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Kindi Collingwood Biography PDF
Kindi Collingwood Biography PDF
nl/jph
Vasso Kindi
University of Athens
vkindi@phs.uoa.gr
Abstract
Biography is usually distinguished from history and, in comparison, looked
down upon. R. G. Collingwood’s view of biography seems to fijit this statement con-
sidering that he says it has only gossip-value and that “history it can never be”. His
main concern is that biography exploits and arouses emotions which he excludes
from the domain of history. In the paper I will try to show that one can salvage a
more positive view of biography from within Collingwood’s work and claim that
his explicit attacks against biography target specifijically the sensationalist kind.
First, I will show that Collingwood, in his later writings, allowed that, not only
thought, but also relevant emotions can be the subject matter of history, which
means that even if one takes biography to deal with emotions, it can still qualify as
history. Second, I will argue, based mainly on Collingwood’s Principles of Art, that
biography can be compared to portrait painting, in which case, it can be redeemed
as a work of art and not just craft and, thus, have more than entertainment value.
It can also be part of history, and more specifijically part of the history of art which
Collingwood endorses, if one takes the life of an individual, recounted by a biogra-
pher, to be an artistic creation, as Collingwood seems to suggest.
Keywords
Collingwood, biography, history, emotions, re-enactment, thought
thought but of natural process. Through this framework – the bodily life of the
man, his childhood, maturity and senescence, his diseases and all the acci-
dents of animal existence – the tides of thought, his own and others’, flow
crosswise regardless of its structure like sea-water through a stranded wreck.
Many human emotions are bound up with the spectacle of such bodily life in
its vicissitudes, and biography, as a form of literature, feeds these emotions
and may give them wholesome food; but this is not history. Again the record
of immediate experience with its flow of sensations and feelings, faithfully
preserved in a diary or recalled in a memoir, is not history. At its best, it is
poetry; at its worst, obtrusive egotism; but history it can never be (IH 304).
4) The passage is drawn, in particular, from his text “The Subject Matter of History” which
appears in the “Epilegomena” section of The Idea of History (302–315).
5) The metaphor of flow is here used in relation to thought, which is supposed to survive the
accidents of life, but most often it is used by Collingwood to indicate the exact opposite,
namely, the transitory and fleeting nature of immediate experience. See for instance, “The
flow of immediate consciousness” (IH 287).
6) In the essay “Human Nature and Human History” published in 1936 and included in The
Idea of History (205–217), Collingwood claims that “[a] natural process is a process of events,
an historical process is a process of thoughts” (IH 216). Events interest historians so far as
they express thought (IH 217). In The Principles of History written in 1939, Collingwood
repeats that “accidental or contingent events do not occur in history at all: they form the
background or scenery of history. A mariner is caught in a storm: this is an accident: but that
storm appears in the history of navigation only if the historian is interested in the mariner’s
handling of the situation to which this accident gave rise (or someone else’s, e.g., the Board
V. Kindi / Journal of the Philosophy of History 6 (2012) 44–59 47
actions,7 unlike natural events, embody and express thought, and are, thus,
the proper object of history.8
of Trade or the Meteorological Offfijice). Nature as such is contingent” (PH 247). He also claims
that natural facts condition but do not determine human action (PH 163).
7) Collingwood allows for the possibility of non-human animals having thoughts and thus,
for the possibility of writing the history of their actions (IH 216, 227; also PH 46–47). Still, the
animal part of both human and non human animals would again be excluded from history:
“With animal appetites and their gratifijication or frustration history is not concerned”
(PH 98).
8) “In history itself, what makes it history is not the chronological framework but the nature
of what it contains: not events as such but Res Gestae, actions expressing thought.” (PH 76).
“Res Gestae are not mere action, they are rational action, action which embodies thought.
To embody thought is to express it” (PH 50).
