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Ike and His Spies in The Sky
Ike and His Spies in The Sky
Sky
in the
By David Haight
Title Prologue 15
Joint Chiefs of Staff, briefed the President Nevertheless, through varying levels of 1953, included an expansion of U.S. intel
and the council on the loss of a U.S. Air archival processing and researchergener ligence collection and analysis.
Force plane, an RB50, in the Sea of Japan. ated declassification requests, a large vol The President placed top priority on
The ensuing discussion revealed that the ume of the historical record of Eisen this, and to drive home a sense of urgency,
United States also shot down Russian planes hower’s management and employment of he told the military service chiefs in late
that approached U.S. ships too closely.The intelligence has been made available to 1954 that for the first time the United
President said that both the Americans and researchers at the Eisenhower Library. States had reason to be frightened for its
the Russians knew that if U.S. planes flew Anyone familiar with 20thcentur y safety because an enemy armed with the
toward Vladivostok, they were not on train records is aware that declassifying intel new (nuclear) weapons could knock out
ing missions. As Eisenhower said, this shoot ligence information is often difficult and the nation within 30 days.
down was not as unprovoked as it might time consuming. Despite the fact that cer Eisenhower authorized aerial intelligence
have seemed. In this case, the former five tain intelligencerelated documents in the collecting programs in order to better assess
star general could see the matter from the library are likely to remain security clas the military capability of the Soviet Union,
Soviet viewpoint and appeared to play it sified for years to come, significant China, and other Communistbloc nations to
down not only to avoid public discussion of progress has been achieved in releasing launch a surprise attack on the United States.
sensitive intelligence operations but also to information on many intelligence topics. He approved overflights of the Soviet Union
avoid domestic pressure to retaliate against The declassified records, in their original by military aircraft in a highly compartmen
the Soviets. context, are dependent upon historians talized intelligence program labeled
Were these aerial missions worth the to give narrative perspective to their SENSINT (Sensitive Intelligence).Despite the
risk, loss, and expense invested in them? archival existence. risks of Soviet retaliation,U.S. military aircraft
Many writers have attempted to answer flew directly over the Soviet territory from
• • •
this question by studying the available evi early 1954 until late 1956.
dence. These f lights were hidden in a To counter the menace of Soviet mili The U.S. Air Force developed balloons
cloak of secrecy, and even now many tary might, the Eisenhower administration equipped with cameras and f lew them
details are unclear either because of con developed a strategic posture policy, over Soviet bloc countries under the guise
tinuing security protection or because of known as the “New Look.” This basic of meteorological research. The balloon
the lack of written documentation. national security policy, approved in late program, which Eisenhower approved
with misgivings in 1955, yielded more
protests from the Kremlin than it did use
ful intelligence information. Eisenhower
ordered balloon f lights over Russia
stopped in 1956, but various schemes for
launching balloons floated as late as 1958.
When the President at Geneva in 1955
sought Soviet agreement to a mutual
exchange of military information with the
United States, First Secretary of the Com
munist Party Nikita Khrushchev and the
Soviet delegation rejected his initiative.
Eisenhower, therefore, relied on covert or
black operations, emphasizing overhead
intelligence collection as a major part of
the United States’ effort to meet this threat
of surprise attack.
Meanwhile, in 1956, U2 aircraft began
f lying over the Soviet Union. Unlike the
SENSINT program, the U2 program was
directed by the CIA, a civilian agency, and
piloted by civilians. Eisenhower, while real
izing the provocative nature of military air
James R. Killian, being sworn in here as special assistant to the President for science and technology, was a
craft f lown by military personnel over or
key adviser to the President on organizing and developing U.S. intelligence capabilities to warn of a possible
around the Soviet Union, continued
Soviet surprise attack.
throughout his administration to approve
enced by the current international situa on January 17, 1961? flights to collect intelligence to the maxi
tion. For example, on March 4, 1959, with At any rate, politicians such as Missouri mum degree possible, the President
the Berlin situation heating up, Good Senator Stuart Symington, a former secretary pointed out the “soulsearching” he
paster recorded: of the Air Force who was running for Presi engaged in when he considered approval
dent in 1960, raised allegations of a “missile for each flight. Gen. John Hull, chairman of
At the President’s request, I advised Gen gap,” claiming the United States was falling the board, pointed out that a recent flight
eral [Nathan] Twining [chairman of the behind the Soviet Union in missile produc disclosed military deployments that gave
Joint Chiefs of Staff] that the President has tion and deployment. Information from the no sign of a slackening off of Soviet mili
decided to disapprove any additional spe risky U2 missions, however, helped confirm tary power as might have been suggested
cial flights by the U2 in the present abnor Eisenhower’s judgment that the socalled by the “spirit of Camp David.” (The Eisen
mally tense circumstances. “missile gap” did not exist and allowed him howerKhrushchev conversations at
to more readily resist calls for massive Camp David in September 1959 had
In a February 10, 1959, meeting, the increases in military spending that might encouraged hope in some quarters that
President expressed hope in technological have accelerated a U.S.Soviet arms race. tensions between the United States and
advancements including the CORONA Throughout the spring and summer of the USSR might be easing.)
