3.8.

Dismissal of action (Rule 16)

- Grounds
- lack of jurisdiction over person

[3.8 01] Amigo v CA, 253 SCRA 382

GR # 102833 | February 9, 1996
Petitioner: LOLITA AMIGO and ESTELITA VDA. DE SALINAS
Respondent: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE AUGUSTO V. BREVA,
as Judge, RTC of Davao, Branch X, THE SHERIFF OF THE RTC represented by Alfonso M.
Zamora, Deputy Sheriff of Branch X, and JESUS WEE ENG
Motion to Dismiss: Lack of Jurisdiction

FACTS
➢ Petitioners leased in 1961 from Mercedes Inigo, a parcel of land.
○ Petitioners constructed their houses on the lot.
○ Mercedes Inigo later sold and transferred her ownership of the land to Juan
Bosquit and herein private respondent Jesus Wee Eng.
➢ Bosquit and Wee entered into a deed of exchange with the City Government of Davao.
○ They exchanged a portion of their lot for a portion of a lot under the name of the
city.
○ The transaction was authorized and approved by the City Council of Davao.
➢ Both pertinent lots were subdivided and the titles, cancelled.
○ New titles were issued as per the exchange aforementioned.
➢ Bosquit and Wee instituted an action for unlawful detainer against petitioners.
○ The city court dismissed the action on the technicality that the plaintiffs did not
observe the required 15-day period from the sending of the letter of demand before
filing the action.
■ Twelve days before the filing of the action nila sinend.
➢ Bosquit sold his rights and interests over the lots to Wee.
➢ Private respondent filed a complaint against petitioners for recovery of the real property in
question.
○ After the petitioners had filed their answer, the court appointed a duly licensed
geodetic engineer to conduct a relocation survey of the boundaries of the land.
■ In his report, it was stated that — ". . . portions of about two-thirds (2/3) of
the houses of Lolita Amigo and that of Estelita Vda. de Salinas is inside the
lot of Wee; the remaining onethird of it lies on the road widening and the
creek respectively."
➢ Private respondent sought an amendment of his complaint which was allowed.
○ The complaint prayed not only for the recovery of real property and damages but
also for an abatement of nuisance over the portion of the improvements introduced
by petitioners that encroached on the sidewalk of Leon Garcia Street.
➢ In their amended answer, petitioners denied the material allegations of the amended
complaint.
 ○ Petitioners stressed that their houses stood neither on private respondent's land
nor on the sidewalk or shoulders of Leon Garcia Street but along the banks of the
Agdao Creek.
➢ The trial court ruled in favor of the private respondent.
➢ The CA dismissed the appeal because petitioners failed to file an appellate brief.
➢ Private respondent then moved for execution of judgment, but petitioners filed for the
annulment of the RTC’s decision at the CA.
○ A TRO was issued but was lifted when the CA dismissed the case.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S
Whether or not the court a quo acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter and their person. –
YES

RULING & RATIO: YES.

Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter:
➢ conferred by law and determined by the allegations of the complaint
○ It should hardly be of any consequence that the merits of the case are later found
to veer away from the claims asseverated by the plaintiff.
➢ The case is on recovering real property -- an action within the jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court.

Jurisdiction over the Person:

➢ acquired either by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority or
by service of summons
➢ By filing an answer and later an amended answer, the petitioners must be deemed to have
formally and effectively appeared before the lower court.
○ Unlike the question of jurisdiction over the subject matter which may be invoked at
any stage of the proceedings (even on appeal), the issue of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant must be seasonably raised.
■ can be pleaded in a motion to dismiss
■ can be through an affirmative defense in an answer
➢ The records bear out the fact that petitioners have allowed the issue of jurisdiction to pass
unquestioned until the rendition of the judgment.
○ They cannot question the jurisdiction too late in the game.

DISPOSITION
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit and the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
 - lack of jurisdiction over subject matter

[3.8 02] La Naval v CA, 236 SCRA 78

Doctrine: Where the court itself clearly has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature
of the action, the invocation of this defense may be done at any time. It is neither for the courts
nor the parties to violate or disregard that rule, let alone to confer that jurisdiction, this matter
being legislative in character. Barring highly meritorious and exceptional circumstances, such as
hereinbefore exemplified, neither estoppel nor waiver shall apply.

