1

B. Crimes against the law of nations stripped of all touches of chivalry or of generosity, so as to present a
horrible case of rapine and near murder.

Provoking war and disloyalty in case of war

On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left matuta, a Dutch possession, for
Peta, another Dutch possession. In one of the boats was one individual, a
Dutch subject, and in the other boat eleven men, women, and children,
5. Inciting to war or giving motives for reprisals likewise subjects of Holland. After a number of days of navigation, at
about 7 o'clock in the evening, the second boat arrived between the
REV. PEN. CODE, art. 118
Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was
surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros all armed. The
Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too for themselves
6. Violation of neutrality all of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated two of
the women by methods too horrible to the described. All of the persons
REV. PEN. CODE, art. 119 on the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young women, were
again placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea that it would
submerge, although as a matter of fact, these people, after eleven days of
7. Corresponding with hostile country hardship and privation, were succored violating them, the Moros finally
arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro marauder were
REV. PEN. CODE, art. 120 Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro the two
women were able to escape.

8. Flight to enemy's country Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi,
Sulu, Philippine Islands. There they were arrested and were charged in the
REV. PEN. CODE, art. 121 Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy. A demurrer was
interposed by counsel de officio for the Moros, based on the grounds that
the offense charged was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of First
Piracy and mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine Waters Instance, nor of any court of the Philippine Islands, and that the facts did
not constitute a public offense, under the laws in force in the Philippine
Islands. After the demurrer was overruled by the trial judge, trial was had,
and a judgment was rendered finding the two defendants guilty and
9. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in sentencing each of them to life imprisonment (cadena perpetua), to
Philippine waters return together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another
REV. PEN. CODE, art. 122 case, to the offended parties, the thirty-nine sacks of copras which had
been robbed, or to indemnify them in the amount of 924 rupees, and to
pay a one-half part of the costs.

