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CREATION
MERGER
ABOLITION
DIVISION
SUBSTANTIAL ALTERATION
of Boundaries of LGUs
-Barangays
-Municipalities
-Cities
-Provinces
CREATION OF LGU
Effects of Merger
(1) Legal existence of LGU to be annexed is dissolved
(2) Laws and ordinance of the annexing LGU prevails
(3) The right of office in the annexed LGU is terminated
(4) Title to property is acquired by the annexing LGU
(5) Debts are assumed by the annexing LGU [Martin, supra]
Effects of division
(1) The legal existence of the original municipality is extinguished
(2) Property, rights and powers are acquired by the dividing LGUs
[Martin, supra]
Abolition
A local government unit may be abolished:
o when its income, population, or land area has been irreversibly
reduced to less than the minimum standards prescribed for its
creation under Book III of this Code, as certified by the national
agencies mentioned in Section 7 hereof to Congress or to the
sangguniang concerned, as the case may be.
The law or ordinance abolishing a local government unit shall specify the
province, city, municipality, or barangay with which the local government
unit sought to be abolished will be incorporated or merged. [Sec. 9, LGC]
NOTE: Failure to provide for seat of government is not fatal. Under Sec. 12 of
the LGC, the city can still establish a seat of government after its creation
(Samson v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 133076, September 22, 1999).
A: NO. EO 353 was issued in 1959 but it was only after 30 years that the
Municipality of San Narciso initially decided to challenge the legality of the EO.
Created in 1959, the Municipality had been in existence for 6 years when the
Court decided the case of Pelaez v. Auditor General which declared void ab initio
several EOs creating 33 municipalities in Mindanao. The ruling could have
sounded the call for a similar declaration of the unconstitutionality of EO 353
but it was not to be the case. Granting that EO 353 was a complete nullity for
being result of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the
Municipality of San Andres created by EO attained the status of de facto
municipal corporation. Certain governmental acts all pointed to the State’s
recognition of the continued existence of the municipality, i.e., it being classified
as a fifth class municipality, the municipality had been covered by the 10th
Municipal Circuit Court and its inclusion in the Ordinance appended to the
1987 Constitution. Equally significant is Section 442(d) of the Local Government
Code to the effect that municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential
issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective
municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of the Code shall
henceforth be considered as regular municipalities. The power to create political
subdivisions is a function of the legislature. Congress did just that when it
incorporated Sec. 442 (d) in the LGC. Curative laws are validly accepted in this
jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against impairment of vested
rights. All considered, the de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in
the province of Quezon must now be conceded. (Municipality of San Narciso v.
Mendez, G.R. No. 103702, December 6, 1994).
A: NO. The case of Municipality of San Narciso is different from the case of
Andong. Unlike in San Narciso, the Executive Order creating Andong was
judicially declared null and void ab initio by the Court in the case of Pelaez.
Andong also does not meet the requisites set forth by Sec. 442 (d) of the LGC
which requires that in order for a municipality created by executive order to
receive recognition, it must have a set of elective municipal officials holding office
at the time of effectivity of the LGC. Andong has never elected its municipal
officers at all. Out of obeisance to the ruling in Pelaez, the national government
ceased to recognize the existence of Andong, depriving it of its share of the public
funds, and refusing to conduct municipal elections for the void municipality.
Section 442(d) does not serve to affirm or reconstitute the judicially dissolved
municipalities which had been previously created by executive orders. They
remain inexistent unless recreated through specific legislative enactments. The
provision only affirms the legal personalities only of those municipalities which
may have been created through executive fiat but whose existence have not been
judicially annulled (Camid v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 161414, January
17, 2005).
NOTE:
I. The color of authority required for the organization of a de facto municipal
corporation may be:
1. A valid law enacted by the legislature.
2. An unconstitutional law, valid on its face, which has either:
a. been upheld for a time by the courts; or
b. not yet been declared void; provided that a warrant for its
creation can be found in some other valid law or in the
recognition of its potential existence by the general laws or
constitution of the state.
The EOs, which created municipalities are declared null and void because Sec.
68 of the Revised Administrative code was repealed by the 1935 constitution
(Pelaez v. Auditor General, G.R. No. L-23825, December 24, 1965). Hence,
municipalities created by an EO could not claim to be a de facto municipal
corporation, because there was no valid law authorizing incorporation.
A: YES. The factors are present as to confer to Sinacaban the status of at least
a de facto municipal corporation, in the sense that its legal existence has been
recognized and acquiesced publicly and officially. Sinacaban had been in
existence for 16 years when Pelaez v. Auditor General was decided on, yet the
validity of EO 258 had never been questioned. On the contrary, the State and
even the municipality of Jimenez itself have recognized Sinacaban’s corporate
existence. Lastly, Sec. 442 (d) of the LGC must be deemed to have cured any
defect in the creation of Sinacaban (Mun. of Jimenez v. Baz Jr, G.R. No. 105746,
December 2, 1996).