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Sustaining Successful Democracy Through Ethnic Division: Propagating A Human Identity For Autonomy, Integration and Interdependence
Sustaining Successful Democracy Through Ethnic Division: Propagating A Human Identity For Autonomy, Integration and Interdependence
Successful
Democracy
Through
Ethnic
Division
Propagating a Human
Identity for
Autonomy,
Integration and
Interdependence
After six years of American occupation and countless more of sectarian violence in Iraq,
many around the world have begun to doubt the viability of ethnically divided states. In fact,
democratization scholars such as Snyder and Wilkinson believe that democracy can promote
ethnic conflict. Though the prospects of establishing and maintaining functioning democracies in
ethnically divided societies around the world may look grim, I argue that democracy can indeed
be successful regardless of the depth of ethnic cleavages by harvesting a united national identity
suggested by Horowitz’s centripetalist views and Moser’s research, maximizing the autonomy
and integration of ethnic minorities in conjunction with increasing the political interdependence
of elites on minorities, we can avoid institutionalizing ethnic cleavages and help young
democracies to grow into the multicultural identities that will induce future coexistence.
Despite ethnocentric tendencies, it is unlikely that elites in every ethnically divided polity
are genuinely racists or separatists, or even zealous nationalists. Because of time and politics,
certain ethnicities are pitted against each other. While this is difficult to reverse, it is not an
innate and eternal mortal combat as the ‘ancient hatreds’ theory suggests. Rather, ethnic identity
is a tool, and a choice, and while there are some identities one can not choose, we are all dealt a
hand from which we can play any, or many cards at a given time. Snyder and Wilkinson both
expound on the idea that elites use these ethnic identities as well as nationalism to direct electoral
outcomes. According to Wilkinson “…ethnic riots, far from being relatively spontaneous
eruptions of anger, are often planned by politicians for a clear electoral purpose.” (p.1). This
‘elite persuasion’ view shows how democratization may promote ethnic violence if elites are
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ACP565 Moser Spring2009
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willing to invoke nationalism to gain or maintain power in high-stakes elections; making young
In turn, masses use ethnic identity and social cleavages (whether ethnic or economic) to
align their votes. In terms of specific examples, Wilkinson cites the situation in southern India
where the polity is saliently divided between Hindus and Muslims in the southern states. He
finds that nationalistic temptation is universal, yet astoundingly high and vulnerable to elite
manipulation at local levels where anti-minority events held before highly competitive elections
are designed to spark violent minority counter-mobilization. The resulting conflict rallies anti-
minority sentiment behind the nationalist party. Thus on a local level, democratic competition
increases violence.
Yet the paradox remains, for democracy increases violence at the local level and reduces
it at the state level. According to Wilkinson “…democratic states protect minorities when it is in
their governments’ electoral interest to do so.”(p.6). This electoral interest, he says, “…is
predicted perfectly by their degrees of party competition and minority support…” (p.8). Thus,
elite motivation is the driving force behind selective ethnic identification and the inciting or
preventing of ethnic violence. If this mass desire for communal identification can be harvested
and directed towards a united identity that surpasses elite manipulated nationalism, the social
The second piece of this puzzle then becomes reflecting this multicultural integration in
political institutions, specifically in electoral design. According to both Arend Lijphart, and
David L. Horowitz, power sharing is the only way to build electoral systems that will support
stable democratic regimes in ethnically divided societies. Despite their agreement on the fact that
institutions and identities matter in order to transcend ethnic divisions, and on the fact that ethnic
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ACP565 Moser Spring2009
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parties struggle only for their own interests and not for universal appeal, they propose two
According to Lijphart and what has been labeled the ‘consociational’ approach, the best
way to engineer new democracies involves a large executive coalition which includes the main
factions. He also proposes granting factional autonomy while promoting a high degree of
fact, in his critique of Horwitz’s approach, known as the ‘centripetal’ approach Lijphart says “It
is hard to imagine that, in the long run, the two minorities would be satisfied with this kind of
(p.98). This shows Lijphart’s unstated subscription to the out-dated ‘ancient-hatred’ theory
which pits certain ethnic groups against one another until the end of time. In addition to this
fashion.”(p.100). Yet, ethnic division begets ethnic division. Lijphart’s precise proportional
representation clearly indicates that every minute division, even ‘noncommunal’ ones will not
advice would create a constitutional base for ethnic discrimination, a bloody burden for future
generations.
Instead I propose reducing the weight of ethnicity. While this may seem like a lofty and
idealistic goal in places where deep ethnic divisions manifest themselves through sectarian
violence, it is the unbounded opposite of an ‘ancient hatreds’ perspective; for it maintains that
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the current divisions are not permanent and we must constantly struggle to erase them and shape
thought which suggests that any executive coalition be limited to moderate parties, non-ethnic
based decentralization of power, majoritarian electoral systems that reward moderation, and a
proportionality, Horowitz sees the flaw in Lijphart’s consociationalism wherein PR does not
guarantee more cooperation in the legislature than what is seen in society; it will likely mirror
any and all societal divides. His goal then becomes figuring out how to shape elections that
According to Horowitz if politicians must seek out votes outside of their same ethnic
group to win this will increase intergroup cooperation and moderation. The best way to
encourage this moderation is by encouraging the adoption of preferential voting systems. These
preferential voting systems lead to the election of a Condorcet winner, which in ethnically
divided societies is often moderate because such a system rewards candidates appealing to a
majority as acceptable, not as most popular. He suggests specifically, alternative vote systems
and the Coombs rule, which are slightly different tools to produce the Condorcet winner. As
opposed to casting one single choice, voters rank candidates by preference. The main point of
this is that by considering second and lower selections, Horowitz asserts that they are better
suited to ensure that the Condorcet winner gets the most votes, therefore is most acceptable.
Last of all, according to Horowitz “If preferential systems…are intended to reflect the full array of
voter preferences, they may also shape those preferences, and they may shape the behavior of the parties competing
under them…Such preferential systems thus encourage the formation of preelectoral coalitions, and those coalitions
in turn depend upon the ability or parties to compromise their differences. Hence the conciliatory thrust of systems
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of this sort under the conditions specified.” (pp.123-124). This shows that just as with any institution,
electoral systems can channel and eventually shape preferences. By limiting electoral success to
Yet as with all theories, when applied to the real world it doesn’t apply at all times in all
places. In his research on post-communist democracies, Robert Moser shows that electoral
engineering can sometimes have unexpected results. He concludes that PR has conditional
benefits and that ethnic representation slides on a scale between minority assimilation and ethnic
mobilization for, “the election of ethnic minorities is contingent upon the electoral mobilization
of coethnic voters.” (p.276). When candidates require the ethnic vote to win they have incentives
to reduce discrimination and violence (as also shown by Wilkinson) and when minorities are
assimilated, all bets are off, for they are no longer seen as outsiders. He concludes thus that
geographically dispersed groups, and small as well as large geographically concentrated groups.
Moser’s findings that PR does not always impact minority representation validate my
claim that the creation of a greater identity while assimilating minorities yet granting them
Leaders can channel ethnicity into violence or a shared identity, and the fragility of new
democracies makes them susceptible. This elite manipulation of nationalist tendencies often
explodes into years of bloodshed, which as I showed through the research of Snyder and
Wilkinson, reaps the most immediate electoral benefits. As epitomized by Horowitz’s centripetal
theories, “Deliberate choice, not cultural affinity, ought to be the basis of decisions…”(p.120)
Promoting integration, and self-determination (what Moser calls autonomy) is our hope that the