, in a Resolution9 dated April 25,
2013, upheld the COMELEC First Division’s ruling in SPA No. 13-057 (DC)
that Alvin John was not a nuisance candidate as defined under Section 6910of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 881, as amended, otherwise known as the "Omnibus
Election Code of the Philippines" (OEC).11 However, in SPA No. 13-056 (DC), it
granted the motion for reconsideration and cancelled Alvin John’s CoC for
having committed false material representations concerning his residency in
accordance with Section 7812 of the OEC.13

On May 15, 2013, Wigberto filed a 2nd Motion for Partial Reconsideration14of
the COMELEC En Banc ’s ruling in SPA No. 13-057 (DC) on the ground of
newly discovered evidence. He alleged that Alvin John’s candidacy was not
bona fide because: (a) Alvin John was merely forced by his father to file his
CoC; (b) he had no election paraphernalia posted in official COMELEC posting
areas in several barangays of Gumaca, Quezon Province; (c) he did not even
vote during the May 13, 2013 National Elections; and (d) his legal
representation appeared to have been in collusion with the lawyers of
Angelina.15

On May 15 and 16, 2013, Wigberto filed with the COMELEC En Banc an
Extremely Urgent Motion to Admit Additional and Newly Discovered
Evidence and to Urgently Resolve Motion for Reconsideration16 and an Urgent
Manifestation and Supplemental17 thereto. These motions, however, remained
un-acted upon until the filing of the present petition before the Court on May
27, 2013. Thus, in order to avoid charges of forum-shopping, said motions
were withdrawn by Wigberto.

In a related development, despite the cancellation of Alvin John’s CoC due to

his material misrepresentations therein, his name was not deleted from – and
thus, remained printed on – the ballot, prompting Wigberto to file a
motion18 with the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Quezon Province (PBOC)
asking that the votes cast in the name of Alvin John be credited to him instead
in accordance with the Court’s ruling in Dela Cruz v. COMELEC19 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 9599.20 The PBOC, however, denied Wigberto’s
motion in a Resolution21 dated May 16, 2013, holding that the votes of Alvin
John could not be counted in favor of Wigberto because the cancellation of the
former’s CoC was on the basis of his material misrepresentations under
Section 78 of the OEC and not on being a nuisance candidate under Section 69
of the same law. Consequently, the PBOC canvassed the votes of all three
contenders separately, and thereafter, on May 16, 2013, proclaimed Angelina
as the winning candidate for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives for the 4th District of Quezon Province.22 According to
Wigberto, it was for the foregoing reason that he impleaded Angelina as a
party-respondent in the instant petition for certiorari.23

It appears, however, that Wigberto had already filed with the COMELEC a
Petition to Annul the Proclamation of Angelina (Petition to Annul) under SPC
No. 13-013, asserting that had the PBOC followed pertinent rulings,24the votes
cast for Alvin John would have been counted in his favor which could have
resulted in his victory.25 While the Petition to Annul was still pending
resolution, Wigberto initiated the instant certiorari case against the
COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated April 25, 2013 declaring Alvin John not
a nuisance candidate.1âwphi1

On July 3, 2013, Wigberto filed a Manifestation26 informing the Court that he

had caused the filing of an Election Protest Ad Cautelam entitled " Wigberto R.
Tañada, Jr. v. Angelina ‘Helen’ D. Tan, " before the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which was docketed as Electoral Protest Case No.
13-018.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of public respondent

COMELEC, affirmed in its Comment dated August 18, 2013,27 that an Election
Protest Ad Cautelam had, indeed, been filed by Wigberto against Angelina
before the HRET, praying that he be declared the winner in the 2013
congressional race in the 4th District of Quezon Province. It also alleged that
on June 28, 2013, the COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution
annulling the proclamation of Angelina as Member of the House of
Representatives for the 4th District of Quezon Province. The propriety of this
ruling is now pending resolution before the COMELEC En Banc.28

The Issues Before the Court

Wigberto assails the COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated April 25, 2013
declaring that Alvin John was not a nuisance candidate as defined under
Section 69 of the OEC. In consequence, he seeks that the votes cast in favor of
Alvin John be credited to him and, thereafter, to be declared the winning
candidate for the congressional post.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition must fail.

Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that the
HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of its respective members:

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal, shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall
be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the
remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives,
as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice
in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Case law states that the proclamation of a congressional candidate following

the election divests the COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed representative in favor
of the HRET.29 The phrase "election, returns and qualifications" refers to all
matters affecting the validity of the contestee’s title.30 In particular, the term
"election" refers to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the
holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes;
"returns" refers to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the
winners, including questions concerning the composition of the board of
canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns; and "qualifications"
refers to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the
proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of
his CoC.31

In the foregoing light, considering that Angelina had already been proclaimed
as Member of the House of Representatives for the 4th District of Quezon
Province on May 16, 2013, as she has in fact taken her oath and assumed office
past noon time of June 30, 2013,32 the Court is now without jurisdiction to
resolve the case at bar. As they stand, the issues concerning the conduct of the
canvass and the resulting proclamation of Angelina as herein discussed are
matters which fall under the scope of the terms "election" and "returns" as
above-stated and hence, properly fall under the HRET’s sole jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
VELASCO VS COMELEC

Velasco was born in San Antonio, Sasmuan, Pampanga on June 22, 1952 to Arsenio
Velasco and Lucia Mangalindan. He married Evelyn D. Castillo on June 29, 1975 at
the Roman Catholic Church of Sasmuan. In 1983, he moved to and worked in
the United States of America where he subsequently became a citizen.

Sometime in 2006, Velasco applied for dual citizenship under Republic Act No.
9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of
2003.His application was approved on July 31, 2006. On the same day, he took his
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Philippine Consulate
General in San Francisco. He returned to the Philippines on September 14, 2006 and
has not left since, except for a 3-day Hongkong trip from September 26,
2006 to September 29, 2009.

Soon thereafter or on October 13, 2006, Velasco applied for registration as a

voter of Sasmuan, Pampanga. The Election Registration Board (ERB) denied his
application. Thereupon, Velasco filed a petition for the inclusion of his name in the
list of voters with the Municipal Trial Court of Sasmuan (MTC). The MTC, finding
no evidence of Velascos change of domicile, granted Velascos petition on February
9, 2007; it reversed the ERBs decision and ordered Velascos inclusion in the List of
Voters of Sasmuan.

On March 1, 2007, Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court of Guagua,

Pampanga (RTC) reversed and set aside, on appeal, the MTC decision. The RTC
reasoned out that Velasco lost his domicile of origin [Sasmuan, Pampanga] when he
became a US citizen; under Philippine immigration laws, he could only stay in
the Philippines as a visitor or as a resident alien. Velasco, according to the RTC,
only regained or reacquired his Philippine residency on July 31, 2006 when he
reacquired his Filipino citizenship. The RTC based this conclusion on our ruling
in Caasi v. Court of Appeals[1] that naturalization in a foreign country results in the
abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. Thus, the RTC found that Velasco
failed to comply with the residency requirement under the Constitution, making him
ineligible to vote in the May 14, 2007 elections.
 Velasco appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a
petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court; the appeal was docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 98259.

It was against this factual backdrop that Velasco filed on March 28,
2007his COC for the position of Mayor of Sasmuan. Velascos COC contains,
among others, the required information that he is a registered voter of Precinct No.
103-A of Sasmuan, Pampanga. He executed on even date an Affidavit renouncing,
abandoning, and relinquishing his American citizenship.

