Working Group Report Appendix 7

Appendix 7 – Working Group Member Comments/Dissents
ACPA Submission to Final Report
ALPA Submission to Final Report
MAC, NATA, ATAC, CBAA, & HAC Joint Submission to the Final Report
NACC Submission to Final Report
TCCA Submission to Final Report
WJPA Submission to Final Report

September 3, 2012
Sent via E-mail
Attn: Working Group Co-Chairs

Captain Dan Adamus, President-Air Line Pilots Association International’s Canada Board &
Ms. Jacqueline Booth, Chief, Technical Program Evaluation and Coordination, Standards, TCCA
330 Sparks Street
Ottawa ON K1A 0N5
Dear Working Group Co-Chairs;
RE: Addendum to Appendix 7 (Dissents) of the Report of the Canadian Aviation Regulation Advisory
Council (CARAC) Flight Crew Fatigue Management Working Group (Report – Dated August 15, 2012)
The Air Canada Pilots Association (ACPA) is grateful for the opportunity to participate in the CARAC Flight
Crew Fatigue Management Working Group.
ACPA thanks the Co-Chairs and fellow members of this Working Group for their professionalism and
dedication in achieving a large portion of goals defined in the Terms of Reference. There remains a short
but important list of concerns where the Working Group Co-Chairs did not form a recommendation in
the order set out in the Terms of Reference. As a result, several recommendations not flowing from a
group consensus run contrary to existing scientific evidence, international harmonization, or both. ACPA
asks that these recommendations (listed below) be revised to comply with the CARAC Charter and
Working Group Terms of Reference.
ACPA remains keenly aware of the delicate balance of risk and cost in this industry. That said, we
increasingly see cases where operating crews reach one or more regulatory limits. If this trend
continues, and market competition suggests it will, those limits must be supported with the best
available information, be it scientific or worldwide best practices.
ACPA’s statement of dissent consists of an executive summary followed by a discussion of issues. In the
discussion of issues, we have limited our submission to identification of the discrepancy and a brief
account of the relevant information. The complete supporting information is available in the report
itself or can be provided if requested. It should be noted that ACPA’s submissions Dated March 3, 2012
and August 8, 2012 were not yet included into Appendix 6 as of the time of the writing of this dissent.
On behalf of the 3000 Professional Pilots represented by ACPA, we thank you for allowing us to
participate in this landmark process.
Air Canada Pilots Association ~ Safety with Integrity ~
Respectfully,
First Officer Douglas Tweedlie

Working Group Member
Human Factors Chairman Air Canada Pilots Association
Page 2 of 9
Executive Summary
The Flight Crew Fatigue Management Working Group was assigned the task of making
recommendations to update the Canadian regulations with the objective of compliance with the
Standards and Recommended Practices for Flight and Duty Times of the latest ICAO Annex 6. The
Working Group was directed to prepare recommendations as follows:
“The Working Group will base its work on scientific data that is defensible and readily available.
In addition, the Working Group will consider the work already completed by Transport Canada in
regards to FRMS, as well as the regulations and proposals of ICAO and other States in an effort
to adopt and harmonize regulations and best practices with those States, where appropriate.“
(ref: Terms of Reference, Objectives and Goals, RDIMS # 5351150)
This direction is consistent with ICAO Annex 6.4.10.1, which reads, as follows:
“The State of the Operator shall establish regulations for the purpose of managing fatigue.
These regulations shall be based upon scientific principles and knowledge, with the aim of
ensuring that flight and cabin crew members are performing at an adequate level of alertness.
Accordingly, the State of the Operator shall establish:
a) regulations for flight time, flight duty period, duty period and rest period limitations; and
b) where authorizing an operator to use a Fatigue Risk Management System (FRMS) to
manage fatigue, FRMS regulations.”
The Working Group convened between August 2010 and December 2011 and achieved most of the
objectives as instructed. In many cases the recommendations reflect group consensus. As well, most
recommendations can be traced to robust science or worldwide regulation founded on best practices.
The nature of this task gave rise to several cases where consensus within the Working Group was not
achieved. The Working Group final report (section 1.3) cited the following process for producing
recommendations in the absence of consensus:
“… Where consensus was achieved the recommendation was accepted. Where consensus was
not achieved, the Co-Chairs used the science first, then harmonization and finally the
operational experience of Working Group members to develop a recommendation.”
While this statement is correct for most of the recommendations in this report, ACPA finds that
recommendations in the following areas did not follow either the existing science or meet the objective
of harmonization with other jurisdictions. With this dissent, we ask that the associated
recommendations be evaluated using the outlined terms of reference and decision making
methodology.
ACPA dissents on the following issues:
1. Maximum Duty Period for Un-Acclimatized Crew Member

2. Successive Overseas Flights
3. Maximum Duty Period at Night
4. Maximum Flight Time within 28 Days
5. Pre-emptive Planning of Controlled Rest
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6. Standby Duty Period of 20 Hours
7. Alternate Method of Determining Acclimatized Time
8. Weekly Time free from duty
9. Use of “Flight Duty Period” Term for Disruptive Schedules
10. Early to Night Disruptive Schedules
11. Cumulative fatigue (Consecutive Duties infringing on the WOCL)
DISCUSSION OF DISSENT ITEMS:
1. Maximum Duty Period for Un-Acclimatized Crew Member (Flight Duty Period)
This issue was addressed within the Working Group, with a position and written submissions indicating
that a recommendation was required. The Working Group report does not include a recommendation
on this item, so supports status quo. Both existing science and international harmonization clearly
indicate a need for change in the Canadian position.
Scientific evidence provided to the Working Group indicated that 24 hours (the typical overseas layover
duration) is not sufficient time to achieve two sleeps. There was no disagreement within the Working
Group on this aspect.
International harmonization further supports change. No other country in the world permits a 13 hour
duty period with 11 hours flight time, following an all-night overseas flight with a layover of 20-28 hours.
UK 9:45 FDP 8.5 flight hours

Australia 11:00 FDP 9 flight hours
USA 9 flight hours
Canada 13:00 FDP 11 flight hours
ACPA believes that, pursuant to the Terms of Reference, a recommendation for change be made on this
item in accordance with both scientific evidence and harmonization
2. Successive Overseas Flights (Additional Rest Due To Time Zone Differences)
The Working Group Report has a provision that permits successive long range flights crossing multiple
time zones with one night rest.
In the section, Additional Rest Due To Time Zone Differences, for between 4-10 time zones and away
from base for less than 60 hours with the returning FDP not encroaching on the WOCL, the flight crew
member shall be provided with a minimum of 1 local nights rest. This provision permits a pilot to cross
up to 10 time zones, layover for 24 hours, fly home, and embark on another long range flight with one
night off. The science indicates that these successive overseas flights, especially at night, will cause a
pilot to be fatigued.
The science referenced within the Working Group report accurately reflects the amount of time to
recover from a typical overseas flight is 48 hours and at least 2 local nights rest at home. The
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harmonization referenced in the Working Group report mentions 36-72 hours off in the EASA NPA and
56 hours off and 3 local nights rest for the USA.
There was a general consensus within the Working Group on the subject of additional rest following an
overseas flight, yet there was no consensus on this one area that permits back to back overseas flights.
In deciding to permit a provision for limited rest, the recommendation did not follow the science and
harmonization with this provision.
ACPA believes that, pursuant to the Term of Reference, a recommendation for change is made on this
item in accordance with both scientific evidence and harmonization.
3. Maximum Duty Period at Night (Un-Augmented Long Range Flights and Flight Duty
Periods)
The current Working Group report permits a FDP of 11.5 hours at night. This was an issue where the
Working Group did not have a consensus. There was consensus on the idea of a reduction to the FDP
for single sector long range flights and the value of 1 hour. The lack of consensus is at what point the
reduction starts.
Permitting long duty periods at night will cause pilots to be fatigued. The science contained within the
report is clear that for overnight flights, the maximum FDP should be 10 hours. Although no consensus
was reached on specific values, the recommendations did not use the science in establishing a position.
The current proposal permits 11.5 hour FDP at 18:59, and 11 hour FDP at 20:59.
In November 2011, Dr. Belenky was asked the specific question about long un-augmented single sector
flights. His answer was clear: “12 hours during the day and 10 hours at night un-augmented limits are
good.” The 10 hours of Duty in the scientific papers referenced in the report equates to 8.5 flight hours.
Here is a brief comparison of flight times for start times of 1800 for a single sector:
USA 9 hours
UK 9 hours
EU (p) 9.5 hours
Australia 8 hours
China 8 hours
Korea 8 hours
Japan 9 hours
India 9 hours
Brazil 8.5 hours
The current proposed for Canada would permit 11.5 hours duty or 10 hours flight time which is about 1
to 2 hours greater than the industry norm. The current recommendation does not represent either the
science, or the harmonization. ACPA believes that, pursuant to the Term of Reference, a
recommendation for change is made on this item in accordance with both scientific evidence and
harmonization.
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4. Maximum Flight Time within 28 Days (Flight Time Limitations)
The Working Group report has a recommendation of 112 hour flight time in any 28 consecutive days.
There is no a scientific recommendation for a value for this issue. Following the decision making
protocol, the next item after science is to harmonize with the rest of the world where possible. There is
a clear summary that the “norm” in the world is 100 hours. All the regulations referenced in the report
have a limit of 100 hours. The following table provides a summary of the maximum permitted flight
time in a month or 28 day period.
28-Day 28-Day 28-Day

Country Monthly Country Monthly Country Monthly
Flight Flight Flight
USA Current 100 Japan 93 New Zealand 100
USA New 100 Maldives 100 UAE 100
EASA 100 Taiwan 100 Seychelles 100
UK 100 90- Mexico 90
China
Australia 100 100 Fiji 100
Hong Kong 100 Korea 90 Argentina 90
Singapore 100 Malaysia 100 Chile 93
Bangladesh 120 Sri Lanka 100 Cambodia 100
Pakistan 100 Philippines 100 Canada 120
India 125 Columbia 75
Bermuda 100 Macao 100
Brazil 85 Oman 100
Mauritius 100 South Africa 100
Cyprus 100 Ghana 100
The value in the report does not reflect the harmonized value.
ACPA believes that pursuant to the Term of Reference, this item ought to be reviewed with the objective
of harmonizing with the vast majority of jurisdictions.
5. Pre-Emptive Planning of Controlled Rest (Controlled Rest on the Flight Deck)
The recommendation in the Working Group report is for pilots to brief controlled rest prior to use. This
recommendation does not reflect the consensus reached within the Working Group.
At the last two Working Group meetings, the issue of controlled rest as a planning tool was raised.
There is evidence from pilots and recent data that pilots are reporting for work anticipating fatigue and
napping on duty to deal with the fatigue. This is abundantly apparent from the Transportation Safety
Board of Canada report A11F0012 Pitch excursion YYZ-ZRH, that cited human error due to inappropriate
use of controlled rest on the flight deck as a factor. The Working Group reached full consensus in
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agreeing that operators and pilots cannot rely on cockpit naps to deal with fatigue. Cockpit naps are
intended only for unplanned and unexpected fatigue onset.
There was full consensus from the Working Group that Canada would be in line with the rest of the
world and only use controlled rest in the flight deck for unforeseen fatigue.
The Working Group report does not reflect the consensus of the Working Group. To simply say a cockpit
nap needs to be “briefed prior to use” does not reflect the need to clarify that pilots and operators are
not to plan on the use of controlled rest.
The Working Group report needs to more clearly reflect the Working Group consensus on the issue.
6. Standby Duty Period of 20 Hours (Standby)
The Working Group report includes a provision to permit 20 hours on Standby starting at 02:00:
“when the SAP begins between 02:00 and 05:59 (flight crew member’s acclimatized time), the
maximum SDP may be increased by 50% of the time period between 02:00 and 05:59 that the
flight crew member was not disturbed by the air operator, to a maximum of 2 hours.”
The Working Draft Report of July 3, 2012 details the following:
flight crew member was not disturbed by the air operator, to a maximum of 1 hour.”
The final recommendation has become:
flight crew member was not disturbed by the air operator, to a maximum of 2 hours.”
The recommendation specifies values that were debated and not accepted by the Working Group.
There is no supporting science and no harmonization argument to justify such a change. ACPA believes
that this change was introduced without following the terms of reference.
7. Alternate Method of Determining Acclimatized Time (Determining FDP Table Start

Time)
The Working Group report recommendation has only one method of calculating the rate of
acclimatization.
There was a general consensus within the Working Group that a second method of determining a crew
member’s acclimatized time can be used. The report should recognize that there is no opposition to
having an alternate means of calculating acclimatized time, using existing science, in addition to the
method currently proposed.
Page 7 of 9
ACPA believes that, pursuant to the Term of Reference the Working Group report should be changed to
reflect this consensus to include a second method of acclimatization.
8. Weekly Time free from duty (Time Free From Duty)
The Working Group report recommends 1 day off (including 2 night’s sleep) after 7 days of work.
However, the scientific references found in the report pertaining to time off in a week, specify that 2
recovery sleeps are required within 7 days and that the minimum of 36 hours off to include 2 night’s
sleep is increased to 48 hours off if there was any duty that contained any WOCL infringement. Clearly,
the science suggests a different approach than is put forward in the recommendation.
The Working Group did not reach a consensus on this issue. The recommendations ought to have
referred to the science where the subject matter expert suggested 1 or 2 days off within 7 days should
apply. To quote Dr. Belenky from the report:
“However, the rule of thumb of one or two days off in seven still applies.”
As suggested by Dr. Belenky many times, mathematical modeling would be prudent in assisting in the
application of the science. However, no modeling was done.
ACPA suggest that this item be revisited. As per the terms of reference the known science ought to be
applied and mathematical modeling ought to be carried out to assist in the application of that science.
9. Use of “Flight Duty Period” Term for Disruptive Schedules (Definitions and Disruptive
Schedules)
The current Working Group report recommendation on disruptive schedules uses the term Flight Duty
Period (FDP). However, there was a consensus on the issue that measures dealing with disruptive
schedules ought to address all duty not just Flight Duty Periods.
In this case the Working Group consensus is not accurately reflected in the recommendations.
10. Early to all night Disruptive schedules (Disruptive schedules)
The current Working Group report states that a minimum of one local night’s rest between duties is
required when switching from early to night duties. The reference science indicates such a schedule
would be fatiguing.
The Working Group did reach consensus on some of the principles to address disruptive schedules.
However, there was no consensus on how to deal with the switch from operating an early shift to an
all-night shift. For such disruptive changes in work schedule, a single night of sleep is insufficient.
There are scientific guidance materials that could have been used in formulating recommendations in
this area. Similarly, Dr. Belenky suggested that scientific modeling is available and could be useful in
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developing recommendations. The scientific principal’s reference and the modeling have not been
applied in this subsection.
ACPA believes that, pursuant to the Term of Reference, a recommendation for change is made on this
item in accordance with scientific evidence.
11. Cumulative fatigue (Consecutive Duties infringing on the WOCL)
The Working Group report contains no recommendations to address multiple infringements into the
WOCL that are not consecutive. The working group referenced science indicates effects of multiple
infringements into the WOCL without adequate opportunity for proper rest will result in cumulative
fatigue.
As there was no consensus reached on this issue, it was expected that a solution based on scientific
evidence would be developed. Failing a science based solution; recommendations based on
harmonization where possible ought to have been put forward.
There is available guidance in this area. There is scientific evidence that two sleep episodes are required
to offset the acute fatigue from duty in the WOCL. Accordingly, many jurisdictions limit the number of
WOCL infringements to no more than four events in seven days. Even though guidance is available, the
report of the Working Group does not include appropriate recommendations.
Pursuant to the Term of Reference, this recommendation ought to be reconsidered with consideration
of the scientific evidence and with the objective of harmonization with other jurisdictions.
Conclusion
Our assessment is that the CARAC Flight Crew Fatigue Management Working Group’s Terms of
Reference were not properly applied in the development of several of the report’s recommendations.
We ask that the items to which we have registered dissent be re-assessed. Further, we request that the
new assessment be conducted in full compliance with the Terms of Reference issued to the Working
Group.
We recognize that the report of the Working Group is only an early step in the process toward
implementation of important regulatory change. It is also a truth that few regulatory instruments are
permanent. However, with the items of our dissent addressed and the remainder of the items of the
Working Group’s report considered, robust and effective changes to the present regulations can be
developed.
Page 9 of 9

REPOR
RT OF THHE CANAADIAN AV VIATION REGULA
ATION AD
DVISORY
Y
COUNCCIL (CAR
RAC) FLIGHT CRE EW FATIIGUE MA
ANAGEMEENT
WORKKING GRO ugust 15, 2012
OUP – Au
AIR LIINE PILOOTS ASSO

OCIATION
N, INTERN
RNATIONA
AL’S DIS
SSENT
Septem
mber 3, 201
12
Preamblle
ALPA would
w like to commend d its fellow Working GGroup Mem mbers for theeir continuinng
efforts to
o move forw ward on thee issue of am
mending annd improvinng Canada’ss flight and duty
time reggulations. It would also
o like to than
nk the co-cchairs for thheir stewarddship of the
process.
The Working Group Memberss have discu ussed, debatted, comproomised andd taken posittions
on the many
m compllex issues raaised in the sessions heeld over thee last two yeears.
The co-cchairs have drafted a reeport based

d on the deliiberations aand conclussions of the
working g group as well
w as the advice
a and recommend
r dations of thhe working group’s
scientific advisor, Dr.
D Belenky y.
ALPA supports thee majority of

o the recom
mmendationns in the repport but notees that theree are
some specific issuees with whicch ALPA does not conncur and whhere improvvements cann
still be achieved.
a
Appendeed to this leetter is the Association

A n’s dissent aand commennts on thosee issues.
ALPA iss confident that, with its

i recommeendations, tthe report caan form thee basis of a
moderniized, scientiifically-based regime of
o flight, duuty time andd rest provisions tailored
specificaally for Can
nadian aviattion.
Captain Martin Gau uthier

Chairmaan, Canadiaan Flight-Time Duty-T Time Comm
mittee
Air Linee Pilots Association, In
nternationall

ALPA DISSENT TO CARAC FATIGUE MANAGEMENT WORKING GROUP REPORT
SEPTEMBER 3, 2012
Note: Working Group Report proposals appear in italics.
Comments on Section 2.0 Definitions
Early Duty means an FDP that starts between 02:00 – 06:59, in the flight crew member’s
acclimatized time.
Late duty means an FDP finishing in the period between 00:00 and 01:59 hours, in the flight
crew member’s acclimatized time.
Night duty means an FDP that starts between 13:01 – 01:59 and finishes after 02:00, in the
flight crew member’s acclimatized time.
In the above expressions, the proposed definitions only apply to FDPs. We believe they should
apply to all duty periods not just FDPs. These expressions are used in the disruptive schedule
provisions where the objective is to prevent rapid shifts in schedules that result in sleep loss and
ensuing reduced alertness. Whether the crew member operates a flight or not when disruptive
duties are scheduled has no bearing on whether the sleep loss will occur or not and therefore
early, late and night duties should apply to all duties.
Recommended definition change:
Early duty means a duty period that starts between 02:00 – 06:59, in the flight crew member’s
acclimatized time.
Late duty means a duty period finishing in the period between 00:00 and 01:59 hours, in the
Night duty means a duty period that starts between 13:01 – 01:59 and finishes after 02:00, in the
Comments on section 3.0 Air Operator Responsibilities
Recommendation: An air operator shall establish processes (where applicable to the type of
operation) to:
x collect actual flight time / flight duty time data necessary to support the planning of flight
operations;
x change a schedule or crewing arrangements when: the planning for a given FDP
or flight time is found to be unrealistic the operator must make the adjustment
within 28 days following the discovery.
2
x report adjustments made to comply with schedule reliability to TC every two

months.
x use all available data to plan realistic flight times and flight duty periods.
Note 1: Planning is considered unrealistic when the maximum FDP or flight time is exceeded on
more than 10% of the time using a sampling of 10 events or 56 days; the operator may choose
which sampling.
The provisions under “Air Operator Responsibilities” should not be prescriptive in nature and
therefore should not include the reference to the 10% limit. They should only refer to an
obligation on the part of the operator to comply with the prescriptive provisions contained in the
regulation. Therefore we recommend the introduction of a section on realistic planning and to
limit the text under “Air Operator Responsibilities” to the obligation of the operator.
Recommended changes (under Air Operator Responsibilities):
x change a schedule or crewing arrangement when the actual operation does not meet the
criteria of realistic planning.
When the Working Group discussed realistic planning many options were evaluated but it was
not possible to reach a consensus on a specific recommendation. We believe the 10 percent limit
proposed in Note 1 is adequate but the report should also include a methodology to calculate the
percentage. The absence of a such a method raises the following question: If an FDP is carried
out on a daily basis can the operator wait until the end of the 56 consecutive days to assess his
schedule reliability? If the answer is yes and the 10% limit has been exceeded on a particular
flight or FDP the operator would have a further 28 days to make adjustments so an unrealistic
FDP could be operated for up to 12 weeks before it would have to be changed which is
unacceptable. We don’t agree with the 56 days option and believe the 10% limit should be
applied to a rolling window of 10 flights or FDPs and assessed on a continuous basis. This is
how it is currently applied according to CARs S740.17 guidance material and we see no
justification to extend the sampling window to 56 days. We recommend a 10% limit using a
sampling of 10 consecutive flights or FDPs. When more than one FDP exceeds the limit within
any 10 consecutive flights or FDPs the operator would have to make changes to the schedule
within 28 days following the discovery.
Recommended changes (new section):
Realistic Planning
x Air operators must use all available data to plan realistic flight times and FDP lengths.
x Planning is considered to be unrealistic when maximum FDP or flight time is

exceeded on more than 10% of occasions using a sampling of any 10 consecutive
flights or FDPs.
3
x Operators must review all planned flight times and FDPs on a regular basis in order to
comply with the requirements of realistic planning.
x When the planning for a given flight or FDP is found to be unrealistic the air operators
must make the required adjustments within 28 days following the discovery.
x Each air operator must submit a report to the Minister detailing the scheduling
adjustments required under this section every two months.
Comments on section 16.0 Cumulative Duty Hour Limitations:
16.0 Cumulative Duty Hour Limitations
The total duration of duty periods to which a flight crew member is assigned shall not exceed:
x 1928 duty hours in any 365 consecutive days;

x 190 duty hours in any 28 consecutive days; and,
When using Time Free from Duty Option 1:
x 60 duty hours in any 7 consecutive days; or,
We believe the 60 hours weekly limit is too high for crew members who have disruptive
schedules. We also believe an additional 14-day limit should be introduced. When combined with
the time free from duty proposals it would be possible for an operator to schedule a crew member
with a mixture of day, night and time zone differences duties and work 190 hours in 25 days with
only 3 days off. Scientific findings on long hours of work coupled with operational experience
lead us to believe that this would produce excessive levels of fatigue and should not be allowed.
The Draft Report includes many references to scientific studies on the effects of long hours of
work and the proposed limits are not in line with the findings:
Folkard & Lombardi estimates the risk of a 60-hour week compared to a 40-hour week to
be 16% higher for day shifts and 38% higher for night shifts. For consecutive 12 hour
shifts the risk is increased 28% for day shifts and 46% for night shifts.
Another study from Dembe, et al comes to the following conclusion: Overtime schedules
are associated with a 68% higher injury hazard rate and working at least 12 hours per day
is associated with a 37% increased hazard rate, while working at least 60 hours per week
is associated with a 23% increased hazard rate.
In the Caruso, et al study, researchers found that a pattern of deteriorating performance

was observed while working long hours, particularly with very long shifts and when 12-
hour shifts combined with more than 40 hours of work a week.
4
At the request of EASA, Mike Spencer assessed the scientific value of the EASA proposal on
cumulative duty limits of 60 hours in 7 days and 190 in 28 days and recommended the
introduction of a 14 days limit with the following comments:
“Cumulative fatigue (AQ3)
Introduction
There is very little scientific evidence to support specific limits for cumulative duty hours. The
main issue is that sufficient time for recovery sleep or sleeps should be provided at regular
intervals to overcome the effect of schedules that disrupt the normal pattern of sleep. The limits
of 60 hours in seven days and 190 in 28 days are very high when crews are subject to continual
disruption of the sleep and circadian rhythms. However, it is recognized that the long-haul limit
over 28 days is effectively restricted by the 28-day limit on flying hours.
A 14 day limit and recovery rest (AQ3a)

