Motivation and Emotion

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11031-018-9673-7

ORIGINAL PAPER

Countering embarrassment-avoidance by taking an observer’s

perspective
Li Jiang1   · Aimee Drolet2 · Carol A. Scott2

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2018

Abstract
The fear of embarrassment can have harmful effects in many important consumer domains (e.g. health and financial), espe-
cially for high public self-consciousness (PUBSC) consumers. This research examines how adopting the perspective of an
observer interacts with trait PUBSC to influence embarrassment-avoidance. Study 1 demonstrates that individuals high in
PUBSC (vs. not) are more likely to take an actor’s perspective and to feel personal distress when viewing an ad with an
embarrassment appeal. Studies 2–3 show that seeing oneself as an observer is a helpful strategy for combatting embarrass-
ment-avoidance for high PUBSC individuals. This process is effortful and requires cognitive resources. Together, Studies
1–3 demonstrate the power of our theory to explain, predict, and modify embarrassment-avoidance among individuals most
likely to anticipate and avoid embarrassment.

Keywords  Embarrassment-avoidance · Empathy · Perspective-taking · Personal distress · Public self-consciousness

Introduction to be aware of oneself as a social object (Fenigstein et al.

As consumers, we often forgo opportunities to help our-
selves, and others, in order to avoid embarrassment (e.g.
Helweg-Larsen and Collins 1994). Our fear of embarrass-
ment prevents us from admitting we do not know how a
product, such as a mortgage or birth control, works. It pre-
vents us from asking advice about what we should do, for
example, about our mounting mortgage bills and unplanned
pregnancies. In many cases, if we are to help ourselves, and
others, we must overcome our fear of embarrassment in
social situations (Foss and Crenshaw 1978).
This overwhelming tendency to avoid embarrassment
is especially true for people who are high in public self-
consciousness (PUBSC). PUBSC is defined as the tendency
* Li Jiang
ljiang2@andrew.cmu.edu
Aimee Drolet
adrolet@anderson.ucla.edu
Carol A. Scott
cscott@anderson.ucla.edu
1 The present research builds on three streams of past lit-
Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
2
UCLA Anderson School of Management, Los Angeles,
CA 90095‑1481, USA
1975). High public self-consciousness (HPUBSC) corre-
sponds to heightened feelings of being the focus of attention
(Fenigstein 1984), i.e. being in the social “spotlight”, and of
paranoia (von Gemmingen et al. 2003). HPUBSC consumers
appear to be more concerned than others are with how they
are regarded by others (e.g., Froming et al. 1990; Miller and
Cox 1982), and are more prone to embarrassment-avoidance
(Lau-Gesk and Drolet 2008).
How can we help individuals, especially high PUBSC
individuals, to counter their tendency toward embarrass-
ment-avoidance? We suspect one of the reasons that high
PUBSC are particularly prone to embarrassment avoidance
is that they may be more likely to take an actor’s (versus an
observer’s) perspective in an embarrassing situation. They
tend to perceive themselves to be in the social “spotlight”
and focus too much on the situation (Fenigstein 1984). If we
can get high PUBSC individuals to focus less on the actor’s
perspective and take an observer’s perspective, we may be
able to help them counter embarrassment avoidance. The
goal of the present research is to propose and test a potential
strategy for reducing embarrassment-avoidance, taking an
observer’s perspective.
erature. First, the work of Epley, Gilovich, and Savitsky sug-
gests when focusing too much on the actor’s perspective,

