Ermita Malate v City of Manila 20 SCRA 849 (1967)

J. Fernando

Facts:

Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and one of its members Hotel del Mar Inc.
petitioned for the prohibition of Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963 to be applicable in the city of Manila.

They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers of the Manila City Board to regulate due to the
fact that hotels were not part of its regulatory powers. They also asserted that Section 1 of the
challenged ordinance was unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due process
insofar because it would impose P6,000.00 license fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for
second class motels; there was also the requirement that the guests would fill up a form specifying their
personal information.

There was also a provision that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses
would be open for inspection from city authorites. They claimed this to be violative of due process for
being vague.

The law also classified motels into two classes and required the maintenance of certain minimum
facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant and laundry.
The petitioners also invoked the lack of due process on this for being arbitrary.

It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours.

There was also a prohibition for persons below 18 in the hotel.

The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic cancellation of the license of the hotels that
violated the ordinance.

The lower court declared the ordinance unconstitutional.

Hence, this appeal by the city of Manila.

Issue:

Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause?

Held: No. Judgment reversed.

Ratio:

"The presumption is towards the validity of a law.” However, the Judiciary should not lightly set aside
legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of
police regulation.

O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co- Case was in the scope of police power. As underlying
questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of
constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the
statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter
on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment
against the ordinance set aside.”

There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain
practices hurtful to public morals, particularly fornication and prostitution. Moreover, the increase in
the licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose
other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city government."

Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order,
safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection
and other applicable constitutional guaranties, however, the power must not be unreasonable or
violative of due process.

There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It has a standard to which the
governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each
appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a
procedural and a substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance from legal infirmity? It is
responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put,
arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided.

Due process is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances," decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into
fundamental principles of our society." Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or
pedantically in slavery to form or phrase.

Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the ordinance’s nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due
process requirement.

Cu Unjieng case: Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the police power and the
right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount of the
license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in this class of cases than in
the former, and aside from applying the well-known legal principle that municipal ordinances must not
be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with
such discretion. Eg. Sale of liquors.
Lutz v. Araneta- Taxation may be made to supplement the state’s police power.

In one case- “much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the amount," here the
license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a police power measure.

On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting duration of use to twice every 24 hours- It was not
violative of due process. 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by
law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the
peace and order of society and the general well-being.

Laurel- The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through
education and personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which
means peace and order and happiness for all.

The freedom to contract no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle, unlike in the sole case of
People v Pomar. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by the
government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations affected with public interest.

What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person,
the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the
liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is
wider.

On the law being vague on the issue of personal information, the maintenance of establishments, and
the “full rate of payment”- Holmes- “We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws
with what they omit but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying
what they obviously mean."
2.

SMITH, BELL & COMPANY (LTD.),v JOAQUIN NATIVIDAD 40 PHIL 136

Facts:

Smith, Bell & Co., (Ltd.), is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippine Islands.
A majority of its stockholders are British subjects. It is the owner of a motor vessel known as the Bato
built for it in the Philippine Islands in 1916, of more than fifteen tons gross The Bato was brought to
Cebu in the present year for the purpose of transporting plaintiff's merchandise between ports in the
Islands. Application (Certificate of Philippine Registry) was made at Cebu, the home port of the vessel, to
the Collector of Customs for a certificate of Philippine registry. The Collector refused to issue the
certificate, giving as his reason that all the stockholders of Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., were not citizens
either of the United States or of the Philippine Islands under Act No. 2761 which provides:

SEC. 1172. Certificate of Philippine register. Upon registration of a vessel of domestic ownership, and of
more than fifteen tons gross, a certificate of Philippine register shall be issued for it. If the vessel is of
domestic ownership and of fifteen tons gross or less, the taking of the certificate of Philippine register
shall be optional with the owner.

SEC. 1176. Investigation into character of vessel. No application for a certificate of Philippine register
shall be approved until the collector of customs is satisfied from an inspection of the vessel that it is
engaged or destined to be engaged in legitimate trade and that it is of domestic ownership as such
ownership is defined in section eleven hundred and seventy-two of this Code.