The next day, private respondent Mozart Panlaqui (Panlaqui), who also filed
his COC for the position of Mayor of Sasmuan, filed a Petition to Deny Due Course
To and/or To Cancel Velascos COC, claiming that: (1) contrary to Velascos claim,
he is not a registered voter of Precinct No. 103-A, as his name is not included in the
list of voters; (2) the RTC has rendered a decision denying Velascos petition for
inclusion as voter; (3) Velasco does not possess the constitutional requirement of
legal residency (i.e., one year residency in the Philippines immediately preceding
the election as provided under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution) to register as
voter; he arrived in the Philippines only last September 14, 2006; and (4) Velasco is
not eligible to run for office since he is not a qualified voter. Panlaqui asked for the
annulment, revocation and cancellation of, or denial of due course to, Velascos COC
that allegedly contained obvious and gross material misrepresentation. The case was
docketed as SPA Case No. 07-148.

In his Answer, Velasco denied the allegations of Panlaquis petition and

claimed in defense that: (1) he possesses all the qualifications of a voter of Sasmuan,
as he is a domiciliary and permanent resident of the Philippines and Sasmuan since
birth; that, when he took his oath of allegiance on July 31, 2006, he is considered
not to have lost his Philippine citizenship and therefore continues to enjoy full civic
and political rights under the Constitution and the statutes; (2) the appeal or review
of the RTC decision is pending resolution with the Court of Appeals; (3) he did not
act with malice, bad faith and gross misrepresentation when he stated that he is a
registered voter of Precinct No. 103-A of Sasmuan in his COC, as the MTC decision
has not been reversed with finality; (4) he has renounced his American citizenship
on March 29, 2007 or prior to the filing of his COC, making him eligible to seek
elective public office pursuant to Republic Act No. 9255; and (5) he possesses all
the qualifications of a voter of Sasmuan and of a candidate for Municipal Mayor,
Sasmuan being his domicile of origin and permanent residence. He claimed that he
is qualified to vote and seek public office until a final judgment is rendered saying
otherwise; hence, he did not commit any misrepresentation and Panlaquis petition
should be dismissed.

Velasco garnered 7,822 votes [the most number] for the position of Mayor of
Sasmuan in the May 14, 2007 election. As the COMELEC failed to resolve
Panlaquis petition prior to the election, Velasco was proclaimed Mayor of Sasmuan
on May 16, 2007. He took his oath of office and assumed the powers and functions
of the office on June 30, 2007.

On July 6, 2007, the Second Division of the COMELEC issued a Resolution

the first of the interrelated resolutions assailed in the present petition canceling
Velascos COC and declaring his proclamation as Mayor of Sasmuan null and
void.Citing Section 138 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC)[2] which declared the
decision of the RTC in the voters inclusion/exclusion proceedings final and
executory, the Second Division of the COMELEC found Velasco guilty of material
misrepresentation when he claimed in his COC filed on March 28, 2007 that he is a
registered voter of Sasmuan, Pampanga. This defect, according to the Second
Division, effectively voided Velascos COC.

Velasco moved to reconsider the Second Divisions Resolution, but the

COMELEC en banc in a Resolution dated October 15, 2007 (also assailed in this
petition) denied the motion. The COMELEC en banc essentially affirmed the
Second Divisions ruling. Additionally, the COMELEC pointed out that in the
absence of a writ or order issued by the CA (where the appeal from the RTC decision
in the inclusion/exclusion case was then pending) enjoining the enforcement of the
RTC decision, it had to apply Section 138 of the OEC. Velasco responded to this
development by filing the present petition with this Court.

THE PETITION, COMMENTS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

The petition is based on the following grounds/arguments:
1. Respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it
decided the issue on petitioners right to vote despite its apparent
 lack of jurisdiction on this issue and the pendency of such
prejudicial issue before the CA.

2. Respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it

ruled that the March 1, 2008 decision of the RTC of Guagua,
Pampanga reversing the earlier decision of the MTC of Sasmuan,
Pampanga is already final and executory.

3. Respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion

when it annulled the proclamation of the petitioner without notice
and hearing.

4. Respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it

ruled that petitioner committed material misrepresentation in his
COC by merely relying on private respondents baseless allegations
in the petition to deny due course to petitioners COC without
taking into consideration that petitioner possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualification of a voter.

In his comment, Panlaqui asserts that: (1) Velasco committed forum shopping,
as another case involving the same issues is on appeal and pending resolution with
the CA; and (2) in light of this appeal, not all the requisites for a petition
for certiorari are present; in the alternative and assuming certiorari to be proper, the
COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion, as the RTC decision is final,
executory, and non-appealable.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the
COMELEC. The OSG argues that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion. The COMELEC has jurisdiction under Section 78 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881, as amended, or the OEC over petitions to deny due course and/or cancel a
COC (COC-denial/cancellation). There was likewise no denial of due process;
Velasco filed an Answer to Panlaquis petition and was fully heard before the
COMELEC denied due course to his COC. The OSG also argues that Velascos
immigration to the United States and subsequent acquisition of US citizenship
constituted an abandonment of his Philippine domicile and residence. Finally, the
OSG claims that Velasco committed misrepresentation in declaring his residence at
Sasmuan in his COC a ground for the cancellation of COC under Section 78 of the
OEC. The real issue, according to the OSG, is not Velascos right to vote, but the
misrepresentation he committed when he filed his COC.

On March 5, 2008, the COMELEC issued a writ of execution to implement

the assailed resolutions. The CA, on the other hand, rendered on March 13, 2008 its
decision in CA-GR SP No. 98259 granting Velascos appeal, thereby reversing and
setting aside the RTC decision. The appellate court ruled that, contrary to the RTCs
finding, Velasco effectively reacquired his residence when he decided to relocate in
the Philippines for good in 2003; from 2003-2006, Velasco stayed in the Philippines
for a total of almost two (2) years for the last three (3) years immediately preceding
the May 14, 2007 election; from the totality of these acts, Velasco revealed his
intention to reacquire his rights as a Filipino citizen. Citing Macalintal v.
Commission on Elections,[3] the CA considered Velasco a qualified voter.

On Velascos motion, we issued a status quo ante order enjoining the

COMELEC from implementing the assailed resolutions.

In an interesting twist, the CA issued on August 19, 2008 an Amended

Decision in response to a motion for reconsideration of its earlier decision dismissing
Velascos Rule 42 petition for lack of jurisdiction. It reversed its earlier ruling that it
has jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, explicitly stating that the jurisprudence it
cited to support its appellate jurisdiction in voters inclusion/exclusion proceeding is
no longer good law because of the amendments to the election law on which its cited
jurisprudence was based. It declared that Section 138 of the OEC being explicit that
the decision on appeal by the RTC in inclusion and exclusion cases is immediately
final and executory appears to be a clear mandate for this Court (the CA) not to
entertain instant petition for lack of jurisdiction.

Based on these submissions, we are called upon to resolve the following

issues: (1) whether Velasco forum-shopped; and (2) whether the COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion in canceling Velascos COC.

THE COURTS RULING

We find the petition devoid of merit.

Grave Abuse of Discretion.