13
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people fail to take into account observers’ empathy (Epley
et al. 2002). This research reveals that observers tend to
make kinder judgments than actors expect when observ-
ers notice actors’ potentially embarrassing blunders (Epley
et al. 2002; Savitsky et al. 2001).1 This bias in judgment
was termed “empathy-neglect.” Focusing too much on the
actor’s perspective, people may underestimate the degree to
which others have experienced similarly embarrassing pre-
dicaments and thus others’ ability to empathize with them.
Second, we draw on literature on the effects of rumination
on negative self-thoughts. This research suggests that “step-
ping out of the self” is an effective strategy for interrupting
an undue focus on oneself, which past studies has shown,
intensifies negative emotions including depression and anxi-
ety (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema 1991). On a similar theme, tak-
ing an observer’s perspective may be an effective strategy to
avoid too much focus on the embarrassing situation. Taking
the perspective of an observer shifts the actor’s attention
away from the self and to those factors that spur observers
to have empathy, tolerance, and kindness.
Third, we draw on the literature on the personality vari-
able public self-consciousness (PUBSC), which is corre-
lated with both the anticipation of embarrassment and the
tendency toward embarrassment-avoidance (Edelmann
1985). Based on this literature, we propose that high PUBSC
individuals are more likely to engage in embarrassment-
avoidance because of their increased tendency to picture
themselves in embarrassing situations and feel personally
distressed.
The main goal of our research, then, is to investigate a
potential strategy for reducing embarrassment-avoidance,
taking an observer’s perspective. We propose that the key
to reducing embarrassment-avoidance is to induce actors (or
those who imagine themselves to be actors) in a situation
to see the situation from the perspective of observing the
embarrassing situation rather than experiencing it.
We test our proposed strategy in three studies, focus-
ing on perhaps the most challenging consumer segment:
individuals who exhibit a high level of chronic public self-
consciousness (HPUBSC).2 Our results demonstrate the
effectiveness of our strategy for reducing embarrassment-
avoidance (and not merely judgments) for high PUBSC
1
 A second judgment bias, the ‘spotlight’ effect, refers to actors’
tendency to overestimate the degree to which observers notice their
embarrassing blunders; see research by Epley and colleagues. We
do not investigate the spotlight effect here. Instead, we focus on the
segment of consumers who chronically feel as though they are under
observation (i.e., in the spotlight).
2 3
  We use the LPUBSC designation as a shortcut for saying low to
medium PUBSC consumers—or not high PUBSC—consumers.
LPUBSC is not the focus of the paper because they do not have
embarrassment avoidance behavior in the first place.
13
Motivation and Emotion
individuals. Specifically, we examine constructs proposed
to underlie embarrassment-avoidance, and demonstrate the
need for sufficient cognitive resources to enable an actor
to adopt an observer’s perspective. In so doing, we extend
the literature on empathy-neglect, the effects of taking an
observer’s perspective, rumination on negative emotions,
and public self-consciousness (PUBSC).
Theoretical foundations
Embarrassment‑avoidance
Researchers define embarrassment as a commonly-occur-
ring, short-lived negative emotional response that arises
from a threat to the public self in the presence of an audi-
ence, real or imagined (Miller and Leary 1992). A person
experiences embarrassment when he or she publicly violates
norms, displays out-of-role behaviors, or is incompetent,
in turn triggering unwanted and unflattering evaluations
that threaten the person’s public identity (Edelmann 1987;
Modigliani 1968; Parrott and Smith 1991; Schlenker 1980).
Much past research has focused on the triggers of embar-
rassment (Keltner and Buswell 1997), how it relates to other
self-conscious emotions such as shame (Miller and Tang-
ney 1994), and how it correlates with various individual-
difference variables such as cultural background (Singelis
and Sharkey 1995).
Other research has shown that people will go to great
lengths to avoid embarrassment (Miller 2007) and the
accompanying threat to their social image. They may mini-
mize or explain away the embarrassing behavior (Modigliani
1971) or simply avoid potentially-embarrassing situations,
for example by purchasing embarrassing products online (vs.
in-store) or by buying products aimed at preventing embar-
rassing situations (e.g. adult diapers) (Bell 2009; Brack-
ett 2004; Lau-Gesk and Drolet 2008; Moore et al. 2006).
Accordingly, a strategy for overcoming the fear of embar-
rassment, and perhaps the emotional distress that accompa-
nies it, would be useful for reducing embarrassment-avoid-
ant behaviors (e.g., not using a condom, hiding sensitive
information from a doctor, etc.).
Most relevant to our construction of such a strategy to
reduce embarrassment-avoidance is the psychological
research on empathy-neglect, which shows that individu-
als’ fears of embarrassment and social disapproval are often
unfounded (Epley et  al. 2002).3 Although actors often
  A reduction in embarrassment-avoidance might also be achieved by
reducing the degree to which individuals feel that others will notice
their behavior, i.e., that they are in the ‘spotlight’ (Gilovich et  al.
2000). In this paper, however, we focus only on empathy-neglect.
Motivation and Emotion
feel or expect to feel embarrassed, observers often do not
notice embarrassing blunders. And, even when observers
do notice, they are generally forgiving. For example, studies