project as well as the more advanced 1959, the President continued to express Eisenhower responded that while he
plane, the SR71. He continued to listen to concern over the risks of continuing these knew of no “spirit of Camp David,” these
Killian and Land on such matters as the reconnaissance flights and to worry over talks had been a frank and respectful dis
monitoring of Soviet missile firings and Soviet reactions to them. In a July 8, 1959, cussion of key issues and accomplished a
the progress of CORONA. meeting with Secretary of State Christian mutual recognition by Eisenhower and
Throughout the February 10 meeting, the Herter, CIA Director Allen Dulles, and Khrushchev that it was critically impor
President demonstrated his interest in Richard Bissell, the CIA’s deputy director tant to avoid general war. Eisenhower
obtaining as much information on the Soviet for plans, he asked “whether we are get viewed the data on soviet missile sites he
missiles as possible and also in details of mis ting to the point where we must decide if had seen as corroborating what
sile production and acceleration. He also we are trying to prepare to fight a war or Khrushchev had told him at Camp David.
commented on leaks by “irresponsible offi to prevent one.” Nevertheless, because of While Hull and the board continued to
cials and demagogues.” He remarked that the unanimous recommendations by his focus on the intelligence value of over
some senators seemed to be responsible for advisers, the President agreed to the flight f lights, the President said that he was
the leaks, while at the same time munitions under consideration at that time. putting on the line his one asset in a sum
makers were striving to get more contracts One of the best examples of the Presi mit meeting: his reputation for honesty. If
and appeared to be exerting undue influ dent’s agonizing over these overf lights is one of these aircraft was lost while the
ence over these senators. Did the President a memorandum for the record document United States was engaged in apparently sin
have this kind of thing in mind when he ing his meeting with his PBCFIA on Feb cere deliberations, it could be put on display
made his famous reference to the “military ruary 2, 1960. in Moscow and ruin the President’s effec
industrial complex” in his farewell address As the board pushed for using over tiveness as a negotiator. Nevertheless, the
On March 31, 1959, the CIA sent the White House an intelligence note about possible ICBM launching sites
trated. The CIA had advised him that it was
in the Urals.
highly unlikely that the Soviets could track
U2 f lights. In fact, almost from the begin
board members insisted on continuing the ers. It was brought down, apparently by a ning, Soviet radar picked up and tracked
overf lights while hoping that the SR71, missile that damaged but did not destroy these flights.The CIA had also assured the
much less vulnerable to tracking and the plane, thus enabling Powers to para President that it was almost a certainty
attack than was the U2, would soon be chute safely. Power’s plane was also appar that no pilot would survive a shootdown
operational. ently the only plane downed deep within of a U2 aircraft.Yet the Soviets captured
The overflights continued, and on April the Soviet Union. Powers alive.
25, 1960, Goodpaster wrote a brief one The Soviets captured Powers and put Eisenhower vowed not to send U2
paragraph memorandum stating: “After what was claimed to be the wreckage of his planes over the Soviet Union any more.
checking with the President, I informed plane on display.The international furor cre This did not, however, mean the cessation
Mr. Bissell that one additional operation ated by this incident forced Khrushchev, of all U.S. aerial reconnaissance programs
[U2 overflight of the USSR] may be under probably under pressure himself in the conducted on the periphery of the Soviet
taken, provided it is carried out prior to Kremlin, to make demands on Eisenhower Union and other Communist territories.
May 1. No operation is to be carried out at the beginning of the Paris summit confer On July 1, 1960—the day the Soviets shot
after May 1.” ence on May 16, 1960. Khrushchev, not down a U.S. RB47 plane conducting
As is well known, that operation carried receiving the apologetic response from reconnaissance in the Barents Sea along
out on May 1 was the U2 f light over the Eisenhower he demanded, then walked out, the northern coast of the USSR—the Pres
Soviet Union piloted by Francis Gary Pow effectively wrecking the summit. ident received a briefing on the status of
NOTE ON SOURCES
The author wishes to express his appreciation The role of the President’s Board of Consultants on ings (Washington, DC: Office of the Historian,
for the assistance provided by Chalsea Millner, Foreign Intelligence Activities (PBCFIA) in advising the National Reconnaissance Office, 2003).This sympo
Michelle Kopfer,Tim Rives, and Kathy Struss of the President is documented in a body of folders under that sium was held at the Defense Intelligence Agency on
Eisenhower Library staff and professor Judith board’s name in the Records of the White House Office February 22–23, 2001.