Counsel says that Act No. 2761 denies to Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., the equal protection of the laws
because it, in effect, prohibits the corporation from owning vessels, and because classification of
corporations based on the citizenship of one or more of their stockholders is capricious, and that Act No.
2761 deprives the corporation of its properly without due process of law because by the passage of the
law company was automatically deprived of every beneficial attribute of ownership in the Bato and left
with the naked title to a boat it could not use.

Issue:

Whether the legislature through Act no. 2761 can deny registry of vessel with foreign stockholders.

Ruling:

Yes. We are inclined to the view that while Smith, Bell & Co. Ltd., a corporation having alien
stockholders, is entitled to the protection afforded by the due-process of law and equal protection of
the laws clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights, nevertheless, Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature, in
denying to corporations such as Smith, Bell &. Co. Ltd., the right to register vessels in the Philippines
coastwise trade, does not belong to that vicious species of class legislation which must always be
condemned, but does fall within authorized exceptions, notably, within the purview of the police power,
and so does not offend against the constitutional provision.

The guaranties of the Fourteenth Amendment and so of the first paragraph of the Philippine Bill of
Rights, are universal in their application to all person within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to
any differences of race, color, or nationality. The word "person" includes aliens. Private corporations,
likewise, are "persons" within the scope of the guaranties in so far as their property is concerned.
Classification with the end in view of providing diversity of treatment may be made among corporations,
but must be based upon some reasonable ground and not be a mere arbitrary selection.

A literal application of general principles to the facts before us would, of course, cause the inevitable
deduction that Act No. 2761 is unconstitutional by reason of its denial to a corporation, some of whole
members are foreigners, of the equal protection of the laws.

To justify that portion of Act no. 2761 which permits corporations or companies to obtain a certificate of
Philippine registry only on condition that they be composed wholly of citizens of the Philippine Islands or
of the United States or both, as not infringing Philippine Organic Law, it must be done under some one
of the exceptions.

One of the exceptions to the general rule, most persistent and far reaching in influence is, broad and
comprehensive as it is, nor any other amendment, "was designed to interfere with the power of the
State, sometimes termed its `police power,' to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace,
morals, education, and good order of the people, and legislate so as to increase the industries of the
State, develop its resources and add to its wealth and prosperity. From the very necessities of society,
legislation of a special character, having these objects in view, must often be had in certain districts. This
is the same police power which the United States Supreme Court say "extends to so dealing with the
conditions which exist in the state as to bring out of them the greatest welfare in of its people." For
quite similar reasons, none of the provision of the Philippine Organic Law could have had the effect of
denying to the Government of the Philippine Islands, acting through its Legislature, the right to exercise
that most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers, the sovereign police power, in the promotion of
the general welfare and the public interest.

Without any subterfuge, the apparent purpose of the Philippine Legislature is seen to be to enact an
anti-alien shipping act. The ultimate purpose of the Legislature is to encourage Philippine ship-building.
3.

Villegas v Hiu Chiong; G.R. No. L-29646; 10 Nov 1978; 86 SCRA 270

FACTS:
The Municipal Board of Manila passed an ordinace making it unlawful for any alien to be employed in
any place of employment or to be engaged in any kind of trade, business or occupation within the City of
Manila without securing an employment permit from the City Mayor who has discretion whether or not
to grant said employment permit.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not assailed ordinance violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution.

RULING:
YES. While it is true that the State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is
admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means
of livelihood.
4.

Buck v. Bell 274 U.S. 200

May 2, 1927

Facts of the case

Carrie Buck was a feeble minded woman who was committed to a state mental institution. Her
condition had been present in her family for the last three generations. A Virginia law allowed for the
sexual sterilization of inmates of institutions to promote the "health of the patient and the welfare of
society." Before the procedure could be performed, however, a hearing was required to determine
whether or not the operation was a wise thing to do.