9) By the term cogitatio (thought) in its wide sense Descartes understands more than the
operations of the intellect: “Thought is a word that covers everything that exists in us in such
a way that we are immediately conscious of it. Thus all the operations of will, intellect, imag-
ination, and of the senses are thoughts” R. Descartes, “Arguments Demonstrating the Exis-
tence of God and the Distinction between Soul and Body, Drawn up in Geometrical Fashion”
in The Philosophical Works of Descartes, transl. E. S. Haldane, G. R. T. Ross, vol. II (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1911/1984, 52). “By the term thought, I understand all
that of which we are conscious as operating in us. And that is why not alone understanding,
willing, imagining, but also feeling, are here the same thing as thought”, R. Descartes,
“The Principles of Philosophy” in The Philosophical Works of Descartes, transl. E. S. Haldane,
G. R. T. Ross, vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1911/1984, Principle ix ).
10) As we will see later in the paper, Collingwood, in his Principles of Art, which is written
later than the essays included in the Idea of History develops further his account of thought
as not just including intellectual operations.
48 V. Kindi / Journal of the Philosophy of History 6 (2012) 44–59
11) Cf. W. H. Walsh, Philosophy of History. An Introduction (New York: Harper & Row Pub-
lishers, 1967, 53–54) and W. Dray, History as Re-enactment. R.G. Collingwood’s Idea of History
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, 164–190).
12) Collingwood agrees with Hegel that nature has no history but disagrees with him in the
rejection of the theory of evolution (IH 115). Although Collingwood does not believe that
evolutionary development by itself amounts to history he is favorably inclined towards evo-
lutionary theory. There is only one possibility, he says, to have history of nature: “The only
condition on which there could be a history of nature is that the events of nature are actions
on the part of some thinking being or beings, and that by studying these actions we could
discover what were the thoughts which they expressed and think these thoughts for our-
selves.” (IH 302, cf. IH 217, PH 44, 60)
13) As Walsh has noted, Collingwood is not guilty of an inner/outer distinction which com-
mits him to a “ghost in the machine” conception of human beings. Collingwood, in trying to
understand thought historically, is not trying to access an inner ethereal entity enclosed in
a visible corporeal capsule (Walsh, Philosophy of History. An Introduction, 55–56). For Ryle’s
criticism which does not explicitly invoke Collingwood, see G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind
(London: Penguin Books, 1949/1990, 56–57).
V. Kindi / Journal of the Philosophy of History 6 (2012) 44–59 49
14) Note that in The Idea of History Collingwood does not distinguish between emotions and
feelings (he uses both terms interchangeably), as he would do later in The New Leviathan
and in The Principles of Art.
15) W. Dilthey, Introduction to the Human Sciences Vol., In Selected Works, ed. R. A.
Makkreel and F. Rodi, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989, 88).
50 V. Kindi / Journal of the Philosophy of History 6 (2012) 44–59
16) I do not mean this as a two-stage process, i.e., fijirst thinking and then acting. Collingwood
seems to be making misleading references to this efffect (IH 311; Dray, History as Re-enactment.
R.G. Collingwood’s Idea of History, 110–111), but what he does want to stress is that thought is
exhibited in action.
17) G. D’Oro, “Collingwood on Re-Enactment and the Identity of Thought”, Journal of
the History of Philosophy 38:1 (2000), 87–101, 99; Dray, History as Re-enactment. R. G. Colling-
wood’s Idea of History, 39. In a sheet of paper, inserted in the essay “Outlines of a Philosophy
of History” and published in note 8 in the revised edition of The Idea of History (IH 442–443),
Collingwood, recognizing that the re-enactment of past history in the historian’s mind is a
V. Kindi / Journal of the Philosophy of History 6 (2012) 44–59 51
difffijicult conception to clarify, asks: “How can the historian genuinely re-enact history in his
mind? How can he call the dead to live again and repeat events that have happened once for
all and are irrevocably past? And does not the idea of a literal revival of the past in the histo-
rian’s mind savour of a crude magical necromancy rather than of a serious theory of knowl-
edge?” (IH 443). This is where the text on the inserted page ends. The editors note that there
follow the words “It is easy to answer” crossed out!
18) Speaking of an inferential process and of clues may invoke again the Rylean implicit
criticism of Collingwood: “Overt intelligent performances are not clues to the workings of
minds; they are those workings” (Ryle, The Concept of Mind, 57). Yet, that would be mis-
taken, I believe, because Collingwood agrees that there is no inference from mere marks to
what these marks mean (PH 53); the inference he speaks of is from already understood
marks (the evidence) to the setting up of a picture of past events.
19) It might seem that there is a contradiction here with what was mentioned earlier,
namely, that thoughts are not abstract entities hovering above the world in a spaceless and
tenseless realm of eternity. When Collingwood says that thoughts are not part of the flow of
consciousness, he means that they are public and shareable, possible objects of experience
and knowledge (PA 159; PH 134–5, 222–224).
20) Such contentions, and claims that historical argument proves its point “as conclusively
as a demonstration in mathematics” (IH 262; cf. IH 268), have driven several scholars to
maintain that the inferences of which Collingwood speaks have the form of valid arguments.
See for instance: G. D’Oro, “Re-enactment and Radical Interpretation”, History and Theory 43
(2004), 198–208; G. D’Oro, “Collingwood, Psychologism and Internalism”, European Journal
of Philosophy, 12:2 (2004), 163–177; Dray, History as Re-enactment. R.G. Collingwood’s Idea of
History, 124; L. Pompa, “Collingwood’s Theory of Historical Knowledge” in D. Boucher, J.
52 V. Kindi / Journal of the Philosophy of History 6 (2012) 44–59
Connelly and T. Modood, Philosophy History and Civilization (Cardifff: University of Wales
Press, 1995, 168–181, 173). This is, I think, overly restrictive. The inferences employed in his-
torical thinking are of a peculiar kind according to Collingwood (PH 165), resembling nei-
ther deductive nor typical inductive arguments. If the inferences were deductively valid,
that would mean that the historians would learn not how particular agents acted in the past
but how they should have acted if they wanted to be rational (cf. IH 445). But Collingwood
claims, fijirst, that historical understanding yields knowledge of particular actions performed
by particular individuals in particular historical settings (“no explanation of the French
Revolution can be the right one which will fijit any other revolution” PH 180), secondly, that
the rationality of past agents may involve unreasonable actions on their part by our own
light (PH 46, n. 13, 47), and thirdly, that logic itself may vary with time and space (PH 242).
He also maintains that historians may reach diffferent conclusions when considering the
same sum of clues (PH 165). Given all this it is doubtful that re-enacting past thoughts is a
valid deductive inference. Admittedly, insistence on the validity of the historical inference
rather than its soundness, is supposed to avoid some, at least, of these objections, but it
certainly cannot avoid them all. This is, perhaps the reason that commentators fijind the
whole doctrine problematic, too restrictive, rationalistic and intellectualist.
V. Kindi / Journal of the Philosophy of History 6 (2012) 44–59 53
the offfijicer who builds the fort feels is relevant to understanding his action
while other emotions that he may have had at the time are irrelevant.21
Despite the concession to emotions, Collingwood repeats in The Princi-
ples of History his categorical objection to biography. His problem is not
so much that biographies include events that may not embody thought,
but rather that the events chosen to be included are included on the
basis of their gossip-value.22 “Biography, though it often uses motives of an
historical kind by way of embroidery, is in essence a web woven of these
two groups of threads, sympathy and malice. Its function is to arouse these
feelings in the reader; essentially therefore it is a device for stimulating
emotion, and accordingly it falls into the two main divisions of amusement-
biography, which is what the circulating libraries so extensively deal in,
and magical biography,23 or the biography of exhortation and moral point-
ing, holding up good examples to be followed or bad ones to be eschewed”
(PH 70).
The purpose of biography, according to Collingwood, is not to command
assent (PH 73), as history properly done requires, but to stimulate emotions
(and, in fact, emotions of the “proper kind”, the ones, that is, that will not
offfend the prevalent public opinion). For that reason, (i.e., to stimulate
emotions), biographers include pictures, they speak of childhood and old
age, of diseases, feuds and love afffairs. They give facts that will paint for the
reader a concrete, and at the same time familiar, individual – a person like
21) The same point, namely that emotions can be the object of historical understanding, is
also made in The Philosophy of Enchantment, and more specifijically in his folktale essays
included in this volume (PE 115–287), which were written in the late 30s, after much of the
Idea of History was written. In these essays, Collingwood’s view is that magic is an expres-
sion of emotion (PE 205) and should be studied by the science of anthropology using the
historical method. “[Cultural] Anthropology . . . is a historical science” (PE 153). The editors
of the volume note that the emphasis given by Collingwood to emotions in relation to magic
“should serve signifijicantly to modify and complicate perceptions of the place of emotions in
Collingwood’s description of history as a history of thought (e.g., as derived from A and IH)”,
(PE 196, n. 3).
22) Cf. Momigliano, The Development of Greek Biography, 103). According to Momigliano the
distinctive features of Hellenistic biography were erudition, scholarly zeal, realism of detail
and gossip. “Clearly it fijitted into the new Hellenistic fashion of care for details, erudition,
elegant gossip. . . . what was now called bios was a detached, slightly humorous account of
events and opinions characterizing an individual”.
23) The term magical here is similar to the use it has in what Collingwood calls magical art
in the Principles of Art, i.e., art that aims to be useful.
54 V. Kindi / Journal of the Philosophy of History 6 (2012) 44–59
us-, which will provoke sympathy or malice. These are facts that, according
to Collingwood, pertain to animals. On top of that all, biography, Colling-
wood says, has also snobbery value which feeds in turn its gossip value.
Members of certain circles, or certain families, have their biographies
written or read biographies themselves so that they can then discuss, in
a gossipy manner, the afffairs of their milieu. In so doing they also flatter
themselves that they read history which is, unfortunately though, scissors
and paste history.
In The Principles of Art things become more complicated. Collingwood
repeats again that “biographies of cattishness” (PA 87) belong to the class of
pseudo-art or amusement-art – that is art that is purely hedonistic that
aims simply to entertain – yet, in this book he does not seem to hold a dis-
paraging view of emotions. Instead, he develops a nuanced account of
them. He distinguishes between feelings of sensation (sensations of hot
and cold, hard and soft, red and blue, bitter, sweet, etc.) and feelings of
pain, anger, fear, etc which he calls emotions. He goes on, however, to say
that there is an intimate relation between sensation and emotion. Emotion
is not a mere efffect of sensation; rather, every sensum has its own emo-
tional charge.24 Then he distinguishes three levels: the psychical level
where feelings and emotions reside, the level of consciousness and the level
of thought or intellectual level. At the level of consciousness the self domi-
nates the feelings, claims them as his own, domesticates them, rescues
them from the flux of mere sensation (PA 209) and the impressions of sense
are converted into ideas of imagination. Thought deals with sensations and
the relations between sensa (as when I say “It’s hot today”), but it can also
take the form of secondary thought when we do not think about our feel-
ings but about our thoughts (PA 166). There are also intellectual emotions,
emotions which can be felt only by intellectual beings and are the emotional
24) The same claim is made in the New Leviathan (NL 4.I–4. II): “A feeling consists of two
things closely connected: fijirst, a sensuous element such as a colour seen, a sound heard, an
odour smelt; secondly, what I call the emotional charge on this sensation: the cheerfulness
with which you see the colour, the fear with which you hear the noise, the disgust with
which you smell the odour. Does every feeling consist of these two elements? I do not know.
Generalization about feelings is impossible.” In the same book, Collingwood argues that
thought, and intellectual work in general, require a fijirm foundation which is provided by
“the solidity and robustness of a man’s sensuous emotional nature” (NL 5.I4). If this base is
shaken, the mind cannot properly perform its intellectual functions.
V. Kindi / Journal of the Philosophy of History 6 (2012) 44–59 55
charge upon thought in the narrow sense (PA 294). Aesthetic emotions are
not some special kind of emotions already formed at the psychical level
of individuals and particularly apt for the creation or appreciation of art.
Rather, they emerge when the crude psychical emotions are transformed
by imagination into idealized emotions, when from impressions they
become ideas. Aesthetic emotions do not pre-exist to the expression of
emotions that are necessary for artistic activity. They are the emotional
charge on the experience of expressing a given emotion (PA 274).
What I want to retain from all this is that thought is pervasive in a com-
plicated but also immediate manner. “[O]ur experience of the world in
space and time, the ‘world of nature’ or the ‘external world’ [. . .] is an expe-
rience partly sensuous (strictly sensuous-emotional) and partly intellec-
tual. (PA 166)” There are no sterilized feelings or emotions. Once they are
arrested by consciousness, thought begins to operate. So, if history is the
history of thought and emotions are fused with thought (PA 295), then, his-
tory can deal with emotions as well. This becomes more evident in the his-
tory of art. Art, according to Collingwood, expresses emotion (that of the
artist) and arouses emotion in the audience but its purpose is neither utili-
tarian nor hedonistic as in the case of magic and amusement art respec-
tively. The artists resonate with their public, share emotions with them
and express them. They tell their audience “the secrets of their own [the
audience’s] hearts” (PA 336). Both writer and reader are artists (PA 119),
both have and express emotion and they need to do that to communicate.