10. Qualified piracy

REV. PEN. CODE, art. 123
Pres. Decree No. 532 (1974)
Rep. Act No. 7659 (1993) and Republic Act No. 9346 (2006)
G.R. No. 17958 February 27, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LOL-LO and SARAW, defendants-appellants.
Thos. D. Aitken for appellants.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
The days when pirates roamed the seas, when picturesque buccaneers like
Captain Avery and Captain Kidd and Bartholomew Roberts gripped the
imagination, when grostesque brutes like Blackbeard flourished, seem far
away in the pages of history and romance. Nevertheless, the record
before us tells a tale of twentieth century piracy in the south seas, but
A very learned and exhaustive brief has been filed in this court by the
attorney de officio. By a process of elimination, however, certain
questions can be quickly disposed of.
The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of the crime of
piracy are present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high
seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit
and intention of universal hostility.
It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was done in the lover
court and as is again done in this court, that the Court of First Instance
was without jurisdiction of the case. Pirates are in law hostes humani
generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all
mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country
where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The
jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is
against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime
was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for
those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes." (U.S. vs.
Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)
The most serious question which is squarely presented to this court for
decision for the first time is whether or not the provisions of the Penal
Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force. Article 153 to 156
of the Penal Code reads as follows:
 2
ART. 153. The crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or the
subjects of another nation not at war with Spain, shall be punished with a
penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another
nation at war with Spain, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio
mayor.
ART. 154. Those who commit the crimes referred to in the first paragraph
of the next preceding article shall suffer the penalty of cadena perpetua or
death, and those who commit the crimes referred to in the second
paragraph of the same article, from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua:
1. Whenever they have seized some vessel by boarding or firing upon the
same.
2. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, or by any of
the physical injuries specified in articles four hundred and fourteen and
four hundred and fifteen and in paragraphs one and two of article four
hundred and sixteen.
3. Whenever it is accompanied by any of the offenses against chastity
specified in Chapter II, Title IX, of this book.
4. Whenever the pirates have abandoned any persons without means of
saving themselves.
5. In every case, the captain or skipper of the pirates.
ART. 155. With respect to the provisions of this title, as well as all others
of this code, when Spain is mentioned it shall be understood as including
any part of the national territory.
ART. 156. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this code, every
person, who, according to the Constitution of the Monarchy, has the
status of a Spaniard shall be considered as such.
The general rules of public law recognized and acted on by the United
States relating to the effect of a transfer of territory from another State to
the United States are well-known. The political law of the former
sovereignty is necessarily changed. The municipal law in so far as it is
consistent with the Constitution, the laws of the United States, or the
characteristics and institutions of the government, remains in force. As a
corollary to the main rules, laws subsisting at the time of transfer,
designed to secure good order and peace in the community, which are
strictly of a municipal character, continue until by direct action of the new
government they are altered or repealed. (Chicago, Rock Islands, etc., R.
Co. vs. McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S., 542.)
These principles of the public law were given specific application to the
Philippines by the Instructions of President McKinley of May 19, 1898, to
General Wesley Meritt, the Commanding General of the Army of
Occupation in the Philippines, when he said:
Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme,
and immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants,
the municipal laws of the conquered territory, such as affect private rights
of person and property, and provide for the punishment of crime, are
considered as continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the
new order of things, until they are suspended or superseded by the
occupying belligerent; and practice they are not usually abrogated, but are
allowed to remain in force, and to be administered by the ordinary
tribunals, substantially as they were before the occupations. This
enlightened practice is so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present
occasion. (Official Gazette, Preliminary Number, Jan. 1, 1903, p. 1. See also
General Merritt Proclamation of August 14, 1898.)
It cannot admit of doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code
dealing with piracy were meant to include the Philippine Islands. Article
156 of the Penal Code in relation to article 1 of the Constitution of the
Spanish Monarchy, would also make the provisions of the Code applicable
not only to Spaniards but to Filipinos.
The opinion of Grotius was that piracy by the law of nations is the same
thing as piracy by the civil law, and he has never been disputed. The
specific provisions of the Penal Code are similar in tenor to statutory
provisions elsewhere and to the concepts of the public law. This must
necessarily be so, considering that the Penal Code finds its inspiration in
this respect in the Novelas, the Partidas, and the Novisima Recopilacion.
The Constitution of the United States declares that the Congress shall
have the power to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on
the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations. (U.S. Const. Art. I,
sec. 8, cl. 10.) The Congress, in putting on the statute books the necessary
ancillary legislation, provided that whoever, on the high seas, commits the
crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought
into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life. (U.S. Crim.
Code, sec. 290; penalty formerly death: U.S. Rev. Stat., sec. 5368.) The
framers of the Constitution and the members of Congress were content to
let a definition of piracy rest on its universal conception under the law of
nations.
It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the
Philippines relating to piracy are not inconsistent with the corresponding
provisions in force in the United States.
By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United
States. A logical construction of articles of the Penal Code, like the articles
dealing with the crime of piracy, would be that wherever "Spain" is
mentioned, it should be substituted by the words "United States" and
wherever "Spaniards" are mentioned, the word should be substituted by
the expression "citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine
Islands." somewhat similar reasoning led this court in the case of United
States vs. Smith ([1919], 39 Phil., 533) to give to the word "authority" as
found in the Penal Code a limited meaning, which would no longer
comprehend all religious, military, and civil officers, but only public
officers in the Government of the Philippine Islands.
Under the construction above indicated, article 153 of the Penal Code
would read as follows:
The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United States and
citizens of the Philippine Islands, or the subjects of another nation not at
war with the United States, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from
cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another
nation at war with the United States, it shall be punished with the penalty
of presidio mayor.
 3
We hold those provisions of the Penal code dealing with the crime of
piracy, notably articles 153 and 154, to be still in force in the Philippines.
The crime falls under the first paragraph of article 153 of the Penal Code in
relation to article 154. There are present at least two of the circumstances
named in the last cited article as authorizing either cadena perpetua or
death. The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense against
chastity and (2) the abandonment of persons without apparent means of
saving themselves. It is, therefore, only necessary for us to determine as
to whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death should be imposed.
In this connection, the trial court, finding present the one aggravating
circumstance of nocturnity, and compensating the same by the one
mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction provided by article 11, as
amended, of the Penal Code, sentenced the accused to life imprisonment.
At least three aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done in the
commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by causing other
wrongs not necessary for its commission, that advantage was taken of
superior strength, and that means were employed which added ignominy
to the natural effects of the act, must also be taken into consideration in
fixing the penalty. Considering, therefore, the number and importance of
the qualifying and aggravating circumstances here present, which cannot
be offset by the sole mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, and the
horrible nature of the crime committed, it becomes our duty to impose
capital punishment.
The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to the propriety of
the imposition of the death penalty upon the defendant and appellant
Lo-lo (the accused who raped on of the women), but is not unanimous
with regard to the court, Mr. Justice Romualdez, registers his
nonconformity. In accordance with provisions of Act No. 2726, it results,
therefore, that the judgment of the trial court as to the defendant and
appellant Saraw is affirmed, and is reversed as to the defendant and
appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the crime of piracy and is
sentenced therefor to be hung until dead, at such time and place as shall
be fixed by the judge of first instance of the Twenty-sixth Judicial District.
The two appellants together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in
another case, shall indemnify jointly and severally the offended parties in
the equivalent of 924 rupees, and shall pay a one-half part of the costs of
both instances. So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez,
JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-60100 March 20, 1985
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JAIME RODRIGUEZ alias JIMMY alias WILFRED DE LARA y MEDRANO and
RICO LOPEZ, accused-appellants.
G.R. No. L-60768 March 20, 1985
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DARIO DE REYES alias DARIO DECE RAYMUNDO y ELAUSA, accused-
appellant.
G.R. No. L-61069 March 20, l985
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PETER PONCE y BULAYBULAY alias PETER POWE, accused-appellant.
PER CURIAM:
Appellants Jaime Rodriguez alias Jimmy alias Wilfred de Lara y Medrano,
Rico Lopez, Davao Reyes alias Dario Dece Raymundo y Elausa and Peter
Ponce y Bulaybulay alias Peter Power were charged of the crime of piracy
in an information filed before the then Court of First Instance of Sulu and
Tawi-Tawi, which reads:
That on or about 3:15 in the morning of August 31, 1981, at the vicinity of
Muligin Island and within the territorial waters of the Municipality of
Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi, Province of Tawi-Tawi, and within the jurisdiction
of this honorable Court, the above-named accused Wilfred de Lara y
Medrano, alias Jaime Rodriguez (Jimmy) Dario Dece Raymundo y Elausa;
Rico Lopez y Fernandez and Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay alias Peter Power
being crew members of the M/V Noria 767, a barter trade vessel of
Philippine registry, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping one another and armed with bladed weapons and high caliber
firearms, to wit: three (3) daggers, two (2) M-14, one (1) garand and one
(1) Browning Automatic Rifle, with intent of gain and by means of violence
and intimidation upon persons, did then and there willfully and
unlawfuflly, and feloniously take, steal and carry away against the consent
of the owners thereof, the equipments and other persona) properties
belonging to the crew members and passengers of the said M/V Noria 767,
consisting of cash money amounting to Three Million Five Hundred
Seventeen Thousand Three Hundred Pesos (P3,517,300.00), personal
belongings of passengers and crew amounting to One Hundred Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P130,000.00), the vessel's compass, navigational charts
and instruments amounting to Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) to the
damage and prejudice of the aforementioned owners in the total amount
of THREE MILLION SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY SEVEN THOUSAND THREE
HUNDRED PESOS (P3,687,300.00) Philippine Currency; that by reason of
and on the occasion of the said piracy and for the purpose of enabling the
abovenamed accused to take, steal and carry away the properties
abovementioned, the herein accused in pursuance to their conspiracy, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill and
with evident premeditation, treacherously attack, assault, stab, shot and,
taking advantage of superior strength, use personal violence upon the
persons of Abdusador Sumihag, Vicente America, Perhan Tan, Marcos Que,
Ismael Turabin, Mabar Abdurahman, Wadi Aduk Rasdi Alfad, Kasmir Tan,
Peter Paul Chiong, Juaini Husini Ismael Ombra, Sabturani Ulag, Mutalib
Sarahadil, Bajubar Adam, Quillermo Wee, Reuben Segovia Ho, Michael Lao,
Yusop Abubakar, Hahji Hussin Kulavan, Amjad Quezon, Rebuan Majid
Edgar Tan, Abdurasul Alialam Federico Canizares, Omar Tahil Gilbert Que,
Arajul Salialam, Masihul Bandahala, Asola Mohammaddin, Batoto Sulpicio,
Sakirani Bassal, Ibrahim Jamil, Saupi Malang and Gulam Sahiddan, thereby
inflicting upon them multiple gunshot wounds which caused their
instantaneous death and likewise causing physical injuries upon the
persons of Inggal Issao Abduhasan Indasan Hadji Yusop H. Alfad and Hadji
Mahalail Alfad, thus performing all acts of execution which could have
produced the death of said persons, but nevertheless did not produce it
by reason or cause independent of the will of said accused, that is, by the
timely and able medical assistance rendered to said victims which
prevented death.
 4
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the aggravating circumstances of treachery,
evident premeditation, night time and the use of superior strength. (pp.
97-98, Rollo of L-61069)
Upon arraignment on February 25, 1982, Jaime Rodriguez and Rico Lopez,
assisted by their counsel, pleaded guilty to the charge, were convicted on
March 5, 1982 and sentenced each "to suffer the extreme penalty of
death."
Dario Dece Raymundo, upon arraignment, interposed a plea of not guilty.
However, he withdrew his plea and substituted it with that of guilty. On
March 10, 1982 he was convicted of the crime charged and sentenced "to
suffer the extreme penalty of death."
Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay entered the plea of not guilty.
After trial, he was found guilty and was also sentenced "to suffer the
extreme penalty of death."
No pronouncement was made with respect to the civil liabilities of the
four defendants because "there was a separate civil action for breach of
contract and damages filed with the same trial court in Civil Case No. N-85
against the several defendants, including the four accused
aforementioned." (p. 26, L-61069)
The case of the four convicted defendants is now before Us on automatic
review.
Evidence shows that on August 29, 1981, at about 7:30 in the evening, the
vessel M/V Noria 767, owned and registered in the name of Hadji Noria
Indasan left Jolo wharf for Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi. It arrived at the port of
Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi the following day, August 30, 1981, at around 2:00
in the afternoon. In the evening of the same date, the vessel left for
Labuan. On board the vessel were several traders and crew members. Two
or three hours after its departure, while sailing about 25 miles from
Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi, a commotion occurred in one of the cabins of the
vessel.
Three witnesses testified on what they saw and heard.
Mr. Clyde Que, a passenger, heard noises inside a cabin and, after awhile,
he heard shots being fired. He rushed to the motor launch to hide and on
his way through the engine room, he saw appellant Peter Ponce. Then
appellants Jaime Rodriguez, Dario Dece and Rico Lopez, all armed with
rifles, started firing towards Que's companions after which they brought
Que to the pilot's house to handle the steering wheel. He was substituted
by Usman, another passenger, while Que and the other crew members
were ordered to throw overboard sacks of copra and the dead bodies of
Peter Chiong, Michael Lao, Casmin Tan and Vicente America. At the time,
appellant Peter Ponce, armed with a M-14 rifle, stood guard.
Hadji Mahalail Alfad, another passenger, heard commotions from the
motor launch, followed by gunfire. He hid by laying down among the sacks
of copra. He saw appellants Peter Ponce, Jaime Rodriguez, Rico Lopez and
Dario Dece coming down the stairs as they were firing shots until Fred
Canizares and Guilbert Que were hit, their bodies falling upon him. When
he tried to move, he realized that he was also hit on the right side of his
stomach. Thereafter, he pretended to be dead till daytime.
Emil Macasaet, Jr., the skipper of the vessel heard the commotion from
one of the cabins. He ordered his men to open the door but it could not be
opened. After awhile, the door opened and he saw a gun pointed at them.
Whereupon, he hid behind the bags of copra until appellant Jaime
Rodriguez came and fired at him. Luckily, he was not hit. He and some of
his men crawled and they took cover in the bodega of copra. While in
hiding there were gunfires coming from Dario Dece and Peter Ponce.
About four (4) hours later, his Chief Mate Usman persuaded him to come
out otherwise something worse would happen. He saw Jaime Rodriguez
who ordered him to direct his men to throw the copras as well as the dead
bodies overboard.
About ten o'clock in the morning of the same day, the vessel reached an
island where the four appellants were able to secure pumpboats.
Macasaet was ordered to load in one of the pumpboats nine (9) attache
cases which were full of money. Rico Lopez and Jaime Rodriguez boarded
one pumpboat, while Peter Ponce and Dario Dece boarded another,
bringing with them: dressed chicken, softdrinks, durian, boxes of
ammunitions, gallons of water and some meat, as well as rifles.
Municipal Health Officer Leopoldo Lao went aboard the vessel M/V Noria
when it arrived at Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi on September 2, 1981 and saw at
the wharf ten dead bodies, all victims of the sea-jacking, namely: Gulam
Sahiddan, Arajul Naran Salialam, Mallang Saupi, Guilbert Que, Frederico
Canizares, Masihul Bandahala, Ribowan Majid Edgar Tan, Omar Sabdani
Tahir and Abdurasul Salialam.
In their brief, appellants Jaime Rodriguez, Rico Lopez and Dario Dece claim
that the trial court erred (1) in imposing the death penalty to the
accused-appellants Jaime Rodriguez alias Wilfred de Lara, Rico Lopez y
Fernandez and Davao de Reyes, alias Dario Dece Raymundo y Elausa
despite their plea of guilty; (2) in giving weight to the alleged sworn
statements of Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay, Identified as Exhibits "C" to
"C-10" and Exhibits "I to I-5", as evidence against Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay;
(3) in holding that accused-appellant Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay is guilty of
the crime of piracy; (4) in holding that the defense of Peter Ponce y
Bulaybulay was merely a denial; and, (5) in holding that Peter Ponce y
Bulaybulay entrusted the P1,700.00 which was his personal money to Atty.
Efren Capulong of the National Bureau of Investigation.
There is no merit in this appeal of the three named defendants, namely:
Jaime Rodriguez and Rico Lopez in G.R. No. L-60100, and Dario Dece in G.R.
No. L-60768.
Anent the first assigned error, suffice it to say that Presidential Decree No.
532, otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy Law, amending Article 134 of the
Revised Penal Code and which took effect on August 8, 1974, provides:
SEC. 3. Penalties.—Any person who commits piracy or highway
robbery/brigandage as herein defined, shall, upon conviction by
competent court be punished by:
a) Piracy.—The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum
periods shall be imposed. If physical injuries or other crimes are
committed as a result or on the occasion thereof, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed. If rape, murder or no homocide is committed
as a result or on the occasion of piracy, or when the offenders abandoned
the victims without means of saving themselves, or when the seizure is
accomplished by firing upon or boarding a vessel, the mandatory penalty
of death shall be imposed. (Emphasis supplied)
 5
Clearly, the penalty imposable upon persons found guilty of the crime of
piracy where rape, murder or homicide is committed is mandatory death
penalty. Thus, the lower court committed no error in not considering the
plea of the three (3) defendants as a mitigating circumstance. Article 63 of
the Revised Penal Code states that:
b) ART. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties.—In all cases in
which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shag be applied by
the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that
may have attended the commission of the deed.
With respect to the other assigned errors, We also find them to be devoid
of merit. Appellants Peter Ponce gave a statement (Exhibits "C" to "C-11")
to the Malaysian authorities and another statement (Exhibits "I" to "I-15")
before the National Bureau of Investigation of Manila. When said
statement (Exhibits "C" to "C-11") was offered in evidence by the
prosecution, the same was not objected to by the defense, aside from the
fact that Peter Ponce, on cross examination, admitted the truthfulness of
said declarations, thus:
Q And the investigation was reduced into writing is that correct?
A Yes. sir.
Q And you were investigated by the police authority of Kudat and Kota
Kinabalo, is that right?
A Yes, sir. Only in Kudat.
Q And that statement you gave to the authority at Kudat, you have signed
that statement, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what you stated is all the truth before the authority in Kudat?
A Yes, sir. (pp. 33-34, tsn, May 28, 1982)
Relative to the appeal of appellant Peter Ponce (G.R. No. L-61069), which
We likewise declare to be without merit, evidence shows that his
participation in the commission of the offense was positively testified to
by the master of the vessel, Emil Macasaet, Jr., and a passenger, Hadji
Mahalail Alfad. Another witness, passenger Clyde Que also pointed to
have seen him (Peter Ponce) armed with an M-14 rifle.
Considering the testimonies of Clyde Que and Emil Macasaet, Jr. who
actually saw appellant Peter Ponce firing his weapon indiscriminately at
the passengers and crew members in wanton disregard of human lives
and the fact that after the looting and killing, appellant Peter Ponce, still
armed, joined Dario Dece in one pumpboat, there can be no question that
he was in conspiracy with the three other defendants. After his arrest,
Ponce gave a statement to the authorities stating therein his participation
as well as those of his companions (Exhibits "I" to "I-1").
The four (4) appellants were arrested and detained by the Malaysian
authorities. On January 8, 1982, the National Bureau of Investigation
authorities fetched and brought them to Manila where they executed
their respective statements after Rico Lopez and Peter Ponce delivered to
the NBI, P3,700.00 and P1,700.00, respectively, aside from the
P527,595.00 and one Rolex watch which the Malaysian authorities also
turned over to the Acting In-Charge of the NBI in Jolo.
The statement of Ponce (Exhibit " I ") contains the questions and answers
pertinent to Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution, to wit:
l. QUESTION: Mr. Peter Ponce, we are informing you that you are under
investigation here in connection with the robbery committed on the M/V
Noria last August 31, 1981, where you are an Assistant Engineer. You have
a right to remain silent and to refuse to answer any of our questions here.
You have the right to be represented by counsel of your choice in this
investigation. Should you decide to be represented by a lawyer but cannot
afford one we will provide a lawyer for you free. Should you decide to give
a sworn statement, the same shall be voluntary and free from force or
intimidation or promise of reward or leniency and anything that you saw
here maybe used for or against you in any court in the Philippines. Now do
you understand an these rights of yours?
ANSWER: Yes, sir.
2. Q: Do you need the services of a lawyer?
A: No, sir.
3. Q: Are you willing to affix your signature hereinbelow to signify that you
so understand all your rights as above stated and that you do not need the
services of a lawyer?
A: Yes, sir. (p. 11 6, Rollo)
Thus, it is clear that Peter Ponce was fully advised of his constitutional
right to remain silent and his right to counsel.
Considering the written statements of all the appellants, (Exhibits "E", "F",
"G", "H", "J" and "K"), interlocking as they are with each other as each
admits his participation and those of the other co-accused, there is no
room for doubt that conspiracy existed among them. The conduct of
appellant
Peter Ponce before, during and after the commission of the crime is a
circumstance showing the presence of conspiracy in the commission of
the crime. As a consequence, every one is responsible for the crime
committed.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Melencio- Herrera, Plana,
Escolin Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay JJ., concur.
Fernando, C.J., took no part,
G.R. No. L-57292 February 18, 1986
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
 6
JULAIDE SIYOH, OMAR-KAYAM KIRAM, NAMLI INDANAN and ANDAW
JAMAHALI, accused-appellants.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
This is an automatic review of the decision of the defunct Court of First
Instance of Basilan, Judge Jainal D. Rasul as ponente, imposing the death
penalty.
In Criminal Case No. 318 of the aforesaid court, JULAIDE SIYOH,
OMARKAYAM KIRAM, NAMLI INDANAN and ANDAW JAMAHALI were
accused of qualified piracy with triple murder and frustrated murder said
to have been committed according to the information as follows:
That on or about the 14th day of July, 1979, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, viz., at Mataja Is., Municipality of Lantawan,
Province of Basilan, Philippines, the above named accused, being
strangers and without lawful authority, armed with firearms and taking
advantage of their superior strength, conspiring and confederating
together, aiding and assisting one with the other, with intent to gain and
by the use of violence or intimidation against persons and force upon
things, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, fire their
guns into the air and stop the pumpboat wherein Rodolfo de Castro,
Danilo Hiolen, Anastacio de Guzman and Antonio de Guzman were riding,
traveling at that time from the island of Baluk-Baluk towards Pilas,
boarded the said pumpboat and take, steal and carry away all their cash
money, wrist watches, stereo sets, merchandise and other personal
belongings amounting to the total amount of P 18,342.00, Philippine
Currency; that the said accused, on the occasion of the crime herein
above-described, taking advantage that the said victims were at their
mercy, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent
to kill, ordered them to jump into the water, whereupon, the said accused,
fired their guns at them which caused the death of Rodolfo de Castro,
Danilo Hiolen, Anastacio de Guzman and wounding one Antonio de
Guzman; thus the accused have performed all the acts of execution which
would have produced the crime of Qualified Piracy with Quadruple
Murder, but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reasons of causes
in dependent of their will, that is, said Antonio de Guzman was able to
swim to the shore and hid himself, and due to the timely medical
assistance rendered to said victim, Antonio de Guzman which prevented
his death. (Expediente, pp. 1-2.)
An order of arrest was issued against all of the accused but only Julaide
Siyoh and Omar-kayam Kiram were apprehended. (Id, p. 8.)
After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision with the following
dispositive portion.
WHEREFORE, in view of the fore going considerations, this Court finds the
accused Omar-kayam Kiram and Julaide Siyoh guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Qualified Piracy with Triple Murder and Frustrated
Murder as defined and penalized under the provision of Presidential
Decree No. 532, and hereby sentences each one of them to suffer the
supreme penalty of DEATH. However, considering the provision of Section
106 of the Code of Mindanao and Sulu, the illiteracy or ignorance or
extreme poverty of the accused who are members of the cultural
minorities, under a regime of so called compassionate society, a
commutation to life imprisonment is recommended. (Id, p. 130.)
In their appeal, Siyoh and Kiram make only one assignment of error:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OMAR-KAYAM KIRAM AND JULAIDE SIYOH HAS
BEEN PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. (Brief, p. 8.)
The People's version of the facts is as follows:
Alberto Aurea was a businessman engaged in selling dry goods at the
Larmitan Public Market, in the province of Basilan (pp. 2-3, tsn). On July 7,