The present proposal would allow 120 hours’ duty in 14 days. I have seen no data from civil
aviation on work rates of this level of intensity, although I am aware of problems that have arisen
in military transport operations at these very high rates of working. It would seem wise to apply a
lower level of say 100 hours in 14 days, to provide some extra protection. If rates higher than this
are achieved on a regular basis, it would be extremely valuable to study their effects.”
Although all these studies and many others raise serious concerns on the negative effects and
decreased alertness associated with prolonged overtime we believe the Report provisions will not
be effective in mitigating this risk.
It is worthwhile to note that in Europe EASA has modified their NPA and introduced a 14-day
limit in their CRD proposal following consultation with their panel of scientific experts.
Many other jurisdictions recognize that a 14-day limit is required to prevent the scheduling of
consecutive weeks at 7-day limit and have included a “reduced” 14-day limit as we suggest:
DUTY HOURS LIMITATIONS-OTHER COUNTRIES
7 DAYS 14 DAYS 28 DAYS

USA 60 - 190
EASA CRD 60 110 190
UK 55 95 190
INDIA (proposed) 60 100 190
AUSTRALIA 60 100 -
SOUTH AFRICA 60 100 190
HONG-KONG 55 95 190
5
Recommended changes (new limits):
The total duty hours to which a crew member may be assigned shall not exceed:
(a) 60 duty hours in any 7 consecutive days for non-disruptive schedules;
(b) 55 duty hours in any 7 consecutive days for disruptive schedules;
(c) 110 duty hours in any 14 consecutive days for non-disruptive schedules;
(d) 100 duty hours in any 14 consecutive days for disruptive schedules;
(e) 190 duty hours in any 28 consecutive days for non-disruptive schedules;
(f) 175 duty hours in any 28 consecutive days for disruptive schedules.
*A disruptive schedule is one in which at least 50% of the duty periods either encroach on
the crew member’s WOCL or include a time zone difference greater than 3 hours between
start and finish of the duty period.
Comments on section 17.0 Flight Time Limitations:
17.0 Flight Time Limitations
The total flight time of the flights on which an individual flight crew member is assigned as an
operating flight crew member shall not exceed:
x for single pilot operations, 8 flight hours in any 24 consecutive hours;

x 112 flight hours in any 28 consecutive days; and
x 1000 flight hours in any 365 consecutive days.
We do not agree with the proposed 28-day flight time limit. The 112 hours in 28 days limit is the
equivalent of the current CARs limit of 120 hours in 30 days but the current limit of 40 hours in
7 days and 300 hours in 90 days applicable to 704 & 705 operations are absent from the proposal.
With the proposed limits, an operator could schedule a crew member to fly up to 360 hours in
90 days, an unacceptable 20% increase on the current CARs limits. It would be a mistake to
believe that the introduction of a 7-day and 28-day cumulative duty hours limit will be effective
in preventing the high number of flight hours since it would be possible to schedule up to
610 hours of duty in 90 days and to achieve 360 hours of flight time within that time frame is
possible. When applied to a crew member on standby the proposed 112 hours in 28 days limit
represents a 20% increase on the current limit of 100 hours in 30 days.
6
The following is a summary of flight time limits in other jurisdictions. Apart from Australia and
India who have a limit based on 30 days, all other countries apply a 100 hours in 28 days limit.
The current limit in Australia is 100 hours in 30 days but in their May 2012 NPRM they are
proposing 100 hours in 28 days for all operations except aerial work with a 120 hours in 28 days
limit.
FLIGHT TIME LIMITATIONS-OTHER COUNTRIES
28 DAYS 365 DAYS

USA 100 1000
EASA CRD 100 1000
UK 100 900
INDIA 125 (30 days) 1000
AUSTRALIA (current) 100 (30 days) 900
AUSTRALIA (NPRM-all except aerial work) 100 (28 days) 1000
AUSTRALIA (NPRM-aerial work) 120 (28 days) 1200
SOUTH AFRICA 100 1000
HONG-KONG 100 900
In order to harmonize Canadian regulations with the rest of the world we recommend that Canada
adopt the international standard of 100 hours in 28 days but we support a limit of 112 hours in
28 days for 702-Aerial Work operations and helicopters not conducting a scheduled passenger
service.
Recommended changes:
x for single pilot operations, 8 flight hours in any 24 consecutive hours;

x for all operations except 702-Aerial Work and helicopters not conducting a scheduled
passenger service: 100 flight hours in any 28 consecutive days;
x for 702-Aerial Work and helicopters not conducting a scheduled passenger service:
112 flight hours in any 28 consecutive days;
x for all operations: 1000 flight hours in any 365 consecutive days.
Comments on section 20.0 Standby:
x when the SAP begins between 02:00 and 05:59 (flight crew member’s acclimatized time),
the maximum SDP may be increased by 50% of the time period between 04:00 and 05:59
that the flight crew member was not disturbed by the air operator, to a maximum of
2 hours;
The above provision was debated at length during the working group deliberations and we
believe a consensus was reached on a maximum SDP increase of 1 hour for no-calls between
7
04:00 and 05:59 using a 50% ratio. This is how the provision appeared on the latest draft version
of the report. For an undetermined reason the maximum extension of the SDP was increased to
2 hours in the final version but the no-call window remained the same (04:00 – 05:59). We
believe the increase from 1 hour to 2 hours might be a typo since it is impossible to achieve
2 hours of extension when applying a 50% credit to a 2-hour window. If it is not a typo then we
disagree with the proposal since a crew member cannot be expected to be fit for duty at 02:00 and
at the same time be expected to be ready to sleep. In order to be alert and fit for duty if a call
comes in at 02:00 the crew member has to obtain as much sleep as possible in the daytime to
counteract the tendency to sleep during the WOCL hours. Therefore we believe that a more
conservative approach applying a 50% credit for the period 0400 to 0559 should be applied.
x when the SAP begins between 02:00 and 05:59 (flight crew member’s acclimatized time),
the maximum SDP may be increased by 50% of the time period between 04:00 and 05:59
that the flight crew member was not disturbed by the air operator, to a maximum of
1 hour;
Comments on section 20.0 Standby
x count all time spent on standby by a flight crew member as duty at a rate of 33% for the
calculation of cumulative duty limitations.
We believe the 33% credit is insufficient since it is non-limiting towards the 60-hours weekly
cumulative duty hour limit. For a 14-hour SAP the 33% allocation amounts to 4.6 hours per day
and 32.2 hours per week. With the proposed limit of 60 hours of duty in 7 days the crew member
would have to accumulate more than 55.4 hours of flight duty in 6 days before he would be
prevented from having a 14 hours SAP on the 7th day. We believe if a crew member has
accumulated 55 hours of duty in 6 days he should not be allowed to be on standby on the 7th day.
A crew member on standby has to be available and fit for duty for up to 18 consecutive hours and
to only recognize 33% of that time as “duty” is insufficient.
x count all time spent on standby by a flight crew member as duty at a rate of 50% for the
calculation of cumulative duty limitations.
Comments on section 22.0 Time Free From Duty:
22.0 Time Free From Duty
The air operator shall provide a flight crew member with additional time free from duty in
accordance with one of the Options below:
8
Option 1:
x A crew member shall be provided a minimum of one single day free from duty in
x any 8 consecutive days;
x the beginning of the single day free from duty may be delayed by a maximum of 2
hours due to unforeseen operational circumstances. When this occurs the duration
of the single day free from duty shall be extended by a minimum of 2 hours;
x a minimum of 4 single days free from duty within in any 28 consecutive days; or,
Option 2 (for use in deployed operations of more than one week):
x 5 consecutive days free from duty within every 20 consecutive days.
To transition between Options, 5 consecutive days free from duty are required.
We support the Option 1 proposal requiring a minimum of one “single day free from duty” within
8 days but believe the 4 days off within 28 days does not provide adequate protection against
cumulative fatigue. This limit basically reproduces the provisions of Section 173 of the Canada
Labour Code stipulating that each employee should normally have a full day of rest in the week.
To our knowledge the CLC provisions did not undergo a safety evaluation when they were
implemented decades ago and are not aviation specific. Most crew members have irregular
schedules, often combining early starts, night flights and time zone differences. These types of
schedules profoundly disrupt the circadian rhythm and when combined with the cockpit working
environment (lack of space, noise, vibration, dryness and altitude) they produce higher levels of
fatigue than regular shift schedules. This should be taken into account when determining the
required minimum days off over extended periods and to simply multiply the weekly minimum
by 4 and apply the result to the 28-day minimum is inadequate.
Option 1: The air operator shall provide crew members with time free from duty
as follows:
x A crew member shall be provided a minimum of one single day free from duty in
any 8 consecutive days, and
x A crew member shall be provided a minimum of 2 consecutive days free from

duties in any 14 consecutive days, and
x A crew member shall be provided a minimum of 7 days free from duties in any 28
consecutive days, and
x A crew member shall have at least 8 days free from duties in each 28 consecutive
day period, averaged over 3 such periods.
9
REFERENCES:
Caruso C, Hitchcock E, Dick R, Russo J, Schmit J, Overtime and Extended Work Shifts: Recent
Findings on Illnesses, Injuries, and Health Behaviors, U. S. Department of Health and Human
Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety
and Health, April 2004.
Dembe A, Erickson J, Delbos R, Banks S, The impact of overtime and long work hours on
occupational injuries and illnesses: new evidence from the United States, Occupational and
Environmental Medicine, 2005, Vol. 62, 588–597.
Folkard S, Lombardi D, Tucker P, Shiftwork: Safety, Sleepiness and Sleep, Industrial Health,
2005, Vol. 43, 20–23
Mick Spencer (2011)-Assessment of the NPA FTL and advise to the FTL Review Group.
Joint Dissent to the CARAC Technical Committee from the Flight Crew Fatigue
Management Working Group Report Dated August 15 2012
By
The Manitoba Aviation Council (MAC), the Northern Air Transport Association
(NATA), the Air Transport Association of Canada (ATAC), the Canadian Business
Aviation Association (CBAA), and the Helicopter Association of Canada (HAC)
September 3 2012
In a series of submissions to the Working Group Co-Chairs and to the Director General
Civil Aviation the signatory associations have documented their objections to the
conduct of the Working Group. They are attached and form part of this, our dissent to
the Working Group Report. It is our view that the deliberations have favoured the
interests of the large scheduled international carriers, and very little emphasis in the
Final Working Group report has been placed on other industry segment-specific
proposals. The Working Group Chairs have not adopted a single proposal put forward
jointly by the signatory associations. Instead, their recommendations have focused on
proposed solutions that are more suited to large international scheduled carriers. These
proposals, if implemented across the board would have a catastrophic effect on the
operation of CAR 604, 702, 703 and 704 aircraft. In particular on seasonal and remote
operations in a self-dispatch environment, and more generally on operations that rely on
rotational crews including CAR 705 on demand and rotational operations.
The report completely ignores the fact that the geographic circumstances in Canada are
significantly different from both Europe and the United States. Neither have the vast
sparsely populated area, not served by road, that Canada has. In addition, due to the
dramatic climatic and daylight swings Canada has, there is a high degree of seasonality
to the flying, particularly in smaller operations. We are also much more heavily reliant on
smaller and slower aircraft to serve large areas than most jurisdictions. Many smaller
operations will no longer be viable when lumped under the same operating rules as large
international carriers. Many operations struggle now to provide over 500 hours of annual
flying to a pilot, even with high utilization in the summer.
The Final Working Group report does not represent any consensus of Working Group
members except on a very few issues. In fact, the signatory associations reject most of
the recommendations contained in the report insofar as they would be applied in a CAR
604, 702, 703, 704, and CAR 705 on-demand environment, and our members
collectively account for most of the AOC and POC holders in Canada today that would
be affected by the changes proposed in the report. Most of the recommendations set
1
out in the Working Group Report were the product of the Working Group Chairs – and
represent NO consensus of the Working Group’s members.
Admittedly, a one-size-fits-all approach made for a less complicated regulatory solution

for the Co-Chairs – but a solution that would have catastrophic consequences for our
industry segments if they are forced to adopt them and for the businesses that rely on
them. Repeatedly, the signatory associations have requested in writing that the
recommendations flowing from the Working Group Chairs should apply only to
scheduled CAR 705 operations, and the rest of the industry should be allowed to debate
the issues relating to flight crew fatigue in an environment where the Working Group
chairs are prepared to properly consider industry segment-specific solutions. A solution
applied to CAR 705 scheduled operations in Canada captures roughly 95% of the air
traveling public. Both the Europeans and the Americans, using a similar Working Group
process have chosen to go down this road to allow different regulatory solutions to be
developed that are sensitive to the needs of different segments of the regulated
community – something that the Co-Chairs in this Working Group have steadfastly
refused to do. Instead, they have focused on developing rules of broad application with a
few small variations, ill suited to the industry segments they were intended to
accommodate. The signatory associations cannot understand why, in spite of the
directions contained in our Terms of Reference, and in spite of the consensus that
seems to have been achieved between Labour representatives and the scheduled CAR
705 operator-representatives on the working group, they would not move forward with
that consensus and later return to consider those fatigue-related principles in the context
of other industry segments separately, either now, or at a future time.
The Co-Chairs have repeatedly made reference to the EASA document and the new
FAA regulations and the ICAO SARPs in support of their recommendations. The EASA
document is a DRAFT and only applicable to airline operations. The new FAA rule is
only applicable to airline operations, and the ICAO SARPs are only applicable to
internationally-operated scheduled airline operations. None of these sources have any
applicability to the CAR 604, 702, 703, or 704 operator-members of the signatory
associations.
In two other submissions, the signatory associations have made proposals of their own
and commented on proposals contained in Working Drafts of the Report. The signatory
associations made one submission to the Co-Chairs prior to the first Draft WG Report.
This report contained a number of proposals. The signatory associations then followed
up with a second written submission entitled “Where the Co-Chairs Got it Wrong”. Not a
single industry segment-specific proposal, even in a modified form, advanced by the
signatory associations was adopted by the Working Group Chairs in the Final Report.
Our substantive objections to the proposals contained in the Working Group report, and
the elements of the report to which we did not object, have been incorporated in those
previous two submissions (dated August 8 and March 2 2012). These are attached and
form part of this dissent to the Final Working Group report. Our previous two
2
submissions to the Working Group Chairs dated March 9 and June 17 2011 and our
letter to Martin Eley dated July 29 2011 are also attached and form part of this dissent as
evidence of our growing frustration and our substantive concerns relating to the process
that led up to the production of the Final Report.
The Working Group Co-Chairs have recommended a series of new and significantly
more restrictive additions to the current regime of Flight & Duty Time Limitations set out
in the CARs which would apply to the members of our respective associations. They
have also ignored certain fatigue-related issues where they were difficult to address on
an industry-wide basis. For example:
• Cumulative Duty Hour Requirements, which are completely new to the

CARs
• Sector Limits requiring a reduction in the Flight Duty Period, which are
completely new to the CARs
• New, more conservative 28-day (down from 140 to 112 hours) and 365-
day (down from 1200 to 1000 hours) Cumulative Flight Time Limits;
• New less-flexible Rest Period requirements that impose a 10 or 12-hour
minimum rest period, rather than simply imposing a requirement on the
air operator to ensure that 8-hours of sleep is protected. By doing this,
operators have lost the ability to adjust the rest period to accommodate
nearby rest facilities and amenities. Some collective agreements call for
accommodation in the city’s core, but many smaller operators
accommodate their pilots in camps or nearby the airport.
• New, variable Maximum Daily Flight Duty Periods depending on when the
flight crew member starts his/her day, which are completely new to the
CARs
• Removal of industry segment-specific Standards which applied to non-
scheduled and helicopter operations and to Heli-Logging Operations
• New, more conservative, Time Free from Duty Requirements for
rotational crews, down from a minimum of five-off after 42 consecutive
days to 5 off after 15 days
• A new, lower, maximum Flight Duty Period, down from 14 hours to 13
hours
• In spite of strong scientific evidence that multiple consecutive days free
from duty will radically reduce fatigue, the Co-Chairs have eliminated the
“zeroing” of accumulated flight time for five days-off.
• In spite of strong evidence that “commuting” by airline pilots presents a
significant fatigue risk, the Co-Chairs have not adequately addressed this
risk in their recommendations.
3
The proposals contained in the Final Working Group report are a radical departure from
the established Flight & Duty time regime currently applicable to our members and set
out in the CARs, and they markedly depart from the scientific evidence heard during the
Working Group’s deliberations. There was no evidence presented that the current
system of Flight & Duty Time regulations has caused or contributed to a single accident.
The Co-Chairs have not done justice to the conflicting and ambiguous scientific
evidence, or even to the changing views of our consulting fatigue expert, Dr. Belenky.
The science on many of the issues giving rise to the recommendations in the report were
far from black-and-white and the Co-Chairs have selectively referred to science in
support of the proposals that they have advanced without presenting a balanced
perspective of the issues.
Clearly, these requirements were targeted for more complex operations. In a scheduled
airline environment, schedules are set in advance and have little or no variation, routes
are planned, and manning levels calculated well in advance, the aircraft that need pilot
augmentation are built with that capability in advance, and dedicated scheduling
departments accommodate the tracking and record-keeping demands imposed by these
new rules. Therefore, the complexities of the proposed scheme can be made to work in
a large scheduled airline environment. Schedulers can input formulas into crew’s
schedules to ensure their compliance well in advance, due to the predictable nature of
their operations.
The vast majority of Canadian business aviation operations and many of the small
commercial operations are single-aircraft and often owner-operated with few staff who
often have more than one job responsibility. These regulations would require that for
each trip that arises someone must go through the tables to calculate the eligibility of
each crew member. On demand operations schedules are never the same; therefore,
these requirements restrict operating flexibility, and become very onerous. The ability to
predict and plan is not available in a non-scheduled environment, and the mission is
such that the long trips or the overnight trips are exceptions and not the norm, usually
bracketed by days free from flying. The continued existence of an on-demand flight
department is contingent on the flexibility offered passengers, as opposed to rigid airline
schedules. They are only staffed to meet their current needs. The imposition of an
onerous administrative burden that would accompany the proposed new regulation will
make it very difficult for such flight departments to comply. They simply do not have the
resources to meet the process, procedures, and documentation requirements proposed
in this report.
The “establishment of processes” implies written processes which:
• are developed by the operator;

• are documented in the operating manual (OM);
4
• are accepted or approved by TC;
• necessitate staff training inclusive of development, documentation in training
manuals which are a subset of the OM, acceptance or approval of TC; and
• are subject to internal audit and TC inspection.
Under today's flight and duty regulations we routinely hear complaints from operators
that their Transport Canada POI refuses to provide an interpretation on the rules as they
don't want to go on the record regarding them. One can only imagine the chaos at the
small operator level if regulations of the proposed complexity are imposed.
For small operators, this is an overly bureaucratic and excessive regulatory burden,
unsubstantiated by any risk analysis, that would inevitably waste operator and TC
resources for no identifiable safety gain. It would require the addition of staff for process
development, documentation and audit on a least a part-time basis that would call into
question the economic viability and cost benefit of using business aviation or of smaller
commercial operations. Compliance with the proposed regulations on a day-to-day
basis would require the establishment of a centralized scheduling and tracking
department which would present significant and crippling expenditures for no safety
benefit. In the context of small operations, the signatory associations also do not believe
that TC can possibly oversee the unscheduled segment of the industry at such a
prescriptive and detailed level. With over 2000 Canadian AOCs and POCs - the vast
majority of them operating in an unscheduled on-demand environment, TC cannot
possibly manage this proposed system. To further suggest that the impact of any
inappropriate regulations could be reduced by development of alternate means of
compliance proposed to and approved by TC under a Fatigue Risk Management (FRM)
program is absurd. TC is not, and is not likely to be, staffed at a level to support this
approach and the TC track record in actually welcoming and approving safety
management-based alternate means of compliance to current regulations is abysmal.
The complexity of the proposed new rules, bluntly-put, will be beyond the ability of flight
crew members to manage in an unscheduled on-demand pilot self-dispatch
environment. These operations take place in the absence of a crew scheduling
department and a dispatch office.
The foundation of the CARs was created with the understanding that different
regulations and requirements would apply to different sub-parts of the regulations. That
is, the operators of larger aircraft and their flight crews would have different regulatory
requirements. While “pilots-are-pilots” as they say, unless the science is unequivocal
(i.e. the average human needs 8 hours sleep each night), then there must be some
recognition that small operators, by virtue of their less-structured operating environment
for example, need different rules. The proposals contained in the Working Group depart
from this principle in a many very significant ways.
5
Because the recommendations in the report advance a one-size-fits-all approach, with
very little effort to develop industry-specific solutions, the effect will be anti-competitive;
favoring the interests of the large scheduled carriers over small and medium-size
operators in an on-demand or business aviation environment. The Co-Chairs have
taken solutions that are largely agreeable in the context of Airline-Labour relations, and
proposed to force them on other industry segments.
None of the proposals for regulatory change made by the co-chairs are supported by a
simple, subjective risk analysis, let alone the rigorous risk analysis required by TC and
Treasury Board policy. Current departmental practice has been to precede regulatory
change proposals by a risk assessment to substantiate the proposal. It follows that
there has been no attempt by the Co-Chairs or TC to quantify the risk or examine any
data on this subject. There has been no effort to evaluate if the measures being
recommended will reduce risk at all and if they will, to determine how much the risk will
be reduced, and at a what cost.
The CBAA adds that there was no risk analysis, inclusive or otherwise of a cost/benefit
analysis, supporting any regulatory change to the past Business Aviation- Operational
Safety Standards (BA-OSS) or current flight and duty time (Interim Order) regulations for
business aviation, yet business aviation was included in this working group’s scope. No
further work should be done on any of these proposals until a formal risk assessment is
conducted on each proposal.
The CBAA also adds that the proposals contained in the Working Group report will
create an uneven playing field for Canadian Business Aviation operators. No other
nation has flight and duty time rules for business aviation anywhere close to as
demanding as those proposed for Canadian business aviation. These rules would
render Canadian business aviation ineffective, inefficient and cost prohibitive.
For CBAA, the operator responsibilities are in large part “common sense” and normally
accepted, understood and met; therefore, a prescriptive rule for small operations would
only need to list the responsibilities without requiring supporting processes. The operator
would simply invoke and comply with the regulation on an “as required” basis. The level
of conformance could be determined by direct operational inspection or an audit of the
required flight and personnel records.
CBAA Recommendation Specific to Business Aviation
Option 1: For Subpart 604 the current regulations (Interim Order 10 Respecting Private
Operations) while "dated" in that they are missing some key considerations like how to
deal with the Window of Circadian Low (WOCL), Controlled Rest on the Flight Deck, and
allowance for fatigue management systems they are the preferred “prescriptive”
regulations. It is understood that fatigue management systems per se are just a subset
of an SMS and fatigue hazards not covered by the regulations, or that could be better
mitigated than by following the regulations, can be dealt with under the SMS.
6
Option 2: The new Subpart 6 regulations will be in force long before the new regulations
are promulgated; therefore, it is proposed that this section and the regulations in general
be replaced with the modern, performance-based requirements of the IS-BAO 6.13
Fatigue Countermeasures. These are tailored to private operators and operations and
the requirement for written processes is understood in the context of the size and
complexity of the operation. Where the size and complexity of the operations warrants
documented, approved and audited process, then these should be required.
Compliance with the IS-BAO standards achieves this safety goal.
Canadian international businesses have a real choice in how they use business aviation.
All they need to do is N-register their aircraft and they no longer have to fly to Canadian
rules. Not only does this hurt the Canadian economy, it also means Canadians will be
flying under less demanding rules and the whole point of putting these regulations in
place is lost. The current Canadian regulations do not put Canadian Business aviation at
a significant competitive economic disadvantage.
All the signatory associations believe that separate and apart from the significant stand-
alone effect of each of these proposed changes, the “stacking effect” of a multitude of
changes when applied together will devastate virtually every non-scheduled domestic
operation of any type. The cumulative application of a new more limiting Duty Day and
cumulative Duty Hour limits combined with sector limits for example has the potential to
cripple the on-demand and business aviation sectors.
Our intentions are not to reiterate the arguments we have raised previously in the
context of the Working Group. These arguments were based on the fatigue-related
science, and on the operational experience of the signatory association’s Working
Group’s members and their Technical Advisors – they have fallen on deaf ears.
What is set out below is a summary of what the signatory associations can support and
why it is important. The signatory associations will also focus on the most offensive and
impractical solutions set out in the Final Working Group report, and on the impact that
these recommendations would have on our respective industry segments. For a more
detailed and substantive summary in support of the conclusions we have drawn, we
recommend the Technical Committee and the CARC to our previous submissions to
Working Group Chairs which provide more detailed reference to the supporting science.
References below are to the section numbers in the Working Group Report.
8.0 Flight Duty Period (FDP)
The signatory associations believe that there is ample support in the science and
operational experience for a maximum basic 14-hour duty day, rather than 13 hours.
The science is quite clear that 14-hour duty days – and even repetitive 14-hour duty
days are quite workable provided that 8-hours of rest is protected, and there is no
disruption of the circadian rhythm.
7
Business aviation operates 300 to 400 hours per year compared to scheduled flight
operations crews that fly between 800-1000 hours per year. A typical pilot flies 250 –
300 hours per year, a busy pilot 400 hours. One only has to compare the resumes of
two pilots of the same age – one corporate and one airline; the airline pilot has double or
triple the flight hours. Many business aviation operators have less than four aircraft and
the vast majority have only one. Business aviation crews do not regularly fly multi-leg,
multi-day pairings. The norm is a fewer number of legs per day with longer layovers and
occasional long haul flights. The non-scheduled environment rarely pushes the pilots to
an environment where chronic fatigue is prevalent. In summary, the fatigue challenges
faced by business aviation crews are significantly different than those of the scheduled
operators. As a result, the method to deal with fatigue has to be tailored to the
challenges.
These proposed rules would render Canadian international business aviation flights
ineffective, inefficient and cost prohibitive. For example, business executives expect to
do a full day’s work in Canada, depart between 20:00 and 23:00 for Europe or Asia,
sleep on the aircraft, and conduct business on arrival. Typically, today’s flight crews
have at least two days off prior to departure and there have been no incidents let alone
accidents in these operations.
Crew augmentation or stationing of relief crews on route is simply not practical (aircraft
not equipped) or cost effective (costs of extra crew or technical stops). What use is a
Bombardier Global 6000 or a Gulfstream 550 or 650 if the operator has to land halfway
to destination to change crews with the tanks still half full? Operators cannot even take
a Falcon 900EX aircraft to Europe unless they station crews along the route! Similarly an
executive flight from Montreal to Beijing, would be significantly impacted by the proposed
regulations and would face difficult changes. Specifically, the current duty parameters
that allow for refuelling in Iqaluit and arrival in Beijing within a 15-hour duty day would no
longer be possible. Instead, flights would need to be rerouted to a major hub for easier
access and appropriate accommodations, imposing up to five hours of additional travel
time and significantly increasing costs.
Respecting same day continental flights, certain mission profiles will be impossible to
meet under these proposed rules. Current duty day regulations and the use of split duty
features enable business aviation to provide same day business trip return flights.
Corporate and non-scheduled flying takes passengers to their destination, and waits for
them, and brings them home. The waiting is usually in daylight hours, in well-
provisioned FBOs, or in day rooms. When not waiting in comfortable surroundings,
mitigation is easily implemented. With little or no capability for augmented crews,
overnight business trips will be the norm resulting in inefficient and ineffective use of
business aviation and unjustifiable increased fixed costs.
Canadian businessmen have choices and are able to opt out of the Canadian regulatory
regime, which is increasingly the case today. Canadian businessmen will continue to
8
make these trips, but they will be forced to register their aircraft off shore as has
happened in many EU countries. Note the multitude of US registered aircraft running
around the world that rarely visit the US.
CBAA Current Practice
The current regulations are adequate and being complied with. Where there are specific
situations not contemplated by the regulations or where an alternate means of
compliance is necessary and warranted, the private operator’s SMS is used to identify
the hazards and mitigate them to achieve an acceptable level of safety.
CBAA Recommendation
For the CBAA, current regulations if prescriptive regulations are needed or the IS-BAO
Standards are recommended.
8.0 Sector-Based Flight Duty Period Limits
Take-offs and landings are an example of a workload-related time-on-task activity, but