Collins, Kansas State University, Salina. of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs as Other important secondary sources consulted
The Records of White House Staff Secretary well as in some of Goodpaster’s memoranda of con include Michael Beschloss, Mayday: Eisenhower,
Andrew Goodpaster constitute the most impor ferences with the President. These files contain the Khrushchev, and the U2 Affair (New York: Harper
tant source of documentation of the Eisenhower semiannual reports for the President prepared by PBC and Row, 1986); Richard M. Bissell, Jr., with Jonathan
administration’s overhead intelligencecollecting FIA chairmen James Killian and his successor, John Hull. E. Lewis and Frances T. Pudlo, Reflections of a Cold
programs.A file consisting of 20 folders entitled The Eisenhower Library therefore holds a reasonably Warrior ( New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
“Intelligence Matters” begins with material dated good declassified record of the recommendations 1996); Stephen Ambrose and Richard Immerman,
December 1955 and continues through the end of passed on to the President by this highlevel advisory Ike’s Spies: Eisenhower and the Intelligence Com
the administration. Found here are memoranda of body, although portions remain security classified as of munity (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1981); and Wil
conferences with the President, and with James 2009. liam E. Burrows, By Any Means Necessary: Amer
Killian,Allen Dulles, Richard Bissell, Edwin Land, As for secondary sources, Cargill Hall, former histo ica’s Secret Air War in the Cold War (New York:
Nathan Twining, and many others involved in rian for the National Reconnaissance Office,has written Farrar, Straus and Giraux, 2001).
these programs.This documentation covers bal numerous articles on the Eisenhower administration’s To encourage research in intelligence documents
loons, U2 missions, peripheral missions, data on overhead intelligence programs,which were the source at the Eisenhower Library, the archival staff devel
intelligence targets within the Soviet Union, plans of information on the SENSINT programs approved oped an exercise intended to introduce participants
and authorizations for the CORONA reconnais early in the Eisenhower administration before Good to highlevel primary sources documenting Presi
sance satellite program including developing paster became staff secretary.The library holds little on dent Eisenhower’s acquisition of aerial intelligence
cover for this black operation, and a few items on these early aerial reconnaissance programs conducted capabilities. This exercise consists of a packet of
the Galactic Radiation and Background (GRAB) from 1954 to 1956. Examples of Hall’s writings include selected documents spanning the period from
electronic reconnaissance satellite (referenced in “The Truth About Overflights,” The Quarterly Journal November 1954 until September 1960 plus a glos
Goodpaster’s records as Project CANES).This satel of Military History, 9 (Spring 1997);“Origins of U.S. sary of terms, lists of key individuals, and suggested
lite, intended to collect electronic intelligence Space Policy: Eisenhower, Open Skies, and Freedom of sources for background reading.This activity con
from Soviet radars, was successfully launched on Space,” in John Logsdon et al., eds. Exploring the sists of reading and analyzing the packet of intelli
June 22, 1960, two months before the first suc Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the gence documents and can be modified to fit groups
cessful CORONA launch. However, CORONA pro U.S. Civil Space Program, Vol. I: Organizing for Explo ranging from secondary school classes to U.S gov
duced the first photographic images from a recon ration (Washington, DC: NASA Sp04407, 1995);“The ernment intelligence analysts. Unlike the Five Star
naissance satellite. Portions of Goodpaster’s rich Eisenhower Administration and the Cold War: Framing Leaders Program, conducted largely by the Eisen
intelligence file remain security classified as of American Astronautics to Serve National Security,” Pro hower Library’s Education Specialist, this intelli
2009. logue: Quarterly Journal of the National Archives, 27 gence document exercise is conducted entirely by
In addition to the “Intelligence Matters” file, (Spring, 1995);“Postwar Strategic Reconnaissance and the library’s archives staff.
the White House Staff Secretary Records contain the Genesis of Corona” in Dwayne A. Day, John M. Logs For further information about this exercise or
other memoranda prepared or received by don, and Brian Latell, eds., Eye in the Sky: The Story of about documentation in the Eisenhower Library
Goodpaster concerning intelligence including the Corona Spy Satellites (Washington, DC: Smithson relating to other intelligence topics, please con
cover material for CORONA. As White House ian Institution, 1998); and “Clandestine Victory: Eisen tact the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library staff while
staff secretary, Goodpaster prepared hundreds of hower and Overhead Reconnaissance in the Cold War,” also examining the Eisenhower Library’s web site
memoranda of conferences with the President. in Dennis E. Showalter, ed., Forging the Shield: Eisen at www.eisenhower.archives.gov.
Many of his memoranda pertaining to the sensi hower and National Security for the 21st Century
Author
tive intelligence matters covered in this article (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 2005). Gregory Pedlow
are found only in the Intelligence file cited and Donald Welzenbach coauthored an official CIA his
above. Most others of his memoranda, including tory entitled The CIA and the U2 Program,
some on intelligence can be found within 1954–1974 (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of David Haight was an archivist
Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Papers as President Intelligence,Central Intelligence Agency,1998).An essen at the Eisenhower Library for
(Ann Whitman File), particularly the ACW Diary tial source for studying the history of the CORONA pro
37 years before retiring in
Series and the DDE Diary Series. The Ann Whit gram is Kevin C. Ruffner, ed., CORONA: America’s First
Satellite Program, Washington, DC: Government Print
August 2008. He continues to
man File contains the richly detailed memoranda
ing Office,1995).Another key source is the twovolume assist the library as a volunteer in security
of National Security Council meetings. Certain
intelligencerelated portions remain security publication edited by R. Cargill Hall and Clayton D. Lau declassification matters and with other activ
classified as of 2009. rie, Early Cold War Overflights: Symposium Proceed ities as needed.