1979 and on July 10, 1979, Antonio de Guzman, Danilo Hiolen, Rodolfo de
Castro and Anastacio de Guzman received goods from his store consisting
of mosquito nets, blankets, wrist watch sets and stereophono with total
value of P15,000 more or less (pp. 4-6, tsn). The goods were received
under an agreement that they would be sold by the above-named persons
and thereafter they would pay the value of said goods to Aurea and keep
part of the profits for themselves. However these people neither paid the
value of the goods to Aurea nor returned the goods to him (pp. 6-7, tsn).
On July 15, 1979, Aurea was informed by Antonio de Guzman that his
group was held up near Baluk- Baluk Island and that his companions were
hacked (p. 8, tsn). On July 16, 1979, the bodies of Rodolfo de Castro,
Danilo Hiolen and Anastacio de Guzman were brought by the PC seaborne
patrol to Isabela, Basilan (pp. 17-18, 29, tsn). Only Antonio de Guzman
survived the incident that caused the death of his companions.
It appears that on July 10, 1979, Antonio de Guzman together with his
friends who were also travelling merchants like him, were on their way to
Pilas Island, Province of Basilan, to sell the goods they received from
Alberto Aurea. The goods they brought with them had a total value of
P18,000.00 (pp- 36-37, tsn). They left for Pilas Island at 2:00 p.m. of July 10,
1979 on a pumpboat. They took their dinner and slept that night in the
house of Omar-kayam Kiram at Pilas Island (pp. 37-38, tsn).
The following day, July 11, 1979, de Guzman's group, together with Kiram
and Julaide Siyoh, started selling their goods, They were able to sell goods
worth P 3,500.00. On July 12, 1979, the group, again accompanied by
Kiram and Siyoh, went to sell their goods at another place, Sangbay,
where they sold goods worth P 12,000.00 (pp. 40-42, tsn). They returned
to Pilas Island at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon and again slept at Kiram's
house. However that night Kiram did not sleep in his house, and upon
inquiry the following day when Antonio de Guzman saw him, Kiram told
the former that he slept at the house of Siyoh.
On that day, July 13, 1979, the group of Antonio de Guzman went to
Baluk-Baluk, a place suggested by Kiram. They were able to sell goods
worth P3,000.00 (pp. 43-46, tsn). They returned to Pilas Island for the
night but Kiram did not sleep with them (p. 47, tsn).
The following day, July 14, 1979, the group again went to Baluk-Baluk
accompanied by Kiram and Siyoh (pp. 48, 50 t.s.n), They used the
pumpboat of Kiram. Kiram and Siyoh were at that time armed with
'barongs'. They arrived at Baluk-Baluk at about 10:00 o'clock in the
morning and upon arrival at the place Kiram and Siyoh going ahead of the
group went to a house about 15 meters away from the place where the
group was selling its goods (pp. 50-53, tsn). Kiram and Siyoh were seen by
the group talking with two persons whose faces the group saw but could
not recognize (pp. 53-54, tsn). After selling their goods, the members of
the group, together with Kiram and Siyoh, prepared to return to Pilas
Island. They rode on a pumpboat where Siyoh positioned himself at the
front while Kiram operated the engine. On the way to Pilas Island, Antonio
 7
de Guzman saw another pumpboat painted red and green about 200
meters away from their pumpboat (pp. 55, tsn). Shortly after" Kiram
turned off the engine of their pumpboat. Thereafter two shots were fired
from the other pumpboat as it moved towards them (pp. 57-58, tsn).
There were two persons on the other pumpboat who were armed with
armantes. De Guzman recognized them to be the same persons he saw
Kiram conversing with in a house at Baluk-Baluk Island. When the boat
came close to them, Kiram threw a rope to the other pumpboat which
towed de Guzman's pumpboat towards Mataja Island. On the way to
Mataja Island, Antonio de Guzman and his companions were divested of
their money and their goods by Kiram (pp. 59-61, tsn). Thereafter Kiram
and his companions ordered the group of de Guzman to undress. Taking
fancy on the pants of Antonio de Guzman, Kiram put it on. With
everybody undressed, Kiram said 'It was good to kill all of you'. After that
remark, Siyoh hacked Danilo Hiolen while Kiram hacked Rodolfo de Castro.
Antonio de Guzman jumped into the water. As he was swimming away
from the pumpboat, the two companions of Kiram fired at him, injuring
his back (pp. 62-65, tsn). But he was able to reach a mangrove where he
stayed till nightfall. When he left the mangrove, he saw the dead bodies of
Anastacio de Guzman, Danilo Hiolen and Rodolfo de Castro. He was picked
up by a fishing boat and brought to the Philippine Army station at Maluso
where he received first aid treatment. Later he was brought to the J.S.
Alano Memorial Hospital at Isabela, Basilan province (pp. 66-68, tsn).
On July 15, 1979, while waiting for the dead bodies of his companions at
the wharf, de Guzman saw Siyoh and Kiram. He pointed them out to the
PC and the two were arrested before they could run. When arrested,
Kiram was wearing the pants he took from de Guzman and de Guzman
had to ask Pat. Bayabas at the Provincial Jail to get back his pants from
Kiram (pp. 69-72, tsn).
Antonio de Guzman was physically examined at the J.S. Alano Memorial
Hospital at Isabela, Basilan and findings showed: 'gunshot wound, scapular
area, bilateral, tangenital' (Exh. C, prosecution). (pp. 134-136, tsn). Dr.
Jaime M. Junio, Provincial Health Officer of Basilan, examined the dead
bodies of Rodolfo de Castro and Danilo Hiolen and issued the
corresponding death certificates (Exhs. D and E, prosecution). (pp.
137-138; 140-141, tsn). (Brief, pp. 5-11.)
As can be seen from the lone assignment of error, the issue is the
credibility of witnesses. Who should be believed Antonio de Guzman who
was the lone prosecution eye-witness or Siyoh and Kiram the
accused-appellants who claims that they were also the victims of the
crime? The trial court which had the opportunity of observing the
demeanor of the witnesses and how they testified assigned credibility to
the former and an examination of the record does not reveal any fact or
circumstance of weight and influence which was overlooked or the
significance of which was misinterpreted as would justify a reversal of the
trial court's determination. Additionally, the following claims of the
appellants are not convincing:
1. That if they were the culprits they could have easily robbed their victims
at the Kiram house or on any of the occasions when they were travelling
together. Suffice it to say that robbing the victims at Kiram's house would
make Kiram and his family immediately suspect and robbing the victims
before they had sold all their goods would be premature. However,
robbing and killing the victims while at sea and after they had sold all their
goods was both timely and provided safety from prying eyes.
2. That the accused immediately reported the incident to the PC. The
record does not support this assertion. For as the prosecution stated: "It is
of important consequence to mention that the witness presented by the
defense are all from Pilas Island and friends of the accused. They claimed
to be members of retrieving team for the dead bodies but no PC soldiers
were ever presented to attest this fact. The defense may counter why the
prosecution also failed to present the Maluso Police Daily Event book?
This matter has been brought by Antonio not to the attention of the PC or
Police but to an army detachment. The Army is known to have no docket
book, so why take the pain in locating the army soldiers with whom the
report was made? (Memorandum, p. 7.) And Judge Rasul also makes this
observation: "..., this Court is puzzled, assuming the version of the defense
to be true, why the lone survivor Antonio de Guzman as having been
allegedly helped by the accused testified against them. Indeed, no
evidence was presented and nothing can be inferred from the evidence of
the defense so far presented showing reason why the lone survivor should
pervert the truth or fabricate or manufacture such heinous crime as
qualified piracy with triple murders and frustrated murder? The point
which makes us doubt the version of the defense is the role taken by the
PC to whom the report was allegedly made by the accused immediately
after the commission of the offense. Instead of helping the accused, the
PC law enforcement agency in Isabela, perhaps not crediting the report of
the accused or believing in the version of the report made by the lone
survivor Antonio de Guzman, acted consistently with the latter's report
and placed the accused under detention for investigation."
(Expediente, pp. 127-128.)
3. That the affidavits of Dolores de Guzman, wife of the deceased
Anastacio de Guzman, and Primitiva de Castro, wife of the deceased
Rodolfo de Castro, state that Antonio de Guzman informed them shortly
after the incident that their husbands were killed by the companions of
Siyoh and Kiram. The thrust of the appellants' claim, therefore, is that
Namli Indanan and Andaw Jamahali were the killers and not the former.
But this claim is baseless in the face of the proven conspiracy among the
accused for as Judge Rasul has stated:
It is believed that conspiracy as alleged in the information is sufficiently
proved in this case. In fact the following facts appear to have been
established to show clearly conspiracy: A) On July 14, 1979, while peddling,
the survivor-witness Tony de Guzman noticed that near the window of a
dilapidated house, both accused were talking to two (2) armed
strange-looking men at Baluk-Baluk Island; B) When the pumpboat was
chased and overtaken, the survivor-witness Tony de Guzman recognized
their captors to be the same two (2) armed strangers to whom the two
accused talked in Baluk- Baluk Island near the dilapidated house; C) The
two accused, without order from the two armed strangers transferred the
unsold goods to the captors' banca; D) That Tony de Guzman and
companion peddlers were divested of their jewelries and cash and
undressed while the two accused remained unharmed or not molested.
These concerted actions on their part prove conspiracy and make them
equally liable for the same crime (People vs. Pedro, 16 SCRA 57; People vs.
lndic 10 SCRA 130). The convergence of the will of the conspirators in the
scheming and execution of the crime amply justifies the imputation of all
of them the act of any of them (People vs. Peralta, 25 SCRA, 759). (Id., pp.
128-129.)
4. That there is no evidence Anastacio de Guzman was killed together with
Rodolfo de Castro and Danilo Hiolen because his remains were never
recovered. There is no reason to suppose that Anastacio de Guzman is still
alive or that he died in a manner different from his companions. The
incident took place on July 14, 1979 and when the trial court decided the
case on June 8, 1981 Anastacio de Guzman was still missing. But the
number of persons killed on the occasion of piracy is not material. P.D. No.
 8
532 considers qualified piracy, i.e. rape, murder or homicide is committed
as a result or on the occasion of piracy, as a special complex crime
punishable by death regardless of the number of victims.
5. That the death certificates are vague as to the nature of the injuries
sustained by the victims; were they hacked wounds or gunshot wounds?
The cause of death stated for Rodolfo de Castro and Danilo Hiolen is:
"Hemorrhage due to hacked wounds, possible gunshot wounds." (Exhs. D
and E.) The cause is consistent with the testimony of Antonio de Guzman
that the victims were hacked; that the appellants were armed with
"barongs" while Indanan and Jamahali were armed with armalites.
WHEREFORE, finding the decision under review to be in accord with both
the facts and the law, it is affirmed with the following modifications: (a)
for lack of necessary votes the penalty imposed shall be reclusion
perpetua; and (b) each of the appellants shall pay in solidum to the heirs
of each of the deceased indemnity in the amount of P30,000.00. No
special pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin Gutierrez, Jr., Dela Fuente,
Alampay and Patajo, JJ., concur.
Aquino, C.J., took no part.
Teehankee, J., for affirmance of death sentence.
G.R. No. 111709 August 30, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C.
INFANTE, CHEONG SAN HIONG, and JOHN DOES, accused-appellants.
MELO, J.:
This is one of the older cases which unfortunately has remained in docket
of the Court for sometime. It was reassigned, together with other similar
cases, to undersigned ponente in pursuance of A.M. No. 00-9-03-SC dated
February 27, 2001.
In the evening of March 2, 1991, "M/T Tabangao," a cargo vessel owned
by the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation, loaded with 2,000
barrels of kerosene, 2,600 barrels of regular gasoline, and 40,000 barrels
of diesel oil, with a total value of P40,426,793,87, was sailing off the coast
of Mindoro near Silonay Island.
The vessel, manned by 21 crew members, including Captain Edilberto
Libo-on, Second Mate Christian Torralba, and Operator Isaias Ervas, was
suddenly boarded, with the use of an aluminum ladder, by seven fully
armed pirates led by Emilio Changco, older brother of accused-appellant
Cecilio Changco. The pirates, including accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola,
and Infante, Jr. were armed with M-16 rifles, .45 and .38 caliber handguns,
and bolos. They detained the crew and took complete control of the
vessel. Thereafter, accused-appellant Loyola ordered three crew members
to paint over, using black paint, the name "M/T Tabangao" on the front
and rear portions of the vessel, as well as the PNOC logo on the chimney
of the vessel. The vessel was then painted with the name "Galilee," with
registry at San Lorenzo, Honduras. The crew was forced to sail to
Singapore, all the while sending misleading radio messages to PNOC that
the ship was undergoing repairs.
PNOC, after losing radio contact with the vessel, reported the
disappearance of the vessel to the Philippine Coast Guard and secured the
assistance of the Philippine Air Force and the Philippine Navy. However,
search and rescue operations yielded negative results. On March 9, 1991,
the ship arrived in the vicinity of Singapore and cruised around the area
presumably to await another vessel which, however, failed to arrive. The
pirates were thus forced to return to the Philippines on March 14, 1991,
arriving at Calatagan, Batangas on March 20, 1991 where it remained at
sea.
On March 28, 1991, the "M/T Tabangao" again sailed to and anchored
about 10 to 18 nautical miles from Singapore's shoreline where another
vessel called "Navi Pride" anchored beside it. Emilio Changco ordered the
crew of "M/T Tabangao" to transfer the vessel's cargo to the hold of "Navi
Pride". Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong supervised the crew of "Navi
Pride" in receiving the cargo. The transfer, after an interruption, with both
vessels leaving the area, was completed on March 30, 1991.
On March 30, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" returned to the same area and
completed the transfer of cargo to "Navi Pride."
On April 8, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" arrived at Calatagan, Batangas, but the
vessel remained at sea. On April 10, 1991, the members of the crew were
released in three batches with the stern warning not to report the incident
to government authorities for a period of two days or until April 12, 1991,
otherwise they would be killed. The first batch was fetched from the
shoreline by a newly painted passenger jeep driven by accused-appellant
Cecilio Changco, brother of Emilio Changco, who brought them to Imus,
Cavite and gave P20,000.00 to Captain Libo-on for fare of the crew in
proceeding to their respective homes. The second batch was fetched by
accused-appellant Changco at midnight of April 10, 1991 and were
brought to different places in Metro Manila.
On April 12, 1991, the Chief Engineer, accompanied by the members of
the crew, called the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation office to
report the incident. The crew members were brought to the Coast Guard
Office for investigation. The incident was also reported to the National
Bureau of Investigation where the officers and members of the crew
executed sworn statements regarding the incident.
A series of arrests was thereafter effected as follows:
a. On May 19, 1991, the NBI received verified information that the pirates
were present at U.K. Beach, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas. After three
days of surveillance, accused-appellant Tulin was arrested and brought to
the NBI headquarters in Manila.
b. Accused-appellants Infante, Jr. and Loyola were arrested by chance at
Aguinaldo Hi-way by NBI agents as the latter were pursuing the
mastermind, who managed to evade arrest.
c. On May 20, 1991, accused-appellants Hiong and Changco were arrested
at the lobby of Alpha Hotel in Batangas City.
 9
On October 24, 1991, an Information charging qualified piracy or violation
of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Piracy in Philippine Waters) was filed
against accused-appellants, as follows:
The undersigned State Prosecutor accuses ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I.
LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C. INFANTE, and CHEONG SAN
HIONG, and nine (9) other JOHN DOES of qualified piracy (Violation of P.D.
No. 532), committed as follows:
That on or about and during the period from March 2 to April 10, 1991,
both dates inclusive, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, then
manning a motor launch and armed with high powered guns, conspiring
and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fire upon, board and seize
while in the Philippine waters M/T PNOC TABANGCO loaded with
petroleum products, together with the complement and crew members,
employing violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things,
then direct the vessel to proceed to Singapore where the cargoes were
unloaded and thereafter returned to the Philippines on April 10, 1991, in
violation of the aforesaid law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(pp. 119-20, Rollo.)
This was docketed as Criminal Case No. 91-94896 before Branch 49 of the
Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in
Manila. Upon arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the
charge. Trial thereupon ensued.
Accused-appellants Tulin, Infante, Jr., and Loyola, notwithstanding some
inconsistencies in their testimony as to where they were on March 1, 1991,
maintained the defense of denial, and disputed the charge, as well as the
transfer of any cargo from "M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride." All of
them claimed having their own respective sources of livelihood. Their
story is to the effect that on March 2, 1991, while they were conversing by
the beach, a red speedboat with Captain Edilberto Liboon and Second
Mate Christian Torralba on board, approached the seashore. Captain
Liboon inquired from the three if they wanted to work in a vessel. They
were told that the work was light and that each worker was to be paid
P3,000.00 a month with additional compensation if they worked beyond
that period. They agreed even though they had no sea-going experience.
On board, they cooked, cleaned the vessel, prepared coffee, and ran
errands for the officers. They denied having gone to Singapore, claiming
that the vessel only went to Batangas. Upon arrival thereat in the morning
of March 21, 1991, they were paid P1,000.00 each as salary for nineteen
days of work, and were told that the balance would be remitted to their
addresses. There was neither receipt nor contracts of employment signed
by the parties.
Accused-appellant Changco categorically denied the charge, averring that
he was at home sleeping on April 10, 1991. He testified that he is the
younger brother of Emilio Changco, Jr.
Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong, also known as Ramzan Ali, adduced
evidence that he studied in Sydney, Australia, obtaining the "Certificate"
as Chief Officer, and later completed the course as a "Master" of a vessel,
working as such for two years on board a vessel. He was employed at Navi
Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. as Port Captain. The company was engaged in
the business of trading petroleum, including shipoil, bunker lube oil, and
petroleum to domestic and international markets. It owned four vessels,
one of which was "Navi Pride."
On March 2, 1991, the day before "M/T Tabangao" was seized by Emilio
Changco and his cohorts, Hiong's name was listed in the company's letter
to the Mercantile Section of the Maritime Department of the Singapore
government as the radio telephone operator on board the vessel "Ching
Ma."
The company was then dealing for the first time with Paul Gan, a
Singaporean broker, who offered to sell to the former bunker oil for the
amount of 300,000.00 Singapore dollars. After the company paid over
one-half of the aforesaid amount to Paul Gan, the latter, together with
Joseph Ng, Operations Superintendent of the firm, proceeded to the high
seas on board "Navi Pride" but failed to locate the contact vessel.
The transaction with Paul Gan finally pushed through on March 27, 1991.
Hiong, upon his return on board the vessel "Ching Ma," was assigned to
supervise a ship-to-ship transfer of diesel oil off the port of Singapore, the
contact vessel to be designated by Paul Gan. Hiong was ordered to
ascertain the quantity and quality of the oil and was given the amount of
300,000.00 Singapore Dollars for the purchase. Hiong, together with Paul
Gan, and the surveyor William Yao, on board "Navi Pride" sailed toward a
vessel called "M/T Galilee". Hiong was told that "M/T Galilee" would be
making the transfer. Although no inspection of "Navi Pride" was made by
the port authorities before departure, Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. was
able to procure a port clearance upon submission of General Declaration
and crew list. Hiong, Paul Gan, and the brokers were not in the crew list
submitted and did not pass through the immigration. The General
Declaration falsely reflected that the vessel carried 11,900 tons.
On March 28, 1991, "Navi Pride" reached the location of "M/T Galilee".
The brokers then told the Captain of the vessel to ship-side with "M/T
Galilee" and then transfer of the oil transpired. Hiong and the surveyor
William Yao met the Captain of "M/T Galilee," called "Captain Bobby"
(who later turned out to be Emilio Changco). Hiong claimed that he did
not ask for the full name of Changco nor did he ask for the latter's
personal card.
Upon completion of the transfer, Hiong took the soundings of the tanks in
the "Navi Pride" and took samples of the cargo. The surveyor prepared the
survey report which "Captain Bobby" signed under the name "Roberto
Castillo." Hiong then handed the payment to Paul Gan and William Yao.
Upon arrival at Singapore in the morning of March 29, 1991, Hiong
reported the quantity and quality of the cargo to the company.
Thereafter, Hiong was again asked to supervise another transfer of oil
purchased by the firm " from "M/T Galilee" to "Navi Pride." The same
procedure as in the first transfer was observed. This time, Hiong was told
that that there were food and drinks, including beer, purchased by the
company for the crew of "M/T Galilee. The transfer took ten hours and
was completed on March 30, 1991. Paul Gan was paid in full for the
transfer.
On April 29 or 30, 1991, Emilio Changco intimated to Hiong that he had
four vessels and wanted to offer its cargo to cargo operators. Hiong was
asked to act as a broker or ship agent for the sale of the cargo in Singapore.
Hiong went to the Philippines to discuss the matter with Emilio Changco,
 10
who laid out the details of the new transfer, this time with "M/T Polaris"
as contact vessel. Hiong was told that the vessel was scheduled to arrive
at the port of Batangas that weekend. After being billeted at Alpha Hotel
in Batangas City, where Hiong checked in under the name "SONNY CSH." A
person by the name of "KEVIN OCAMPO," who later turned out to be
Emilio Changco himself, also checked in at Alpha Hotel. From
accused-appellant Cecilio Changco, Hiong found out that the vessel was
not arriving. Hiong was thereafter arrested by NBI agents.
After trial, a 95-page decision was rendered convicting accused-appellants
of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, judgment is
hereby rendered by this Court finding the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio
Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco guilty beyond reasonable
doubt, as principals, of the crime of piracy in Philippine Waters defined in
Section 2(d) of Presidential Decree No. 532 and the accused Cheong San
Hiong, as accomplice, to said crime. Under Section 3(a) of the said law, the
penalty for the principals of said crime is mandatory death. However,
considering that, under the 1987 Constitution, the Court cannot impose
the death penalty, the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante,
Jr., and Cecilio Changco are hereby each meted the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, with all the accessory penalties of the law. The accused
Cheong San Hiong is hereby meted the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA,
pursuant to Article 52 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5 of
PD 532. The accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr. and
Cecilio Changco are hereby ordered to return to the PNOC Shipping and
Transport Corporation the "M/T Tabangao" or if the accused can no longer
return the same, the said accused are hereby ordered to remit, jointly and
severally, to said corporation the value thereof in the amount of
P11,240,000.00, Philippine Currency, with interests thereon, at the rate of
6% per annum from March 2, 1991 until the said amount is paid in full. All
the accused including Cheong San Hiong are hereby ordered to return to
the Caltex Philippines, Inc. the cargo of the "M/T Tabangao", or if the
accused can no longer return the said cargo to said corporation, all the
accused are hereby condemned to pay, jointly and severally, to the Caltex
Refinery, Inc., the value of said cargo in the amount of P40,426,793.87,
Philippine Currency plus interests until said amount is paid in full. After
the accused Cheong San Hiong has served his sentence, he shall be
deported to Singapore.
All the accused shall be credited for the full period of their detention at
the National Bureau of Investigation and the City Jail of Manila during the
pendency of this case provided that they agreed in writing to abide by and
comply strictly with the rules and regulations of the City Jail of Manila and
the National Bureau of Investigation. With costs against all the accused.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 149-150, Rollo.)
The matter was then elevated to this Court. The arguments of
accused-appellants may be summarized as follows:
Roger P. Tulin, Virgilio I. Loyola, Andres C. Infante, Jr., and Cecilio O.
Changco
Accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Jr., and Cecilio Changco assert
that the trial court erred in allowing them to adopt the proceedings taken
during the time they were being represented by Mr. Tomas Posadas, a
non-lawyer, thereby depriving them of their constitutional right to
procedural due process.
In this regard, said accused-appellants narrate that Mr. Posadas entered
his appearance as counsel for all of them. However, in the course of the
proceedings, or on February 11, 1992, the trial court discovered that Mr.
Posadas was not a member of the Philippine Bar. This was after Mr.
Posadas had presented and examined seven witnesses for the accused.
Further, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Cecilio, Changco
uniformly contend that during the custodial investigation, they were
subjected to physical violence; were forced to sign statements without
being given the opportunity to read the contents of the same; were
denied assistance of counsel, and were not informed of their rights, in
violation of their constitutional rights.
Said accused-appellants also argue that the trial court erred in finding that
the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that they committed
the crime of qualified piracy. They allege that the pirates were
outnumbered by the crew who totaled 22 and who were not guarded at
all times. The crew, so these accused-appellants conclude, could have
overpowered the alleged pirates.
Cheong San Hiong
In his brief, Cheong argues that: (1) Republic Act No. 7659 in effect
obliterated the crime committed by him; (2) the trial court erred in
declaring that the burden is lodged on him to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that he had no knowledge that Emilio Changco and
his cohorts attacked and seized the "M/T Tabangao" and/or that the cargo
of the vessel was stolen or the subject of theft or robbery or piracy; (3) the
trial court erred in finding him guilty as an accomplice to the crime of
qualified piracy under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532
(Anti-Piracy and Anti-Robbery Law of 1974); (4) the trial court erred in
convicting and punishing him as an accomplice when the acts allegedly
committed by him were done or executed outside of Philippine waters
and territory, stripping the Philippine courts of jurisdiction to hold him for
trial, to convict, and sentence; (5) the trial court erred in making factual
conclusions without evidence on record to prove the same and which in
fact are contrary to the evidence adduced during trial; (6) the trial court
erred in convicting him as an accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential
Decree No. 532 when he was charged as a principal by direct participation
under said decree, thus violating his constitutional right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Cheong also posits that the evidence against the other accused-appellants
do not prove any participation on his part in the commission of the crime
of qualified piracy. He further argues that he had not in any way
participated in the seajacking of "M/T Tabangao" and in committing the
crime of qualified piracy, and that he was not aware that the vessel and its
cargo were pirated.
As legal basis for his appeal, he explains that he was charged under the
information with qualified piracy as principal under Section 2 of
Presidential Decree No. 532 which refers to Philippine waters. In the case
at bar, he argues that he was convicted for acts done outside Philippine
waters or territory. For the State to have criminal jurisdiction, the act must
have been committed within its territory.
 11