the signatory associations believe that monitoring sectors AND Flight Time will be
duplicative and problematic in a CAR 604, 702, 703, 604 and helicopter context and
particularly in an unpredictable on-demand or seasonal environment. Limiting Duty Time
based on sectors in additional to flight time we believe, will have a negligible positive
effect on safety for our flight crews, and there is virtually no science to support its
application in our industry, particularly in single-pilot VFR and on-demand type
operations. There should be no sector-based Flight Duty Period Limit for any CAR 604,
702 or 703 operations, or for any helicopter operations.
With the exception of MEDEVAC and Scheduled helicopter operations, helicopter

operators have been excluded from any sector limit requirements. The signatory
associations believe that all helicopter operations should be excluded from all sector limit
requirements, contrary to the Co-Chairs recommendation to include scheduled and
MEDEVAC helicopters in the sector-based limit.
In Section 8.1 at page 35 in the Summary of Positions the Co-Chairs have indicated that
there was consensus on a sector-based limit. The signatory associations disagree.
Furthermore, the statement contradicts the summary of positions under 8.3.
9.0 Planned Extensions
The signatory associations believe that there was strong consensus to have available a
planned one-hour extension to the flight duty day not infringing on the WOCL, provided
that there was appropriate rest. – two local nights was discussed. This would harmonize
with EASA and make available a 14 hour day similar to the FAA.
9
The associations reject any notion of cumulative duty hours as they applies to CAR 604,
702, 703, or helicopter operations. There is no support for the proposition in the
science, and little support for it in other regulatory jurisdictions. The signatory
associations have argued that a pilot who may experience extended Duty Days
combined with very little flying could easily violate the proposed limits and be completely
rested. There are significant concerns that maintaining pilot currency on task may be a
by-product of a new Cumulative Duty Hour requirement. We have argued that
cumulative flight time when combined with a maximum Flight Duty Period is a much
better indication of when a flight crew member will experience fatigue. We believe that a
new requirement for additional rest (10 hours free from Duty rather than 8) when
combined with higher flight times across a three-day period will mitigate any possible
fatigue.
If 28 consecutive days of duty were permitted by the proposals contained in the Working
Group report, then flight crews would be limited to an average of 8.6 duty hours each
day (using Time free from Duty Option 1) or 6.8 duty hours each day (Time free from
Duty Option 2). This would mean that in either case, to operate during the summer or in
extended daylight operations in the north, all aircraft would need to be double-crewed,
even where the aircraft was only flying for a very few hours each day. The signatory
associations believe that our proposal for flight time limits set out below, would mitigate
the potential for fatigue when crews are operating the aircraft for extended periods of
time.
NATA does not support cumulative Duty Hour limitations however, for Option 2 to
actually work it has to be at least 84 duty hours in any 7 consecutive days. This allows
for average 12-hour days. NATA believes that the other restrictions proposed to use
Option 2 are an unnecessary burden given the other WOCL, night, and early-and-late-
start restrictions in other parts of the report and that with appropriate time off afterward
there is more than adequate protection provided.
HAC’s Comments
Many commercial helicopter operators conduct most of their business in a three or four-
month period, and in some of the most remote areas of the Country. Our members have
commented that the application of cumulative duty hours would not enhance safety.
Furthermore, the logistics of double-crewing aircraft in remote regions, particularly when
there is a low number of flying hours would make many operations impractical. A crew
member could operate the aircraft early in the Duty Day to take crews out to the field, but
the same crew member could not bring them back in for dinner repeatedly over a series
of days if the proposed limits were applied.
NATA Comments
Many NATA operators are in the Emergency Measures Service (EMS) role, either
providing medevac or aerial firefighting services. There has been considerable concern
10
raised that with the proposed cumulative duty time limits it will be difficult to maintain
pilot currency due to the prolonged periods of waiting timing them out, usually in very
comfortable conditions, versus actually flying. In these areas of typically low pilot
utilization already you are going to end up with extremely well rested, but very rusty
pilots, creating another, potentially greater, safely hazard.
17.0 Flight Time Limits
The signatory Associations proposed:
• 60 hours in 7 days
With the additional requirement that any three consecutive days of flying totaling in
excess of 24 hours increases the rest period on the third night by two hours.
The signatory associations believe that this would be an effective way to mitigate any
potential effect of fatigue that relates to time-on-task. We believe that there is very little
fatigue occurring as a result of time on-duty, not also accompanied by flight time.
The proposal by the Working Group Co-Chairs to limit flight time to 8 hours in any 24-
hour period (currently not limited other than single pilot IFR) and 112 hours (down from
140) in any 28 days is without support in the science or operational experience. The
signatory associations believe that there has to be some way to deal with the intense
seasonal demand for services in Canada.
Furthermore, many pilots are underutilized on an annual basis and some crew members
have raised concerns over their currency if the proposed limits were to become law.
19. Split-Duty
While the proposed changes to Split Duty extend its availability to other -than aerial
applicators, the proposal will make it useless to aerial applicators for whom it was
actually brought in for. The 50% credit from 0600 to 2359 is too limiting, especially for
aerial application purposes. The Science is clear that there is a high likelihood of sleep
during the afternoon circadian dip, and more credit should be available in the 1200 to
1800 time frame where sleep following an early morning start is very likely.
21.0 Rest Periods
The distinction that the Co-Chairs have drawn between a minimum rest period at “home
base” [12 hours] and “away from home base” [10 hours] is unnecessary. The signatory
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associations have agreed that moving away from a regulation where eight hours of rest
“needs to be protected” to a system where 10 hours free from duty AND a requirement
to ensure that 8 hours opportunity or rest is provided during that period will be more than
adequate at home, or away from base. There are many occasions where the
accommodation, prepared meals, and shower facilities are nearby the aircraft and the
operator should not be compelled to accommodate extended rest periods when 8 hours
of sleep is the normal required by the average person. What’s more, the signatory
associations do not believe that additional rest at home for “family responsibilities” needs
to be addressed in the CARs.
The signatory associations reject the concept of 10 hours away from base and 12 hours
at home base concept. It should be 10 hours in both places. The 12-hour concept
penalizes those CAR 702/703 operators in smaller towns and cities, as well as many
CAR 704/705 operators.
The signatory Associations believe an extended tour of up-to 35 days is sustainable

under the following circumstances, assuming 8 hours of sleep each night and no
disruption of the circadian rhythm:
Up to 10 days on, must be followed by 2 consecutive days off, or
Up to 35 days on, must be followed by 7 consecutive days off
Extended duration operations (beyond 15 days) can only be conducted on a non-

disruptive basis. To qualify as non-disruptive a crew member must have the opportunity
for 8 hours of sleep each night between the hours of 2200 and 0900 local time.
A tour that is planned to exceed 15 consecutive days must be preceded by five days off.
NOTE: Tours in excess of 25 days duration have a disincentive, as the time off is in
excess of the 5 days necessary to reset cumulative flight hour limitations.
Five consecutive days free from duty should “zero” accumulated 7 and 28-day flight
times at any time.
There is strong support in the science that extended consecutive days free from duty
provides appropriate recuperative rest. The signatory associations are baffled by Co-
12
Chairs refusal to allow the “zeroing” provisions currently in the CARs to be extended to
all operations of all types. This would facilitate rotational operations AND eliminate any
possible fatigue.
HAC Comments
The industry norm is generally to use 30-day tours with extended periods of time off (at
least 5 days) before and after the tour. Occasionally there may be delays inserting or
extracting the crew member at the work site (weather delays for the relief pilot, or
mechanical problems with an aircraft, for example). Under prescribed circumstances,
where there is extraordinary additional compensatory rest for the outbound pilot it would
be acceptable to extend the 30-day tour to a maximum of 35 days.
25.0 Consecutive Duties infringing on the WOCL – CAR 702 703 604 and all
Helicopter IFR/VFR Operations
Intrusions on the Window of Circadian Low (WOCL) are one of the areas where the
signatory associations believe that there is evidence to suggest that a new limit may
mitigate fatigue.
For CAR 702,703, 604 and all Helicopter operations the associations propose a simpler
table with no sector limitations.
START OF FDP
1 0700-1259 14:00
2 1300-1459 13:30
3 1500-1659 13:00
4 1700-1859 12:30
5 1900-2059 12:00
6 2100-2259 11:30
7 2300-0429 11:00
8 0430-0459 11.30
9 0500-0529 12:00
10 0530-0559 13:15
13
11 0600-0629 14:00
12 0630-0659 14:00
While the matrix above allows access to a full 14-hour Duty Day with a FDP start at 6am
and a minor attendant intrusion on the WOCL, the signatory associations believe that
there would be a minimal impact on safety, particularly during the summer season when
most of the activity occurs in the CAR 702, 703 and 604 industry segments and wake-up
times are naturally earlier . Operators in these categories are also not typically subject to
time zone induced circadian disruptions.
The signatory associations also question the value of reducing the length of the Duty
Day based on an early-start intrusion on the WOCL, since the effect of the intrusion will
be to cause some small amount of additional fatigue early in the FDP, but not apparent
at the end of a reduced FDP. Furthermore, EASA allows for a full 13-hour duty day
(extendable to 14 hours) with a 0600 start in their latest proposal.
MEDEVAC Operations
HAC Comments
Under the current regulations, Canadian helicopter MEDEVAC operators have been
operating dedicated HEMS services since 1977 with 20 aircraft across four operators
with over 230,000 hours without a fatal accident. We see no reason why special, more
restrictive rules should be applied to these operations.
Heli-Logging Operations - Flight Time Limitations & Time Free from Duty
HAC Comments
For two-pilot Heli-logging operations, three consecutive flying days totaling in excess of
27 hours would require a two-hour increase in the rest period on the third night. Flight
crew members using this rule would require 6 days off in 14 or 13 days off in 28. Heli-
logging operations take place generally off a barge where crew accommodations are
located or under very controlled circumstances in a two-crew environment. Historically,
Flight & Duty Time limits have been managed very responsibly, and there are no
passengers by this niche segment of the helicopter community. We see no reason why
special industry segment-specific limits should not apply.
A sampling of Comments Received from Individual Operator-Members
“Assuming that the maximum FDP will be 13 hours (we do not agree with this), as the
table is laid out, it will affect approximately 50% of the scheduled flights operated by Air
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Inuit. That is to say the flights will be impossible to complete or we will have to have crew
changes somewhere in the north.
The problem with remote operations is that you are dependent on connecting flights or
multi leg flights, to enable the customer to travel to and from their destinations on a
same day basis whenever possible. The geography of this country is such that it takes
time to travel to the more remote areas, i.e. Montreal to Ivujivik is 1184 nautical miles. in
a straight line. The runways at most of the communities, along the Hudson Bay coast are
only 3500 feet long and gravel surfaces. This already imposes severe restrictions on the
types of aircraft capable of operating these flights. Once there, there is are no facilities to
overnight, so we must return to the starting point. The infrastructure doesn’t allow use of
larger/faster aircraft, there is not enough hotel space in the most of the communities to
accommodate even a Twin Otter load of passengers, let alone a Dash 8 or ATR 42.
Costs of building a ‘staff-house’ in multiple locations to enable crews to be positioned in
the appropriate locations to complete these flights are in the neighbourhood of
$750,000.00 to $1,000,000.00 due to the fact that materials must either be flown in or
brought in by ship on the once-a-year sealift.
If it remains at 13 hours max FDP, in order to mitigate the effects of this table for remote
operations, the Average Sector Times need be changed to: <40 minutes, 40 to 59
minutes, >60 minutes. This change would allow ALL to continue providing the service as
is completed today with only one combination that would not work. Savings would be in
the area of $1.5 to $2 million per year in crews, training, accommodation, positioning,
etc. for Air Inuit alone.”
Operator X
“We can’t double crew a Cessna 206 and 172. Long legs and slow airplanes are a
reality.
[On Medevacs] While I understand there may be some relief granted to this type of
operation. my concern is that too many restrictions may cut into actual flying time. In our
operation, currency could become an issue. Winter operations entail a great deal of night
flying into uncontrolled mountainous airports. Currency is essential to conducting this in
a safe manner. The calls can be infrequent and extensive time free from standby duty
lowers pilot utilization and currency. It is important to have a balance, being on standby
for medevacs is not a relaxing pastime. However, it is a job that needs to be done and
adding additional crews to fly a small number of hours will not necessarily make it safer.
This is a difficult position, every operator has a different workload, ours is seasonal, busy
in summer, but the challenges are in the winter, in the dark when utilization is less.
We do a fair amount of fuel hauling, bulk and drums, mostly from remote sites or from a
summer operation in Mayo, mostly Otters and Caravans. Easy loads, quick turns on the
ground. We can routinely do flight times of 10 or more hours in a 14 hour day. The
current level of flight [time] allowed, 60 hours in 7 days is routinely met with little effort,
15
sometimes in 5 or 6 days. Again, any additional restrictions would be a hardship. This is
easy flying and good money, it makes up for sitting all winter. There is seldom enough
flying to double crew a machine, and the fleeting summer daylight brings that to an end
by late July anyways. You cannot hire crews for the 2 months of 24 hour daylight.”
“The cumulative duty day is going to be a severe restriction for us. We are an “on
demand” charter service. We are always “on call”, that is what the business is. A
cumulative duty period becomes very unproductive when the pilot is in an off base crew
house or bush camp. It will make these positions more difficult to crew. In the slow
season, it would be more economical to park the aircraft rather than try to keep staffing
levels at a point that would satisfy the regulations. Again, it comes back to how many
pilots does it take to fly one aircraft 1000 hours per year. If there is no hard science to
back this proposal, it should not be considered.”
“This proposal, as well as enforcing these definitions such a SAP, SDP is complicating
the issue beyond reason. Add in the complexity of approach bans that apply in the south
but not in the north, controlled airspace IFR, uncontrolled airspace VFR and we are
going to need another seat to have a lawyer on board. I have had Transport Inspectors
refuse to interpret the regs, they do not want to be quoted. “
“Our current Air Ambulance operation is very sensitive to more restrictive regulations
when it applies to crew assignments and duty time. We currently serve all communities
in the Yukon with most transfers to Whitehorse as the destination. We routinely transfer
patients to a southern facility to access a higher level of care. The ad hoc nature of the
needs of the communities, as well as the limitations of the facilities into which we fly,
such as gravel runways, NDB approaches or no approach, limited weather reporting and
sporadic winter maintenance dictates that operational flexibility be maximized to enable
completion of the job. We may sit quietly for several days with no calls, and then be
flying non-stop for days at a time. It is conceivable that a crew may fly as little as three
trips in a 10 day rotation. With the extended daylight in the summer months and
generally good weather, a crew could literally fly for months with doing nothing more
than visual approaches. The winter season is exactly the opposite, and while legal
currency is not much of a challenge, keeping familiar with night approaches into our
isolated communities is a constant challenge. Proposals such as regulating days off after
3 days of “on call” duty will do little for currency in our operation. Our operation flies less
than 2000 hours annually on Air Ambulance flights with three aircraft and 8 pilots.
Diluting pilot utilization has implications on the their skill set as well as increasing the
cost to the Health Services department which is certainly sensitive to costs of any kind.
The challenge is to keep pilots engaged in a job that is less than 500 hours annually.
Financial remuneration is not the issue, currency and job satisfaction is.
I do not want to have well rested pilots that have not done a night approach into Dawson
City in the last 8 months in an airplane. That is more of a hazard than a tired pilot doing
3 trips in 3 nights to the same place. At least he is familiar with the task at hand. Diluting
16
the job makes it less attractive, causing turnover, and bringing the experience level
down, not necessarily total time experience, but experience in our part of the world in the
Air Ambulance role.”
Operator Y
“The first obvious issue we have with the working group document is that the proposed
limitations try to cover the whole aviation industry with an all-encompassing set of
regulations that truly does not fit with Canadian seasonal aerial work operators such as
[us].
[Our company] has been managing fatigue within the existing regulations and we have
not seen any trends of fatigue as a causal factor in occurrences reported through our
safety management system. The flight crews are seasonal and dedicate 3 to 4 months a
year to our firefighting activities. This short season does not lend itself to the rotation of
crews that would be required to comply with the proposed rest period. Our operation
requires our aircraft to work in groups of two to seven airplane and we find that changing
group members too often will delay the higher and safer performance we are seeking
through a mature group dynamic. Due to the nature of aerial firefighting, the proposed
Flight Duty Period limitations would be overly difficult to track and very distracting for a
flight crew as they would need to adjust their duty period on the fly; we would set
ourselves for non-compliance. Sector limits are not applicable to our operations due to
the dispatch requirements of aerial firefighting operations.
[Our company] is fully prepared to be a participant in a working group on Flight Crew