The well-settled rule is that this Court will not interfere with a COMELEC
decision unless the COMELEC is shown to have committed grave abuse of
discretion.[4] Correctly understood, grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or [an]
exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, or an exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to
act in a manner not at all in contemplation of law.[5]

CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO,
LINOG G. BALUA, Respondents.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ.:

THE CASE

This is a Petition for Certiorari ender Rule 64 in conjunction with Rule 65 of

the Rules of Court to review the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC). The Resolution1 in SPA No. 10-1 09(DC) of the COMELEC First
Division dated 5 October 201 0 is being assailed for applying Section 44 of the
Local Government Code while the Resolution2 of the COMELEC En Banc
dated 2 February 2011 is being questioned for finding that respondent
Rommel Arnado y Cagoco (respondent Arnado/Arnado) is solely a Filipino
citizen qualified to run for public office despite his continued use of a U.S.
passport.

FACTS
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.3 However, as a
consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States
of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation
under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the
Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008.4 On the same day an Order of
Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his
favor.5

The aforementioned Oath of Allegiance states:

I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, solemnly swear that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal
orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines and
I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I
impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion.6

On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship, which states:

I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, do solemnly swear that I absolutely and

perpetually renounce all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA of which I am a citizen, and I divest myself of full employment of all
civil and political rights and privileges of the United States of America.

I solemnly swear that all the foregoing statement is true and correct to the best
of my knowledge and belief.7

On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of

Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, which contains, among others, the following
statements:

I am a natural born Filipino citizen / naturalized Filipino citizen.

I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country.

I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to.

I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. I will obey the laws, legal
orders and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities.
I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion.8

On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty

candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate
of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in
connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections.9

Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan,

Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification
issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the
nationality of Arnado as "USA-American."10To further bolster his claim of
Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a computer-
generated travel record11 dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has
been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and departing the
Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado left the country on 14 April
2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009,
arriving back in the Philippines on 24 November 2009.

Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated

23 April 2010, certifying that the name "Arnado, Rommel Cagoco" appears in
the available Computer Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of
21 April 2010, with the following pertinent travel records:

DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010

NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN

PASSPORT : 057782700

DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010

NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN

PASSPORT : 05778270012

On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order13requiring

the respondent to personally file his answer and memorandum within three
(3) days from receipt thereof.

After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in
default and to present evidence ex-parte.
Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections
where Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently
proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte.

It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer,
submitting the following documents as evidence:14

1. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of

the Philippines dated 03 April 2009;

2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May 2010 of Engr. Virgil Seno, Virginia

Branzuela, Leoncio Daligdig, and Jessy Corpin, all neighbors of Arnado,
attesting that Arnado is a long-time resident of Kauswagan and that he
has been conspicuously and continuously residing in his family’s
ancestral house in Kauswagan;

3. Certification from the Punong Barangay of Poblacion, Kauswagan,

Lanao del Norte dated 03 June 2010 stating that Arnado is a bona fide
resident of his barangay and that Arnado went to the United States in
1985 to work and returned to the Philippines in 2009;

4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from the Municipal Local

Government Operations Office of Kauswagan stating that Dr. Maximo P.
Arnado, Sr. served as Mayor of Kauswagan, from January 1964 to June
1974 and from 15 February 1979 to 15 April 1986; and

5. Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of Kauswagan

certifying that Arnado has been a registered voter of Kauswagan since
03 April 2009.

THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION

Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate

of candidacy based on misrepresentation,15 the COMELEC First Division
considered it as one for disqualification. Balua’s contention that Arnado is a
resident of the United States was dismissed upon the finding that "Balua failed
to present any evidence to support his contention,"16whereas the First Division
still could "not conclude that Arnado failed to meet the one-year residency
requirement under the Local Government Code."17

In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division disagreed
with Arnado’s claim that he is a Filipino citizen.18
We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the
requirements of R.A. No. 9225, Arnado’s act of consistently using his US
passport after renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively
negated his Affidavit of Renunciation.

xxxx

Arnado’s continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that Arnado

had no real intention to renounce his US citizenship and that he only executed
an Affidavit of Renunciation to enable him to run for office. We cannot turn a
blind eye to the glaring inconsistency between Arnado’s unexplained use of a
US passport six times and his claim that he re-acquired his Philippine
citizenship and renounced his US citizenship. As noted by the Supreme Court
in the Yu case, "a passport is defined as an official document of identity and
nationality issued to a person intending to travel or sojourn in foreign
countries." Surely, one who truly divested himself of US citizenship would not
continue to avail of privileges reserved solely for US nationals.19

The dispositive portion of the Resolution rendered by the COMELEC

First Division reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for disqualification

and/or to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Rommel C. Arnado is hereby
GRANTED. Rommel C. Arnado’s proclamation as the winning candidate for
Municipal Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Nore is hereby ANNULLED. Let
the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code of
1991 take effect.20

The Motion for Reconsideration and

the Motion for Intervention

Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the COMELEC En

Banc on the ground that "the evidence is insufficient to justify the Resolution
and that the said Resolution is contrary to law."21 He raised the following
contentions:22

1. The finding that he is not a Filipino citizen is not supported by the

evidence consisting of his Oath of Allegiance and the Affidavit of
Renunciation, which show that he has substantially complied with the
requirements of R.A. No. 9225;
 2. The use of his US passport subsequent to his renunciation of his
American citizenship is not tantamount to a repudiation of his Filipino
citizenship, as he did not perform any act to swear allegiance to a
country other than the Philippines;

3. He used his US passport only because he was not informed of the

issuance of his Philippine passport, and that he used his Philippine
passport after he obtained it;

4. Balua’s petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Arnado was

filed out of time, and the First Division’s treatment of the petition as one
for disqualification constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction;23

5. He is undoubtedly the people’s choice as indicated by his winning the

elections;

6. His proclamation as the winning candidate ousted the COMELEC

from jurisdiction over the case; and

7. The proper remedy to question his citizenship is through a petition for

quo warranto, which should have been filed within ten days from his
proclamation.

Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor

of Kauswagan, and who garnered the second highest number of votes in the
2010 elections, intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc
a Motion for Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnado’s
Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First
Division correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Section
44 of the Local Government Code is not applicable in this case. Consequently,
he claimed that the cancellation of Arnado’s candidacy and the nullification of
his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who obtained the
highest number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the winner.

Maquiling simultaneously filed his Memorandum with his Motion for

Intervention and his Motion for Reconsideration. Arnado opposed all motions
filed by Maquiling, claiming that intervention is prohibited after a decision has
already been rendered, and that as a second-placer, Maquiling undoubtedly
lost the elections and thus does not stand to be prejudiced or benefitted by the
final adjudication of the case.
 RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC

In its Resolution of 02 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc held that under
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, the Commission "shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest even after the proclamation
of the candidate whose qualifications for office is questioned."

As to Maquiling’s intervention, the COMELEC En Banc also cited Section 6 of

R.A. No. 6646 which allows intervention in proceedings for disqualification
even after elections if no final judgment has been rendered, but went on
further to say that Maquiling, as the second placer, would not be prejudiced by
the outcome of the case as it agrees with the dispositive portion of the
Resolution of the First Division allowing the order of succession under Section
44 of the Local Government Code to take effect.

The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the First Division of the
petition as one for disqualification, and ruled that the petition was filed well
within the period prescribed by law,24 having been filed on 28 April 2010,
which is not later than 11 May 2010, the date of proclamation.

