Fine on Vagueness, Truth and Logic

Paulo Santos

June 17, 2015

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 1 / 28

Outline I

1 Background

2 Truth-value approach

3 The specification-space approach

4 The super-truth theory

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 2 / 28

Background

what are the correct truth-conditions for a vague language?

key idea: consider not only the truth-values that sentences actually
receive, but also the truth values they might receive under different
ways of making them more precise
a vague sentence is true iff it is true for all ways of making it
completely precise
vagueness is deficiency of meaning
I it is to be distinguished from generality, undecidability and ambiguity

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 3 / 28

Background

what are the correct truth-conditions for a vague language?

key idea: consider not only the truth-values that sentences actually
receive, but also the truth values they might receive under different
ways of making them more precise
a vague sentence is true iff it is true for all ways of making it
completely precise
vagueness is deficiency of meaning
I it is to be distinguished from generality, undecidability and ambiguity

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 3 / 28

Background

what are the correct truth-conditions for a vague language?

key idea: consider not only the truth-values that sentences actually
receive, but also the truth values they might receive under different
ways of making them more precise
a vague sentence is true iff it is true for all ways of making it
completely precise
vagueness is deficiency of meaning
I it is to be distinguished from generality, undecidability and ambiguity

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 3 / 28

Background

what are the correct truth-conditions for a vague language?

key idea: consider not only the truth-values that sentences actually
receive, but also the truth values they might receive under different
ways of making them more precise
a vague sentence is true iff it is true for all ways of making it
completely precise
vagueness is deficiency of meaning
I it is to be distinguished from generality, undecidability and ambiguity

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 3 / 28

Background

what are the correct truth-conditions for a vague language?

key idea: consider not only the truth-values that sentences actually
receive, but also the truth values they might receive under different
ways of making them more precise
a vague sentence is true iff it is true for all ways of making it
completely precise
vagueness is deficiency of meaning
I it is to be distinguished from generality, undecidability and ambiguity

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 3 / 28

Background

what are the correct truth-conditions for a vague language?

key idea: consider not only the truth-values that sentences actually
receive, but also the truth values they might receive under different
ways of making them more precise
a vague sentence is true iff it is true for all ways of making it
completely precise
vagueness is deficiency of meaning
I it is to be distinguished from generality, undecidability and ambiguity

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 3 / 28

Examples

nice1 is vague
I n is nice1 if n > 15
I n is not nice1 if n < 13
nice2 is ambiguous (over-determined meaning)
I n is nice iff n > 15
2
I n is nice iff n > 14
2

nice3 is general or un-specific

I n is nice iff n > 15
3

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 4 / 28

any type of expression that is capable of meaning is also capable of
being vague: names, name-operators, predicates, quantifiers and
sentence-operators
if meaning can have an extensional and intensional sense, then so
can vagueness
extensional vagueness is closely allied to the existence of truth-value
gaps
any (extentionally) vague sentence is neither true nor false
what distinguishes gaps or deficiency is that they can be closed by an
appropriate linguistic decision ( viz. an extension, not change) in the
meaning of the relevant expression.

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 5 / 28

any type of expression that is capable of meaning is also capable of
being vague: names, name-operators, predicates, quantifiers and
sentence-operators
if meaning can have an extensional and intensional sense, then so
can vagueness
extensional vagueness is closely allied to the existence of truth-value
gaps
any (extentionally) vague sentence is neither true nor false
what distinguishes gaps or deficiency is that they can be closed by an
appropriate linguistic decision ( viz. an extension, not change) in the
meaning of the relevant expression.

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 5 / 28

any type of expression that is capable of meaning is also capable of
being vague: names, name-operators, predicates, quantifiers and
sentence-operators
if meaning can have an extensional and intensional sense, then so
can vagueness
extensional vagueness is closely allied to the existence of truth-value
gaps
any (extentionally) vague sentence is neither true nor false
what distinguishes gaps or deficiency is that they can be closed by an
appropriate linguistic decision ( viz. an extension, not change) in the
meaning of the relevant expression.