have shown that people asked to imagine publicly tripping
a security alarm, failing a test, arriving at a party without a
gift, or being introduced as someone who bed-wets believe
observers will judge them more harshly than observers actu-
ally do (Savitsky et al. 2001). Actors, focus too much on
their perspective, appear not to take observers’ empathy into
account; they exhibit empathy-neglect (Epley et al. 2002).
This bias appears to be fairly robust and difficult to counter.
Several processes have been proposed to explain why
actors overestimate others’ harshness. The most common
explanation appears to be that empathy-neglect is due to a
failure on the part of the actor to process information from
the perspective of others (Epley et al. 2002). Egocentric,
people focus on their blunders and do not consider other
factors that influence observers’ judgments (c.f., Epley 2014,
pp. 111–115; Savitsky et al. 2001). Accordingly, embarrass-
ment-avoidance may result from too much attention being
paid to the self for an embarrassing situation. First, actors
may underestimate the frequency with which others also
experience embarrassment and thus underestimate others’
potential empathy. Second, actors may engage in “naïve
cynicism,” the tendency to believe that others will not be
as understanding as they themselves would be (Epley et al.
2002; Kruger and Gilovich 1999). What is needed, then, is a
way to disrupt actors’ focus on themselves and augment this
focus with an observer’s view of the situation.
Past research on rumination also shows that a heavy
focus on oneself can intensify negative emotions because
it focuses people on episodic information concerning the
specific chain of events and emotions experienced (Kross
2009; Kross et al. 2005). Alternatively, less focus on oneself
can weaken negative emotions such as distress. For example,
people felt less personal distress when asked to “take a few
steps back and move away from their experience” versus
“relive the situation as if it is happening.” They also had
more construing thoughts (e.g. “I understand why the fight
happened; it might have been irrational but I understand his
motivation now”) and fewer ruminative thoughts (Kross and
Ayduk 2008). Research also suggests that self-distancing
buffers people against blood pressure reactivity (Ayduk and
Kross 2008) and future negative affect (Ayduk and Kross
2008). In other words, an actor can benefit by taking another
perspective, i.e., one of an observer to the situation.
We propose that, similar to the self-regulation of negative
emotions, taking an observer’s perspective in an embarrass-
ing situation will make a consumer step out of the situation,
focus on the bigger picture (possibly kinder judgments), and
reduce embarrassment-avoidance. Taking an observer’s per-
spective is an implementable and credible intervention. An
observer’s perspective can be primed through advertising,
interactions with sales people, cues in the environment, et
cetera. An observer’s perspective may reduce self-focus and
in turn personal distress arising from an embarrassing situa-
tion, and thus reduce embarrassment-avoidance.4
Moderating role of public self‑consciousness
Not all actors are equivalent in terms of their expectation of
1987 experiencing embarrassment. In particular, a person’s
tendency toward public self-consciousness is associated
with expectations of being embarrassed and embarrassment-
avoidance. PUBSC is defined as the tendency to be aware of
oneself as a social object (Fenigstein et al. 1975). High pub-
lic self-consciousness (HPUBSC) corresponds to heightened
feelings of being the focus of attention (Fenigstein 1984), i.e.
being in the social “spotlight”, and of paranoia (von Gem-
mingen et al. 2003). HPUBSC individuals appear to be more
concerned than others are with how they are regarded by
others (e.g., Miller and Cox 1982), and thus more suscepti-
ble to experiencing personal distress due to an embarrassing
situation.
Past research confirms that HPUBSC consumers are
more prone to embarrassment-avoidance and so less likely
to engage in potentially embarrassing behaviors. For exam-
ple, Lau-Gesk and Drolet (2008) found that ads for a prod-
uct aimed at preventing embarrassing situations (e.g., gas
prevention product) incurred higher purchase intentions of
the product among individuals higher in PUBSC. Further,
a study by Froming et al. (1990) confirmed that HPUBSC
individuals exhibit embarrassment-avoidance in part due to
their greater sensitivity to the negative evaluations of oth-
ers. Specifically, participants were paid to sing “The Star-
Spangled Banner” in front of (1) a friend, (2) a stranger with
whom they did not expect to interact with in the future, or
(3) a stranger with whom they did expect to interact with in
the future. The longer participants sang, the more money
they earned. Regardless of audience type, participants with
higher levels in PUBSC sang for a shorter time compared to
participants with lower levels of PUBSC who curtailed their
singing only when the audience was composed of strangers
with whom they expected to interact with again.
To demonstrate that HPUBSC participants tend to focus
on themselves as an actor in an embarrassing situation and
4
  We are aware of the literature on vicarious (i.e. empathetic) embar-
rassment, which reveals that observers of an actor committing a
social blunder often experience that actor’s emotional distress (Edel-
mann and McCusker 1986; Miller 1987). We focus on somewhat
different aspects of embarrassing situations. Specifically, whereas
vicarious embarrassment focuses on what an observer may feel while
witnessing an actor commit a social blunder, we focus on how the
observer will evaluate the actor. In brief, we believe that our work
represents a novel extension of the vicarious embarrassment litera-
ture.
13
 Motivation and Emotion