Fatigue Management that would take into considerations the unique requirements of
CAR 702 and 703 operations. A large number of the report’s proposed changes are not
supported scientifically and some other significant studies on fatigue were not referred
to. We see a lot of contradictions in the document regarding science either not existing
or not supporting a particular consideration. There are also many items that did not
reach consensus for good reason, which resulted in divided opinions amongst members
of the working group.”
“Operator Y” - on Flight Duty Period
“We are opposed to the report’s position as our duty period is based on the basic
principle that we provide a minimum of 8 hours of sleep per night. The proposed FDP is
reduced from the present 14 hours per day. It is not practical to have a duty day of less
than 14 hours during high forest fire danger periods. We have a system where the air
tanker base structure is within a short travel time from the crew’s accommodations and
food is available on site if the crews need to stay on site; we can always provide 8 hours
of sleep time for our crews within the 10 hours off duty. Our crews do not accumulate
sleep debt which is the main contributing factor to fatigue. All air tanker bases have quiet
areas designated for crew rest. The extension of FDP due to unforeseen operational
circumstances has not changed and offers the required flexibility.”
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“Operator Y” – on Cumulative Duty Hours
“We are opposed to the report’s position; We would not be able to operate within the
proposed limits as we would have to replace flight crew after less than one week, in
some scenarios, even though they may have flown very little or, in cases, not at all. Our
flight crews fly on average between 125 and 150 hours per season and the extra
rotations suggested would decrease their flight time to a point where currency would
become a safety issue. We think these limitations have little positive effect on fatigue
management. Our present system requires the crew to be on base only when the forest
fire hazard is high; otherwise, the crew will be able to stay in their accommodations and
are free to do what they like, providing they can meet the longer dispatch timeline. These
measures were adopted by our clients and were designed to mitigate fatigue. In
summary, the operating season for aerial firefighting is 3 to 4 months long, we always
provide opportunity for a minimum of 8 hours sleep daily and no sleep debt is
accumulating.”
“Operator Y” – on Flight Time Limitations
“We are opposed to the report’s position; We agree that flight time should be limited and
we have adopted 8 hours flight time as a daily maximum due to the nature of our
operation. We see no reason to change the monthly and yearly maximums and there is
no science to support the proposed changes. The present CARs values are acceptable.
“Operator Y” on Rest periods:
We are opposed to the report’s position; the science supports our current practice of
providing a minimum of 10 hours within which the crew can receive 8 hours sleep every
day (24 hour period). The present regulations regarding duty hour extension for
unforeseen operational circumstances are sufficient and provide a safe extension to
crews’ rest periods, there is no sense in re-inventing the wheel. As sated above, we
agree on the consensus requiring 8 hours of sleep within 24 hours. It is to be noted that
operators can only provide time available for rest; individuals still hold the responsibility
to use the time for rest and sleep.
“Operator X” - on Time Free from Duty
“We are opposed to the report’s position; as stated above, our present system requires
the crew to be on base only when the forest fire hazard is high; otherwise, in most
cases, the crew will be able to stay in their accommodations and are free to do what they
like. If the flying activity increases, spare pilots are used to ensure we comply with
existing regulations. We recognize periods of high activity will increase fatigue and these
periods are managed properly through our safety management system. Flight crew
members are constantly monitored for fatigue and they have the ultimate responsibility
18
to advise us any time they feel fatigued even if they are well within their required time
free from duty limits. This contributes greatly to our overall fatigue management plan.
The proposed changes do not recognize the unique nature of our aerial work business
and would result in extreme financial and logistical hardship, yet provide no gain in
fatigue management. Notwithstanding the financial impact, we do not see any significant
safety gains over what we are presently enforcing so we strongly oppose the
recommendations. We also note that there is not enough scientific proof or
overwhelming agreement within the working group to substantiate the proposed
changes. We suggest the regulator consider letting operators submit a risk analysis and
fatigue management plan that would fit within the present regulatory guidelines that
would be subject to approval and contained within the operator’s flight operation’s
manual. This would fit within the SMS model we are all striving to develop and improve,
it would also ensure ownership and compliance through program validation as well as
effectively deal with the aerial work operator’s unique fatigue management profile.
“Helicopter Operator Z”
"The co-chairs of this working group have missed the most important reality of the CARS
- we have different rules for the various segments of our Canadian Industry. When the
CARS were drafted they got that much right. Except for the fact that we all operate
aircraft, the airline business is a very different business than the rest of Canadian
Aviation. We need rules that recognise this uniqueness.
With the seasonal nature of the helicopter business it is very hard to justify changing
many of the current rules, which I feel for the most part do their job to protect the flying
public from pilot fatigue. Many pilots in the helicopter business only work during the
short summer season and almost without exception helicopter pilots generate the
majority of their income from the high flying summer season. To restrict the pilot's and
the operator's ability to benefit from the high flying season is going to drive many out of
the business. While there may be a few scheduled helicopter operations, the majority
are on demand charters or contracted work from very remote locations. To mange the
flight and duty time of a pilot from these locations is going to be near impossible. The
rules have to be simple and make sense or self despatch type situations are not going
to work. To double crew every helicopter is impracticable if not impossible. There
simply are not enough pilots in the business - and if you reduce their flying hours (and
hence their income) there will be even fewer.
Clearly another working group with a mandate to look at the Canadian Aviation Business,
not the Airline business, is needed."
19
Where the Co-Chairs “Got it Wrong”
in the Draft FRM Working Group Report Released on July 3 2012
A Joint Submission to the Fatigue Risk Management Working Group Co-Chairs by the
Canadian Business Aviation Association (CBAA), the Air Transport Association of
Canada (ATAC), the Manitoba Aviation Council (MAC), the Northern Air Transport
Association (NATA), and the Helicopter Association of Canada (HAC)
August 8 2012
Introduction
The signatory associations continue to believe that the Working Group leaders have
focused on the interests of the large scheduled international carriers and have applied a
complex one-size-fits-all set of recommendations that will be virtually impossible for
small air operators to apply and for flight crew members in a pilot self-dispatch
environment to manage.
In some cases, the signatory associations agree with the underlying fatigue-related
science, but not with the one-size-fits-all recommendations for regulatory change that
the Co-Chair have proposed. In writing, the signatory associations have repeatedly
raised our concerns in writting that the Working Group Co-Chairs have made little effort
to accommodate the unique requirements of the CAR 604, 702, 703, 704 and 705
rotational operations communities, and particularly those operating in seasonal, on-
demand, and remote operations. Canada’s remote regions, extended daylight hours in
the north, and vast geography present unique challenges for Canadian operators. Crew
changes can sometimes require days to accomplish. These unique Canadian
challenges are unlike most European or American operations and call for Canadian
Flight & Duty Time solutions that are industry-segment specific. Notwithstanding these
differences, the Co-Chairs have not incorporated a single industry segment-specific
proposal from the signatory associations in the Draft Working Group Report, or
recognized that different industry segments may require different regulatory solutions.
The signatory associations have repeatedly recommended that CAR 604, 703, 703 and
704 operations should be dealt with in a separate Working Group under a Working
Group Chair(s) who is prepared to examine the fatigue-related science with a view to
developing industry segment-specific solutions. Adopting the Draft report as it applies to
CAR 705 operations would capture over 95% of fare-paying passengers in Canada
today, and would permit a proper, more focused review of the remaining segments of the
Aviation industry. The signatory associations continue to believe that this would be a far
more appropriate course of action.
1
Failure to meet the Stated Objectives
Objective 1
“To review the existing FDT&RP regulatory scheme pertaining to flight crew with
reference to and utilising current scientific data relating to fatigue.”
Objective 1 is only partially met: the science referred to throughout the report fails to
cover to any meaningful degree the work of Dr. Mark Rosekind (foundational work) or Dr.
Alexandra Holmes (FRMS), both of whom are well recognized experts in the area and
have consulted to TC. Statements are made about the science either not existing or not
supporting a particular consideration, yet specific papers and data to counter at least
some of these statements exist. Basically, what this objective achieved was only
achieved in a very biased manner.
Objective 2
“To review the basic principles of the fatigue risk management system approach to
fatigue management as it would apply to flight crew with reference to and utilising
current scientific data relating to fatigue.”
This objective has been “glossed over” given there is little or no evidence in the report of
the completion of this objective.
Objective 3
“To determine the commonalities and differences with respect to the FDT & RP and
Fatigue Risk Management Systems (FRMS) approach to the management of fatigue in
order to develop recommendations for regulatory proposals which might include:
a) identifying and analysing differences that consider the current Canadian

operational environment and;
b) suggesting alternate recommendations in respect to, for example, fatigue
and the operational environment.“
The work and reporting on this objective seems biased from the beginning in that a
logical first sub-point would be to identify how commonalities in FRMS might enhance
fatigue management in Canadian operations. Instead, the first point refers to differences
and the second refers to ‘alternate recommendations’. There is little evidence of the
achievement of this objective.
1. Fatigue Risk Management Systems
Objective 2 indicates that there would be a review of the FRMS approach yet it is not
covered in the report and in fact, is never defined. Many references to it are found and
Appendix 3 gives an overview of Canada’s move from prescription to performance-
based systems and points to FRMS as an example of such an approach, yet there are
no meaningful paragraphs even in section 29.0 which is supposedly about FRMS and its
potential application.
2
Furthermore, none of the recommendations are based on FRMS or allow for it in a
meaningful way. References to FRMS are generally obscured by referring to ULR flights
as the most appropriate application of it, yet a CBAA Human Factors seminar in Calgary
2011 specifically reviewed operational use of the science in regional airlines and charter
operations. The co-chairs in the report appear to have ignored anything that would
scientifically allow for tactical two-crew duty extensions on the same scientific basis as
requirements for duty day reductions.
2. Principles (Section 1.2)
The report says that an “intrinsic” principle is “that fatigue impacts all crew
equally”. Does this mean that all people get tired? Does it mean that all crew members
experience fatigue the same way? All flight crew in a global sense, or all members of a
specific flight crew? Does this presume that all members of a specific flight crew
experience equal levels of fatigue? This is debatable and a poor starting point for the
report. Dr. Mark Rosekind, in AvAlert and many papers written and presented during his
tenure at NASA states that “there can be significant individual differences among the
human operators”. In addition he points out that “operational diversity, individual
differences, and physiological complexity- will preclude a simple or single solution that
will eliminate fatigue from aviation operations.”
3. Inconsistent Views Expressed by Dr. Belenky
The Working Group report selectively uses the views of Dr. Belenky without doing justice
to the glaring inconsistencies between his statements early in the Working Group’s
deliberations and later on. For reasons that are unclear to the signatory associations, Dr.
Belenky’s views hardened in a variety of areas as the Working Group’s deliberations
progressed. The quotes below are from the April 11 2011 meeting.
“12 on 12 off” Belenky - “Wild-ass guess. I don’t even remember where I came up with
that.” Why? "McCauley's Study - start with 8 hours of sleep and work backwards. If no
sleep debt, then you can carry on indefinitely”… “14 and 10 off could work in a particular
operational environment” “If you are satisfied that they are getting the 8 hours rest, then
that is OK”
“I don’t even have an opinion on how many days someone can work before they get
stale. Probably a month would not be unreasonable, but there is no real data."
"Cumulative Duty hours are irrelevant and Duty time is irrelevant except as a tool to
assess sleep opportunity – [Duty hours are] an imperfect tool if the workload is low"
"Cumulative Duty Hour limits 60 in 7" Belenky - “SWAG” Stupid Wild-Ass Guess” “That
is their [Moebius Report authors] opinion. Nothing to hang their hats on”
4. Harmonization
In Section 1.2 of the Draft Report, the document sets out:
3
“The Working Group co-chairs acknowledge that the European Aviation Safety Agency
(EASA) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) revised regulatory proposals only
apply to large air carriers.”
The Draft Working Group Report then goes on to use excerpts from these documents in
support of recommendations that have much broader application to other-than large air
carriers, in the name of “Harmonization”.
Furthermore, the Draft Working Group report makes no reference to the fact that both
EASA and the FAA have chosen to address Air Taxi fixed-wing operations, Commuter
Operations, Helicopter Operations, and Private Operations in a separate Working Group
at some uncertain time in the future. The Draft Working Group report, while it makes
numerous references to the EASA Comment Response Document (CRD) in the
“Harmonization” sections, it makes no reference to the fact that the document is a series
of recommendations-only with no regulatory force or effect in Europe or anywhere else.
While the Draft Working Group report also makes reference to ICAO SARPs, it makes
no reference to the fact that the SARPs are intended to apply only to large international
air carrier operations.
The Working Group Co-Chairs have relied heavily on these sources, and the application
of these SARPs and European Recommendations, intended only to apply to large air
carriers, will have an extremely damaging effect on smaller Canadian commercial and
business aviation operators.
5. One-Size-Fits All
The DRAFT Report does not do justice to the Purpose section of our Terms of
Reference, which states:
“…develop recommendations for regulatory proposals which might include identifying
and analysing differences that consider the current Canadian operational environment.”
The signatory associations believe that the Working Group Chairs made little effort to
develop industry segment-specific recommendations for regulatory change and have
instead focused on proposals which accommodate the needs of the scheduled
international airline community and Labour, but have virtually ignored the needs and
regulatory proposals presented by the signatory associations. Not a single proposal from
one of the signatory associations was adopted in the Draft Working Group report.
6. Introduction to Section 2 Recommendations
There is no justification provided for why prescription is preferred basis of

recommendations. What happened to the performance-based approach in Appendix 3
or supposedly common in Canadian regulations and standards? FRMS would help
remove the reliance on prescription.
The example “Ultra Long haul operations are conducted by CAR 705 AOC holders only.”
is not accurate given CAR 604 operations may include ultra long flights.
4
7. Harmonization Wherever Possible
In section 1.2 the Draft Working Group report sets out:
“Additionally, the co-chairs respected the principle that harmonization should be

achieved wherever possible.” while our Terms of Reference say:
“The Working Group will base its work on scientific data that is defensible and readily
available. In addition, the Working Group will consider the work already completed by
Transport Canada in regards to FRMS, as well as the regulations and proposals of ICAO
and other States in an effort to adopt and harmonize regulations and best practices with
those States, where appropriate. [emphasis added]”
8. Zeroing Accumulated Flight Time
Notwithstanding ample support from our Scientific Advisor and in the scientific literature,
there was no effort by the Chairs to incorporate recommendations that “zero”
accumulated flight time or the cumulative duty time, based on the recuperative effects of
an extended period of time free from duty.
9. Deployed Operations
Dr. Belenky stated that a 14-hour Duty Day followed by the opportunity for 8-hours rest
could be accomplished safely. At page 3 of the February 2011 Q&A session, he said:
Q: Does the science support a schedule of 14 hours of work followed by 10 hours for
rest - over a period of one, two, or three weeks? What maximum duty period and
corresponding rest period, day after day, over an extended time does the science
support?
A: The science does support 14 hours on and 10 hours off, if, the 10 hours off is
adequate for the person to obtain 7-8 hours of actual sleep. That said, we understand
very little about cumulative fatigue over weeks, months, and years. Most cultures favor
one or two days off in 7 days. If you are doing nothing else, for example you are a
deployed soldier, a submariner, or working on an oil rig for two weeks straight then you
can manage for long periods (weeks) with 12 hours on duty and 12 hours off duty.
Having days off would change this equation and allow for longer duty periods, for
example, the 14 on 10 off schedule you mention.
He went on to say in response to the next question, in part:
“…It is not so much the length of the duty period as the need to provide 7-8 hours of
actual sleep time/24 hours that should guide the discussion of duty period.”
The signatory associations believe that the regulations should contemplate a scenario
where rotational or bush crews operate nearby the aircraft and under circumstances
where they have no family responsibilities, and permit the 14-hour DD that Dr. Belenky
made reference to in February of 2011.
5
Dr. Belenky made reference to the McCauley 2009 study on cumulative fatigue as
“seminal”. That study indicated that performance can be sustained for extended periods
of time if the 8-hour rest period is protected. Dr. Belenky also referred to the Van
Dongen et al. 2003 and the Belenky et al. 2003 studies as “seminal” as support for the
proposition that it is the 8-hours rest that is the key to sustaining performance. The Draft
Report make no reference to these key reports that point to the ability of individuals to
sustain performance (the McCauley report suggests for extended periods of time),
provided that the 8-hours rest period is protected.
10. Defining WOCL
Dr. Belenky did not agree with the FDP Reduction for WOCL infringement, and he
advocates that the WOCL should be defined more narrowly – specifically:
“For the purposes of avoiding flying through the WOCL I would be inclined to define the
WOCL more narrowly as between 0400-0600 h.”
In fact, he went on to say more bluntly, with respect to the solution that the Co-Chairs
proposed, “Again, I do not see how this helps” Dr. Belenky went on to say, “I am not
convinced”.
This was a point that the signatory associations made in their previous written
submission.
The signatory associations also believe that the WOCL should be defined more
narrowly.
11. Definitions
3.1 Local nights rest definition. By removing the bracketed comment at the end of the
definition, it is no longer clear that you can start a duty period at 0730. There is a need
to revisit this definition to ensure the ability to start at 0730 is clear.
3.2 Positioning definition. Need to add “excluding” in the second part, “and excluding the
time for local transfer” to be absolutely clear that it is excluded as well.
3.3 WOCL definition. Time zone to which the crew member is acclimatized.
12. Section 3 Air Operator Responsibilities
The last bullet point, use “military aircraft” in lieu of “Royal Canadian Air Force Aircraft” to
ensure that all such operations are considered.
13. Section 7 Records of Flight and Duty Times and Rest Periods.
Suggest last recommendation read: “Upon request the air operator shall provide a fight
crew member copies of their individual records of flight and duty times and rest periods.”
6
14. Section 8 Flight Duty Period
This section states that the “science suggests a maximum FDP of 12 hours…” and
certainly some of the findings related to specific duty profiles support that
suggestion. However, the weakness in this suggestion is revealed in 8.1, paragraph 2:
Dr. Belenky points out that the need for 7 to 8 hours of actual sleep is the driver, not the
length of the day. His (earlier in the paragraph) example of working backwards from 24
hours to account for sleep, ablutions, eating, and travel gives 4 hours for ablutions,
eating an travel. Often crews eat on the airplane, arrive at the hotel room within 30
minutes of landing and are asleep within the hour after landing. Similarly, with
preplanning it is possible to do the reverse in the morning. Dr. Belenky’s example could
just as easily be modified to support a longer or shorter day, as it should be. Data driven
FRMS would help support this method. Obviously when the hotel is far away and
support services are limited more time needs to be allocated between a landing and the
next takeoff. There should be no unreasonably long days, but FRMS can allow for
extended days if the data shows that the crew has been off duty for sufficient period prior
to operations and is actually rested (as determined by algorithms using data from
devices such as oximeters, actigraphs, and other data collection tools). The FRMS
could also require shorter duty periods to account for poor quality sleep, WOCL duty,
number and length of sectors, back to back duty days, etc. The data in 8.1, 8.2, and 8.3
is reasonably well presented but on P. 36 there is reference to Dr. Belenky’s experience,
which leaves uncertainty. Is it about fit, young army pilots? Is it research experience,
which would not likely replicate the real world? It is interesting that the middle paragraph
in the page says “verified by Dr. Belenky, the scientific evidence supports a maximum 10
hours during the night and 12 hours during the day”, which is taking the minimum times
discussed in other contexts and trying to make a case out of them.
The table on page 32 is odd given it appears to be the co-Chairs’ compromise indicating
that the science is now negotiable. Is the need for prescription so overriding that
performance-based measures would not be included in the development of such a
table? It is certainly possible. If the co- chairs’ answer is that they didn’t have adequate
FRMS information, then that is proof that some of the WG objectives have not been met.
The signatory Associations take issue with the statement that “science suggests a
maximum FDP of 12 hours would be effective in managing flight crew fatigue.” Both the
rational following this statement and the quoted science at the end of the section are
talking about rest, not maximum FDP.
The signatory associations also disagree with the need for a 12 hour rest period (we
support a 10 hour rest period supporting 8 hours of sleep). In many Canadian cities 10
hours will provide 8 hours sleep opportunity along with time for personal hygiene. The
science supports a 14 hour duty day, just not day after day for an extended period of
time.
In Section 8, Table 1, there is a need to clarify that a VFR Helicopter uses Column A at
all times to make it clear that sectors do not apply.
Section 8.1 paragraph 11. There is a statement that “the relative risk of an accident at
14 hours of duty rises to 2.5 times that of the lowest point in the first eight hours of duty.”
There is no indication though if this is still an acceptable level or not. In the absence of
this information the statistic is not being used appropriately. A major flaw in the Draft
7
Working Group report, here and elsewhere, is that an “acceptable level of risk” has not
been discussed. Even accepting for a moment that the relative risk does increase 2. 5
times; is that an acceptable risk? No aviation business can function in a “zero risk”
environment.
Section 8.1, page 35.Summary of positions. The signatory associations do not believe
there was consensus on a flight duty period reduction for sectors flown. This statement
actually contradicts the summary of positions under 8.3 which is correct.
Section 8.3, last paragraph. The signatory associations believe that ALL 702 and 703
operations, both fixed wing and rotary wing, should not be subject to sector limits.
15. Section 9 Planned Extensions to the Daily FDP & Section 10 Extension of
FDP Due to In-Flight Rest
Recommendation 9 contradicts itself when it says, “There is no science supporting the

use of extensions without the use of split duty or augmented flight crews” and then refers
to the use of FRMS, which is scientifically based. Similarly, respecting Section 11, the
report allows for FRMS approval but says that there is “limited science” presented
concerning this issue.
Section 9.0, Planned Extensions, Although there was no consensus, there certainly was
strong support by the majority of stakeholders to have a one hour extension, not
infringing on the WOCL, providing there was appropriate rest prior, such as having two
local nights rest. The signatory associations firmly believe that this provision should be
in the final report. There is ample science to support a 14 hour day under these
conditions.
16. Section 13 Unforeseen Operational Circumstances – Pilot-In-Command’s

Discretion
This section in part presents a circular argument. The recommendation for a negotiated
duty period is treated as scientific (“scientifically it is difficult to justify further extensions
to a limitation that has been established”) and as an established requirement. Yet
nothing has been established and FRMS would establish the scientific basis for strategic
and tactical extensions.
Section 13.0 Unforeseen Operational Circumstances, last bullet point. The signatory
associations do not feel there is any rational for increasing the minimum rest period
following an unplanned extension. A person away from base will not sleep longer given
a 14 or 15 hour rest versus having a standard rest period.
17. Sleep Obtained versus Sleep Opportunity
At page 50 of the Draft Report in section 15.0 relating to Delayed Reporting Time the
report sets out:
“Use of this provision should consider actual sleep obtained versus opportunity.”
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Scheduling of flight crews in scheduled or unscheduled operations cannot be predicated
on actual sleep obtained. The recommendations should be structured to ensure that the
flight crew member has a high probability of obtaining the necessary rest, based on his
previous work/rest schedule, and then allow the crew member to claim that he is not fit
for work if that rest is not achieved. Flight crew members are currently obliged by
regulation to turn down a flight if they believe that they are fatigued.
18. Cumulative Duty Hours
At page 60 in Cumulative Duty Hours the Co-Chairs have opted to recommend a very
restrictive new limitation in to the Canadian regulations.
Dr. Belenky in their “Scientific Issues Regarding the NPRM” Belenky & Graeber,
November 5 2010 said:
“Limiting flight time in addition to duty time –
Comment: There are no scientific papers supporting the idea that flight time should be
treated differently from duty time except perhaps in so far as they involve differences in
workload. Workload in the commercial aviation context is thought of primarily in terms of
number of segments, specifically number of take offs and landings. Since both number
of segments and circadian timing are taken care of in the duty time limits there is no
rationale for putting further limits on flight time.”
Instead the Co-Chairs have chosen to recommend the application of Cumulative Duty
Time, which goes beyond the application of Duty Time and Flight time.
The recommendation of the Co-Chairs “when using Duty Option 2” was one of the few
examples where any effort was made to tailor the proposals for small operators, and
even it is difficult to understand in the context of the current “60 flight hours in 7 days”
limitation. For a single crew member to fly 60 hours in 7 days he would have to ensure
that the customer’s Duty Day requirements coincided completely with his own. That is,
he would have to instruct the customer that he could only fly between the hours of 0700
and 1400 or 1200 and 1900 each day, but not both.
What’s more in an unscheduled on-demand operation of any type the recommended 190
hours in 28 days results in an average of 6.7 hours/day. This would result in a number
of anomalies in an unscheduled environment, including:
• A consecutive series of low flying days combined with long Duty Days
could result in the flight crew member reaching his Cumulative Duty Day
limit in 14 days (at 13 Duty hours each day).
• An average limit of 6.7 hours of Duty per day could mean triple-crewing
an aircraft that can be operated today with one crew member, and this
problem would be aggravated by circumstances in the North during
extended summer daylight hours and by remote operations where the
logistics of replacing crew members become complicated and time
consuming.
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Fundamentally however, the proposition to impose a cumulative Duty time limit is flawed
because the science is certainly clear that there is nothing unsafe about operating
successive long duty days, if the circadian rhythm is undisrupted and 8 hours of sleep is
protected.
It is unreasonable to suggest that a single intrusion on the WOCL would preclude the
use of Option 2. That is, one early start would drive the flight crew member to 60 Duty
hours in any 7 days from 70 Duty Hours in any 7 days.
The cumulative Duty Time proposals become even more ridiculous in the context of the
Time Free from Duty recommendations in the draft report, which would see that
seasonal pilots were limited to five consecutive days off within every 20 consecutive
days. The signatory associations stand by our previously submitted proposal which
includes extended periods of time free from duty, both before and after a 30-day tour,
and includes day-for-day additional days of rest for any tours over 30 to a maximum of
35 days.
The scientific studies referred to by the Co-Chairs in the Draft Report (specifically
Landrigan et al, Dembe et al. Folkard & Lombardi, Caruso et al. with the exception of the
Moebus Report) are not to be found in the compendium of scientific paper presented to
the Working Group or vetted by Dr. Belenky. They appear to have been sourced by the
Working Group Co-Chairs since the Working Group’s deliberations concluded.
There are many examples in today’s society where people in safety-related occupations
work extended hours, including fire-fighters, police and EMS attendants, and ARFF.
Particularly in remote areas and in on-demand and business operations where
operations are unpredictable and crew changes may involve difficult logistics, the
signatory associations believe that the regulations should provide more flexibility than
the Co-Chairs have suggested.
NATA does not support cumulative duty hour restrictions, however in order for Option 2
to work it has to be 84 duty hours in any 7 consecutive days. This allows for 12-hour
days, not infringing on the WOCL, which is completely supported by science. CBAA,
NATA, MAC, ATAC and HAC do not support the Cumulative Duty Hour concept for CAR
604, 702, and 703 operations on any terms.
19. Sector Limitations
Dr. Belenky did not believe that sector limits should apply to helicopter operators at all.
He commented on the Draft Report:
“With respect to rotary wing, all flying is fatiguing and so there is little value in attending
to sectors flown as opposed to total flight time. So, I would be inclined not to restrict
rotary wing flying even for scheduled or medevac rotary wing flying.”
HAC believes that sector limits should not apply to helicopter operations of any type.
What’s more, the signatory associations believe that a sector limit should not apply to
VFR operations of any type or to IFR Air Taxi operations, since they are characterized
by multiple take-offs and landings that are already naturally limited by both the existing
Duty Day and Flight Time limits.
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Furthermore sector limits in on-demand operations could hamstring an operation that is
characterized by unpredictability, and multiple short sectors on a one-off basis. An Air
Taxi float outpost operation is a good example of how changing circumstances, seasonal
operations, and customer demands (the same pilot could not do an early and a late day
resupply run without compromising his subsequent duty days, for example) can conspire
to make the application of 6.7 hours average Duty extremely problematic.
20. Limits on Flight Time AND Duty Time
In section 17.0 Flight Time Limitations, rather than accept the advice of Dr. Belenky to
set only a limit on Duty Time and not on Flight Time, the Co-Chairs have set limits on
Flight Time and on Cumulative Duty Time, which the signatory associations would argue
is worse. The Co-Chairs even cite the Graeber & Belenky study, but still go on to impose
a cumulative Duty Time limit on top of the proposed Flight Time limit.
At page 56 of the Draft Report, on the subject of an 8-hour flight time limitation, the Co-
Chairs set out:
“That said the literature is not clear on this subject and there are some papers that
suggest an exponential increase in accident risk after 8 hour on duty.”
Dr. Belenky responded:
“The scientific evidence supporting this assertion is weak.”, and the signatory
associations believe this reference in the Draft Report should be removed.
There is no support in the science for a single-pilot limit of 8-hours or 112 hours in 28
days. The signatory associations see no reason why the current 140 flight hours in 28
days (or 150 in 30 days) and the other 7-day and 90-day limits should not continue to be
applied.
The structure of the CARs is predicated on the size of the aircraft being regulated and
the number of passengers carried. For the Co-Chairs to suggest that in the absence of
compelling scientific evidence that the CAR 604, 702, 703, and 704 limits should be the
same as the airline limits is unsupportable and inconsistent with the Working Group’s
Terms of Reference.
The “Harmonization” sections throughout the Draft Report continue to make reference to
proposals and airline-only rules as if they were universally relevant to Air Taxi,
Commuter, Business Aviation or Helicopter operations.
The reference to “The current CAR limitations are more permissive than most regulatory
regimes” under Operational Experience, is inappropriate and should be removed. All
references to the CARs provisions under the Operational Experience sections are
inappropriate.
Section 17, Flight-Time Limitations. For CAR 604/702/703 operations there has to be a
way to deal with seasonality. NATA believes, that if these recommendations are to
apply to 604/702/703 then where multiple other constraints, including cumulative duty,
11
have been layered on then the existing 702/703 flight time limitation of 140 hours in 28
needs to be maintained.
21. Split Duty
Section 19, Split-duty, The 50% credit from 0600 to 2359 is too limiting, especially for
aerial application purposes. Science show that there is a good likelihood of sleep during
the afternoon circadian dip and more credit should be available in the 1200 to 1800 time
frame where sleep following an early morning start is very likely.
Section 19, Split-duty, Dr Belenky says “This is of course assuming a good night of sleep
between 10:00pm and 6:00am immediately preceding that particular day. Sleep will be
limited because you are you are topped off from your good night’s sleep the night before.”
This is not the case for aerial applicators having an early start to the day
At section19 at page 60 under Split Duty, the 2-sector limit following the break would
completely nullify the benefit of the split to the operator, particularly if the break took
place early in the FDP or if it applied to on-demand or aerial application operations for
example.
Furthermore, the increase to the subsequent rest period (“at least as long as the
preceding duty period”) makes no sense when we consider that the rest during the break
provides minute-for-minute compensatory rest for the extension to the FDP. The Co-
Chairs, oddly, even cited Dr. Belenky when he said “All sleep obtained contributes to this
[7 to 8 hour] daily requirement”, but still recommended additional rest.
The Operational Experience section contains an inappropriate reference to the CARs,