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 5 / 28

any type of expression that is capable of meaning is also capable of
being vague: names, name-operators, predicates, quantifiers and
sentence-operators
if meaning can have an extensional and intensional sense, then so
can vagueness
extensional vagueness is closely allied to the existence of truth-value
gaps
any (extentionally) vague sentence is neither true nor false
what distinguishes gaps or deficiency is that they can be closed by an
appropriate linguistic decision ( viz. an extension, not change) in the
meaning of the relevant expression.

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 5 / 28

any type of expression that is capable of meaning is also capable of
being vague: names, name-operators, predicates, quantifiers and
sentence-operators
if meaning can have an extensional and intensional sense, then so
can vagueness
extensional vagueness is closely allied to the existence of truth-value
gaps
any (extentionally) vague sentence is neither true nor false
what distinguishes gaps or deficiency is that they can be closed by an
appropriate linguistic decision ( viz. an extension, not change) in the
meaning of the relevant expression.

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 5 / 28

Approaches to vagueness

Truth-value approach
I specification
I valuation
I natural constraints: F - Fidelity Condition; S - Stability Condition
Specification-space approach: specification points and partial
ordering – extends (≥)
the Super-truth theory

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 6 / 28

Truth-value approach

truth-value gaps: it is tempting to treat neither-true-nor-false (or

indefinite) as a third truth-value and to model truth-value assessment
along the lines of the classical truth conditions
let a partial specification be an assignment of a truth-value (T, F or I)
to the atomic sentences of L
the specification is appropriate if the assignment is in accordance
with the intuitively understood meanings of the predicate
suggestion: the truth-value of each sentence in L be evaluated on the
basis of the appropriate specification
the valuation is to be truth-functional

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 7 / 28

Truth-value approach

truth-value gaps: it is tempting to treat neither-true-nor-false (or

indefinite) as a third truth-value and to model truth-value assessment
along the lines of the classical truth conditions
let a partial specification be an assignment of a truth-value (T, F or I)
to the atomic sentences of L
the specification is appropriate if the assignment is in accordance
with the intuitively understood meanings of the predicate
suggestion: the truth-value of each sentence in L be evaluated on the
basis of the appropriate specification
the valuation is to be truth-functional

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 7 / 28

Truth-value approach

truth-value gaps: it is tempting to treat neither-true-nor-false (or

indefinite) as a third truth-value and to model truth-value assessment
along the lines of the classical truth conditions
let a partial specification be an assignment of a truth-value (T, F or I)
to the atomic sentences of L
the specification is appropriate if the assignment is in accordance
with the intuitively understood meanings of the predicate
suggestion: the truth-value of each sentence in L be evaluated on the
basis of the appropriate specification
the valuation is to be truth-functional

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 7 / 28

Truth-value approach

truth-value gaps: it is tempting to treat neither-true-nor-false (or

indefinite) as a third truth-value and to model truth-value assessment
along the lines of the classical truth conditions
let a partial specification be an assignment of a truth-value (T, F or I)
to the atomic sentences of L
the specification is appropriate if the assignment is in accordance
with the intuitively understood meanings of the predicate
suggestion: the truth-value of each sentence in L be evaluated on the
basis of the appropriate specification
the valuation is to be truth-functional

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 7 / 28

Truth-value approach

truth-value gaps: it is tempting to treat neither-true-nor-false (or

indefinite) as a third truth-value and to model truth-value assessment
along the lines of the classical truth conditions
let a partial specification be an assignment of a truth-value (T, F or I)
to the atomic sentences of L
the specification is appropriate if the assignment is in accordance
with the intuitively understood meanings of the predicate
suggestion: the truth-value of each sentence in L be evaluated on the
basis of the appropriate specification
the valuation is to be truth-functional

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 7 / 28

Constraints on truth conditions

The possible truth-conditions can be subject to two natural constraints

faithfull to the classical truth-conditions, whenever applicable
a specification is complete if it assigns only definite truth-values

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 8 / 28

Constraints on truth conditions

The possible truth-conditions can be subject to two natural constraints

faithfull to the classical truth-conditions, whenever applicable
a specification is complete if it assigns only definite truth-values

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 8 / 28

Constraints on truth conditions

The possible truth-conditions can be subject to two natural constraints

faithfull to the classical truth-conditions, whenever applicable
a specification is complete if it assigns only definite truth-values

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 8 / 28

Truth conditions

the fidelity constraint (F) states that a sentence is true (or false) for
a complete specification iff it is classically true (or false);
the Stability condition (S) states that if a sentence has a definite
truth-value under a specification t it enjoys the same definite
truth-value under any specification u that extends t
I u extends t if u assigns the an atomic sentence any definite truth-value
assigned by t

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 9 / 28

Truth conditions

the fidelity constraint (F) states that a sentence is true (or false) for
a complete specification iff it is classically true (or false);
the Stability condition (S) states that if a sentence has a definite
truth-value under a specification t it enjoys the same definite
truth-value under any specification u that extends t
I u extends t if u assigns the an atomic sentence any definite truth-value
assigned by t

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 9 / 28

Two constraints work together

definite truth-values for a partial specification must be retained upon

the classical evaluation of any of its complete extensions.
if quantifiers are dropped, the two constraints are equivalent to the
classical necessary truth and falsehood conditions: (formulae p. 268)

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 10 / 28

Two constraints work together

definite truth-values for a partial specification must be retained upon

the classical evaluation of any of its complete extensions.
if quantifiers are dropped, the two constraints are equivalent to the
classical necessary truth and falsehood conditions: (formulae p. 268)

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 10 / 28

one can move in the direction of minimizing or of maximizing the degree to
which sentences receive definite truth -values under a given specification
the indefinite truth value dominates: any sentence with an
indefinite subsentence is also definite
the indefinite truth value dithers: a sentence is definite if its
truth-value is unchanged for any way of making definite its immediate
indefinite subsentences

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 11 / 28

any account that satisfies conditions F and S would always appear to
make correct allocations of definite truth value.
however, even the maximising policy fails to make correct allocations.
e.g. P: “the blob is pink”; R: “the blob is red”, then the conjunction
R ∧ R is false, but on the maximising account it is indefinite, since
both conjuncts are indefinite
thus, a conjunction of indefinite conjuncts is sometimes indefinite and
sometimes false, so ∧ is not truth-functional.
a similar argument applies to the other connectives

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 12 / 28

any account that satisfies conditions F and S would always appear to
make correct allocations of definite truth value.
however, even the maximising policy fails to make correct allocations.
e.g. P: “the blob is pink”; R: “the blob is red”, then the conjunction
R ∧ R is false, but on the maximising account it is indefinite, since
both conjuncts are indefinite
thus, a conjunction of indefinite conjuncts is sometimes indefinite and
sometimes false, so ∧ is not truth-functional.
a similar argument applies to the other connectives

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 12 / 28

any account that satisfies conditions F and S would always appear to
make correct allocations of definite truth value.
however, even the maximising policy fails to make correct allocations.
e.g. P: “the blob is pink”; R: “the blob is red”, then the conjunction
R ∧ R is false, but on the maximising account it is indefinite, since
both conjuncts are indefinite
thus, a conjunction of indefinite conjuncts is sometimes indefinite and
sometimes false, so ∧ is not truth-functional.
a similar argument applies to the other connectives

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 12 / 28

any account that satisfies conditions F and S would always appear to
make correct allocations of definite truth value.
however, even the maximising policy fails to make correct allocations.
e.g. P: “the blob is pink”; R: “the blob is red”, then the conjunction
R ∧ R is false, but on the maximising account it is indefinite, since
both conjuncts are indefinite
thus, a conjunction of indefinite conjuncts is sometimes indefinite and
sometimes false, so ∧ is not truth-functional.
a similar argument applies to the other connectives

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 12 / 28

Penumbral connection

Penumbral connection: logical relations that hold among indefinite

sentences
penumbral truths: truths that arise, wholly or in part, from penumbral
connections
argument: no natural truth-value approach respects penumbral truths

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 13 / 28

Penumbral connection

Penumbral connection: logical relations that hold among indefinite

sentences
penumbral truths: truths that arise, wholly or in part, from penumbral
connections
argument: no natural truth-value approach respects penumbral truths

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 13 / 28

Penumbral connection

Penumbral connection: logical relations that hold among indefinite

sentences
penumbral truths: truths that arise, wholly or in part, from penumbral
connections
argument: no natural truth-value approach respects penumbral truths

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 13 / 28

The specification-space approach

account for penumbral connection?

why “the blob is pink and red” is false, but “the blob is pink and small”
is indefinite?
the difference in truth-value reflects a difference in how the predicates
can be made more precise
this can be made more precise with the idea of specification space

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 14 / 28

The specification-space approach

account for penumbral connection?

why “the blob is pink and red” is false, but “the blob is pink and small”
is indefinite?
the difference in truth-value reflects a difference in how the predicates
can be made more precise
this can be made more precise with the idea of specification space

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 14 / 28

The specification-space approach

account for penumbral connection?

why “the blob is pink and red” is false, but “the blob is pink and small”
is indefinite?
the difference in truth-value reflects a difference in how the predicates
can be made more precise
this can be made more precise with the idea of specification space

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 14 / 28

The specification-space approach

account for penumbral connection?

why “the blob is pink and red” is false, but “the blob is pink and small”
is indefinite?
the difference in truth-value reflects a difference in how the predicates
can be made more precise
this can be made more precise with the idea of specification space

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 14 / 28

Specification Space

hS , ≥i
I S: non-empty set of elements: specification points
I ≥: partial ordering (read as: extends) on the set
I a space is appropriate if each point corresponds to a precisification,
one point for each precisification
I each point is assigned a specification that is appropriate to the
precisification to which it corresponds
I points extend one another just in case they correspond to
precisifications that extend one another in the natural sense
I truth-valuation in this sense would be based on the specification space
(i.e. on the specification points that correspond to the different ways of
making the language more precise)
I a specification space is, in effect, a collection of specifications partially
ordered by the natural extension-relation

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 15 / 28

Specification Space

hS , ≥i
I S: non-empty set of elements: specification points
I ≥: partial ordering (read as: extends) on the set
I a space is appropriate if each point corresponds to a precisification,
one point for each precisification
I each point is assigned a specification that is appropriate to the
precisification to which it corresponds
I points extend one another just in case they correspond to
precisifications that extend one another in the natural sense
I truth-valuation in this sense would be based on the specification space
(i.e. on the specification points that correspond to the different ways of
making the language more precise)
I a specification space is, in effect, a collection of specifications partially
ordered by the natural extension-relation

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 15 / 28

Specification Space

hS , ≥i
I S: non-empty set of elements: specification points
I ≥: partial ordering (read as: extends) on the set
I a space is appropriate if each point corresponds to a precisification,
one point for each precisification
I each point is assigned a specification that is appropriate to the
precisification to which it corresponds
I points extend one another just in case they correspond to
precisifications that extend one another in the natural sense
I truth-valuation in this sense would be based on the specification space
(i.e. on the specification points that correspond to the different ways of
making the language more precise)
I a specification space is, in effect, a collection of specifications partially
ordered by the natural extension-relation

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 15 / 28

Specification Space

hS , ≥i
I S: non-empty set of elements: specification points
I ≥: partial ordering (read as: extends) on the set
I a space is appropriate if each point corresponds to a precisification,
one point for each precisification
I each point is assigned a specification that is appropriate to the
precisification to which it corresponds
I points extend one another just in case they correspond to
precisifications that extend one another in the natural sense
I truth-valuation in this sense would be based on the specification space
(i.e. on the specification points that correspond to the different ways of
making the language more precise)
I a specification space is, in effect, a collection of specifications partially
ordered by the natural extension-relation

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 15 / 28

Specification Space

hS , ≥i
I S: non-empty set of elements: specification points
I ≥: partial ordering (read as: extends) on the set
I a space is appropriate if each point corresponds to a precisification,
one point for each precisification
I each point is assigned a specification that is appropriate to the
precisification to which it corresponds
I points extend one another just in case they correspond to
precisifications that extend one another in the natural sense
I truth-valuation in this sense would be based on the specification space
(i.e. on the specification points that correspond to the different ways of
making the language more precise)
I a specification space is, in effect, a collection of specifications partially
ordered by the natural extension-relation

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 15 / 28

Specification Space

hS , ≥i
I S: non-empty set of elements: specification points
I ≥: partial ordering (read as: extends) on the set
I a space is appropriate if each point corresponds to a precisification,
one point for each precisification
I each point is assigned a specification that is appropriate to the
precisification to which it corresponds
I points extend one another just in case they correspond to
precisifications that extend one another in the natural sense
I truth-valuation in this sense would be based on the specification space
(i.e. on the specification points that correspond to the different ways of
making the language more precise)
I a specification space is, in effect, a collection of specifications partially
ordered by the natural extension-relation

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 15 / 28

Conditions upon a specification space

it has a base-point, the appropriate specification-point: the

precisification of which all the other precisifications are extensions
completeability (C): any point can be extended to a complete point
within the same space

∀t ∃u ≥ t (u complete)

fidelity (F): truth-values at a complete point are classical:

t |= A ↔ t |=c A for t complete

stability (S): truth-values are presented under extensions of points

within a given space:

t |= A and u ≥ t → u |= A

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 16 / 28

Conditions upon a specification space

it has a base-point, the appropriate specification-point: the

precisification of which all the other precisifications are extensions
completeability (C): any point can be extended to a complete point
within the same space

∀t ∃u ≥ t (u complete)

fidelity (F): truth-values at a complete point are classical:

t |= A ↔ t |=c A for t complete

stability (S): truth-values are presented under extensions of points

within a given space:

t |= A and u ≥ t → u |= A

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 16 / 28

Conditions upon a specification space

it has a base-point, the appropriate specification-point: the

precisification of which all the other precisifications are extensions
completeability (C): any point can be extended to a complete point
within the same space

∀t ∃u ≥ t (u complete)

fidelity (F): truth-values at a complete point are classical:

t |= A ↔ t |=c A for t complete

stability (S): truth-values are presented under extensions of points

within a given space:

t |= A and u ≥ t → u |= A

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 16 / 28

maximize or minimize the amount of truth tagging

minimize: nothing new

maximize: a sentence is true at a partial specification point if and only
if it is true at all complete extensions
a sentence is true simpliciter iff it is true at the appropriate
specification point (i.e. at all complete and admissible specifications)
Truth is super-truth, truth from above
many intermediate truth definitions (I’m skipping)

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 17 / 28

maximize or minimize the amount of truth tagging

minimize: nothing new

maximize: a sentence is true at a partial specification point if and only
if it is true at all complete extensions
a sentence is true simpliciter iff it is true at the appropriate
specification point (i.e. at all complete and admissible specifications)
Truth is super-truth, truth from above
many intermediate truth definitions (I’m skipping)

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 17 / 28

maximize or minimize the amount of truth tagging

minimize: nothing new

maximize: a sentence is true at a partial specification point if and only
if it is true at all complete extensions
a sentence is true simpliciter iff it is true at the appropriate
specification point (i.e. at all complete and admissible specifications)
Truth is super-truth, truth from above
many intermediate truth definitions (I’m skipping)

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 17 / 28

maximize or minimize the amount of truth tagging

minimize: nothing new

maximize: a sentence is true at a partial specification point if and only
if it is true at all complete extensions
a sentence is true simpliciter iff it is true at the appropriate
specification point (i.e. at all complete and admissible specifications)
Truth is super-truth, truth from above
many intermediate truth definitions (I’m skipping)

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 17 / 28

Abstract theory of intensions and extensions

Intension and extension, in logic, correlative words that indicate the

reference of a term or concept: “intension” indicates the internal content of
a term or concept that constitutes its formal definition; and “extension”
indicates its range of applicability by naming the particular objects that it
denotes. For instance, the intension of “ship” as a substantive is “vehicle
for conveyance on water,” whereas its extension embraces such things as
cargo ships, passenger ships, battleships, and sailing ships. The
distinction between intension and extension is not the same as that
between connotation and denotation.

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 18 / 28

Abstract theory of extensions

the extension of a compound term Φ(A1 . . . An ) is a function f of the

extensions of its parts
if extensions x10 , . . . xn0 extend extensions x1 , . . . xn then f (x10 , . . . xn0 )
extends f (x1 , . . . xn )

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 19 / 28

Theory of intensions

a specific model can be obtained by indexing extensions with possible

worlds
Pure theory of intensions should have the analogues of Funcionality
and Intensionality:
I (3) the intension of a compound is a function of the intension of its parts
I (4) if intensions x10 , . . . xn0 extend intensions x1 , . . . xn then F (x10 , . . . xn0 )
extends F (x1 , . . . xn )
I (5) the intension F (x1 , . . . xn ) determines the extension f (x1 , . . . xn )
I (60 X extends Y iff x extends y
the combined theory should link intensions to extensions. Each
intension X determines an extension x; and each extension is so
determined

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 20 / 28

Theory of intensions

a specific model can be obtained by indexing extensions with possible

worlds
Pure theory of intensions should have the analogues of Funcionality
and Intensionality:
I (3) the intension of a compound is a function of the intension of its parts
I (4) if intensions x10 , . . . xn0 extend intensions x1 , . . . xn then F (x10 , . . . xn0 )
extends F (x1 , . . . xn )
I (5) the intension F (x1 , . . . xn ) determines the extension f (x1 , . . . xn )
I (60 X extends Y iff x extends y
the combined theory should link intensions to extensions. Each
intension X determines an extension x; and each extension is so
determined

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 20 / 28

Assumptions (4) and (6)
(4) an expression is made more precise through making its simple
terms more precise
second assumption says that extension does not decrease with an
increase of intension
to precisify is to rule out the possibility of certain truth value gaps
truth could hold by default, in virtue of lack of meaning. It could be a
product of linguistic laziness and not be consequent upon a positive
accordance
under the pressure of their own use, the meanings of terms will need
to change.
tie in well with a dynamic conception of language, for language need
no retain its identity upon arbitrary changes in meaning, or rather, any
such identity is a matter of degree and dependent upon how much
change there is
on the other hand, language can retain its identity upon precisification
or conservative meaning change
Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 21 / 28
truth-value approach: the extension of a sentence is a truth value;
each truth value extends itself
specification space approach: extension of B will extend that of A iff B
corresponds to A at a later stage fo precisification. Two ways of
securing this:
I regard each expression as an ordered pair (A,t), where A is an
expression and t is a specification point that indicates the state of
precisification
I in precisifying and expression is not endowed with a new sense but it is
succeeded by an expression of that sense

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 22 / 28

Super-truth account

The extension of a sentence (A,t) will be an ordered pair (U,V), where

U = {u : t ≤ u and uiscomplete} and V = {v ∈ U : v |= A}
the partial specification points can be recovered from the complete
ones so long as two further conditions are satisfied.
I two points are identical if the complete specifications assigned to their
successors are the same
I for any non-empty set of complete points, there is a point extended by
exactly those points in the set

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 23 / 28

super-truth theory

a vague sentence is true iff it is true for all admissible and complete
specifications
an intensional version of the theory is that a sentence is true if it is
true for all ways of making it completely precise
super-truth is better than the other approaches for two reasons:
I it covers all cases of penumbral connections
F Resolution condition R (p. 278): an indefinite atomic sentence can be
resolved in either way upon improvement of precision
I it follows an optimising strategy: maximize one’s advantage within the
given constraints
I the resolution condition R should hold for all sentences, so that any
indefinite sentence can be resolved in either one of two ways (bipolar
resolution)

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 24 / 28

super-truth theory

a vague sentence is true iff it is true for all admissible and complete
specifications
an intensional version of the theory is that a sentence is true if it is
true for all ways of making it completely precise
super-truth is better than the other approaches for two reasons:
I it covers all cases of penumbral connections
F Resolution condition R (p. 278): an indefinite atomic sentence can be
resolved in either way upon improvement of precision
I it follows an optimising strategy: maximize one’s advantage within the
given constraints
I the resolution condition R should hold for all sentences, so that any
indefinite sentence can be resolved in either one of two ways (bipolar
resolution)

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 24 / 28

super-truth theory

a vague sentence is true iff it is true for all admissible and complete
specifications
an intensional version of the theory is that a sentence is true if it is
true for all ways of making it completely precise
super-truth is better than the other approaches for two reasons:
I it covers all cases of penumbral connections
F Resolution condition R (p. 278): an indefinite atomic sentence can be
resolved in either way upon improvement of precision
I it follows an optimising strategy: maximize one’s advantage within the
given constraints
I the resolution condition R should hold for all sentences, so that any
indefinite sentence can be resolved in either one of two ways (bipolar
resolution)

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 24 / 28

Completeability

super-truth theory presuppose completeability: which is unreasonable

the objection to completeability may be a question about our
understanding of vague sentences: how do we grasp all of those
complete admissible specifications, the existence of which is
necessary to determine truth-value?

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 25 / 28

Completeability

super-truth theory presuppose completeability: which is unreasonable

the objection to completeability may be a question about our
understanding of vague sentences: how do we grasp all of those
complete admissible specifications, the existence of which is
necessary to determine truth-value?

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 25 / 28

Three main possibilities:

1 We understand each of the predicates that make the given predicate

perfectly precise; we then grasp the complete and admissible
specifications indirectly, as those appropriate to the perfectly precise
predicates
2 we directly grasp all of the admissible and complete specifications
3 we grasp all of the perfect precisifications

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 26 / 28

Vagueness and ambiguity

vague and ambiguous sentences are subject to similar

truth-conditions:
a vague sentence is true if true for all complete precisifications
an ambiguous sentence is true if true for all disambiguations

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 27 / 28

The way we grast precisifications and disambiguations is
different

ambiguity is understood in accordance with the first account:

disambiguations are distinguished; to assert an ambiguous sentence
is to assert, severally, each of its disambiguations
vagueness is understood in accordance with the third account:
precisifications are extended from a common basis and according to
commons constraints: to assert a vague sentence is to assert„
generally, its precisifications
ambiguity is like the super-imposition of several pictures, vagueness
like an unfinished picture, with marginal notes for completion
I one can say that a super-imposed picture is realistic if each of its
disentanglements are;
I one can say that an unfinished picture is realistic if each of its
completions are;

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 28 / 28

The way we grast precisifications and disambiguations is
different

ambiguity is understood in accordance with the first account:

disambiguations are distinguished; to assert an ambiguous sentence
is to assert, severally, each of its disambiguations
vagueness is understood in accordance with the third account:
precisifications are extended from a common basis and according to
commons constraints: to assert a vague sentence is to assert„
generally, its precisifications
ambiguity is like the super-imposition of several pictures, vagueness
like an unfinished picture, with marginal notes for completion
I one can say that a super-imposed picture is realistic if each of its
disentanglements are;
I one can say that an unfinished picture is realistic if each of its
completions are;

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 28 / 28

The way we grast precisifications and disambiguations is
different

ambiguity is understood in accordance with the first account:

disambiguations are distinguished; to assert an ambiguous sentence
is to assert, severally, each of its disambiguations
vagueness is understood in accordance with the third account:
precisifications are extended from a common basis and according to
commons constraints: to assert a vague sentence is to assert„
generally, its precisifications
ambiguity is like the super-imposition of several pictures, vagueness
like an unfinished picture, with marginal notes for completion
I one can say that a super-imposed picture is realistic if each of its
disentanglements are;
I one can say that an unfinished picture is realistic if each of its
completions are;

Paulo Santos June 17, 2015 28 / 28