Petitioner: La Naval Drug Corporation

Respondents: Court of Appeals and Wilson Yao

FACTS:
1. Respondent Yao is the present owner of a commercial building a portion of which is leased
to petitioner under a contract of lease executed on December 23, 1983 with the former
owner thereof, La Proveedora, Inc., which contract expired on April 30, 1989.

2. Petitioner exercised its option to lease the same building for another five years. But
petitioner and respondent Yao disagreed on the rental rate, and to resolve the controversy,
the latter, thru written notices to the former, expressed his intention to submit their
disagreement to arbitration, in accordance with Republic Act 876 (Arbitration Law).
Petitioner and Respondent chose Atty. Casiano Sabile and Domingo Alamarez Jr. as their
arbitrators respectively, however, an issue arose in choosing the third arbitrator.

3. This prompted Yao to go to court to demand the arbitrators to proceed with the arbitration.
Yao went to the regional trial court and the case was filed as a summary proceeding case
under R.A. 876. Yao also prayed for an award for damages in his favor.

4. In its answer, La Naval asserted that the case should be dismissed as it was filed
prematurely; La Naval questioned Yao’s claim for damages as it averred that the same
should be litigated independently and not in the same summary proceeding case.
5. RTC announced that Eloisa Narciso was chosen as the third arbitrator and ordered the
parties to submit their position paper on the issue as to whether or not respondent’s claim
for damages may be litigated in a summary proceeding for enforcement of arbitration
agreement.

6. CA agreed with Petitioner that a court, acting within the limits of its special jurisdiction,
may in this case solely determine the issue of whether the litigants should proceed or not
to arbitration, it, however, considered petitioner in estoppel from questioning the
competence of the court to additionally hear and decide in the summary proceedings
private respondent’s claim for damages, it (petitioner) having itself filed similarly its own
counter-claim with the court a quo.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case?

RULING:
No. Where the court itself clearly has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature of the
action, the invocation of this defense may be done at any time. It is neither for the courts nor the
parties to violate or disregard that rule, let alone to confer that jurisdiction, this matter being
legislative in character. Barring highly meritorious and exceptional circumstances, such as
hereinbefore exemplified, neither estoppel nor waiver shall apply.

In the case at bench, the want of jurisdiction by the court is indisputable, given the nature of the
controversy. The arbitration law explicitly confines the court’s authority only to pass upon the issue
of whether there is or there is no agreement in writing providing for arbitration. In the affirmative,
the statute ordains that the court shall issue an order “summarily directing the parties to proceed
with the arbitration in accordance with the terms thereof.” If the court, upon the other hand, finds
that no such agreement exists, “the proceedings shall be dismissed.” The proceedings are
summary in nature.

All considered, the court a quo must then refrain from taking up the claims of the contending
parties for damages, which, upon the other hand, may be ventilated in separate regular
proceedings at an opportune time and venue. The circumstances obtaining in this case are far,
we hold, from justifying the application of estoppel against either party.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals and the orders of the trial court in question
are SET ASIDE. The court a quo, in the instant proceedings, is ordered to DESIST from further
hearing private respondent’s claim, as well as petitioner’s counterclaim, for damages. No costs.

[3.8 03] Ilocos Sur Electric v NLRC 241 SCRA 36

Doctrine: While jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a party's active participation in the
proceedings before a court without jurisdiction will estop such party from assailing such lack of
it. It is an undesirable practice of a party participating in the proceedings and submitting his case
for decision and then accepting the judgment only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of
jurisdiction, when adverse.

Facts:
Engr. Egdon Sabio was employed as Manager of the Engineering Department of Ilocos Sur
Electric Cooperative (ISECO), herein petitioner, in May 1982. He was relieved of his duties on
June 10, 1989 and was dismissed on July 1, 1989 pursuant to ISECO's Board Resolution No.
63 s. 1989.

It appears that Sabio wrote to the ISECO Board of Directors (nagsumbong), about the expenses
incurred by Acting General Manager, Atty. Bautista, in the total amount of P131,788.79 from
May 1988 to May 1989 for his travel to the office of the National Electrification Administration
(NEA) and places outside the area serviced by the cooperative. Sabio revealed that in one year,
Bautista was away for two hundred twenty (220) days, while in contrast the previous Acting
General Manager, Genaro Cada, who stayed out of the cooperative for not more than thirty (30)
days for the same length of time spent not more than ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) only.