“The CARs have a provision for split duty”. It might be more appropriate to say that “The
CARs currently extend a very limited opportunity for aerial application operators to use
split-duty, but there has been keen interest from industry to have broader provisions
made for split-duty in the regulations.”
22. Notice for Standby Duty
In Section 20.0, Standby, the requirement to provide 32 hours or even 24 hours notice to
the flight crew member if the SDP intrudes on the WOCL makes no sense for on
demand operators which by definition are unpredictable.
The statements at page 64 “not assign a flight crew member to a SAP that exceeds 14
hours;” and “not assign the flight crew member to a flight duty that exceeds either the
SDP maximum or the FDP maximum from the FDP Tables;” are inconsistent.
The signatory associations are still adamantly and unanimously opposed to the
application of cumulative duty times to operations under CAR 604, 702, 703, and 704.
23. Section 21 Rest Periods and Minimum Rest Away from Base
The signatory associations oppose the “12-hours at home base” concept completely and
feel that it should be 10 hours both home and away. The 12 hour concept severely
penalizes those operators in smaller towns and cities, in particular the 702/703 operators
12
but including many 704/705 ones as well.
The signatory associations question why the Co-Chairs have chosen to harmonize with
EASA rather than the FAA on this particular issue?
At page 66 Rest Period, the Draft Report sets out:
“minimum rest period away from home base: The minimum rest period provided before
undertaking a flight duty period starting away from home base shall be 10 hours in the
suitable accommodation;”, and Dr. Belenky comments:
“This is cutting it close, leaving only 2 hours for getting to and from the airport and the
necessities of living.” He made similar comments at page 68 of the report.
For many small operators and helicopter operators living “away from home base”, and
even “at home base”, two hours may be more than adequate, and neither the Co-Chairs
or Dr. Belenky have considered that for outpost operations, rotational crews, for private
owner-operators, or in bush helicopter operations for example, the accommodation may
be a stone’s throw away from the aircraft. Furthermore, in remote or rotational
operations the “necessities of living” frequently do not include any family obligations or
shopping or cooking – the crew members could be required to eat a prepared meal and
shower before reporting for duty at the aircraft on foot. The proposal in the Draft Report
does not contemplate this type of operation, which is quite common in private owner-
operator situations and in remote operations for the helicopter and Air Taxi communities.
This section of the Draft Report conspicuously does not make reference to the study by
McCauley on this subject (which Dr. Belenky refers to as “seminal”), or any of the others
he has recommended (Van Dongen notwithstanding), but instead the Co-Chairs have
selected a study of their own by Wright et al., which contradicts the McCauley study and
was not included in the compendium of studies provided to the Working Group
members.
Furthermore, the Co-Chairs have completely misquoted the Van Dongen et al. study.
The Van Dongen study did not produce similar results to the Wright et al. study. The
Van Dongen et al. study found no degradation in performance after 14 days with eight
hours of sleep. Even the Wright et al. study acknowledges “The amount of sleep
required to prevent cumulative decrements in performance across weeks of sustained
work-rest schedules without a day off is unknown.” The study goes on to say “These
preliminary results suggest that an 8-hr scheduled sleep opportunity may not be
sufficient to maintain performance levels for work-rest schedules that do not include
days off or time for extra sleep, although other explanations related to repetitive
performance of the task itself have yet to be excluded.” [emphasis added] The Draft
report has presented a less-than-balanced examination of the science to support a
conclusion that appears to have been drawn in advance.
In conclusion, there is strong support in the science, and from Dr. Belenky who has said
repeatedly that high performance can be maintained for extended periods of time,
provided that 8 hours of sleep is protected and the circadian rhythm is not disrupted. It
is our view that Dr. Belenky’s reservations are limited only to demands from family and
travel to work, eating and showering which can be addressed in the context of rotational,
13
business, and bush operations for many air operators. His comment on the Draft Report
in section 21.0 (see Prep 12-7-6 8:58 AM) Rest Periods supports this proposition. The
Co-Chairs have steadfastly refused to make a separate industry segment-specific
recommendation on this subject and others that target the underlying fatigue-related
issue, but using a different regulatory tool.
24. Exceeding the Maximum FDP
At page 66, the Draft Working Group report sets out:
“where the duration of duty period exceeds the permitted FDP plus 1 hour (with the
exception of positioning), the subsequent rest period shall be at least as long as the
preceding duty period.”
The science is clear, that anyone given an opportunity to sleep after a 14 or even 15
hour FDP, could not sleep for 14 or 15 hours. The section appears to be entirely punitive
to the operator, even when the circumstances that led to the exceedance may have
been entirely beyond the operator’s control. Perhaps the crew member should be
provided with one or two more hours sleep (9 or 10 hours rest), but the signatory
associations believe a rest period that is “at least as long as the previous duty period”, is
unnecessary and will not mitigate the additional fatigue occurring as a result of the
increase to the FDP.
25. “Recurrent Extended Recovery Rest Period”
At page 69 of the Draft Report in section 22.0 Time Free from Duty it is unclear what a
“recurrent extended recovery rest period” is.
The signatory associations believe we need a third option for 702/703 operations,
particularly those operating in remote locations, whereby a crew member gets a
minimum of 7 consecutive days free from duty in every 36, however there is a day off
provided following any WOCL intrusion.
As we have commented earlier, the Co-Chairs have eliminated the current ability of flight
crews to “zero” their accumulated Flight Time through the use of five consecutive free
from duty. This is a proven mechanism, supported by the science, to eliminate fatigue
that actually facilitates operations. It is unclear why the Report does not reflect this
effective regulatory tool to mitigate fatigue – particularly in the CAR 604, 702, 703, and
704 communities. The science is quite clear that an extended period of consecutive days
off “zeros” accumulated fatigue. The fact that this was pointed out to the Co-Chairs in
our meeting of June 27, and the fact that they have not modified the recommendations in
the Draft Working Group Report to incorporate this principal is a clear indication of the
airline-specific bias that pervades the report.
26. Section 25 Consecutive Duties Infringing on the WOCL
The signatory associations believe that to deal with EMS (medivac) operations there has
to be a third option for 702/703 operations, harmonized with EASA (providing additional
rest after 4 or more night duties) to provide additional time off (5 days off after 7 nights).
14
This will allow a two-week rotation, the first weekdays, the second weeknights, then a full
rest period.
27. Removal of the Heli-Logging Provisions
The Working Group Co-Chairs have deleted any provisions that relate specifically to the
Heli-logging industry and have not considered this unique environment. This is one
example where an industry segment-specific solution is required.
28. Section 26 Determining FDP Table Start Time
In the Science section, the co-chairs assert that it is too difficult to write a rule to cover
start times with circadian considerations, yet earlier in the report they have suggested a
table. In fact, the rule could be performance based, requiring an FRMS to determine this.
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Joint Submission by MAC, ATAC & HAC to the Flight Crew Fatigue
Management Working Group
March 2 2012
Introduction
The signatory associations believe that the existing prescriptive Flight & Duty
Time limits set out in the CARs are fundamentally sound however, we support
operationally practical changes that are recognized clearly by science. We also
support a periodic review of our regulations to bring them in to line with the latest
fatigue-related scientific research. Foreign rules must be examined with caution
because they may have evolved in the context of other circumstances (i.e. less
demand for remote operations, or shorter geographic distances between points,
or less-intense demand for seasonal operations or shorter summer-season
daylight hours, for example).
Furthermore, foreign Flight and Duty time rules also evolve in the context of a
political climate where organized labour can significantly affect the form and
content of the flight and duty time limits based on their political influence in each
country. In short, pure fatigue-related science may be the least influential factor
in the development of the rules that exist in other jurisdictions and they should be
examined with extreme caution as we consider the influence that they should
have in shaping the Canadian regulatory landscape.
“Common Elements” - Use by the Working Group Leaders
Throughout the Working Groups deliberations the Working Group leaders have
misunderstood and misinterpreted the Terms of Reference for the Working
Group. The Working Group leaders have regularly insisted that their objective
was to find “common elements” and to regulate as much of the industry as
possible under the same set of rules. The Working Group Leaders have insisted
upon this course of action in spite of our Terms of Reference that make no
reference to this, but instead make specific reference to industry segment-
specific solutions in the Working Group’s “Purpose” section:
…
a) “identifying and analysing differences that consider the current
Canadian operational environment and;
b) suggesting alternate recommendations in respect to, for example,
fatigue and the operational environment.”
…
In a submission to Martin Eley dated July 29 2011, the associations made the
following request to modify the Terms of Reference and the behaviour of the
Working Group Leaders:
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“The Working Group should strive to ensure that science-based fatigue-related
issues that apply to all industry segments are addressed in the Working Group’s
recommendations for regulatory change on an industry segment-specific basis to
ensure that the common fatigue-related issue is addressed, but in a way that
does not unnecessarily constrain the affected industry segment or compromise
its economic position.” The issue went unaddressed by the CARC and
unresponded to by Mr. Eley and he refused our request to meet with us on the
issues raised in our letter.
To make matters worse, the list of “common elements” identified by the Working
Group leaders was not driven exclusively by fatigue-related science or by
operational experience, but largely by issues where the interests of the large
scheduled international carriers and their unions coincided. Large parts of the
Working Group’s discussions have been devoted to items that track the elements
of the large scheduled airline’s Collective Agreements.
The interests of our constituents have been sacrificed to the dominant interests
of the large scheduled international carriers and their unions. The debate in
plenary has strayed from principles of broad application based on fatigue-related
science and operational experience to a shopping list of issues agreed upon by
the large carriers and their unions. The effect of this course of action will be to
impose unnecessary limitations on the operation of smaller commercial and
business aircraft operators that will unnecessarily limit the access of Canadians
and Canadian businesses to important air services.
“Our” List of Common Elements
In our submission to the Working Group Leaders dated March 9 2011 the
signatory associations identified a list of issues, supported by the science that we
believe are common issues. In the absence of consensus, we still believe that
these items form the core of changes that should limit the extent of the
amendments to the current Flight & Duty Time regulations. They are:
1. Minimum Rest
2. Intrusions on the WOCL
3. Split Duty and the recuperative benefits of less than four hours rest during
a Duty Period
4. The fatiguing effect (or lack thereof) of Stand-by or Reserve Duty
5. The recuperative effect of a few days off as it relates to “zeroing”
accumulated flight time-related fatigue
6. The need for a minimum addition to the minimum rest period of eight
hours to contemplate meals, personal hygiene, etc. (by consensus)
7. The ability of flight crews to work multiple consecutive duty-days without
erosion of the minimum rest, and without any attendant erosion of
performance
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8. Operations involving disruptions of the circadian rhythm
There is a short list of other items requiring change that have become evident
since our March 9 submission, but they are included in our proposal that follows.
Our Regulatory Structure
When the CARs were originally drafted, one of the founding principles was that
the level of complexity of the regulations would be based on the number of
certified seats in the aircraft. This principle was adopted on the expectation that
an aircraft that carried a larger number of passengers should adopt more
sophisticated systems, but also with an appreciation that operators of smaller
aircraft cannot possibly implement or sustain these more sophisticated and costly
systems and technology given their type of aircraft and theater of operations. It
is only through the use of different, industry segment-specific regulatory
requirements that address the same underlying safety concern, can small
operators sustain their services.
Furthermore, flight crews in different industry segments reach a fatigued

condition in different ways and under different operational circumstances. These
call for different regulatory solutions to address these operational circumstances.
That is, identical operational circumstances generate identical risks, but different
operational circumstances generate different risks, and different regulatory
solutions are required to mitigate those risks.
Furthermore, our current regulatory structure at all levels provides recognition

that vast areas of Canada are remote and inaccessible except by small aircraft,
and to expect the same regulations to apply to CAR 604, 702 and 703 fixed-wing
and helicopter operators would render these important transportation services
impossible to deliver. Bluntly-put, when our current regulatory structure was
conceived, there was recognition from industry and the regulator that it would be
unreasonable to expect the commercial operator of Cessna 206 on floats to
implement safety programs, staff, infrastructure and equipment that were
identical to an operator of an A320. Smaller commercial and business aviation
operators provide essential services to remote communities and support
economic development in Canada’s most difficult to access regions, and the
current regulations provide some recognition for the fact that smaller commercial
and business aviation operators cannot possibly achieve or sustain operations in
an airline-like regulatory environment.
We have little confidence that the interests of the on-demand, Specialty Air
Service, Business Aviation, Helicopter, and Fixed-Wing Air Taxi segments of the
aviation community will be fairly represented in the Working Group’s report, in
favour of a one-size-fits-all regulation.
3
Flight & Duty Times in an On-Demand Pilot Self-Dispatch Context
In the context of CAR 702, 703, and 604 operations, it is important to recognize
that pilots largely manage their own Flight & Duty Time limitations. They are
generally not “scheduled” by a Dispatch Office. The regulations that apply to
pilots under these circumstances should be straightforward and relatively easy
for flight crews to manage in the field and without the assistance of a Crew
Scheduling department.
The “Working Draft”
* indicates that this section in the proposal is unchanged from the latest Working
Draft
*“Airport standby” means a period of time during which a crew member is

required by the operator to be on standby at an aerodrome.
*“Acclimatized” means the physiological and mental state of a crew member

whose bio-rhythms and bodily functions are considered aligned with local time.
*‘Augmented flight crew’ means a flight crew which comprises more than the
minimum number required to operate the aircraft allowing each flight crew
member to leave their assigned post and be replaced by another appropriately
qualified flight crew member for the purpose of in-flight rest.
*‘Break’ means a period of time on the ground, shorter than a rest period, when
the crew is free of all duties but still considered to be within a duty period. (A
break counts as duty – provision).
*‘Crew member’ means a flight, technical or cabin crew member.
*‘Duty’ means any task that a flight crew member is assigned by an air operator,
including flight duty, administrative work, training, positioning, and standby.
*‘Duty period’ means a period which starts when a flight crew member is required
by an operator to report for or to commence a duty and ends when that person is
free from all duties.
*“Early Duty” means a flight duty period that starts between 02:00 – 05:59, in the
*‘Eastward-Westward and Westward-Eastward transition’ means the transition at

the place, usually home base, between a series of flights encompassing 6-hour
time differences or more and a second series of flights encompassing 4-hour
time differences or more in the opposite direction.(we need to see if there is a
related provision)
4
*"Fatigue" means a physiological state of reduced mental or physical
performance capability resulting from sleep loss or extended wakefulness and/or
physical activity that can impair a crew member’s alertness and ability to safely
operate an aircraft or perform safety related duties.
*"Fit for duty" - means that the crew member is not suffering from fatigue or likely
to suffer from fatigue that would impair their ability to safely operate an aircraft or
perform safety related duties for the duration of the planned flight duty period.
(review 602 applicability)
*“Flight crew member" - means a crew member assigned to act as pilot or flight
engineer of an aircraft during flight time, ;
*Flight duty period (FDP) means a period that begins when a flight crew member
is required to report for duty with the intention of conducting a flight, a series of
flights, or positioning, and ends when the aircraft is parked with “engines off” or
“rotors stopped” after the last flight and there is no intention for further aircraft
movement by the same flight crew member.
*“FDP Table Start Time” means the time at the location where the flight crew
member is deemed to be acclimatized and is the time of day used to determine
the maximum permitted FDP from the FDP Tables.
*"flight time" - means the time from the moment an aircraft first moves for the
purpose of taking off until the moment it finally comes to rest at the end of the
flight;
‘Home base’i
*“Last Acclimatized Time” means the time at the location where the crewmember
was last acclimatized.
*‘Late duty’ means a flight duty period finishing in the period between 01:00 and
01:59 hours in the time zone to which the crew is acclimatised.
*‘Local day’ means a 24-hour period commencing at 00:00 local time.
“Local night’s rest” means when the flight crew member’s rest period fully
encompasses the hours between 22:30 23:00 to 07:30 06:00 in the local time
zone.ii
*‘A single day free of duty’ means a time free of all duties consisting of a single
day and two local night’s rest and which may include a rest period as part of the
day off.
5
“minimum rest period” means a rest period of 10 hours ensuring that 8 hours of
rest during that period can be accomplished during that period.
*“Night Duty” means a duty period that starts between 13:01 – 01:59 and finishes
after 02:00, in the flight crew member’s acclimatized time.
“standby” means any period of time predetermined by the air operator when a
crew member may be called upon to report for duty standby other than airport or
aerodrome standby.
*“airport or aerodrome standby” – standby duty which takes place at an airport or

aerodrome.
‘Positioning’ means the transferring of a crew member from one place to another,
at the request of the operator, excluding the time from home to the designated
reporting place at home base and vice versa, as well as but including the time for
local transfer from a place of rest to the commencement of duty and vice versa.
*"Prescriptive fatigue management documentation" means a set of flight and duty

time limitations including flight time, flight duty period, duty period limitations and
rest period requirements and the policies and procedures for their application.
*‘In flight rest facility’ means a bunk, seat, room, or other accommodation that
provides a flight crew member with a sleep opportunity:
1. ‘Class 1 rest facility’ - means a bunk that meets the Society of

Automotive Engineers (SAE) Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP)
4101/3, Crew Rest Facilities, used in conjunction with ARP 4101, Flight
Deck Layout and Facilities. (if ARP changes, new aircraft must meet new
standard. Old aircraft grandfathered. Date of registration in Canada used
as reference. Define parameters or refer to SAE standard?)
2. ‘Class 2 rest facility’ means a seat in an aircraft cabin that allows for a
flat or near flat and horizontal sleeping position, which is separated from
passengers at least by a curtain to provide darkness and some sound
mitigation, equipped with portable oxygen and is reasonably free from
disturbance by passengers or crew members;
3. ‘Class 3 rest facility’ means a seat in an aircraft cabin or flight deck that
reclines at least 40 degrees from vertical, provides leg and foot support
and is separated from passengers by at least a curtain to provide
darkness and some sound mitigation, and is not attached or joined to any
seat occupied by passengers.
6
‘Rest period’ means a continuous and defined period of time, subsequent to
and/or prior to duty, during which a crew member is free of all duties.
"Sector" means a single flight that includes one takeoff and landingiii
*‘Split duty’ means a duty period where the FDP is extended by one or more
breaks on the ground within the FDP.
*“Standby” means a defined period of time during which a crewmember is

required by the operator to be available to receive an assignment for a specific
duty without an intervening rest period.
*“Standby availability period” (SAP) means a defined period of time during which
a crew member is on standby.
*“Standby Accommodation” means a place that protects from the elements, a

place to sit, where available not open to the public, and with access to food and
drink.
*“Standby duty period” (SDP) means the elapsed time from the beginning of the
standby duty to the end of an assigned flight duty period without an intervening
rest period.
*"Suitable accommodation" - means, for the purpose of standby, split duty and
minimum rest, a single-occupancy bedroom that is subject to a minimal level of
noise, with sufficient ventilation and a device for regulating temperature and light
intensity or, where such a bedroom is not available, an accommodation that is
suitable for the site and season, is subject to a minimal level of noise and
provides adequate comfort, to obtain horizontal rest, and protection from the
elements;
*‘Ultra long range operations (ULR)’ means long range flights having a planned
flight time greater than 16 hours or a flight duty period that exceeds 18
hours.(crewing issue – 2 captains / 2 FOs / FO & RP ? – FSF Recommendations
to guidance material or newer material
“Unforeseen operational circumstance” means an unplanned event beyond the

control of the air operator of insufficient duration to allow for adjustments to
schedules, including unforecast weather, equipment malfunction, or air traffic
delay. These circumstances can occur on the ground prior the flight’s departure,
or in the air.
*‘Window of Circadian Low (WOCL)’ means the period between 02:00 and 05:59
hours in the time zone to which the crew is acclimatised.
7
[A statement of general responsibilities for all air operators – some items
may not apply in all situations.]
700.50 Air Operator responsibilities
(1) An air operator shall, where applicable to the type of operation:
*(a) publish duty schedules sufficiently in advance to provide the

opportunity for flight crew members to plan adequate rest;
*(b) scheduled maximum FDPs shall be based on the flight crew

