JOSEPH ESTRADA V.

GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO

G.R. No. 146710-15 March 2, 2001
Ponente: Puno, J.:

FACTS: This involves petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic. A short outline of events that precipitated the case at
bar thus follows

1. Petitioner won in the May 1998 national elections as president, the respondent as vice-president.
2. On October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit Singson accused the petitioner and his family of
receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. Such expose ignited several reactions of rage.
3. There became a built up of a call for petitioner to resign from office and his officials one by one resigned
withdrawing their support.
4. In November 20 Impeachment Trial of the petitioner was opened, in December 7 Impeachment Trial
began.
5. January 19 people lined up in EDSA showing a greater call for the resignation of the president.
6. January 20 was the day of petitioner's surrender. At 12:00 noon Chief Justice Hilario Davide administered
oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. At 2:30 pm petitioner left Malacanang and issued
a press statement and a letter transmitting the executive power upon him, the president to the vice
president becoming the acting president
7. The Monday after the oath, Arroyo discharged powers of the President.
8. Criminal cases have been filed against the petitioner after he stepped down into presidency.

ISSUES:
There are several important issues sprouting in this case.
WON the cases at bar present a justiciable controversy / political question specifically in regard the
legitimacy of the Arroyo administration
WON Estrada merely resigned as President
WON Estrada is only temporarily unable to act as President
WON Estrada enjoys immunity from suit
WON the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity

HELD:

The petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the de jure
14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED.

The question on the legitimacy of the Arroyo administration is subject to judicial review. It is a legal
question, which is justiciable.
At first, it can be said that acquisition of the presidential seat of respondent Arroyo would be similar to that
of former
President Corazon Aquino as they were placed into position by means of the call of the people in a
revolutionary mass demonstration known as EDSA I for Aquino, and EDSA II for Arroyo.
It has been stressed by private respondents that Arroyo ascended the presidency through people power;
that she has already taken her oath as the 14th President of the Republic; that she has exercised the powers
of the presidency and that she has been recognized by foreign governments. Consequently, the grounds of
the case show that such is a political question.
SC read the case Lawyers League vs Pres. Aquino, which decided that the legitimacy of Aquino
administration in question was a political question. The Freedom Constitution declared that Aquino's
government was a result a successful peaceful revolution by the sovereign Filipino people, hence a political
question. In contrast, Arroyo's government was not revolutionary in character. Arroyo swore under the 1987
Constitution. There is a legal distinction between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People Power II. EDSA I
involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government; it
presented then a political question. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and
freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of
the President, presenting a legal and justiciable question.

It was held that Estrada has resigned as President.

The issue was whether the petitioner resigned as President or should he be considered resigned as of
January 20, 2001 when respondent took her oath as the 14th President of the Public in view of Art. VII Sec. 8
of 1987 Constitution. It was said that there must be intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts
of relinquishment. There is no formal requirement as to form of a valid resignation. It can be oral. It can be
written. It can be express. It can be implied.

As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. Consequently, whether or not petitioner
resigned has to be determined from his act and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by
the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material
relevance on the issue. Using the TOTALITY TEST, Estrada was held to have resigned as President. Intent to
Resign. There was public pressure for petitioner to resign. In the diary of Executive Secretary Eduardo
Angara called "Final Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada," an authoritative window to the state of mind of the
petitioner was provided. On January 20, 2:30 pm he proposed for a snap election for president in May,
emphasizing that he would not be a candidate. This is an indication that he intended to give up the
presidency even at that time. As his support from his officials were withdrawn, he was even advised to have
a "dignified exit or resignation." Estrada did not object to this suggestion but stated that he would never
leave the country. At 10:00 p.m. he said to Angara "Ed, Angie (Reyes) guaranteed that I would have five days
to a week in the palace." This was proof petitioner had reconciled himself to the reality that he had to
resign. His mind was already concerned with the five-day grace period he could stay in the palace. Estrada
became concerned with peaceful and orderly transfer of power when he told Angara ""Ed, magtulungan
tayo para magkaroon tayo ng (let's cooperate to ensure a) peaceful and orderly transfer of power." The
resignation of the petitioner was implied. Acts of Relinquishment.

In the press release containing his final statement before he and his family left Malacanang, (1) he
acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with reservation about
its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace
and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to
any kind inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears: (3)
he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring
to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President (4) he assured that he will not shirk from
any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner's reference is to a
future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up;
and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be
attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner's valedictory, his final act of
farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense.

The law which concerned this issue was Article VII Sec.11 which provides in part:

"Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his
written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits
to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-
President as Acting President. Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the
President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that
the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately
assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President." "If the Congress, within ten days after
receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days after it is required to assemble,
determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall
continue exercising the powers and duties of his office" The operative facts concerning this issue are:

*Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent letter claiming inability to the Senate President and Speaker of the
House;
*Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her oath of office as President on January 20, 2001 at about
12:30 p.m.;
*Despite receipt of the letter, the House of Representatives passed on January 24, 2001 House Resolution
No. 175; followed by House Resolution No. 176 a resolution expressing the support of the house of
representatives to the assumption into office by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the
Republic of the Philippines, adopted January 24, 2001.
Clearly, from the given facts, both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President.
Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer
temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of temporary inability. The Court has no
jurisdiction to review the temporary inability and to revise thereafter the decision of both houses of
Congress recognizing Arroyo as President because this question involves the Legislature's discretionary
authority.

It was held the Estrada is not immune for liability. His claim that he must the impeachment proceeding must
first be decided before civil or criminal prosecution begin is untenable for he has been considered resigned
from office. Hence the impeachment tribunal and proceeding has ceased. Hence, as a non-sitting President,
he can be tried for civil and criminal charges filed against him.

Petitioner contended that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting the
investigation of the cases filed against him due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt. He stated
that the respondent Ombudsman has developed bias and is all set file the criminal cases violation of his
right to due process. It was held that there was not enough evidence to warrant the Court to enjoin the
preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman. The evidence given by petitioner
that Ombudsman has been biased by the pervasive prejudicial publicity against him was insubstantial.
CRUZ V. COA
G.R. No. 138489. November 29, 2001

FACTS: The NHA Resident Auditor issued a Notice of Disallowance on October 23, 1997 disallowing the
payment to the petitioners, who are the members of the Board of Directors of the National Housing
Authority (NHA), of their representation allowances and per diems for the period from August 19 199 to
August 31, 1996 in the total amount of P276,000.00. Such disallowance was pursuant to COA Memorandum
No. 97-038 issued by the COA, directing all unit heads/auditors/team leaders of the national government
agencies and government-owned and controlled corporations which have effected payment of any form of
additional compensation or remuneration to cabinet secretaries, their deputies and assistants, or their
representatives, in violation of the rule on multiple positions, to (a) immediately cause the disallowance of
such additional compensation or remuneration given to and received by the concerned officials, and (b)
effect the refund of the same from the time of the finality of the Supreme Court En Banc Decision in the
consolidated cases of Civil Liberties Union vs. Exexcutive Secretary and Anti-Graft League of the Philippines,
Inc. et al. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, et al., promulgated on February 22, 1991. The COA
Memorandum further stated that the said Supreme Court Decision, which became final and executory on
August 19, 1991, declared Executive Order No. 284 unconstitutional insofar as it allows Cabinet members,
their deputies and assistants to hold other offices, in addition to their primary offices, and to receive
compensation therefor.

The petitioners appealed from the Notice of Disallowance to the COA, claiming that the aforementioned
Supreme Court decision applies only to the members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants and does
not cover other appointive officials with equivalent rank or those lower than the position of Assistant
Secretary. They added that NHA Directors are not Secretaries, Undersecretaries or Assistant Secretaries and
that they occupy positions lower than the position of Assistant Secretary. On September 22, 1998, the COA
issued Decision No. 98-38 denying petitioners' appeal, stressing that the petitioners “were not sitting in the
NHA Board in their own right but as representatives of cabinet members and who are constitutionally
prohibited from holding any other office or employment and receive compensation therefor, during their
tenure (Section 13, Article VII, Constitution; Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA
317).”

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are entitiled to their representation allowances and per diems as
members of the NHA Board of Directors.

RULING: NO. Presidential Decree No. 757 is the law "Creating the National Housing Authority and dissolving
the existing housing agencies, defining its powers and functions, providing funds therefor, and for other
purposes." Section 7 thereof provides that the persons mandated by law to sit as members of the NHA
Board are the following: (1) the Secretary of Public Works, Transportation and Communications, (2) the
Director-General of the National Economic and Development Authority, (3) the Secretary of Finance, (4) the
Secretary of Labor, (5) the Secretary of Industry, (6) the Executive Secretary, and (7) the General Manager of
the NHA. While petitioners are not among those officers, however, they are alternates of the said officers,
whose acts shall be considered the acts of their principals.

On this point, Section 13, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, provides:
SEC. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall
not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure.
They shall not, during their tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any
business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by
the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of
their office. The prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to be interpreted as covering positions held
without additional compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided by law and as required by the primary
functions of the concerned officials office. The term ex-officio means from office; by virtue of office. It refers
to an authority derived from official character merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual character,
but rather annexed to the official position. Ex-officio likewise denotes an act done in an official character, or
as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment or authority than that conferred by the
office.

An ex-officio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and
without further warrant or appointment. To illustrate, by express provision of law, the Secretary of
Transportation and Communications is the ex-officio Chairman of the Board of the Philippine Ports
Authority, and the Light Rail Transit Authority. Since the Executive Department Secretaries, as ex-oficio
members of the NHA Board, are prohibited from receiving extra (additional) compensation, whether it be in
the form of a per diem or an honorarium or an allowance, or some other such euphemism," it follows that
petitioners who sit as their alternates cannot likewise be entitled to receive such compensation. A contrary
rule would give petitioners a better right than their principals.
We thus rule that in rendering its challenged Decision, the COA did not gravely abuse its discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

NATIONAL AMNESTY COMMISSION V. COA

Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall
not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure.
They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any
business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by
the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of
their office.

The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not
during his tenure be appointed as members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the
Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. (Art. VII, 1987 Constitution)

FACTS: Petitioner National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government agency created in 1994 by then
President Fidel V. Ramos through Proclamation No. 347. The NAC is tasked to receive, process and review
amnesty applications. It is composed of 7 members: a Chairperson, three regular members appointed by
the President, and the Secretaries of Justice, National Defense and Interior and Local Government as ex
officio members.

After personally attending the initial NAC meetings, the three ex officio members turned over said
responsibility to their representatives who were paid honoraria. However, in 1997, NAC resident auditor
Eulalia disallowed on audit the payment of honoraria to these representatives pursuant to COA
Memorandum No. 97-038.