Question

Did the Virginia statute which authorized sterilization deny Buck the right to due process of the law and
the equal protection of the laws as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

The Court found that the statute did not violate the Constitution. Justice Holmes made clear that Buck's
challenge was not upon the medical procedure involved but on the process of the substantive law. Since
sterilization could not occur until a proper hearing had occurred (at which the patient and a guardian
could be present) and after the Circuit Court of the County and the Supreme Court of Appeals had
reviewed the case, if so requested by the patient. Only after "months of observation" could the
operation take place. That was enough to satisfy the Court that there was no Constitutional violation.
Citing the best interests of the state, Justice Holmes affirmed the value of a law like Virginia's in order to
prevent the nation from "being swamped with incompetence . . . Three generations of imbeciles are
enough."
5.

G.R. No. L-14078 March 7, 1919

RUBI, ET AL. (manguianes), plaintiffs,

vs.

THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO, defendant.

FACTS:

This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of
Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial
officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at
Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the
provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation. It thus appears that
the provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the Manguianes in
question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, selected by the provincial governor and approved by the
provincial board.

The action was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly
approved by the Secretary of the Interior.

Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code. This, therefore,
becomes the paramount question which the court is called upon the decide.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is an unlawful delegation of legislative
power by the Philippine Legislature to the provincial official and a department head.

HELD:
No.

That the maxim of Constitutional Law forbidding the delegation of legislative power should be zealously
protected, the Court agrees.

However, an exception to the general rule, sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the central
legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities. The Philippine Legislature has here
conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial governor and the
provincial board.

Who but the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the province,
are better qualified to judge “when such as course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and
order?” As officials charged with the administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants,
who but they are better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most favorable for improving the
people who have the misfortune of being in a backward state?

Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of legislative power by
the Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department head.
6.

TERRACE VS THOMPSON (1923)

11 Dec 2017

US Supreme Court| Constitutional Law| Right to Property| Bill of Rights

TERRACE vs THOMPSON, November 12, 1923

FACTS:

Appellants questioned the Anti-Alien Land Law which is enforced by the Attorney General of
Washington on the grounds that it is in conflict with the due process and equal protection clauses of the
14th Amendment.

The appellants are residents of Washington. The Terraces are citizens of the US and of Washington.
Nakatsuka was born in Japan of Japanese parents and is a subject of the emperor of Japan.

The Terraces are the owners of a tract of land in King county and has a desire to lease their land to
Nakatsuka for the period of five years, that the latter desires to accept such lease. However, the
Attorney General, informed the appellants that the Anti-Alien Land Law will be enforced and the
leasehold interest will be forfeited in favor of the state, and will prosecute them criminally for the
violation of the act.

ISSUE:

Whether the Anti-Alien Land Law is repugnant to the due process clause or the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment?

HELD:
It is obvious that one who is not a citizen and cannot become one lacks an interest in, and the power to
effectually work for the welfare of, the state, and, so lacking, the state may rightfully deny him the right
to own and lease real estate within its boundaries.

The rights, privileges and duties of aliens differ widely from those of citizens; and those of alien
declarants differ substantially from those of non-declarants. All persons of whatever color or race who
have not declared their intention in good faith to become citizens are prohibited from so owning
agricultural lands. Two classes of aliens inevitably result from the naturalization laws-those who may
and those who may not become citizens. The rule established by Congress on this subject, in and of
itself, furnishes a reasonable basis for classification in a state law withholding from aliens the privilege of
land ownership as defined in the act. The quality and allegiance of those who own, occupy and use the
farm lands within its borders are matters of highest importance and affect the safety and power of the
state itself.

Thus, the state act is not repugnant to the equal protection clause and does not contravene the
Fourteenth Amendment.
7.

Nunez v Averia; G.R. No. L-38415; 28 Jun 1974; 57 SCRA 726

FACTS:

Petitioner is the protestant in Election Case No. TM-470 of respondent court contesting the November
8, 1971 election results in certain precincts for the mayoralty of Ternate, Cavite on the ground of fraud,
irregularities and corrupt practices. Original protestee was the proclaimed mayor-elect Edgardo
Morales, who was ambushed and killed on 1974 and hence was succeeded by then vice-mayor Rodolfo
de Leon (respondent). Respondent court had in its questioned order of January 31, 1974 granted
protestee's motion for dismissal of the election protest on the ground that the court lost its jurisdiction
as the case has become moot and academic, citing the President's authority under the 1973
Constitution to remove from office all incumbent government officials and employees, whether elective
or appointive.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the election protest against the respondent be dismissed.