Bautista summoned Sabio to his office and asked him to file a letter of irrevocable resignation
with the assurance that separation benefits will be granted to him. Thereafter, Bautista issued
Memo No. 55-89 requiring Sabio to explain in writing within 24 hours upon receipt why he
should not be separated from the service for grave and serious misconduct.

Sabio submitted his answer denying all the charges against him. On June 30, 1989 Bautista
placed him under preventive suspension without pay effective July 1, 1989, which prompted
Sabio to file a complaint for illegal suspension and a claim for representation/travel allowances
before the Labor Arbiter.

Bautista then created an ad hoc committee; to investigate the case against Sabio. Thereafter,
the ad hoc committee submitted a report of its investigation and finding Sabio guilty and
recommended that he should be dismissed. Bautista recommended to the ISECO Board of
Directors the approval of the report and recommendation of the ad hoc committee. On July 29,
1989, the Board adopted the recommendation of the ad hoc committee and passed
Resolution No. 63 s. 1989, terminating the services of Sabio retroactive July 1, 1989.

Consequently, Sabio filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with claim for damages against
petitioner with respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), docketed as NLRC
Case No. RAB-1-07-1050-89, which was assigned to Labor Arbiter Amado T. Adquilen of the
Regional Arbitration Branch, DOLE, for compulsory arbitration. On January 8, 1990, the Labor
Arbiter, after considering the evidence on record, held in his decision that Sabio was illegally
and unjustly dismissed without due process of law.

Petitioner (ISECO) appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission, but NLRC
dismissed the appeal for having been filed out of time. The NLRC found that petitioners
filed their appeal beyond the ten-day period prescribed by the Revised Rules of the NLRC,
specifically Rule VIII section I(a). A motion for reconsideration was, likewise, denied by the
NLRC in its resolution of November 16, 1990. A notice of appeal to the President was filed.
This was merely noted by the Commission on June 24, 1991, a petition for the issuance of a writ
of execution was submitted by Sabio. Upon computation of the exact amount to be awarded to
Sabio, the Executive Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution.

Petitioner now assails that the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter and therefore,
their decision must be void.

Issue: Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction over the case of Engr. Egdon A. Sabio.
Held: YES. It is clear from the provision of P.D. 269, as amended by P.D. 1645 that only the
power of supervision and control over electric cooperatives and other borrowers, supervised or
controlled, is given to the NEA. There is nothing said law which provides that the NEA
administration has the power to hear and decide termination cases of employees in electric
cooperatives. That authority is vested in the Labor Arbiter (NLRC). In the present case, there is
no dispute that Sabio is an employee of ISECO whose services as manager of the Engineering
Department of ISECO were terminated. The dismissal arose from a purely labor dispute which
falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC. Thus,
Section. 217 of the Labor Code provides:

Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. — (a) Except as
otherwise provided under this Code the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case
by the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the
following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
2. Termination of disputes;

Moreover, the NLRC’s jurisdiction was only raised for the first time in this petition. Petitioners did
not question the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter either in a motion to dismiss or in their answer.
In fact, petitioners participated in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, as well as in the
NLRC to which they appealed the Labor Arbiter's decision. It has been consistently held by this
Court that while jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a party's active participation in the
proceedings before a court without jurisdiction will estop such party from assailing such lack of
it. It is an undesirable practice of a party participating in the proceedings and submitting his case
for decision and then accepting the judgment only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of
jurisdiction, when adverse.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO
ORDERED.

[3.8 04] Andaya v Abadia 228 SCRA 705

Petitioners: NOE S. ANDAYA
Respondent: LISANDRO C. ABADIA, RENE R. CRUZ, VICTOR M. PUNZALAN, LYSIAS C.
CABUSAO, JOSE O. BARNUEVO, JOSE M. FORONDA, LAMBERTO TORRES, EDGAR C.
GALVANTE, EMERSON C. TANGAN, PRIMITIVO A. SOMERA and BENJAMIN N. SANTOS,
SR.
Doctrine: Jurisdiction over subject matter is essential in the sense that erroneous assumption
thereof may put at naught whatever proceedings the court might have had. Hence, even on
appeal, and even if the parties do not raise the issue of jurisdiction, the reviewing court is not
precluded from ruling that it has no jurisdiction over the case. It is elementary that jurisdiction is
vested by law and cannot be conferred or waived by the parties or even by the judge. It is also
irrefutable that a court may at any stage of the proceedings dismiss the case for want of
jurisdiction. For this matter, the ground of lack of jurisdiction in dismissing a case is not waivable.
Hence, the last sentence of Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court, expressly states: "Whenever it appears
that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, it shall dismiss the action."
FACTS:
- Petitioner contends that RTC, and not SEC, has jurisdiction over his complaint.
- That the civil case he filed should not have been dismissed
- He asserts that "actually, the complaint is based not so much on plaintiff's
attempted removal but rather on the manner of his removal and the consequent
effects thereof ."
- That “the directors of the Armed Forces and Police Savings and Loan
Association, Inc., (AFPSLAI) . . . acting in concert and pursuant to an illegal
and nefarious scheme to oust petitioner from his then positions as
President and General Manager of the AFPSLAI, with grave abuse of
authority and in gross and deliberate violation of the norms of human
relations and of petitioner's right to due process, illegally, maliciously and
with evident bad faith, convened a meeting of the AFPSLAI Board of
Directors and illegally reorganized the management of AFPSLAI by ousting
and removing, without just and lawful cause, petitioner from his position
and praying for the issuance of TRO and writ of preliminary injunction…”
- TC granted the prayer of TRO and set the hearing on the injunctive relief.
- Respondent filed an urgent motion to dismiss.
- Complaint raised an intra-corporate controversies over which SEC has exclusive
original jurisdiction.
- Respondent also filed an Urgent Motion to Lift Restraining ORder and Opposition to
Preliminary Injunction.
- Petitioner filed a Consolidated Opposition to Urgent Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Lift
Restraining Order with Reply to Opposition to Preliminary Injunction and Reiteration of
Motions for Contempt (for violation of the Temporary Restraining Order).
- Before the TC could rule on the motion to dismiss, petitioner filed an amended complaint
impleading additional defendants. (Central Bank managing director and acting director)
- Respondents filed an Omnibus Motion: that the filing of the amended complaint seeking
to confer jurisdiction on the court was improper and shouldn’t be allowed.
- TC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction insofar as respondents are concerned and
denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss.
- That “...the specific law, P.D. No. 902-A, defines and vests jurisdiction over
corporate matters in the Securities and Exchange Commission in no uncertain
terms, Section 3, to be 'absolute jurisdiction, supervision and control over all
corporations.' In the case at bar, AFPSLAI is a corporation and the alleged causes
of action in the complaint are clearly corporate matters....”
- Petitioner moved to consider and argued that "since the case under the Amended
Complaint impleads parties-defendant not in any way connected with the AFPSLAI, any
apparent corporate element in the case is swept away." but was denied.
ISSUE:
1. WON it is the SEC that has jurisdiction over the subject matter and not the court
2. WON the court acted on the Urgent Motion to Dismiss or on the Omnibus Motion without
the requisite notice as provided by Secs. 4 & 6 of Rule 15