“If a poet expresses, for example, a certain kind of fear, the only hearers
who can understand him, are those who are capable of experiencing that
kind of fear themselves. Hence, when some one reads and understands a
poem, he is not merely understanding the poet’s expression of his, the poet’s
emotions, he is expressing emotions of his own in the poet’s words, which
have thus become his own words. As Coleridge put it, we know a man for a
poet by the fact that he makes us poets. [. . .] The poet’s diffference from his
audience lies in the fact that, [. . .] the poet is a man who can solve for him-
self the problem of expressing [this particular emotion], whereas the audi-
ence can express it only when the poet has shown them how” (PA 118).
According to Collingwood, language expresses emotion (PA 245, 252,
260, 266, 296); even when it becomes intellectualized, it does not dry up
emotions but it acquires new (PA 269). “Every utterance”, Collingwood
says, “and each gesture that each one of us makes is a work of art” (PA 285,
296), “Every human being is an artist” (IH 431).
56 V. Kindi / Journal of the Philosophy of History 6 (2012) 44–59
not being a romantic fijigure but “a very ordinary English lady” would not
provide the spicy material that a biographer would require (PE 38).
2. In The Principles of Art, Collingwood notes that a portrait painter sees
much more in his subject than a casual observer does. The artist “may
easily see through the mask that is good enough to deceive a less active
and less pertinacious observer, and detect in a mouth or an eye or the
turn of a head things that have long been concealed” (PA 309). The art-
ist’s work, that is, is diffferent from an ordinary artifact. And it so hap-
pens that many people, according to Collingwood, prefer ‘nature’ to ‘art’
“because they prefer not to be shown so much, in order to keep their
apprehensions at a lower and more manageable level, where they can
embroider what they see with likes and dislikes, fancies and emotions of
their own, not intrinsically connected with the subject” (PA 308–309). If
we draw the analogy with biography, we could say that we can distin-
guish between two kinds of biographies: the gossipy ones and the artis-
tic. A biography, just like a portrait done by a real artist, may be a work
of art properly so called28 and not just something for amusement or
instruction. In producing a biography, we may genuinely aim at under-
standing a particular character and the life he or she led. In this case we
are creating a work of art and it would be possible for Collingwood to
accept it.
3. In the previous paragraph I developed an argument to show that Col-
lingwood would not object to the kind of biography which aims to be
itself a work of art. Now, I will consider an argument in favour of biogra-
phy from within Collingwood’s philosophy which does not take biogra-
phy to be a work of art but, rather, considers biography to be the history
of a work of art. This piece of art is the life of an individual. As long as an
individual does not corrupt his or her consciousness, his or her life may
be considered a work of art. Consequently, the biography of this indi-
vidual may qualify as history of art. Here, of course, one is faced with the
problems surrounding history of art from the point of view of Collingwood.
Collingwood was not at all critical of the history of art and considered it
I think it follows from the above that Collingwood is only opposed to the
kind of biography that aims solely to entertain the public by cultivating and
enhancing already available inclinations and habits of reaction. No efffort is
being made in these works to understand an individual and the historical
circumstances of his or her life. The only care authors of such biographies
have is to arouse and feed the hunger of the audience for personal details
and eccentric facts. It’s a mechanical process which links externally together
satisfaction and demand. Such biographies cannot qualify as either history
or art. Collingwood, who commended the communion of souls between
artist and audience and insisted on historians making every efffort to re-
enact past thoughts in order to understand past agents and their actions,
could not but be opposed to such shallow pieces of work. But his under-
standing of history cannot exclude and could not, in principle, be opposed
to biographies which aim to make sense of the events that make up a
human life. As either pieces of art themselves, just like portrait painting, or
as historical accounts of artistic or non-artistic individual lives, biographies
can be redeemed from within Collingwood’s work.30