We affirm the conviction of all the accused-appellants. with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
The issues of the instant case may be summarized as follows: (1) what are
the legal effects and implications of the fact that a non-lawyer (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means
represented accused-appellants during the trial?; (2) what are the legal which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention
effects and implications of the absence of counsel during the custodial places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
investigation?; (3) did the trial court err in finding that the prosecution prohibited.
was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellants
committed the crime of qualified piracy?; (4) did Republic Act No. 7659 (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17
obliterate the crime committed by accused-appellant Cheong?; and (5) hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
can accused-appellant Cheong be convicted as accomplice when he was
not charged as such and when the acts allegedly committed by him were
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this
done or executed outside Philippine waters and territory?
section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture
or similar practices, and their families.
On the first issue, the record reveals that a manifestation (Exhibit "20",
Record) was executed by accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Changco, and
Such rights originated from Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436 [1966])
Infante, Jr. on February 11, 1991, stating that they were adopting the
which gave birth to the so-called Miranda doctrine which is to the effect
evidence adduced when they were represented by a non-lawyer. Such
that prior to any questioning during custodial investigation, the person
waiver of the right to sufficient representation during the trial as covered
must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he
by the due process clause shall only be valid if made with the full
gives may be used as evidence against him, and that he has the right to
assistance of a bona fide lawyer. During the trial, accused-appellants, as
the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant
represented by Atty. Abdul Basar, made a categorical manifestation that
may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made
said accused-appellants were apprised of the nature and legal
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. The Constitution even adds the
consequences of the subject manifestation, and that they voluntarily and
more stringent requirement that the waiver must be in writing and made
intelligently executed the same. They also affirmed the truthfulness of its
in the presence of counsel.
contents when asked in open court (tsn, February 11, 1992, pp. 7-59).

Saliently, the absence of counsel during the execution of the so-called

It is true that an accused person shall be entitled to be present and to
defend himself in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings,
from arraignment to promulgation of judgment (Section 1, Rule 115,
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure). This is hinged on the fact that a
layman is not versed on the technicalities of trial. However, it is also
provided by law that "[r]ights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary
to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs or prejudicial
to a third person with right recognized by law." (Article 6, Civil Code of the
Philippines). Thus, the same section of Rule 115 adds that "[u]pon motion,
the accused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it
sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly protect his rights
without the assistance of counsel." By analogy, but without prejudice to
the sanctions imposed by law for the illegal practice of law, it is amply
shown that the rights of accused-appellants were sufficiently and properly
protected by the appearance of Mr. Tomas Posadas. An examination of
the record will show that he knew the technical rules of procedure. Hence,
we rule that there was a valid waiver of the right to sufficient
representation during the trial, considering that it was unequivocally,
knowingly, and intelligently made and with the full assistance of a bona
fidelawyer, Atty. Abdul Basar. Accordingly, denial of due process cannot
be successfully invoked where a valid waiver of rights has been made
(People vs. Serzo, 274 SCRA 553 [1997]; Sayson vs. People, 166 SCRA 680
[1988]).
However, we must quickly add that the right to counsel during custodial
investigation may not be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution reads:
SECTION 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and
to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice.
If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided
confessions of the accused-appellants make them invalid. In fact, the very
basic reading of the Miranda rights was not even shown in the case at bar.
Paragraph [3] of the aforestated Section 12 sets forth the so-called "fruit
from the poisonous tree doctrine," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix
Frankfurter in the celebrated case of Nardone vs. United States (308 U.S.
388 [1939]). According to this rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is
shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative
evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. The rule is based
on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be
used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained
evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained (People vs. Alicando,
251 SCRA 293 [1995]). Thus, in this case, the uncounselled extrajudicial
confessions of accused-appellants, without a valid waiver of the right to
counsel, are inadmissible and whatever information is derived therefrom
shall be regarded as likewise inadmissible in evidence against them.
However, regardless of the inadmissibility of the subject confessions,
there is sufficient evidence to convict accused-appellants with moral
certainty. We agree with the sound deduction of the trial court that
indeed, Emilio Changco (Exhibits "U" and "UU") and accused-appellants
Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. did conspire and confederate to commit the
crime charged. In the words of then trial judge, now Justice Romeo J.
Callejo of the Court of Appeals —
. . . The Prosecution presented to the Court an array of witnesses, officers
and members of the crew of the "M/T Tabangao" no less, who identified
and pointed to the said Accused as among those who attacked and seized,
the "M/T Tabangao" on March 2, 1991, at about 6:30 o'clock in the
afternoon, off Lubang Island, Mindoro, with its cargo, and brought the said
vessel, with its cargo, and the officers and crew of the vessel, in the
vicinity of Horsebough Lighthouse, about sixty-six nautical miles off the
shoreline of Singapore and sold its cargo to the Accused Cheong San Hiong
upon which the cargo was discharged from the "M/T Tabangao" to the
 12
"Navi Pride" for the price of about $500,000.00 (American Dollars) on
March 29, and 30, 1991. . .
xxx xxx xxx
The Master, the officers and members of the crew of the "M/T Tabangao"
were on board the vessel with the Accused and their cohorts from March
2, 1991 up to April 10, 1991 or for more than one (1) month. There can be
no scintilla of doubt in the mind of the Court that the officers and crew of
the vessel could and did see and identify the seajackers and their leader.
In fact, immediately after the Accused were taken into custody by the
operatives of the National Bureau of Investigation, Benjamin Suyo,
Norberto Senosa, Christian Torralba and Isaias Wervas executed their
"Joint Affidavit" (Exhibit "B") and pointed to and identified the said
Accused as some of the pirates.
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, when they testified before this Court on their defense, the three
(3) Accused admitted to the Court that they, in fact, boarded the said
vessel in the evening of March 2, 1991 and remained on board when the
vessel sailed to its destination, which turned out to be off the port of
Singapore.
(pp. 106-112, Rollo.)
We also agree with the trial court's finding that accused-appellants'
defense of denial is not supported by any hard evidence but their bare
testimony. Greater weight is given to the categorical identification of the
accused by the prosecution witnesses than to the accused's plain denial of
participation in the commission of the crime (People v. Baccay, 284 SCRA
296 [1998]). Instead, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr.
narrated a patently desperate tale that they were hired by three complete
strangers (allegedly Captain Edilberto Liboon, Second Mate Christian
Torralba, and their companion) while said accused-appellants were
conversing with one another along the seashore at Aplaya, Balibago,
Calatagan, Batangas, to work on board the "M/T Tabangao" which was
then anchored off-shore. And readily, said accused-appellants agreed to
work as cooks and handymen for an indefinite period of time without
even saying goodbye to their families, without even knowing their
destination or the details of their voyage, without the personal effects
needed for a long voyage at sea. Such evidence is incredible and clearly
not in accord with human experience. As pointed out by the trial court, it
is incredible that Captain Liboon, Second Mate Torralba, and their
companion "had to leave the vessel at 9:30 o'clock in the evening and
venture in a completely unfamiliar place merely to recruit five (5) cooks or
handymen (p. 113, Rollo)."
Anent accused-appellant Changco's defense of denial with the alibi that on
May 14 and 17, he was at his place of work and that on April 10, 1991, he
was in his house in Bacoor, Cavite, sleeping, suffice it to state that alibi is
fundamentally and inherently a weak defense, much more so when
uncorroborated by other witnesses (People v. Adora, 275 SCRA 441 [1997])
considering that it is easy to fabricate and concoct, and difficult to
disprove. Accused-appellant must adduce clear and convincing evidence
that, at about midnight on April 10, 1991, it was physically impossible for
him to have been in Calatagan, Batangas. Changco not only failed to do
this, he was likewise unable to prove that he was in his place of work on
the dates aforestated.
It is doctrinal that the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of a
testimony is accorded the highest respect, for trial courts have an
untrammeled opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of witnesses
and, thus, to determine whether a certain witness is telling the truth
(People v. Obello, 284 SCRA 79 [1998]).
We likewise uphold the trial court's finding of conspiracy. A conspiracy
exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it (Article 8, Revised Penal
Code). To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of
execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not even know
the exact part to be performed by the others in the execution of the
conspiracy. As noted by the trial court, there are times when conspirators
are assigned separate and different tasks which may appear unrelated to
one another, but in fact, constitute a whole and collective effort to
achieve a common criminal design.
We affirm the trial court's finding that Emilio Changco, accused-appellants
Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. and others, were the ones assigned to attack
and seize the "M/T Tabangao" off Lubang, Mindoro, while
accused-appellant Cecilio Changco was to fetch the master and the
members of the crew from the shoreline of Calatagan, Batangas after the
transfer, and bring them to Imus, Cavite, and to provide the crew and the
officers of the vessel with money for their fare and food provisions on
their way home. These acts had to be well-coordinated. Accused-appellant
Cecilio Changco need not be present at the time of the attack and seizure
of "M/T Tabangao" since he performed his task in view of an objective
common to all other accused-appellants.
Of notable importance is the connection of accused-appellants to one
another. Accused-appellant Cecilio Changco is the younger brother of
Emilio Changco (aka Captain Bobby/Captain Roberto Castillo/Kevin
Ocampo), owner of Phil-Asia Shipping Lines. Cecilio worked for his brother
in said corporation. Their residences are approximately six or seven
kilometers away from each other. Their families are close.
Accused-appellant Tulin, on the other hand, has known Cecilio since their
parents were neighbors in Aplaya, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas.
Accused-appellant Loyola's wife is a relative of the Changco brothers by
affinity. Besides, Loyola and Emilio Changco had both been accused in a
seajacking case regarding "M/T Isla Luzon" and its cargo of steel coils and
plates off Cebu and Bohol in 1989. Emilio Changco (aka Kevin Ocampo)
was convicted of the crime while Loyola at that time remained at large.
As for accused-appellant Hiong, he ratiocinates that he can no longer be
convicted of piracy in Philippine waters as defined and penalized in
Sections 2[d] and 3[a], respectively of Presidential Decree No. 532 because
Republic Act No. 7659 (effective January 1, 1994), which amended Article
122 of the Revised Penal Code, has impliedly superseded Presidential
Decree No. 532. He reasons out that Presidential Decree No. 532 has been
rendered "superfluous or duplicitous" because both Article 122 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 532 punish
piracy committed in Philippine waters. He maintains that in order to
reconcile the two laws, the word "any person" mentioned in Section 1 [d]
of Presidential Decree No. 532 must be omitted such that Presidential
Decree No. 532 shall only apply to offenders who are members of the
complement or to passengers of the vessel, whereas Republic Act No.
7659 shall apply to offenders who are neither members of the
complement or passengers of the vessel, hence, excluding him from the
coverage of the law.
Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, used to provide:
 13
ARTICLE 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas. — The penalty
of reclusion temporal shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the high
seas, shall attack or seize a vessel or, not being a member of its
complement nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the cargo of
said vessel, its equipment, or personal belongings of its complement or
passengers.
(Italics supplied.)
Article 122, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (January 1, 1994),
reads:
ARTICLE 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine
waters. — The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be inflicted upon any
person who, on the high seas, or in Philippine waters, shall attack or seize
a vessel or, not being a member of its complement nor a passenger, shall
seize the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment, or
personal belongings of its complement or passengers.
(Italics ours)
On the other hand, Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 provides:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. — The following shall mean and be
understood, as follows:
d. Piracy. — Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel or the taking away of
the whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the personal
belongings of its complement or passengers, irrespective of the value
thereof, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or force
upon things, committed by any person, including a passenger or member
of the complement of said vessel in Philippine waters, shall be considered
as piracy. The offenders shall be considered as pirates and punished as
hereinafter provided (Italics supplied).
To summarize, Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its
amendment, provided that piracy must be committed on the high seas by
any person not a member of its complement nor a passenger thereof.
Upon its amendment by Republic Act No. 7659, the coverage of the
pertinent provision was widened to include offenses committed "in
Philippine waters." On the other hand, under Presidential Decree No. 532
(issued in 1974), the coverage of the law on piracy embraces any
person including "a passenger or member of the complement of said
vessel in Philippine waters." Hence, passenger or not, a member of the
complement or not, any person is covered by the law.
Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions on
piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532. There is no contradiction
between the two laws. There is likewise no ambiguity and hence, there is
no need to construe or interpret the law. All the presidential decree did
was to widen the coverage of the law, in keeping with the intent to
protect the citizenry as well as neighboring states from crimes against the
law of nations. As expressed in one of the "whereas" clauses of
Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is "among the highest forms of
lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries." For this
reason, piracy under the Article 122, as amended, and piracy under
Presidential Decree No. 532 exist harmoniously as separate laws.
As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the person of accused-appellant Hiong since the crime was
committed outside Philippine waters, suffice it to state that
unquestionably, the attack on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" (renamed
"M/T Galilee" by the pirates) and its cargo were committed in Philippine
waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by the pirates to
Singapore where its cargo was off-loaded, transferred, and sold. And such
transfer was done under accused-appellant Hiong's direct supervision.
Although Presidential Decree No. 532 requires that the attack and seizure
of the vessel and its cargo be committed in Philippine waters, the
disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still deemed part of
the act of piracy, hence, the same need not be committed in Philippine
waters.
Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal
Code. As such, it is an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law.
The same principle applies even if Hiong, in the instant case, were charged,
not with a violation of qualified piracy under the penal code but under a
special law, Presidential Decree No. 532 which penalizes piracy in
Philippine waters. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 532 should be applied
with more force here since its purpose is precisely to discourage and
prevent piracy in Philippine waters (People v. Catantan, 278 SCRA 761
[1997]). It is likewise, well-settled that regardless of the law penalizing the
same, piracy is a reprehensible crime against the whole world (People v.
Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19 [1922]).
However, does this constitute a violation of accused-appellant's
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him on the ground that he was convicted as an
accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 even though he
was charged as a principal by direct participation under Section 2 of said
law?
The trial court found that there was insufficiency of evidence showing:
(a) that accused-appellant Hiong directly participated in the attack and
seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo; (b) that he induced Emilio
Changco and his group in the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its
cargo; (c) and that his act was indispensable in the attack on and seizure
of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo. Nevertheless, the trial court found that
accused-appellant Hiong's participation was indisputably one which aided
or abetted Emilio Changco and his band of pirates in the disposition of the
stolen cargo under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 which
provides:
SECTION 4. Aiding pirates or highway robbers/brigands or abetting piracy
or highway robbery brigandage. — Any person who knowingly and in any
manner aids or protects pirates or highway robbers/brigands, such as
giving them information about the movement of police or other peace
officers of the government, or acquires or receives property taken by such
pirates or brigands or in any manner derives any benefit therefrom; or any
person who directly or indirectly abets the commission of piracy or
highway robbery or brigandage, shall be considered as an accomplice of
the principal officers and be punished in accordance with Rules prescribed
by the Revised Penal Code.
It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the acts provided in
this Section has performed them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven.
 14
The ruling of the trial court is within well-settled jurisprudence that if
there is lack of complete evidence of conspiracy, the liability is that of an
accomplice and not as principal (People v. Tolentino, 40 SCRA 514 [1971]).
Any doubt as to the participation of an individual in the commission of the
crime is always resolved in favor of lesser responsibility (People v. Corbes,
270 SCRA 465 [1997]; People vs. Elfano, Jr., 125 SCRA 792 [1983]; People v.
Pastores, 40 SCRA 498 [1971]).
Emphasis must also be placed on the last paragraph of Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 532 which presumes that any person who does
any of the acts provided in said section has performed them knowingly,
unless the contrary is proven. In the case at bar, accused-appellant Hiong
had failed to overcome the legal presumption that he knowingly abetted
or aided in the commission of piracy, received property taken by such
pirates and derived benefit therefrom.
The record discloses that accused-appellant Hiong aided the pirates in
disposing of the stolen cargo by personally directing its transfer from "M/T
Galilee" to "M/T Navi Pride". He profited therefrom by buying the hijacked
cargo for Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. (tsn, June 3, 1992, pp. 15-23). He
even tested the quality and verified the quantity of the petroleum
products, connived with Navi Marine Services personnel in falsifying the
General Declarations and Crew List to ensure that the illegal transfer went
through, undetected by Singapore Port Authorities, and supplied, the
pirates with food, beer, and other provisions for their maintenance while
in port (tsn, June 3, 1992, pp. 133-134).
We believe that the falsification of the General Declaration (Arrival and
Departure) and Crew List was accomplished and utilized by
accused-appellant Hiong and Navi Marine Services personnel in the
execution of their scheme to avert detection by Singapore Port Authorities.
Hence, had accused-appellant Hiong not falsified said entries, the
Singapore Port Authorities could have easily discovered the illegal
activities that took place and this would have resulted in his arrest and
prosecution in Singapore. Moreover, the transfer of the stolen cargo from
"M/T Galilee" to "Navi Pride" could not have been effected.
We completely uphold the factual findings of the trial court showing in
detail accused-appellant Hiong's role in the disposition of the pirated
goods summarized as follows: that on March 27, 1991, Hiong with Captain
Biddy Santos boarded the "Navi Pride," one of the vessels of the Navi
Marine, to rendezvous with the "M/T Galilee"; that the firm submitted the
crew list of the vessel (Exhibit "8-CSH", Record) to the port authorities,
excluding the name of Hiong; that the "General Declaration" (for
departure) of the "Navi Pride" for its voyage off port of Singapore (Exhibits
"HH" and "8-A CSH", Record) falsely stated that the vessel was scheduled
to depart at 2200 (10 o'clock in the evening), that there were no
passengers on board, and the purpose of the voyage was for "cargo
operation" and that the vessel was to unload and transfer 1,900 tons of
cargo; that after the transfer of the fuel from "M/T Galilee" with Emilio
Changco a. k. a. Captain Bobby a. k. a. Roberto Castillo at the helm, the
surveyor prepared the "Quantity Certificate" (Exhibit "11-C CSH, Record)
stating that the cargo transferred to the "Navi Pride" was 2,406 gross
cubic meters; that although Hiong was not the Master of the vessel, he
affixed his signature on the "Certificate" above the word "Master" (Exhibit
"11-C-2 CSH", Record); that he then paid P150,000.00 but did not require
any receipt for the amount; that Emilio Changco also did not issue one;
and that in the requisite "General Declaration" upon its arrival at
Singapore on March 29, 1991, at 7 o'clock in the evening, (Exhibits "JJ" and
"13-A CSH", Record), it was made to falsely appear that the "Navi Pride"
unloaded 1,700 tons of cargo on the high seas during said voyage when in
fact it acquired from the "M/T Galilee" 2,000 metric tons of diesel oil. The
second transfer transpired with the same irregularities as discussed above.
It was likewise supervised by accused-appellant Cheong from his end
while Emilio Changco supervised the transfer from his end.
Accused-appellant Hiong maintains that he was merely following the
orders of his superiors and that he has no knowledge of the illegality of
the source of the cargo.
First and foremost, accused-appellant Hiong cannot deny knowledge of
the source and nature of the cargo since he himself received the same
from "M/T Tabangao". Second, considering that he is a highly educated
mariner, he should have avoided any participation in the cargo transfer
given the very suspicious circumstances under which it was acquired. He
failed to show a single piece of deed or bill of sale or even a purchase
order or any contract of sale for the purchase by the firm; he never
bothered to ask for and scrutinize the papers and documentation relative
to the "M/T Galilee"; he did not even verify the identity of Captain Robert
Castillo whom he met for the first time nor did he check the source of the
cargo; he knew that the transfer took place 66 nautical miles off Singapore
in the dead of the night which a marine vessel of his firm did not ordinarily
do; it was also the first time Navi Marine transacted with Paul Gan
involving a large sum of money without any receipt issued therefor; he
was not even aware if Paul Gan was a Singaporean national and thus safe
to deal with. It should also be noted that the value of the cargo was
P40,426,793.87 or roughly more than US$1,000,000.00 (computed at
P30.00 to $1, the exchange rate at that time). Manifestly, the cargo was
sold for less than one-half of its value. Accused-appellant Hiong should
have been aware of this irregularity. Nobody in his right mind would go to
far away Singapore, spend much time and money for transportation —
only to sell at the aforestated price if it were legitimate sale involved. This,
in addition to the act of falsifying records, clearly shows that
accused-appellant Hiong was well aware that the cargo that his firm was
acquiring was purloined.
Lastly, it cannot be correctly said that accused-appellant was "merely
following the orders of his superiors." An individual is justified in
performing an act in obedience to an order issued by a superior if such
order, is for some lawful purpose and that the means used by the
subordinate to carry out said order is lawful (Reyes, Revised Penal Code,
Vol. 1, 1981 ed., p. 212). Notably, the alleged order of Hiong's superior
Chua Kim Leng Timothy, is a patent violation not only of Philippine, but of
international law. Such violation was committed on board a
Philippine-operated vessel. Moreover, the means used by Hiong in
carrying out said order was equally unlawful. He misled port and
immigration authorities, falsified records, using a mere clerk, Frankie Loh,
to consummate said acts. During the trial, Hiong presented himself, and
the trial court was convinced, that he was an intelligent and articulate Port
Captain. These circumstances show that he must have realized the nature
and the implications of the order of Chua Kim Leng Timothy. Thereafter,
he could have refused to follow orders to conclude the deal and to effect
the transfer of the cargo to the "Navi Pride." He did not do so, for which
reason, he must now suffer the consequences of his actions.
WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellants justified by the
evidence on record, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the judgment of the trial
court in toto.
SO ORDERED.
11. Hijacking
 15

Rep. Act No. 6235 (1971) or Anti-Hijacking Law

Mamamalakaya (PAMALAKAYA), Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT),

Migrante, Health Alliance for Democracy (HEAD), and Agham, represented

Terrorism
by their respective officers,[4] and joined by concerned citizens and

taxpayers Teofisto Guingona, Jr., Dr. Bienvenido Lumbera, Renato

12. Terrorism Constantino, Jr., Sister Mary John Manansan, OSB, Dean Consuelo Paz,

Atty. Josefina Lichauco, Retired Col. Gerry Cunanan, Carlitos Siguion-Reyna,

Republic Act No. 9372 (2007) or Human Security Act Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, Renato Reyes, Danilo Ramos, Emerenciana
of 2007
de Jesus, Rita Baua and Rey Claro Casambre filed a petition for certiorari
Republic Act No. 10168 (2012) or The Terrorism
and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178581.
Financing Prevention and Suppression Act
of 2012 On August 6, 2007, Karapatan and its alliance member organizations

Hustisya, Desaparecidos, Samahan ng mga Ex-Detainees Laban sa

Detensyon at para sa Amnestiya (SELDA), Ecumenical Movement for

Justice and Peace (EMJP), and Promotion of Church Peoples Response

DECISION
(PCPR), which were represented by their respective officers [5] who are also

bringing action on their own behalf, filed a petition for certiorari and
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178890.
Before the Court are six petitions challenging the constitutionality of

Republic Act No. 9372 (RA 9372), An Act to Secure the State and Protect
On August 29, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Counsels
our People from Terrorism, otherwise known as the Human Security Act of
for the Defense of Liberty (CODAL),[6] Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S.
2007,[1] signed into law on March 6, 2007.
Madrigal, Sergio Osmea III, and Wigberto E. Taada filed a petition for
Following the effectivity of RA 9372 on July 15, 2007,[2] petitioner
certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 179157.
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., a non-government

organization, and Atty. Soliman Santos, Jr., a concerned citizen, taxpayer

Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-Southern Tagalog (BAYAN-ST), other
and lawyer, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition on July 16,
regional chapters and organizations mostly based in the Southern Tagalog
2007 docketed as G.R. No. 178552. On even date, petitioners Kilusang
Region,[7] and individuals[8]followed suit by filing on September 19, 2007 a
Mayo Uno (KMU), National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo
petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 179461 that
Uno (NAFLU-KMU), and Center for Trade Union and Human Rights
replicates the allegations raised in the BAYAN petition in G.R. No. 178581.
(CTUHR), represented by their respective officers[3] who are also bringing

the action in their capacity as citizens, filed a petition for certiorari and
Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-Terrorism
prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178554.
Council[9] composed of, at the time of the filing of the petitions, Executive

Secretary Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales

The following day, July 17, 2007, organizations Bagong Alyansang
as Vice Chairperson, and Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting
Makabayan (BAYAN), General Alliance Binding Women for Reforms,
Defense Secretary and National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales,
Integrity, Equality, Leadership and Action (GABRIELA), Kilusang
Interior and Local Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and Finance
Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP), Movement of Concerned Citizens for Civil
Secretary Margarito Teves as members. All the petitions, except that of
Liberties (MCCCL), Confederation for Unity, Recognition and Advancement
the IBP, also impleaded Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of
of Government Employees (COURAGE), Kalipunan ng Damayang
Staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief
Mahihirap (KADAMAY), Solidarity of Cavite Workers (SCW), League of
Gen. Oscar Calderon.
Filipino Students (LFS), Anakbayan, Pambansang Lakas ng Kilusang
 16

Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of

The Karapatan, BAYAN and BAYAN-ST petitions likewise impleaded particularity how respondents acted without or in excess of their

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the support agencies for the respective jurisdictions, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to

Anti-Terrorism Council like the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, lack or excess of jurisdiction.

National Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of Immigration, Office of Civil

Defense, Intelligence Service of the AFP, Anti-MoneyLaundering Center, The impropriety of certiorari as a remedy aside, the petitions fail just the

Philippine Center on Transnational Crime, and the PNP intelligence and same.

investigative elements.

In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by four

T exacting requisites, viz: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b)

he petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality

petition must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of

s fail. constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.[10]

Petition In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites, which
ers are the most essential, renders the discussion of the last two superfluous.
resort
to
certiora Petition
ri is ers lack
improp locus
er standi

Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of

Preliminarily, certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not
the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
of Court is clear:
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.[11]

Section 1. Petition for certiorari.When

any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or
in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal,
board or officer, and granting such incidental
reliefs as law and justice may require. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive Secretary[12] summarized
the rule on locus standi, thus:
Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a
personal and substantial interest in a case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as
a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The gist of the question on standing is
whether a party alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

[A] party who assails the constitutionality of a statute

must have a direct and personal interest. It must
show not only that the law or any governmental act is
invalid, but also that it sustained or is in immediate
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of

its enforcement, and not merely that it suffers
thereby in some indefinite way. It must show that it
has been or is about to be denied some right or
privilege to which it is lawfully entitled or that it is
about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties
by reason of the statute or act complained of.
For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a
constitutional question, it must show that (1) it
has personally suffered some actual or threatened
injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of
the government, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to
the challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)
Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being
suspected communist fronts by the government, especially the military;
whereas individual petitioners invariably invoke the transcendental
importance doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers.
While Chavez v. PCGG[13] holds that transcendental public importance
dispenses with the requirement that petitioner has experienced or is in
actual danger of suffering direct and personal injury, cases involving the
constitutionality of penal legislation belong to an altogether different
genus of constitutional litigation. Compelling State and societal interests in
the proscription of harmful conduct, as will later
elucidated, necessitate a closer judicial scrutiny of locus standi.
Petitioners have not presented any personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy. None of them faces any charge under RA 9372.
KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP and PCR, petitioners
in G.R. No. 178890, allege that they have been subjected to close security
surveillance by state security forces, their members followed by suspicious
persons and vehicles with dark windshields, and their offices monitored by
men with military build. They likewise claim that they have been branded
as enemies of the [S]tate.[14]
Even conceding such gratuitous allegations, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) correctly points out that petitioners have yet to show
any connection between the
purported surveillance and the implementation of RA 9372.
17
BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW, LFS,
Anakbayan, PAMALAKAYA, ACT, Migrante, HEAD and Agham,
petitioner-organizations in G.R. No. 178581, would like the Court to
take judicial notice of respondents alleged action of tagging them as
militant organizations fronting for the Communist Party of the Philippines
(CPP) and its armed wing, the National Peoples Army (NPA). The tagging,
according to petitioners, is tantamount to the effects of proscription
without following the procedure under the law. [15] The petition
of BAYAN-ST, et al. in G.R. No. 179461 pleads the same allegations.
The Court cannot take judicial notice of the alleged tagging of petitioners.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have
three material requisites: (1) the matter must be
one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must
be well and authoritatively settledand not doubtful
or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within
the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The
principal guide in determining what facts may be
assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety.
Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to
facts evidenced by public records and facts of general
notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be
one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it
is either: (1) generally known within the territorial
jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of
accurate and ready determination by resorting to
be sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questionable.
Things of common knowledge, of which courts take
judicial matters coming to the knowledge of men
generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of
life, or they may be matters which are generally
accepted by mankind as true and are capable of
ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts
which are universally known, and which may be
found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other
publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they are
of such universal notoriety and so generally
understood that they may be regarded as forming
part of the common knowledge of every person. As
the common knowledge of man ranges far and wide,
a wide variety of particular facts have been judicially
noticed as being matters of common
knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial notice of
any fact which, in part, is dependent on the
existence or non-existence of a fact of which the
court has no constructive knowledge.[16] (emphasis
and underscoring supplied.)
No ground was properly established by petitioners for the taking of
judicial notice. Petitioners apprehension is insufficient to substantiate
 18

their plea. That no specific charge or proscription under RA 9372 has been development is the filing of the firstcase for proscription under Section

filed against them, three years after its effectivity, belies any claim 17[23] of RA 9372 by the Department of Justice before the Basilan Regional

of imminence of their perceived threat emanating from the so-called Trial Court against the Abu Sayyaf Group.[24] Petitioner-organizations do

tagging. not in the least allege any link to the Abu Sayyaf Group.

The same is true with petitioners KMU, NAFLU and CTUHR in G.R. No. Some petitioners attempt, in vain though, to show the imminence of a

178554, who merely harp as well on their supposed link to the CPP and prosecution under RA 9372 by alluding to past rebellion charges against

NPA. They fail to particularize how the implementation of specific them.

provisions of RA 9372 would result in direct injury to their organization

and members. In Ladlad v. Velasco,[25] the Court ordered the dismissal of rebellion

charges filed in 2006 against then Party-List Representatives Crispin

While in our jurisdiction there is still no judicially declared terrorist Beltran and Rafael Mariano of Anakpawis, Liza Maza of GABRIELA, and Joel

organization, the United States of America[17] (US) and the European Virador, Teodoro Casio and Saturnino Ocampo of Bayan Muna. Also

Union[18] (EU) have both classified the CPP, NPA and Abu Sayyaf Group as named in the dismissed rebellion charges were petitioners Rey Claro

foreign terrorist organizations. The Court takes note of the joint statement Casambre, Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, Renato Reyes, Rita Baua,

of Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita and Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales Emerencia de Jesus and Danilo Ramos; and accused of being front

that the Arroyo Administration would adopt the US and EU classification organizations for the Communist movement were petitioner-organizations

of the CPP and NPA as terrorist organizations. [19] Such statement KMU, BAYAN, GABRIELA, PAMALAKAYA, KMP, KADAMAY, LFS and

notwithstanding,there is yet to be filed before the courts an application COURAGE.[26]

to declare the CPP and NPA organizations as domestic terrorist or

outlawed organizations under RA 9372.Again, RA 9372 has been in effect The dismissed rebellion charges, however, do not save the day for

for three years now. From July 2007 up to the present, petitioners. For one, those charges were filed in 2006, prior to the

petitioner-organizations have conducted their activities fully and freely enactment of RA 9372, and dismissed by this Court. For another, rebellion

without any threat of, much less an actual, prosecution or proscription is defined and punished under the Revised Penal Code. Prosecution for

under RA 9372. rebellion is not made more imminent by the enactment of RA 9372, nor

does the enactment thereof make it easier to charge a person with

Parenthetically, the Fourteenth Congress, in a resolution initiated by rebellion, its elements not having been altered.

Party-list Representatives Saturnino Ocampo, Teodoro Casio, Rafael

Mariano and Luzviminda Ilagan,[20]urged the government to resume peace Conversely, previously filed but dismissed rebellion charges bear no

negotiations with the NDF by removing the impediments thereto, one of relation to prospective charges under RA 9372. It cannot be

which is the adoption of designation of the CPP and NPA by the US and EU overemphasized that three years after the enactment of RA 9372, none of

as foreign terrorist organizations. Considering the policy statement of the petitioners has been charged.

Aquino Administration[21] of resuming peace talks with the NDF, the

government is not imminently disposed to ask for the judicial proscription Petitioners IBP and CODAL in G.R. No. 179157 base their claim of locus

of the CPP-NPA consortium and its allied organizations. standi on their sworn duty to uphold the Constitution. The IBP zeroes in

on Section 21 of RA 9372 directing it to render assistance to those

More important, there are other parties not before the Court with direct arrested or detained under the law.

and specific interests in the questions being raised.[22] Of recent

 19

The mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law does not, It bears to stress that generalized interests, albeit accompanied by the

however, suffice to clothe the IBP or any of its members with assertion of a public right, do not establish locus standi. Evidence of a

standing.[27] The IBP failed to sufficiently demonstrate how its mandate direct and personal interest is key.

under the assailed statute revolts against its constitutional rights and

duties. Moreover, both the IBP and CODAL have not pointed to even a Petition
ers fail
single arrest or detention effected under RA 9372. to
Former Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo Madrigal, who claims to have been the present
an
subject of political surveillance, also lacks locus standi. Prescinding from actual
case or
the veracity, let alone legal basis, of the claim of political surveillance, the
controv
Court finds that she has not shown even the slightest threat of being ersy

charged under RA 9372. Similarly lacking in locus standi are former

Senator Wigberto Taada and Senator Sergio Osmea III, who cite their
By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual
being respectively a human rights advocate and an oppositor to the
case or controversy.
passage of RA 9372. Outside these gratuitous statements, no concrete
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one
injury to them has been pinpointed. Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
Petitioners Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network and Atty. justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
Soliman Santos Jr. in G.R. No. 178552 also conveniently state that the which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave
issues they raise are of transcendental importance, which must be settled abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
early and are of far-reaching implications, without mention of any specific
instrumentality of the Government.[30] (emphasis
provision of RA 9372 under which they have been charged, or may be and underscoring supplied.)

charged. Mere invocation of human rights advocacy has nowhere been

held sufficient to clothe litigants with locus standi. Petitioners must show As early as Angara v. Electoral Commission,[31] the Court ruled that the

an actual, or immediate danger of sustaining, direct injury as a result of power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies to be

the laws enforcement. To rule otherwise would be to corrupt the settled exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties. Any attempt at

doctrine of locus standi, as every worthy cause is an interest shared by the abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to

general public. sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.

An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that

Neither can locus standi be conferred upon individual petitioners is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory,

as taxpayers and citizens. A taxpayer suit is proper only when there is an lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.[32]

exercise of the spending or taxing power of Congress, [28] whereas citizen

standing must rest on direct and personal interest in the proceeding.[29] Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v.

COMELEC[33] cannot be more emphatic:

RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any

appropriation from Congress for its implementation, while none of the [C]ourts do not sit to adjudicate mere
academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest,
individual petitioner-citizens has alleged any direct and personal interest however intellectually challenging. The
controversy must be justiciabledefinite and
in the implementation of the law.
concrete, touching on the legal relations of
parties having adverse legal interests. In other
words, the pleadings must show an active
 20
antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the
one hand, and a denial thereof on the other
hand; that is, it must concern a real and not
merely a theoretical question or issue. There
ought to be an actual and substantial
controversyadmitting of specific relief through a
decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished
from an opinion advising what the law would be
upon a hypothetical state of facts. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Thus, a petition to declare unconstitutional a law converting
the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City was held to be
premature as it was tacked on uncertain, contingent events. [34] Similarly,
a petition that fails to allege that an application for a license to operate a
radio or television station has been denied or granted by the authorities
does not present a justiciable controversy, and merely wheedles the Court
to rule on a hypothetical problem.[35]
The Court dismissed the petition in Philippine Press Institute v.
Commission on Elections[36] for failure to cite any specific affirmative
action of the Commission on Elections to implement the assailed
resolution. It refused, in Abbas v. Commission on Elections,[37] to rule on
the religious freedom claim of the therein petitioners based merely on a
perceived potential conflict between the provisions of the Muslim Code
and those of the national law, there being no actual controversy between
real litigants.
The list of cases denying claims resting on purely hypothetical or
anticipatory grounds goes on ad infinitum.
The Court is not unaware that a reasonable certainty of the occurrence of
a perceived threat to any constitutional interest
suffices to provide a basis for mounting a constitutional challenge. This,
however, is qualified by the requirement that there must be sufficient
facts to enable the Court to intelligently adjudicate the issues.[38]
Very recently, the US Supreme Court, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project,[39] allowed the pre-enforcement review of a criminal statute,
challenged on vagueness grounds,since plaintiffs faced a credible threat of
prosecution and should not be required to await and undergo a criminal
prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief.[40] The plaintiffs therein
filed an action before a federal court to assail the constitutionality of the
material support statute, 18 U.S.C. 2339B (a) (1),[41] proscribing the
provision of material support to organizations declared by the Secretary of
State as foreign terrorist organizations. They claimed that they intended to
provide support for the humanitarian and political activities of two such
organizations.
Prevailing American jurisprudence allows an adjudication on the merits
when an anticipatory petition clearly shows that the challenged
prohibition forbids the conduct or activity that a petitioner seeks to do,
as there would then be a justiciable controversy.[42]
Unlike the plaintiffs in Holder, however, herein petitioners have failed to
show that the challenged provisions of RA 9372 forbid constitutionally
protected conduct or activitythat they seek to do. No demonstrable threat
has been established, much less a real and existing one.
Petitioners obscure allegations of sporadic surveillance and supposedly
being tagged as communist fronts in no way approximate a credible
threat of prosecution. From these allegations, the Court is being lured to
render an advisory opinion, which is not its function.[43]
Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for
declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then
again, declaratory actions characterized by double contingency, where
both the activity the petitioners intend to undertake and the anticipated
reaction to it of a public official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial
review for lack of ripeness.[44]
The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail
to take the present petitions out of the realm of the surreal and merely
imagined. Such possibility is not peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise of
any power granted by law may be abused.[45] Allegations of abuse must be
anchored on real events before courts may step in to settleactual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable.
 21

A facial
invalidation of a
statute is allowed While in the subsequent case of Romualdez v. Commission on
only in free
speech cases, Elections,[52] the Court stated that a facial invalidation of criminal statutes
wherein certain
is not appropriate, it nonetheless proceeded to conduct a vagueness
rules of
constitutional analysis, and concluded that the therein subject election offense[53] under
litigation are
rightly excepted the Voters Registration Act of 1996, with which the therein petitioners

were charged, is couched in precise language.[54]

Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the
The two Romualdez cases rely heavily on the Separate Opinion[55] of
definition of the crime of terrorism[46] under RA 9372 in that terms
Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in the Estrada case, where the Court found the
like widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the
Anti-Plunder Law (Republic Act No. 7080) clear and free from ambiguity
populace and coerce the government to give in to an unlawful
respecting the definition of the crime of plunder.
demand are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no

standard to measure the prohibited acts.

The position taken by Justice Mendoza in Estrada relates these two

doctrines to the concept of a facial invalidation as opposed to an

Respondents, through the OSG, counter that the doctrines of
void-for-vagueness and overbreadth find no application in the present
case since these doctrines apply only to free speech cases; and that RA
9372 regulates conduct, not speech.
For a jurisprudentially guided understanding of these doctrines, it is
imperative to outline the schools of thought on whether the
void-for-vagueness and overbreadth doctrines are equally
applicable grounds to assail a penal statute.
Respondents interpret recent jurisprudence as slanting toward the idea of
limiting the application of the two doctrines to free speech cases. They
particularly cite Romualdez v. Hon. Sandiganbayan[47] and Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan.[48]
The Court clarifies.
At issue in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan was whether the word intervene
in Section 5[49] of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was intrinsically
vague and impermissibly broad. The Court stated that
overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special application only to
free-speech cases, and are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal
statutes.[50] It added that, at any rate, the challenged provision, under
which the therein petitioner was charged, is not vague.[51]
as-applied challenge. He basically postulated that allegations that a penal
statute is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its
validity. The pertinent portion of the Concurring Opinion of Justice
Mendoza, which was quoted at length in the main Estrada decision, reads:
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a
vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of
possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The
theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe
speech and no readily apparent construction suggests
itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a
single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society
of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to
justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no
requirement that the person making the attack
demonstrate that his own conduct could not be
regulated by a statute drawn with narrow
specificity." The possible harm to society in permitting
some unprotected speech to go unpunished is
outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech
of others may be deterred and perceived grievances
left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of
overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal
statutes. Criminal statutes have general in
terrorem effect resulting from their very existence,
and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason
alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting
the laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of
criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area
of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines
then have special application only to free speech
cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal
statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion
 22

by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an legislative process of the relief
'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of sought, and above all the
the First Amendment." In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the speculative and amorphous nature
Court ruled that "claims of facial overbreadth have of the required line-by-line
been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by analysis of detailed
their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words" and, statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a
again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, kind of case that is wholly
have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary unsatisfactory for deciding
criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected constitutional questions,
conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a facial whichever way they might be
challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult decided.
challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger
must establish that no set of circumstances exists under For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation
which the Act would be valid." As for the vagueness of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong
doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last
on its face only if it is vague in all its possible resort," and is generally disfavored. In determining the
applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions
that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the which are alleged to have been violated in a case must
vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of be examined in the light of the conduct with which the
others." defendant is charged.[56] (Underscoring supplied.)

In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny,

overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools
developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free
speech cases or, as they are called in American The confusion apparently stems from the interlocking relation of
law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to
the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines as grounds for
do service when what is involved is a criminal
statute. With respect to such statute, the established a facial or as-applied challenge against a penal statute (under a claim of
rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is
constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on violation of due process of law) or a speech regulation (under a claim of
the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as abridgement of the freedom of speech and cognate rights).
applying to other persons or other situations in which
its application might be unconstitutional." As has been
pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First
To be sure, the doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do
Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges
typically produce facial invalidation, whilestatutes not operate on the same plane.
found vague as a matter of due process typically are
invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular
defendant." Consequently, there is no basis for A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
petitioner's claim that this Court review the
Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety. comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must

necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is

Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes
results in striking them down entirely on the ground repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process
that they might be applied to parties not before the
Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair
constitutes a departure from the case and controversy notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions
to be made without concrete factual settings and in discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of
sterile abstract contexts. But, as the U.S. Supreme
the Government muscle.[57] The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile,
Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris
decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
[T]he task of analyzing a
proposed statute, pinpointing its constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by
deficiencies, and requiring means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
correction of these deficiencies
before the statute is put into protected freedoms.[58]
effect, is rarely if ever an
appropriate task for the
judiciary. The combination of the As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine
relative remoteness of the
controversy, the impact on the assumes that individuals will understand what a statute prohibits and will

accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though some of it is
protected.[59]
A facial challenge is likewise different from an as-applied challenge.
Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers
only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is
examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only
on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the
assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not
before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
activities.[60]
Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle[61] in his concurring
opinion that the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a
facial challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus
successfully mount a facial challenge against a criminal statute on either
vagueness or overbreadth grounds.
The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by the
aim to avert the chilling effect on protected speech, the exercise of which
should not at all times be abridged.[62] As reflected earlier, this rationale is
inapplicable to plain penal statutes that generally bear an in
terrorem effect in deterring socially harmful conduct. In fact, the
legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered
innocent and lawful, so long as it refrains from diminishing or dissuading
the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.[63]
The Court reiterated that there are critical limitations by which a criminal
statute may be challenged and underscored that an on-its-face
invalidation of penal statutes x x x may not be allowed.[64]
[T]he rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes
on free speech, religious freedom, and other
fundamental rights may be facially challenged. Under
no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a
facial challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a facial
challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the
prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No
prosecution would be possible. A strong criticism
against employing a facial challenge in the case of penal
statutes, if the same is allowed, would effectively go
23
against the grain of the doctrinal requirement of an
existing and concrete controversy before judicial power
may be appropriately exercised. A facial challenge
against a penal statute is, at best, amorphous and
speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to
consider third parties who are not before it. As I have
said in my opposition to the allowance of a facial
challenge to attack penal statutes, such a test will
impair the States ability to deal with crime. If warranted,
there would be nothing that can hinder an accused
an from defeating the States power to prosecute on a
mere showing that, as applied to third parties, the
penal statute is vague or overbroad, notwithstanding
that the law is clear as applied to him.[65] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the overbreadth
doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given
rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases.
By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial
type of invalidation in order to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably
almost always under situations not before the court, that are
impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise
stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being substantially
overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as applied to the
litigants.
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth
technique is that it marks an exception to some of the
usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a
particular litigant claims that a statute is
unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant
prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional
aspects of the law by invalidating its improper
applications on a case to case basis. Moreover,
challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the
rights of third parties and can only assert their own
interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way;
challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third
parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on
its face," not merely "as applied for" so that the
overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly
authorized court construes it more narrowly. The factor
that motivates courts to depart from the normal
adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling;"
deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third
parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court
assumes that an overbroad laws "very existence may
cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or expression." An
overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that
deterrent effect on the speech of those third
 24

parties.[66] (Emphasis in the original omitted;

underscoring supplied.) doctrine hailed as among the most important guarantees of liberty under

law.[75]

In restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the Court, in

In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted under the
at least two cases,[67] observed that the US Supreme Court has not
due process clause has been utilized in examining the constitutionality of
recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the
criminal statutes. In at least three cases,[76] the Court brought the doctrine
First Amendment,[68] and that claims of facial overbreadth have been
into play in analyzing an ordinance penalizing the non-payment of
entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to
municipal tax on fishponds, the crime of illegal recruitment punishable
regulate only spoken words.[69] In Virginia v. Hicks,[70] it was held that
under Article 132(b) of the Labor Code, and the vagrancy provision under
rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or
Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code. Notably, the petitioners in these
regulation that is not specifically addressed to speech or speech-related
three cases, similar to those in the two Romualdez and Estrada cases,
conduct. Attacks on overly broad statutes are justified by the
were actually charged with the therein assailed penal statute, unlike in the
transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected
present case.
expression.[71]

There is no
Since a penal statute merit in the
may only be assailed for claim that
being vague as RA 9372
applied to petitioners, regulates
a limited vagueness speech so as
analysis of the definition to permit a
of terrorism in RA 9372 facial
is legally impermissible analysis of
absent an actual or its validity
imminent
charge against them

From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited Section 3

of RA 9372, the following elements may be culled: (1) the offender

While Estrada did not apply the overbreadth doctrine, it did not preclude
commits an act punishable under any of the cited provisions of the
the operation of the vagueness test on the Anti-Plunder Law as applied to
Revised Penal Code, or under any of the enumerated special penal laws; (2)
the therein petitioner, finding, however, that there was no basis to review
the commission of the predicate crime sows and creates a condition of
the law on its face and in its entirety.[72] It stressed that statutes found
widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace; and (3)
vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated only 'as applied'
the offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the government to give in
to a particular defendant.[73]
to an unlawful demand.

American jurisprudence[74] instructs that vagueness challenges that do not

In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law
involve the First Amendment must be examined in light of the specific
penalizes speech, petitioners contend that the element of unlawful
facts of the case at hand and not with regard to the statute's facial
demand in the definition of terrorism[77] must necessarily be transmitted
validity.
through some form of expression protected by the free speech clause.

For more than 125 years, the US Supreme Court has evaluated defendants
The argument does not persuade. What the law seeks to penalize
claims that criminal statutes are unconstitutionally vague, developing a
is conduct, not speech.
 25

Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must first IN FINE, Estrada and the other cited authorities engaged in a vagueness

be a predicate crime actually committed to trigger the operation of the analysis of the therein subject penal statute as applied to the therein

key qualifying phrases in the other elements of the crime, including petitioners inasmuch as they were actually charged with the pertinent

the coercion of the government to accede to an unlawful demand. Given crimes challenged on vagueness grounds. The Court in said cases, however,

the presence of the first element, any attempt at singling out or found no basis to review the assailed penal statute on its face and in its

highlighting the communicative component of the prohibition cannot entirety.

recategorize the unprotected conduct into a protected speech.

In Holder, on the other hand, the US Supreme

Court allowed the pre-enforcement review of a criminal statute,

Petitioners notion on the transmission of message is entirely inaccurate,
challenged on vagueness grounds, since the therein plaintiffs faced
as it unduly focuses on just one particle of an element of the
a credible threat of prosecution and should not be required to await and
crime. Almost every commission of a crime entails some mincing of words
undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief.
on the part of the offender like in declaring to launch overt criminal acts

against a victim, in haggling on the amount of ransom or conditions, or in

As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual charge
negotiating a deceitful transaction. An analogy in
nor a credible threat of prosecution under RA 9372. Even a limited
one U.S. case[78] illustrated that the fact that the prohibition on
vagueness analysis of the assailed definition of terrorism is thus legally
discrimination in hiring on the basis of race will require an employer to
impermissible. The Court reminds litigants that judicial power neither
take down a sign reading White Applicants Only hardly means that the law
contemplates speculative counseling on a statutes future effect on
should be analyzed as one regulating speech rather than conduct.
hypothetical scenarios nor allows the courts to be used as an extension of
Utterances not elemental but inevitably incidental to the doing of the
a failed legislative lobbying in Congress.
criminal conduct alter neither the intent of the law to punish socially
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.
harmful conduct nor the essence of the whole act as conduct and not

speech. This holds true a fortiori in the present case where the expression LAGMAN v. MEDIALDEA

figures only as an inevitable incident of making the element of coercion

perceptible. Genocide and Other Crimes Against Humanity

[I]t is true that the agreements and course of conduct

13. Republic Act No. 9851 (Philippine Act on Crimes
here were as in most instances brought about through
Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide
speaking or writing. But it has never been deemed an
and Other Crimes Against Humanity)
abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a
course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct
was, in part, initiated, evidenced, or carried out by
means of language, either spoken, written, or
printed. Such an expansive interpretation of the
constitutional guaranties of speech and press would
make it practically impossible ever to enforce laws
against agreements in restraint of trade as well as many
other agreements and conspiracies deemed injurious to
society.[79] (italics and underscoring supplied)

Certain kinds of speech have been treated as unprotected conduct,

because they merely evidence a prohibited conduct.[80] Since speech is not

involved here, the Court cannot heed the call for a facial analysis.