exhibit heightened susceptibility to feelings of personal dis- We hypothesize that the effort involved in taking the
tress, we conducted a pilot study that examined the correla- perspective of an observer requires cognitive resources.
tion between PUBSC and the fantasy and personal distress Indeed, cognitive load can diminish people’s ability to
subscales of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) (Davis imagine how others perceive the situation (Davis et al.
1980, 1983). One hundred-three participants were recruited 1996). Similarly, we propose that people need cognitive
from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (Mage = 35; 53% female) resources to step out of themselves and take an observer’s
to complete an “Opinion Survey” which contained both role, and thus a lack of cognitive resources would reduce
the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis 1980, 1983), or the effect of an observer’s perspective.
the “IRI” as well as a measure of PUBSC (Fenigstein et al.
1975). The IRI contains 28 questions (anchors 1 = does not
Hypotheses
describe me well; 7 = describe me very well) that measure
different aspects of empathy, 7 items of which measure fan-
The results of the above-mentioned pilot study suggest
tasizing tendencies (e.g. “When I am reading an interesting
that PUBSC is positively associated with fantasizing,
story or novel, I imagine how I would feel if the events in the
which implies that HPUBSC (vs. not) are more likely to
story were happening to me”) and 7 items measure personal
put themselves in the perspective of an actor. Study 1, in a
distress (e.g., “In emergency situations, I feel apprehen-
correlational manner, tests the hypothesis that:
sive and ill-at-ease,” “Being in a tense emotional situation
scares me,” and “I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the
H1a  PUBSC is associated with an increased tendency to
middle of a very emotional situation”). The PUBSC scale
take the actor’s perspective in an embarrassing situation;
consists of seven items that measure the extent to which par-
PUBSC is associated with a decreased tendency to take an
ticipants consider themselves as social objects (Fenigstein
observer’s perspective in an embarrassing situation.
et al. 1975). Example items for the PUBSC scale include
“I usually worry about making a good impression” and “I
H1b  PUBSC is associated with increased embarrassment
am concerned about what other people think about me.” To
and personal distress.
ensure that participants were unaware of the survey’s pur-
pose, several filler tasks were placed between the PUBSC
Studies 2 and 3 test the effect of taking an observer’s
and IRI scales. In support of the above theorizing, we found
perspective, in both a health and an advertising context
a significant positive correlation between PUBSC and Fan-
respectively, on embarrassment-avoidance, and multiple
tasy sub-scale (r = .30, p < .0024) and between PUBSC and
measures to illuminate the underlying mechanism of these
Personal Distress sub-scale (r = .31, p < .002).
effects. Specifically, we hypothesize that:
Taking the perspective of an observer
H2a  PUBSC is associated with increased embarrassment-
avoidance (control condition).
The present research examines how taking an observer’s
perspective reduces self-focus and can counter embarrass-
H2b  Taking the perspective of the observer causes HPUBSC
ment-avoidance among individuals who expect and fear
individuals (but not others) to exhibit less embarrassment-
embarrassment, namely HPUBSC individuals. It is impor-
avoidance (Observer’s Perspective condition).
tant to note that taking an observer’s perspective is not to
be confused or equated with the more general, traditional
concept of perspective-taking, a term that usually refers to Effortful process
any attempt to overcome one’s own perspective by consider-
ing another’s potentially-different perspective (Davis et al. The process of taking the perspective of the observer pre-
1996; Gilovich et al. 2000; Nickerson 1999). Traditionally, sumably requires attentional resources and effort to redi-
perspective-taking describes the active attempt to understand rect one’s own perspective. Individuals can take an observ-
an actor’s thoughts with respect to a third object. In other er’s perspective only if sufficient cognitive resources are
words, perspective-taking refers to taking the perspective available to them. Thus, one key goal of Studies 3 is to
of the actor, not taking the perspective of the observer. In tease apart less effortful processing vs. more effortful con-
the present research, taking the perspective of an observer trolled processing presumably associated with countering
describes the attempt to imagine oneself as an observer to it by taking the perspective of an observer.
an (embarrassing) event (not the actor in it), which in turn Cognitive load has been shown to disrupt more con-
influences the salience of a now-wider set of information, sciously-controlled processes, causing people to rely
including information that observers are typically kinder in on more automatic processes and a narrowed focus of
their evaluations of embarrassed others.

13
Motivation and Emotion
attention on immediate, local information (e.g., Drolet and
Luce 2004; Drolet et al. 2009).5 When cognitive resources
are limited, HPUBSC individuals may not be able to take
an observer’s perspective to counter empathy-neglect, and
HPUBSC individuals will seek to avoid embarrassment
even more. In short, load blocks the effect of an observer’s
perspective on embarrassment-avoidant behavior. Based
on this reasoning, we hypothesize:
H3  Cognitive load moderates the effects of observer’s per-
spective-taking. Under load (vs. no load), HPUBSC indi-
viduals who take the role of an observer will exhibit greater
embarrassment-avoidance.
Essentially, under load, individuals will revert to their
chronic response patterns. This last hypothesis is tested in
Study 3.
In summary, we conducted Studies 1–3 in order to better
understand how to reduce undue embarrassment-avoidance
among HPUBSC individuals since they are more likely to
be negatively affected by an embarrassing situation than are
other individuals, namely individuals with medium and low
levels of PUBSC. Past research has not much examined the
drivers of embarrassment-avoidance among individuals who
are not high in PUBSC, instead treating individuals who are
high in PUBSC as a clinical population. In the General Dis-
cussion, we offer several observations about this group we
refer to as “LPUBSC individuals,” though it includes indi-
viduals with moderate levels of PUBSC as well as individu-
als with low levels of PUBSC, and several suggestions for
future research with respect to this less well-defined group.
Study 1
Study 1 is a correlational study to demonstrate an empirical
foundation of our intervention: HPUBSC individuals tend
to take an actor’s perspective and tend to feel more personal
distress (control condition) which in turn makes them more
prone to embarrassment-avoidance. We introduced partici-
pants to a potential embarrassing situation, and we measured
actor’s and observer’s perspectives, personal distress, and
embarrassment-avoidant tendencies.
Method and stimuli
One hundred and eighty people from an online panel of stu-
dents, staff, and local residents of a large public West Coast
5 information. We conducted covariate analyses for age,
 Unawareness, unintentionality, uncontrollability, and high effi-
ciency are four underlying qualities of automaticity (see Bargh 1994).
Evidence of one of these qualities is said to indicate automaticity.
university participated in Study 1 (Mage = 31.0, SD = 9.1;
44.3% female; approximately 7.1% Asian or Asian Ameri-
can, 70.0% Caucasian, 22.9% Hispanic, African American,
Pacific Islander, and mixed/other race). Nine people failed
to answer all of the questions, leaving a final sample of 171
participants.
Participants examined an ad for Beano, a gas-prevention
product. The ad portrayed a situation in which a person acci-
dentally farts in a yoga class while doing the downward fac-
ing dog position (see “Appendix”). The ad read:
Rip. Accidentally passing gas in front of classmates is
one of the most embarrassing experiences. Guaranteed
to linger forever. Try Beano to avoid future embar-
rassment.
After reading the ad, participants answered several ques-
tions regarding the perspective they took when they read
the ad. Three questions assessed the extent to which par-
ticipants took the actor’s perspective (“When you read the
ad, to what extent did you imagine yourself being the actor
who farted in the scene?” “When you read the ad, to what
extent did you put yourself in the scene and imagine this
happening to you?” “When you read the ad, to what extent
did you think of yourself?”, 1 = A little, 7 = A lot). The three
questions were highly correlated and were averaged to cre-
ate an actor’s perspective index (α = .77). Another question
captured the extent to which participants took an observer’s
perspective (“When you read the ad, to what extent did you
imagine yourself outside of the picture”; 1 = A little; 7 = A
lot).
Next, participants completed two items that assessed their
personal distress when they read the ad (“When you read
the ad, to what extent did you feel personal uneasiness?”
“When you read the ad, to what extent did you feel personal
discomfort?” 1 = A little; 7 = A lot). The two questions were
averaged to create a personal distress index (α = .96). Par-
ticipants reported their level of embarrassment in response
to the ad using a 7-point scale (“When I read the ad, I felt
embarrassed”; 1 = Not at all agree; 7 = Agree). Then, par-
ticipants answered two questions measuring their inten-
tions to purchase the gas-prevention products (“Would you
consider buying this gas prevention product?”, “Would you
want to purchase this product?”, α = .96) using a 7-point
scale (1 = Not at all; 7 = Definitely). Last, participants rated
their tendency to pass gas in public (1–7 scale; 1 = Never,
7 = Very often). Responses to this question served as a poten-
tial covariate.
At the end of the survey session, participants completed
the Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss (1975) public self-con-
sciousness (PUBSC) sub-scale and supplied demographic
ethnicity, and gender. However, no significant differences
emerged (ts < 1) in Study 1, or in Studies 2–3.
13