However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First
Division and granted Arnado’s Motion for Reconsideration, on the following
premises:

First:

By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the respondent

embraced his Philippine citizenship as though he never became a citizen of
another country. It was at that time, April 3, 2009, that the respondent
became a pure Philippine Citizen again.

xxxx

The use of a US passport … does not operate to revert back his status as a dual
citizen prior to his renunciation as there is no law saying such. More
succinctly, the use of a US passport does not operate to "un-renounce" what he
has earlier on renounced. The First Division’s reliance in the case of In Re:
Petition for Habeas Corpus of Willy Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, et al. is
misplaced. The petitioner in the said case is a naturalized citizen who, after
taking his oath as a naturalized Filipino, applied for the renewal of his
Portuguese passport. Strict policy is maintained in the conduct of citizens who
are not natural born, who acquire their citizenship by choice, thus discarding
 their original citizenship. The Philippine State expects strict conduct of
allegiance to those who choose to be its citizens. In the present case,
respondent is not a naturalized citizen but a natural born citizen who chose
greener pastures by working abroad and then decided to repatriate to
supposedly help in the progress of Kauswagan. He did not apply for a US
passport after his renunciation. Thus the mentioned case is not on all fours
with the case at bar.

xxxx

The respondent presented a plausible explanation as to the use of his US

passport. Although he applied for a Philippine passport, the passport was only
issued on June 18, 2009. However, he was not notified of the issuance of his
Philippine passport so that he was actually able to get it about three (3)
months later. Yet as soon as he was in possession of his Philippine passport,
the respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad. This
fact is proven by the respondent’s submission of a certified true copy of his
passport showing that he used the same for his travels on the following dates:
January 31, 2010, April 16, 2010, May 20, 2010, January 12, 2010, March 31,
2010 and June 4, 2010. This then shows that the use of the US passport was
because to his knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet issued to him
for his use. As probably pressing needs might be undertaken, the respondent
used whatever is within his control during that time.25

JAPSON VS. COMELEC CASE DIGEST

Topic: Dual Citizenship/ Dual Allegiance

JAPSON VS. COMELEC
Facts:
 Both petitioner Manuel B. Japzon (Japzon) and private respondent Jaime S. Ty (Ty) were
candidates for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, in the local elections held on 14 May 2007.
 Japzon instituted SPA No. 07-568 by filing before the COMELEC a Petition[5] to disqualify
and/or cancel Ty's Certificate of Candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation.
Japzon averred in his Petition that Ty was a former natural-born Filipino, having been
born on 9 October 1943 in what was then Pambujan Sur, Hernani Eastern Samar (now
the Municipality of General Macarthur, Easter Samar) to spouses Ang Chim Ty (a
Chinese) and Crisanta Aranas Sumiguin (a Filipino).
 Ty eventually migrated to the United States of America (USA) and became a citizen
thereof. Ty had been residing in the USA for the last 25 years. When Ty filed his Certificate
of Candidacy on 28 March 2007, he falsely represented therein that he was a resident
of Barangay6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for one year before 14 May
2007, and was not a permanent resident or immigrant of any foreign country.
 While Ty may have applied for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, he never
actually resided in Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for a
period of one year immediately preceding the date of election as required under Section
39 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991
 Inspite of having reacquisition in his Philippine citizenship, Ty continued to make trips to
the USA, the most recent of which was on 31 October 2006 lasting until 20 January 2007.
 Ty already took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, he continued to
comport himself as an American citizen as proven by his travel records. He had also failed
to renounce his foreign citizenship as required by Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise
known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, or related laws.
 Japzon prayed for in his Petition that the COMELEC order the disqualification of Ty from
running for public office and the cancellation of the latter's Certificate of Candidacy.
 Ty admitted that he was a natural-born Filipino who went to the USA to work and
subsequently became a naturalized American citizen. Ty claimed, however, that prior to
filing his Certificate of Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March 2007, he already performed the following acts:
(1) with the enactment of Republic Act No. 9225, granting dual citizenship to natural-born
Filipinos, Ty filed with the Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, USA,
an application for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship; (2) on 2 October 2005, Ty
executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before Noemi T. Diaz,
Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, USA; (3) Ty
applied for a Philippine passport indicating in his application that his residence in the
Philippines was at A. Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar. Ty's application was approved and he was issued on 26 October 2005 a
Philippine passport; (4) on 8 March 2006, Ty personally secured and signed his
Community Tax Certificate (CTC) from the Municipality of General Macarthur, in which
he stated that his address was at Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar; (5) thereafter, on 17 July 2006, Ty was registered as a voter in Precinct
0013A, Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; (6) Ty secured
another CTC dated 4 January 2007 again stating therein his address as Barangay 6,
Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; and (7) finally, Ty executed on 19 March
2007 a duly notarized Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship.
 He had reacquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced his American citizenship, and
he had been a resident of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for more
than one year prior to the 14 May 2007 elections. Therefore, Ty sought the dismissal of
Japzon's Petition in SPA No. 07-568.
Ty acquired the highest number of votes and was declared Mayor of the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by the Municipal Board of Canvassers on 15 May
2007.[7]
 The COMELEC First Division found that Ty complied with the requirements of Sections 3
and 5 of Republic Act No. 9225 and reacquired his Philippine citizenship, to wit:
 Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office,
and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no
alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our
country or a unit of territory thereof.
 Evidences revealed that Ty executed an Oath of Allegiance before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice
Consul of the Philippine Consulate General, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. on October
2, 2005 and executed a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship on March 19, 2007 in
compliance with R.A. [No.] 9225. Moreover, neither is Ty a candidate for or occupying
public office nor is in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officer in the
armed forces in the country of which he was naturalized citizen
 Ty did not commit material misrepresentation in stating in his Certificate of Candidacy that
he was a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for at
least one year before the elections on 14 May 2007. It reasoned that: Although Ty has
lost his domicile in [the] Philippines when he was naturalized as U.S. citizen in 1969, the
reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship and subsequent acts thereof proved that he has
been a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar for at least
one (1) year before the elections held on 14 May 2007 as he represented in his certificate
of candidacy.
 The petition was denied and COMELEC was in favor of the defendant failing to obtain a
favorable resolution from the COMELEC, Japzon proceeded to file the instant Petition
for Certiorari, that the COMELEC had committed grave abuse of discretion and lack of
discretion for dismissing the petition.
 Japzon prays for the Court to annul and set aside the Resolutions dated 31 July 2007 and
28 September 2007 of the COMELEC First Division and en banc, respectively; to issue a
new resolution denying due course to or canceling Ty's Certificate of Candidacy; and to
declare Japzon as the duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar.
 Ty sought the dismissal of the present Petition. According to Ty, the COMELEC already
found sufficient evidence to prove that Ty was a resident of the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, one year prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections. The Court
cannot evaluate again the very same pieces of evidence without violating the well-
entrenched rule that findings of fact of the COMELEC are binding on the Court.
 The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), meanwhile, is of the position that Ty failed to
meet the one-year residency requirement set by law to qualify him to run as a mayoralty
candidate in the 14 May 2007 local elections.The Court finds no merit in the Petition at
bar.
 . On 19 March 2007, he personally executed a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship before
a notary public. By the time he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of
the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March 2007, he had already
effectively renounced his American citizenship, keeping solely his Philippine citizenship.

 The Court of Appeals set aside the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the Court of
Appeals and annulled the election of the respondent as Municipal Mayor of Bolinao,
Pangasinan on the ground that respondent's immigration to the United States in 1984
constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. Being a
green card holder, which was proof that he was a permanent resident or immigrant of the
 United States, and in the absence of any waiver of his status as such before he ran for
election on January 18, 1988, respondent was held to be disqualified under §68 of the
Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881).

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defedant has complied with the residency requirement for elective
positions.