HELD: YES.
1. The determination of the rights of petitioner arising from the alleged illegal convening of
the meeting of AFPSLAI Board of Directors and his subsequent ouster from corporate
offices as a result of the voting for the reorganization of management are obviously intra-
corporate controversies subject to the jurisdiction of SEC as provided in P. D. No. 902-A.
- Even the supposed allegations of violation of the provisions of the Civil Code on human
relations, as in par. 7 of the Complaint which states that "certain parties, including
defendant SANTOS "masterminded a plot to degrade plaintiff and to denigrate his
accomplishments in the AFPSLAI by spreading false and derogatory rumors against
plaintiff," are all treated in the complaint as mere components of the general scheme
allegedly perpetrated by respondents as directors to oust him from his corporate offices,
and not as causes of action independent of intra-corporate matters.
- These paragraphs themselves show that the allegations of violations of the rules
on human relations also fall within the jurisdiction of SEC because they are treated
merely as ingredients of "malevolent and illegal acts calculated to realize and
accomplish the threatened illegal removal of plaintiff from his (corporate)
positions."
-
2. NO. Petitioner posits that the court a quo was precluded from acting not only on the Urgent
Motion to Dismiss because it was deemed superseded, but also on the Omnibus Motion
because no hearing was had thereon thus leaving the assailed orders without basis to
lean on. This is untenable.
-The Omnibus Motion already comprehended the lone issue raised in the Urgent
Motion to Dismiss (i.e., the court has no jurisdiction over intra-corporate matters)
and upon which ground the court a quo dismissed the case against respondents,
the previous hearing on the Urgent Motion to Dismiss may cure the defect of
absence of hearing on the Omnibus Motion but only insofar as said issue was
concerned. What is important is that petitioner was heard on that issue, hence,
due process was observed.
-The last sentence of Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court, expressly states: "Whenever
it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, it shall dismiss
the action."
We note that Sec. 2, Rule 9 uses the word "shall," leaving the court no choice
under the given situation but to dismiss the case. The same Rule also uses the
phrase "whenever it appears," which means at anytime after the complaint or
amended complaint is filed, because the lack of jurisdiction may be apparent from
the allegations therein. Hence, from the foregoing, even if no answer or motion to
dismiss is filed the court may dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction. In this sense,
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction may be ordered by the court motu proprio. Applying
 this notion to the case at bar, with the dismissal of the case against respondents
for lack of jurisdiction, it then becomes inconsequential whether the court acted on
the Urgent Motion to Dismiss or on the Omnibus Motion without the requisite notice
as provided in Secs. 4 and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. The determination
of lack of jurisdiction over respondents being apparent from the face of the
amended complaint, the defect of want of prior notice and hearing on the Omnibus
Motion could not by itself confer jurisdiction upon the court a quo.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition dismissed.

[3.8 05] Republic v Bantigue Point Development Corp 668 SCRA 158 – SAI

DOCTRINE: The rule is settled that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the
Constitution or the law. It cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the
parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court. Consequently, questions of jurisdiction may
be cognizable even if raised for the first time on appeal
Facts:

 On July 17, 1997, Bantigue Point filed with RTC Rosario, Batangas an application for
original registration of title over Lot 8060 of Cad 453-D, San Juan Cadastre, 10,732 m2
with a total assessed value of P14,920.

 On July 18, 1997, the RTC issued an Order setting the case for initial hearing on
October 22, 1997. On August 7, 1997, it issued a second Order setting the initial hearing
on November 4, 1997.

 In 1998, while the records were still with the RTC, Republic filed its Opposition.

 RTC Clerk of Court transferred motu propio the records of the case to MTC San Juan,
because the assessed value of the property was less than P100,000.

 MTC: Order of General Default and commenced with the reception of evidence.
Bantigue presented Tax Declarations, a Deed of Absolute Sale in its favor, and a
Certification from the DENR CENRO of Batangas City that the lot is within the alienable
and disposable (A&D) zone. MTC awarded the land to Bantigue.

 CA: affirmed MTC. Since Republic actively participated in the proceedings, it is estopped
from questioning the issue of jurisdiction on appeal. Bantigue sufficiently established its
registrable title over the property after having proven OCEN possession and occupation.

Issue: WoN MTC has jurisdiction over the application for original registration of land title

Held: Yes, we uphold the jurisdiction of the MTC, but remand the case to the court a quo for
further proceedings in order to determine if the property in question forms part of the A&D land
of the public domain.

I. The Republic is not estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction in this case.
Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. Tijam
v. Sibonghanoy n/a.

CAB: Republic filed its Opposition at the RTC. Republic could not have questioned the
delegated jurisdiction of the MTC, simply because the case was not yet with that court. When
the records were transferred to the MTC, Republic neither filed pleadings nor requested
affirmative relief from that court. On appeal, petitioner immediately raised the jurisdictional
question in its Brief. Clearly, the exceptional doctrine of estoppel by laches is inapplicable to the
instant appeal.

II. The MTC properly acquired jurisdiction over the case.

Republic: RTC failed to acquire jdxn over the application because the RTC set the date and
hour of the initial hearing beyond the 90-day period provided in the PRD.

SC: No. The Property Registration Decree provides:

Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc.—The court shall, within 5 days from
filing of the application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing
which shall not be earlier than 45 days nor later than 90 days from the date of the order.
x x x.

CAB: application for original registration was filed on 17 July 1997. The next day the RTC
immediately issued an Order setting the case for initial hearing on 22 October 1997, which was
96 days from the Order. While the date set by the RTC was beyond the 90-day period provided
for in Sec. 23, this fact did not affect the jurisdiction of the trial court. Not fatal to the application
because they have no control over the court and cannot meddle with official functions.

The RTC’s failure to issue the Order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing within 5 days
from the filing of the application for registration, as provided in the PRD, did not affect the court’s
jurisdiction. Observance of the 5-day period was merely directory, and failure to issue the Order
within that period did not deprive the RTC of its jurisdiction.

Republic: The selling price of the property based on the DoS annexed was P160,000 so the
MTC did not have jurisdiction over the case. Under BP 129, Sec. 34 the MTC’s delegated
jurisdiction to try cadastral and land registration cases is limited to lands, the value of which
should not exceed P100,000.

SC: No. BP 129 provides:

Sec. 34. Delegated Jurisdiction in Cadastral and Land Registration Cases.—Metropolitan

Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned
by the SC to hear and determine cadastral or land registration cases covering lots where
there is no controversy or opposition, or contested lots where the value of which does not
exceed P100,000.00, such value to be ascertained by the affidavit of the claimant or by
agreement of the respective claimants if there are more than one, or from the
corresponding tax declaration of the real property. Their decision in these cases shall be
appealable in the same manner as decisions of the RTCs.
MTC has delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and land registration cases in 2 instances: first,
where there is no controversy or opposition; or, second, over contested lots, the value of which
does not exceed P100,000. MTC acquired jdxn via #2.

The value of the land should not be determined with reference to its selling price. Rather, BP
129, Sec. 34 provides that the value of the property sought to be registered may be ascertained
in 3 ways: first, by the affidavit of the claimant; second, by agreement of the respective
claimants, if there are more than one; or, third, from the corresponding tax declaration of the
real property.

CAB: #1 n/a - no affidavit executed by Bantigue as to the value of the property. #2 n/a - no
multiple claimants, just Bantigue. #3 it is then. From the records, we find that the assessed
value of the property is P14,920 for the entire property. Based on these Tax Declarations, it is
evident that the total value of the land in question does not exceed P100,000. Clearly, the MTC
may exercise its delegated jurisdiction under the BP 129, as amended.

- pendentia litis

[3.8 06] Andersons Group v CA. 266 S 423 - MIGUEL

PETITIONER: The Andersons Group, Inc. (Andersons)
RESPONDENT: Court of Appeals (CA), Spouses Willie A. Denate and Myrna Lo Denate
(Denate)

DOCTRINE:
Lis pendens as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to that situation wherein
another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action. To constitute
the defense of lis pendens, it must appear that not only are the parties in the two actions the same
but there is substantial identity in the cause of action and relief sought. Further, it is required that
the identity be such that any judgment which may be rendered in the other would, regardless of
which party is successful, amount to res judicata the case on hand.

FACTS:

1. Denate entered into an agency agreement with Andersons as its commission agent for
the sale of distilled spirits (wines and liquors) in Davao City, three Davao provinces and
North Cotabato. On November 18, 1991, Denate filed a civil action for collection of sum of
money against Andersons before the RTC of Davao City. In the complaint, Denate alleged
that he was entitled to the amount of Php882,107.95, representing commissions from
Andersons, but that the latter had maliciously failed and refused to pay the same.

2. December 19, 1991, Andersons likewise filed a complaint for collection of sum of money
with damages and prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against
Denate with the RTC of Kalookan City, Branch 22. Andersons alleged in the complaint
that Denate still owed it the sum of P1,618,467.98 after deducting commissions and
remittances.
 3. On February 5, 1992, Denate filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. C-15214 with the
Kalookan RTC on the ground that there was another action pending between the same
parties for the same cause of action, citing the case earlier filed with the RTC of Davao
City.

4. On February 14, 1992, Andersons filed its opposition to the Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that the RTC of Davao had not acquired jurisdiction over it.

5. RTC of Kalookan denied MTD saying that it has already acquired jurisdiction over the
parties by virtue of the service of summons. MR denied.

6. CA set aside the order of the RTC.

ISSUE/S:
WON the action in the Kalookan RTC should be dismissed on the ground of lis pendens.

RULING: YES.
Lis pendens as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to that situation wherein
another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action. To constitute
the defense of lis pendens, it must appear that not only are the parties in the two actions the same
but there is substantial identity in the cause of action and relief sought. Further, it is required that
the identity be such that any judgment which may be rendered in the other would, regardless of
which party is successful, amount to res judicata the case on hand.
All these requisites are present in the instant case. The parties in the Davao and Caloocan
cases are the same. They are suing each other for sums of money which arose from their contract
of agency. As observed by the appellate court, the relief prayed for is based on the same facts
and there is identity of rights asserted. Any judgment rendered in one case would amount to res
judicata in the other.
Litis pendentia is a sanction of public policy against multiplicity of suits. The principle upon
which a plea of another action pending is sustained is that the latter action is deemed unnecessary
and vexatious.
A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court. The phraseology adopted
in the Rules of Court merely states that another action pending between the same parties for the
same cause is a ground for motion to dismiss. As worded, the rule does not contemplate that
there be a prior pending action, since it is enough that there is a pending action. Neither is it
required that the party be served with summons before lis pendens should apply.

DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
[3.8 07] Ramos v Peralta, 203 S 412

1. Petitioner started occupying the Salgado fishpond in 1964 by virtue of a lease contract
executed in his favor by private respondents spouses Juvencio and Juliana Ortanez.

2. Unknown to petitioner, title 1 to said property was in the name of Philippine International
Surety Co., Inc., a corporation founded, organized and 99.5%-owned by the Salgado
spouses, said corporation was placed under receivership and liquidation

3. respondent P. R. Roman, Inc. purchased the Salgado fishpond for P950,000.00. The
deed of sale was signed by the receiver and duly approved by the liquidation court.

4. due to this development, the spouses Ortanez refused to accept from petitioner the
advance rentals on the fishpond due on March 15, 1976 in the amount of P30,000.00.

5. petitioner received a letter from Don Pablo R. Roman informing him of the latter's
acquisition of the fishpond and intention to take possession thereof on May 16, 1976. In
his letter-reply, petitioner reminded Mr. Roman of his lease contract over the fishpond
and refused to consent to the intended take over. Notwithstanding petitioner's objection,
P. R. Roman, Inc. took over possession of the fishpond.

6. Petitioner filed before the CFI of Manila the aforesaid complaint, docketed as Civil Case
No. 103647, 3 against private respondents Juvencio and Juliana Ortanez, Mindanao
Insurance and P. R. Roman, Inc. for consignation of the sum of P70,000.00 representing
advance rentals on the fishpond in the amounts of P30,000.00 and P40,000.00
respectively due on March 15, 1976 and June 15, 1976, which he had previously
tendered to, but refused by the spouses Ortanez and Pablo Roman.

7. P. R. Roman, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that venue was improperly
laid, the complaint states no cause of action and the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject of the action or suit. In its motion to dismiss, P. R. Roman, Inc. cited the
pendency before the then CFI of Bataan of Civil Case No 4102 instituted by P.R.
Roman, Inc. against petitioner Benedicto Ramos on August 13, 1976 to quiet its title
over the Salgado fishpond.

8. CFI Dismissed the case. Hence this petition.

Private respondents counter that the view taken by petitioner of the Manila consignation case is
quite limited and bookish, because while it may be true that the main issue involved in a
consignation case is whether or not the defendant is willing to accept the proffered payment, in
the consignation case brought by petitioner, other issues were pleaded by petitioner himself,
such as the validity and binding effect of the lease contract and the existence of the
supposed obligor-obligee relationship. They further contend that a plaintiffs right of choice of
venue is not absolute, but must invariably how to the dismissal of the case because of litis
pendentia which, in refutation of petitioner's argument, does not require that there is a prior
pending action, merely that there is a pending action.

ISSUE: W/N the elements of litis pendentia exist as to amount to the dismissal of the case

RULING: YES

Under the rules and jurisprudence, for litis pendentia to be invoked as a ground for the dismissal
of an action, the concurrence of the following requisites is necessary: (a) Identity of parties or at
least such as represent the same interest in both actions; (b) Identity of rights asserted and
relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) The identity in the two
cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which
party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.

These requisites are present in the case at bar. It is worthwhile mentioning that in his basic
petition for review, one of the assigned errors of petitioner is that the respondent court erred in
not holding that the parties in Civil Case No. 4102 are not the same as the parties in Civil Case
No. 103647.

However, in his brief, no further mention of this assigned error was made; a clear indication of
petitioner's admission of the identity of parties in Civil Case No. 4102 and Civil Case No.
103647, particularly as he filed a third party complaint in Civil Case No. 4102 against the
spouses Ortanez and Mindanao Insurance.

Anent the second element, we agree with private respondents' observation that petitioner's
approach to his consignation case is quite constricted. His contention that the only issue in a
consignation case is whether or not the defendant is willing to accept the proffered payment is
true only where there is no controversy with respect to the obligation sought to be discharged by
such payment.

His consignation case, however, is not as simple. While ostensibly, the immediate relief sought
for in his consignation case is to compel therein defendants to accept his advance rentals, the
ultimate purpose of such action is to compel the new owner of the fishpond to recognize his
leasehold rights and right of occupation. In the last analysis, therefore, the issue involved in
Civil Case No. 103647 is the right of possession over the fishpond intertwined with the validity
and effectivity of the lease contract.

That whatever decision may be handed down in Civil Case No. 4102 would constitute res judicata
in Civil Case No. 103647 is beyond cavil. Should the Bataan court rule that the lease contract is
valid and effective against P. R. Roman, Inc., the petitioner can compel it to accept his proffered
payment of rentals; otherwise, he may not do so.

SC AFFIRMED CFI.
[3.8 08] Yap v Chua 672 S 411 - VIN

Doctrine: Litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to that situation
wherein another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, such
that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious.
Facts:

1. -Yap delivered the checks to Te, which were payable to property owners and various
financers, for the purchase of a land. Bagatao was among the people who received
checks. However, Yap was later informed that Bagatao was not the owner of the land.
He concluded that it was proper to cancel the checks he issued at payment to all other
contracts of sale he entered into through Te.

2. -Verbal demands for Yap to make good the checks he issued proved to be futile. Thus,
Chua filed with RTC General Santos City a complaint for sum of money. RTC General
Santos ruled in favor of Chua.
3.
-Petitioner Yap filed a complaint against respondents Chua and Te before RTC Makati
principally praying for the cancellation of several checks. Yap alleged that he purchased
several real properties through Te (real estate broker) and delivered checks as
payments either to the property owners or to individuals who agreed to finance the
acquisitions.

4. -Armed with the decision of RTC General Santos, Chua moved for the dismissal of Yap’s
complaint on the twin grounds of litis pendentia and forum shopping. Chua averred that
Yap violated the rule against forum shopping when he failed to inform RTC Makati of the
case. RTC Makati refused to dismiss the case. CA ordered the dismissal of the case.

5. -Yap urges the SC to reverse as the alleged existence of litis pendentia is belied by the
incomparable causes of action he and Chua advanced in the separate complaints they
initiated against each other.

Issue: W/N Yap is liable for forum shopping

Ruling:Yes.

 What is critical in forum shopping is the vexation brought upon the courts and the litigants
by a party who asks different courts to rule on the same or related causes and grant the
same reliefs. To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the
most important factor is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a
final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another.

Litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to that situation wherein
another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action. The
 theory is founded on the public policy that the same subject matter should not be the
subject of controversy in courts more than once, in order that possible conflicting
judgments may be avoided for the sake of the stability of the rights and status of persons.

The requisites of litis pendentia are:

(a) Identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions;
(b) Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts;
(c) Identity of the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful,
would amount to res judicata in the other.

All 3 elements are present.

Yap filed his complaint for the annulment of the checks to Chua after he was adjudged by RTC
General Santos liable. This is indicative of his deliberate and willful attempt to render worthless
and defeat the adverse decision of RTC General Santos and relieve himself of the obligation to
pay by having the checks annulled.
By seeking to cancel such checks, Yap attempted to use the RTC Makati to destroy the
evidentiary foundation of the decision of RTC General Santos. In doing so, Yap trifled with court
processes and exposed the courts to the possibility of rendering conflicting decisions.

Disposition:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated December 10,
2008 and Resolution dated February 19, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 93974
are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.