Results
We followed Aiken et al. (1991) method and mean-centered
the level of PUBSC scores (M = 4.43, SD = 1.33). We then
conducted a regression analysis (SAS PROC SURVEYREG)
in order to examine participants’ responses to the embarrass-
ing situation with respect to the centered level of PUBSC.
Although we have made directional predictions, we report
the (more conservative) two-tail t-tests.
H1a  Hypothesis H1a suggests that PUBSC is positively
related to the tendency to take the actor’s perspective
and negatively related to the tendency to see oneself as
an observer in embarrassing situations. We ran a regres-
sion with the actor’s perspective as the dependent variable
and (continuous) PUBSC as an independent variable. The
analysis revealed a main effect of PUBSC (F(1, 169) = 3.90,
p = .05). The results became more significant if we included
the tendency to pass gas in public as a covariate (F(1,
168) = 4.93, p < .03). We reported the results below without
the covariate. HPUBSC individuals were more likely to take
an actor’s perspective (β = .19, t(169) = 1.97, p = .05) and
less likely to take an observer’s perspective (β = − .39, t(169)
= − 2.40, p < .02). These results are consistent with H1a.
H1b  Consistent with H1b, a regression with the personal
distress index as the dependent variable and PUBSC as an
independent variable revealed a main effect of PUBSC (F(1,
169) = 5.34, p < .03) on personal distress such that HPUBSC
individuals felt more personal distress when they read the ad
of the embarrassing situation (β = .40, t(169) = 2.31, p < .03).
We also found a main effect of embarrassment. HPUBSC
(vs. LPUBSC) individuals felt more embarrassment when
reading the ad (β = .35, t(169) = 1.96, p < .05).
Embarrassment‑avoidance
In this specific consumer context, higher intentions to pur-
chase embarrassment-prevention products indicate greater
embarrassment-avoidance. A regression with purchase
intentions as the dependent variable and PUBSC as the
independent variable revealed a main effect of PUBSC
(F(1, 169) = 8.16, p < .005). HPUBSC individuals were
more likely to purchase embarrassment-prevention products
in order to forestall embarrassment (β = .31, t(169) = 2.86,
p < .005).
Personal distress as mediator
We tested whether personal distress mediated the effect of
PUBSC on embarrassment-avoidance (purchase intentions)
using Hayes’ mediation model (2013, Model 4). Preacher
and Hayes’s (2008) SAS macro with 10,000 bootstrapped
13
Motivation and Emotion
samples revealed indirect-only mediation (Zhao et al. 2010).
We ran a regression with purchase intentions as the depend-
ent variable and both PUBSC and personal distress as inde-
pendent variables. Estimation revealed that, controlling for
PUBSC, personal distress was a significant predictor of
embarrassment-avoidance (β = .31; t(168) = 4.43, p < .0001);
controlling for personal distress, the direct effect of PUBSC
on embarrassment-avoidance became marginally-significant
(β = .196; t(168) = 1.83, p = .07). The indirect path (β = .12,
95% CI [.04, .23]) had a 95% confidence interval that did
not include 0. Therefore, we conclude that personal distress
mediated the effect of PUBSC on embarrassment-avoidance.
HPUBSC individuals’ tendency toward embarrassment-
avoidance appears driven, at least in part, by higher personal
distress experienced by HPUBSC individuals in an embar-
rassing situation.
Discussion
Study 1, along with the pilot study, provides an empirical
foundation for our proposed intervention: HPUBSC indi-
viduals are more likely to imagine themselves to be in an
embarrassing situation, experience greater personal distress
at its prospect, and then are more likely to seek to avoid
embarrassment. These results are supportive of H1a and
H1b.
Studies 2–3 build on these results by investigating the
effects of taking an observer’s perspective on embarrass-
ment-avoidance. Specifically, studies 2–3 test whether a
cue to take the perspective of an observer decreases embar-
rassment-avoidance among HPUBSC individuals. Since
HPUBSC individuals’ higher embarrassment-avoidance may
be driven partly by greater personal distress or egocentric
attention, an observer’s perspective may reduce embarrass-
ment-avoidance by reducing personal distress. Study 3 also
provides insights as to the effortful nature of processing
information from the standpoint of an observer and provides
direct evidence as to process via thought protocols.
Study 2
Study 2 tests the hypothesis (H2) that a cue to take the
perspective of an observer will have a helpful effect on
HPUBSC individuals. Again, taking the perspective of an
observer should make one’s own perspective as an observer
salient. By stepping out of oneself and viewing the embar-
rassing situation from an observer’s perspective, HPUBSC
individuals should realize that others will not judge them as
harshly and so HPUBSC individuals should experience less
personal distress. In brief, HPUBSC individuals should dis-
play less embarrassment-avoidance when they are encour-
aged to focus on their role as observers rather than actors
Motivation and Emotion
(H2). Because individuals who are not high in PUBSC
are less likely to feel embarrassment in the first place, we
hypothesize that taking an observer’s perspective will have
no effect on them.
Method and stimuli
One hundred and seven students at a large West Coast uni-
versity participated in Study 2 for a $20 payment (M age =
19.9, SD = 1.5; 74.0% females). The ad read:
We are looking for volunteers to talk to researchers
about how to improve communication lines between
doctors and their patients about sensitive healthcare
issues. For example, people who should get tested for
HIV or need treatment for genital herpes frequently
opt not to seek help from doctors, family members
and friends. You will be asked several personal ques-
tions during the interview. The goal of this research
is to identify ways to make it easier for people to talk
more openly about such sensitive topics and thereby
feel more comfortable seeking treatment. You will
be paid $50 in exchange for your time and insights
(approximately 1 h).
After participants examined the volunteer ad, they
answered one of two versions of the survey corresponding
to the ad. The two different versions of the survey asked the
same set of questions but in a different order. Past research
has shown that different ordering of the same set of ques-
tions can differentially affect responses (Sudman et al. 1996).
One version of the survey served as a control condition.
Participants in the control condition were first asked about
their intentions to volunteer (1–7, not at all/definitely vol-
unteer). Here, per H2a, we expected to find that higher lev-
els of PUBSC correlate with lower intentions to volunteer,
a manifestation of embarrassment-avoidance. Participants
then indicated how they expected to feel during the inter-
view (1 = not at all, 7 = very comfortable, nervous, embar-
rassed, confident, calm), how they expected the researchers
to react towards them as volunteers (1 = not at all, 7 = very
positive, favorable, good; α = .97), and how they would react
towards other volunteers in the study (1 = not at all, 7 = very
positive, favorable, good; α = .98).
The second version represented the observer’s perspec-
tive condition. Participants in this condition first indicated
how they would react towards the volunteers if they were the
researchers. They then indicated (in order) their intentions
to volunteer, how they expected to feel during the interview,
and how they expected the researchers to react towards them
as volunteers. In sum, participants answered the four ques-
tions in a different order.
At the end of the survey session, participants completed
Fenigstein et al.’s (1975) public self-consciousness scale (7
7
VOLUNTEER INTENTIONS
6 5.78
5.15
5 4.59
4 3.40
3
2
1
LOW PUBSC HIGH PUBSC
CONTROL OBSERVER PERSPECTIVE
Fig. 1  Mean volunteer intentions by question-order and PUBSC
(Study 2). Higher volunteer intentions correspond to more embarrass-
ment-avoidance
items). Participants then answered demographic questions.
We suspected that low-income individuals might volunteer
for the interview for $50 even if they would feel embar-
rassed, so we included income as a covariate in the analyses
reported for this study.6 Below we report the two-tail t tests
with an alpha level of 0.05.
Results
In this study, we used volunteer intentions as our main
dependent variable. Higher volunteering intentions to dis-
close embarrassing information correspond to less embar-
rassment-avoidance. Note, different from the dependent
variables used in studies 1 and 3 (i.e., purchase intentions
for embarrassment-prevention products), the dependent
variable used in Study 2 (i.e., volunteer intentions) is nega-
tively correlated with the underlying construct of embar-
rassment-avoidance. We conducted a regression analy-
sis (SAS PROC SURVEYREG), exploring participants’
responses to the embarrassing volunteer opportunity from
the mean-centered level of PUBSC (M = 3.76, SD = .54)
and question-order condition (control vs. observer perspec-
tive). Analysis revealed a highly significant two-way inter-
action effect of PUBSC and question-order condition (F(1,
102) = 4.23, p < .04). The two main effects were not signifi-
cant (ps > 0.25). Estimated means for volunteer intentions
are provided below using + 1SD and − 1SD to depict the
nature of any interactions that emerged. Figure 1 depicts
these results using this criterion.
The results of Study 2 support our hypotheses. In the con-
trol condition, volunteer intentions were significantly lower
6
  The effect of including income as a covariate did not change the
significant level of the two-way interaction: (F(1, 102) = 3.80,
p < .05), or main effect (ps > 0.05).
13

