AKBAYAN V.

COMELEC

Facts: Petitioners seek to direct COMELEC to conduct a special registration before the
May 14, 2001 General Elections. Petitioners requested for an additional two days of
registration to accommodate those youth, who failed to meet the deadline set by
COMELEC.

The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 3584 denying the request for additional registration
of voters on the ground that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 explicitly provides that no registration
shall be conducted during the period starting 120 days before a regular election and that
the Commission has no more time left to accomplish all pre-election activities.

Aggrieved by the denial, petitioners filed before the Supreme Court which seeks to set
aside the COMELEC Resolution and/or to declare Section 8 of R. A. 8189 unconstitutional
insofar as said provision effectively causes the disenfranchisement of petitioners.

Ruling: Statutory construction- courts should endeavor to harmonize related laws,

if they can be done by any fair and reasonable interpretation

Every new statute should be construed in connection with those already existing in
relation to the same subject matter and all should be made to harmonize and stand together,
if they can be done by any fair and reasonable interpretation. Interpretare et concordare
legibus est optimus interpretandi, which means that the best method of interpretation is
that which makes laws consistent with other laws. Accordingly, courts of justice, when
confronted with apparently conflicting statutes, should endeavor to reconcile them instead of
declaring outright the invalidity of one against the other. Courts should harmonize them,
if this is possible, because they are equally the handiwork of the same legislature.

METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, PETITIONER, V. LIBERTY

CORRUGATED BOXES MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.

Facts: Respondent Liberty Corrugated Boxes Manufacturing Corp. obtained various credit
accommodations and loan facilities from petitioner amounting to P19,940,000.00. To secure
its loans, Liberty mortgaged to Metrobank 12 lots in Valenzuela City.

Liberty claimed that it could not meet its obligations to Metrobank because of the Asian
Financial Crisis, and the serious sickness of its Founder and President

Metrobank filed its Comment/Opposition. It argued that Liberty was not qualified for
corporate rehabilitation;

The Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court's finding that debtor corporations could
still avail themselves of the remedy of rehabilitation under the Interim Rules of
Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation (Interim Rules) even if they were already in default.

Petitioner argues that respondent can no longer file a petition for corporate rehabilitation. It
claims that Rule 4, Section 1 of the Interim Rules restricts the kind of debtor who can file
petitions for corporate rehabilitation.[29] Petitioner insists that the phrase "who foresees the
impossibility of meeting its debts when they respectively fall due" must be construed plainly
to mean that an element of foresight is required.[30] Because foresight is required, the
debts of the corporation should not have matured (due).[31]
Ruling: The Interim Rules provide for a liberal construction of its provisions:
RULE2, SECTION 2. Construction. - These Rules shall be liberally construed to carry out the
objectives…

To adopt petitioner's interpretation would undermine the purpose of the Interim Rules.
There is no reason why corporations with debts that may have already matured
should not be given the opportunity to recover and pay their debtors in an orderly
fashion.

In this case, the phrase "any debtor who foresees the impossibility of meeting its debts when
they respectively fall due" in Rule 4, Section 1 of the Interim Rules need not refer to a
specific period or point in time when the debts mature. It may refer to the debtor
corporation's general realization that it will not be able to fulfill its obligations— a
realization that may come before default.

Construing the phrase "when they respectively fall due" to mean that the debtor must already
be in default defeats the clear purpose of the lawmakers. It unjustly limits
rehabilitation to corporations with matured obligations.

SAGUISAG V OCHOA

Facts: Petitioners respectfully prays declaring the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement
(EDCA) entered into by the respondents for the Philippine government, with the United States
of America, UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND INVALID and to permanently enjoin its
implementation.

Petitioners claim that the court erred when it ruled that EDCA was not a treaty.[5] In
connection to this, petitioners move that EDCA must be in the form of a treaty in order
to comply with the constitutional restriction under Section 25, Article XVIII (18) of the
1987 Constitution

Section 25 Article XVIII. The general rule is that foreign bases, troops, and facilities are
not allowed in the Philippines.

Petitioners assert that this Court contradicted itself when it interpreted the word "allowed
in" to refer to the initial entry of foreign bases, troops, and facilities, based on the fact that
the

plain meaning of the provision in question referred to prohibiting the return of foreign bases,
troops, and facilities except under a treaty concurred in by the Senate.[8]

Ruling:

On verba legis interpretation:

This argument fails to consider the function and application of the verba legis rule.

Secondly, by interpreting "allowed in" as referring to an initial entry, the Court has simply
applied the plain meaning of the words in the particular provision.[10] Necessarily, once
entry has been established by a subsisting treaty, latter instances of entry need not
be embodied by a separate treaty. After all, the Constitution did not state that foreign
military bases, troops, and facilities shall not subsist or exist in the Philippines.

Petitioners' own interpretation and application of the verba legis rule will in fact result in an
absurdity, which legal construction strictly abhors.[11] If this Court accept the essence of
their argument that every instance of entry by foreign bases, troops, and facilities must
be set out in detail in a new treaty, then the resulting bureaucratic impossibility of
negotiating a treaty for the entry of a head of State's or military officer's security detail,
meetings of foreign military officials in the country, and indeed military exercises such
as Balikatan will occupy much of, if not all of the official working time by various
government agencies. This is precisely the reason why any valid mode of interpretation
must take into account how the law is exercised and its goals effected. [12] Ut res magis valeat
quam pereat.

In this particular case, we find that EDCA did not go beyond the framework. The entry of
US troops has long been authorized under a valid and subsisting treaty, which is the Visiting
Forces Agreement (VFA).[14] Reading the VFA along with the longstanding Mutual Defense
Treaty (MDT)[15] led this Court to the conclusion that an executive agreement such as the
EDCA was well within the bounds of the obligations imposed by both treaties.

US V. HART

Facts:
The appellants, Hart, Miller, and Natividad, were found guilty on a charge of vagrancy
under the provisions of Act No. 519. All three appealed and presented evidence showing that
each of the defendants was earning a living at a lawful trade or business sufficient enough
to support themselves. However, the Attorney-General defended his clients by arguing that
in Section 1 of Act No. 519, the phrase “no visible means of support” only applies to
the clause “tramping or straying through the country” and not the first clause which
states that “every person found loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses,”
thus making the 3 appellants guilty of vagrancy. He further argued that it been intended
for “without visible means of support” to qualify the first part of the clause, either the comma
after gambling houses would have been omitted, or else a comma after country would
have been inserted.

Ruling: That the absence of visible means of support or a lawful calling is necessary
under these statutes to a conviction for loitering around saloons, dram shops, and
gambling houses and not only to those tramping or straying through the country.

When the meaning of a legislative enactment is in question, it is the duty of the

courts to ascertain, if possible, the true legislative intention, and adopt that construction
of the statute which will give it effect.

The construction finally adopted should be based upon something more substantial
than the mere punctuation found in the printed Act.

If the punctuation of the statute gives it a meaning which is reasonable and in apparent
accord with the legislative will, it may be used as an additional argument for adopting
the literal meaning of the words of the statute as thus punctuated.
But an argument based upon punctuation alone is not conclusive, and the courts
will not hesitate to a change the punctuation when necessary, to give to the Act the
effect intended by the Legislature, disregarding superfluous or incorrect punctuation
marks, and inserting others where necessary.

And since it was proven that all three of the defendants were earning a living by
legitimate means at a level of comfort higher than usual, Hart, Miller and Natividad
were acquitted, with the costs de oficio.

CHAVEZ V. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL

Facts:
 In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added
to the JBC
 As two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House
of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.
 JBC En Banc, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of
Representatives one full vote each.
 Escudero and Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as
representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned
in this petition. It should mean one representative each from both Houses which
comprise the entire Congress.
 Respondent contends that the phrase “a representative of congress” refers that
both houses of congress should have one representative each, and that these two
houses are permanent and mandatory components of “congress” as part of the
bicameral system of legislature. Both houses have their respective powers in
performance of their duties.
 Art VIII Sec 8 of the constitution provides for the component of the JBC to be 7
members only with only one representative from congress.

Ruling: The court held that the phrase “a representative of congress” should be construed
as to having only one representative that would come from either house, not both.
That the framers of the constitution only intended for one seat of the JBC to be allotted for
the legislative.

Since there is no liaison between the two houses, the term “Congress” must be taken
to mean the entire legislative department. The Constitution mandates that the JBC
be composed of seven (7) members only.

From a simple reading of the above-quoted provision, it can readily be discerned that the
provision is clear and unambiguous. It goes to its composition where the ex officio or
special members of the JBC composed of the Chief Justice, who shall be its Chairman, the
Secretary of Justice and “a representative of Congress.”

The use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is unequivocal
and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of
the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1)
representative to the JBC.

Had it been the intention that more than one (1) representative from the legislature
would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.
It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language
employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed. Verba legis non est recedendum – from the words of a
statute there should be no departure.

It is worthy to note that the seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical
purpose, that there should be a stalemate in voting. This underlying reason leads the Court
to conclude that a single vote may not be divided into half (1/2), since it might cause
disorder and eventually muddle the JBC’s voting process,

The respondents insist that at the time the said provision was being drafted, the Framers
initially intended a unicameral form of Congress. Then, when the Constitutional Commission
eventually adopted a bicameral form of Congress, the Framers, through oversight, failed
to amend Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution.

OCAMPO V ENRIQUEZ

Facts: Secretary of National Defense Delfin Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to the

Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), General Ricardo Visaya directing
the latter to undertake preparations to have the remains of the late former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos be transported from Ilocos Norte in order to be interred at the
Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB), in accordance with the verbal order of President
Rodrigo Duterte to implement his election campaign promise

Petitioners contend that the interment of Marcos at the LNMB will desecrate it as a sacred
and hallowed place and a revered national shrine where the mortal remains of our
country's great men and women are interred for the inspiration and emulation of the
present generation and generations to come.

Ruling: The Libingan Ng Mga Bayani is not a national shrine covered under PD
105, but a national military shrine under the jurisdiction of the PVAO

Marcos then issued Proclamation No. 208, which excluded the LNMB from the Fort
Bonifacio military reservation and reserved the LNMB for national shrine purposes
under the administration of the National Shrines Commission (NSC) under the DND.

P.D. No. 105 does not apply to the LNMB. Despite the fact that P.D. No. 208 predated P.D.
No. 105, the LNMB was not expressly included in the national shrines enumerated in
the latter. The proposition that the LNMB is implicitly covered in the catchall phrase "and
others which may be proclaimed in the future as National Shrines" is erroneous because:

(b) Following the canon of statutory construction known as ejusdem generis, the LNMB is
not a site "of the birth, exile, imprisonment, detention or death of great and eminent
leaders of the nation." (which places National Shrines include)
(c) Since its establishment, the LNMB has been a military shrine under the
jurisdiction of the PVAO.

The NHCP manages, maintains and administers national shrines, monuments, historical
sites, edifices and landmarks of significant historico-cultural value.
Excluded, however, from the jurisdiction of the NHCP are the military memorials and
battle monuments declared as national shrines, which have been under the administration,
maintenance and development of the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (PVAO) of the DND

IDEALS, INC. V. PSALM CORP.

Facts: Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM) is a

government-owned and controlled corporation created by virtue of Republic Act No.
9136, otherwise known as the "Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001" (EPIRA).
The EPIRA provided a framework for the restructuring of the electric power industry, including
the privatization of the assets of the National Power Corporation (NPC).

In August 2005, PSALM commenced the privatization of the 246-megawatt (MW) Angat
Hydro-Electric Power Plant (AHEPP) located in San Lorenzo, Norzagaray, Bulacan.

Petitioners contend that PSALM should have exercised the discretion not to proceed
with the privatization of AHEPP.

Ruling: Privatization of AHEPP mandatory under EPIRA (The proposed transfer to

MWSS which is another government entity would contravene the mandate under
EPIRA)

EPIRA mandated that all such assets shall be sold through public bidding with the
exception of Agus and Pulangui complexes in Mindanao, the privatization of which was
left to the discretion of PSALM in consultation with Congress. The intent of Congress
not to exclude the AHEPP from the privatization of NPC generation assets is evident
from the express provision exempting only the aforesaid two power plants in Mindanao.

Had the legislature intended that PSALM should likewise be allowed discretion in case of
NPC generation assets other than those mentioned in Sec. 47, it could have explicitly
provided for the same. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the express inclusion
of one implies the exclusion of all others.

The Court therefore cannot sustain the position of petitioners, adopted by respondent
MWSS, that PSALM should have exercised the discretion not to proceed with the privatization
of AHEPP, or at least the availability of the option to transfer the said facility to another
government entity such as MWSS. Having no such discretion in the first place, PSALM
committed no grave abuse of discretion when it commenced the sale process of
AHEPP pursuant to the EPIRA.

Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council

Facts:

 In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added
to the JBC
 As two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House
of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.
 JBC En Banc, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of
Representatives one full vote each.
  Escudero and Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as
representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned
in this petition. It should mean one representative each from both Houses which
comprise the entire Congress.
 Respondent contends that the phrase “a representative of congress” refers that
both houses of congress should have one representative each, and that these two
houses are permanent and mandatory components of “congress” as part of the
bicameral system of legislature. Both houses have their respective powers in
performance of their duties.
 Art VIII Sec 8 of the constitution provides for the component of the JBC to be 7
members only with only one representative from congress.

Ruling:

In other words, the Court cannot supply the legislative omission. According to the
rule of casus omissus “a case omitted is to be held as intentionally omitted.”34 “The
principle proceeds from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has
been omitted from a legislative enumeration.”35 Pursuant to this, “the Court cannot under its
power of interpretation supply the omission even though the omission may have resulted from
inadvertence or because the case in question was not foreseen or contemplated.”36 “The
Court cannot supply what it thinks the legislature would have supplied had its
attention been called to the omission, as that would be judicial legislation.”37

Stated differently, the Court has no power to add another member by judicial
construction.

MAPA V. ARROYO

Facts:
 Mapa bought lots from Labrador Development Corporation which are payable in
ten years. Mapa defaulted to pay the installment dues and continued to do so
despite constant reminders by Labrador. The latter informed Mapa that the contracts
to sell the lots were cancelled, but
 Mapa invoked Clause 20 of the four contracts. Said clause obligates Labrador to
complete the development of the lots, except those requiring the services of a
public utility company or the government, within 3 years from the date of the contract.
 Petitioner contends that P.D. 957 requires Labrador to provide the “facilities,
improvements, and infrastructures for the lots, and other forms of
development” if offered and indicated in the approved subdivision plans

Ruling: Labrador has every right to cancel the contracts of sale, pursuant to Clause
7 of the said contract for the reason of the lapse of five years of default payment from Mapa.
P.D. 957 does not apply because it was enacted long after the execution of the
contracts involved, and, other than those provided in Clause 20, no further written
commitment was made by the developer.
We further reject petitioner's strained and tenuous application of the so-called doctrine of
last antecedent in the interpretation of Section 20 and, correlatively, of Section 21.
He would thereby have the enumeration of "facilities, improvements, infrastructures and other
forms of development" interpreted to mean that the demonstrative phrase "which are offered
and indicated in the approved subdivision plans, etc." refer only to "other forms of
development" and not to "facilities, improvements and infrastructures." The
complete and applicable rule is ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur
sentencia. 9 Relative words refer to the nearest antecedent, unless it be prevented by the
context.

In the present case, The words “which are offered and indicated in the subdivision or
condominium plans” refer not only to “other forms of development” but also to “facilities,
improvements, and infrastructures”. The word “and” is not meant to separate words, but
is a conjunction used to denote a joinder or a union.

CIR vs. PLDT

Facts: For equipment, machineries and spare parts it imported for its business PLDT
paid the BIR the amount of P164,510,953.00. For similar importations, PLDT paid
P116,041,333.00 value-added tax (VAT).

On March 15, 1994, PLDT addressed a letter to the BIR seeking a confirmatory ruling on
its tax exemption privilege under Section 12 of R.A. 7082 to the effect that as franchise
grantee, it is liable to pay a 3% franchise tax on gross receipts which shall be in lieu of
all taxes on its franchise or earnings thereof.

In reply, the BIR issued Ruling No. UN-140-94 holding that in view of the "in lieu of all taxes"
provision under Section 12 of R.A. 7082, PLDT is exempt from VAT on its importation of
equipment, machineries and spare parts needed in its franchise operations.

Armed with the BIR ruling, PLDT filed a claim for tax credit/refund of the VAT,
compensating taxes, advance sales taxes and other taxes it had been paying "in
connection with its importation of various equipment, machineries and spare parts needed for
its operations".

The issue is whether the exemption under the "in lieu of all taxes" clause covers direct taxes
only or includes indirect taxes such as VAT, etc.