RULING:

Yes, the defendant solely complied the residency requirements for elective position.
 It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs the manner in which a natural-
born Filipino may reacquire or retain[17] his Philippine citizenship despite acquiring a
foreign citizenship, and provides for his rights and liabilities under such circumstances. A
close scrutiny of said statute would reveal that it does not at all touch on the matter of
residence of the natural-born Filipino taking advantage of its provisions. Republic Act No.
9225 imposes no residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine
citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine
citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. Clearly,
Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. This is only logical
and consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship.
 There is no basis for this Court to require Ty to stay in and never leave at all the Municipality
of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for the full one-year period prior to the 14 May
2007 local elections so that he could be considered a resident thereof. To the contrary,
the Court has previously ruled that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice
a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected, does
not constitute loss of residence.[24] The Court also notes, that even with his trips to other
countries, Ty was actually present in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, Philippines, for at least nine of the 12 months preceding the 14 May 2007 local
elections. Even if length of actual stay in a place is not necessarily determinative of the
fact of residence therein, it does strongly support and is only consistent with Ty's avowed
intent in the instant case to establish residence/domicile in the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
 Japzon repeatedly brings to the attention of this Court that Ty arrived in the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 4 May 2006 only to comply with the one-year
residency requirement, so Ty could run as a mayoralty candidate in the 14 May 2007
elections.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
AZUCENA SAAVEDRA BATUGAS, Respondent.

DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

"It is universally accepted that a State, in extending the privilege of citizenship

to an alien wife of one of its citizens could have had no other objective than to
maintain a unity of allegiance among the members of the family."1

This Petition for Review on Certiorari2 assails the May 23, 2008 Decision3of
the Court of Appeals (CA) G.R. CV No. 00523, which affirmed the January 31,
2005 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 29, Zamboanga del
Sur that granted the Petition for Naturalization5 of respondent Azucena
Saavedra Batuigas (Azucena).

Factual Antecedents

On December 2, 2002, Azucena filed a Petition for Naturalization before the

RTC of Zamboanga del Sur. The case was docketed as Naturalization Case No.
03-001 and raffled to Branch 29 of said court.

Azucena alleged in her Petition that she believes in the principles underlying
the Philippine Constitution; that she has conducted herself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during the period of her stay in the Philippines, as well
as in her relations with the constituted Government and with the community
in which she is living; that she has mingled socially with the Filipinos and has
evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace their customs, traditions, and
ideals; that she has all the qualifications required under Section 2 and none of
the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473
(CA473);6 that she is not opposed to organized government nor is affiliated
with any association or group of persons that uphold and teach doctrines
opposing all organized governments; that she is not defending or teaching the
necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination for the
success and predominance of men’s ideas; that she is neither a polygamist nor
believes in polygamy; that the nation of which she is a subject is not at war
with the Philippines; that she intends in good faith to become a citizen of the
Philippines and to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity
to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, and particularly to
China; and that she will reside continuously in the Philippines from the time
of the filing of her Petition up to the time of her naturalization.

After all the jurisdictional requirements mandated by Section 97 of CA 473had

been complied with, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Motion
to Dismiss8 on the ground that Azucena failed to allege that she is engaged in a
lawful occupation or in some known lucrative trade. Finding the grounds
relied upon by the OSG to be evidentiary in nature, the RTC denied said
Motion.9 Thereafter, the hearing for the reception of Azucena’s evidence was
then set on May 18, 2004.10

Neither the OSG nor the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor appeared on the
day of the hearing. Hence, Azucena’s counsel moved that the evidence be
presented ex-parte, which the RTC granted. Accordingly, the RTC designated
its Clerk of Court as Commissioner to receive Azucena’s evidence.11 During the
November 5, 2004 ex-parte hearing, no representative from the OSG appeared
despite due notice.12

Born in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur on September 28, 1941 to Chinese

parents,13 Azucena has never departed the Philippines since birth. She has
resided in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur from 1941-1942; in Margosatubig,
Zamboanga del Sur from 1942-1968; in Bogo City for nine months; in Ipil,
Zamboanga del Sur from 1969-1972; in Talisayan, Misamis Oriental from
1972-1976; and, in Margosatubig, Zamboanga del Sur, thereafter, up to the
filing of her Petition.

Azucena can speak English, Tagalog, Visayan, and Chavacano. Her primary,
secondary, and tertiary education were taken in Philippine schools,i.e.,
Margosatubig Central Elementary School in 1955,14 Margosatubig Academy
in1959,15 and the Ateneo de Zamboanga in 1963,16 graduating with a degree in
Bachelor of Science in Education. She then practiced her teaching profession
at the Pax High School for five years, in the Marian Academy in Ipil for two
years, and in Talisayan High School in Misamis Oriental for another two
years.17

In 1968, at the age of 26, Azucena married Santiago Batuigas18 (Santiago),a

natural-born Filipino citizen.19 They have five children, namely Cynthia,
Brenda, Aileen, Dennis Emmanuel, and Edsel James.20 All of them studied in
Philippine public and private schools and are all professionals, three of whom
are now working abroad.21

After her stint in Talisayan High School, Azucena and her husband, as
conjugal partners, engaged in the retail business of and later on in
milling/distributing rice, corn, and copra. As proof of their income, Azucena
submitted their joint annual tax returns and balance sheets from 2000-
200222 and from 2004-2005.23 The business name and the business permits
issued to the spouses’ store, ‘Azucena’s General Merchandising,’ are registered
in Santiago’s name,24 and he is also the National Food Authority licensee for
their rice and corn business.25 During their marital union, the Batuigas
spouses bought parcels of land in Barrio Lombog, Margosatubig.26

To prove that she has no criminal record, Azucena submitted clearances

issued by the Philippine National Police of Zamboanga del Sur Provincial
Office and by the National Bureau of Investigation.27 She also presented her
Health Examination Record28 declaring her as physically and mentally fit.

To further support Azucena’s Petition, Santiago and witnesses Eufemio

Miniao and Irineo Alfaro testified.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On January 31, 2005, the RTC found that Azucena has amply supported the
allegations in her Petition. Among these are her lack of a derogatory record,
her support for an organized government, that she is in perfect health, that she
has mingled with Filipinos since birth and can speak their language, that she
has never had any transgressions and has been a law abiding citizen, that she
has complied with her obligations to the government involving her business
operations, and that the business and real properties she and Santiago own
provide sufficient income for her and her family. Thus, the RTC ruled:

x x x In sum, the petitioner has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications to be admitted as citizen of the Philippines in accordance
with the provisions of the Naturalization Law.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby granted.

SO ORDERED.29

In its Omnibus Motion,30 the OSG argued that the ex-parte presentation of
evidence before the Branch Clerk of Court violates Section 10 of CA 473,31as
the law mandates public hearing in naturalization cases.

Rejecting this argument in its March 21, 2005 Order,32 the RTC held that the
public has been fully apprised of the naturalization proceedings and was free
to intervene. The OSG and its delegate, the Provincial Prosecutor, are the only
officers authorized by law to appear on behalf of the State, which represents
the public. Thus, when the OSG was furnished with a copy of the notice of
hearing for the reception of evidence ex-parte, there was already a sufficient
compliance with the requirement of a public hearing.
The OSG then appealed the RTC judgment to the CA,33 contending that
Azucena failed to comply with the income requirement under CA 473. The
OSG maintained that Azucena is not allowed under the Retail Trade Law
(Republic Act No. 1180) to engage directly or indirectly in the retail trade.
Hence, she cannot possibly meet the income requirement. And even if she is
allowed, her business is not a "lucrative trade" within the contemplation of the
law or that which has an appreciable margin of income over expenses in order
to provide for adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or
disability to work. The OSG likewise disputed Azucena’s claim that she owns
real property because aliens are precluded from owning lands in the country.