among HPUBSC individuals (+ 1 SD) versus LPUBSC7
individuals (− 1 SD) (MLPUBSC = 5.78 vs. MHPUBSC = 3.40;
t(102) = − 2.32, p < .03), consistent with H2a. According to
H2b, HPUBSC (vs. not HPUBSC) individuals will respond
differently to a cue to take the perspective of an observer.
According to our theory, because an observer’s perspective
can make HPUBSC individuals step out of themselves and
reduce personal distress, HPUBSC individuals should dis-
play less embarrassment-avoidance (i.e., higher volunteer
intentions) when taking an observer’s perspective (vs. con-
trol). Because individuals who are not high in PUBSC do
not easily feel embarrassed in the first place, a cue to take an
observer’s perspective may simply be ineffective at reducing
embarrassment-avoidance. Consistent with H2b, an analysis
across question–order conditions showed that the observer
perspective-taking prime increased HPUBSC participants’
intentions to volunteer (MHPUBSC,observer’s perspective = 5.15
vs. MHPUBSC,control = 3.40; t(102) = 1.97, p = .05), making
HPBUSC participants less embarrassment-avoidant. When
participants took an observer’s perspective, those with
higher levels of PUBSC (+ 1 SD) displayed the same level
of embarrassment-avoidance as those with lower levels of
PUBSC (− 1 SD) (MHPUBSC = 5.15 vs. MLPUBSC = 4.59;
t(102) = .94, p = .35). However, taking the perspective
of an observer did not affect LPUBSC participants’ vol-
unteer intentions (M LPUBSC, observer’s perspective  =  4.59 vs.
MLPUBSC,control = 5.78; t(102) = 1.57, p = .12).8
Discussion
The results of Study 2 support our theorizing. Taking the
perspective of an observer appears to be a helpful strategy to
combat undue embarrassment-avoidance among HPUBSC
individuals but not among individuals who do not embarrass
easily (i.e. individuals not high in PUBSC).
Study 3 builds on the results of studies 1–2 in two impor-
tant ways. First, Study 3 tests our theorizing in another
important consumer context, advertising, which generally
follows different social rules compared to volunteering.
Second, in order to examine our proposed process in more
detail, we collected process measures, such as the perceived
empathy participants expect from others and participants’
open-ended responses relating to an egocentric focus. Third,
we tested cognitive load as a moderating variable in order
7
 Again, we use the LPUBSC designation as a shortcut for saying
low to medium PUBSC consumers—or not high PUBSC—consum-
ers.
8
 The results change slightly if income is not included as a
covariate (intentions: MHPUBSC,observer’s perspective  =  4.91 vs.
MHPUBSC,control  =  3.39; t(102) = 1.75, p = .08; intentions:
MLPUBSC,observer’s perspective  =  4.76 vs. MLPUBSC,control  =  6.08;
t(102) = 1.64, p = .11).
13
Motivation and Emotion
to demonstrate the cognitive toll of adopting an observer’s
perspective. We expected load to interfere with taking the
perspective of an observer and to reverse the effect of an
observer’s perspective on embarrassment-avoidance.
Study 3
Study 3 examines the mechanism of the effect of taking an
observer’s perspective on countering embarrassment-avoid-
ance. We introduced cognitive load to moderate the effect of
observer’s perspective. We expect cognitive load to interfere
the effect of observer’s perspective. We also collected open-
ended thinking protocols on self-related thoughts.
Participants and procedure
Study 3 participants were two hundred and twenty under-
graduate students at a large public West Coast university
(Mage = 20.0; 75.7% female). All participants received a
survey packet with a cover page instructing them to pro-
vide feedback on an ad for a real product targeted towards
college-aged people like themselves. We created two ads
for a real-world flatulence prevention brand (i.e., Beano),
with a photo used by Lau-Gesk and Drolet (2008, Study 2)
that depicted four college-age individuals at a party sharing
a couch. A male is sitting alone, slouching at one end of a
sofa. The side of his head is resting on his hand. His head
is turned slightly down. At the other end of the sofa, three
females are sitting together. One of the females is looking
nervously sidelong at the male. The other two females are
in animated conversation. The consumers in this photo dis-
played nonverbal behaviors that signaled embarrassment
(Keltner and Buswell 1997). Participants in the control con-
dition read the following ad copy:
Rip. Accidentally passing gas in front of a crush is one
of the most embarrassing experiences. Guaranteed to
linger forever.
Participants in the observer’s perspective-taking condition
read the same ad copy along with an additional sentence:
Others will know what it’s like. Put yourself in their
shoes…would you giggle? Would you be horrified?
Would you stare?
To ensure that taking an observer’s perspective could suc-
cessfully make people think others would not judge them
harshly, we conducted a pretest with 164 undergraduate stu-
dents (Mage = 24.0; 52% female). Half of participants received
the control-ad copy and the other half of participants received
the observer’s-perspective ad copy. All participants were asked
to read the ad copy and answer two questions about the empa-
thy they would expect from others if they were to pass gas in
Motivation and Emotion
public (1–7 scale, 1 = not agree at all; 7 = agree): “If I pass gas
aloud, people would put themselves in my shoes”; “If I passed
gas aloud, people would empathize with me”. The PUBSC
scale was embedded among questions at the end of the survey.
Regression analysis found a highly-significant two-way
interaction between ad condition and PUBSC (F(1,160) = 3.98,
p < .05). Consistent with past research, HPUBSC participants
(+ 1 SD) in the control condition expected less empathy from
others (β = − .46, t(160) = − 2.30, p < .02). Taking an observ-
er’s perspective caused HPUBSC participants to expect the
same level of empathy as participants not high in PUBSC
did (-1 SD) (β = .27, t(160) = .87, p < .39). The cue to take an
observer’s perspective led HPUBSC participants to expect
more empathy, compared to HPUBSC participants in the con-
trol condition (mobserver’s perspective = 3.79 vs. Mcontrol = 3.14,
t(160) = − 2.51, p = .01). However, the cue did not affect the
amount of empathy participants not high in PUBSC expected
(Mobserver’s perspective = 3.59 vs. Mcontrol = 3.48, t(160) = − .41,
p = .48). Therefore, the pretest results suggest taking an
observer’s perspective could successfully make HPUBSC
participants think others have more empathy, providing a
foundation for Study 3.
In the main study (Study 3), approximately half of the
participants in each ad condition received a cognitive load
manipulation before being asked to provide feedback on
the print ad they were shown (Ward and Mann 2000). Par-
ticipants in the load (vs. no load) condition were asked to
study 20 words for 2 min and keep them in mind when they
answered questions regarding the ad. At the end of the study,
they were asked to write down as many of the 20 words they
could remember. All participants were exposed to one of the
two ads described above and then answered two questions
that assessed purchase intentions. Participants then provided
open-ended responses; they were instructed to write down
any thoughts or feelings that occurred to them while read-
ing the ad. This task was followed by a manipulation check
question assessing whether participants viewed the ad as
relatively self-related versus other-related, the feelings they
experienced while viewing the ad (PANAS scale; Watson
et al. 1988), and potential covariates including their own ten-
dency to pass gas in public and the feelings that arise from
such situations. Last, participants completed the PUBSC
scale and provided demographic information.
Results and discussion
Manipulation checks
The manipulation check analysis yielded a significant
main effect of ad type on the actor index (“When I read
the ad, I imagined that I was the person who accidentally
passed gas”; 1 = disagree, 7 = agree). Participants exposed
to the ad encouraging them to become an observer scored
lower on this index than those exposed to the control ad
(Mobserver’s perspective = 3.83 vs. Mcontrol = 4.34, t(212) = 1.96,
p = .05).
Two independent coders assessed the elaborateness of
participants’ thoughts that served as a manipulation check
for the influence of load on thinking processes. Decision
makers who are under load rely relatively more on auto-
matic processes and locally-provided information rather
than stored information (Ward and Mann 2000). Coders
were instructed to rate the thoughts along two items using a
7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very) that measured: (1) the
degree to which participants provided thoughts elaborating
beyond simply describing the ad based on the picture or copy
it used; and (2) the degree to which participants provided
thoughts indicative of gut reactions to the ad. The latter item
was reverse-scored to create an elaboration index (r = .86).
Initial inter-rater reliability was high (r = .85). Inconsisten-
cies between the coders were discussed until agreement was
reached. Analysis found only a main effect of load consistent
with expectation: load participants tended to elaborate less
(Mload = 2.35 vs. Mno load = 3.42, t(212) = 4.47, p < .0001),
indicating the manipulation of load was successful.
Purchase intentions
Study 3 measures the same dependent variable tested in
Study 1: purchase intentions for embarrassment-preven-
tion products. Purchase intentions for products aimed
at preventing embarrassment correspond to increased
embarrassment-avoidance.
We analyzed the effects of mean-centered PUBSC
(M = 3.80, SD = .58), ad condition, and load on partici-
pants’ purchase intentions. Regression analysis revealed
the predicted three-way interaction among PUBSC, ad
type, and load on the purchase intention index (r = .75, F(1,
212) = 11.11, p < .001) and a marginally-significant two-
way interaction between PUBSC and ad condition (F(1,
212) = 3.62, p < .06). The two-way interaction emerged
between PUBSC and load for the control condition (F(1,
212) = − 2.67, p < .008) and the observer’s perspective con-
dition (F(1, 212) = 2.19, p < .03).
Our hypotheses were again confirmed. In the no load
control condition, purchase intentions for the gas preven-
tion product were significantly higher among HPUBSC
participants (+ 1 SD) participants than among LPUBSC9
participants (− 1 SD) (MLPUBSC = 2.56 vs. MHPUBSC = 4.45;
t(212) = 2.40, p < .015). This suggests that HPUBSC
9
 Again, we use the LPUBSC designation as a shortcut for saying
low to medium PUBSC consumers—or not high PUBSC—consum-
ers.
13
 Motivation and Emotion