member’s acclimatized time.
*(c) ensure that flight duty periods are planned in such a way in order to
enable flight crew members to remain sufficiently free from fatigue;
*(d) specify reporting times to allow sufficient time for duties;1
(e) take into account the relationship between the frequencies and pattern
of flight duty periods and rest periods and give consideration to the
cumulative effects of undertaking long duty hours combined with minimum
rest periods;iv
*(f) allocate duty schedules which avoid practices that cause a serious
disruption of established sleep/work pattern such as alternating day/night
duties;
*(g) provide rest periods of sufficient time to enable flight crew members to
overcome the effects of the previous duties and to be well-rested by the
start of the following flight duty period;
*(h) plan days free of duty and notify flight crew members sufficiently in
advance;
*(i) ensure that flights are planned to be completed within the allowable
flight duty period taking into account the time necessary for pre-flight
duties, the flight and turn-around times;2
1
The definition of “sufficient” is unclear.
2
Unclear how the operator would apply this in a pilot self-dispatch environment.
3
We question how this would be accomplished in a pilot self-dispatch
2
environment.
Unclear how the operator would apply this in a pilot self-dispatch environment.
8
(j) change a schedule or crewing arrangements where the actual operation
exceeds the maximum flight duty period on (10 % ) a significant proportion
of flights in that schedule during a 28 day period. v
*(k) require that flight crew members declare to the air operator whether or
not they are fit for duty, prior to beginning a flight duty period. vi
*(l) not assign a flight crew member, who has declared them self not fit for
duty, to a flight duty period;
*(m) remove a flight crew member who is no longer fit for duty from a flight
duty period assignment.
(n) include reported flight times and flight duty times accumulated in other
flight operations, flight training units, and Royal Canadian Air Force aircraft
when calculating individual flight crew member flight time and flight duty
period limitations.vii
*(o) Document how meal opportunities are provided.
[Statement of responsibilities that apply to all flight crew members – an

effort to make the issue of fatigue a primary consideration for all flight crew
members.]
*700.51 Flight Crew Member Responsibilities
(1) A flight crew member shall:
(a) plan to use the rest periods provided by the air operator to obtain sleep
to recover from a previous flight duty period and to be rested in order to
safely perform their duties in a subsequent flight duty period;
(b) prior to beginning a flight duty period, declare to the air operator
whether or not they are fit for duty;3
(c) not begin a flight duty period if they are unfit for duty;
(d) as soon as possible and as applicable, advise the air operator, the
pilot-in-command, and other flight crew members, if during a flight duty
period, they become unfit for duty; and,
3
We question how this would be accomplished in a pilot self-dispatch
environment.
9
(e) report to the air operator all flight time and flight duty times
accumulated in operations for other air operators, flight training units, and
Royal Canadian Air Force aircraft for calculation of flight time and flight
duty period limitations.
700.52 Prescriptive Fatigue Management Documentationviii
*700.53 Nutrition (include with 700.67)
If the FDP exceeds 6 hours, the operator shall provide a meal and drink
opportunity.
*700.54 Records of flight and duty times and rest periods
(1) Operators shall maintain:
(a) Individual records of flight, duty and rest period for all crew members,
for a period of 24 months, including:
(i) Flight times;
(ii) Start, duration and end of each duty or FDP;
(iii) Rest periods and days free of all duties;
(b) Reports by the pilot-in-command on extended flight duty periods and

extended flight hours, for a period of 24 months.
(2) Upon request, the operator shall provide copies of individual records of
flight and duty times and rest periods to the flight crew member concerned.
The associations believe that the maximum Duty Day should be 14 rather than
13 hours.
The McCauley study, discussed at length in the Working Group clearly

demonstrated that individuals whose circadian rhythm is not disrupted, can work
repetitive 14-hour days, provided that 8 hours of sleep is protected.
Doctor Belenky was quite clear on the potential for repetitive 14-hour Duty Days,
assuming that 8-hour of rest was protected and there is no disruption of the
circadian rhythm.ix Other references by Dr. Belenky on this subject were framed
in the context of social norms or softer references to “burn out” which could result
from extended tours without time off.
10
Sector Limits
The associations do not believe that a sector-based limitation on the Duty Day is
required for CAR 702 703 604 or for helicopter operations.
The influence of sectors and time-on-task are naturally correlated. A number of

studies have even omitted any reference to sectors as a discrete cause of
fatigue, and make reference only to time-on-task. The signatory associations
believe that accounting for sectors and flight time in our industry segments would
be the equivalent of considering the effect of eating steak or pasta on hunger.
Take-offs and landings are an example of a workload-related time-on-task
activity, but we believe that monitoring sectors AND Flight Time will be
duplicative and problematic in a CAR 702, 703, 604 and helicopter context and
particularly in an unpredictable on-demand or seasonal environment. Limiting
Duty Time based on sectors in additional to flight time we believe, would have a
negligible positive effect on safety for our flight crews, and there is virtually no
science to support its application in our industry segments.
In response to a written question by the Working Group to Dr Belenky relating to

airline-related sector limits had this say:
Question
“Can you please provide the working group with any studies relating to the
impact of flying multiple sectors during a flight/duty time period. Also do you
have any information relating to the difference between flying a long sector (12.5
hours for example point-to-point) without a break and the same sector with a
break in between.”
Answer
“There is no current evidence. However, we are conducting just such an

experiment sponsored by the Regional Airline Association...”
A number of sector-related studies were submitted by the Labour groups

participating on the Working Group however, they universally related to two-crew
IFR airline operations, and not to the operation of smaller aircraft or single-pilot
operations.
The associations believe that the values in column one in “Intrusions on the
WOCL – IFR/VFR 702 703 604 and all Helicopter Operations” below, should
apply.
Intrusions on the WOCL – CAR 702 703 604 and all
11
Helicopter IFR/VFR Operations
START OF FDP
1 0700-1259 14:00
2 1300-1459 13:30
3 1500-1659 13:00
4 1700-1859 12:30
5 1900-2059 12:00
6 2100-2259 11:30
7 2300-0429 11:00
8 0430-0459 11.30
9 0500-0529 12:00
10 0530-0559 13:15
11 0600-0629 14:00
12 0630-0659 14:00
While the matrix above would allow access to a full 14-hour Duty Day with a FDP
start at 6am and an attendant intrusion on the WOCL, we believe that there
would be a minimal impact on safety, particularly during the summer season
when most of the activity occurs in the CAR 702, 703 and 604 industry
segments, and when wake-up times are naturally earlier.4
The signatory associations question the value of reducing the length of the Duty
Day based on an early-start intrusion on the WOCL. Doctor Belenky indicated
that the risk is at the beginning rather than at the end of the Duty Period. What’s
more, Dr. Belenky indicated that performance in and around the WOCL is
impaired to a continuously variable degree, and it is clear that performance
impairment is minimized at either extreme end of the WOCL.x
*700.56 Extension of FDP due to in-flight rest
(1) The maximum FDP value in 700.55 (1) -Table 1 - may be increased by:
(a) with one additional flight crew member: (increase for FDP through the
WOCL?)
(i) 1 / 1.5 with a curtain / 2 hours with class 3 rest facilities;
(ii) 2 / 3 hours with class 2 rest facilities;
4
Seasonal Variation in the Human Circadian Rhythm: disassociation between sleep and
the human temperature rhythm Department of Pysiology, Hokkaido School of Medicine
1992 and Seasonality in Human Sleep Hokkaido University School of Medicine 1992
12
(iii) 3 / 4 hours with class 1 rest facilities;
(b) with two additional flight crew members: (TNO / FAA numbers)
(i) 2.25 / 3 hours with class 3 rest facilities;
(ii) 3.5 / 4 hours with class 2 rest facilities;
(iii) 5 / 6 to a max FDP of 18 hours with class 1 rest facilities;
(2) The augmented FDP shall be limited to 3 sectors.
(3) The minimum opportunity for in-flight rest period shall be:
(a) for flights planned as 1 sector, a balanced or optimized division of duty

and rest between all of the flight crew members; or,
(b) for flights planned as 2 or 3 sectors:
(i) a period of 2 consecutive hours for the flight crew members

seated at the aircraft controls for the final landing; and
(ii) a period of consecutive 90 minutes for all other flight crew

members.
(4) All flight crew members shall commence their FDP at the same reporting
place if they are part of an augmented crew. However, if the first sector of the
FDP is planned at a flight time of less than 105 minutes, the augmenting flight
crew member may join the flight following the first sector. The augmenting flight
crew member shall not position on the same flight prior to augmenting. (EASA
language)
(5) At least one augmenting flight crew member shall be on the flight deck
during all takeoffs and landings.
(6) In order to determine the maximum time available for in flight rest, the air
operator shall use the phase of flight between climbing above 10,000 AAE and
15 minutes prior to the planned beginning of the descent.
(7) All the time spent in the rest facility shall be counted as FDP.
(8) The minimum rest following an augmented flight shall be at least 14 hours
at / in the suitable accommodation, whichever is the greater. (other provisions
may apply – time zone differences)
13
*720.16(4) keep it - logging of flight time
*Long-Range Flight Limitations
· When a FDP infringes on the crewmember’s WOCL and includes a sector

with a planned flight time greater than 7 hours no additional sector can be
operated after the long-range sector.
· When a FDP includes a sector with a planned flight time greater than 10
hours the maximum FDP in Table A is reduced by 1 hour.
*Ultra Long Range
ULR operations shall only be conducted under the approval of the Minister (an
approved / developing FRMS).
Present a proper risk assessment for approval.
*700.57 Unforeseen Circumstances In Actual Flight Operations —

Pilot-In-Command’s Discretion
(1) The conditions for the modification of the limits on flight duty, duty and rest
periods by the pilot-in-command in the case of unforeseen circumstances in flight
operations, shall comply with the following:
(a) The maximum daily FDP which results after applying the appropriate
Table in 700.55 (Table 1, Table 2, Table 3, or Table 4) may be increased
as follows:
(i) For un-augmented flight crews, by not more than 2 hours;
(ii) For augmented flight crews with a FDP planned with 1 sector, by
not more than 3 hours; or
(iii) For augmented flight crews with a FDP planned with 2 or 3

sectors, by not more than 2 hours;
(b) If on the final sector within an FDP that has been increased in
accordance with (a) and further unforeseen circumstances occur after
take-off, that will result in the permitted increase being exceeded, the flight
may continue to the planned destination or alternate;
(2) The pilot-in-command, in case of unforeseen circumstances, which could

lead to fatigue, may reduce the actual flight duty time and/or increase the rest
period in order to reduce any detrimental effect on flight safety.
(3) The pilot-in-command shall consult all crew members on their alertness
levels before deciding these modifications.
14
(4) The rest period following a FDP that has been increased in duration due to
unforeseen operational circumstances shall be at least as long in duration as the
increased FDP.
*700.58 Unforeseen Circumstances In Actual Flight Operations —

Short-Term Re-Planning — Pilot-In-Command’s Discretion
(1) The air operator may request a split duty period to a scheduled FDP due
to unforeseen operational circumstances.
(2) The air operator may only adjust flight crew schedules after reporting time
in the event of unforeseen circumstances.
(3) The pilot-in-command may accept the split duty or modifications to the
schedule at the pilot-in-command's discretion.
(4) The pilot-in-command shall consult all crew members on their alertness
levels before accepting the split duty or modifications to the schedule.
(5) When requesting the introduction of a split duty, the air operator shall
make the request to the pilot-in-command before the start of the break on the
ground;
*700.59 Delayed Reporting Time (CAP 371 language – ALPA/ACPA/WJ
When a crew member is informed of a delay to the reporting time due to a

changed schedule, before leaving the place of rest, the FDP shall be calculated
as follows.
When the delay is less than 4 hours, the maximum FDP allowed shall be based
on the original report time and the FDP shall start at the actual report time.
Where the delay is 4 hours or more, the maximum FDP shall be based on the
more limiting time band of the planned and the actual report time and the FDP
starts 4 hours after the original report time.
When an operator informs a crew member before leaving the place of rest of a
delay in reporting time of 10 hours or more ahead, and that crew member is not
further disturbed by the operator until a mutually agreed hour, then that elapsed
time is classed as a rest period. If, upon the resumption of duty, further delays
occur, then the appropriate criteria in this paragraph and paragraph 10.1 above
shall be applied to the re-arranged reporting time.
700.60 Flight Time and Duty Period Limitations xi
15
Cumulative Duty Hours
The associations reject any notion of cumulative duty hours as it applies to CAR
702, 703, 604 or helicopter operations. There is no support for the proposition in
the science, and little support for it in other regulatory jurisdictions.
The flight time limitations set out below should apply. There is no evidence that
they are unsafe.
700.60 Flight Time Limits
Any three consecutive days of flying totaling in excess of 24 hours increases the
rest period on the third night by two hours.
There is support for the recuperative effect of two additional hours of rest, even
after seven days of 5 hour-rest periods.5
700.61 Positioning
When an air operator assigns a flight crewmember to positioning, the following

shall apply:
(1) All of the time spent in positioning shall count as duty time;
(2) Positioning after reporting but prior to operating shall be included as part
of the FDP but shall not count as a sector;
(3) Where positioning follows a FDP, the subsequent rest period shall be as
follows:
(a) where the duration of duty period exceeds the permitted FDP, but is
less than the permitted FDP plus 3 hours, the subsequent rest period shall
be at least 12 hours. as long as the preceding duty period; or,
5
Kales et al. (1970) found that restricting sleep to 5 hours per night for 7 days, which
more closely resembles crew sleep patterns, required only a single extended night of
sleep of 10 hours for full recovery.
Found at page 21 of the Battelle report An overview of the Scientific Literature

Concerning Fatigue, Sleep and the Circadian Cycle, 1998.
16
(b) with the mutual consent of the flight crew member and the air operator,
where the duration of duty period is equal to or greater than the permitted
FDP plus 3 hours, the subsequent rest period shall be at least 14 hours.
twice as long as the preceding duty period.xii
700.62 Split Duty
For a sleep opportunity in suitable accommodation occurring during a duty period

which occurs during the hours of 1100 and 1800 local time or any part thereof,
the maximum applicable duty period can be extended hour-for-hour for up to
three hours for every hour of sleep opportunity after the first hour in suitable
accommodation at the crew member’s acclimatized local time.
The split may be interrupted, then restarted but only where the first hour is added
again.
For a sleep opportunity occurring in suitable accommodation during a duty period

which occurs between the hours of 00:00 and 05:59 local time or any part
thereof, the maximum applicable Duty Period may be extended hour-for-hour for
every hour of sleep opportunity after the first hour.
The split may be interrupted, then restarted but only where the first hour is added
again.
700.63 Standby
When assigning a flight crew member to Airport Standby, the air operator shall:
*(a) consider the flight crew member to be on standby from the time of
reporting at the aerodrome until the end of the scheduled SAP;
(b) count all time spent by a flight crew member on airport standby as FDP
duty for the calculation of cumulative duty limitations;
*(c) use the start time of the SAP as the FDP start time (left hand column
of table?) in order to establish the maximum FDP, according to the FDP
Tables, when the air operator assigns a flight crew member to a FDP
during a SAP.
*(d) provide the flight crew member with standby accommodation while
assigned to airport standby.
*(e) when the flight crew member has not been assigned to flight duty,
provide the flight crew member with a minimum rest period prior to the
next scheduled SAP or FDP.
17
(3) Other Standby (in suitable accommodation or in accommodation not
provided by the air operator)
The signatory associations believe that standby at home or in suitable

accommodation counts as duty at 50% after the first 8 hours.
When assigning a flight crew member to Other Standby, the air operator shall:
(a) not assign a flight crew member to a SAP that exceeds 18 (rather than
4) hours;
*(b) provide the flight crew member with a minimum rest period of 10
hours between SAPs;
*(c) calculate the SDP for a flight crew member as follows:
*(i) the maximum SDP for an un-augmented flight crew is 18 hours;
*(ii) the maximum SDP for a flight crew augmented with one
additional flight crew member is 20 hours; in a class 1 or 2 rest
facility
*(iii) the maximum SDP for a flight crew augmented with two
additional flight crew members is 22 hours; or, in a class 1 or 2 rest
facility
700.64 Rest Periods and Time Free From Duty
(1) Basic Minimum Rest
1 day Free From Duty must include 2 local nights
2 or more days Free From Duty – 2 or more consecutive days FFD are calendar
days, but must include a minimum of 2 local nights rest.
The FAA Final Rule, applicable to FAR 121 Operations, makes reference to three
types of fatigue:
“There are three types of fatigue: transient, cumulative, and circadian.
Transient fatigue is acute fatigue brought on by extreme sleep restriction or

extended hours awake within 1 or 2 days.
Cumulative fatigue is fatigue brought on by repeated mild sleep restriction or
18
extended hours awake across a series of days.
Circadian fatigue refers to the reduced performance during nighttime hours,

particularly during an individual’s WOCL (typically between 2:00 a.m. and 6:00
a.m.).”6
The associations believe that there is NO CUMULATIVE FATIGUE as it relates

to multiple consecutive Duty Days where there is no disruption of the Circadian
rhythm or erosion of 8 hours sleep each night.
The FAA Final Rule as it applies to FAR 121 Operations sets out:
“Scientific research and experimentation have consistently demonstrated that

Adequate sleep sustains performance. For most people, 8 hours of sleep in each
24-hour period sustains performance indefinitely.”7
The signatory Associations believe an extended tour of up-to 35 days is

sustainable under the following circumstances, assuming 8 hours of rest each
night and no disruption of the circadian rhythm:

Up to 35 days on, must be followed by 7 consecutive days off
Extended duration operations (beyond 15 days) can only be conducted on a non-

disruptive basis. To qualify as non-disruptive a crew member must have the
opportunity for 8 hours of sleep each night between the hours of 2200 and 0900
local time.
Five consecutive days free from duty will “zero” accumulated 7 and 28-day flight
times at any time.
A tour that is planned to exceed 15 consecutive days must be preceded by five

days off.
NOTE: Tours in excess of 25 days duration have a disincentive, as the time off is
in excess of the 5 days necessary to reset flight hour limitations.
*(3) Disruptive Schedules:
6
See Page 16 of the FAA Final Rule.
7
See Page 18 of the FAA Final Rule.
19
When a flight crewmember is scheduled to transition from a night duty to an early
duty or from an early duty to a night duty, the air operator shall provide the flight
crew member with one local night’s rest in between the two duties.
(Early to night, if WOCL infringement for both FDPs combined is 1 hour or less –
1 night, Greater than 1 hour WOCL infringement for both FDPs combined – 2
nights rest between FDPs. Night to early – 1 local night between FDPs)
*(4) Additional Rest for Time Zone Differences
The air operator shall provide the flight crew member with additional rest due to
time zone differences as follows:
(a) When a flight duty period ends away from home base at a location
where the local time zone differs by:
(i) 3 or 4 hours from the time zone at the location of the start of the
flight duty period, the minimum rest shall be 11 hours plus travelling
time; or,
(ii) more than 4 hours from the time zone at the location of the start
of the flight duty period, the minimum rest shall be 14 hours plus
travelling time.
(b) When a duty period ends at home base and the local time zone differs
by:
(i) 3 or 4 hours from the time zone at the location of the start of the
flight duty period and the flight crew member has been away from
home base for more than 36 consecutive hours, the minimum rest
shall be 13 hours ;
(ii) more than 4 hours and not more than 10 hours from the time
zone at the location of the start of the flight duty period and the
flight crew member has been away from home base for:
(a) more than 60 consecutive hours or the returning FDP

encroaches upon the flight crew member’s WOCL, the flight
crew member shall be provided with a minimum of 2 local
night’s rest prior to the start of the next flight duty period; or,
(b) less than 60 consecutive hours and the returning FDP

does not encroach on the flight crew member’s WOCL, the
flight crew member shall be provided with a minimum of 1
20
local night’s rest prior to the start of the next flight duty
period.
(iii) more than 10 hours from the time zone at the location of the
start of the flight duty period, the flight crew member shall be
provided with a minimum of 3 local night’s rest prior to the start of
the next flight duty period.
700.65 Consecutive duties encroaching the WOCL -- 02:00 – 05:59
(1) When an air operator schedules a flight crew member to consecutive late,
night, or early FDPs, the air operator shall, after 3 consecutive late, night, or early
FDPs, provide the flight crew member with a local night’s rest; or
(2) The air operator may schedule a flight crew member to 5 consecutive
night FDPs8 if:
(a) the FDP on the 5th consecutive night includes a split duty with a
scheduled break of a minimum duration of 4 hours; and9
(b) after 5 consecutive night FDPs, provide the flight crew member with 2
local night’s rest.
*700.66 Determining FDP Table Start Time
(1) Time Zone Differences - FDP Table application and time required to
acclimatize
(a) For the purpose of determining the FDP Table start time, the
Newfoundland time zone is considered to be included in the Atlantic time
zone. Canada will be considered to encompass 5 time zones: Pacific,
Mountain, Central, Eastern, and Atlantic.
(b) Time required to acclimatize:
(i) when the time zone difference between local time and last
acclimatized time does not exceed 4 hours, a flight crew member is
considered acclimatized to his new location or time zone when all
rest periods within a 72 consecutive hour period have occurred in
the same location or in the same time zone; or,
8
The FAA final rule allows five consecutive night FDPs.
9
We need to have a provision that would allow the PIC to waive this split for
EMS, Police, or other stand-by operations, if for example there has been little or
no flying in the previous duty period(s).
21
(ii) when the time zone difference between local time and last
acclimatized local time exceeds 4 hours, a flight crew member is
considered acclimatized to his new location or time zone when all
rest periods within a 96 consecutive hour period have occurred in
the same location or in the same time zone.
(2) For an acclimatized crewmember the maximum daily FDP is based on

start time of the FDP using local time.
(3) For a not acclimatized crewmember the maximum daily FDP is based on
start time of FDP using the last acclimatized local time.
*700.67 Nutrition
An operator shall specify in its Operations Manual how the crew member’s
nutrition during FDP is ensured.
*700.69 Controlled Rest on the Flight Deck – language to remove the

planning aspect
720.23 Controlled Rest on the Flight Deck
The standards for compliance with this section require that the air operator's
program is outlined in the company operations manual and contains the following
elements:
(1) Training
Every flight crew member who participates in the controlled rest on the flight deck
program shall have received training in the program as well as training in the
general principles of fatigue and fatigue countermeasures.
(2) Pre-flight Activities
(a) The pilot-in-command shall determine if operational considerations allow or

preclude the use of controlled rest on the flight deck based on guidelines
developed by the air operator;
(b) the flight crew members' rest periods will be planned at a pre-flight briefing to
enable them to anticipate and maximize the sleep opportunity and to manage
their alertness. If required, this briefing can occur in flight; and
(c) the briefing shall include:
22
(i) the choice of rest sequence;
(ii) planned and unplanned wake-up criteria;
(iii) transfer of control procedures; and
(iv) co-ordination with the flight attendants.
(3) Pre-rest Period
Pre-rest period activities should take approximately 5 minutes and shall include:
(a) the transfer of duties;
(b) an operational briefing;
(c) completion of physiological needs;
(d) co-ordination with the flight attendants; and
(e) time for the flight crew member preparing to rest to become comfortable in the
flight deck seat.
(amended 1998/03/23; previous version)
(4) Rest Period
(a) Only one flight crew member at a time shall rest and the other flight crew
member(s) shall remain alert. An alertness monitor may be considered as a
back-up system;
(b) The resting flight crew member's duties shall be completed by the non-resting
flight crew member(s);
(c) All flight crew members shall remain on the flight deck throughout the rest
period;
(d) Each rest period shall be limited to a maximum of 45 minutes to avoid sleep
inertia when the flight crew member is awakened;
(e) Rest periods shall occur only during the cruise phase of the flight and shall be
completed at least 30 minutes before planned top of descent, workload
permitting; and
23
(f) If required, more than one sleep opportunity may be taken by the flight crew
members.
(5) Post-rest Period
(a) Unless required due to an abnormal or emergency situation, at least 15

minutes without any flight duties should be provided to the awakened flight crew
member to allow sufficient time to become fully awake before resuming normal
duties; and
(b) an operational briefing shall be given to the awakened flight crew member.
*Heli-Logging Operations - Flight Time Limitations & Time Free from Duty
For two-pilot Heli-logging operations, three consecutive flying days totaling in