Ruling: The clause "in lieu of all taxes" in Section 12 of RA 7082 applies to direct
taxes only, not indirect taxes

The clause "in lieu of all taxes" in Section 12 of RA 7082 is immediately followed by the
limiting or qualifying clause "on this franchise or earnings thereof", suggesting that
the exemption is limited to taxes imposed directly on PLDT since taxes pertaining to
PLDT's franchise or earnings are its direct liability. Accordingly, indirect taxes, not
being taxes on PLDT's franchise or earnings, are outside the purview of the "in
lieu" provision.
14. It may be so that in Maceda vs. Macaraig, Jr. the Court held that an exemption from "all
taxes" granted to the National Power Corporation (NPC) under its charter includes both direct
and indirect taxes. But far from providing PLDT comfort, the correct lesson of Maceda is
that an exemption from "all taxes" excludes indirect taxes, unless the exempting
statute, like NPC's charter, is so couched as to include indirect tax from the
exemption.

If we adhere to the interpretation of the law that the "in lieu of all taxes" clause
encompasses the totality of all taxes collectible under the Revenue Code, then, the
immediately following limiting clause "on this franchise and its earnings" would be
nothing more than a pure jargon bereft of effect and meaning whatsoever. Needless to
stress, this kind of interpretation cannot be accorded a governing sway following the
familiar legal maxim redendo singula singulis meaning, take the words distributively
and apply the reference. Under this principle, each word or phrase must be given its
proper connection in order to give it proper force and effect, rendering none of them
useless or superfluous.

DIOKNO V REHABILITATION FINANCE CORPORATION

Facts:
 Petitioner, the holder of a back pay certificate of indebtedness issued under RA
304, sought to compel Respondent Company to accept his back pay certificate
as payment of his loan from the latter.
 His basis was Sec. 2 of RA 304, which provides that “investment funds or banks
or other financial institutions owned or controlled by the government shall
subject to availability of loanable funds … accept or discount at not more than
two per centum per annum for ten years such certificate” for certain specified
purposes.
 Respondent company contended however that the word “shall” used in this
particular section of the law is merely directory.
 The lower court sustained Respondent Company.

Ruling: The appeal involves the interpretation of section 2 of Republic Act No. 304,
which provides:

. . . And provided, also, That investment funds or banks or other financial institutions
owned or controlled by the Government shall, subject to availability of loanable
funds, . . .

It is true that in its ordinary signification the word "shall" is imperative.

In common or ordinary parlance, and in its ordinary signification, the term "shall' is a word
of command, and one which has always or which must be given a compulsory meaning;
as denoting obligation.

However, the rule is not absolute; it may be construed as "may" (permissive,

directory, discretion to use it), when so required by the context or by the intention
of the statute.

The word "shall" is generally regarded as imperative, but in some contexts it is

given a permissive meaning, the intended meaning being determined by what is
intended by the statute.

In other words, acceptance or discount is to be permitted only if there are loanable

funds. Having come to the conclusion that section 2 of the Backpay Law is directory
merely. The acceptance and discount of backpay certificates has been placed within the
sound discretion of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, and subject to the availability of
loanable funds

ENRIQUEZ V ENRIQUEZ

Facts:
  Maximo Enriquez, later substituted by his heirs (respondents), filed with the RTC
Branch 71 of Iba, Zambales a complaint for partition of land in Amungan against
petitioners.
 He alleged that he owns 10/18 undivided portion of the property, 9/18 by purchase
and 1/18 by inheritance; and that petitioners have been residing in the premises
without his knowledge and consent, thereby depriving him of his undivided share
of the property.
 RTC-ordered petitioners to vacate the property and to surrender possession
thereof to respondents.
 July 3, 1998-petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. Approved on July
7, 1998.
 CA-dismissed the appeal of petitioners for their failure to pay appellate court
docket fee.
 Hence, this petition for review

Ruling: Petitioners admit that the governing Rule on their payment of appellate court docket
fee is Section 4, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which
provides:

"Section 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. - Within the period for taking an
appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final
order appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees…

Petitioners maintain that the trial court must first send them a notice to pay the appellate
court docket fee and other lawful fees within the period for taking an appeal. Hence, they
waited for the notice for them to pay the appellate court docket fee. When they did
not receive any, they paid the docket fee to the trial court.

However, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which took effect on July 1,
1997, now require that appellate docket and other lawful fees must be paid within
the same period for taking an appeal. This is clear from the opening sentence of Section
4, Rule 41 of the same Rules that, "(W)ithin the period for taking an appeal, the
appellant shall pay to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final order
appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees."

The use of the word "shall" underscores the mandatory character of the Rule. The
term "shall" is a word of command, and one which has always or which must be given a
compulsory meaning, and it is generally imperative or mandatory.[4] Petitioners cannot
give a different interpretation to the Rule and insist that payment of docket fee shall be
made only upon their receipt of a notice from the trial court to pay. For it is a rule in statutory
construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the
context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be interpreted together with the other parts,
and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.[5] Indeed, petitioners
cannot deviate from the Rule.

GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES VS. COMELEC (2016)

G.R. No. 221697 and G.R. Nos. 221698-700 | 2016-03-08

FACTS:
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned as a newborn
infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar on September 3, 1968.
Edgardo turned over custody over the infant to his relatives, Emiliano Militar and his wife. On
September 6, 1968, Emiliano registered petitioner as a foundling with the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo ).

When petitioner was five years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando
Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a petition for her adoption in the
MTC. On May 13, 1974, the trial court granted their petition and ordered that petitioner's
name be changed from "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar" to "Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe." However, it was only on May 4, 2006 that the OCR-Iloilo issued a new Certificate
of Live Birth in the name of Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.

Although petitioner initially enrolled in the University of the Philippines, she opted to continue
her studies abroad and left for the United States of America in 1988. Petitioner graduated in
1991 from Boston College where she earned her Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Studies.

On July 27, 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Llamanzares, a citizen of both the Philippines
and the U.S., in San Juan City. Desirous of being with her husband who was then based in
the U.S., the couple flew back to the U.S. two days after the wedding ceremony or on July
29, 1991.

While in the U.S., the petitioner gave birth to a son in April 1992. Two daughters followed in
July 1998 and June 2004, both born in the Philippines.

On October 18, 2001, petitioner became a naturalized American citizen. She obtained a U.S.
Passport in December 2001.

On April 8, 2004, petitioner came back to the Philippines to support her father's candidacy for
President in the May 2004 elections. She returned to the U.S. on July 8, 2004.

On December 13, 2004, petitioner rushed back to the Philippines upon learning of her father's
deteriorating medical condition. Her father slipped into a coma and eventually expired. The
petitioner returned to the US on February 3, 2005

Petitioner and her husband decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines
sometime in the first quarter of 2005. The couple began preparing for their resettlement
including notification of their children's schools that they will be transferring to Philippine
schools for the next semester; coordination with property movers for the relocation of their
household goods to the Philippines. As early as 2004, petitioner already quit her job in the
U.S.

Petitioner came home to the Philippines on May 24, 2005. Her three children immediately
followed while her husband was forced to stay in the U.S. to complete pending projects as
well as to arrange the sale of their family home there. In the second half of 2005, she and
her husband purchased a condominium unit at One Wilson Place Condominium in San Juan
City.

In early 2006, petitioner and her husband acquired a lot in Corinthian Hills, Quezon City where
they built their family home and continue to reside up to the present. Her children of school
age also began attending Philippine private schools.
On July 7, 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.
In its July 18, 2006 Order, the Bureau of Immigration (BI) declared that petitioner is deemed
to have reacquired her Philippine citizenship. She thereafter secured a Philippine passport.

On October 6, 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed petitioner as Chairperson of

the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB). Before assuming her post,
petitioner executed an "Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America
and Renunciation of American Citizenship". From then on, petitioner stopped using her
American passport.

On December 9, 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of
Nationality of the United States" effective October 21, 2010.

On October 2, 2012, petitioner filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she answered "6 years and 6 months" to the question
"Period of residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013." Having obtained the highest
number of votes, she was proclaimed Senator on May 16, 2013.

On October 15, 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016 Elections.
In her COC, the petitioner declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that her residence
in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven (11)
months counted from May 24, 2005. This triggered the filing of several petitions in the
Comelec against her.

G.R. No. 221697

A day after petitioner filed her COC for President, Estrella Elamparo filed a petition in the
Comelec to deny due course or cancel said COC on the ground that petitioner committed
material misrepresentation in her COC when she claimed that was a natural born Filipino
citizen and that she had complied with the 10 year residency requirement.

Elamparo claimed that international law does not confer natural-born status and Filipino
citizenship on foundlings. Even assuming that petitioner was a natural-born Filipino, she is
deemed to have lost that status when she became a naturalized American citizen. According
to Elamparo, natural-born citizenship must be continuous from birth.

On the matter of petitioner's residency, Elamparo pointed out that petitioner was bound by
the sworn declaration she made in her 2012 COC for Senator wherein she indicated that she
had resided in the country for only six years and six months as of May 2013 Elections.
Moreover, petitioner's residence could only be counted at the earliest from July 2006, when
she reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 9225. Petitioner also allegedly failed to
reestablish her domicile in the Philippines.

The COMELEC Second Division promulgated a Resolution finding that petitioner's COC
contained material representations which are false. Hence, petitioner's COC was cancelled.
The COMELEC En Banc denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

G.R. Nos. 221698-700

Three separate petitions were filed by Francisco S. Tatad, Antonio P. Contreras and Amado
D. Valdez against petitioner before the Comelec.

Tatad filed a petition to disqualify petitioner under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
alleging that petitioner lacks the requisite residency and citizenship to qualify her for the
Presidency. He averred that the fact that foundlings were not expressly included in the
categories of citizens in the 193 5 Constitution is indicative of the framers' intent to exclude
them. Therefore, the burden lies on petitioner to prove that she is a natural-born citizen.
Tatad asserts that international conventions and treaties are not self-executory and that local
legislations are necessary in order to give effect to treaty obligations assumed by the
Philippines. He also stressed that there is no standard state practice that automatically confers
natural-born status to foundlings.

Contreras' petition limited the attack to the residency issue. He contended that the reckoning
period for computing petitioner's residency in the Philippines should be from 18 July 2006,
the date when her petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship was approved by the BI.
Petitioner's physical presence in the country before that date could not be valid evidence of
reacquisition of her Philippine domicile since she was then living here as an American citizen
and as such, she was governed by the Philippine immigration laws.

The Comelec First Division ruled that petitioner is not a natural-born citizen and that she failed
to complete the ten year residency requirement, and cancelled petitioner's COC. The
COMELEC En Banc denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Present petition

Petitioner instituted the present petitions for certiorari to assail the Comelec resolutions on
the ground of grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE:

1. WON Poe-Llamanzares satisfy the requirement of being a natural-born citizen of the

Philippines allowing her to run for the 2013 Presidential Election.

2. WON COMELEC erred in cancelling Peo-Llamanzares' COC on the ground that she failed to
complete the ten year residency requirement

RULING:

1. Yes. This is the inevitable conclusion reached when the entirety of the provisions of the
Constitution is considered alongside the contemporary construction based on statutes and
international norms that form part of the law of the land.

a. 1930 Hague Convention and 1961 UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness

(binding as generally accepted principles of international law)

The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the Philippines, are generally
accepted principles of international law. (1) The first is Article 14 of the 1930 Hague
Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws under which a
foundling is presumed to have the "nationality of the country of birth" (2) The second is Article
2 of the 1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness under which a
foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country where he is found.

That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to the 1961 Convention
on the Reduction of Statelessness does not mean that their principles are not binding. While
the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention, it is a signatory to the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights, Article 15(1) of which effectively affirms Article 14 of the 1930
Hague Convention. Article 2 of the 1961 "United Nations Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness" merely "gives effect" to Article 15(1) of the UDHR. (Razon vs. Tagitis and
Mijares v. Ranada)

b. Repatriation under RA 9225 resulted in Grace Poe's reacquisition of her status as a natural
born Filipino citizen

The COMELEC ruled that petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under R.A. No. 9225 did not
result in the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship. The COMELEC reasoned that since the
applicant must perform an act, what is reacquired is not "natural-born" citizenship but only
plain "Philippine citizenship."

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino
citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
(Bengson Ill v. HRET)

COMELEC's position that natural-born status must be continuous was already rejected in
Bengson Ill v. HRET where the phrase "from birth" was clarified to mean at the time of birth:
"A person who at the time of his birth, is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born
citizen thereof." Neither is "repatriation" an act to "acquire or perfect" one's citizenship. In
Bengson Ill v. HRET, this Court pointed out that there are only two types of citizens under the
1987 Constitution: natural-born citizen and naturalized, and that there is no third category
for repatriated citizens.

---

2. Yes. The statements on residency made in 2012 COC is not conclusive. It is the fact of
residence, as borne out by the evidence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy, which
shall be determinative.

The COMELEC ruled that petitioner's claim of residence of ten (10) years and eleven (11)
months in her 2015 COC was false because she put six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as
"period of residence before May 13, 2013" in her 2012 COC for Senator. In doing so, the
COMELEC automatically assumed as true the statement in the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC
as false.

According to petitioner, in her 2012 COC, she reckoned residency from April-May 2006 which
was the period when the U.S. house was sold and her husband returned to the Philippines.
Petitioner could have reckoned residence from a date earlier given the evidence that she had
returned a year before. Such evidence would include her passport and the school records of
her children.

It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 COC as a binding and
conclusive admission against petitioner. It could be given in evidence against her, yes, but it
was by no means conclusive. There is precedent after all where a candidate's mistake as to
period of residence made in a COC was overcome by evidence. (Romualdez-Marcos v.
COMELEC)

It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be

decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitutions residency
qualification requirement." The COMELEC ought to have looked at the evidence presented and
see if petitioner was telling the truth that she was in the Philippines from 24 May 2005. Had
the COMELEC done its duty, it would have seen that the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC both
correctly stated the pertinent period of residency.

***

ESCRA Syllabus:

Citizenship; Natural-born Citizens; View that being Filipina at birth, petitioner did not have to
do anything to perfect her Filipino citizenship. She is natural-born.—Even if we assume that
it was petitioner who had the burden of evidence, a complete and faithful reading of the
provisions of the entire Constitution, together with the evidence that petitioner presented,
leads to the inescapable conclusion that as a newborn abandoned by her parents in Jaro, Iloilo
in 1968, she was at birth Filipina. Thus, being Filipina at birth, petitioner did not have to do
anything to perfect her Filipino citizenship. She is natural-born. Furthermore, there is no shred
of evidence to rebut the circumstances of her birth. There is no shred of evidence that can
lead to the conclusion that both her parents were not Filipino citizens. The whole case of
private respondents, as well as the basis of the Commission on Elections’ Resolutions, is a
presumption that all newborns abandoned by their parents even in rural areas in the
Philippines are presumed not to be Filipinos. Private respondents’ approach requires that
those who were abandoned — even because of poverty or shame — must exert extraordinary
effort to search for the very same parents who abandoned them and might not have wanted
to be identified in order to have a chance to be of public

service.

Foundlings; View that the first approach is to assume as a matter of constitutional

interpretation that all foundlings found in the Philippines, being presumptively born to either
a Filipino biological father or a Filipina biological mother, are natural-born, unless there is
substantial proof to the contrary; The second approach is to read the definition of natural-
born in Section 2 in relation to Article IV, Section 1(2). Section 1(2) requires that the father
or the mother is a Filipino citizen.—The first approach is to assume as a matter of
constitutional interpretation that all foundlings found in the Philippines, being presumptively
born to either a Filipino biological father or a Filipina biological mother, are natural-born,
unless there is substantial proof to the contrary. There must be substantial evidence to show
that there is a reasonable probability that both, not just one, of the biological parents are not
Filipino citizens. This is the inevitable conclusion reached when the entirety of the provisions
of the Constitution is considered alongside the contemporary construction based on statutes
and international norms that form part of the law of the land. It is also the most viable
conclusion given the purpose of the requirement that candidates for President must be
natural-born. The second approach is to read the definition of natural-born in Section 2 in
relation to Article IV, Section 1(2). Section 1(2) requires that the father or the mother is a
Filipino citizen.
EBARLE V SUCALDITO
FACTS:
The petitioner, then provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur and a candidate for reelection
in the local elections of 1971, seeks injunctive relief in two separate petitions, to enjoin further
proceedings of his criminal cases, as well as I.S. Nos. 1-70, 2-71, 4-71, 5-71, 6-71, and 7-
71 of the respondent Fiscal's office of the said city, all in the nature of prosecutions for
violation of certain provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and various
provisions of the Revised Penal Code. Principally, the petitioner relies on the failure of the
Respondents City Fiscal and the Anti-Graft League to comply with the provisions of Executive
Order No. 264, "OUTLINING THE PROCEDURE BY WHICH COMPLAINANTS CHARGING
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES WITH COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES
SHOULD BE GUIDED," preliminary to their criminal recourses.

NOTE:

Certain rules of procedure is not being complied with.

Must be in the Office of the President – not the courts. – ISSUE.

Criminal cases –

RPC provides for the crimes.

R.A. 5180 – governs for procedure courts for preliminary investigation (at the case at bar)

But now, it is the Rules of Procedure

ISSUE:

Whether or not EO 264 is applicable in the case at bar.

HELD:
No. It is plain from the very wording of the Order that it has exclusive application to
administrative, not criminal complaints. The very title speaks of "COMMISSION OF
IRREGULARITIES." There is no mention, not even by implication, of criminal "offenses," that
is to say, "crimes." While "crimes" amount to "irregularities," the Executive Order could have
very well referred to the more specific term had it intended to make itself applicable thereto.
Clearly, the Executive Order simply consolidates these existing rules and streamlines the
administrative apparatus in the matter of complaints against public officials. It is moreover
significant that the Executive Order in question makes specific reference to "erring officials or
employees ... removed or otherwise vindicated. If it were intended to apply to criminal
prosecutions, it would have employed such technical terms as "accused", "convicted," or
"acquitted." While this is not necessarily a controlling parameter for all cases, it is here
material in construing the intent of the measure.

Cannot apply.

NESTLE PHILIPPINES INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS (1991)

Statutory Construction; Interpretation given by administrative agency entitled to
great respect.—It is a principle too well established to require extensive documentation that
the construction given to a statute by an administrative agency charged with the
interpretation and application of that statute is entitled to great respect and should be
accorded great weight by the courts, unless such construction is clearly shown to be in sharp
conflict with the governing statute or the Constitution and other laws. xxx. The rationale for
this rule relates not only to the emergence of the multifarious needs of a modern or
modernizing society and the establishment of diverse administrative agencies for addressing
and satisfying those needs; it also relates to accumulation of experience and growth of
specialized capabilities by the administrative agency charged with implementing a particular
statute.

Revised Securities Act; Issuance of previously authorized but unissued capital stock
to existing stockholders; Registration requirement; Exempt transactions.—
Consideration of the underlying statutory purpose of Section 6(a) (4) compels us to sustain
the view taken by the SEC and the Court of Appeals. The reading by the SEC of the scope of
application of Section 6(a) (4) permits greater opportunity for the SEC to implement the
statutory objective of protecting the investing public by requiring proposed issuers of capital
stock to inform such public of the true financial conditions and prospects of the corporation.
By limiting the class of exempt transactions contemplated by the last clause of Section 6(a)
(4) to issuances of stock done in the course of and as part of the process of increasing the
authorized capital stock of a corporation, the SEC is enabled to examine issuances by a
corporation of previously authorized but theretofore unissued capital stock, on a case-to-case
basis, under Section 6(b); and thereunder, to grant or withhold exemption from the normal
registration requirements depending upon the perceived level of need for protection by the
investing public in particular cases.

Under the reading urged by petitioner Nestlé of the reach and scope of the third clause of
Section 6(a) (4), the issuance of previously authorized but unissued capital stock would
automatically constitute an exempt transaction, without regard to the length of time which
may have intervened between the last increase in authorized capital stock and the proposed
issuance during which time the condition of the corporation may have substantially changed,
and without regard to whether the existing stockholders to whom the shares are proposed to
be issued are only two giant corporations as in the instant case, or are individuals numbering
in the hundreds or thousands. In contrast, under the ruling issued by the SEC, an issuance of
previously authorized but still unissued capital stock may, in a particular instance, be held to
be an exempt transaction by the SEC under Section 6(b) so long as the SEC finds that the
requirements of registration under the Revised Securities Act are “not necessary in the public
interest and for the protection of the investors” by reason, inter alia, of the small amount of
stock that is proposed to be issued or because the potential buyers are very limited in number
and are in a position to protect themselves. In fine, petitioner Nestlé’s proposed construction
of Section 6(a) (4) would establish an inflexible rule of automatic exemption of issuances of
additional, previously authorized but unissued, capital stock. We must reject an interpretation
which may disable the SEC from rendering protection to investors, in the public interest,
precisely when such protection may be most needed.

FACTS:
San Miguel Corporation and Nestle S.A. are the two major stockholders of Neslte. Nestle
increased its authorized capital stock and was approved by SEC. Thereafter, some unissued
stocks were sold to San Miguel and Nestle. Nestle filed a complaint with the SEC, seeking to
exempt the firm from the registration requirement of Section4 of the Revised Securities Act
and from payment of the fee referred to in Section
6(c). The provision states that a corporation may be exempted from the requirement of regi
stration if its issues additional capital stock among its own stockholders exclusively. Nestle
argued that issuance of additional capital stock means issuance of increased authorized
capital stock. SEC held that for purposes of granting a general or particular exemption from
the registration requirements, a request for exemption and a fee equivalent to 0.1% of issued
value or securities or stocks are required.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Nestle is entitled to exemption.

RULING:

Nestle is not exempted from the fee provided for in Section 6 (c) of the Revised Securities
Act. Section 6(a) (4) permits greater opportunity for the SEC to implement the
statutory objective of protecting the investing public by requiring proposed issuers of capital
stock to inform such public of the true financial conditions and prospects of the
corporation. When capital stock is issued in the course of and in compliance with the
requirements of increasing its authorized capital stock under Section 38 of the Corporation
Code, the SEC as a matter of course examines the financial condition of the corporation.
Under the ruling issued by the SEC, an issuance of previously authorized but still unissued
capital stock may, in a particular instance, be held to bean exempt transaction by the SEC
under Section 6(b) so long as the SEC finds that the requirements of registration under
the Revised Securities Act are "not necessary in the public interest and for the
protection of the investors" by reason, inter alia, of the small amount of stock that is
proposed to be issued or because the potential buyers are very limited in number and are in
a position to protect themselves. The construction of a statute by the executive officers of the
government is entitled to great respect and should be accorded great weight by the courts.

Petitioner Nestlé’s second claim for exemption is from payment of the fee provided for in
Section 6 (c) of the Revised Securities Act, a claim based upon petitioner’s contention that
Section 6 (a) (4) covers both issuance of stock in the course of complying with the statutory
requirements of increase of authorized capital stock and issuance of previously authorized
and unissued capital stock. Petitioner claims that to require it now to pay one tenth of one
percent (1%) of the issued value of the 344,500 shares of stock proposed to be issued, is to
require it to pay a second time for the same service on the part of the SEC. Since we have
above rejected petitioner’s reading of Section 6 (a) (4), last clause, petitioner’s claim about
the additional fee of one-tenth of one percent (1%) of the issue value of the proposed issuance
of stock (amounting to P34,450 plus P344.50 for other fees or a total of P37,794.50) need
not detain us for long. We think it clear that the fee collected in 21 February 1983 by the SEC
was assessed in connection with the examination and approval of the certificate of increase
of authorized capital stock then submitted by petitioner. The fee, upon the other hand,
provided for in Section 6 (c) which petitioner will be required to pay if it does file an application
for exemption under Section 6 (b), is quite different; this is a fee specifically authorized by
the Revised Securities Act, (not the Corporation Code) in connection with the grant of an
exemption from normal registration requirements imposed by that Act. We do not find such
fee either unreasonable or exorbitant. WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Petition for
Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 13 January 1989 in C.A.-G.R. No. SP-13522, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

PHILIPPINE SCOUT VETERANS SECURITY & INVESTIGATION AGENCY V. NLRC

(1997) G.R. No. 115019 | 1997-04-14

FACTS:

Mariano Federico had been working with Philippine Scout Veterans Security and Investigation
Agency and/or Severo Santiago as a security guard for twenty-three (23) years. Federico,
then already sixty (60) years old, tendered his so-called "letter of resignation" citing as his
reasons physical disability to perform his duties and desire to spend the rest of his life in the
province. It seems that the letter did not strictly refer to "resignation" but "withdrawal from
occupation" because he sought alternative reliefs, namely, termination pay corresponding to
his years of service, or retirement benefits.

Philippine Scout rejected the claim for termination pay contending that Federico voluntarily
resigned. The claim for retirement benefits met the same fate there being no collective or
individual agreement providing therefor.

Federico brought his grievance to the Labor Arbiter (LA). The latter directed Philippine Scout
to pay Federico P10,000.00 as financial assistance. The NLRC reversed the decision of the LA
relying on Art. 287 of the Labor Code as amended by R.A. 7641 which, in the absence of a
retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement benefits, grants retirement pay
equivalent to fifteen days for every year of service.

ISSUE:

WON Federico is entitled to receive his pay and benefits in the absence of a retirement plan
or agreement providing for retirement benefits

Or?

WON R.A. 7641 can be applied retroactively to entitle Federico to receive his pay and benefits

RULING:

No. Although R.A. 7641 can be applied retroactively, which provides that absent a retirement
plan devised by, an agreement with, or a voluntary grant from - an employer can respond, in
part at least, to the financial well-being of workers during their twilight years soon following
their life of labor. There should be little doubt about the fact that the law can apply to labor
contracts still existing at the time the statute has taken effect, and that its benefits can be
reckoned not only from the date of the law's enactment but retroactively to the time said
employment contracts have started. (Oro Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRC)

However, before R.A. 7641 could be given retroactive effect, the following must concur: (a)
the claimant for retirement benefits was still the employee of the employer at the time the
statute took effect; and, (b) the claimant was in compliance with the requirements for
eligibility under the statute for such retirement benefits. Nevertheless, there was nothing to
prevent the employer from voluntarily giving the employees some financial assistance on an
ex gratia basis. (CJC Trading, Inc. v. NLRC)

In this case, Federico severed his employment relationship with Philippine Scout when he
tendered his "letter of resignation" on 16 September 1991 or prior to the effectivity of R.A.
7641. In fact, the issue before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC was not the existence of
employee-employer relationship between the parties; rather, whether he was entitled to
monetary awards.

Thus, Federico cannot seek the beneficial provision of R.A. 7641 and must settle for the
financial assistance of P10,000.00 offered by Philippine Scouts and directed to be released to
him by the Labor Arbiter.

ESCRA Syllabus:

Labor Law; Retirement Benefits; Court has ruled in Oro Enterprises, Inc. vs. NLRC that R.A.
7641 can indeed be applied retroactively.—Under the amendment, respondent Federico
appears to be entitled to retirement pay. But can he avail himself of this provision considering
that it took effect subsequent to his filing of the complaint? This brings to mind the principle
reiterated in Allied that police power legislation intended to promote public welfare applies to
existing contracts and can therefore be given retroactive effect. Actually, the case at bench
no longer presents a novel issue. We have ruled in Oro Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRC that R.A.
7641 can indeed be applied retroactively.

Same; Same; Circumstances that must concur before the law can be given retroactive
effect.—At this point we emphasized the circumstances, based on Oro, that must concur
before the law could be given retroactive effect: (a) the claimant for retirement benefits was
still the employee of the employer at the time the statute took effect; and, (b) the claimant
was in compliance with the requirements for eligibility under the statute for such retirement
benefits.

DAVID V SET

Quo Warranto: In this Petition for Quo Warranto filed on 06 August 2015, Petitioner Rizalito
Y. David questioned the qualifications of sitting Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares on two
grounds, namely: that being a foundling whose parents are unknown, she is not a natural
born Filipino citizen; and that she lacks the residency requirement provided by law.

After the issues had been joined, the Tribunal called the parties and their respective counsel
to a Preliminary Conference on 11 September 2015. During the Preliminary Conference,
Petitioner David agreed to drop the issue of residency on the ground of prescription.
Thereafter, on 21 September 2015, the Tribunal heard the parties in Oral Argument.

Status: On 17 November 2015, the Tribunal promulgated its Decision, dismissing the petition
for quo warranto. The Tribunal ruled that Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-
born citizen under the 1935 Constitution and continue to be a natural-born citizen as defined
under the 1987 Constitution. The Tribunal further ruled that she validly reacquired her
natural-born citizen under R.A. 9225 and validly renounced her American citizenship.

The decision of the Tribunal was upheld by the Supreme Court in its decision rendered on 20
September 2016 in G.R. No. 221538 (David vs. SET and Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares).

Art. 4 Sec. 1 and Sec. 2 - finds the concept of natural born citizen. Read in its entirety the
provisions.

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

[1] Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;

[2] Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

[3] Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority; and

[4] Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed
natural-born citizens.

PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY VS. GREEN ASIA CONSTRUCTION &

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ETC.
PEZA and respondent Green Asia Construction and Development Corporation were parties to
a contract for a road network / storm drainage project. The project was awarded to Green
Asia for P130M

Green Asia sent a letter to PEZA Development Project for price escalation in the amount of
more than 9M. The claim was denied because it requires proof of the increase or decrease in
construction cost due to direct acts of government.

Green Asia failed to prove the legal necessity of applying the price escalation provided in
PD1594. PEZA pointed out that contract price was fixed as stipulated in Article IV of the
contact and that this provision was an effect a waiver of PD 1594.

Office of the President interpreted the phrase “due to direct acts of the Government”. It held
that PD 454, included increases in the prices of gasoline, fuel, oil and cement, in effect that
price escalation is automatically awarded to contractors of all government infrastructure
projects.
Since PD 454 was not expressly repealed by PD 1594,

ISSUE:

Whether Presidential Decree 1594 requires the contractor to prove that the price increase of
construction materials was due to the direct acts of the government before a price escalation
is granted in this payment dispute in a construction contract

RULING:

Court agrees that the OP construed PD1594 as being in pari materia PD 454. Since the two
decrees are in pari materia, there is a need to construe them together.

Statutes are in pari materia when they relate to the same person or thing or to the same class
of persons or things, or object, or cover the same specific or particular subject matter.

It is axiomatic in statutory construction that a statute must be interpreted, not only to be

consistent with itself, but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as
to form a complete, coherent and intelligible system. The rule is expressed in the maxim,
"interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi," or every statute must be so
construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.

PD 454 which was enacted prior to PD 1594, was where the phrase "direct acts of the
government" was explained to cover the increase of prices during the effectivity of a
government infrastructure contract. The phrase was first used in Republic Act (RA) No. 1595,
which was amended by PD 454. The latter amended R.A. No. 1595 by supplying the meaning
of the phrase "direct acts of the government" and expressly including the increase of prices
of gasoline within the coverage of that phrase. Consequently, when PD 1594 reproduced the
phrase without supplying a contrary or different definition, the definition provided by the
earlier enacted PD 454 was deemed adopted by the later decree. Thus, proof of an increase
in fuel and cement price and a subsequent increase in the cost of labor and relevant
construction materials during the contract period are considered a compliance with the IRR
requirements for a claim for price escalation.

PD1594 leads to the conclusion that price adjustment refers to price escalation in IRR.

The contract between PEZA and Green Asia did not incorporate provisions prohibiting price
escalation or any clause that may be interpreted as a waiver of the price escalation.
Consequently, payment of price escalation is deemed to have included the provision for the
payment of price escalation.

OSG vs. CA G.R. No. 199027 | 2014-06-09

FACTS:

The petitioners, members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Saguiran filed a petition for
mandamus before the RTC of Lanao Del Sur to compel the respondent, Municipality of
Saguiran, to pay them 726,000.00 for their unpaid terminal leave benefits
Respondent presented its Verified Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim

RTC dismissed the petition. RTC explained that it had to undergo the ordinary process of
verification, approval or disapproval by municipal officials. However, RTC directed the
respondent to include in its general or special budget for the year 2009 the subject claims.

The respondent being dissatisfied, partially appealed to the CA. It then issued a notice
requiring the OSG to file a memorandum for the Municipality of Saguiran within a non-
extendible period of 30 days.

The OSG initially moved for a suspension of the period to file the required memorandum,
explaining that it had not received any document or pleading in connection with the case. It
asked for a period of 30 days from receipt of such documents within which to file the required
memorandum. The OSG’s motion was denied saying that such was not allowed by the Rules
of Court. The OSG was instead given a non-extendible period of 90 days from notice within
which to file the memorandum.

Thereafter, the OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion requesting to be excused from filing the
memorandum on the ground of lack of legal authority to represent the Municipality of
Saguiran. It reasoned that the Municipality of Saguiran had to be represented by its legal
officer, pursuant to Article XI(3)(i) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991 (LGC).

CA denied the OSG’s motion contending that, the SC in Province of Camarines Sur vs. Court
of Appeals, Et. Al. held that a local government unit, in the performance of its political
functions, is an agency of the Republic and acts for the latter’s benefit.

ISSUE:

WON CA can compel the OSG to file a memorandum for the Municipality of Saguiran

RULING:

No. Although the OSG’s powers and functions as defined in the Administrative Code, in Section
35, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12, seems unqualified and broad enough to include
representation of a local government unit in any case filed by or against it, the OSG’s mandate
under the Administrative Code must be construed taking into account the other statutes that
pertain to the same subject of representation in courts.

As the Court explained in Philippine Economic Zone Authority v. Green Asia Construction &
Development Corporation:

Statutes are in pari materia when they relate to the same person or thing or to the same class
of persons or things, or object, or cover the same specific or particular subject matter.

It is axiomatic in statutory construction that a statute must be interpreted, not only to be

consistent with itself, but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as
to form a complete, coherent and intelligible system. The rule is expressed in the maxim,
“interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi,” or every statute must be so
construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.
However, Sec. 481 of the LGC not only identifies the powers and functions of a local
government unit’s legal officer. It also restricts, as it names, the lawyer who may represent
the local government unit as its counsel in court proceedings.

Further, the Court ruled in Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation:

A general statute is one which embraces a class of subjects or places and does not omit any
subject or place naturally belonging to such class. A special statute, as the term is generally
understood, is one which relates to particular persons or things of a class or to a particular
portion or section of the state only.

A general law and a special law on the same subject are statutes in pari materia and should,
accordingly, be read together and harmonized, if possible, with a view to giving effect to both.
The rule is that where there are two acts, one of which is special and particular and the other
general which, if standing alone, would include the same matter and thus conflict with the
special act, the special law must prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly
than that of a general statute and must not be taken as intended to affect the more particular
and specific provisions of the earlier act, unless it is absolutely necessary so to construe it in
order to give its words any meaning at all.

Given the foregoing, the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolutions which obligated the OSG to represent the
Municipality of Saguiran.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

CIR v. SEC. OF JUSTICE

TOMAWIS V. BALINDONG (G.R. NO. 182434)

FACTS:

Respondents herein, daughters of the late Acraman Radia, filed with the Shari’a District Court
an action for quieting of title of a parcel of land against petitioner Tomawis, alleging that they
are the absolute owners of the lot, that petitioner assumed ownership of the land and removed
the small houses they built therein, and thereby unlawfully deprived them of their possession
of the land. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint assailing SDC’s lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case, as it is the regular civil courts that had such jurisdiction
pursuant to BP 129. Respondent judge denied the motion asserting in his decision SDC’s
original jurisdiction over the case, concurrently with the RTC. Petitioner sought relief before
the CA, but the latter dismissed the petition. Petitioner now asserts that BP 129 as amended,
vesting original exclusive jurisdiction to the RTCs/MTCs over real actions, effectively removed
the concurrent jurisdiction once pertaining to the SDC.

ISSUE:
Whether the Shari’a District Court has jurisdiction over the action for quieting of title,
notwithstanding the jurisdiction of RTCs or MTCs over such cases.

RULING:

YES. The allegations, as well as the relief sought by private respondents, the elimination of
the “cloud of doubts on the title of ownership” on the subject land, are within the SDC’s
jurisdiction to grant.

A reading of the pertinent provisions of BP 129 and PD 1083 shows that the former, a law of
general application to civil courts, has no application to, and does not repeal, the provisions
found in PD 1083, a special law, which only refers to Shari’a courts. BP 129 was enacted to
reorganize only existing civil courts and is a law of general application to the judiciary. In
contrast, PD 1083 is a special law that only applies to Shari’a courts.

We have held that a general law and a special law on the same subject are statutes in pari
materia and should be read together and harmonized, if possible, with a view to giving effect
to both. A general law does not nullify a special law. The general law will yield to the special
law in the specific and particular subject embraced in the latter. We must read and construe
BP 129 and PD 1083 together, then by taking PD 1083 as an exception to the general law to
reconcile the two laws.

In order to give effect to both laws at hand, we must continue to recognize the concurrent
jurisdiction enjoyed by SDCs with that of RTCs under PD 1083.

We hold that the respondent court did not commit any grave abuse of discretion. Its reliance
on the provisions of PD 1083 in asserting its jurisdiction was sound and unassailable.

ROQUE v. COMELEC

FACTS:

This case is a motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners of the September 10, 2009
ruling of the Supreme Court, which denied the petition of H. Harry L. Roque, Jr., et al. for
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to nullify the contract-award of the 2010 Election
Automation Project to the joint venture of Total Information Management Corporation (TIM)
and Smartmatic International Corporation (Smartmatic).

In this MR, petitioners Roque, et al. are again before the Supreme Court asking that the
contract award be declared null and void on the stated ground that it was made in violation
of the Constitution, statutes, and jurisprudence. Intervening petitioner also interposed a
similar motion, but only to pray that the Board of Election Inspectors be ordered to manually
count the ballots after the printing and electronic transmission of the election returns.

Petitioners Roque, et al., as movants herein, seek a reconsideration of the September 10,
2009 Decision on the following issues or grounds:

1. The Comelec’s public pronouncements show that there is a "high probability" that there
will be failure of automated elections;

2. Comelec abdicated its constitutional functions in favor of Smartmatic;

3. There is no legal framework to guide the Comelec in appreciating automated ballots in case
the PCOS machines fail;

4. Respondents cannot comply with the requirements of RA 8436 for a source code review;

5. Certifications submitted by private respondents as to the successful use of the machines in

elections abroad do not fulfill the requirement of Sec. 12 of RA 8436;

6. Private respondents will not be able to provide telecommunications facilities that will assure
100% communications coverage at all times during the conduct of the 2010 elections; and

7. Subcontracting the manufacture of PCOS machines to Quisdi violates the Comelec’s bidding
rules.

ISSUE:

Is the motion for reconsideration meritorious?

RULING:

No. Upon taking a second hard look into the issues in the case at bar and the arguments
earnestly pressed in the instant motions, the Court cannot grant the desired reconsideration.

Petitioners’ threshold argument delves on possibilities, on matters that may or may not occur.
The conjectural and speculative nature of the first issue raised is reflected in the very manner
of its formulation and by statements, such as "the public pronouncements of public
respondent COMELEC x x x clearly show that there is a high probability that there will be
automated failure of elections"; "there is a high probability that the use of PCOS machines in
the May 2010 elections will result in failure of elections"; "the unaddressed logistical
nightmares—and the lack of contingency plans that should have been crafted as a result of a
pilot test—make an automated failure of elections very probable"; and "COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion when it signed x x x the contract for full automation x x x despite
the likelihood of a failure of elections."

Speculations and conjectures are not equivalent to proof; they have little, if any, probative
value and, surely, cannot be the basis of a sound judgment.

Petitioners, to support their speculative venture vis-à-vis the possibility of Comelec going
manual, have attributed certain statements to respondent Comelec Chairman Melo, citing for
the purpose a news item on Inquirer.net, posted September 16, 2009.

Reacting to the attribution, however, respondents TIM and Smartmatic, in their comment,
described the Melo pronouncements as made in the context of Comelec’s contingency plan.
Petitioners, however, the same respondents added, put a misleading spin to the Melo
pronouncements by reproducing part of the news item, but omitting to make reference to his
succeeding statements to arrive at a clearer and true picture.

Private respondents’ observation is well-taken. Indeed, it is easy to selectively cite portions

of what has been said, sometimes out of their proper context, in order to assert a misleading
conclusion. The effect can be dangerous. Improper meaning may be deliberately attached to
innocent views or even occasional crude comments by the simple expediency of lifting them
out of context from any publication.

Petitioners’ posture anent the third issue, i.e, there no is legal framework to guide Comelec
in the appreciation of automated ballots or to govern manual count should PCOS machines
fail, cannot be accorded cogency. First, it glosses over the continuity and back-up plans that
would be implemented in case the PCOS machines falter during the 2010 elections. The overall
fallback strategy and options to address even the worst-case scenario—the wholesale
breakdown of the 80,000 needed machines nationwide and of the 2,000 reserved units—have
been discussed in some detail in the Decision subject of this recourse. The Court need not
belabor them again.

While a motion for reconsideration may tend to dwell on issues already resolved in the decision
sought to be reconsidered—and this should not be an obstacle for a reconsideration—the hard
reality is that petitioners have failed to raise matters substantially plausible or compellingly
persuasive to warrant the desired course of action.

Significantly, petitioners, in support of their position on the lack-of-legal-framework issue,

invoke the opinion of Associate, later Chief, Justice Artemio Panganiban in Loong v. Comelec,
where he made the following observations: "Resort to manual appreciation of the ballots is
precluded by the basic features of the automated election system," and "the rules laid down
in the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) for the appreciation and counting of ballots cast in a
manual election x x x are inappropriate, if not downright useless, to the proper appreciation
and reading of the ballots used in the automated system." Without delving on its wisdom and
validity, the view of Justice Panganiban thus cited came by way of a dissenting opinion. As
such, it is without binding effect, a dissenting opinion being a mere expression of the individual
view of a member of the Court or other collegial adjudicating body, while disagreeing with the
conclusion held by the majority.