RULING:

The Court sets aside respondent court's questioned order of dismissal of the pending election protest
before it on the authority of its recent decisions (Paredes, Sunga and Valley), ruling that courts of first
instance "should continue and exercise their jurisdiction to hear, try and decide the election protests".
The Court in its unanimous joint decision en banc in the above-cited cases has already declared such
dismissal orders as "clear error," ruling that "It must be emphasized that the “right” of the private
respondents to continue in office indefinitely arose not only from the New Constitution* but principally
from their having been proclaimed elected to their respective positions as a result of the 1971 elections.
8.

Crespo v Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija; G.R. No. L-33237; 15 Apr 1988; 160 SCRA 66

FACTS:

Petitioner Gregorio Crespo was the elected Municipal Mayor of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija in the local elections
of 1967. An administrative complaint was filed against him by private respondent Pedro Wycoco for
harassment, abuse of authority and oppression. Public respondent Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija heard
the said administrative case without notifying the petitioner or his counsel and, on the basis of the
evidence presented by private respondent, passed a resolution preventively suspending petitioner from
his office as municipal mayor.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the preventive suspension issued by the Provincial Board is arbitrary and violated the
fundamental principle of due process.

RULING:

YES. Petitioner was denied due process by respondent Provincial Board. Undoubtedly, the order of
preventive suspension was issued without giving the petitioner a chance to be heard. In the proceedings
held on 15 February 1971, nothing therein can be gathered that, in issuing the assailed order, the
written explanation submitted by petitioner was taken into account. The assailed order was issued
mainly on the basis of the evidence presented ex parte by respondent Wycoco.

Petition is DISMISSED for being MOOT and ACADEMIC.

9.

Pedro vs Provincial Board of Rizal

G. R. No. 34163, September 18, 1931

Facts: Gregorio Pedro argues for the nullity of Ordinance No. 36, series of 1928, approved on December
29, 1928, by the temporary councillors appointed by the provincial governor of Rizal, Eligio Naval, on
the ground that (1) it impairs the acquired rights of said appellant; (2) it was enacted on account of
prejudice, because it was intended for a special and not a general purpose, namely to prevent, at any
cost, the opening, maintenance, and exploitation of the cockpit of the said petitioner-appellant; and (3)
it provides for special committee composed of persons who are not members of the council, vested
them with powers which of their very nature, cannot be delegated by said council to that committee.

He further contends that, having obtained the proper permit to maintain, exploit, and open to the public
the cockpit in question, having paid the license fee and fulfilled all the requirements provided by
Ordinance No. 35, series of 1928, he has acquired a right which cannot be taken away from him by
Ordinance No. 36, series of 1928, which was subsequently approved.

Issue: Whether a license authorizing the operation and exploitation of a cockpit falls under property
rights which a person may not be deprived of without due process of law

Held: No.

The court held: (1) That a license authorizing the operation and exploitation of a cockpit is not property
of which the holder may not be deprived without due process of law, but a mere privilege which may be
revoked when the public interests so require; (2) that the work entrusted by a municipal council to a
special sanitary committee to make a study of the sanitary effects upon the neighborhood of the
establishment of a cockpit, is not legislative in character, but only informational, and may be delegated;
and (3) that an ordinance, approved by a municipal council duly constituted, which suspends the effects
of another which had been enacted to favor the grantee of a cockpit license, is valid and legal.
10.

Libanan v Sandiganbayan; G.R. No. 112386; 14 Jun 1994; 233 SCRA 163

FACTS:

Petitioner Marcelino C, Libanan, the incumbent Vice-Governor of Eastern Samar, was a member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of that province prior to the 11 May 1992 elections. He was suspended from
office after he was charged before the Sandiganbayan with having violated Section 3(e) of Republic Act
No. 3019.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not Libanan’s suspension violated his constitutional right to due process.

RULING:

NO. The suspension order cannot amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law.
Public office is “a public agency or trust,” and it is not the property envisioned by the Constitutional
provision which petitioner invokes.

Petition is DISMISSED.