The OSG further asserted that the ex-parte proceeding before the
commissioner is not a "public hearing" as ex-parte hearings are usually done
in chambers, without the public in attendance. It claimed that the State was
denied its day in court because the RTC, during the May 18, 2004 initial
hearing, immediately allowed the proceeding to be conducted ex-parte
without even giving the State ample opportunity to be present.

Azucena countered that although she is a teacher by profession, she had to

quit to help in the retail business of her husband, and they were able to send
all their children to school.34 It is highly unlikely that she will become a public
charge as she and her spouse have enough savings and could even be given
sufficient support by their children. She contended that the definition of
"lucrative trade/income" should not be strictly applied to her. Being the wife
and following Filipino tradition, she should not be treated like male applicants
for naturalization who are required to have their own "lucrative trade."

Azucena denied that the hearing for her Petition was not made public, as the
hearing before the Clerk of Court was conducted in the court’s session hall.
Besides, the OSG cannot claim that it was denied its day in court as notices
have always been sent to it. Hence, its failure to attend is not the fault of the
RTC.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In dismissing the OSG’s appeal,35 the CA found that Azucena’s financial

condition permits her and her family to live with reasonable comfort in
accordance with the prevailing standard of living and consistent with the
demands of human dignity. It said:

Considering the present high cost of living, which cost of living tends to
increase rather than decrease, and the low purchasing power of the Philippine
currency, petitioner-appellee, together with her Filipino husband,
nonetheless, was able to send all her children to college, pursue a lucrative
business and maintain a decent existence. The Supreme Court, in recent
decisions, adopted a higher standard in determining whether a petitioner for
Philippine citizenship has a lucrative trade or profession that would qualify
him/her for admission to Philippine citizenship and to which petitioner has
successfully convinced this Court of her ability to provide for herself and avoid
becoming a public charge or a financial burden to her community. x x x36

As for the other issue the OSG raised, the CA held that the RTC had complied
with the mandate of the law requiring notice to the OSG and the Provincial
Prosecutor of its scheduled hearing for the Petition.

Thus, the instant Petition wherein the OSG recapitulates the same arguments
it raised before the CA, i.e., the alleged failure of Azucena to meet the income
and public hearing requirements of CA 473.

Our Ruling

The Petition lacks merit.

Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship through

either judicial naturalization under CA 473 or administrative naturalization
under Republic Act No. 9139 (the "Administrative Naturalization Law of
2000"). A third option, called derivative naturalization, which is available to
alien women married to Filipino husbands is found under Section 15 of CA
473, which provides that:

"any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the

Philippines and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a
citizen of the Philippines."

Under this provision, foreign women who are married to Philippine citizens
may be deemed ipso facto Philippine citizens and it is neither necessary for
them to prove that they possess other qualifications for naturalization at the
time of their marriage nor do they have to submit themselves to judicial
naturalization. Copying from similar laws in the United States which has since
been amended, the Philippine legislature retained Section 15 of CA 473, which
then reflects its intent to confer Filipino citizenship to the alien wife thru
derivative naturalization.37
Thus, the Court categorically declared in Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of
Immigration:38

Accordingly, We now hold, all previous decisions of this Court indicating

otherwise notwithstanding, that under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473,
an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso
facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the
Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman
married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the
Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino
citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications
under said Section 4.39

As stated in Moy Ya Lim Yao, the procedure for an alien wife to formalize the
conferment of Filipino citizenship is as follows:

Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a

Filipino citizen in order to acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure
followed in the Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must
file a petition for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration
alleging, among other things, that she is married to a Filipino citizen and that
she is not disqualified from acquiring her husband’s citizenship pursuant to
Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing of said
petition, which should be accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of
the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does
not belong to any of the groups disqualified by the cited section from
becoming naturalized Filipino citizen x x x, the Bureau of Immigration
conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or decision
granting or denying the petition.40

Records however show that in February 1980, Azucena applied before the then
Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) for the cancellation of her
Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. 03070541 by reason of her marriage
to a Filipino citizen. The CID granted her application. However, the Ministry
of Justice set aside the ruling of the CID as it found no sufficient evidence that
Azucena’s husband is a Filipino citizen42 as only their marriage certificate was
presented to establish his citizenship.

Having been denied of the process in the CID, Azucena was constrained to file
a Petition for judicial naturalization based on CA 473. While this would have
been unnecessary if the process at the CID was granted in her favor, there is
nothing that prevents her from seeking acquisition of Philippine citizenship
through regular naturalization proceedings available to all qualified foreign
nationals. The choice of what option to take in order to acquire Philippine
citizenship rests with the applicant. In this case, Azucena has chosen to file a
Petition for judicial naturalization under CA 473. The fact that her application
for derivative naturalization under Section 15 of CA 473 was denied should not
prevent her from seeking judicial naturalization under the same law. It is to be
remembered that her application at the CID was denied not because she was
found to be disqualified, but because her husband’s citizenship was not
proven. Even if the denial was based on other grounds, it is proper, in a
judicial naturalization proceeding, for the courts to determine whether there
are in fact grounds to deny her of Philippine citizenship based on regular
judicial naturalization proceedings.

As the records before this Court show, Santiago’s Filipino citizenship has been
adequately proven. Under judicial proceeding, Santiago submitted his birth
certificate indicating therein that he and his parents are Filipinos. He also
submitted voter’s registration, land titles, and business registrations/licenses,
all of which are public records. He has always comported himself as a Filipino
citizen, an operative fact that should have enabled Azucena to avail of Section
15 of CA473. On the submitted evidence, nothing would show that Azucena
suffers from any of the disqualifications under Section 4 of the same Act.

However, the case before us is a Petition for judicial naturalization and is not
based on Section 15 of CA 473 which was denied by the then Ministry of
Justice. The lower court which heard the petition and received evidence of her
qualifications and absence of disqualifications to acquire Philippine
citizenship, has granted the Petition, which was affirmed by the CA. We will
not disturb the findings of the lower court which had the opportunity to hear
and scrutinize the evidence presented during the hearings on the Petition, as
well as determine, based on Azucena’s testimony and deportment during the
hearings, that she indeed possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications for acquisition of Philippine citizenship.

The OSG has filed this instant Petition on the ground that Azucena does not
have the qualification required in no. 4 of Section 2 of CA 473 as she does not
have any lucrative income, and that the proceeding in the lower court was not
in the nature of a public hearing. The OSG had the opportunity to contest the
qualifications of Azucena during the initial hearing scheduled on May 18,
2004.However, the OSG or the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor failed to
appear in said hearing, prompting the lower court to order ex parte
presentation of evidence before the Clerk of Court on November 5, 2004. The
OSG was also notified of the ex parte proceeding, but despite notice, again
failed to appear. The OSG had raised this same issue at the CA and was denied
for the reasons stated in its Decision. We find no reason to disturb the findings
of the CA on this issue. Neither should this issue further delay the grant of
Philippine citizenship to a woman who was born and lived all her life, in the
Philippines, and devoted all her life to the care of her Filipino family. She has
more than demonstrated, under judicial scrutiny, her being a qualified
Philippine citizen. On the second issue, we also affirm the findings of the CA
that since the government who has an interest in, and the only one who can
contest, the citizenship of a person, was duly notified through the OSG and the
Provincial Prosecutor’s office, the proceedings have complied with the public
hearing requirement under CA 473.