And going to another but recycled issue, petitioners would have the Court invalidate the
automation contract on the ground that the certifications submitted by Smartmatic during the
bidding, showing that the PCOS technology has been used in elections abroad, do not comply
with Sec. 1222 of RA 8436. Presently, petitioners assert that the system certified as having
been used in New York was the Dominion Image Cast, a ballot marking device.

Petitioners have obviously inserted, at this stage of the case, an entirely new factual
dimension to their cause. This we cannot allow for compelling reasons. For starters, the Court
cannot plausibly validate this factual assertion of petitioners. As it is, private respondents
have even questioned the reliability of the website24 whence petitioners base their assertion,
albeit the former, citing the same website, state that the Image Cast Precinct tabulation
device refers to the Dominion’s PCOS machines.

Moreover, as a matter of sound established practice, points of law, theories, issues, and
arguments not raised in the original proceedings cannot be brought out on review. Basic
considerations of fair play impel this rule. The imperatives of orderly, if not speedy, justice
frown on a piecemeal presentation of evidence and on the practice of parties of going to trial
haphazardly.

Moving still to another issue, petitioners claim that "there are very strong indications that
Private Respondents will not be able to provide for telecommunication facilities for areas
without these facilities." This argument, being again highly speculative, is without evidentiary
value and hardly provides a ground for the Court to nullify the automation contract. Surely,
a possible breach of a contractual stipulation is not a legal reason to prematurely rescind,
much less annul, the contract.

Finally, petitioners argue that, based on news reports,28 the TIM-Smartmatic joint venture
has entered into a new contract with Quisdi, a Shanghai-based company, to manufacture on
its behalf the needed PCOS machines to fully automate the 2010 elections.29 This
arrangement, petitioners aver, violates the bid rules proscribing sub-contracting of significant
components of the automation project.

The argument is untenable, based as it is again on news reports. Surely, petitioners cannot
expect the Court to act on unverified reports foisted on it.

GOV. EXEQUIEL B. JAVIER v. COMELEC, GR No. 215847, 2016-01-12

FACTS:

On December 3, 1985, the Batasang Pambansa enacted the Omnibus Election Code (Election
Code)

On April 3, 2012, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9385[5] fixing the calendar of activities for
the May 2013 elections. The resolution set the election period from January 13, 2013 until
June 12, 2013.

Coercion, as an election offense, is punishable by imprisonment of not less than one year but
not more than six years. Notably, Section 68 of the Election Code provides that the
Commission may administratively disqualify a candidate who violates Section 261(d) or (e).

On September 3, 2012, Valderrama Municipal Vice-Mayor Christopher B. Maguad filed an

administrative complaint for Gross Misconduct/Dereliction of Duty and Abuse of Authority
against Valderrama Mayor Mary Joyce U. Roquero (Mayor Roquero). This complaint was
docketed as Administrative Case No. 05-2012.

On February 20, 1995, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7890 amending the definition of
Grave Coercion under the Revised Penal Code. It increased the penalty for coercion committed
in violation of a person's right to suffrage to prision mayor. Further, Section 3 of R.A. 7890
expressly repealed Section 26, paragraphs (d) (l) and (2) of the Election Code.

On December 18, 2012, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9581prohibiting any public official
from suspending any elective provincial, city, municipal, or barangay officer during the
election period for the May 13, 2013 elections. This resolution implements Section 261 (x)
of the Election Code.

Mayor Roquero filed an Election Offense complaint against Gov. Javier for violating Section
261(x) of the Election Code.

On October 3, 2014, the COMELEC Second Division issued a resolution in SPA No. 13-254
(DC) disqualifying Gov. Javier and annulling his proclamation as the Governor of Antique. The
resolution was penned by Commissioner Elias R. Yusoph.

On April 3, 2012, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9385 fixing the calendar of activities for the
May 2013 elections. The resolution set the election period from January 13, 2013 until June
12, 2013.

On September 3, 2012, Valderrama Municipal Vice-Mayor Christopher B. Maguad filed an

administrative complaint for Gross Misconduct/Dereliction of Duty and Abuse of Authority
against Valderrama Mayor Mary Joyce U. Roquero (Mayor Roquero).
The Commission asserts that COMELEC Resolution No. 9581 fixing the date of the election
period is expressly authorized by Article IX, Section 9 of the Constitution and Section 8 of
Republic Act No. 7056.

On November 9, 2012, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) issued Resolution No. 291-2012
recommending to Antique Governor Exequiel Javier (Gov. Javier) the preventive suspension
of Mayor Roquero.

On November 21, 2012, Mayor Roquero filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 12, Antique, against Gov. Javier and the members of the SP to restrain them
from proceeding with Administrative Case No. 05-2012.

On January 16, 2013, the RTC, Branch 11 promulgated its judgment granting certiorari and
prohibition. It ordered the SP to cease and desist from further proceeding with Administrative
Case No. 05-2012. It likewise ordered Gov. Javier to refrain from implementing SP Resolution
No. 291-2012 and from preventively suspending Mayor Roquero.

On January 23, 2013, Gov. Javier issued Executive Order No. 003, S. 2013, preventively
suspending Mayor Roquero for thirty (30) days.

On February 7, 2013, the SP of Antique issued a decision finding Mayor Roquero guilty of
Grave Misconduct in relation with Section 3(e) of R. A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, and Grave Abuse of Authority in relation with Section 5(e) of R.A. No. 6713.
The SP suspended her for four (4) months. Mayor Roquero filed an Election Offense complaint
against Gov. Javier for violating Section 261(x) of the Election Code

On March 22, 2013, private respondents Cornelio P. Aldon (Aldon) and Raymundo T. Roquero
(Roquero) also filed a petition for disqualification before the Commission against Gov. Javier,
Vice-Governor Rosie A. Dimamay, and the other members of the SP.

After the May 13, 2013 Elections, only Gov. Javier and SP Members Tobias M. Javier, Edgar
D. Denosta, Teopisto C. Estaris, Jr., and Victor R. Condez were proclaimed winners. Hence,
the Commission considered the disqualification cases against the losing candidates moot.

The COMELEC ruled that Gov. Javier's act of preventively suspending Mayor Roquero during
the election period ban fell within the contemplation of Section 261 (d) of the Election Code,
which is a ground for disqualification under Section 68. It held that while Section

261(d) of the Election Code was repealed by Republic Act No. 7890, it did not remove coercion
"as a ground per se for disqualification under [Section] 68." In fact, R.A. 7890 made Coercion
(an election offense) a felony with a higher penalty. The COMELEC added that the general
repealing clause of R.A. No. 7890 cannot impliedly repeal Section 68 because the latter was
"not absolutely and irreconcilably incompatible with Article 286."

ISSUES:

Whether the not there has been a conflict between the repealing clause?

RULING:

No less than the Constitution authorizes the Commission to fix the dates of the election period.
Article IX-C, Section 9 provides:
Section 9. Unless otherwise fixed by the Commission in special cases, the election period shall
commence ninety days before the day of election and shall end thirty days thereafter.

Congress, through the Election Code, explicitly recognizes this authority:

Sec. 3. Election and campaign periods. - Unless otherwise fixed in special cases by the
Commission on Elections, which hereinafter shall be referred to as the Commission, the
election period shall commence ninety days before the day of the election and shall... end
thirty days thereafter. (emphasis supplied)

Evidently, the 120-day period is merely the default election period. The Commission is not
precluded from fixing the length and the starting date of the election period to ensure free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. This is not merely a statutory but a
constitutionally granted power of the Commission.

The petitioner contends that the election period for the reckoning of administrative and
criminal liabilities under election laws should always be the same-90 days before and 30 days
after an election-fixed in Article IX-C, Section 9 of the Constitution and Section 8 of Republic
Act No. 7056. He argues that the Commission's authority to fix the pre-election period refers
only to the period needed to properly administer and conduct orderly elections. The petitioner
argues that by extending the period for incurring criminal... liability beyond the 90-day period,
the Commission encroached on the legislature's prerogative to impute criminal and
administrative liability on mala prohibita acts. Therefore, COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9385 and
9581 were issued ultra vires.

We do not find this argument meritorious.

Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the Commission's act of fixing the election period does
not amount to an encroachment on legislative prerogative. The Commission did not prescribe
or define the elements of election offenses. Congress already defined them through the
Omnibus Election Code, the Fair Elections Act, and other pertinent election laws.