excess of 27 hours would require a two-hour increase in the rest period on the
third night.
Flight crew members using this rule would require 6 days off in 14 or 13 days off
in 28.
The signatory associations representing fixed-wing CAR 704 and 705 operations
see no reason why the proposed limits set out herein should not apply to these
operations.
24
i
‘Home base’ means the location nominated by the operator to the crew member
from where the crew member normally starts and ends a duty period or a series
of duty periods and where, under normal circumstances, the operator is not
responsible for the accommodation of the crew member concerned.
The associations disagree that we need the foregoing provision. The current
regulations provide that 8 hours of rest needs to be protected, and we are
moving to a system that will protect 10 hours free from duty and a requirement to
ensure that 8 hours opportunity for rest is provided during that period. This is
consistent with the FAA final rule for part 121 Operations at page 15.
There was some suggestion on the Working Group that there should be 10 hours
free from duty plus travel where the operator provides the accommodation, and
10 hours free from duty plus travel to a maximum of 11 or 12 hours at the flight
crew members home base. The associations oppose this distinction. As
discussed in the Working Group, to suggest that the operator must differentially
accommodate the commuting time of each employee at home, and adjust the
Duty Day downwards accordingly is unenforceable, unmanageable, and places
an unreasonable burden on the operator to accommodate different duty day
periods for different employees based on their commute when at home.
ii
The Associations believe that the change from 22:30 to 07:30 to 23:00 to 06:00
captures the normal variability of individual sleep patterns for a local night’s rest,
avoids an intrusion on the WOCL, and still allows for an earlier start to the
following FDP.
iii
The Working Group left open the Applicability of sector-based limitations to the
FDP. The Associations believe that sector-related limitations should not apply to
CAR 702 or 703, 604, or helicopter operations.
While there is some limited sector-related fatigue research for IFR operations in
the airline community, there is no sector-related research that touches on
helicopters or fixed-wing Air Taxi operations or business aviation operations.
What’s more, VFR Air Taxi operations and particularly float and helicopter
operations are characterized by multiple sectors in any given duty period.
Furthermore, flight-training operations which by-their-nature can include many
take-offs and landings should be excluded from any sector-related limitation.
The associations believe that while the effect of workload is relevant to the
accumulation of fatigue, there are other related factors that influence fatigue,
including duty time and flight time that act as an effective proxy for workload, and
those limitations also substantially mitigate workload-related fatigue. A sector
limit adds little to the flight time and duty time limits that already exist in the
25
CARs, and the cumulative effect of limiting sectors and duty time and flight time
is oppressive and unnecessary.
iv
Minimum rest periods are meant to eliminate fatigue created by long Duty
Days.
v
This should be in Guidance Material.
vi
The signatory associations believe that this requirement is impractical in a pilot
self-dispatch environment unless the requirement is incorporated in OFP in the
COM.
vii
The signatory Associations believe that the air operator has no authority to
demand this information from the flight crew member unless the Minister compels
the crew member to provide it. It follows that it should be the responsibility of the
crew member to provide this information to the operator.
viii
The associations believe that the section which follows is too complicated and
cumbersome for CAR 702 703 604 and helicopter operators.
700.52 Prescriptive Fatigue Management Documentation Too

complicated for small operators
(1) An air operator shall document the policies and procedures required for
compliance with the applicable prescriptive limitations.
(2) An air operator shall nominate a home base for each flight crew member.
(3) Flight Duty Period (FDP)
(a) The air operator shall establish procedures specifying how the pilot-in-
command shall — in case of special circumstances which could lead to
fatigue, and after consultation with the crew members affected — reduce
the actual FDP and/or increase the rest period in order to eliminate any
detrimental effect on flight safety.
(b) The air operator shall establish procedures specifying how the pilot-in-
command shall — in case of unforeseen operational circumstances which
could lead to fatigue, and after consultation with the crew members
affected, increase the actual FDP in order to manage any detrimental
effect on flight safety.
(c) The air operator shall require the pilot-in-command to submit a report
whenever an FDP is increased beyond the maximum at his/her discretion,
in actual operation.
26
(d) The air operator shall notify the Minister of an FDP that exceeds the
maximum FDP by more than 1 hour as soon as practicable.
(e) In scheduled air operations, the air operator shall review all increases
beyond the maximum FDP to determine the percentage of FDPs that
increase beyond the maximum FDP.OK with comment
The signatory Associations believe that in an SMS environment, the air
operator should be responsible for recording and tracking the
exceedences and taking the necessary corrective action to ensure that
they do not re-occur.
(f) The air operator shall adjust the schedule within 56 days where any
FDP that is shown to actually increase beyond the maximum FDP more
than 10 percent of the time in any period of 28 consecutive
days.[Schedule realism part – sampling - ???]
(g) The air operator shall document in the prescriptive fatigue
management documentation the requirements in 700.53 to 700.XX, ,
where applicable to the type of operation:
(i) Maximum basic daily FDP;
(ii) Reductions of the maximum basic daily FDP dependent on the

number of sectors flown; (6 yes / 4 no / 1 n/a - )
The associations believe that a sector-based reduction in the basic daily FDP is
unnecessary for CAR 702, 703, 604 and all helicopter operations.
(iii) Reductions of the maximum basic daily FDP when this FDP
would start, end or encompass the WOCL;
(iv) Conditions for planned extensions of the maximum basic daily

FDP, taking into account:
(a) the number of sectors flown,
(b) FDPs within the WOCL,
(c) a maximum number of extensions for a consecutive

number of days,
(d) break periods on ground during a single FDP - split duty,
(e) the requirement for rest prior to the FDP
27
(f) the augmentation of the basic flight crew,
(g) the type of in-flight rest facilities, and
(h) the minimum duration of in-flight rest allocated to each

flight crew member;
The associations do not support the need for planned extensions if

there is a 14-hour Duty Day.
(v) Conditions under which the FDP, the flight times and duty
periods may be exceeded by the pilot-in-command after
consultation with all crew members, in the case of unforeseen
circumstances in flight operations after the reporting time, and the
procedures used to report these modifications.
ix
Q: Does the science support a schedule of 14 hours of work followed by 10
hours for rest - over a period of one, two, or three weeks? What maximum duty
period and corresponding rest period, day after day, over an extended time does
the science support?
A: The science does support 14 hours on and 10 hours off, if, the 10 hours off is
adequate for the person to obtain 7-8 hours of actual sleep. That said, we
understand very little about cumulative fatigue over weeks, months, and years.
Most cultures favor one or two days off in 7 days. If you are doing nothing else,
for example you are a deployed soldier, a submariner, or working on an oil rig for
two weeks straight then you can manage for long periods (weeks) with 12 hours
on duty and 12 hours off duty. Having days off would change this equation and
allow for longer duty periods, for example, the 14 on 10 off schedule you
mention.
x
… The so-called window of circadian low (WOCL) is a set of “bright” lines that bracket
the low point in body temperature. How these are set is essentially arbitrary. It is not
very useful to speak of infringement into the WOCL, as if say, one was safe at 0300 but
unsafe at 0301. The circadian rhythm is a sinusoidal curve continuously changing across
the 24 hours. Performance in (and around) the WOCL is impaired but to a continuously
variable degree. The performance problem, if one is starting work in the WOCL, is at the
beginning not the end of the flight. Thus, reducing the duration of the duty period does as
the problem is at the beginning of the duty period. The only thing that works is [to] shift
the duty period to a later start time.”
Doctor Belenky went on to say that you can obtain 8 hours rest and get up at 5am, in
response to the question:
28
Q: What is the earliest one can plan to wake a person up and still achieve 8 hours of
sleep?
A: This should be considered in relation to normal wake time and hence characteristic
for the individual person circadian phase angle. It is difficult to go to sleep much earlier
than an hour prior to one’s normal (preferred) bedtime. Therefore, for example, a person
who normally goes to sleep at 2200 hours would probably be able to fall asleep an hour
earlier at 2100 hours. Adding 8 hours to 2100 h give 0500 h. So, if a person’s normal
waking sleep interval was 2200 h to 0600 h, the earliest you could wake this person up
and expect he or she to, with conscientious effort , achieve 8 hours of sleep is 0500 h.
xi
(1) The total duration of duty periods to which a flight crew member is
assigned shall not exceed:
(a) 60/64/65 duty hours in any 7 consecutive days; (55 – 60 world

average)
(b) xx hours in any 14 consecutive days;
(b) 190/192/200? duty hours in any 28 consecutive days; and,.
(c) 1928 duty hours in any 365 consecutive days.
(2) The total flight time of the flights on which an individual flight crew member
is assigned as an operating crew member shall not exceed:
(a) 100 / 112 / 120 flight hours in any 28 consecutive days; and
(discussion - seasonality)
(b) 1000 flight hours in any 365 consecutive days.
xii
In (3) (a) and (b), the Associations see no reason why the rest period should
be as long or twice as long as the preceding duty period. If the intent is to provide
compensatory rest for an extended Duty Period, then the flight crew member
should get an additional hour of rest for every hour in excess of the permitted
FDP to a maximum of three hours. No one could possibly use 36 hours to
recover from an 18 hour Duty Period for example. This requirement would also
be very difficult for the operator to track in a pilot self-dispatch environment.
29
July 29, 2011
Martin Eley,
Director General Civil Aviation
Transport Canada
Tower C - 330 Sparks Street
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
K1A 0N5
Dear Mr. Eley:
CBAA, HAC, MAC, ATAC and NATA have been represented on the Flight Crew Fatigue
Management Working Group since its inception over one year ago. We have devoted two or
three days each month to the deliberations, and we appreciate their importance both from a
safety and economic perspective.
Our five associations have shared concerns over the direction the deliberations of the Working
Group have taken. We believe that these problems are partly attributable to deficiencies in the
Terms of Reference (attached) that have only become apparent during the course of the group’s
deliberations.
The signatory associations have made two written submissions (dated March 9, 2011 and June
17, 2011, attached) to the Working Group Co-Chairs in an effort to resolve some of these
concerns. However, we now believe that our concerns can only be addressed through
amendments to Working Group’s Terms of Reference and/or clear written direction to the
Working Group’s Chairs.
Our most recent submission was precipitated by an email to the Working Group dated June 4,
2011, however, our concerns originated from the discretion that the Chairs have been
exercising inside the existing Terms of Reference. We would like to propose the following
amendments and suggestions for your consideration. The signatory associations believe that
the following proposals are entirely consistent with, and support, the objects of the Cabinet
Directive on Streamlining Regulation.
1. The Working Group should strive to ensure that science-based fatigue-related issues
that apply to all industry segments are addressed in the Working Group’s
recommendations for regulatory change on an industry segment-specific basis to
ensure that the common fatigue-related issue is addressed, but in a way that does not
unnecessarily constrain the affected industry segment or compromise its economic
position.
2. Where issues are addressed in the absence of a clear scientific rationale, and are
based instead on operational experience, the Working Group should take particular
care to ensure that those regulatory solutions are applied only to those industry
segments with shared operational experience.
3. The signatory associations believe that Transport Canada should be removed as a

Working Group member and instead those same individuals should be made available
to the Working Group for technical advice at the request of the Working Group.
Transport Canada’s role as a Working Group member is inconsistent with CARAC’s
consultative purpose. The signatory associations believe that their participation on this
basis, given the practice of the Chairs to “vote each issue”, has blurred the distinction
between Transport Canada’s role as the decision-maker and its role as a Working
Group member.
4. The Working Group has virtually completed its discussion of the “Common” fatigue-
related issues supported by the science that should be addressed in the regulations by
all industry segments. The Working Group Chairs should be directed to provide a
complete list of those issues to all Working Group members so that the signatory
associations can prepare and consult proposals of their own with their constituents that
will address those science-based fatigue-related concerns. We believe that a near-
complete list of those common issues supported by the science can be found at page
two of our March 9, 2011 written submission.
5. Finally, the signatory associations would like to urge you to amend the Terms of
Reference to allow the CAR 705 community to complete their deliberations in Plenary
so that we may all continue to participate, and to table their report to the Technical
Committee before inviting other industry segments to resume their deliberations. The
signatory associations appreciate the importance of our involvement in those airline-
specific discussions and the effect that the issues under discussion there could have on
us. Given that the CAR 705 issues under discussion, as they apply to other industry
segments, would still need to be considered in light of the supporting fatigue-related
science and relevant operational experience, we believe that other industry segments
could still benefit from those discussions.
We would be pleased to discuss these issues with you at your convenience.
Sincerely,
[Sam Barone]
Merlin Preuss, Vice-President Government & Regulatory Affairs

For Sam Barone, President & CEO
Canadian Business Aviation Association
John McKenna, President & CEO

Air Transport Association of Canada
Stephen Nourse, Executive Director
Northern Air Transport Association of Canada
Dennis Lyons, President

Manitoba Aviation Council
Fred L. Jones, President & CEO

Helicopter Association of Canada
Cc Jacqueline Booth-Boudreau, Transport Canada

Dan Adamus, ALPA
Joint Submission from CBAA, HAC, MAC, ATAC and NATA to the
Co-Chairs of the Flight Crew Fatigue Management Working Group
June 17 2011
Dan & Jackie:
The five associations that are signatories to this submission have grave concerns
with the deliberations of the Flight Crew Fatigue Management Working Group
and the email below, sent by the Chairs.
Our concerns are as follows:
A. The most charitable interpretation of the Chairs’ comments in the email below
is that they simply do not understand the effect that applying the draft regulatory
framework and supporting tables to all certificates would have. The suggestion
that the application of tables, based on large scheduled international operations,
should apply to all operators of all types is a clear indication that the Chairs
simply do not have a grasp of the implications of their statement, or the function
of the Working Group, or of their role as Chairs.
B. The suggestion that the Chairs “reject the notion that different sectors of the
industry are so different that the rules should be written differently for each
sector” indicates that they believe “one size fits all”. The solutions that the
Working Group should strive to find, are solutions that mitigate the fatigue-related
problem under discussion but accommodate the needs of each industry
segment. To suggest otherwise could sacrifice the economic viability of one or
more industry segments for the sake of simplicity – a proposition that the
signatory associations adamantly oppose. To suggest that everyone in the
regulated air carrier community should adopt the Large Scheduled International
regime for Flight & Duty Time Limits would drive the whole industry to accept the
cost structure of those carriers. ANY regulatory solution should fit the regulated
community.
C. Many of the issues being presented in the draft regulatory framework are
without support in fatigue-related science and are being discussed by agreement
between the NACC and their unions. The resulting solutions are then being
forced on other industry segments. The rest of the industry simply should not
have those specific agreements forced on them, even where there IS scientific
support for the fatigue-related issue under discussion. Other dynamics in the
relationship that exist between NACC members and their unions can drive these
agreements, which are largely irrelevant to other segments of the regulated
community.
D. The Chairs should provide the signatory associations with a written response
1
to their joint submission dated March 9 2011, so that the signatory associations
can determine if it is in the best interests of their constituents to continue
participating in the Working Group’s deliberations.
E. The list of non-common elements identified in the email below is incomplete

and does not reflect the additional items under discussion by the Working Group
which are uncontemplated by the Working Group’s Terms of Reference. There
are other items that are “non-common”, including the concept of Cumulative Duty
Hours, which has no foundation in the science; changes to the maximum 14-hour
Duty Day that have no support in the science; and sector-limits which have no
applicability to VFR helicopter or VFR fixed-wing operations, to name only a few.
Simply put, there is no supporting science and there is no consensus to move
forward with them as regulations of general application.
Finally, the signatory associations note that the Terms of Reference set out: “This
Working Group will have 12 months from the date the Terms of Reference are
signed to complete the project. After that time, the Working Group may continue
if the Technical Committee agrees to the extension.” The signatory Associations
do not agree to holding any further meetings until the Terms of Reference have
been reconsidered by the Technical Committee and that body agrees to extend
the deliberations. Our continued participation in this process will depend on the
willingness of the Technical Committee to amend the Terms of Reference. The
deliberations of the Working Group as currently constituted have revealed that
there are some fundamental flaws and gaps in the existing Terms of Reference
that are distorting the debate currently taking place and have resulted in
misunderstandings which have called the value of the Working Group in to
question.
We would like to use the September Technical Committee meeting to propose

changes to the Terms of Reference. We offer up these items for addition to the
September CARAC meeting Agenda:
i) The Working Group should strive to find industry segment-specific solutions

that address fatigue-related issues supported by the science in a way that will not
unduly compromise the economic position of those industry segments. The
discussions at the Working Group and the terms of the email below have
revealed a bias on the part of the Working Group Chairs to craft proposals that
do not address industry-specific solutions but instead cater to the views of the
unions and the largest scheduled international carriers in the process.
ii) Debate relating to all but CAR 705 Fixed-Wing Operations should be
suspended until Labour and the CAR 705 operators have tabled a final report. No
elements of the report should be applicable to other industry segments without
also engaging other industry segments in a discussion of the issues.
iii) Large scheduled international carrier-specific solutions to fatigue-related
2
issues should not be forced on other industry segments. Even where the issue is
supported by the science, the WG should strive to find industry segment-specific
solutions. The Chairs have adopted a completely different approach.
iv) Transport Canada should be removed as an official Working Group

member, since ultimately the Minister will make a decision on the issues under
consideration. Transport Canada’s role should be to facilitate the discussion, and
to provide assistance to the Working Group when requested. There should be a
discussion of the role and function of Transport Canada Working Group
members at the Technical Committee level. Some statements by current
Transport Canada Working Group members suggest that the Minister has
already formulated a position on some of the issues under discussion. Those
statements are inconsistent with the consultation process and the Terms of
Reference for the Working Group.
v) The Working Group must not harmonize to the terms of any DRAFT
proposal (EASA, ICAO, or the FAA) unless there is a consensus among all
affected members.
vi) A review of the Chairmanship of the Working Group in light of the large
scheduled international carrier-specific bias issues we have raised.
vii) Any discussion of FRMS should be removed from the Terms of Reference
until the prescriptive “baseline” rules have been addressed. There is little
confidence from the signatory associations that Transport Canada will devote the
necessary resources to address the needs of all operators in an FRMS, and
there is every reason to believe that Transport Canada will be incapable of
devoting the necessary resources to engage with industry when exceptional
variations to the prescriptive rules require the involvement of Departmental staff.
viii) Other amendments that may arise through discussions between now and
the September CARAC meeting.
The signatory associations are prepared to work with Transport Canada to

discuss the proposed amendments.
3
Email to Working Group Members dated June 4 2011:
From: Dan Adamus <dan.adamus@alpa.org>

Date: Sat, 4 Jun 2011 05:31:01 -0700
To: "Laurence, Mark" <mark.laurence@tc.gc.ca>, Bil Boucher ATAC
<bboucher@atac.ca>, "Booth, Jacqueline" <jacqueline.booth@tc.gc.ca>, Dan
Glass - WestJet <dglass@westjet.com>, Dennis Lyons - MAC
<faprm@flyfastair.com>, Doug Tweedlie ACPA <dtweedlie@acpa.ca>, Fred
Jones <fred.jones@h-a-c.ca>, "Gauthier, Martin, Canadian FTDT Chairman"
<Martin.Gauthier@alpa.org>, Merlin Preuss CBAA <mpreuss@cbaa.ca>, Michel
Chiasson - Air Canada <Michel.Chiasson@aircanada.ca>, Phil Benson
Teamsters <pbenson@teamsters-canada.org>, Stephen Nourse NATA
<exec@nata-yzf.ca>
Cc: "Ogilvie, Al, Ottawa" <Al.Ogilvie@alpa.org>, Bary Wisznioski
<BWisznioski@acpa.ca>, BC Campbell <BC_campbell@skyservice.com>, Bruce
Flodstedt <bflodstedt@westjet.com>, Clement Campeau
<CCampeau@flysunwing.com>, Duff Sullican <duff.sullivan@navcanada.ca>,
"Freeman, Robert" <robert.freeman@tc.gc.ca>, Greg Richardson
<g.g.rich@gmail.com>, Jacques Mignault <jmignault@airtransat.com>, Jay
Musselman <jay.musselman@aircanada.ca>, John Murphy
<jmurphy@firstair.ca>, Julie Pelletier <j.pelletier@accomponent.ca>, Len
Giacomelli <len.giacomelli@scotiabank.com>, Matthew Collins
<mcollins@cougar.ca>, Murtaza Mohamedbhai <MMohamedbhai@acpa.ca>,
Paul Steeves <paul.steeves@flyjazz.ca>, Paul Strachan <PStrachan@acpa.ca>,
Percy Wadia <pdwadia@powergate.ca>, Remi Joly <remi.joly@navcanada.ca>,
Richard Balnis <rbalnis@cupe.ca>, Trevor Beattie <Trevor.Beattie@flyjazz.ca>,
"Zahody, Douglas" <douglas.zahody@tc.gc.ca>, "Premachuk, Kristina"
<kristina.premachuk@tc.gc.ca>
Subject: Non Common Elements
Working Group members:
We have completed a thorough review of the draft regulatory framework in order

to compile a list of exceptions to the definition of common. The list of non-
common provisions is as follows:
Non-Common
‘Augmented flight crew’
‘Eastward-Westward and Westward-Eastward transition’
‘Extension of FDP due to in-flight rest’
‘In flight Rest facility’
‘Ultra long range operations (ULR)’
4
In our analysis of the draft we used the science (as detailed in the articles
provided to all working group members), Dr Belenky’s presentation and
comments and the discussion as per the previous meetings minutes. We find
that, with the exception of the preceding list, the framework applies to all
operators.
It should be noted that we worked through each individual provision of the draft in
order to determine common and non-common elements. With the exception of
the elements listed in the “non-common” list, we could not put forward an
argument as to why the draft and supporting tables shouldn’t apply to all
Certificates. Even in the helicopter environment there are scheduled flights,
multiple sectors flown, standby, as well as in some cases positioning overseas
(e.g. CHC).
In addition, we considered the arguments put forward in respect to the

application (or non-application) of the draft regulations to specific sectors of the
industry. While we acknowledge there may be different ways to interpret the
requirements, we reject the notion that different sectors of the industry are so
different that the rules should be written differently for each sector.
We would ask Working Group members to keep in mind that the prescriptive
requirements will also be accompanied by FRMS and hybrid FRMS. We believe
nuances such as the difference in commute between small town airports versus
large city airport can be dealt with through an FRMS provision. Additionally,
operators choosing not to follow a prescriptive FDT regime will have the option of
implementing a FRMS. However, we contend that the prescriptive scheme is
required to establish a baseline for the acceptable level of safety in respect to
flight and duty times.
Jacqueline/Dan
Captain Dan Adamus