7 load condition (MHPUBSC,observer’s perspective,load  =  3.50 vs.

M HUPBSC,observer’s perspective,no load  =  2.01 t(212) = − 1.89,
PURCHASE INTENTIONS
6
p < .06).
5 4.45 We also found that load reversed the harmful effects of
4 3.55
taking the perspective of an observer among participants
NO LOAD
2.93 with lower levels of PUBSC. Among these individuals,
3 2.56 LOAD purchase intentions were lower in the load condition than
2 in the no load condition (MLPUBSC,observer’s perspective = 2.96
1 vs. MLUPBSC,observer’s perspective,no load = 4.36, t(212) = 2.04,
LOW PUBSC HIGH PUBSC p < .04). In fact, purchase intentions among both
CONTROL HPUBSC and LPUBSC participants in the load,
observer’s perspective condition did not diff in their
intentions in the no load, control (non-intervention)
7
condition (M LPUBSC,observer’s perspective,load   =  2.96 vs.
PURCHASE INTENTIONS

6 ­M LPUBSC,control,no load   =  2.56; t(212) = .64, p < .52, and

5 MHPUBSC,observer’s perspective,load = 3.50 vs. MHPUBSC,control,no load
4.35
= 4.45; t(212) = − 1.30, p < .19). These results for HPUBSC
4 3.50
2.96
NO LOAD
participants under load are consistent with our hypotheses.
3 We found lower purchase intentions among HPUBSC
LOAD
2.01
2 participants in the load, control condition vs. the no
1
load, control condition (MHPUBSC,control,no load  =  4.45 vs.
LOW PUBSC HIGH PUBSC MHPUBSC,control,load  =  2.93; t(212) = 2.32, p < .02). Load
OBSERVER PERSPECTIVE-TAKING appears to have blocked cognitively-demanding processes,
namely the self-monitoring HPUBSC people usually engage
in to compare their behavior vis-a-vis social standards. Con-
Fig. 2  Mean purchase intentions by ad type by cognitive load by
PUBSC (Study 3)
sequently, HPUBSC participants in the control condition
exhibited less embarrassment-avoidance under load.

individuals do indeed exhibit more embarrassment-avoid- Thoughts

ance, supporting H2a and replicating Study 2’s findings.
Further, results for the no load, observer’s perspec-
tive condition were consistent with H2b. Under no
load, taking the perspective of an observer was effec-
tive at reducing HPUBSC participants’ purchase
intentions (M HPUBSC,observer’s perspective,no load  =  2.01 vs.
M HPUBSC,control,no load  =  4.45; t(212) = 1.08, p < .006).
When HPUBSC participants had sufficient cognitive
resources to perspective-take, they displayed less embar-
rassment-avoidance. See Fig. 2. Because individuals who
are not high in PUBSC do not easily feel embarrassed,
we expected that the cue to take an observer’s perspec-
tive would have no effect on their purchase intentions.
Unexpectedly, however, we found taking an observer’s
perspective increased lower PUBSC participants’ pur-
chase intentions (MLPUBSC,perspective-taking no load = 4.36 vs.
MLPUBSC,control,no load = 2.56; t(212) = − 2.44, p < .002), i.e.,
increased embarrassment-avoidance. We will discuss this
finding in detail in the “General discussion”.
In addition, consistent with H3, load reversed the help-
ful effects of taking the perspective among HPUBSC
participants. Among HPUBSC individuals in the observ-
er’s perspective condition, purchase intentions were
marginally-higher in the load condition than in the no
To illuminate the process that more self-focus and personal
distress lead to more embarrassment-avoidance among
HPUBSC participants in the control condition, and that an
observer’s perspective reduces self-focus and personal dis-
tress, two independent coders classified participants’ open-
ended thoughts into three categories (inter-rater reliabil-
ity = .85): (1) a “self-related” thinking score, i.e. the extent
to which participants related the embarrassing situation to
self (vs. others), given the embarrassing situation depicted
in the ad (1 = other-related/not related to self; 7 = highly
related to self); (2) other ad-related thoughts; and (3) irrel-
evant thoughts. No significant differences emerged for the
latter two categories of thoughts (ps > 0.30).
Most pertinent to our theorizing regarding process are the
results for the first category. We found a significant three-
way interaction among PUBSC, ad condition, and load on
participants’ self-related thoughts (F(1, 212) = 6.89, p < .01).
There was also a significant main effect of ad condition
(F(1,212) = 7.79, p < .006). Further analysis revealed a sig-
nificant two-way interaction between PUBSC and load in the
control condition (F(1,212) = − 2.90, p = .004) but not in the
observer’s perspective condition (F(1,212) = 1.11, p = .27).
In the no load, control condition, self-related thoughts

13
Motivation and Emotion

7 resources are available to take an observer’s perspective.

The ability to adopt the perspective of an observer is essen-
SELF-RELATED THINKING
6
tial. Under load, participants generated fewer self-related
5 thoughts, but embarrassment-avoidance is unaffected by that
4.01
4 emotion-as-information.
3.21 NO LOAD
3
Consistent with the view that load disrupts cogni-
LOAD
2.15 tive processes associated with HPUBSC, load decreased
2
1.31 self-thoughts relative to HPUBSC participants in the no
1 load, control condition (MHPUBSC,control,no load  =  4.01 vs.
LOW PUBSC HIGH PUBSC
MHPUBSC,control,load = 2.15; t(212) = 2.44, p < .02). In line with
CONTROL
the unexpected finding of greater embarrassment-avoidance
among LPUBSC individuals in the load, control condition,
7 LPUBSC individuals exhibited more self-related thoughts
SELF-RELATED THINKING

6 (MLPUBSC,control,no load = 1.31 vs. MLPUBSC,control,load = 3.21;

5
t(212) = 2.34, p = .02).
In summary, the results of Study 3 support our theoriz-
4 NO LOAD ing about how taking the perspective of an observer reduces
2.84
3
LOAD embarrassment-avoidance among HPUBSC individuals and
2 1.36 1.44
1.88
how cognitive load moderates these effects; for these indi-
1
viduals, taking an observer’s perspective reduces personal
LOW PUBSC HIGH PUBSC distress in embarrassing situations. Study 3 provides evi-
OBSERVER PERSPECTIVE-TAKING dence for the proposed process and its consequences.

Fig. 3  Mean self-related thoughts by ad type by cognitive load by

PUBSC (Study 3) General discussion

This research adds to an accumulating body of work on

were significantly higher among HPUBSC (+ 1 SD) versus
LPUBSC (− 1 SD) participants (MHPUBSC,noload = 4.01 vs.
MLPUBSC,noload = 1.31; t(212) = 2.09, p < .041). This finding
is consistent with the notion that HPUBSC participants are
more likely to envision oneself in the embarrassing situa-
tion. See Fig. 3.
Consistent with our theorizing, when HPUBSC partici-
pants adopted the observer’s perspective and had sufficient
cognitive resources, taking an observer’s perspective reduced
self-related thinking (MObserver’s perspective,no load = 1.44 vs.
Mcontrol,no load = 4.01; t(212) = 3.15, p < .002). Taking an
observer’s perspective caused no load LPUBSC partici-
pants to engage in directionally more, albeit not statisti-
cally-significantly more self-related thoughts than they did
in the control condition (Mobserver’s perspective,no load = 2.84 vs.
Mcontrol,no load = 1.31, t(212) = − 1.59, p < .11). This finding
is consistent with the view that individuals who are not high
in PUBSC typically do not put themselves in the picture and
thus would usually generate fewer self-related thoughts.
Across observer’s perspective conditions, there were
no effects of load or PUBSC on self-related thoughts. In
comparison to findings with respect to purchase intentions,
these findings suggest that, while the content of thoughts
can be changed by priming instructions, differences in
purchase intentions arise only when ample cognitive
embarrassment and embarrassment-avoidance. Building
on past research demonstrating that, in comparison to indi-
viduals with medium or low levels of PUBSC, HPUBSC
individuals expect more embarrassment and exhibit more
embarrassment-avoidant behavior. As a point of departure
(Lau-Gesk and Drolet 2008), the present research offers the
first comprehensive examination of the relationship between
PUBSC and embarrassment-avoidance, and offers an imple-
mental intervention to counter embarrassment-avoidance. As
Study 1 demonstrates, HPUBSC individuals tend to imag-
ine themselves as an actor in an embarrassing situation and
experience more distress. We demonstrated through media-
tion analysis that personal distress underlies HPUBSC indi-
viduals’ exaggerated embarrassment-avoidance tendency.
Further, as shown in studies 2 and 3, HPUBSC individuals
are more likely to exhibit embarrassment-avoidance. The
present research also introduces an intervention to counter
embarrassment-avoidance among consumers. Studies 2 and
3 demonstrate the power of taking the perspective of an
observer to an embarrassing situation on the incidence of
self-related thoughts, and offer a way to counteract embar-
rassment-avoidance among HPUBSC individuals.
The present research extends past research on the effects
of vicarious embarrassment. Specifically, the literature on
vicarious (i.e. empathetic) embarrassment indicates that