Meanwhile, in 1999, the NAC passed Administrative Order No. 2 (the new Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Proclamation No. 347), which was approved by then President Joseph Estrada. Section 1,
Rule II thereof provides that ex officio members may designate their representatives to the Commission.
Said Representatives shall be entitled to per diems, allowances, bonuses and other benefits as may be
authorized by law.
Petitioner invoked Administrative Order No. 2 in assailing before the COA the rulings of the resident auditor
and the National Government Audit Office disallowing payment of honoraria to the ex officio members'
representatives, to no avail.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not COA committed grave abuse of discretion in implementing COA Memorandum No. 97-
038 without the required notice and publication under Article 2 of the Civil Code

2. Whether or not COA committed grave abuse of discretion disallowing the payment of honoraria on the
ground of lack of authority of representatives to attend the NAC meetings in behalf of the ex officio
members

3. Are the representatives de facto officers and as such are entitled to allowances?

HELD:

1. No. COA Memorandum No. 97-038 does not need, for validity and effectivity, the publication required
by Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.
We clarified this publication requirement in Taada vs. Tuvera:

[A]ll statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the
exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present,
directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of
the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the
so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

COA Memorandum No. 97-038 is merely an internal and interpretative regulation or letter of
instruction which does not need publication to be effective and valid. It is not an implementing rule or
regulation of a statute but a directive issued by the COA to its auditors to enforce the self-executing
prohibition imposed by Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution on the President and his official family, their
deputies and assistants, or their representatives from holding multiple offices and receiving double
compensation.

2. No. The COA is correct that there is no legal basis to grant per diem, honoraria or any allowance
whatsoever to the NAC ex officio members' official representatives.

The representatives in fact assumed their responsibilities not by virtue of a new appointment but by mere
designation from the ex officio members who were themselves also designated as such.
There is a considerable difference between an appointment and designation. An appointment is the
selection by the proper authority of an individual who is to exercise the powers and functions of a given
office; a designation merely connotes an imposition of additional duties, usually by law, upon a person
already in the public service by virtue of an earlier appointment.

Designation does not entail payment of additional benefits or grant upon the person so designated the
right to claim the salary attached to the position. Without an appointment, a designation does not entitle
the officer to receive the salary of the position. The legal basis of an employee's right to claim the salary
attached thereto is a duly issued and approved appointment to the position, and not a mere designation.

In Civil Liberties Union, we held that cabinet secretaries, including their deputies and assistants, who hold
positions in ex officio capacities, are proscribed from receiving additional compensation because their
services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to their principal offices. Thus, in
the attendance of the NAC meetings, the ex officio members were not entitled to, and were in fact
prohibited from, collecting extra compensation, whether it was called per diem, honorarium, allowance or
some other euphemism. Such additional compensation is prohibited by the Constitution.

Furthermore, in de la Cruz vs. COA and Bitonio vs. COA, we upheld COA's disallowance of the payment of
honoraria and per diems to the officers concerned who sat as ex officio members or alternates.
The agent, alternate or representative cannot have a better right than his principal, the ex officio member.
The laws, rules, prohibitions or restrictions that cover the ex officio member apply with equal force to his
representative. In short, since the ex officio member is prohibited from receiving additional compensation
for a position held in an ex officio capacity, so is his representative likewise restricted.

3. No. The representatives cannot be considered de facto officers because they were not appointed but
were merely designated to act as such. Furthermore, they are not entitled to something their own principals
are prohibited from receiving. (National Amnesty Commission vs. COA, G. R. No. 156982, September 8, 2004)

LAUREL V. GARCIA
G.R. No. 92013 July 25, 1990

FACTS: The subject property in this case is one of the 4 properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine
government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan, the Roppongi property. The said
property was acquired from the Japanese government through Reparations Contract No. 300. It consists of
the land and building for the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy. As intended, it became the site of the
Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to Nampeidai when the Roppongi building needed major
repairs. President Aquino created a committee to study the disposition/utilization of Philippine government
properties in Tokyo and Kobe, Japan. The President issued EO 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities
to avail of separations' capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or disposition.

ISSUES: Whether or not the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and jurisdiction, to
sell the Roppongi property.

RULING: It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on his or her own
sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It
requires executive and legislative concurrence. It is indeed true that the Roppongi property is valuable not
so much because of the inflated prices fetched by real property in Tokyo but more so because of its
symbolic value to all Filipinos, veterans and civilians alike. Whether or not the Roppongi and related
properties will eventually be sold is a policy determination where both the President and Congress must
concur. Considering the properties' importance and value, the laws on conversion and disposition of
property of public dominion must be faithfully followed.

MARCOS V. MANGLAPUS, RESPONDENT (PART 1)

G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989

FACTS: Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent
“people power” revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return
to the Philippines to die. But President Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of
his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy
is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and
his family.

Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following supervening events:

1. failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders

2. channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists
3. plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese arms dealer.

This is to prove that they can stir trouble from afar

4. Honasan’s failed coup

5. Communist insurgency movements
6. secessionist movements in Mindanao
7. devastated economy because of
1. accumulated foreign debt
2. plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies

Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue them their travel
documents and prevent the implementation of President Aquino’s decision to bar Marcos from returning in
the Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquino’s power to bar his return in the country. He also questioned the
claim of the President that the decision was made in the interest of national security, public safety and
health. Petitioner also claimed that the President acted outside her jurisdiction.
According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property without due
process and equal protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them of their right to travel which
according to Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only be impaired by a court order.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
2. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a
serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.

DECISION:
No to both issues. Petition dismissed.

RATIO: Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers. According to Section 1,
Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “the executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines.”

However, it does not define what is meant by “executive power” although in the same article it touches on
exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive departments,
bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power to grant reprieves, commutations
and pardons… (art VII secfs. 14-23). Although the constitution outlines tasks of the president, this list is not
defined & exclusive. She has residual & discretionary powers not stated in the Constitution which include the
power to protect the general welfare of the people. She is obliged to protect the people, promote their
welfare & advance national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution). Residual powers, according to
Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President can do anything which is not forbidden in the Constitution
(Corwin, supra at 153), inevitable to vest discretionary powers on the President (Hyman, American
President) and that the president has to maintain peace during times of emergency but also on the day-to-
day operation of the State.

The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. They’re flexible depending on the circumstances. The
request of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely
of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain
exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present
one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the
President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and
protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader
discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.
For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine is whether or not there exist factual basis for the
President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses in the Philippines.
It is proven that there are factual bases in her decision. The supervening events that happened before her
decision are factual. The President must take preemptive measures for the self-preservation of the country
& protection of the people. She has to uphold the Constitution.

Fernan, Concurring
1. The president’s power is not fixed. Limits would depend on the imperatives of events and not on abstract
theories of law. We are undergoing a critical time and the current problem can only be answerable by the
President.
2. Threat is real. Return of the Marcoses would pose a clear & present danger. Thus, it’s the executive’s
responsibility & obligation to prevent a grave & serious threat to its safety from arising.
3. We can’t sacrifice public peace, order, safety & our political & economic gains to give in to Marcos’ wish
to die in the country. Compassion must give way to the other state interests.

Cruz, Dissenting
1. As a citizen of this country, it is Marcos’ right to return, live & die in his own country. It is a right
guaranteed by the Consti to all individuals, whether patriot, homesick, prodigal, tyrant, etc.
2. Military representatives failed to show that Marcos’ return would pose a threat to national security. Fears
were mere conjectures.
3. Residual powers – but the executive’s powers were outlined to limit her powers & not expand.

Paras, Dissenting
1. AFP has failed to prove danger which would allow State to impair Marcos’ right to return to the
Philippines. .
2. Family can be put under house arrest & in the event that one dies, he/she should be buried w/in 10 days.
3. Untenable that without a legislation, right to travel is absolute & state is powerless to restrict it. It’s w/in
police power of the state to restrict this right if national security, public safety/health demands that such be
restricted. It can’t be absolute & unlimited all the time. It can’t be arbitrary & irrational.
4. No proof that Marcos’ return would endanger national security or public safety. Fears are speculative &
military admits that it’s under control. Filipinos would know how to handle Marcos’ return.

Padilla, Dissenting
Sarmiento, Dissenting
1. President’s determination that Marcos’ return would threaten national security should be agreed upon by
the court. Such threat must be clear & present.

MARCOS, PETITIONER V. MANGLAPUS, RESPONDENT (PART 2)

G.R. No. 88211, October 27, 1989

FACTS:
In its decision dated September 15, 1989, the Court by a vote of eight to seven, dismissed the petition, after
finding that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the
return of former President Marcos and his family pose a threat to national interest and welfare and in
prohibiting their return to the Philippines. On September 28, 1989, Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii.
President Corazon Aquino issued a statement saying that in the interest of the safety of those who will take
the death of Marcos in widely and passionately conflicting ways, and for the tranquility and order of the
state and society, she did not allow the remains of Marcos to be brought back in the Philippines.
A motion for Reconsideration was filed by the petitioners raising the following arguments:
1. Barring their return would deny them their inherent right as citizens to return to their country of birth and
all other rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all Filipinos.
2. The President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she has, she had exercised it
arbitrarily.
3. There is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President Marcos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the motion for reconsideration that the Marcoses be allowed to return in the
Philippines be granted.

DECISION: No. The Marcoses were not allowed to return. Motion for Reconsideration denied because of
lack of merit.

RATIO:

1. Petitioners failed to show any compelling reason to warrant reconsideration.

2. Factual scenario during the time Court rendered its decision has not changed. The threats to the
government, to which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not
been shown to have ceased. Imelda Marcos also called President Aquino “illegal” claiming that it is
Ferdinand Marcos who is the legal president.
3. President has unstated residual powers implied from grant of executive power. Enumerations are merely
for specifying principal articles implied in the definition; leaving the rest to flow from general grant that
power, interpreted in conformity with other parts of the Constitution (Hamilton). Executive unlike Congress
can exercise power from sources not enumerates so long as not forbidden by constitutional text (Myers vs.
US). This does not amount to dictatorship. Amendment No. 6 expressly granted Marcos power of legislation
whereas 1987 Constitution granted Aquino with implied powers.
4. It is within Aquino’s power to protect & promote interest & welfare of the people. She bound to comply
w/ that duty and there is no proof that she acted arbitrarily

DENR VS DENR EMPLOYEES

G.R. No. 149724 [Alter ego of the President, Qualified Political Agency Doctrine]

FACTS:
DENR Reg 12 Employees filed a petition for nullity of the memorandum order issued by the Regional Exec.
Director of DENR, directing the immediate transfer of the DENR 12 Regional Offices from Cotabato to
Koronadal City. The memorandum was issued pursuant to DENR Executive Order issued by the DENR
Secretary.

ISSUE:
Whether or not DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR Region 12 Office.

RULING: The qualified political agency doctrine, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts
of the Executive Department, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive, are presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. It is corollary to the control power of the
President as provided for under Art. VII Sec. 17 of the 1987 Constitution: "The President shall have control of
all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed."

In the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer of the
DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise of this authority
by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be the acts of the President for the latter had not
expressly repudiated the same.

DE LEON V. CARPIO
178 SCRA 457 (1989)
"Alter-ego" Doctrine

FACTS: Estavillo and de Leon are two NBI agents terminated by then Minister of Justice Neptali A. Gonzales.
Upon appeal to the Review Committee, the said body declined to act on their petitions for reconsideration
on the ground that it had lost its jurisdiction with the ratification of the new Constitution. They were advised
instead to seek relief from the Civil Service Commission.

The Merit Systems Protection Board of CSC held that their dismissals were invalid and unconstitutional,
having been done in violation of their security of tenure under the 1987 Constitution. Accordingly, the Board
ordered their reinstatement.

However, respondent Carpio, as Director of NBI, returned the orders issued by the Secretary of Justice to
CSC “without action,” claiming that they were null and void for having been rendered without jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Director of the NBI can disobey an explicit and direct order issued to him by the
Secretary of Justice

HELD: It is an elementary principle of our republican government, enshrined in the Constitution and
honored not in the breach but in the observance, that all executive departments, bureaus and offices are
under the control of the President of the Philippines.

The President’s power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn
and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the
executive department. The constitutional vesture of this power in the President is self-executing and does
not require statutory implementation, nor may its exercise be limited, much less withdrawn, by the
legislature.

Theoretically, the President has full control of all the members of his Cabinet and may appoint them as he
sees fit or shuffle them at pleasure, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, and
replace them in his discretion. Once in place, they are at all times under the disposition of the President as
their immediate superior. “Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various departments,
their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President. Hence, their acts, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.” (Villena v. Secretary of the Interior)

In the case at bar, there is no question that when he directed the respondent to reinstate the petitioners,
Sec. Ordonez was acting in the regular discharge of his functions as an alter ego of the President. His acts
should therefore have been respected by the respondent Director of the NBI, which is in the Department of
Justice under the direct control of its Secretary. As a subordinate in this department, the respondent was
(and is) bound to obey the Secretary’s directives, which are presumptively the acts of the President of the
Philippines.

HUTCHISON PORTS PHILIPPINES LIMITED V. SUBIC BAY

METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 131367 August 31, 2000

FACTS: The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (or SBMA) advertised in leading national daily newspapers and
in one international publication, an invitation offering to the private sector the opportunity to develop and
operate a modern marine container terminal within the Subic Bay Freeport Zone. Out of seven bidders who
responded to the published invitation, three were declared by the SBMA as qualified bidders after passing
the pre-qualification evaluation conducted by the SBMA’s Technical Evaluation Committee (or SBMA-TEC).
Among these is the petitioner.

Thereafter, the services of three (3) international consultants recommended by the World Bank for their
expertise were hired by SBMA to evaluate the business plans submitted by each of the bidders, and to
ensure that there would be a transparent and comprehensive review of the submitted bids. The SBMA also
hired the firm of Davis, Langdon and Seah Philippines, Inc. to assist in the evaluation of the bids and in the
negotiation process after the winning bidder is chosen. All the consultants, after such review and evaluation
unanimously concluded that HPPL’s Business Plan was “far superior to that of the two other bidders.”

However, even before the sealed envelopes containing the bidders’ proposed royalty fees could be opened
at the appointed time and place, RPSI formally protested that ICTSI is legally barred from operating a
second port in the Philippines based on Executive Order No. 212 and Department of Transportation and
Communication (DOTC) Order 95-863.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner HPPL has the legal capacity to seek redress from the Court.

RULING: Yes. Admittedly, petitioner HPPL is a foreign corporation, organized and existing under the laws of
the British Virgin Islands. While the actual bidder was a consortium composed of petitioner, and two other
corporations, namely, Guoco Holdings (Phils.) Inc. and Unicol Management Services, Inc., it is only petitioner
HPPL that has brought the controversy before the Court, arguing that it is suing only on an isolated
transaction to evade the legal requirement that foreign corporations must be licensed to do business in the
Philippines to be able to file and prosecute an action before Philippines courts.

There is no general rule or governing principle laid down as to what constitutes “doing” or “engaging in” or
“transacting” business in the Philippines. Each case must be judged in the light of its peculiar
circumstances.Thus, it has often been held that a single act or transaction may be considered as “doing
business” when a corporation performs acts for which it was created or exercises some of the functions for
which it was organized. The amount or volume of the business is of no moment, for even a singular act
cannot be merely incidental or casual if it indicates the foreign corporation’s intention to do business.

Participating in the bidding process constitutes “doing business” because it shows the foreign corporation’s
intention to engage in business here. The bidding for the concession contract is but an exercise of the
corporation’s reason for creation or existence. Thus, it has been held that “a foreign company invited to bid
for IBRD and ADB international projects in the Philippines will be considered as doing business in the
Philippines for which a license is required.”

RUFINO V. ENDRIGA
G.R. No. 139554
July 21, 2006
FACTS: On 25 June 1966, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Executive Order No. 30 (EO 30)
creating the Cultural Center of the Philippines as a trust governed by a Board of Trustees of seven members
to preserve and promote Philippine culture.
On 5 October 1972, or soon after the declaration of Martial Law, President Marcos issued PD 15, the CCP’s
charter, which converted the CCP under EO 30 into a non-municipal public corporation free from the
“pressure or influence of politics.” PD 15 increased the members of CCP’s Board from seven to nine trustees.
Later, Executive Order No. 1058, issued on 10 October 1985, increased further the trustees to 11.

After the People Power Revolution in 1986, then President Corazon C. Aquino asked for the courtesy
resignations of the then incumbent CCP trustees and appointed new trustees to the Board. Eventually,
during the term of President Fidel V. Ramos, the CCP Board included Endriga, Lagdameo, Sison,
Potenciano, Fernandez, Lenora A. Cabili (“Cabili”), and Manuel T. Mañosa (“Mañosa”).

On 22 December 1998, then President Joseph E. Estrada appointed seven new trustees to the CCP Board for
a term of four years to replace the Endriga group as well as two other incumbent trustees. The seven new
trustees were:

1. Armita B. Rufino - President, vice Baltazar

N. Endriga

2. Zenaida R. Tantoco - Member, vice Doreen Fernandez

3. Federico Pascual - Member, vice Lenora A. Cabili

4. Rafael Buenaventura - Member, vice Manuel T. Mañosa

5. Lorenzo Calma - Member, vice Ma. Paz D. Lagdameo

6. Rafael Simpao, Jr. - Member, vice Patricia C. Sison

7. Freddie Garcia - Member, vice Irma Ponce-Enrile

Potenciano

Except for Tantoco, the Rufino group took their respective oaths of office and assumed the performance
of their duties in early January 1999.

On 6 January 1999, the Endriga group filed a petition for quo warranto before this Court questioning
President Estrada’s appointment of seven new members to the CCP Board. The Endriga group alleged
that under Section 6(b) of PD 15, vacancies in the CCP Board “shall be filled by election by a vote of a
majority of the trustees held at the next regular meeting x x x.” In case “only one trustee survive[s], the
vacancies shall be filled by the surviving trustee acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the [CCP].”
The Endriga group claimed that it is only when the CCP Board is entirely vacant may the President of the
Philippines fill such vacancies, acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the CCP.

The Endriga group asserted that when former President Estrada appointed the Rufino group, only one seat
was vacant due to the expiration of Mañosa’s term. The CCP Board then had 10 incumbent trustees.
The Endriga group refused to accept that the CCP was under the supervision and control of the President.
The Endriga group cited Section 3 of PD 15, which states that the CCP “shall enjoy autonomy of policy and
operation x x x.”
On 14 May 1999, the Court of Appeals granted the quo warranto petition. The Court of Appeals declared
the Endriga group lawfully entitled to hold office as CCP trustees. On the other hand, the appellate court’s
Decision ousted the Rufino group from the CCP Board.

In their motion for reconsideration, the Rufino group asserted that the law could only delegate to the CCP
Board the power to appoint officers lower in rank than the trustees of the Board. The law may not validly
confer on the CCP trustees the authority to appoint or elect their fellow trustees, for the latter would be
officers of equal rank and not of lower rank. Section 6(b) of PD 15 authorizing the CCP trustees to elect
their fellow trustees should be declared unconstitutional being repugnant to Section 16, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution allowing the appointment only of “officers lower in rank” than the appointing power.

On 3 August 1999, the Court of Appeals denied the Rufino group’s motion for reconsideration. The Court
of Appeals also denied the Endriga group’s motion for immediate execution of the 14 May 1999 Decision.

Hence, the instant consolidated petitions.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 6 (b) of PD 15 is constitutional and CCP trustees have the authority to appoint
and elect their fellow trustees when there is vacancy.

RULING: NO. The SC ruled that Sec. 6 (b) and (c) of PD 15 as amended which authorizes the remaining
trustees to fill by election vacancies in the Board of Trustees of CCP is unconstitutional.
Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15, which authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to fill vacancies in the Board,
runs afoul with the President’s power of control under Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The
intent of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is to insulate the CCP from political influence and pressure, specifically
from the President. Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes the CCP a self-perpetuating entity, virtually outside
the control of the President. Such a public office or board cannot legally exist under the 1987 Constitution.

Section 3 of PD 15, as amended, states that the CCP “shall enjoy autonomy of policy and operation x x x.”
This provision does not free the CCP from the President’s control, for if it does, then it would be
unconstitutional. This provision may give the CCP Board a free hand in initiating and formulating policies
and undertaking activities, but ultimately these policies and activities are all subject to the President’s power
of control.

The CCP is part of the Executive branch. No law can cut off the President’s control over the CCP in the guise
of insulating the CCP from the President’s influence. By stating that the “President shall have control of all
the executive x x x offices,” the 1987 Constitution empowers the President not only to influence but even to
control all offices in the Executive branch, including the CCP. Control is far greater than, and subsumes,
influence.

PIMENTEL V. AGUIRRE
FACTS: In 1997, President Ramos issued AO 372 which: (1) required all government departments and
agencies, including SUCs, GOCCs and LGUs to identify and implement measures in FY 1998 that will reduce
total expenditures for the year by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriations for non--personal
services items (Section 1) and (2) ordered the withholding of 10% of the IRA to LGUs (Section 4) . On 10
December 1998, President Estrada issued AO 43, reducing to 5% the amount of IRA to be withheld from
LGU.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the president committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering all LGUS to adopt a 25%
cost reduction program in violation of the LGU'S fiscal autonomy

2. Whether Section 4 of the same issuance, which withholds 10 percent of their internal revenue allotments,
are valid exercises of the President's power of general supervision over local governments

HELD:

1. Section 1 of AO 372 does not violate local fiscal autonomy. Local fiscal autonomy does not rule out any
manner of national government intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs,
fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national goals. Significantly, the President, by constitutional fiat, is
the head of the economic and planning agency of the government, primarily responsible for formulating
and implementing continuing, coordinated and integrated social and economic policies, plans and
programs for the entire country. However, under the Constitution, the formulation and the implementation
of such policies and programs are subject to "consultations with the appropriate public agencies, various
private sectors, and local government units." The President cannot do so unilaterally.

Consequently, the Local Government Code provides:

"x x x [I]n the event the national government incurs an unmanaged public sector deficit, the President of the
Philippines is hereby authorized, upon the recommendation of [the] Secretary of Finance, Secretary of the
Interior and Local Government and Secretary of Budget and Management, and subject to consultation with
the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and the presidents of the liga, to make the necessary
adjustments in the internal revenue allotment of local government units but in no case shall the allotment
be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year
preceding the current fiscal year x x x."
There are therefore several requisites before the President may interfere in local fiscal matters: (1) an
unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government; (2) consultations with the presiding officers of
the Senate and the House of Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; and (3) the
corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and Local
Government, and Budget and Management. Furthermore, any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case
be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year
preceding the current one.

Petitioner points out that respondents failed to comply with these requisites before the issuance and the
implementation of AO 372. At the very least, they did not even try to show that the national government
was suffering from an unmanageable public sector deficit. Neither did they claim having conducted
consultations with the different leagues of local governments. Without these requisites, the President has no
authority to adjust, much less to reduce, unilaterally the LGU's internal revenue allotment.

AO 372, however, is merely directory and has been issued by the President consistent with his power of
supervision over local governments. It is intended only to advise all government agencies and
instrumentalities to undertake cost-reduction measures that will help maintain economic stability in the
country, which is facing economic difficulties. Besides, it does not contain any sanction in case of
noncompliance. Being merely an advisory, therefore, Section 1 of AO 372 is well within the powers of the
President. Since it is not a mandatory imposition, the directive cannot be characterized as an exercise of the
power of control.

2. Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of
the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than the Constitution. The
Local Government Code specifies further that the release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned
within five (5) days after every quarter of the year and "shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may
be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose." As a rule, the term "shall" is a word of
command that must be given a compulsory meaning. The provision is, therefore, imperative. (Pimentel vs.
Aguirre, G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 200

BERMUDEZ V. TORRES
FACTS: Petitioner Oscar Bermudez, the First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac and Officer-in-Charge
of the Office of Provincial Prosecutor, was a recommendee of then Sec. of Justice Guingona for the position
of Provincial Prosecutor. Private respondent Atty. Conrado Quiaoit had the support of then Representative
Yap of the Second District of Tarlac. Quiaoit was appointed by Pres. Ramos to the office. Quiaoit took his
oath and assumed office. Bermudez refused to vacate the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Nonetheless,
Quiaoit, performed the duties and functions of the Office of Provincial Prosecutor. Petitioner Bermudez
challenged the appointment of Quiaoit primarily on the ground that the appointment lacks the
recommendation of the Sec. Of Justice prescribed under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. Section 9,
Chap. II, Title III, Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code provides that “all provincial and city
prosecutors and their assistants shall be appointed by the Pres. upon the recommendation of the
Secretary.”

ISSUE: Whether or not the absence of a recommendation of the Secretary of Justice to the President can be
held fatal to the appointment of Quiaoit

HELD: An appointment to a public office is the unequivocal act of designating or selecting by one having
the authority therefor of an individual to discharge and perform the duties and functions of an office or
trust. The appointment is deemed complete once the last act required of the appointing authority has been
complied with and its acceptance thereafter by the appointee in order to render it effective.

The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing authority has the right of choice which he
may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who
have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities.

When the Constitution or the law clothes the Pres. with the power to appoint a subordinate officer, such
conferment must be understood as necessarily carrying with it an ample discretion of whom to appoint. The
Pres. is the head of government whose authority includes the power of control over all “executive
departments, bureaus and offices.” Control means the authority of an empowered officer to alter or modify,
or even nullify or set aside, what a subordinate officer has done in the performance of his duties, as well as
to substitute the judgment of the latter, as and when the former deems it to be appropriate. The Pres. has
the power to assume directly the functions of an executive department, bureau and office. It can therefore
be inferred that the Pres. can interfere in the exercise of discretion of officials under him or altogether
ignore their recommendations.

The phrase “upon recommendation of the Secretary” found in Sec. 9, Chap. II, Title III, Book IV of the
Revised Administrative Code should be interpreted to be a mere advice, exhortation or indorsement, which
is essentially persuasive in character and not binding or obligatory upon the party to whom it is made. The
recommendation is here nothing really more than advisory in nature. The Pres., being the head of the
Executive Department, could very well disregard or do away with the action of the departments, bureaus or
offices even in the exercise of discretionary authority, and in so opting, he cannot be said as having acted
beyond the scope of his authority.

ULPIANO SARMIENTO III VS SALVADOR MISON

156 SCRA 549 – Political Law – Appointment of “Head of Bureaus” – Officers Requiring Confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments

FACTS: This is the 1st major case under the 1987 Constitution. In 1987, Salvador Mison was appointed as the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by then president Corazon Aquino. Ulpiano Sarmiento III and
Juanito Arcilla, being members of the bar, taxpayers, and professors of constitutional law questioned the
appointment of Mison because it appears that Mison’s appointment was not submitted to the Commission
on Appointments (COA) for approval. Sarmiento insists that uner the new Constitution, heads of bureaus
require the confirmation of the COA.

Meanwhile, Sarmiento also sought to enjoin Guillermo Carague, the then Secretary of the Department of
Budget, from disbursing the salary payments of Mison due to the unconstitutionality of Mison’s
appointment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of “heads of bureaus” needed confirmation by the Commission on
Appointment.

HELD: No. In the 1987 Constitution, the framers removed “heads of bureaus” as one of those officers
needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointment. Under the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4)
groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of
the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution; Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law; Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
The first group above are the only public officers appointed by the president which require confirmation by
the COA. The second, third, and fourth group do not require confirmation by the COA. The position of
Mison as the head of the Bureau of Customs does not belong to the first group hence he does not need to
be confirmed by the COA.

MARY CONCEPCION-BAUTISTA V. SENATOR JOVITO SALONGA

172 SCRA 150 – Political Law – Appointments – Commission on Human Rights – Security of Tenure

FACTS: In August 1987, then President Corazon Aquino designated Mary Concepcion-Bautista as the Acting
Chairwoman of Commission on Human Rights. In December 1987, Cory made the designation of Bautista
permanent. Bautista then took her oath of office. Later however, Bautista received a letter from the
Commission on Appointments (COA) requiring her to submit certain documents for her qualification and for
confirmation by the COA. Bautista then wrote a letter to the COA Chairman, Senate President Jovito
Salonga, and she explained that her position as chairwoman of the CHR does not require confirmation by
the COA as laid down in the case of Sarmiento vs Mison.

Meanwhile, pending the issue of Bautista’s appointment with the COA, Cory designated Hesiquio Mallilin as
the acting chairman of the CHR.
In 1989, the COA finally disapproved the appointment of Bautista. COA considered Bautista’s appointment
as “ad interim”.
Bautista went to the Supreme Court and questioned COA’s actions. She impleaded Mallillin. Mallillin on his
part invoked Executive Order No. 163-A which provided that the appointment of the CHR chair is at the
pleasure of the president. Hence, since Cory left the issue with the COA and the latter decided not to
confirm Bautista, Mallillin should be allowed to take his seat as chairman of the CHR.

ISSUE: Whether or not Bautista’s appointment is subject to COA’s confirmation.

HELD: No. The appointment of the Chairman and Members of the CHR is not specifically provided for in the
Constitution itself, unlike the Chairmen and Members of the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on
Elections and the Commission on Audit, whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution in the
President with the consent of the COA. The President appoints the Chairman and Members of the CHR
pursuant to the second sentence in Sec 16, Art. 7, that is, without the confirmation of the COA because they
are among the officers of government “whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint.” The
law which authorizes the president to make appointments to the CHR is Executive Order No. 163.
The act of Cory submitting Bautista’s appointment to the COA for confirmation is merely political in nature
and it has no basis in law or in the constitution. Appointment to the CHR should be made without the
participation of the COA. Thus, Cory’s act of submitting the appointment of Bautista to the CHR is
done without or in excess of jurisdiction.

Even assuming arguendo that the President can submit such appointment to the COA for the latter’s
approval or rejection, such submission is not valid because at the time of submission, the office of the
chairman (chairwoman) of the CHR is not vacant – as at that time, Bautista already took her oath and was
the incumbent CHR chairperson.

There is also no basis for the COA to consider Bautista’s appointment as “ad interim”. Since the position of
chairman and members of the CHR are not subject to COA confirmation, all appointments to the CHR are
always permanent and cannot be ad interim.

Anent the argument of Mallillin that EO 163-A provides that the chairman and members of the CHR may be
removed at the pleasure of the president, the same is not valid. Thus, EO 163-A is unconstitutional. Note
that the earlier EO 163 provides that the chairman and the members of the CHR shall have a term of 7
years. The Chairman and the Commissioners of the CHR cannot be removed at the pleasure of the
president for it is guaranteed that they must have a term of office. They can only be removed upon cause
and with the observance of due process.

CALDERON V. CARALE
GR 91636 208 SCRA 254 – Political Law – Appointment – List of Appointees Requiring COA Confirmation
Cannot Be Expanded by Law
FACTS: In 1989, Republic Act No. 6715 was passed. This law amended PD 442 or the Labor Code. RA 6715
provides that the Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners [of the NLRC]
shall all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (COA).
Pursuant to the said law, President Corazon Aquino appointed Bartolome Carale et al as the Chairman and
the Commissioners respectively of the NLRC. The appointments were however not submitted to the CoA for
its confirmation. Peter John Calderon questioned the appointment saying that without the confirmation by
the CoA, such an appointment is in violation of RA 6715. Calderon insisted that RA 6715 should be followed
as he asserted that RA 6715 is not an encroachment on the appointing power of the executive contained in
Sec. 16, Art. 7, of the Constitution, as Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of other officers appointed by the President in addition to those mentioned in the first
sentence of Sec. 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not Congress may, by law, expand the list of public officers required to be confirmed by
the Commission on Appointment as listed in the Constitution.

HELD: No. Under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the
President shall appoint. These four (4) groups are:

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of
the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
The Supreme Court agreed with the Solicitor General: confirmation by the CoA is required exclusively for
the heads of executive departments, ambassadors, public ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the
President by the Constitution, such as the members of the various Constitutional Commissions (first group).
With respect to the other officers (second to fourth group) whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for by the law and to those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint, no confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments is required.

“Had it been the intention to allow Congress to expand the list of officers whose appointments must be
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the Constitution would have said so by adding the phrase
“and other officers required by law” at the end of the first sentence, or the phrase, “with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments” at the end of the second sentence. Evidently, our Constitution has
significantly omitted to provide for such additions.

This jurisprudence established the following in interpreting Sec 16, Art 7 of the Constitution
1. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required only for presidential appointees
mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII, including, those officers whose appointments are
expressly vested by the Constitution itself in the president (like sectoral representatives to Congress and
members of the constitutional commissions of Audit, Civil Service and Election).
2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government officers whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint (like the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights). Also, as observed in Mison,
when Congress creates inferior offices but omits to provide for appointment thereto, or provides in an
unconstitutional manner for such appointments, the officers are considered as among those whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law.

MANALO V. SISTOSA
The police force is different from and independent of the armed forces and the ranks in the military are not
similar to those in the Philippine National Police. Thus, directors and chief superintendents of the PNP do not
fall under the first category of presidential appointees requiring the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.

FACTS: On December 13, 1990, former President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Republic Act 6975,
creating the Department of Interior and Local Government. The said Act states that the PNP Chief, Chief
Superintendent and Director General shall be appointed by the President subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. Pursuant thereto, Pres. Aquino, through Executive Secretary Franklin S.
Drilon, promoted 15 police officers to permanent positions in the Philippine National Police with the rank of
Chief Superintendent to Director. The said police officers took their oath of office and assumed their
respective positions. Thereafter, the Department of Budget and Management, under the then Secretary
Salvador M. Enriquez III, authorized disbursements for their salaries and other emoluments.

Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, as a taxpayer suit, to assail the legality of subject appointments and
disbursements made therefor. He contents that: (1) RA 6975 requires confirmation of the appointments of
officers from the rank of senior superintendent and higher by the CA; (2) The PNP is akin to the Armed
Forces where the Constitution specifically requires confirmation by the CA, and (3) Respondent Secretary in
allowing and/or effecting disbursements in favor of respondent officers despite the unconstitutionality and
illegality of their appointments is acting without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not the appointment PNP officers need CA confirmation

2) Whether or not the PNP is akin to the AFP
3) Whether or not Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975 are constitutional

HELD:

1. Under Section 16, Article VII, of the Constitution, there are four groups of officers of the government to be
appointed by the President:

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of
the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
It is well-settled that only presidential appointments belonging to the first group require the confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments. The appointments of respondent officers who are not within the first
category, need not be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. As held in the case of Tarrosa vs.
Singson, Congress cannot by law expand the power of confirmation of the Commission on Appointments
and require confirmation of appointments of other government officials not mentioned in the first sentence
of Section 16 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

2. The Philippine National Police is separate and distinct from the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

The Constitution, no less, sets forth the distinction. Under Section 4 of Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution,
“The Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be composed of a citizen armed force which shall undergo
military training and service, as may be provided by law. It shall keep a regular force necessary for the
security of the State.”

On the other hand, Section 6 of the same Article of the Constitution ordains that: “The State shall establish
and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character to be administered
and controlled by a national police commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in
their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.”

The police force is different from and independent of the armed forces and the ranks in the military are not
similar to those in the Philippine National Police. Thus, directors and chief superintendents of the PNP, such
as the herein respondent police officers, do not fall under the first category of presidential appointees
requiring the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

3. Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975 which empower the Commission on Appointments to confirm
the appointments of public officials whose appointments are not required by the Constitution to be
confirmed are unconstitutional. The rest of Republic Act 6975 stands. It is well-settled that when provisions
of law declared void are severable from the main statute and the removal of the unconstitutional provisions
would not affect the validity and enforceability of the other provisions, the statute remains valid without its
voided sections.

AQUILINO PIMENTEL V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA

472 SCRA 587 – Political Law – Commission on Appointment – Ad Interim Appointments vs Appointments in
an Acting Capacity; Law on Public Officers – Modes and Kinds of Appointment

FACTS: While Congress was in session, due to vacancies in the cabinet, then president Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo (GMA) appointed Arthur Yap et al as secretaries of their respective departments. They were
appointed in an acting capacity only. Senator Aquilino Pimentel together with 7 other senators filed a
complaint against the appointment of Yap et al. Pimentel averred that GMA cannot make such appointment
without the consent of the Commission on Appointment; that, in accordance with Section 10, Chapter 2,
Book IV of Executive Order No. 292, only the undersecretary of the respective departments should
be designated in an acting capacity and not anyone else. On the contrary, then Executive Secretary Eduardo
Ermita averred that the president is empowered by Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to
issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries without the consent of the Commission
on Appointments even while Congress is in session. Further, EO 292 itself allows the president to issue
temporary designation to an officer in the civil service provided that the temporary designation shall not
exceed one year. During the pendency of said case, Congress adjourned and GMA issued ad
interim appointments re-appointing those previously appointed in acting capacity.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appointments made by ex PGMA is valid.

HELD: Yes. The argument raised by Ermita is correct. Further, EO 292 itself provided the safeguard so that
such power will not be abused hence the provision that the temporary designation shall not exceed one
year. In this case, in less than a year after the initial appointments made by GMA, and when the Congress
was in recess, GMA issued the ad interim appointments – this also proves that the president was in good
faith.
It must also be noted that cabinet secretaries are the alter egos of the president. The choice is the
president’s to make and the president normally appoints those whom he/she can trust. She cannot be
constrained to choose the undersecretary. She has the option to choose. An alter ego, whether temporary
or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing
qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a department
secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the
President’s confidence. That person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons
may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee.
Anent the issue that GMA appointed “outsiders”, such is allowed. EO 292 also provides that the president
“may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to
perform the functions of an office in the executive branch.” Thus, the President may even appoint in an
acting capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as the President deems that person
competent.
NOTE: Ad Interim Appointments vs Appointments in an Acting Capacity

Appointments in an Acting
Ad Interim Appointments
Capacity

It is a permanent appointment because it

takes effect immediately and can no
longer be withdrawn by the President
once the appointee has qualified into
Description
office. The fact that it is subject to
confirmation by the COA does not alter
its permanent character (Matibag vs
Benipayo)
Acting appointments are a way
of temporarily filling important
offices but, if abused, they can
also be a way of circumventing
the need for confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.

When
Upon Acceptance by Appointee Upon Acceptance by Appointee
Effective

When Made When Congress is in recess Any time when there is vacancy

Submitted
Yes No
to the COA

DE RAMA V. CA
FACTS: Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitioner Conrado L. de Rama
wrote a letter dated July 13, 1995 to the Civil Service Commission (or CSC), seeking the recall of the
appointments of fourteen (14) municipal employees. Justifying his recall request on the allegation that the
appointments of the said employees were “midnight” appointments of the former mayor, Ma. Evelyn S.
Abeja, done in violation of Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution. The CSC denied petitioner’s
request for the recall of the appointments of the fourteen employees, for lack of merit. The CSC upheld the
validity of the appointments on the ground that they had already been approved by the Head of the CSC
Field Office in Lucena City, and for petitioner’s failure to present evidence that would warrant the revocation
or recall of the said appointments.

ISSUE: whether or not the recall made by petitioner is valid.

RULING: No. It is the CSC that is authorized to recall an appointment initially approved, but only when such
appointment and approval are proven to be in disregard of applicable provisions of the civil service law and
regulations. Rule V, Section 9 of the Omnibus Implementing Regulations of the Revised Administrative Code
specifically provides that “an appointment accepted by the appointee cannot be withdrawn or revoked by
the appointing authority and shall remain in force and in effect until disapproved by the Commission.

Accordingly, the appointments of the private respondents may only be recalled on the following grounds:
(a) Non-compliance with the procedures/criteria provided in the agency’s Merit Promotion Plan; (b) Failure
to pass through the agency’s Selection/Promotion Board; (c) Violation of the existing collective agreement
between management and employees relative to promotion; or (d) Violation of other existing civil service
law, rules and regulations.

DISSENTING OPINION: Mendoza

What the majority overlooks is that Article VII, Section 15 is simply an application of a broader principle that
after theappointing authority has lost the elections, his is the duty of a prudent caretaker of the office, and
therefore, he shouldnot fill positions in the government unless required by the imperatives of public service.

MATIBAG V. BENIPAYO
G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002

FACTS: COMELEC en banc appointed petitioner as “Acting Director IV” of the EID. Such appointment was
renewed in “temporary” capacity twice, first by Chairperson Demetrio and then by
Commissioner Javier. Later, PGMA appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman, and Borra and
Tuason as COMELEC Commissioners, each for a term of 7 yrs. The three took their oaths of office and
assumed their positions. However, since the Commission on Appointments did not act on said
appointments, PGMA renewed the ad interim appointments.

ISSUES: Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad
interim appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Sec. 1(2),
Art. IX-C

Assuming that the first ad interim appointments and the first assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason are legal, whether or not the renewal of their ad interim appointments and subsequent assumption
of office to the same positions violate the prohibition on reappointment under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX-C

RULING: Nature of an Ad Interim Appointment An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment

because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee
has qualified into office. The fact that is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does
not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in
character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of Congress. The second paragraph of Sec.16, Art.VII of the Constitution provides as follows:
“The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress,
whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress.”

Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next adjournment, signifying
that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President.

...the term “ad interim appointment” means a permanent appointment made by the President in the
meantime that Congress is in recess. It does not mean a temporary appointment that can be withdrawn or
revoked at any time. The term, although not found in the text of the Constitution, has acquired a definite
legal meaning under Philippine jurisprudence.

ECHAGARAY V. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

G.R. No. 132601, October 12, 1998

FACTS: On June 25, 1996, this Court affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the crime
of rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of the death
penalty for the said crime. Petitioner duly filed a Motion for Reconsideration raising mainly factual issues,
and on its heels, a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raising for the first time the issue of the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 (the death penalty law) and the imposition of the death penalty
for the crime of rape. On February 7, 1998, this Court denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration and
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration with a finding that Congress duly complied with the requirements
for the re-imposition of the death penalty and therefore the death penalty law is not unconstitutional. In the
meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of execution of the death penalty from
electrocution to lethal injection, [4] and passed Republic Act No. 8177, AN ACT DESIGNATING DEATH BY
LETHAL INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 7659.[5] Pursuant to the provisions of said law, the Secretary of Justice promulgated the Rules and
Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 ("implementing rules")[6] and directed the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections to prepare the Lethal Injection Manual.

On March 2, 1998, petitioner filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order
to enjoin respondents Secretary of Justice and Director of the Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the
execution by lethal injection of petitioner under R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules as these are
unconstitutional and void for being, among others: (d)an undue delegation of legislative power by
Congress, (e) an unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary of the power to legislate, and (f) an unlawful
delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice to respondent Director.

ISSUE: Was there undue delegation with respect to the restriction imposed on the accessibility of the
Manual of Execution?
HELD: YES. A careful reading of R.A. No. 8177 would show that there is no undue delegation of legislative
power from the Secretary of Justice to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections for the simple reason that
under the Administrative Code of 1987, the Bureau of Corrections is a mere
constituent unit of the Department of Justice. Further, the Department of Justice is tasked, among others, to
take charge of the "administration of the correctional system." Hence, the import of the phraseology of the
law is that the Secretary of Justice should supervise the Director of the Bureau
of Corrections in promulgating the Lethal Injection Manual, in consultation with the Department of Health.
However, the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 suffer serious flaws that could not
be overlooked. To begin with, something basic appears missing in Section 19 of the implementing rules
which provides: "SEC. 19. EXECUTION PROCEDURE. - Details of the procedure prior to, during and after
administering the lethal injection shall be set forth in a manual to be prepared by the Director. The manual
shall contain details of, among others, the sequence of events before and after execution; procedures in
setting up the intravenous line; the administration of the lethal drugs; the pronouncement of death; and the
removal of the intravenous system. Said manual shall be confidential and its distribution shall be limited to
authorized prison personnel." Thus, the Courts finds in the first paragraph of Section 19 of the implementing
rules a veritable vacuum. The Secretary of Justice has practically abdicated the power to promulgate the
manual on the execution procedure to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, by not providing for a mode
of review and approval thereof. Being a mere constituent unit of the Department of Justice, the Bureau of
Corrections could not promulgate a manual that would not bear the imprimatur of the administrative
superior, the Secretary of Justice as the rule-making authority under R.A. No. 8177 . Such apparent abdication
of departmental responsibility renders the said paragraph invalid. As to the second paragraph of section 19,
the Court finds the requirement of confidentiality of the contents of the manual even with respect to the
convict unduly suppressive. It sees no legal impediment for the convict, should he so desire, to obtain a copy
of the manual. The contents of the manual are matters of public concern "which the public may want to
know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the
interest of an ordinary citizen."[62] Section 7 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

"SEC. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transaction, or decisions, as well as
to government research data used as a basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject
to such limitation as may be provided by law." The incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee of
access to information of public concern is a recognition of the essentiality of the free flow of ideas and
information in a democracy. In the same way that free discussion enables members of society to cope with the
exigencies of their time, access to information of general interest aids the people in democratic decision-
making by giving them a better perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation.

PEOPLE V. NACIONAL
FACTS: On December 18, 1989, Walter Nacional alias "Ka Dennis," Absalon Millamina alias "Ka Alvin," Efren
Musa, Rudy Luces, Javier Mirabete alias "Commander," and Zacarias Militante alias "Care" were charged
with murder

The six (6) accused, including accused-appellant, were all civilian members of the barangay organization of
the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) - NPA at Daraga, Albay.[10] A few days before February 21,
1985, their organization had a pulong-pulong(conference) at Barangay Lacag, Daraga for the purpose of
identifying suspected informers of the military whom they perceived as posing a threat to the NPA's
operations within the vicinity. They identified Quirino and Joel Lagason, both residents of Barangay
Salvacion, Daraga as military informers and were targeted for liquidation. Elevino Rincopan, their team
leader, however, disapproved the proposal for lack of clearance and approval from the higher NPA
authorities.

On February 21, 1985 they found them and carried out their plan. Walter Nacional approached Quirino and
said something to him. Walter then pulled out a gun from his waist and shot Quirino in the face, hitting him
between the eyebrows. Quirino fell to the ground and died instantly. A few seconds later, Absalon Millamina
shot Joel Lagason on the head. The group then fled towards the direction of the RCPI Relay Station. Joel’s
mother, who was at the scene of the crime, rushed him to the hospital where he died a few hours later.

Five of them were caught and tried at the trial court found them guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt
and were sentenced accordingly. The decision was made on May 31, 1993. And then all of the accused
appealed their case.

On March 1, 1994, Walter Nacional, Zacarias Militante and Efren Muse, through counsel, moved to withdraw
their appeal. They claimed that the charges against them were political in nature committed while they were
members of the NP. They informed the Court that as political prisoners, they applied for and were
recommended by then Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon for conditional pardon by the president of the
Philippines. The court granted their motion on May 11, 1994.

ISSUE: Does the conditional pardon and consequent dismissal of the appeals of the accused exempt them
from payment of the civil indemnity

RULING: The court ruled that the grant of conditional pardon and the consequent dismissal of the appeals
of Walter Nacional, Zacarias Militante, Efren Musa and Rudy Luces does not exempt them from payment of
the civil indemnity. A conditional pardon, when granted, does not extinguish the civil liability arising from
the crime.

MONSANTO VS. FACTORAN

FACTS: The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of
Calbayog City) of the crime of estafa through falsification of public documents. She was sentenced to jail
and to indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50.The SC affirmed the decision. She then filed a
motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended by then President Marcos
absolute pardon which she accepted (at that time, the rule was that clemency could be given even before
conviction). By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be
restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant. Her letter was referred
to the Minister of Finance who ruled that she may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a
new appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon.

Petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which
implies that her service in the government has never been interrupted and therefore the date of her
reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive suspension; that she is entitled to backpay
for the entire period of her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the proportionate share
of the amount of P4,892.50

The Ministry referred the issue to the Office of the President. Deputy Executive Secretary Factoran denied
Monsanto’s request averring that Monsanto must first seek appointment and that the pardon does not
reinstate her former position.

ISSUES:

1. Is Monsanto entitled to backpay?

2. Is a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, entitled to
reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment?

3. May petitioner be exempt from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon her by the sentence?

HELD:

1. Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the
laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime
he has committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual
for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the Court.

While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eye of the
law the offender is as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not operate for all
purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not
erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral
stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.

A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for
what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make
reparation for what has been suffered. “Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that
which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and
justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required.” This would explain why petitioner, though
pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits.
2. The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public
employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must
re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.

3. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding service
of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence.
Petitioner's civil liability may only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely:
payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor,
compensation and novation.

granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon.” Here,
the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the President’s executive prerogative and is not subject to
judicial scrutiny.

WILFREDO TORRES VS HON. NEPTALI GONZALES

FACTS: In 1978, Wilfredo Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the president with the
condition that he shall not violate any penal laws again. In 1982, Torres was charged with multiple crimes of
estafa. In 1986, then Chairman of the Board of Paroles Neptali Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of
Torres’ pardon. Hence, the president cancelled the pardon. Torres appealed the issue before the Supreme
Court averring that the Executive Department erred in convicting him for violating the conditions of his pardon
because the estafa charges against him were not yet final and executory as they were still on appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before Torres can be
validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to
serve the balance of his original sentence.

HELD: The SC affirmed the following:

1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely
executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.

2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences
of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a
conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed under
Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime
is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be
recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.

3. Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and because the conditionally pardoned
convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which he
was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a
constitutional vice.

In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have breached
the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under
Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the RPC
which imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who “having been granted
conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon.” Here, the
President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative
Code. That choice is an exercise of the President’s executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.

LLAMAS VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS: Vice-Governor Llamas together with some other complainants filed an administrative case against
Governor Ocampo III of Tarlac for alleged acts constituting graft and corruption. After trial, the Secretary of
the then Department of Local Government found Ocampo guilty of serious neglect of duty and/or abuse of
authority for entering into a loan contract grossly/manifestly disadvantageous to Tarlac Province and meted
a penalty of suspension for 90 days. Llamas, assumed office. In not less than 30 days, however, Executive
Secretary Orbos, by authority of the President, issued a Resolution granting executive clemency to Ocampo
(after finding the relative success of Ocampo's livelihood loan program) in the sense that the latter's 90-day
suspension is reduced to the period already served. Ocampo reassumed the governorship of the province,
allegedly without any notification made to Llamas. Llamas questioned the Resolution before the SC.

Petitioner's main argument is that the President may grant executive clemency only in criminal cases, based
on Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution which reads:
Sec. 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may
grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final
judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the
Congress.
Petitioner argued that the qualifying phrase “after conviction by final judgment” applies solely to criminal
cases, and no other law allows the grant of executive clemency or pardon to anyone who has been
“convicted in an administrative case.

Respondent Governor avers that since under the Constitution discretionary authority is granted to the
President on the exercise of executive clemency, the same constitutes a political question which is beyond
judicial review.

ISSUES:

1. Is the question on the exercise of executive clemency by the president a political question?

2. May the President grant executive clemency in administrative cases?

3. Was petitioner's right to due process violated when he was not notified of the grant of executive
clemency?

HELD:

1. While it is true that courts cannot inquire into the manner in which the President's discretionary powers
are exercised or into the wisdom for its exercise, it is also a settled rule that the Court may exercise its power
of judicial review when the issue involved concerns the validity of such discretionary powers or whether said
powers are within the limits prescribed by the Constitution. And such review does not constitute a
modification or correction of the act of the President, nor does it constitute interference with the functions
of the President. Besides, under the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court has been conferred an
"expanded jurisdiction" to review the decisions of the other branches and agencies of the government to
determine whether or not they have acted within the bounds of the Constitution.

2. Yes. "Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguire debemos." If the law does not distinguish, so We must not
distinguish. The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be
exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive
clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the
exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Following
petitioner's proposed interpretation, cases of impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the
same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses. In the same vein, We do not clearly see any valid and
convincing reason why the President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is Our
considered view that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative
cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.

If those already adjudged guilty criminally in court may be pardoned, those adjudged guilty administratively
should likewise be extended the same benefit. In criminal cases, the quantum of evidence required to
convict an individual is proof beyond reasonable doubt, but the Constitution grants to the President the
power to pardon the act done by the proved criminal and in the process exempts him from punishment
therefor. On the other hand, in administrative cases, the quantum of evidence required is mere substantial
evidence to support a decision, not to mention that as to the admissibility of evidence, administrative bodies
are not bound by the technical and rigid rules of admissibility prescribed in criminal cases. It will therefore
be unjust and unfair for those found guilty administratively of some charge if the same effects of pardon or
executive clemency cannot be extended to them, even in the sense of modifying a decision to subserve the
interest of the public.

Moreover, the President, in the exercise of her power of supervision and control over all executive
departments, may substitute her decision for that of her subordinate, most especially where the basis
therefor would be to serve the greater public interest. It is clearly within the power of the President not only
to grant "executive clemency" but also to reverse or modify a ruling issued by a subordinate against an
erring public official, where a reconsideration of the facts alleged would support the same. It is in this sense
that the alleged executive clemency was granted, after adducing reasons that subserve the public interest.
— "the relative success of . . . livelihood loan program.

However, that when we say the President can grant executive clemency in administrative cases, we refer
only to all administrative cases in the Executive branch, not in the Judicial or Legislative branches of the
government.

3. Petitioner's argument that his constitutional rights to due process were violated is uruneritorious. Pardon
has been defined as "the private, though official, act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual
for whose benefit it is intended and not communicated officially to the court. ..." Thus, assuming that
petitioner was not notified of the subject pardon, it is only because said notice is unnecessary. (Llamas vs.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 99031, October 15, 1991)
IBP V. ZAMORA
GR. No. 141284 August 15, 2000

FACTS: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President
directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and
utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The
President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in
nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. The IBP
filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and
unconstitutional.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is
subject to judicial review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the
constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP

HELD: When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII
of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However,
there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s action to call
out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to
declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers
of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and
review without any qualification.

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant the President
the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the
lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of
certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review
by the Court. In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine
the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the
President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy
burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the
armed forces. The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task
of law enforcement is “militarized” in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the
Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes
permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in charge
of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP

Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the
police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP,
and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP,
there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the
joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.
AQUINO V. ENRILE
59 SCRA 183 Martial Law – Habeas Corpus – Power of the President to Order Arrests

FACTS: Enrile (then Minister of National Defense), pursuant to the order of Marcos issued and ordered the
arrest of a number of individuals including Benigno Aquino Jr even without any charge against them.
Hence, Aquino and some others filed for habeas corpus against Juan Ponce Enrile. Enrile’s answer contained
a common and special affirmative defense that the arrest is valid pursuant to Marcos’ declaration of Martial
Law.

ISSUE: Whether or not Aquino’s detention is legal in accordance to the declaration of Martial Law.

HELD: The Constitution provides that in case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger
against the state, when public safety requires it, the President may suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part therein under Martial Law. In the case at bar, the state of
rebellion plaguing the country has not yet disappeared, therefore, there is a clear and imminent danger
against the state. The arrest is then a valid exercise pursuant to the President’s order.
TEODOSIO LANSANG V. GARCIA
42 SCRA 448, December 11, 1971

FACTS: In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9 p.m., while the Liberal Party of the Philippines was
holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the presentation of its candidates in the general
elections scheduled for November 8, 1971, two hand grenades were thrown at the platform where said
candidates and other persons were. Eight persons were killed and many more injured. Proclamation 889
was issued by the President suspending privilege of writ of habeas corpus stating that there is a conspiracy
of rebellion and insurrection in order to forcibly seize political power. Petitions for writ of habeas corpus
were filed by persons (13) who have been arrested without a warrant.

It was stated that one of the safeguards of the proclamation was that it is to be applied to persons caught in
flagrante delicto. Incidentally, Proc. 889-A was issued as an amendment, inserting the word “actually
staging”. Proc. 889-B was also issued lifting the suspension of privilege in 27 provinces, 3 sub-provinces and
26 cities. Proc. 889-C was issued restoring the suspension in 13 provinces and cities(mostly in Mindanao).
Proc. 889-D further lifted the suspension in 7 provinces and 4 cities. Only 18 provinces and sub-provinces
and 2 cities whose privilege was suspended. Petitioners maintained that Proclamation No. 889 did not
declare the existence of actual "invasion insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, however it
became moot and academic since it was amended. Petitioners further contend that public safety did not
require the issuance of proclamations stating: (a) that there is no rebellion; (b) that, prior to and at the time
of the suspension of the privilege, the Government was functioning normally, as were the courts; (c) that no
untoward incident, confirmatory of an alleged July-August Plan, has actually taken place after August 21,
1971; (d) that the President's alleged apprehension, because of said plan, is non-existent and unjustified; and
(e) that the Communist forces in the Philippines are too small and weak to jeopardize public safety to such
extent as to require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus A resolution was issued by
majority of the Court having tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may inquire in order to satisfy itself of
the existence of the factual bases for the proclamations. Now the Court resolves after conclusive decision
reached by majority.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or Not the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension (of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus) belongs to the President and his decision is final and conclusive upon
the courts and upon all other persons.
(2) Whether or Not public safety require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
decreed in Proclamation No. 889-A.

HELD: The President has authority however it is subject to judicial review. Two conditions must concur for
the valid exercise of the authority to suspend the privilege to the writ (a) there must be "invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion" or "imminent danger thereof," and (b) "public safety" must require the suspension
of the privilege. President has three (3) courses of action: (a) to call out the armed forces; (b) to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (c) to place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.
He had, already, called out the armed forces, proved inadequate. Of the two other alternatives, the
suspension of the privilege is the least harsh.

Petitioners contention that CPP-NPA has no ability, is negatived by the killing of 5 mayors, 20 barrio
captains and 3 chiefs of police; that there were fourteen (14) meaningful bombing incidents in the Greater
Manila Area in 1970. CPP has managed to infiltrate or establish and control nine major labor organizations;
has exploited the (11) major student or youth organizations; about thirty (30) mass organizations actively
advancing the CPP.
RANDOLF DAVID, ET AL. V. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 171396, Presidential Proclamation No. 1017

FACTS: On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I,
President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and call upon the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and
lawless violence in the country. The Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and
activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the permits to hold
rallies issued earlier by the local governments and dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA. The police arrested
(without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the University of the Philippines and newspaper
columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.
In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily
Tribune offices in Manila and attempt to arrest was made against representatives of ANAKPAWIS,
GABRIELA and BAYAN MUNA whom suspected of inciting to sedition and rebellion. On March 3,
2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to
exist. Petitioners filed seven (7) certiorari with the Supreme Court and three (3) of those petitions
impleaded President Arroyo as respondent questioning the legality of the
proclamation, alleging that it encroaches the emergency powers of Congress and it violates the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and assembly.

ISSUE:

1.) Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is unconstitutional?

2.) Whether or not the warantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas and the dispersal of KMU
and NAFLU-KMU members during rallies were valid?
3.) Whether or not proper to implead President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as respondent in the petitions?
4.) Whether or not the petitioners have a legal standing in questioning the constitutionality of the
proclamation?
5.) Whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the alarming powers incident to
Martial Law are used?

RULING:

1.) The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President
for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence whenever becomes necessary as prescribe under
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. However, there were extraneous provisions giving the President
express or implied power
(A) To issue decrees; (" Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article
VI categorically states that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which
shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.")
(B) To direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as well as
decrees promulgated by the President[The absence of a law defining "acts of terrorism" may result in abuse
and oppression on the part of the police or military]; and
(C) To impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra
vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the
President, in the absence of legislative legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private
business affected with public interest. Therefore, the PP No. 1017 is only partly unconstitutional.
2.) The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the
KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies are illegal, in the absence of proof that these petitioners
were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition
of standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless search of
the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other materials, are declared
unconstitutional because there was no clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a
right to prevent.
3.) It is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President,
during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is
no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law.
4.) This Court adopted the “direct injury” test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person
who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” Therefore, the court ruled that the petitioners have
a locus standi, for they suffered “direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful search” committed
by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.
5.) Under Article XII Section 17 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, in times of national emergency, when the
public interest so requires, the President may temporarily take over a privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest only if there is congressional authority or approval. There must
enactment of appropriate legislation prescribing the terms and conditions under which the President may
exercise the powers that will serves as the best assurance that due process of law would be observed.

CONSTANTINO V. CUISA
FACTS: During the Aquino regime, her administration came up w/ a scheme to reduce the country’s
external debt. The solution resorted to was to incur foreign debts. Three restructuring programs were
sought to initiate the program for foreign debts – they are basically buyback programs & bond-conversion
programs). Constantino as a taxpayer and in behalf of his minor children who are Filipino citizens, together
w/ FFDC averred that the buyback and bond-conversion schemes are onerous and they do not constitute
the loan “contract” or “guarantee” contemplated in Sec. 20, Art. 7 of the Constitution. And assuming that
the President has such power unlike other powers which may be validly delegated by the President, the
power to incur foreign debts is expressly reserved by the Constitution in the person of the President. They
argue that the gravity by which the exercise of the power will affect the Filipino nation requires that the
President alone must exercise this power. They argue that the requirement of prior concurrence of an entity
specifically named by the Constitution–the Monetary Board–reinforces the submission that not respondents
but the President “alone and personally” can validly bind the country. Hence, they would like Cuisia et al to
stop acting pursuant to the scheme.

ISSUE: Whether or not the president can validly delegate her debt power to the respondents.

HELD: There is no question that the president has borrowing powers and that the president may contract or
guarantee foreign loans in behalf of this country w/ prior concurrence of the Monetary Board. It makes no
distinction whatsoever and the fact that a debt or a loan may be onerous is irrelevant. On the other hand,
the president can delegate this power to her direct subordinates. The evident exigency of having the
Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the President to execute the debt-relief contracts is made
manifest by the fact that the process of establishing and executing a strategy for managing the
government’s debt is deep within the realm of the expertise of the Department of Finance, primed as it is to
raise the required amount of funding, achieve its risk and cost objectives, and meet any other sovereign
debt management goals. If the President were to personally exercise every aspect of the foreign borrowing
power, he/she would have to pause from running the country long enough to focus on a welter of time-
consuming detailed activities–the propriety of incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and choosing among
the many methods that may be taken toward this end, meeting countless times with creditor representatives
to negotiate, obtaining the concurrence of the Monetary Board, explaining and defending the negotiated
deal to the public, and more often than not, flying to the agreed place of execution to sign the documents.
This sort of constitutional interpretation would negate the very existence of cabinet positions and the
respective expertise which the holders thereof are accorded and would unduly hamper the President’s
effectivity in running the government. The act of the respondents are not unconstitutional.

Exception
There are certain acts which, by their very nature, cannot be validated by subsequent approval or ratification
by the President. There are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the
Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or ratification will validate the
exercise of any of those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, in his power to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus and proclaim martial law and the exercise by him of the benign prerogative of pardon
(mercy).
There are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would
involve the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive
prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of government. The declaration of martial law, the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power notwithstanding the
judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this special class that demands the exclusive
exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there
must be a showing that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import.
PEOPLE’S MOVEMENT FOR PRESS FREEDOM V. MANGLAPUS
GR 84642, September 13, 1988

FACTS: Petitioners, consisted of members of the mass media, were seeking information from the Presidents
representatives on the state of the then on going negotiations of the RP-US military base agreements. A
collision between governmental power o er the conduct of foreign affairs and the citizen's right to
information.

ISSUE: Whether the information sought by the petitioners are of public concern and are still covered by the
doctrine of executive privilege?

HELD: The court adopted the doctrine in U.S. v Cutiss-Wright Export Corp. that the President is the sole
organ of the nation in its negotiations with foreign countries. The court denied the petition, stressing that
secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom of
speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to information.

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS & COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS V. EASTERN SEA TRADING

3 SCRA 351 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Treaties vs Executive Agreements

FACTS: Eastern Sea Trading (EST) was a shipping company which imports from Japan onion and garlic into
the Philippines. In 1956, the Commissioner of Customs ordered the seizure and forfeiture of the import
goods because EST was not able to comply with Central Bank Circulars 44 and 45. The said circulars were
pursuant to Executive Order 328. On the other hand, EO 328 was the implementing law of the Trades and
Financial Agreements, an executive agreement, entered into between the Philippines and Japan. The said
executive agreement states, among others, that all import transactions between Japan and the Philippines
should be invoiced in dollar. In this case, the said items imported by EST from Japan were not invoiced in
dollar.

EST questioned the validity of the said EO averring that the executive agreement that the EO was
implementing was never concurred upon by the Senate. The issue was elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals
and the latter ruled in favor of EST. The Commissioner appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Agreement is subject to the concurrence by the Senate.

HELD: No, Executive Agreements are not like treaties which are subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of
the members of the Senate. Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties are
commonly referred to as executive agreements and are no less common in our scheme of government than
are the more formal instruments — treaties and conventions. They sometimes take the form of exchanges
of notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated ‘agreements’ or ‘protocols’.

The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and agreements —
whether denominated executive agreements or exchanges of notes or otherwise — begin, may sometimes
be difficult of ready ascertainment. It would be useless to undertake to discuss here the large variety of
executive agreements as such, concluded from time to time. Hundreds of executive agreements, other than
those entered into under the trade- agreements act, have been negotiated with foreign governments. . . . It
would seem to be sufficient, in order to show that the trade agreements under the act of 1934 are not
anomalous in character, that they are not treaties, and that they have abundant precedent in our history, to
refer to certain classes of agreements heretofore entered into by the Executive without the approval of the
Senate.

They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income tax on shipping profits, the
admission of civil aircraft, customs matters, and commercial relations generally, international claims, postal
matters, the registration of trade-marks and copyrights, etc. Some of them were concluded not by specific
congressional authorization but in conformity with policies declared in acts of Congress with respect to the
general subject matter, such as tariff acts; while still others, particularly those with respect to the settlement
of claims against foreign governments, were concluded independently of any legislation.

GO TEK V. DEPORTATION BOARD

GR No. L-46240, November 3, 1939

FACTS: Go Tek was to be deported as an undesirable alien for being an alleged sector commander and
intelligence and record officer of a guerilla unit in Sta. Cruz, Manila. Fake dollar checks were found on him in
violation of RPC 168 (illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank notes and other instruments of
credit)Go Tek filed MD, Board has no jdxn in view of the obiter in Qua Chee Gan (aliens can only be
deported on grounds specified by law)Go Tek filed action in CFI and a writ of preliminary injunction was
issuedCFI: after hearing, granted writ of prohibition, Board to desist. Mere possession of forged dollar
checks not ground for deportation under the Immigration Law. Deportation was premature. An alien should
be convicted 1 year + of a crime involving moral turpitude

ISSUE: WoN the Deportation Board can entertain deportation proceeding based on ground not specified in
the Immigration Law and although alien not yet convicted

HELD: Yes, the Board has jdxn to investigate Go Tek for illegal possession and alleged guerilla activities. The
charge was not premature. Di applicable ang QCG. Qua Chee Gan: in EO No. 398, of 1951, the Deportation
Board to issue a warrant of arrest upon the filing of formal charges against an alien, is "illegal" or
unconstitutional because it is contrary to 1935 Constitution that warrants shall issue only by JUDGE.2 ways of
deporting: (1) by order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to RAC sec. 69 and (2) by the
Commissioner of Immigration upon recommendation of the Board of Commissioners under immigration
Law, sec. 37The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens. That power may be exercise by
the Chief Executive "when he deems such action necessary for the peace and domestic tranquility of the
nation. When the Chief Executive finds that there are aliens whose continued in the country is injurious to
the public interest he may, even in the absence of express law, deport them.RAC Sec. 69 and EO 398 do not
specify the grounds for deportation. EO 398 merely provides that "the Deportation Board, motu proprio or
upon complaint of any person is authorized to conduct investigations in the manner prescribed in section
69 of the RAC to determine whether a subject of a foreign power in the Philippines is an undesirable alien
or not, and thereafter to recommend to the President of the Philippines the deportation of such alien."The
Chief Executive is the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of facts which warrant the deportation of
aliens as disclosed in an investigation conducted in accordance with 69. No other tribunal is at liberty to
reexamine or to controvert the sufficiency of the evidence on which he acted.The fact that an alien has been
acquitted in a of the charge does not prevent the deportation of such alien based on the same charge.
Such acquittal does not constitute res judicata in the deportation proceedings. Conviction of a crime is not
nto warrant deportation. (sorry copy paste sa lawphil medyo bano ang lawphil)The Deportation Board could
take cognizance of the charge of illegal importation against an alien as a ground for deportation, even if he
of the Deportation Board is merely recommendatory. The Chief Executive has to approve the board's
recommendatory Abuses or rents committed by the prosecutor or by the Board should first be brought to
his attention. Reversed and set aside. WPI dissolved. Remanded to Deportation Board for further
proceeding
SENATE V. ERMITA
(G.R. No. 169777) – Digest

FACTS: This case is regarding the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China
National Machinery and Equipment Group as well as the Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP, and the Fertilizer
scam.