Air Line Pilots Association Intl.
Bus +1 613 569 5668 X6225
Cell +1 613 293 0882
dan.adamus@alpa.org
5
Submission by HAC, NATA, ATAC and CBAA to the Co-Chairs of the
Fatigue Working Group
March 9 2011
HAC, NATA, ATAC and CBAA have been participating in the Fatigue Working
Group since its inception.
The work of the group has been predicated on the assumption that both large
and small operator-representatives would stay in plenary and discuss the
foundational elements of the regulations which captured the needs of flight crews
at all levels of the commercial aviation community, and only then proceed to
break-out groups when those discussions had been exhausted. The intent was
also to avoid forcing large carriers to endure a discussion of heli-logging and to
avoid forcing fixed-wing Air Taxi operators to endure a discussion of long range
operations, for example.
It was also agreed that the group would focus on the science as the cornerstone
of our discussions – but only on science that was first vetted by Dr. Belenky. In
Toronto, the group voted on this issue, and it was decided that this would avoid
the “dueling scientist” problems that previous working groups on this subject
have encountered. What’s more, there was agreement that since Dr. Belenky
was in a position to evaluate credible research in the fatigue domain, he could
ensure that the group only considered science, rather than science fiction on this
subject.
There is a misconception by some members of the Working Group that it should

fall to working group members who support the status quo on one or more
elements of the existing CARs, that they must produce science in support of
those rules – otherwise they should fall in favour of new rules. The signatory
associations disagree with this proposition. We believe that if there IS credible
science which suggests that the rules are outdated or do not reflect the current
state of scientific research, the onus must be on the Working Group member(s)
to present that science - only then should there be discussion of alternatives to
the status quo. In the absence of any credible science to support a change, the
rules must remain as they currently exist unless the group can otherwise find
consensus to make a particular change. The Working Group Chairs need to
provide clear direction to the Working Group on this subject.
The Working Group decided to use the EASA document as a “template” for a
new regulatory structure for the CARs. Because the report was a set of
recommendations-only from the European community, and because the report
ONLY related to fixed-wing Airline carriers there was agreement NOT to use the
numbers or even the concepts contained in the report without independent
support from the scientific literature. Furthermore, there was also agreement to
1
use the concepts contained therein only insofar as they were supported by the
science endorsed by Dr. Belenky.
The signatory associations believe that the Working Group has strayed well
beyond its stated objectives.
The foundational or common elements of the regulations which can apply across
all industry-segments and supported by the science extend only to a very few
areas of our regulatory structure under discussion. The Working Group in plenary
has strayed beyond the accepted science or beyond the elements of the
regulations which apply to all segments of the regulated community, or both. It is
the opinion of the signatory associations, that there are a very few issues under
discussion by the group so-far which meeting this criteria. They are:
1. Minimum Rest
2. Intrusions on the WOCL
3. Split Duty and the recuperative benefits of less than four hours rest during
a Duty Period
4. The fatiguing effect (or lack thereof) of Stand-by or Reserve Duty
5. The recuperative effect of a few days off as it relates to “zeroing”
accumulated flight time-related fatigue
6. The need for a minimum addition to the minimum rest period of eight
hours to contemplate meals, personal hygiene, etc. (by consensus)
7. The ability of flight crews to work multiple consecutive duty-days without
erosion of the minimum rest, and without any attendant erosion of
performance (McCauley)
8. Operations involving disruptions of the circadian rhythm
Issues that are unsupported by the science can only be discussed on the basis of
operational experience. The signatory Associations have no objection to the
discussion of these issues on this basis but the Working Group members should
acknowledge that these discussions should be industry segment-specific and
that they will hinge on soft science and “horse trading” and can only proceed on
the basis of a consensus. Discussions by the group of issues falling in to this
class will naturally rely on industry-specific anecdotal and operational experience
that does not easily translate to other industry segments. The signatory
Associations challenge the Working Group Chairs to ensure that each
recommendation for change in the Working Group report is supported by
approved science (and cited) or by the consensus of all affected segments of the
commercial aviation community (Unions and Operators).
There are a number of issues under discussion in plenary by the Working Group
currently which are either unsupported by science, or they do not straddle all
industry segments, or both:
a. Sector-limits (inapplicable to helicopters and unsupported by the science)
2
b. Cumulative Duty Hours (unsupported by the science)
c. The concept of “cumulative fatigue” (unsupported by the science) except
insofar as regular intrusions on the 8 hours minimum rest period are
concerned
d. Changes to the maximum 14-hour Duty Day under circumstances where
the flight crew member has a normal opportunity to obtain 8 hours rest
(unsupported by the science)
CBAA, HAC, NATA and ATAC have waited for six meetings for the opportunity to
discuss fatigue-related issues as they relate to CAR 702, 703, 604 and
Unscheduled or VFR 704 Operations and to all helicopters. We are concerned
as our deadline looms that we are going to have to compress those discussions
in to a small portion of the remaining few WG meetings and furthermore, that we
may be prevented from discussing those issues which have already been
canvassed in plenary outside the science or without regard to specific industry
circumstances, including items a. through d., above.
We need the opportunity to discuss the applicability of these issues to the CAR
702, 703, 604 and Unscheduled or VFR 704 Operations and to all helicopters
and to find a solution that fits our industry segments. Our industry simply cannot
accommodate airline-type solutions to the issues that are under discussion in the
scheduled CAR 705 sub-group, and we should have an opportunity to discuss
these issues in the context of our Canadian business model.
The signatory associations also agree that the driving force for the formation of
the Working Group were issues relating to the scheduled airlines and in some
ways the other included segments of the aviation community were caught in the
vortex of this issue. Both the EASA Report and the FAA NPRM started out with
similar intentions to capture large and small commercial operations in their
discussions and ultimately arrived at the conclusion that is a complex issue and
the solutions are necessarily industry segment-specific. Both reports only
contemplate airline-type operations. Even ICAO’s Standards deal only with
international scheduled operations.
The CAR 705 sub-group and their unions appear to be making good progress on
the issues under discussion there, but the signatory associations object to many
of the solutions under discussion being forced on other industry segments where
they simply do not fit and many of them are the product of negotiations and are
simply inconsistent with the established science. If the solutions that are under
discussion in that group are driven to other segments of the industry, they will
have a catastrophic effect on our operations without any enhancement to the
fatigue-related issues facing our flight crews.
Transport Canada should focus on the scheduled airline segment of the

community and return to deal with other stakeholders when it has the time and
inclination to deal with our issues in a meaningful way. Two other regulatory
3
jurisdictions have come to this conclusion and the signatory associations urge
the same strategy on Transport Canada. Other members of the working group
including NACC have supported this proposition. The views of the signatory
associations as they relate to CAR 702, 703, 604 and Unscheduled or VFR 704
Operations and to all helicopters serve only to obstruct and delay discussions
relating to airline operations on what is already a very tight time-line for the
completion of the Working Group report.
The signatory Associations believe that if Transport Canada insists on

proceeding with discussions which affect CAR 702, 703, 604 and Unscheduled
or VFR 704 Operations and to all helicopters, then in plenary the WG needs to
have a discussion of the sub-groups and how they should be constituted,
including Terms of Reference and a clear definition of who will be captured by
those discussions. A CAR 704/705 sub-committee for example simply cannot
deal with the diversity and complexity of operations in the Canadian industry and
one-size-does-not-fit-all.
[Original Signed by]
Stephen Nourse
Executive Director NATA
Art Laflamme
Special Advisor to CBAA
Bill Boucher
ATAC Vice President Operations
Fred Jones
HAC President & CEO
4
September 04, 2012
RE: Comments: Final Report Fatigue Management Working Group
Jacqueline and Dan,
In reviewing the “Final Report Fatigue Management Working Group” we have a few
comments to address our concerns with the final document.
Definitions:
Fit for duty means that the crew member is not suffering from fatigue or likely to suffer
from fatigue, under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or mentally or physically impaired
in any way that would impair their ability to safely operate an aircraft or perform safety
related duties for the duration of the planned flight duty period.
Comment: Crewmembers are to report fit for duty, which is their responsibility; there is
no ambiguity in their responsibility. In the definition we are introducing subjectivity with
the “likely to suffer from fatigue”, which may lead to abuse with the subjectivity.
FDP table start time: means the local time at the flight crew member’s designated
home base or at the location where the flight crew member becomes acclimatized and
is the time of day used to determine the maximum permitted FDP from the FDP Table.
Comment: Adds more clarity, ensuring that a crewmember is either starting at home
base at the beginning of their FDP or following a series of FDPs.
3.0 Air Operator Responsibilities
Comment: The current proposed language on schedule reliability remains too

onerous on the carrier; we have proposed language below that we believe is a
fair compromise. It will require the addition of two simple definitions:
Equivalent Seasons: consecutive summer season (two summers) or
consecutive winter seasons (two winters) as opposed to two consecutive
seasons (a summer and a winter season).
Season: the summer season commencing on the last Sunday in March, or the
winter season commencing on the last Sunday in October.
Proposed Text
• collect actual flight time / flight duty time data necessary to support the
planning of flight operations;
• change a schedule or crewing arrangements when: the planning for a
given FDP or flight time is found to be unrealistic the operator must make
the adjustment within 28 days (or for the next equivalent season for flights
requiring a crewing adjustment ) following the discovery.
• report adjustments made to comply with schedule reliability to TC within
two months of identifying the unreliable schedule.
• use all available data to plan realistic flight times and flight duty periods.
Note 1: Planning is considered unrealistic when the maximum FDP or

flight time is exceeded more than 20% of the time using a sampling of 20
events or a consecutive 56 day period (within the current season for
operations that schedule their flights on a seasonal basis); the operator
may choose which sampling.
Note 2: Flight time and FDP in this section refer to average sector
flight time and FDP maximums shown in Table 1 in Section 8.
Comment: We cannot support the use of the sector matrix as proposed in

the current document; once again there is absolutely no scientific basis to
this particular matrix on sectors, nor is there any jurisdiction or state
contemplating such a convoluted definition of sectors. We need to be
more in line with other state matrixes outlining number of sectors.
I reiterate: “there is no scientific basis for the introduction in the FDP

matrix of “Average Sector Flight Times”.
While we acknowledge that sectors do have an impact on fatigue,

fundamentally we believe we should stay within the parameters currently
used by other states and believe that the FDP should only be reduced
after the fourth sector.
Table 1 - Maximum Daily FDP
Columns
A B C D E
Average Sector Number of Sectors
Flight Time
> 50 minutes 1-3 4 5 6 7+
30 to 50 minutes 1-5 6-7 8-9 10-11 12+
< 30 minutes 1-8 9-11 12-14 15-17 18+
9.0 Planned Extensions to the Daily FDP
Comment: We fundamentally disagree with your statement and will continue to

promote the safe use of planned extensions, they have a place within the NPA.
In our submission we carefully used scientific impute to ensure fatigue was

mitigated. The NACC’s conviction is that there must be a facility within the
prescriptive rules to allow for a planned (scheduled) extension or two within a
seven day period which is unequivocally within a safe benchmark of fatigue.
Our position remains that there must guidelines introduced into the prescriptive
regulation allowing for limited use of extensions. We will continue to pursue this
up to and including CARAC.
20.0 Standby
Comment: We believe that there needs to be a robust set of guidance material

for Standby and that it clearly outlines that set of examples for the crewmember
and operator. We agreed that the SAP and the assigned FDP once a flight has
been assigned is not cumulative, but the words within the draft document
remains unclear on this subject.
21.0 Rest Periods
where the air operator provides a suitable accommodation to the flight crew at
home base, the away from home base provision may be applied (10 hours in the
suitable accommodation); and,
where the duration of duty period exceeds the permitted maximum FDP plus 1
hour (with the exception of positioning), the subsequent rest period shall be at
least as long as the preceding duty period.
Comment: Should it not simply be 11 hours in a suitable accommodation, as

opposed to 14 hours (currently 13+1), the intent is not to have a crew sitting
around a hotel waiting to return to work but simply to allow for some added rest,
or 13 hours if at home base.
25.0 Consecutive Duties Infringing on the WOCL
Comment: We have not changed our position on this section and will continue
to pursue this with agencies and our professional pilots associations.
We remain steadfast in our assertion that a split duty can safely be operated on a
fourth and fifth consecutive infringement on the WOCL safely as the
crewmembers are getting rest “behind the door” enabling them to complete the
4th and 5th FDPs safely.
In closing the NACC will continue to work with our industry colleagues, professional pilot
associations and agencies over the next two months prior to CARAC to seek
consensus.
We will bring all of our remaining concerns to CARAC in November.
The NACC must acknowledge the work of the Chairs in their leadership working
together with industry, the scientific community and labour representatives; thought the
final document does not represent unanimous consensus, in our view it has afforded
our 705 operators the opportunity to explore and express our concerns and better
understand the science as well as our colleagues various points of view, for that we
must thank you.
We are committed to continued work with industry, Transport Canada, professional pilot
associations and agencies to ensure our constituency the traveling public interests are
well served and the final NPA reflects ICAO’s SARPs.
Should you have any questions, please feel free to contact me. Can you please advise
what is the two day format planned for the special CARAC meeting in November and
agenda as soon as possible.
It is our assumption that we will see the final draft recommendations and WG member
submissions well before CARAC.
Respectfully,
Captain Michel G. Chiasson

FDT Working Group NACC Spokesperson,
Submission to the Co-Chairs
Re: The Report
21 August 2012
Jacqueline & Dan,
I believe that the recommendations made in the Report are on the whole balanced and
if adopted would result in a significant improvement in aviation safety in Canada. As the
current Flight Time and Flight Duty Time Limitations and Rest Periods of the CARs are
the responsibility of Commercial Flight Standards, I sought and received the
concurrence for this submission from those directly involved: specifically Georges
Lagacé (Airline Standards) and Rob Freeman (Rotorcraft Standards & Air Taxi and
Commuter Standards).
When I was Canada’s representative on the International Civil Aviation Organization’s

Operations Panel, the membership of the Panel articulated their concerns over
Canada’s flight and duty time scheme to me. It is important that our international
partners have confidence in the Canadian system and the regulatory framework
designed to manage fatigue. Indeed, the ICAO has recently published a revised SARP
requiring States to review their flight and duty time requirements in the context of the
current science on fatigue. Our current flight and duty time limitations and rest period
requirements were first published in 1996. At the time, the air taxi and aerial work
sectors of the industry were exempted (through the Standards) from these
requirements. The recommendations of contained in this Report utilise the latest
science and research in fatigue and will provide a modern, science based regulatory
framework and appropriate mitigations to address fatigue.
The flight time limitations for the airline and commuter sectors are 40 flight hours per 7
consecutive days. This will generally result in 50 to 60 hours of work to achieve 40 flight
hours. In the air taxi and aerial work sectors the limit is 60 flight hours per 7 days. This
will generally result in 80 to 90 hours of work to achieve 60 flight hours. I am sure that
there are many people in Canada that work between 80 to 90 hours per week but these
levels of working hours should not be permitted in aviation where a few seconds of
inattention can easily result in a catastrophic accident.
The Standards for flight duty time allow for consecutive 14 hour days for up to 42
consecutive days. No days off are required during that 42 day period. The scientific
evidence demonstrates that the level of fatigue that will be accumulated during a work
schedule like this is not safe.
1/5
Excerpts from Transportation Safety Board of Canada Table 4. Aircraft accident fatalities, 2002-2011
10 year totals
Crew fatalities by operator type
Airliner (705) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4
Commuter (704) 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 1 2 7
Air taxi (703) 2 5 4 9 5 7 6 7 11 7 63
Aerial work (702) 4 6 0 4 7 6 2 1 5 5 40
114
Passenger fatalities by
operator type
Airliner (705) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 8
Commuter (704) 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 15 0 0 16
Air taxi (703) 7 10 14 8 12 3 14 11 16 9 104
Aerial work (702) 0 0 0 3 3 3 2 0 2 3 16
144
Total Commercial fatalities 2002 - 2011 258
Airliner & Commuter 35 13.6%
Air Taxi & Aerial Work 223 86.4%
3/5
R. Freeman: Notes: FRMS meeting 11 March 2011.
As way of introduction and for the purpose of this Sub Group discussion, I feel that you
should be aware of Transport Canada’s concerns with regard to fatigue, flight and duty
time, and the regulations as they apply to CAR 702 and 703 operations.
As you know, the current CARS were published in October 1996. In the months
previous to that, there was a lot of pressure to complete the draft regulations to meet
the proposed publishing date. We missed the first proposed date of June, 1996, and
everything slipped to the second proposed date in October. Although many of the regs
were still in a rough draft, we were denied any further delay. Management decided to
release them anyway, with the intent to repair them at the subsequent CARAC
meetings.
For the Flight and Duty Time deliberations, there were several working groups, much
the same as today, for airline, commuter, air taxi and aerial work. Some of the
deliberations were done in plenary sessions, and some in sub-groups. As now, the
airlines were well-represented by management and unions. Also, as now, the 702 and
703 representatives were mostly industry and associations. There were few pilot
representatives, and they were not always available on a regular basis, as they had to
pay their own way.
Deliberations for these Sub Parts were mostly negotiations between the operators and
their associations and Transport personnel. There was no science applied to the
derived numbers. Simply put, the operators took the previous F&DT numbers, (from the
old Air Regulations/ Air Navigation Orders) stated that they were not adequate, and
more or less dictated the increased limits that we have today.
Although some of the TC representatives thought these numbers were excessive, we

had no pilot representation to counter that argument. In the interest of getting
something on paper for the CARS deadlines, the Operator / association numbers stood.
The one important point to remember is that the existing F&DT limits in 702/703 are not
based on any science – only the perceived requirements of the operator as negotiated
in 1994-96.
Fast forward to today. The F&DT limits for air taxi and aerial work are the most lenient
in the CARS for all Sub Parts. That should raise some eyebrows. 702/703 aircraft, for
the most part, are single pilot, single engine, with limited redundancy in systems. They
are often flown at low level, in all weather, in remote areas, under pilot self dispatch,
and in technically demanding roles, such as external load, fire fighting and so on. They
work out of minimally prepared areas, and land and depart from confined areas,
mountain peaks and other areas where many times, not even a windsock is available.
Finally, many of these operations are conducted out of camps where creature comforts
are minimal, where there are often numerous people sharing the sleeping facility, and
constant noise and discomfort are part of the lifestyle. I know. I’ve lived in them all.
4/5
None of this would matter, I suppose, except that the overwhelming majority of the
commercial aircraft accidents today occur in Sub Parts 702 and 703. It can be stated
that fatigue has yet to be proven to be a factor, but common sense says that flying a
technically challenging tasking, in a remote area, alone, for an extended period of time
in a tent cannot be anything else but fatiguing.
In my time in the bush, I saw quite a number of pilots become “bushed” and act
impulsively and foolishly. Some of them had tragic accidents. When I became Chief
Pilot, I changed our rotation schedule to a maximum of four weeks from the traditional
six, amongst other measures. It was a start, and we saw a reduction in incidents.
To sum up, we have to ensure that our operators are able to survive economically and
any imposed limits are supportable and necessary. However, we also have to ensure
the safety of our pilot community, and I don’t believe that the current limits provide
adequate protection for them, for the reasons previously stated.
Given the current situation, and latest accident rates from the TSB, an argument could
be made that 702 and 703 F&DT limits should be reduced below the airline numbers.
In my opinion, pilots are pilots and everyone suffers from fatigue. No one is immune.
5/5
WestJet Pilot Association
Comment & Dissent to Transport Canada’s
REPORT OF THE CANADIAN AVIATION REGULATION
ADVISORY COUNCIL (CARAC) FLIGHT CREW FATIGUE
MANAGEMENT WORKING GROUP
Dated 15 August 2012
Submitted by:
Captain Dan Glass
Flight & Duty Time Representative
WestJet Pilots Association
September 3, 2012
Issue:
Definitions section:
Early Duty means a flight duty period that starts between 02:00 –
06:59, in the flight crew member’s acclimatized time.
Late duty means a FDP finishing in the period between 00:00 and 01:59
hours, in the flight crew member’s acclimatized time.
Night duty means a FDP that starts between 13:01 – 01:59 and finishes
after 02:00, in the flight crew member’s acclimatized time.
Comment:
The WJPA believes the highlighted items (flight duty period, FDP) above
should all state “Duty Periods” since a duty period is a requirement from
the operator for the Flight Crew Member to be present to perform a task
and represents duty.
Issue:
This section limits the amount of flight time permissible within the flight
duty period and cumulatively on a monthly and yearly basis.
Recommendation: This recommendation is based more on operational
experience and harmonization than on science.
The total flight time of the flights on which an individual flight crew
member is assigned as an operating flight crew member shall not
exceed:
• for single pilot operations, 8 flight hours in any 24 consecutive

hours;
• 112 flight hours in any 28 consecutive days; and
• 1000 flight hours in any 365 consecutive days.
Dissent:
The WJPA maintains that in order to harmonize to international
standards, and from observed operational experience within our
membership, the 28 day consecutive flight hour limitation should be:
100 flight hours in any 28 consecutive days.
As we stated in an earlier submission, it is understandable that

specialized operations require a higher limitation for a seasonal
operation or short-term contract and the WJPA is supportive of allowing
a higher limit for 702 operations only. Also, there is no provision for a 7
day or 90 day limit under the new proposal, which would allow an
unacceptably higher 90 day limit of 360 hours – a significant increase
from the current limit of 300 hours.
There are numerous examples of current and new regulations in other

jurisdictions limiting pilots to 100 hours in 28 days. Again, we ask, why
would Canada be willing to risk a higher limit, not allowed in many
other jurisdictions, in order to satisfy a relatively small segment of
aerial work when that segment can be carved out, as has been done in
other jurisdictions?
Issue:
23.0 Additional Rest Due To Disruptive Schedules
Disruptive schedule provisions do not apply when the crew member is
in a location where local time differs with the flight crew member’s
acclimatized time by more than 4 hours.
• When a flight crew member is scheduled to transition from:
• a late or night duty to an early duty; or

• an early duty to a late or night duty:
the air operator shall provide the flight crew member with a minimum
of one local night’s rest in between the two FDPs.
Comment:
The WJPA believes this is a clerical/typographical error, in that “FDPs”
in the final sentence should state “Duty periods”, since the bullet points
above are referring to “duty”, not “FDPs”. Otherwise, this becomes a
confusing statement, as the two items are quite different.
Issue:
28.0 Controlled Rest on the Flight Deck
This section describes the procedures required for flight crew utilising
controlled rest on the flight deck.
Recommendation: Maintain the current CAR requirements with one

minor change:
The use of controlled rest on the flight deck shall be briefed prior to use.
Comment:
The WJPA would like to clarify; the suggestion we had made in the final
plenary meeting was that controlled rest on the flight deck shall be
briefed prior to use, while in flight (when it becomes apparent a flight
crew member will use/require it). The idea being, controlled rest on the
flight deck should not be briefed before flight, as it would now be clear
that the flight crew members are planning to use it and are already
fatigued.
Issue:
29.0 Fatigue Risk Management Systems
This section defines the criteria for the development of voluntary

fatigue management systems.
Recommendation: There was consensus on the issue of whether FRMS

should be mandatory or not. The majority of Working Group Members
felt it should not be mandatory. There was also agreement that when
ULR operations are being conducted an approved FRMS is required. It is
recommended that if planned extensions to the maximum flight duty
period are requested, that an approved FRMS is required for this
approval.
Dissent:
The highlighted text above, “The majority of Working Group Members
felt it should not be mandatory”, does not comprehensively reflect what
was stated in plenary. The majority of 705 groups believed FRMS
should be mandatory for 705 operations. The WJPA along with ACPA,
ALPA and NACC all stated this. These four groups easily represent a
majority of 705 operations within Canada.
The WJPA believes FRMS should be mandatory for all 705 operations.

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Working Group Report Appendix 7

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Appendix 7 – Working Group Member Comments/Dissents

ACPA Submission to Final Report

ALPA Submission to Final Report

NACC Submission to Final Report

TCCA Submission to Final Report

WJPA Submission to Final Report

Sent via E-mail

Attn: Working Group Co-Chairs

Dear Working Group Co-Chairs;

Air Canada Pilots Association ~ Safety with Integrity ~

First Officer Douglas Tweedlie

ACPA dissents on the following issues:

1. Maximum Duty Period for Un-Acclimatized Crew Member

DISCUSSION OF DISSENT ITEMS:

UK 9:45 FDP 8.5 flight hours

2. Successive Overseas Flights (Additional Rest Due To Time Zone Differences)

28-Day 28-Day 28-Day

5. Pre-Emptive Planning of Controlled Rest (Controlled Rest on the Flight Deck)

6. Standby Duty Period of 20 Hours (Standby)

The Working Draft Report of July 3, 2012 details the following:

The final recommendation has become:

7. Alternate Method of Determining Acclimatized Time (Determining FDP Table Start

8. Weekly Time free from duty (Time Free From Duty)

10. Early to all night Disruptive schedules (Disruptive schedules)

11. Cumulative fatigue (Consecutive Duties infringing on the WOCL)

AIR LIINE PILOOTS ASSO

The co-cchairs have drafted a reeport based

ALPA supports thee majority of

Appendeed to this leetter is the Association

ALPA iss confident that, with its

Captain Martin Gau uthier

Note: Working Group Report proposals appear in italics.

Comments on Section 2.0 Definitions

Recommended definition change:

Comments on section 3.0 Air Operator Responsibilities

x report adjustments made to comply with schedule reliability to TC every two

Recommended changes (under Air Operator Responsibilities):

Recommended changes (new section):

x Planning is considered to be unrealistic when maximum FDP or flight time is

Comments on section 16.0 Cumulative Duty Hour Limitations:

16.0 Cumulative Duty Hour Limitations

x 1928 duty hours in any 365 consecutive days;

When using Time Free from Duty Option 1:

x 60 duty hours in any 7 consecutive days; or,

In the Caruso, et al study, researchers found that a pattern of deteriorating performance

“Cumulative fatigue (AQ3)

A 14 day limit and recovery rest (AQ3a)

DUTY HOURS LIMITATIONS-OTHER COUNTRIES

7 DAYS 14 DAYS 28 DAYS

Recommended changes (new limits):

16.0 Cumulative Duty Hour Limitations

(a) 60 duty hours in any 7 consecutive days for non-disruptive schedules;

(b) 55 duty hours in any 7 consecutive days for disruptive schedules;

Comments on section 17.0 Flight Time Limitations:

17.0 Flight Time Limitations

x for single pilot operations, 8 flight hours in any 24 consecutive hours;

FLIGHT TIME LIMITATIONS-OTHER COUNTRIES

28 DAYS 365 DAYS

17.0 Flight Time Limitations

x for single pilot operations, 8 flight hours in any 24 consecutive hours;

Comments on section 20.0 Standby:

Comments on section 20.0 Standby

Comments on section 22.0 Time Free From Duty: