ABS TECHNICAL PAPERS 2002
Application of Reliability-centered Maintenance Techniques to the Marine Industry1
By: Robert M. Conachey, Randal L. Montgomery
Originally presented at Institute of Marine Engineers, India, November 2002
Abstract
Reliability-centered maintenance (RCM) is a
process of systematically analyzing an engineered
system to determine:
• system functions and impact of functional
failures,
• equipment failure modes and causes that can
result in functional failures,
• optimal strategy for managing potential
failures, including maintenance to prevent the
failures from occurring or to detect potential
failures before a failure occurs, and
• spare holding requirements.
The objective of RCM, of course, is to achieve
reliability for the system in all its operating modes.
RCM has been applied in the airline industry and
other industries (e.g., electrical utility, process
industry) for many years with notable success.
Therefore, there is no evidence to suggest that its
application to the marine industry would not meet
an equal degree of success. Traditionally,
shipboard machinery and system maintenance has
relied on planned maintenance (based on a
prescribed time schedule), and to varying degrees
on predictive maintenance (using condition-
monitoring techniques).
Specifically, this paper illustrates how risk
assessment techniques and the RCM analysis
process and tools (e.g., Task Selection Algorithm)
can be used to provide a rational decision-making
process to optimize maintenance tasks, and hence
costs, while at the same time achieving optimal
reliability for the system in all its operating modes.
This paper also argues that ship safety can be
enhanced with such a rational approach to
maintenance in place of the traditional time-
schedule based inspection and surveys. ABS
SafeShip, a lifecycle total ship safety concept, is
now being considered for extension to cover also
lifecycle maintenance of machinery based on RCM.
Introduction
By applying RCM principles, maintenance is
evaluated and applied in a rational manner that
provides the most value to a vessel’s
owner/operator. Accordingly, improved equipment
and system reliability on board ships and other
marine structures can be expected by applying this
philosophy.
Application of Reliability-Centered Maintenance Techniques to the Marine Industry
RCM is also a part of overall risk management so
that the risk of losses associated with equipment
failures can be effectively managed by the
maintenance program. This failure management is
achieved by allocating maintenance resources to
equipment maintenance according to risk impact on
the ship. For example, RCM analysis can be
employed to:
• Identify functional failures with the highest
risk, which will then be focused on for
further analyses;
• Identify equipment items and their failure
modes that will cause high-risk functional
failures; and
• Determine a maintenance strategy that will
reduce risk to acceptable levels.
The remainder of this paper summarizes the basic
principles of RCM and provides an overview of the
RCM process that will be included in ABS
SafeShip. Also a discussion on sustaining an RCM
program is included.
Overview of RCM Principles
Reliability-centered maintenance (RCM) is a
process of systematically analyzing an engineered
system to understand:
• system functions and impact of functional
failures
• equipment failure modes and causes that can
result in functional failures
• optimal strategy for managing potential
failures, including maintenance to prevent the
failures from occurring or to detect potential
failures before a failure occurs, and
• spare holding requirements.
This understanding is accomplished by applying an
analysis approach that answers these questions:
1. What are the system functions and associated
performance standards?
2. How can the system fail to fulfill these
functions?
3. What failures can cause a functional failure?
4. What happens when a failure occurs?
5. What might the consequence be when the
failure occurs?
6. What can be done to detect and prevent the
failure?
7. What should be done if a maintenance task
cannot be found?
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 ABS TECHNICAL PAPERS 2002
Typically, the following analytical tools are
employed in the RCM analyses:
• Failure modes, effects, and criticality
analysis (FMECA),
• RCM task selection flow diagram,
Risk-based decision making tools (e.g., risk
matrix).
In addition, the following system expertise is
needed to successfully and efficiently perform the
analysis:
• Design, engineering, and operational
knowledge of the system,
• Condition-monitoring techniques,
• Other proactive maintenance practices (e.g.,
lubrication).
The RCM analysis process uses these tools and
expertise to help establish the cause effect
relationship between equipment failures and
system performance (i.e., questions 1 through 5)
and then determine an effective failure
management strategy (i.e., questions 6 and 7).
To begin to understand RCM, a basic
understanding of equipment failures, equipment
failure patterns, and maintenance tasks is needed.
The following paragraphs briefly discuss each of
these topics.
Equipment Failure Basics
A combination of one or more equipment failures
and/or human errors cause a loss of system
function. Specifically, one of the focuses of
reliability improvement is to manage the
equipment failures that impact system
performance (i.e., losses of system function).
Therefore, an understanding of the factors that
influence equipment failures is needed. The
following factors usually influence equipment
failure:
• Design error
• Faulty material
• Improper fabrication and construction
• Improper operation
• Inadequate maintenance
• Maintenance errors
Note that maintenance does not influence many
of these factors; therefore, maintenance is merely
one of the many approaches to improving
equipment reliability and hence system reliability.
RCM analyses focus in reducing failures resulting
from inadequate maintenance. In addition,
RCM aids in identifying premature equipment
failures introduced by maintenance errors. In
these cases, RCM analyses may recommend
improvements for specific maintenance activities,
such as improving maintenance procedures,
improving worker performance, or adding quality
assurance/quality control tasks to verify correct
performance of critical maintenance tasks. In
10 Application of Reliability-Centered Maintenance Techniques to the Marine Industry
addition, RCM analyses may recommend design
changes and/or operational improvements when
equipment reliability cannot be ensured through
maintenance.
Next, to develop an effective failure management
strategy, the strategy must be based on an
understanding of the failure mechanism.
Equipment will exhibit several different failure
modes (e.g., how the equipment fails). Also, the
failure mechanism may be different for the
different failure modes, and the failure
mechanisms may vary during the life of the
equipment. In addition, to understanding the
failure mechanism, a basic understanding of the
equipment failure rate and pattern is needed.
Equipment Failure Rate and Patterns
One of the key concepts of RCM is that all
equipment failures are not the same; therefore,
failures may require different strategies in order to
successfully manage them. In fact depending on
the dominant system failure mechanisms, system
operation, system operating environment, and
system maintenance, specific equipment failure
modes exhibit a variety of failure rates and
patterns.
First lets discuss the failure rate. The failure rate
or lambda (λ) (i.e., the conditional probability
failure rate) is the probability that a failure occurs
during the next instant of time given that the
failure has not already occurred before that time.
The conditional failure rate, therefore, provides
additional information about the survival life and
is used to illustrate failure patterns.
Understanding that equipment failure modes can
exhibit different failure patterns has important
implications when determining appropriate
maintenance strategies. The literature has
indicated there are six different failure patterns2:
• Pattern A - Bathtub Curve
• Pattern B - Traditional Wear-Out
• Pattern C - Gradual Rise with no
Distinctive Wear-out Zone
• Pattern D - Initial Increase with a Leveling
Off
• Pattern E – Random
• Pattern F - Infant Mortality
These patterns are shown in Figure 1.
For most equipment failure modes, the specific
failure patterns are not known and fortunately
detail knowledge is not needed to make
maintenance decisions. Nevertheless, certain
failure characteristic information is needed to
make maintenance decisions. These
characteristics are:
 ABS TECHNICAL PAPERS 2002
• Wear-in failure – dominated by “weak”
members related to problems such as
manufacturing defects and installation/
maintenance/startup errors. Also known as
“burn in” or “infant mortality” failures.
• Random failure – dominated by chance
failures caused by sudden stresses, extreme
conditions, random human errors, etc. (i.e.,
failure is not predictable by time).
• Wear-out failure – dominated by end-of-
useful life issues for equipment.
These failure characteristics are best illustrated by
the failure pattern identified in Figure 2. By
simply identifying which of the three equipment
failure characteristics is representative of the
equipment failure mode, one gains insight into the
proper maintenance strategy. For example, those
patterns that do not have distinctive wear-out
regions (i.e., patterns C through F) may not benefit
from maintenance tasks of rebuilding or replacing
equipment items. There may actually be an
increase in failures as a result of infant mortality
(pattern F) and/or human errors during
maintenance tasks. If an equipment failure mode
exhibits a wear-out pattern, rebuilding or replacing
the equipment item may be an appropriate
strategy.
Finally, a basic understanding of failure rate helps
in determining whether maintenance or equipment
redesign is necessary and provides insight into
frequency of maintenance tasks. Once one begins
to understand how equipment fails and its failure
rate and pattern, an understanding of maintenance
tasks types and their relationship to the failure
characteristics is needed.
Overview of Maintenance Task Types
One of the primary objectives of the RCM analysis
is to define a set of proactive maintenance tasks
needed to manage potential equipment failures that
can impact system performance. These tasks can
manage these potential failures by:
• Preventing the failures before they occur,
• Detecting onset of failure with sufficient time
to allow corrective action before the failure
occurs,
• Discovering and correcting hidden failures
before they impact system performance.
Recognizing these three different objectives, the
maintenance tasks can be divided into following
three task types:
• Condition-monitoring Tasks - A condition-
monitoring task is a scheduled task used to
detect the onset of a failure so that action can
be taken to prevent the functional failure.
Condition-monitoring tasks are also referred to
as “predictive maintenance.” When choosing
Application of Reliability-Centered Maintenance Techniques to the Marine Industry
maintenance tasks, condition-monitoring tasks
should be considered first, unless a detect-
able potential failure condition cannot be
identified.
• Planned Maintenance Tasks - A planned
maintenance task (sometimes called preventive
maintenance) is performed on a specified
interval, regardless of the equipment’s
condition. The purpose of this type of task is
to prevent functional failure before it occurs.
Many times this type of task is applied when
no condition-monitoring task is identified or
justified, and the failure mode is characterized
with a wear-out region.
• Failure-finding Tasks - A failure-finding task
is a scheduled task used to detect hidden
failures when no condition-monitoring or
planned maintenance task is applicable. It is a
scheduled function check to determine
whether an item will perform its required
function if called upon. Most of these items
are standby or protective equipment.
In addition, the RCM analysis might indicate the
failure does not warrant any proactive maintenance
and run-to-failure is acceptable. Also, RCM
analysis should also include routine servicing tasks
to ensure the assumed failure rate and failure
pattern are valid (e.g., failure rate and pattern for
an unlubricated bearing is drastically different
from that of a lubricated bearing).
To help ensure that the RCM principles are
consistently applied, a structured analysis process
is applied. The next section describes the ABS
SafeShip RCM process.
ABS SafeShip RCM Analysis Process
The basic elements of the RCM analysis process
are:
1. Defining systems
2. Identifying functions and functional
failures
3. Conducting a failure modes, effects, and
criticality analysis (FMECA)
4. Selecting a failure management strategy
5. Documenting the analysis
The following sections briefly describe each step.
Step 1 - Defining Systems
Each system must be thoroughly defined. This
activity involves (1) partitioning the vessel into
functional groups and then into specific equipment
items and (2) defining the operating characteristics
for the ship as a whole and then for each system.
These distinctions are needed to clearly define the
boundaries and operational intent of each system
that is subject to the RCM analysis.
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 ABS TECHNICAL PAPERS 2002
Because a ship is made up of many complex
systems and subsystems, it is helpful to divide the
ship into functional groups and then into specific
equipment items within each functional group.
Partitioning a ship into functional groups is
accomplished using a top-down approach. For
most ships, the top level includes these top-level
functional groups:
• Hull
• Machinery and utilities
• Cargo handling
In most cases, partitioning of these high-level
functional groups is necessary to identify major
systems for analysis. For example, machinery and
utilities should be further divided into the
following functional groups:
• Propulsion functional group
• Maneuvering functional group
• Electrical functional group
• Ship service functional group (i.e., bilge,
ballast, firefighting, steam)
• Navigation and communication functional
group
Each functional group should be partitioned using
a top-down approach. This is done until a level is
reached at which functions are identified with
discrete physical units, such as a single system or
equipment item. This is sometimes called the
level of indenture. The level of indenture is of
vital importance as it significantly affects the
amount of time and effort required to complete a
satisfactory analysis. The level of indenture
should be such that the following can be identified
for the functional group:
• Physical boundaries
• Functions and functional failures
• Discrete equipment items
Once a satisfactory level of partitioning functional
groups has been completed, each functional group
is partitioned into specific equipment items. The
level of indenture chosen for equipment items
should be such that the equipment:
• Can be identified for its contribution to the
overall functions of the functional group,
• Can be identified for its failure modes, and
• Is the most convenient physical unit for
which maintenance can be specified.
Figure 3 shows an example of partitioning of
functional groups and their associated equipment
items.
Because of the number and size of systems on a
vessel, it may be necessary to identify an order of
12 Application of Reliability-Centered Maintenance Techniques to the Marine Industry
priority for the analysis of the functional groups so
that resources may be targeted most productively.
In general, one of the following methods is used to
select groups for analysis:
• Engineering judgment,
• Simple analytical approaches, such as
Pareto analysis and relative ranking, or
• Risk assessment.
Regardless of which approach is used to select
groups for analysis; the following considerations
should be made:
• The expected cost savings over the
predicted remaining life of the equipment
should be balanced against the cost of the
study.
• The human resources required to
undertake each analysis must be identified
and their availability ascertained.
Once the systems have been partitioned and
selected, the operating characteristics are defined.
The operating characteristics of the ship are the
foundation for RCM failure management strategy
decisions. Poorly defined or incomplete operating
characteristics will result in an improper failure
management strategy. To properly define
operating characteristics, the various operating
modes for the ship must be identified.
An operating mode of a ship is the operational
state the ship is in. Cruising at sea, cargo handling
in port, entering and departing port, navigation in
restricted waters, etc., are examples of operating
modes. Each operating mode influences the
manner in which the shipboard systems and
machinery are to be operated; this in turn dictates
the development of operating contexts for
individual functional groups.
Next, the operating modes are used to define the
operating context for each functional group. The
operating context of a functional group is the
circumstances under which the system is expected
to operate. It must fully describe:
• The physical environment in which the
functional group is operated,
• A precise description of the manner in
which the functional group is used, and
• The specified performance capabilities of
the functional group as well as the
required performance of any additional
functional groups within which the
functional group is embedded.
Some of the important factors that must be
considered in the development of the operating
context for a functional group are:
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Failure Rate

Failure Rate
Time Time
Type A — Bathtub Type B — Traditional Wear-out
(4%) (2%)
Failure Rate

Time Failure Rate Time

Type C — Gradual Rise, No Wear-out Type D — Initial Increase, Level Off
( %) ( %)
Failure Rate

Failure Rate

Time Time
Type E — Random Failure Type F — Infant Mortality
(14%) (68%)
Figure 1: Failure Patterns

I II III
Infant Useful Wear out
Mortality Life
Rate λ (t )
Failure

Burn in Wear out Time

Figure 2: Equipment Life Periods

Application of Reliability-Centered Maintenance Techniques to the Marine Industry 13

 ABS TECHNICAL PAPERS 2002
• Redundancy
• Performance and quality standards
• Environmental standards
• Safety standards
• Shift arrangements
Operating contexts are to be developed to different
degrees of detail at each level. At each level of
functional breakdown, an operating context
statement should be written for that level,
amplifying the operating context written for the
preceding level. At the lower levels of the
functional breakdown, more detail is included in
the operating context statement because by this
time, the focus is on the systems and equipment
that make up the functional group. Specific
performance parameters are necessary to clearly
define functions for the functional group and then
to determine what constitutes a failure and what
effects such failures will have upon specific
equipment performance, overall system operation,
and ultimately the ship’s roles. Example operating
contexts for the Propulsion Functional Group and
the Diesel Engine are provided in Tables 1 and 2
respectively.
Step 2 - Defining Functions and Functional
Failures
Once the operating mode for the ship and the
operating context for a functional group have been
defined, the RCM analysis team uses this
information to define the functions needed for the
functional group to successfully operate so that all
relevant ship functions are maintained. When
defining functions for a functional group, the
applicable operating modes must be considered
because functions can vary with the different
operating modes. It is important that all functions
be identified. Failure to identify all functions can
result in important failures (i.e., failures that affect
system and ship performance) being overlooked.
One method for identifying functions is to develop
a functional block diagram of the system. A
functional block diagram is a graphical
representation of the system operation. It typically
contains (1) the inputs (e.g., materials, energy
sources) entering the system boundary, (2) the
blocks representing the functions that occur within
the system boundary, and (3) the outputs (e.g.,
materials, energy, signals) leaving the boundary. In
addition, arrows are used to depict the flow of
materials, energy, signals, etc., between functional
blocks and into and out of the system. Within the
boundary, each block represents a primary or
secondary function that must be provided for the
system to convert the inputs into outputs. Figure 4
provides an example functional block diagram.
Each function should be documented as a function
statement that contains a verb, an object, and a
14 Application of Reliability-Centered Maintenance Techniques to the Marine Industry
performance standard. The performance standard
is to describe the minimum acceptable requirement
rather than the design capability. Performance
standards must be clearly defined or quantified;
they are used to define failure, which forms the
basis of the maintenance decision-making process.
Functions are to be categorized as follows:
• Primary functions – These functions are
the reasons why the system/equipment
exists.
• Secondary functions – Most systems/
equipment will have secondary functions
that will generally be less obvious than the
primary functions, although their failure
may sometimes have worse consequences.
The following functional categories can be
helpful in determining secondary functions:
Environment integrity
Safety, structural integrity
Control, containment, comfort
Appearance
Protection
Economy, efficiency
Supplementary functions
Once the functions are defined, functional failures
(i.e., different loss functions that can occur due to
failures) are defined. Functional failures can reflect
the total loss of function (e.g., provides no
compressed air) or partial loss of function (e.g.,
provides compressed air at reduced pressure and
flow). Functional failures can be identified from
functions by applying the following guides to each
function:
• No or none of the function
• Less of each performance standard
parameter
• More of each performance parameter
• Premature operation of the function
• Failure to cease operation of the function
(i.e., function operates too long)
• Intermittent operation of the function
Step 3 - Conducting an FMECA
Once potential functional failures have been
identified, the next step in the RCM analysis is to
conduct an FMECA. The purpose of this step is to
establish the cause-and-effect relationship among
potential equipment failures, functional failures,
and the end effect of the functional failures, and to
evaluate the criticality of the postulated failure
mode.
This information is vital to determine the
following:
• When a failure management strategy is
needed,
 ABS TECHNICAL PAPERS 2002
• What type of failure management strategy is
best used to manage the failure mode (i.e.,
one-time change, proactive maintenance, or
run-to-failure), and
• The importance of the failure management
strategy.
In conducting the FMECA, there are two basic
substeps: (1) identifying the failure mode and its
effects and (2) assessing the criticality of the
failure mode.
Identifying the failure mode and effects involves
postulating different equipment failure modes or
system functional failures and then determining
the following:
• Local effect, which is the immediate
impact/effect that is seen when the failure
occurs (e.g., alarm goes off, unusual noise).
• System effect, which is the system-level
impact that occurs when the failure occurs
(e.g., equipment stops operating shutting
down the system). This is the system
functional failure.
• End effect, which is the ultimate
consequence that results from the failure
(e.g., loss of system for a time period
resulting in loss revenue, release of material
potentially resulting in an employee injury or
environmental exceedance).
• Causes, which are the basic equipment
failures that can result in the equipment
failure mode or the system functional failure.
• Indications/detections, which are the alarms,
sounds, etc. that can alert operations of the
failure. (Note: Not all failures will have
indications/detections. These are hidden
failures.)
There are two basic approaches for conducting an
FMECA: a bottom-up approach and a top-down
approach. Either method can be successfully used
in an RCM analysis, and each has its strengths and
weaknesses. The key attribute of both approaches
is that they are an inductive analysis technique that
guides the RCM analysis team in establishing the
cause-and-effect relationship needed to define
maintenance requirements and discover other
improvements.
The bottom-up approach is performed by explicitly
analyzing each equipment item of interest. This
approach focuses on determining what effects
different equipment failure modes have on the
operation of the system. The bottom-up approach
determines whether the equipment failure mode
results in a local effect that causes a functional
failure that causes an end effect of interest. The
bottom-up approach helps ensure that all equipment
items are analyzed and all plausible equipment
failure modes are considered.
Application of Reliability-Centered Maintenance Techniques to the Marine Industry
The top-down approach is performed by analyzing
each function and its associated functional failures.
This approach focuses on determining what effects
different functional failures have on the operation
of the system and then what equipment failures
(i.e., failure mode) can result in the functional
failure. The top-down approach determines
whether the functional failure results in an end
effect of interest and then determines which
equipment failures can cause the functional failure.
Tables 3 and 4 show examples of bottom-up and
top-down FMECA's.
Once the effects of the failure mode have been
established, the criticality of the failure mode is
assessed. The failure mode’s criticality is
determined by the failure mode’s risk. This allows
the comparison of each failure mode to all other
failure modes with respect to risk. In addition, the
risk is used to determine the need for a failure
management strategy and if one is needed, risk
provides means to assess the effectiveness of the
failure management strategy.
The failure mode’s risk is determined by assessing
the severity of the end effect(s) and the likelihood
of the failure mode resulting in the end effect of the
given severity. For most analyses, a single end
effect (e.g., worst-case effect) (versus a range of
effects) can be used to assess the risk. The risk can
be assessed either quantitatively (i.e., numerical
rating of the risk [e.g., injuries per year]) or
qualitatively (e.g., high medium, low).
For most RCM analyses a simple risk matrix is
used to assess the risk. To develop and use a risk
matrix, consequence severity and likelihood
(frequency) bins are established. The risk matrix is
then developed based on these bins and a risk level
(e.g., high risk) is defined for each intersection (i.e.,
consequence and likelihood bin combination).
Once the risk matrix is defined, the team
determines the risk by determining which
consequence bin is descriptive of the end effect(s)
and which likelihood bin is descriptive of the
failure mode likelihood. The intersection of the
two bins then establishes the risk for the failure
mode.
Tables 5 and 6 provide example consequence and
frequency bins. Figure 5 provides an example risk
matrix.
The criticality ranking (i.e., the risk) for each
failure mode/end effect pair is then used in an RCM
task selection flow diagram chart to determine the
proper failure management strategy. The example
FMECA tables, Tables 3 and 4, include example
criticality rankings.
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 ABS TECHNICAL PAPERS 2002
Step 4 - Selecting A Failure Management
Strategy
Selecting a failure management strategy involves
three substeps:
A. Applying an RCM Task Selection Flow
Diagram
B. Allocating and planning selected tasks
C. Determining spares holding
Applying an RCM Task Selection Flow Diagram
At the level of each system/equipment for which
FMECA has been conducted, the failure modes
assessed to have high, medium, or low risks are
evaluated in accordance with the RCM Task
Selection Flow Diagram in Figure 6. The purpose
of the Task Selection Flow Diagram is to assist in
selecting the most appropriate failure management
strategy to prevent or detect a specific failure mode.
At the first decision point, the team must decide
whether the risk associated with the failure mode is
the highest or lowest risk and determine the
confidence in the risk characterization. If the
failure mode had the highest risk, then typically a
one-time change (i.e., a fundamental change in how
the equipment is designed or operated) is needed
because an acceptable level of risk cannot be
achieved through maintenance alone. However, a
failure with the lowest risk is a low-priority failure
and, therefore, is acceptable without any failure
management strategy for most organizations.
In addition, the confidence in the risk
characterization is also assessed. A high
confidence indicates the team is relatively certain
that the risk is properly characterized and,
therefore, can be used in the RCM flow diagram
without any further discussion. Low confidence
indicates that the team is uncertain and that
additional data (about the likelihood or
consequence of the failure) are needed before the
risk can be used in the decision-making process.
To be conservative, the failure mode is then
assumed to have a medium/moderate risk
characterization and is evaluated through the entire
RCM flow diagram.
The second decision point provides the
maintenance task selection. Condition-monitoring
tasks are first considered because these tasks
typically are the best choice technically and usually
the most cost-effective. In determining if the
failure mode can be managed by a condition-
monitoring task, the team must select a specific
task and then determine an appropriate task
interval.
For a condition-monitoring task to be selected, it
must first be applicable and effective. When
16 Application of Reliability-Centered Maintenance Techniques to the Marine Industry
determining the applicability and effectiveness, the
following should be considered:
• Must be practicable to implement,
• Must have a high degree of success in
detecting the failure mode, and
• Must be cost-effective.
Next, the team must evaluate the potential risk
reduction resulting from implementing the
condition-monitoring task. This is accomplished
by determining the reduction in risk that is
anticipated if the task is implemented.
In general, proactive maintenance tasks will
reduce the likelihood of the failure mode occurring
rather than the severity of the consequence. The
reduced risk is then compared to the risk
acceptance criteria to determine whether the task
should be selected.
If the risk reduction does not achieve an acceptable
level of risk, the failure mode is further analyzed to
determine if other maintenance tasks or a one-time
change is needed to manage the failure.
If condition monitoring does not provide an
effective failure management strategy, the third
decision point is evaluated. At this decision point,
the team must then use its knowledge of the failure
characteristics to evaluate the need for other
proactive maintenance tasks or one-time change. If
the failure mode exhibits a wear-in failure
characteristic, the team considers a one-time
change or redesign of the equipment item as a
means to manage the failure. If the failure mode
exhibits a wear-out failure characteristic, the team
first considers planned maintenance to manage the
failure. Again, the team must select the task and
task interval.
Again, the team must evaluate the potential risk
reduction resulting from implementing the planned
maintenance task and the task interval just as in the
condition-monitoring task.
If the risk reduction does not achieve an acceptable
level of risk, the failure mode is further analyzed to
determine if a combination of planned maintenance
or condition-monitoring tasks can achieve an
acceptable risk. If a combination does not provide
an appropriate failure management strategy, the
failure mode is further analyzed.
At the fourth decision point, the analysis team
decides whether the failure mode is an evident or a
hidden failure mode. If the failure is hidden and
there is no condition-monitoring, planned
maintenance, or combination of tasks that will
provide an acceptable risk level, the team must
determine if a failure-finding task is needed to
manage the failure.
 ABS TECHNICAL PAPERS 2002

Figure 3: Example Partitioning of Functional Groups

Application of Reliability-Centered Maintenance Techniques to the Marine Industry 17

 ABS TECHNICAL PAPERS 2002

Table 1: Example Operating Context of Propulsion Functional Group

Operating Context of Propulsion Functional Group

The propulsion system consists of a MAN B&W Diesel Type 6S70MC MkVI low-speed diesel engine rated 16,860 kW
Maximum Continuous Rating (MCR) at 91 RPM, coupled directly to a shaft supported by one intermediate bearing and two stern
tube bearings, and driving a fixed pitched propeller.
Common Operating Modes
Characteristics
At Sea In Restricted Waters Maneuvering in Port Cargo
Handling
Environmental Nominal ambient air Depending on geographical Depending on geographical Not used
Parameters temperature: 25 °C. Range location location
from –29 °C to 45 °C
Manner of Use Propels ship at 20 knots at Propels ship from 2 to 10 Propels ship from 2 to 10 Not used
85% of MCR. Capable of knots, with reversing and knots, with reversing and
continuous operation for up stopping capabilities stopping capabilities, and
to 22 days. Single-engine assists in mooring
installation
Performance To output 16,860 kW @ 91 To output at 30 to 85 RPM; To output at 30 to 85 RPM; Not Used
Capability RPM; controllable from reversing at 63 RPM, reversing at 63 RPM,
bridge, centralized control controllable from bridge, controllable from bridge,
station, and locally centralized control station, centralized control station,
and locally and locally

Table 2: Example Operating Context of Diesel Engine

Operating Context of Diesel Engine

The propulsion system consists of a MAN B&W Diesel Type 6S70MC MkVI low-speed diesel engine rated 16,860 kW
Maximum Continuous Rating (MCR) at 91 RPM, coupled directly to a shaft supported by one intermediate bearing and two stern
tube bearings, and driving a fixed pitched propeller.
Common Operating Modes
Characteristics
At Sea In Restricted Waters Maneuvering in Port Cargo
Handling
Environmental Nominal ambient air temperature: 25 °C. Depending on Depending on Not used
Parameters Range from –29 °C to 45 °C geographical location geographical location
Barometric air press (dry)
Nominal seawater inlet temperature
Cooling FW nominal temperature
L.O. max. supply temp.
F.O. supply max. temp.
Manner of Use Propels ship at 20 knots at 85% of MCR. Propels ship from 2 to Propels ship from 2 to Not used
Capable of continuous operation for up to 22 10 knots, with 10 knots, with
days. Single-engine installation reversing and stopping reversing and stopping
capabilities capabilities, and
assists in mooring
Performance To output 16,860 kW @ 91 RPM; To output at 30 to 85 To output at 30 to 85 NA
Capability controllable from bridge, centralized control RPM; reversing at 63 RPM; reversing at 63
station, and locally RPM, controllable RPM, controllable
from bridge, from bridge,
centralized control centralized control
station, and locally station, and locally

18 Application of Reliability-Centered Maintenance Techniques to the Marine Industry

 Start/Stop Signals

Control Systems
Barring
Interlock Air Starting System
Signal
Bridge
Bridge Signal
Signal

C ontrol Air
Torque
Governor
Crankcase Clean Vapor
Speed Vapor System Oil Sludge to Sludge Tank
Control
Signal
Starting
Engine Air
RPM Lube
Vapor
Oil

To Propulsion
Torque &
Heavy Fuel Oil Shafting
Fuel System Vibration
Diesel Oil Pressurized Contaminated Cleaning System, Stuffing
Fuel Basic Engine Lube Oil Box Drain Oil
RPM, Pressure
Temperature, Level Lube
Oil Lube
Cylinder Lubricating Oil
Oil

Lube Oil
Scavenge Air To Lube Oil Sludge
Exhaust

& Heat
Lube Oil
Gasses Sump Tank (to waste)
Lube Oil & Heat

Lube Oil
& Noise
Cool Lube Oil
Cylinder Scavenge Air & Exhaust
Main Lube Camshaft Lube
Lubricating Oil Gas Systems, including
Oil System Oil System
System Turbochargers Lube Oil &
Heat
Cool Freshwater
Freshwater & Heat
ABS TECHNICAL PAPERS 2002

Freshwater

Cool Freshwater Cool Freshwater

& Heat

Freshwater & Heat Freshwater & Heat

Freshwater
& Noise

Instrumentation

Application of Reliability-Centered Maintenance Techniques to the Marine Industry

Condensate

& Alarms
Exhaust Gasses
Atmospheric Air

Central Cooling Water System

Cylinder
Alarms Readouts Lubricating
Oil
Seawater
Seawater
& Heat

Figure 4: Example Functional Block Diagram

19
20
Table 3: Example Bottom-up FMECA Worksheet

No.: 1 Description: Cylinder cover assembly, including the fuel injection and exhaust ports

Item Failure Failure Causes Local Effects Functional End Effects Matrix S UL UR Indications/
Mode Charac- Failures Safeguards
teristic

1.1 Exhaust Wear-in, Cylinder cover Release of Transmits less Potential Safety Minor Probable Medium Exhaust fume
gas leak Random, sealing ring exhaust gas than 16,860 exposure of odor and visual
fails
(External Wear-out into the engine kW of power personnel to indications will
leak) Improper room to the exhaust fumes, alert operators
(evident) torquing of propulsion potentially to the failure
nuts on studs Exhaust gas shafting resulting in a
(HE) leak into single first-aid
Broken studs cooling water Reduce rpm case
(evident)
Loss of power Partial loss of
Vessel out of Property Moderate Occasional Medium
Exhaust valve in the affected containment of
seal rings in service for a Damage
cylinder, exhaust gases
cover fail time to make
causing
repairs
External leak reduced
of the exhaust engine
valve housing performance
(evident)
(linked from
7.1)

1.2 Cylinder Wear-in, Improper Catastrophic No Potential injury Safety Major Improbable Medium Engine noise,
ABS TECHNICAL PAPERS 2002

cover Random, installation of release of transmission of of personnel if exhaust fume

the cylinder cylinder torque to the
ruptures Wear-out cover (HE) pressure, propulsion hit by shrapnel odor, and
(External causing shafting engine
rupture) Manufacturing/ shrapnel to be vibration will
(evident) metallurgical released in the No alert operators
flaw engine room transmission of
torque to the to the failure
Cylinder safety High engine control system
valve fails to vibration,
open on Partial loss of Damage to Property Major Improbable Medium
requiring a
demand shutdown containment of cylinder cover Damage
fuel and/or piston
Injection valve Rupture of fuel
fails open oil line, Partial loss of
releasing fuel containment of
Cylinder liner exhaust gases Vessel out of Economic Major Improbable Medium
crack allowing oil into the
engine room service for a
cylinder to fill Partial loss of
with water containment of time to make
during engine cooling water repairs
stop

Application of Reliability-Centered Maintenance Techniques to the Marine Industry

 Table 4: Example Top-down FMECA Worksheet

No.: 25 Description: Transmit 16,860 kW of power at 91 rpm to the propulsion shafting

Item Functional Failure Failure Local Effects End Effects Matrix S UL UR Indications/
Failure Causes Charac- Safeguards
teristic

25.1 No transmission External Wear-in, High engine Potential injury to Safety Major Improbable Medium Engine noise, exhaust
of torque to the rupture of Random, vibration, requiring a personnel if hit by fume odor, and
propulsion the Wear-out shutdown shrapnel engine vibration will
shafting cylinder alert the operator to
cover Rupture of fuel oil Damage to Property Major Improbable Medium the failure
(evident) line, releasing fuel oil cylinder cover Damage
into the engine room and/or piston

Catastrophic release Vessel out of Economic Major Improbable Medium

of cylinder pressure, service for a time
causing shrapnel to to make repairs
be released in the
engine room
Partial loss of
containment of
cooling water

Loosened Wear-in, Relative motion Engine damage Property Moderate Remote Medium Visual inspection
piston rod Random, between two parts, due to a loose Damage during normal engine
studs at Wear-out fretting piston rod shutdowns
the
crosshead Studs eventually Vessel out of Economic Moderate Occasional Medium
(evident) break if left service for a time
undetected to make repairs
ABS TECHNICAL PAPERS 2002

Restricted Wear-in, Overheating of Damage to the Property Moderate Remote Medium

Application of Reliability-Centered Maintenance Techniques to the Marine Industry

oil Wear-out piston crown, piston Damage
passagewa potentially causing
y in the piston failure Vessel out of Economic Moderate Remote Medium
piston rod service for a time
(hidden) to make repairs

21
 ABS TECHNICAL PAPERS 2002

Catastrophic

Major

Moderate

Minor

Fewer than 0.001 0.001 to 0.01 0.01 to 0.1 0.1 to 1 1 or more

events/year events/year events/year events/year events/year

Improbable Remote Occasional Probable Frequent

Frequency of Occurrence
High Risk – Redesign or one-time change required to reduce risk
Medium Risk – One or more maintenance tasks are acceptable to reduce
risk (e.g., condition monitoring, preventive maintenance)
Low Risk – Run-to-failure (no maintenance) is acceptable

Figure 5: Risk Matrix with Lines of Constant Risk and Action Levels Defined

Table 5: Example Consequence (Severity) Categories

Business Property
Safety* Environmental Reputation Damage Economic

Catastrop One or more Spill of 1,000 Worldwide press $1 million or Ten or more days
hic fatalities gallons or more exposure more of lost revenue
Spill of 100 to Nationwide or
One or more severe $100,000 to One to 10 days of
Major 1,000 gallons local press
injuries $1 million lost revenue
exposure
Multiple minor (first- Spill of 10 to 100 Involvement of $10,000 to Less than 1 day of
Moderate
aid-only) injuries gallons regulatory agency $100,000 lost revenue
Spill of less than Notification of Less than Operating
Minor One minor injury
10 gallons regulatory agency $10,000 inefficiencies
* Safety losses are not intended to be compared to other losses to determine monetary equivalency.

Table 6: Example Frequency Categories

Frequency Category Frequency of Occurrence
Frequent More than 1 event per year
0.1 to 1 event per year
Probable (1 event every 10 years to 1 event per year)
0.01 to 0.1 events per year
Occasional (1 event every 100 years to 1 event every 10 years)
0.001 to 0.01 events per year
Remote (1 event every 1,000 years to 1 event every 100 years)
Less than 0.001 events per year
Improbable (Less than 1 event every 1,000 years)

22 Application of Reliability-Centered Maintenance Techniques to the Marine Industry

 ABS TECHNICAL PAPERS 2002

Is the failure Is there high

Highest One-time
mode risk in the confidence in the
highest or lowest failure mode risk change
categories? Yes ranking? Yes required

No
No

Specify run-
to-failure
strategy
Lowest

1. Is there a condition-monitoring
task that is applicable and Specify condition-
effective? monitoring task at
2. Will the task reduce the risk to Yes 1/2 the P-F interval
an acceptable level?
No
No
Does the failure mode exhibit a wear-in and/or wear-out
failure characteristic?

Yes Wear-in
Wear-out

1. Is there a planned maintenance task that 1. Is there a one-time change that is

Specify
is applicable and effective? applicable and effective?
one-time
2. Will the task reduce the risk to an 2. Will the change reduce the risk to an
change
acceptable level? acceptable level? Yes

Consider
redesign
No

Specify planned
maintenance at the
Yes appropriate life limit

1. Is there a combination of condition-

monitoring and planned maintenance tasks Specify combination
that are applicable and effective? tasks at 1/2 the P-F
2. Will the task reduce the risk to an Yes interval and the life
acceptable level? limit

No

Hidden
Will the loss of function caused by this failure mode be
hidden or evident?

Evident
1. Is there a failure-finding task that is
Specify failure-
1. Is there a task(s) that is applicable and applicable and effective?
finding task at the
effective? 2. Will the task reduce the risk to an
appropriate interval
2. Will the task reduce the risk to a acceptable level? Yes
tolerable level?

No
Yes Notes:
No
1. Applicable and effective means the task is technically feasible and is cost-
effective (e.g., meets budget constraints)
Specify the tasks at One-time change 2. Acceptable risk is the risk level that meets the acceptance criteria and
the appropriate may be necessary to requires no further risk reduction
interval to achieve a achieve a tolerable 3. Tolerable risk is the risk level that is marginally acceptable and for which
tolerable risk risk no further risk reduction is feasible

W:\Reports\2000\475-00\475-01-00\Graphics\RCM Decision Diagrams.vsd

Figure 6: RCM Task Selection Flow Diagram

Application of Reliability-Centered Maintenance Techniques to the Marine Industry 23

 ABS TECHNICAL PAPERS 2002
As for condition-monitoring and planned
maintenance tasks, a failure-finding task must first
be applicable and effective to be selected.
Next, the team must evaluate the potential risk
reduction resulting from implementing the failure-
finding task just as in the condition-monitoring
and planned maintenance tasks.
If the failure is evident or it is hidden and there is
no failure-finding task that will provide an
acceptable risk level, the team must decide if risk
cannot be practically reduced to the low risk level.
Then the team determines which of the tasks (or
combination of tasks) provides the best failure
management strategy. If the team determines that
the risk can and should be lower than what can be
achieved with maintenance, the team should
consider one-time changes to manage the failure.
To evaluate the effectiveness of one-time changes,
the team should determine the potential changes
and consider the following:
• Does the one-time change reduce the risk
to an acceptable level?
• If not, does the one-time change reduce
the risk to a tolerable level with no further
risk reduction reasonably possible?
• Is the one-time change cost-effective?
That is, is the cost reasonable for the
resulting risk reduction?
• Are any of the other maintenance tasks
discussed more effective, or can they
result in more risk reduction than the one-
time change?
In addition, the team should examine rounds and
routine inspection tasks. These important tasks
help ensure the failure rate curve for the failure
mode (that is the basis for the proactive
maintenance tasks and risk characterization) is not
altered (e.g., premature wear-out of bearing
because of lack of lubrication).
Allocating and Planning Maintenance Tasks
The maintenance tasks derived from the RCM
analysis are to be allocated in accordance with the
following categories:
• Category A — Can be undertaken at sea
by the ship’s crew
• Category B — Must be undertaken
alongside by equipment vendors or with
use of dockside facilities
• Category C — Must be undertaken in a
dry dock facility
Because the task intervals derived from the RCM
analysis need not be in alignment with the current
calendar-based maintenance schedule, the team
should adjust and integrate these task intervals into
a common maintenance schedule. For this
24 Application of Reliability-Centered Maintenance Techniques to the Marine Industry
purpose, RCM task intervals may have to be
adjusted to a shorter or longer interval depending
on the criteria given below.
• Tasks with safety/environmental
consequences should only be adjusted to a
shorter task interval to ensure that safety
and the environment are not compromised
• Tasks with operational consequences may
be adjusted to a longer or shorter task
interval. However, when adjusting to a
longer interval, the team should obtain the
approval of the responsible person in the
shipping company.
Finally, the Category B and C task intervals should
then be organized to derive an overall maintenance
schedule. This is done by adjusting the RCM task
intervals (Category B and C tasks only) using the
criteria specified in Category B, so that the tasks
can coincide with the ship’s port calling and dry-
docking schedules.
Determining Spare Holdings
For the proposed maintenance schedules to be
viable, it is essential that the spares that support
the identified maintenance tasks are available in
the appropriate time scales. On completion of the
RCM analysis, the spare holding requirements will
be developed based on the following
considerations:
• A list of the parts necessary to perform tasks to
correct each failure mode identified in the
RCM study, along with the parts required as a
result of remedial work to correct “on-
condition,” “failure finding,” and “run-to-
failure” failures;
• An evaluation of the effects on the system’s
operational availability if an out-of-stock
condition occurs; and
• Assessment for those parts whose use can be
anticipated (preplanned). For the parts whose
use cannot be anticipated, determine the
quantity necessary to achieve the desired
operational availability.
The purpose of Figure 7 is to assist the team in
selecting the most appropriate spares holding to
achieve the desired level of safety, protection of
the environment, and operational availability.
Step 5 - Documenting RCM Analyses
The information used in and the results from each
RCM analysis step must be documented. The
entire RCM analysis should be documented for the
following reasons:
• To provide defendability,
• To provide auditability,
• To establish a baseline,
 ABS TECHNICAL PAPERS 2002
• To preserve corporate memory, and
• To ensure a living RCM program.
The analysis and program documentation should
include:
• Summary of the analysis proceedings and
the decisions taken,
• Progressive improvements based on
operational and maintenance experience, and
• Clear audit trails of maintenance actions
taken and improvements made.
Once the analysis has been completed and the
RCM-derived tasks implemented, the RCM
program transfers to sustainment mode (versus an
analysis and implementation mode).
Sustaining the RCM Program
A maintenance program that is based on the RCM
philosophy must be dynamic. This is especially
true during the early stages of a new program
when it is based on limited information. The
vessel operator must be prepared to collect,
analyze, review and respond to in-service data
throughout the operating life of the vessel in order
to continually refine the maintenance program.
The procedures and processes used to monitor,
analyze, update, and refine the maintenance
program through RCM analysis will sustain the
program. These procedures and processes are to
be identified in the RCM program plan.
The basis for the decisions made during an RCM
analysis are not static. As the maintenance
program experiences changes because of
equipment and system modifications and
modernization, reviewing and refining the
maintenance program must occur continuously.
An organized information system is necessary to
capture the data from the performance of the
maintenance tasks (selected during the previous
RCM analyses) as well as from data from other
analyses, such as periodic root cause failure
analyses. This information is used to determine
what refinements and modifications need to be
made to the initial maintenance program.
Secondly, it is used to determine the need for
taking other actions, such as product improvement
or operational changes. These two purposes are
met by monitoring and adjusting existing
maintenance tasks, developing emergent
requirements, and periodically assessing RCM-
generated maintenance requirements. Analysts use
this new information to revise RCM analyses,
which subsequently may reflect a need for changes
to the maintenance program.
The objective of the sustainment process is to:
• Continually monitor and optimize the current
maintenance program,
• Delete unnecessary requirements,
• Identify adverse failure trends,
Application of Reliability-Centered Maintenance Techniques to the Marine Industry
• Address new failure modes, and
• Improve overall efficiency and effectiveness
of the RCM and maintenance programs.
Sustainment efforts should be organized such that
the results can be effectively used to support the
RCM analysis updates. Following are a list of
RCM sustainment processes that can be applied, as
appropriate:
• trend analysis
• maintenance requirements document
reviews
• task packaging reviews
• age exploration tasks
• failure analysis
Failure Analysis
One key sustainment activity is failure analysis. A
successful RCM program has a process to address
failures (loss events) and other unpredicted events,
and to determine the appropriate response or
corrective action. An example of such a process is
shown in Figure 8.
A root cause analysis should be performed first to
develop an understanding of the failure. By using
a structured process, the analysis can identify areas
such as maintenance, operations, design, human
factors, etc., which require further analysis. The
key steps in a root cause analysis include:
• Identifying the failure/loss event or
potential failure/loss event
• Classifying the event and convening a
trained team suitable for addressing the
issues posed by this event
• Gathering data to understand how the
event happened
• Performing a root cause failure analysis to
understand why it happened
• Generating corrective actions to keep it
(and similar events) from recurring
• Verifying that corrective actions are
implemented
• Putting all of the data related to this event
into an information system for trending
purposes
The failure may be addressed by corrective actions
for which an RCM analysis is not necessary.
Examples of non-RCM corrective actions include
technical publication changes and design
changes.
The root cause analysis may reveal problems that
may need immediate attention. Issuing inspection
bulletins, applying temporary operational
restrictions, and implementing operating safety
measures are examples of interim actions.
25
 ABS TECHNICAL PAPERS 2002

Will the stock-out or the stock-out and No spares

further failure have an effect on one of the holding
following? required
No
or Yes

Safety or Operational Nonoperational

environment (e.g., equipment
damage)

1. Can the parts requirements be anticipated (i.e.,

can the parts be obtained before failure Order parts
occurs)? before
2. Does this strategy provide an acceptable risk? demand
Yes

No No No

1. Is it feasible and cost-effective to hold required

parts and quantity in stores? Hold parts
2. Does this strategy provide an acceptable risk?
Yes

No No No

Revise Review Review RCM

RCM tasks RCM tasks tasks as
needed

W:\Reports\2000\475-00\475-01-00\Graphics\RCM Decision Diagrams.vsd

Figure 7: Spares Holding Decision Flow Diagram3

26 Application of Reliability-Centered Maintenance Techniques to the Marine Industry

 ABS TECHNICAL PAPERS 2002
The results produced from reviewing the RCM
analysis will be a factor that should be considered
in determining a response to the failure. It is
necessary that an RCM review be part of the
overall methodology. The RCM review and
update, if required, will determine if changes in
maintenance requirements are necessary. The
review will indirectly aid in determining if
corrective actions are necessary. Decisions not to
update the RCM analysis should be documented
for audit purposes. During the RCM review the
following questions should be addressed:
• Is the failure mode already covered?
• Are the failure consequences correct?
• Are the reliability data accurate?
• Is the existing task (or requirement for no
task) adequate?
• Are the related costs accurate?
When new failure modes or failure modes
previously thought unlikely to occur are
determined to be significant, the RCM analysis is
to be updated. The existing analysis for a failure
mode may also be determined to be correct or
inadequate. Inadequate analyses can result for
any number of reasons, such as revision of
mission requirements or changes to operator or
maintenance procedures.
Failures and other unpredicted events are available
from several sources, including the following
examples:
• Defect reports issued by maintenance
engineering or the vessel’s crew;
• Defects discovered during routine vessel
repairs in a shipyard;
• Vendor and original equipment manu-
facturer reports related to inspections,
rework, or overhauls;
• Design changes, which may be in the form
of a single item change or a major system
modification; and
• Results of tests (such as certification tests
or tests performed during the course of a
failure investigation or some other
unrelated event) that may require RCM
review and update.
Assessment of the RCM Program
Effectiveness
Another key to the sustainment effort is assessing
the effectiveness of the RCM program. To
measure the effectiveness of the RCM program,
performance parameters are identified and
monitored. The RCM analyses should have
established the units of performance measurement
for the equipment under evaluation. The feedback
from the effectiveness assessments can be used to
Application of Reliability-Centered Maintenance Techniques to the Marine Industry
provide justification for the continued use of RCM
to management. Examples of effectiveness assess-
ments are cost avoidance, maintenance performed,
and operational availability.
Cost avoidance compares the operational cost
related to the original maintenance or reliability of
an item with the operational cost that result after
the application of an RCM analysis.
The man-hours expended in performing scheduled
and unscheduled maintenance may provide an
indication of the maintenance program’s effective-
ness. Comparison of man-hours expended prior to
implementation of RCM-generated tasks with
man-hours expended afterward may provide a
useful measure. A similar approach may be used
for measuring the effectiveness of the sustaining
efforts.
The effectiveness of RCM-generated tasks may
also be measured by the availability of the equip-
ment or system before and after implementation of
the RCM program. Certain equipment operating
without the benefit of an RCM program may
require extensive unscheduled maintenance, which
negatively impacts availability. Also, equipment
that is subject to too much maintenance will also
affect availability.
Other relevant maintenance metrics that can be
used to monitor the RCM program include:
• Compliance with the RCM maintenance
plan
• Safety performance metrics (e.g., number of
recordable incidents, incident rate)
• Environmental performance metrics (e.g.,
permit exceedances, average emission rates)
• Miles/ton of fuel
• Asset downtime
• Number of breakdowns
• Port maintenance days
• Comparison of actual maintenance costs to
budgeted maintenance costs
Overview of Alternative RCM
Analysis Processes
As can be seen in this paper, a full-blown,
traditional RCM analysis is very detailed and may
require more resources and effort than a vessel
owner/operator is willing to expend or is
warranted (e.g., why spend $10,000 to perform an
analysis on a $1000 problem.) Therefore, many
organizations pursue alternative or streamlined
RCM analysis approaches. While there are
shortcomings and critics of the streamlined
approaches, they can be a cost-effective means for
improving maintenance.
27
 ABS TECHNICAL PAPERS 2002

Root Cause
Failure
Failure Analysis

Non-RCM Yes Non-RCM

Corrective Action
Corrective Action
Required?

No

Interim Action Yes

Interim Action
Required?

No

RCM Review

RCM Update Yes

RCM Update
Required?

No

Document Results

475-00 RCM Concept Doc.vsd

Figure 8: Process to Address Failures and Unpredicted Events4

28 Application of Reliability-Centered Maintenance Techniques to the Marine Industry

 ABS TECHNICAL PAPERS 2002
Streamlined approaches typically follow many of
the same steps, except they only focus on “critical”
equipment items or equipment failure modes, or
the analysis assumes that the current maintenance
tasks are in place. One streamlined approach that
ABS is developing is called Knowledge-based
RCM™.
The Knowledge-based RCM is intended for
machinery systems in which all of the following is
true:
• The vessel’s owners/operators have
considerable operating and maintenance
knowledge and experience with the
equipment to be analyzed;
• The current proactive/preventive
maintenance program is satisfactory, but
possibly excessive; and
• The vessel’s owner/operator desires to
apply a streamlined RCM analysis
approach (as compared to a traditional
RCM analysis approach).
This approach focuses on analyzing the
effectiveness of the current maintenance practices
in preventing or detecting the dominant equipment
failure modes, but at the same time holds true to
the basic principles of RCM embodied in the RCM
seven questions.
To ensure that the basic RCM principles are
followed, this approach uses (1) some simplified
and less structured analysis tools that rely heavily
on the team’s knowledge and experience and (2)
some of the same analysis tools as traditional
RCM. This approach also integrates risk-based
decision-making tools to ensure that the team is
analyzing the correct issues.
A four-step approach is used. The Knowledge-
based RCM analysis steps are:
1. Identify significant equipment items and
their failure modes of interest
2. Correlate current maintenance tasks to
failure modes of interest
3. Perform an FMECA
4. Select a failure management strategy and
package the maintenance tasks
The following paragraphs briefly explain this
approach.
Step 1 - Identify significant equipment
items and their failure modes of interest
The objective of this step is begin to establish the
relationship between equipment failures and
system functional failures with the focus being on
the dominant equipment failures.
Application of Reliability-Centered Maintenance Techniques to the Marine Industry
The analysis first begins with identifying the
system functions and their associated functional
failures. Next, the analysis team uses their
knowledge and experience to determine which
equipment items can fail and result in each
functional failure.
Once the equipment items that can fail and result
in a functional failure are identified, the risk of the
equipment failure is assessed to determine if it
poses an unacceptable risk (e.g., medium or high
risk). The risk can be assessed using a simple risk
matrix, such as the one presented in Figure 5. The
result is a list of significant equipment items (i.e.,
equipment whose failure can cause a functional
failure with an unacceptable risk).
Once the significant equipment items are
identified, the failure modes of interest are
determined. For the frequent equipment failure
items, the failure modes of interest are those that
have been experienced and are considered
dominant by the team. For the low frequency/high
consequence events, the failure modes of interest
are those that can conceivably result in the high
consequence event(s).
Step 2 - Correlate current maintenance
tasks to failure modes of interest
Next, we begin to create the relationship between a
vessel’s current proactive maintenance tasks and
the equipment failure modes. This is
accomplished by creating a simple grid that
correlates the equipment failure modes with the
maintenance tasks based on the team’s knowledge
and experience. The team must determine if a task
is an effective means of detecting and/or
preventing the failure mode. The team develops a
grid for each equipment item that can fail and
result in a functional failure with an unacceptable
risk. Table 7 provides an example grid.
Step 3 - Perform an FMECA
In this step, an FMECA is performed on the
significant equipment items. Specifically, only the
failure modes of interest for each significant
equipment item are analyzed. The purpose of the
FMECA is to (1) finish establishing the
relationship between equipment failure modes and
system functional failures, and (2) assess the risk
of the failure mode with the current applicable
maintenance tasks (identified in Step 2).
A FMECA worksheet similar to the one presented
in Table 3 is used to document this step.
29
 ABS TECHNICAL PAPERS 2002
Step 4 – Select A Failure Management
Strategy and Package the Maintenance
Tasks
Once the FMECA has been completed (i.e., Step
3) and any current tasks which have not been
correlated to any specific failure mode in Step 2
have been identified, RCM decision diagrams are
used to select an appropriate failure management
strategy. Since the current tasks were included in
the analysis, the RCM decision diagrams must
assess the need for the current task and determine
if the current task can be altered (e.g., interval
extended or task deleted). In addition, RCM
decision diagrams must account for failure modes
in which there are no applicable tasks. The
following are the four situations that must be
analyzed:
1. Current tasks that were identified as being
effective in preventing or detecting a
failure mode;
2. Failure modes in which no current tasks
are being performed;
3. Current tasks that were identified as not
being effective in preventing or detecting a
failure mode (i.e., tasks in Step 2 that were
not correlated to a failure mode); and
4. Current maintenance tasks for equipment
items not identified as significant in
Step 1.
Three different RCM decision diagrams are used
to evaluate these situations. The traditional RCM
decision diagram (i.e., Figure 6) and the two
decision diagrams provided in Figures 9 and 10.
The results of the decision diagram are
documented in a worksheet (see Table 8). The
tasks are then planned and scheduled as in the full-
blown RCM approach.
30 Application of Reliability-Centered Maintenance Techniques to the Marine Industry
Summary
This paper has illustrated how the RCM analysis
approaches used in other industries can be applied
to marine machinery. While applying RCM to
marine machinery is a relatively new concept to
vessel owners/operators and there is little data
available to quantify the expected benefits from
applying RCM to marine machinery, there is no
reason to believe that vessel owners/operators will
not see the same benefits of other industries that
have embraced RCM. Some of the benefits that
vessel owners/operators can expect are:
• An integrated program to address safety and
environmental concerns, as well as machinery
integrity and reliability;
• Increased life of critical machinery and
components;
• More cost-effective maintenance; and
• Improved understanding of equipment failures
and their impact on vessel performance.
In addition, RCM provides vessel
owners/operators the opportunity to develop and
technically justify alternate maintenance plans to
classification societies.
References
1. Concept Document – Reliability-centered
Maintenance, American Bureau of Shipping,
Revision 2, 30 May 2002.
2. Reliability-centered Maintenance, US
Department of Commerce, by F. Stanley Nowlan
and Howard F. Heap, December 1978.
3. Adapted from the diagram in Ministry of
Defense, Requirements for the Application of
Reliability-centered Maintenance to HM Ships,
Submarines, Royal Fleet Auxiliaries, and Other
Naval Auxiliary Vessels, Naval Engineering
Standard NES 45, Issue 3, September 1999.
4. Guidelines for the Naval Aviation Reliability-
centered Maintenance Process, Published by
Direction of Commander, Naval Air Systems
Command, NAVAIR 00-25-403, 01 February
2001.
 ABS TECHNICAL PAPERS 2002

Table 7: Example Maintenance Task/ Failure Mode Grid

Equipment Item: Pump 1A
Current Maintenance Tasks Dominant Failure Modes
Task Interval Task Type External Leak Fails Off Degraded Head
Lubrication 1 month Servicing X
Vibration 1 month Condition monitoring X X X
Visual 1 week Condition monitoring X
Inspection
Oil Analysis 3 months Condition monitoring
Rebuilding 1 year Preventive maintenance X X X

Analyze each failure mode

and its current maintenance
tasks

Are any of the current

maintenance tasks Consider deleting the
inappropriate for the failure Yes task
characteristic?
No

1. Is acceptable risk achieved with the

current maintenance tasks?
2. Is there a high confidence in this risk
assessment?

No Yes

1. Can some tasks be deleted without

Consider deleting Estimate the risk assuming
increasing the risk?
the tasks the current maintenance
Yes 2. Is there a high confidence in this risk
tasks are not performed
assessment?
No

1. Can acceptable risk be achieved by 1. Is acceptable risk achieved without

shortening the task intervals? the current maintenance tasks? Consider deleting the
2. Is it feasible and cost effective to 2. Is there a high confidence in this risk Yes tasks
Specify the tasks assessment?
with new intervals perform the tasks at the shortened
intervals? No
Yes 3. Is there a high confidence in this risk
assessment?
1. Can some tasks be deleted and still
No achieve acceptable risk? Consider deleting the
2. Is there a high confidence in this risk Yes tasks
assessment?
No
New additional tasks or a
one-time change may be
1. Can task intervals be extended and
needed to achieve acceptable
acceptable risk still be achieved? Specify the tasks with
risk (see Figure 6)
2. Is there a high confidence in this risk Yes extended task intervals
assessment?

No

Specify the tasks

as they are

Notes:
1. For a task type to be appropriate it must be technically effective and
must match the failure characteristic (e.g., planned maintenance for
wear-out failures.
2. Acceptable risk is the risk level that meets the acceptance criteria
and requires no further risk reduction.

Figure 9: RCM Diagram for Evaluating Current Maintenance Tasks

Application of Reliability-Centered Maintenance Techniques to the Marine Industry 31

 ABS TECHNICAL PAPERS 2002

Evaluate each current task

being considered for deletion

Will deleting the task alter

the failure rate or pattern Delete the
Is the task a servicing task?
Yes for the applicable failure No task
mode?
No
Yes

Brainstorm what credible

failure modes the task could Can the task interval be Specify task
be preventing or detecting extended without altering with new
the failure rate or pattern? Yes interval
and then evaluate each
failure mode
No

Does the task interval

Specify task
need to be shortened to
Update the RCM with new
Was the failure mode achieve an acceptable
analysis to include this Yes interval
included in the FMECA? risk?
No failure mode
No
Yes

Specify
1. Was acceptable risk
current task
achieved with the other Update the RCM
as is
maintenance tasks? analysis to include the
2. Is there a high confidence No maintenance task
in this risk assessment?
Yes

Can this maintenance task

provide more cost-
effective failure Delete the
management strategy maintenance task
than the previously No
selected strategy?
Yes

Update the analysis

to include the
maintenance task

Figure 10: RCM Diagram for Determining Current Maintenance Task Deletions

32 Application of Reliability-Centered Maintenance Techniques to the Marine Industry

 Table 8: Example Task Selection using Figure 9

Effects Risk Characterization1 Task Selection2

Failure Failure Hidden/ Local Functional End S CL CR Proposed Action(s) PL PR Disposition
Mode Char. Evident failure
External Wear-out Evident Release of Loss of Potential Maj. Rem. Medium Delete rebuilding task Rem. Med. Consider
leak hazardous containment severe deleting the
material injury to rebuilding task
employees 1. Reduce vibration Rem. Med.
analysis interval to 1
week
2. Maintain visual
inspection at 1 week
1. Reduce vibration Imp. Low 1. Reduce
analysis interval to 1 vibration
week analysis interval
2. Reduce visual to 1 week
inspection interval to 2. Reduce
daily visual
inspection
interval to daily
Fails off Random Evident Brief loss of Transfer time Brief Min. Occ. Low 1. Delete rebuilding Occ. Low Delete
flow until too long interruption task because it is rebuilding task
the spare in inappropriate because it is
pump is production 2. Other tasks remain inappropriate
started the same
Delete all tasks Freq. Med.
ABS TECHNICAL PAPERS 2002

Application of Reliability-Centered Maintenance Techniques to the Marine Industry

Lubrication at an Prob. Low Lubrication at
interval of 1 month an interval of 1
month

33
34
Table 8: Example Task Selection using Figure 9 (cont’d)
Effects Risk Characterization1 Task Selection2
Failure Failure Hidden/ Local Functional End S CL CR Proposed Action(s) PL PR Disposition
Mode Char. Evident failure
Degraded Wear-out Evident Reduced Transfer time Production Mod. Rem. Low Delete all tasks Occ. Med.
head flow of too long rate
material reduced
1. Delete vibration Occ. Med.
analysis
2. Maintain rebuilding
at 1 year interval
1. Maintain vibration Rem. Low Team has low
analysis at 1 month confidence that
2. Delete rebuilding vibration
task analysis will
always detect
degraded
performance
1. Maintain vibration Rem. Low 1. Maintain
analysis at 1 month vibration
2. Increase rebuilding analysis at 1
task interval to 2 month
years 2. Increase
rebuilding task
interval to 2
years
ABS TECHNICAL PAPERS 2002

1
- Risk characterization abbreviations are: S is severity; CL is current likelihood; CR is current risk
2
– Task Selection abbreviations are: PL is projected likelihood; PR is projected risk

Application of Reliability-Centered Maintenance Techniques to the Marine Industry