The Senate Committees sent invitations to various officials of the Executive Department and AFP officials for
them to appear before Senate on Sept. 29, 2005. Before said date arrived, Executive Sec. Ermita sent a letter
to Senate President Drilon, requesting for a postponement of the hearing on Sept. 29 in order to “afford
said officials ample time and opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that they may better
enlighten the Senate Committee on its investigation.” Senate refused the request.

On Sept. 28, 2005, the President issued EO 464, effective immediately, which, among others, mandated that
“all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before either House of Congress.” Pursuant to this Order, Executive Sec. Ermita
communicated to the Senate that the executive and AFP officials would not be able to attend the meeting
since the President has not yet given her consent. Despite the lack of consent, Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen.
Gudani, among all the AFP officials invited, attended the investigation. Both faced court marshal for such
attendance.

ISSUE: Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress.

RULING:
To determine the constitutionality of E.O. 464, the Supreme Court discussed the two different functions of
the Legislature: The power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation and the power to conduct inquiry during
question hour.

QUESTION HOUR:

The power to conduct inquiry during question hours is recognized in Article 6, Section 22 of the 1987
Constitution, which reads:

“The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the
request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such
House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President
of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled
appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto.
When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the
appearance shall be conducted in executive session.”

The objective of conducting a question hour is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight
function. When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the
statutes which it had issued, the department heads’ appearance is merely requested.

The Supreme Court construed Section 1 of E.O. 464 as those in relation to the appearance of department
heads during question hour as it explicitly referred to Section 22, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution.
In aid of Legislation:

The Legislature’s power to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation is expressly recognized in Article 6, section21
of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:

“The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing
in, or affected by, such inquiries shall be respected.”

The power of inquiry in aid of legislation is inherent in the power to legislate. A legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is
intended to affect or change. And where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite
information, recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
attendance.

BELTRAN V. MAKASIAR

FACTS: Beltran broadcasted the statement that President Aquino hid under her bed during a coup d' etat.
The President sued for libel. beltran claimed that he can't be sued because the President was immune from
suit.

Pres. Cory Aquino filed a criminal complaint for libel against Beltran. Beltran argues that "the reasons which
necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit". He contends that if
criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may
subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction. This
would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she
would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury. Beltran also contends that he could not
be held liable for libel because of the privileged character of the publication. He also says that to allow the
libel case to proceed would produce a “chilling effect” on press freedom.

ISSUES:
(1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them
although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice
and, subsequently, by the President;

(2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a
warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine
probable cause; and

(3) whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings
against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.

HELD:
(1) The allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that
instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect
waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require
that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation
is deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit
counter-affidavits if he is so minded.

(2) What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to
satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard
the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges
would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of
concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts

(3) The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise
of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief
Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's time, also demands
undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked
only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a
criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to
prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if
so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's
jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's
prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.

(4) Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts. Court finds no basis at this stage to

ESTRADA V. DISIERTO
FACTS: Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines on June 30, 1998 with Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as his Vice President.

In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis “Chavit” Singson, a close friend of the President, alleged that he
had personally given Estrada money as payoff from jueteng hidden in a bank account known as “Jose
Velarde” – a grassroots-based numbers game. Singson’s allegation also caused controversy across the
nation, which culminated in the House of Representatives’ filing of an impeachment case against Estrada on
November 13, 2000. House Speaker Manny Villar fast-tracked the impeachment complaint. The
impeachment suit was brought to the Senate and an impeachment court was formed, with Chief
Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding officer. Estrada, pleaded “not guilty”.

The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd continued to grow at EDSA,
bolstered by students from private schools and left-wing organizations. Activists from the group Bayan and
Akbayan as well as lawyers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other bar associations joined in the
thousands of protesters.

On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines also withdrew their
support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.
At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the beginning of the protests and
maintains that he will not resign. He said that he wanted the impeachment trial to continue, stressing that
only a guilty verdict will remove him from office.

At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a snap presidential election to be held
concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this
election.

OnJanuary 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada
“constructively resigned his post”. Noon of the same day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath of office
in the presence of the crowd at EDSA, becoming the 14th president of the Philippines.
At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had “strong and serious doubts about the legality and
constitutionality of her proclamation as president”, but saying he would give up his office to avoid being an
obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace.
A heap of cases then succeeded Estrada’s leaving the palace, which he countered by filing a peition for
prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent
Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as
president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent
President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and
declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an
acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.”

ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not the case at bar a political or justiciable issue. If justiciable, whether or not petitioner
Estrada was a president-on-leave or did he truly resign.
2.) Whether or not petitioner may invoke immunity from suits.

HELD: The Court defines a political issue as “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.”

The Court made a distinction between the Aquino presidency and the Arroyo presidency. The Court said
that while the Aquino government was a government spawned by the direct demand of the people in
defiance to the 1973 Constitution, overthrowing the old government entirely, the Arroyo government on the
other hand was a government exercising under the 1987 constitution, wherein only the office of the
president was affected. In the former, it The question of whether the previous president (president Estrada)
truly resigned subjects it to judicial review. The Court held that the issue is legal and not political.

For the president to be deemed as having resigned, there must be an intent to resign and the intent must
be coupled by acts of relinquishment. It is important to follow the succession of events that struck petitioner
prior his leaving the palace. Furthermore, the quoted statements extracted from the Angara diaries, detailed
Estrada’s implied resignation On top of all these, the press release he issued regarding is acknowledgement
of the oath-taking of Arroyo as president despite his questioning of its legality and his emphasis on leaving
the presidential seat for the sake of peace. The Court held that petitioner Estrada had resigned by the use of
the totality test: prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material
relevance on the issue. As to the issue of the peitioner’s contention that he is immuned from suits, the Court
held that petitioner is no longer entitled to absolute immunity from suit. The Court added that, given the
intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a public office is a public trust, the petitioner,
as a non-sitting President, cannot claim executive immunity for his alleged criminal acts committed while a
sitting President. From the deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the
president from suit is concurrent only with his tenure(the term during which the incumbent actually holds
office) and not his term (time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the
interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another).
RICHARD NIXON V. A. ERNEST FITZGERALD
Citation. 457 U.S. 731, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 73 L. Ed. 2d 349, 1982 U.S.

BRIEF FACT SUMMARY. A cost-management expert for the Air Force was fired after he testified in front of
Congress about cost overruns in certain military projects. The Defendant, the President of the United States
Richard Nixon (Defendant), claimed that he made the firing decision.

SYNOPSIS OF RULE OF LAW. The President of the United States (President) is shielded by absolute
immunity from civil damages for acts done in his official capacity as President.

FACTS. The Plaintiff, Ernest Fitzgerald (Plaintiff), was fired from his job with the Air Force as cost-
management analyst because he embarrassed his superiors by testifying about certain cost-overruns. The
Air Force said he was fired because of reorganization and a reduction in force. An internal memo was
passed through White House staff saying the Plaintiff was a “top notch cost expert” but with “very low marks
of loyalty” and recommended that they “let him bleed.” At a press conference, the Defendant said he
personally made the decision to fire the Plaintiff. The White House later retracted the statement saying that
the Defendant had confused the Plaintiff with another employee. The Plaintiff brought suit and the
Defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground of absolute immunity from suit.

ISSUE. Does the President have absolute immunity from suit for actions taken in his official capacity?
Held. Yes, the President is immune from suit from his official acts as a matter of public policy rooted in the
structure of government mandated by the separation of power principle. This immunity stems from the
President’s unique position in the constitution scheme and the immense importance of his duties. The
Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) is worried about diverting the President’s energies to
the concerns related to private lawsuits.

DISSENT. Justice Byron White (J. White) felt that this decision places the President above the law.

DISCUSSION. The President must be empowered with the maximum ability to deal fearlessly and impartially
with the duties of his office. If not, his visibility would subject him to numerous suits for civil damages. To
keep the public safe, there is the constitutional remedy of impeachment, vigilant oversight by Congress and
the press.
WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON V. PAULA CORBIN JONES
Citation. 520 U.S. 681, 117 S. Ct. 1636, 37 L. Ed. 2d 945, 1997 U.S.

BRIEF FACT SUMMARY. The Defendant, the President of the United States William Clinton (Defendant) was
accused of sexually harassing the Plaintiff, Paula Jones (Plaintiff), while he was Governor of Arkansas. The
Defendant sought to postpone the proceeding of a civil lawsuit until after he left office.

SYNOPSIS OF RULE OF LAW. A sitting President does not enjoy temporary immunity from all civil suits until
he has left office.

FACTS. In 1994, the Plaintiff filed suit against the Defendant regarding sexual advances (in a hotel), which
occurred while the Defendant was Governor of Arkansas in 1991. The Defendant was a speaker at the
conference and the Plaintiff was a state employee working at the reception desk. The Plaintiff claims she was
summoned by a state trooper to the Defendant’s suite where he made sexual advances towards her that
she rejected. As a result, her supervisors were hostile and rude to her and her duties were changed to
punish her for rejecting those advances. The Plaintiff filed suit seeking actual and punitive damages.

ISSUE. Does the President have immunity from all suits against him while he occupies the office?

HELD. No, a sitting President is not immune from suit for unofficial acts. The separation of powers doctrine
does not require federal courts to stay all private actions against the president until he leaves office. The
Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) distinguishes this matter from a situation where a
public official is sued based on some sort of official action taken. In the latter situation the public official is
generally granted immunity. The Defendant’s Separation of Powers argument fails because there is no
indication that the judiciary is being asked to perform any function that might in some way be described as
executive, or that this decision will curtail the scope of official powers of the Executive Branch. Moreover, the
Supreme Court observed that this decision would not result in a deluge of private litigation against sitting
presidents.

DISCUSSION. Although the Defendant claims that in all but the most exceptional cases, the United States
Constitution (Constitution) affords the President temporary immunity from civil damages litigation arising
out of events that took place before he took office, it is not the case. The Defendant’s argument rests on
neither history nor precedent.