No. 4, Section 2 of CA 473 provides as qualification to become a Philippine

citizen:

4. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five
thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have known lucrative trade,
profession, or lawful occupation.

Azucena is a teacher by profession and has actually exercised her profession

before she had to quit her teaching job to assume her family duties and take
on her role as joint provider, together with her husband, in order to support
her family. Together, husband and wife were able to raise all their five
children, provided them with education, and have all become professionals
and responsible citizens of this country. Certainly, this is proof enough of both
husband and wife’s lucrative trade. Azucena herself is a professional and can
resume teaching at anytime. Her profession never leaves her, and this is more
than sufficient guarantee that she will not be a charge to the only country she
has known since birth.

Moreover, the Court acknowledged that the main objective of extending the
citizenship privilege to an alien wife is to maintain a unity of allegiance among
family members, thus:

It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished traditions of family unity and
identity that a husband should be a citizen and the wife an alien, and that the
national treatment of one should be different from that of the other. Thus, it
cannot be that the husband’s interests in property and business activities
reserved by law to citizens should not form part of the conjugal partnership
and be denied to the wife, nor that she herself cannot, through her own efforts
but for the benefit of the partnership, acquire such interests. Only in rare
instances should the identity of husband and wife be refused recognition, and
we submit that in respect of our citizenship laws, it should only be in the
instances where the wife suffers from the disqualifications stated in Section 4
of the Revised Naturalization Law.43

We are not unmindful of precedents to the effect that there is no proceeding

authorized by the law or by the Rules of Court, for the judicial declaration of
the citizenship of an individual.44 "Such judicial declaration of citizenship
cannot even be decreed pursuant to an alternative prayer therefor in a
naturalization proceeding."45

This case however is not a Petition for judicial declaration of Philippine

citizenship but rather a Petition for judicial naturalization under CA 473. In
the first, the petitioner believes he is a Filipino citizen and asks a court to
declare or confirm his status as a Philippine citizen. In the second, the
petitioner acknowledges he is an alien, and seeks judicial approval to acquire
the privilege of be coming a Philippine citizen based on requirements required
under CA 473.Azucena has clearly proven, under strict judicial scrutiny, that
she is qualified for the grant of that privilege, and this Court will not stand in
the way of making her a part of a truly Filipino family.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The May 23, 2008 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00523 which affirmed the January
31,2005 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, Zamboanga del Sur
that granted the Petition for Naturalization, is hereby

AFFIRMED. Subject to compliance with the period and the requirements

under Republic Act No. 530which supplements the Revised Naturalization
Law, let a Certificate of Naturalization be issued to AZUCENA SAAVEDRA
BATUIGAS after taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines. Thereafter, her Alien Certificate of Registration should be
cancelled.

SO ORDERED.

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGAR WORKERS (NFSW), petitioner,

vs.
ETHELWOLDO R. OVEJERA et. al., respondents

G.R. No. L-59743

May 31, 1982
FACTS:
NFSW struck against private respondent Central Azucarera de la Carlota (CAC) to compel
the latter for the payment of the 13th month pay under PD 851 (13th Month Pay Law) in
addition to the Christmas, milling and amelioration bonuses being enjoyed by CAC workers
which amount to 1-½ months’ salary.

Labor Arbiter Ovejera declared the strike as illegal and no pronouncement was made as to
the demand on the 13th month pay. This caused petitioner to file an instant petition with
SC.

ISSUE:
WON under PD 851, an employer is obliged to give its workers a 13th month salary in
addition to Christmas, milling and amelioration bonuses, the aggregate of which exceeds
the 13th month pay.

HELD:
No.
The intention was to grant some relief — not to all workers — but only to the unfortunate
ones not actually paid a 13th month salary or what amounts to it, by whatever name called;
but it was not envisioned that a double burden would be imposed on the employer already
paying his employees a 13th month pay or its equivalent — whether out of pure generosity
or on the basis of a binding agreement and, in the latter ease, regardless of the conditional
character of the grant, so long as there is actual payment. Otherwise, what was conceived
to be a 13th month salary would in effect become a 14th or possibly 15th month pay.

Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R. No. 101083, July

30, 1993)
FACTS:

The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their
parents. The first complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch
66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court, National capital
Judicial Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the Department
of Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they
are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource
treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate
that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn and
asserted that continued deforestation have caused a distortion and
disturbance of the ecological balance and have resulted in a host of
environmental tragedies.

Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his

agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all
existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and
desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
TLAs.

Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
complaint had no cause of action against him and that it raises a political
question.

The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting
of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is
prohibited by the Constitution.

Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari
and asked the court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground
that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the
action.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.

(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.

(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the
impairment of contracts.

RULING:

First Issue: Cause of Action.

Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a

specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is
provided by law. The Court did not agree with this. The complaint focuses on
one fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said
right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the environment and
implies, among many other things, the judicious management and
conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates
the DENR to be the primary government agency responsible for the governing
and supervising the exploration, utilization, development and conservation of
the country's natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also
substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of
1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives
which will serve as the bases for policy formation, and have defined the
powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all
those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's
duty to protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or
obligation to respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of
action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which they claim
was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance and
healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further
TLAs should be renewed or granted.

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be

adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.

Second Issue: Political Issue.

Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the
expanded jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to
rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the Executive and Legislature
and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because it
is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.

The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which
the state regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end
that public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract within the purview of the
due process clause thus, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can
be validly withdraw whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as
in this case. The granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither
is it property or property rights.

Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of

contract is limit by the exercise by the police power of the State, in the interest
of public health, safety, moral and general welfare. In short, the non-
impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State.

The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the
RTC decision is SET ASIDE.
CASE DIGEST: IN Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the
Appraised Value of the Properties Purchased by the Retired
Chief/Associate Justices of the Supreme Court

FACTS: In June 8, 2010, the Legal Services Sector, Office of the General
Counsel of the Commission on Audit (COA) issued an opinion which found
that an underpayment amounting to P221,021.50 resulted when five (5)
retired Supreme Court justices purchased from the Supreme Court the
personal properties assigned to them during their incumbency in the Court.
The COA attributed this underpayment to the use by the Property Division of
the Supreme Court of the wrong formula in computing the appraisal value of
the purchased vehicles.

ISSUE: Did the COA err when it issued its June 8, 2010 opinion?

HELD: The COA's authority to conduct post-audit examinations on

constitutional bodies granted fiscal autonomy is provided under Section 2(1),
Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. This authority, however, must be read
not only in light of the Court's fiscal autonomy, but also in relation with the
constitutional provisions on judicial independence and the existing
jurisprudence and Court rulings on these matters.
One of the most important aspects of judicial independence is the
constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy. While, as a general proposition, the
authority of legislatures to control the purse in the first instance is
unquestioned, any form of interference by the Legislative or the Executive on
the Judiciary's fiscal autonomy amounts to an improper check on a co-equal
branch of government. If the judicial branch is to perform its primary function
of adjudication, it must be able to command adequate resources for that
purpose. This authority to exercise (or to compel the exercise of) legislative
power over the national purse (which at first blush appears to be a violation of
concepts of separateness and an invasion of legislative autonomy) is necessary
to maintain judicial independence and is expressly provided for by the
Constitution through the grant of fiscal autonomy under Section 3, Article
VIII.

COCOFED-PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION,

INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for certiorari,1 with prayer for temporary restraining
order and/or status quo ante order, challenging the May 10, 2013 omnibus
resolution issued by the Commission on Elections ( COMELEC) in In the
Matter of the Compliance of the Commission on Elections En Banc with the
Directives of the Supreme Court in Atong Paglaum, et al. v. Commission on
Elections –COCOFED-Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc.2

Petitioner COCOFED-Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc.

(COCOFED) is an organization and sectoral party whose membership comes
from the peasant sector, particularly the coconut farmers and producers.3 On
May 29, 2012, COCOFED manifested with the COMELEC its intent to
participate in the party-list elections of May 13, 2013 and submitted the names
of only two nominees – Atty. Emerito S. Calderon (first nominee) and Atty.
Domingo P. Espina.4

On August 23, 2012, the COMELEC conducted a summary hearing, pursuant

to COMELEC Resolution No. 9513,5 to determine whether COCOFED, among
several party-list groups that filed manifestations of intent to participate in the
May 13, 2013 party-list elections, had continuously complied with the legal
requirements.

In its November 7, 2012 resolution, the COMELEC cancelled COCOFED’s

registration and accreditation as a party-list organization on several
grounds.6 Notably, the Concurring Opinion of Commissioner Christian Lim
cited, as additional ground, that since COCOFED submitted only two
nominees, then it failed to comply with Section 8 of Republic Act (RA) No.
79417 that requires the party to submit to COMELEC a list of not less than five
nominees.

On December 4, 2012, COCOFED submitted the names of Charles R. Avila, in

substitution of Atty. Espina, as its second nominee and Efren V. Villaseñor as
its third nominee.8

COCOFED, among several others, questioned the COMELEC’s cancellation of

its registration and accreditation before this Court, with a prayer for the
issuance of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. By
reason of the status quo ante order issued by the Court, COCOFED’s name was
included in the printing of the official ballots for the May 13, 2013 elections.

On April 2, 2013, the Court rendered its Decision in Atong Paglaum, Inc., etc.,
et al. v. Commission on Elections.9 The Court remanded all the petitions to the
COMELEC to determine their compliance with the new parameters and
guidelines set by the Court in that case. In Atong Paglaum, the Court ruled:

Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In determining

who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list
elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:

xxxx

6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be

disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have
at least one nominee who remains qualified.

On May 10, 2013, the COMELEC issued its assailed resolution, maintaining its
earlier ruling cancelling COCOFED’s registration and accreditation for its
failure to comply with the requirement of Section 8 of RA No. 7941, i.e., to
submit a list of not less than five nominees.

The COMELEC noted that all existing party-list groups or organizations were
on notice as early as February 8, 2012 (when Resolution No. 9359 was
promulgated) that upon submission of their respective manifestations of
intent to participate, they also needed to submit a list of five
nominees.10During the hearing on August 23, 2012, the COMELEC pointed out
to COCOFED that it had only two nominees.

WHEREFORE, the Commission En banc RESOLVES:

A. To DENY the Manifestations of Intent to Participate, and CANCEL the

registration and accreditation, of the following parties, groups, or
organizations:

xxxx

(3) x x x – COCOFED – Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc.

Accordingly, the foregoing shall be REMOVED from the registry of party-list

groups and organizations of the Commission, and shall NOT BE ALLOWED to
PARTICIPATE as a candidate for the Party-List System of Representation for
the 13 May 2013 Elections and subsequent elections thereafter.11 (emphases
ours)

COCOFED moved for reconsideration only to withdraw its motion later.

Instead, on May 20, 2013, COCOFED filed a Manifestation with Urgent
Request to Admit Additional Nominees with the COMELEC, namely: (i)
Felino M. Gutierrez and (ii) Rodolfo T. de Asis.12

On May 24, 2013, the COMELEC issued a resolution declaring the cancellation
of COCOFED’s accreditation final and executory.

THE PETITION

COCOFED argues that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in issuing
the assailed resolution on the following grounds:

First, the COMELEC’s issuance of the assailed resolution violated its right to
due process because the COMELEC did not even conduct a summary hearing,
as ordered by the Court in Atong Paglaum, to give it an opportunity to explain
and comply with the requirement. COCOFED submits that the requirement of
submitting the names of at least five nominees should not be strictly applied
"in light of the nature of party-list representation" which "looks to the party,
and not to the nominees per se."13

Second, its failure to submit the required number of nominees was based on
the good faith belief that its submission was sufficient for purposes of the
elections and that it could still be remedied since COCOFED could simply
submit the names of its additional two nominees. COCOFED adds that the
number of nominees becomes significant only "when a party-list organization
is able to attain a sufficient number of votes which would qualify it for a seat in
the House of Representatives."14

Third, the COMELEC violated its right to equal protection of the laws since at
least two other party-list groups (ACT-CIS and MTM Phils.) which failed to
submit five nominees were included in the official list of party-list groups.

COCOFED prays for the following:

2. After giving due course to the instant Petition and after a consideration of
the issues, judgment be rendered:

a. ANNULLING and SETTING ASIDE the COMELEC’s assailed resolution;

b. DECLARING petitioner COCOFED x x x to be eligible to participate in the
Party-List System of Representation in the 2013 Elections; and

c. ORDERING the COMELEC x x x to COUNT and TALLY the votes garnered

by petitioner COCOFED.15

RESPONDENT’S COMMENT

The petition is already moot and academic. Despite the issuance of the
assailed resolution three days before the elections, COCOFED remained in the
ballot and its votes were counted and tallied. As of 8:26:02 a.m. of May 29,
2013, the official results showed that it only received 80,397 votes or 0.36% of
the total number of votes cast for the party-list elections. With the reliefs
prayed for already performed, nothing more remained for COCOFED to ask.

At any rate, the COMELEC claims that it did not abuse, much less gravely
abuse its discretion, when it maintained its earlier ruling cancelling
COCOFED’s registration and accreditation; it merely applied the clear
requirement of Section 8, in relation to Section 6, of RA No. 7941. The
importance of a complete list of five nominees cannot be overemphasized.
Based on this list, the COMELEC checks a party’s compliance with the other
legal requirements, namely: (i) that a person is nominated in only one list; and
(ii) that the list shall not include any candidate for any elective office or a
person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding
election.

Additionally, the submission of a complete list is mandatory under the terms

of Section 8 of RA No. 7941. As we held in Lokin, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections,16 the submission of a complete list goes into the right of the voters to
know and make intelligent and informed choice.

Lastly, it is not mandatory for the COMELEC to conduct summary evidentiary

hearings under the ruling in Atong Paglaum.

COURT’S RULING

We DISMISS the petition.

The petition is not moot

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable

controversy because of supervening events so that a declaration thereon would
be of no practical use or value.17
In the present case, while the COMELEC counted and tallied the votes in favor
of COCOFED showing that it failed to obtain the required number of votes,
participation in the 2013 elections was merely one of the reliefs COCOFED
prayed for. The validity of the COMELEC’s resolution, canceling COCOFED’s
registration, remains a very live issue that is not dependent on the outcome of
the elections.

Under Section 4 of RA No. 7941, a party-list group already registered "need

not register anew" for purposes of every subsequent election, but only needs to
file a manifestation of intent to participate with the COMELEC. These two acts
are different from each other.

Under Section 5 of RA No. 7941, an applicant for registration has to file with
the COMELEC, not later than ninety (90) days before the election, a verified
petition stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national,
regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or
organizations.

The applicant is required to submit its constitution, by-laws, platform or

program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant
information as the COMELEC may require. Aside from these, the law requires
the publication of the applicant’s petition in at least two (2) national
newspapers of general circulation. The COMELEC then resolves the petition,
determining whether the applicant has complied with all the necessary
requirements.