13

observers of an embarrassed actor often experience that
actor’s emotional distress. They empathize with the actor,
and feeling embarrassed they will turn away (Edelmann and
McCusker 1986; Miller 1987). This literature implies that
if an actor adopts the perspective of an observer, then the
actor will still continue to experience embarrassment. How-
ever, past research suggests that this vicarious or empathetic
embarrassment is qualitatively different from the embarrass-
ment actors experience. For example, Miller (1987) intro-
duced an important distinction when he defined empathetic
embarrassment as embarrassment that is felt for another even
though one’s own social identity has not been threatened.
And, Layton (2016) argues that not only must the observer
experience an emotion that closely matches the actor’s
(i.e., embarrassment) in order to qualify as an empathetic
response but also the observer must realize this emotion is
unrelated to his own circumstances. This literature relates to
our own theorizing about the lack of personal distress one
feels when one adopts the perspective of an observer versus
actor. Observers may feel embarrassed but are unlikely to
think that their own social standing is at stake. This is a key
difference between actors and observers and is related to
our hypothesis regarding how observers would evaluate the
actor. Our research proposition is not whether observers will
experience vicarious embarrassment. Rather, we consider
how observers will evaluate an actor regardless of whether
they feel embarrassment on behalf of the actor.
It is not entirely clear what a vicarious embarrassment
account would predict with respect to observers’ evalua-
tions of embarrassed actors. Past research demonstrates that
actors, as opposed to observers, focus on their own behav-
ior and tend to assume the worst in terms of interpersonal
evaluations. Regardless of vicariously experienced embar-
rassment, observers’ judgments or actors are consistently
kinder than actors generally expect, perhaps because observ-
ers who are not personally threatened they be sympathetic.
As Miller (1987) shows, empathetic embarrassment is more
likely if observers are susceptible to embarrassment them-
selves. Such observers tend to view embarrassed actors more
kindly. If an actor is able to view the situation as an observer
would, the kinder evaluations of the observer may become
salient; actors will then realize that observers are generally
kinder than they expect. Thus, our main hypothesis is that
encouraging an actor to take the viewpoint of the observer
will counteract actor’s tendency to anticipate harsher evalu-
ations. In summary, it is important to note that ‘taking the
perspective of an observer’ is a fundamentally different tack
than ‘trying to predict how observers will evaluate actors’
since actors generally do not predict observers’ evaluations
of them very well. Instead, actors need to consider the expe-
rience of an observer (vs. their own). Our data is consistent
with the hypothesis that when the actor takes an observer’s
perspective, he/she distances himself from the situation (e.g.,
13
Motivation and Emotion
his/her social identity is not threatened) and is able to real-
ize others will not judge him negatively. Future research
may want to look into, under what circumstances taking an
observer’s perspective can lead to greater embarrassment
avoidance instead.
Future research might consider other ways in which indi-
viduals’ self-related thoughts can be redirected to dampen
HPUBSC individuals’ expectations of overly-harsh observer
evaluations. For example, results for the load, control (no
intervention) condition imply that load thwarts HPUBSC
individuals’ ability to engage in their usual self-monitoring
(i.e., fewer self-related thoughts; Study 3) which in turn
causes empathy-neglect and embarrassment-avoidance.
Furthermore, future research may want to examine
the group of individuals who are low, versus not-high or
medium PUBSC individuals, in greater detail. We hypoth-
esized that taking an observer’s perspective would have no
effect on what we termed ‘LPUBSC’ individuals because
these individuals are less easily embarrassed in the first
place. However, we found that taking an observer’s perspec-
tive can increase embarrassment-avoidance among LPUBSC
(vs. HPUBSC) individuals (directional in Study 2 and sig-
nificant in Study 3). It may be that lower PUBSC individuals
tend not to perceive themselves as being in the spotlight, but
that taking an observer’s perspective switches the spotlight
on and grows embarrassment-avoidance. This is consistent
with Froming et al.’s (1990) finding LPUBSC people behave
similarly to HPUBSC people when under a spotlight.
For lower PUBSC participants in the control conditions,
the load manipulation appears to have increased self-related
thoughts and embarrassment-avoidance. Although a firmer
explanation for this unexpected finding awaits further
empirical experiment, lower PUBSC participants in Study
3 responded as though the load manipulation instructions
caused them to focus more on social actions than they would
have otherwise. Alternatively, it may be that lower PUBSC
participants tend to engage in self-protective thinking that
is blocked by working-memory load. The underlying cogni-
tive processes for individuals who are not high in PUBSC
have not been studied previously. Rather, researchers have
focused on HPUBSC individuals as a clinical population
and not individuals with low or medium levels of PUBSC.
Importantly, load’s effects in Study 3 on self-related
thoughts and purchase intentions demonstrate that tak-
ing an observer’s perspective is an effortful endeavor. In
this way, the present research adds to the growing body
of research that shows how cognitive load can exacerbate
individuals’ reliance on information stored in memory and
their chronic tendencies. Under load, taking the perspec-
tive of the observer lead to fewer self-related thoughts, in
particular fewer thoughts relating the embarrassing situ-
ation to themselves. Future research might benefit from
explicitly adopting a dual processing view and exploring
Motivation and Emotion

the automatic vs. effortful tendencies associated with that will successfully universally reduce embarrassment-
PUBSC levels in detail (Evans 2008). avoidance is more complicated than devising strategies to
Our results have significant implications for marketers increase embarrassment-avoidance since consumers will
given the frequency with which embarrassment-avoidance react differently to persuasion tactics depending on their
forms the basis for attempts to motivate consumers to buy level of PUBSC and the amount of available cognitive
a wide variety of products from laundry detergents (“ring resources.
around the collar”), to dishwashing liquid (unsightly spots
on dishes), and even to cars (avoiding the embarrassment Acknowledgements  The authors would like to thank Loraine Lau-
Gesk for contributions to an earlier version of this research.
of an unfavorable evaluation by the neighbors). Beyond
this, however, our research is relevant to those situations
in which marketers want to inoculate consumers against a
fear of embarrassment and encourage them to take actions
Methodological details appendix:
they might otherwise avoid. These situations frequently
Countering embarrassment‑avoidance
occur. Examples include getting an embarrassing but
among consumers
potentially life-saving medical test, asking a technician
See Fig. 4.
“dumb” questions that will increase customer satisfaction
with a purchase, or adopting an innovative and socially-
visible but potentially-risky product that might invite pub-
lic ridicule. Our research shows that devising strategies

Fig. 4  Ad—Study 1

13
 Motivation and Emotion

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