SC grants Cebu lawyer’s bid to be delisted from ‘corrupt’ profession

When he returned to the prosecutors’ office, Cañete said the case Cañete passed the Bar Examinations in 1960 and was a member of the

folders of these cases could no longer be found. Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) the next year.
By: Ador Vincent Mayol - Senior Reporter / @adorCDN
Inquirer Visayas / 02:58 PM February 25, 2017
The actions of prosecutors and judges, he said, convinced him that the In 1981, he was elected vice president of the IBP Cebu Province
CEBU CITY–The Supreme Court (SC) has granted the request of a
criminal justice system in the Philippines is “like a spider’s web, Chapter. The following year, he assumed the presidency when the
Cebuano lawyer to strip him of his title and functions to protest the
wherein only the mosquitoes and flies are caught, but the wealthy and elected president resigned and ran for an elective post.
alleged corruption in the profession, particularly in the prosecution
government officials simply go through it.”
service and the judiciary.
In 1983, Cañete ran and was elected IBP President Cebu Province

“With all those cruel and brutal injustices heaped on me, I feel that Chapter—a position he held until 1985.
“Please take notice that the court en banc issued a resolution dated
being a lawyer does not anymore deserve respect and courtesy from
January 31, 2017. The court resolved to grant the Petition for Voluntary
his own brothers in the legal profession; that there is no more logical At present, he is the chairman-emeritus of the World Eskrima Kali Arnis
Delisting in the Roll of Attorneys filed by the petitioner,” said the High
and cogent reason for me to remain as a lawyer,” he added. Federation. CDG
Court’s Clerk of Court Felipa Anama in a Notice.

ADVERTISEMENT Cañete said he’s hoping that his voluntary resignation from the Roll of

Attorneys would lead to a meaningful reform and reorientation in the

prosecution service and the judiciary” in order to minimize corruption.

Lawyer Dionisio Cañete was elated upon receiving the Notice last

Wednesday. ADVERTISEMENT

“I have no regrets whatsoever. I am happy that I am now out of the

He said lawyers are very much aware of the ongoing corruption in the
profession so that I will not be in the same association with corrupt
prosecution service and the judiciary but have been silent or indifferent
prosecutors and judges,” he said.
toward it.

Cañete, 78, expressed dismay over the “unspeakable injustices” he

Cañete cited an example wherein a lawyer loses a case because the
suffered while practicing the profession for 56 years.
opposing party had all the money to “buy” the prosecutor or the judge.

He said he was extremely disappointed when nine of the 10 cases he

“Filing the petition was based on my disillusion, frustration, utter
filed before the prosecutors’ office from 2014 to 2016 were
disappointment as well as humiliation and embarrassment inflicted by
“maliciously dismissed” despite having presented strong evidence.
the highly unfair and brutally unjust actions of my brothers in the legal

Three of the nine dismissed cases were overturned by the Regional profession who are members of the prosecution and judiciary…” he

State Prosecutor. said.


A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty.
MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1)
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing
attorney in the Philippines.
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for
short) Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No.
75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the
Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon)
recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the
respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his
membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution
notwithstanding due notice.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B.
Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration
and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the
By-Laws of the IBP, which reads:
.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June
29, the Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the
continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem
appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme Court for
the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of
Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be sent by registered mail
to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment
on the resolution and letter adverted to above; he submitted his
comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the
membership fees due from him.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP
Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: on March 24,
1976, they submitted a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the
hearing, the parties were required to submit memoranda in
amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth
submitted for resolution.
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings
would show that the propriety and necessity of the integration of the
Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent,
however, objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A
(hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule) 1 — in accordance with
which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated — and to the
provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws
(hereinabove cited).
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the
Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent member's name from
the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP
By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue the
order applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which
reads:
SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions
of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for
six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated
Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for
the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys.
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is
stated in these words of the Court Rule:
SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official
national body to be known as the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,'
composed of all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter
be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following
words of the Court Rule:
SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall
pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with
the approval of the Supreme Court. ...
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions
constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he
is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a
lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the
corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled
financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty
and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the
respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of
the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to
strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said
matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is
rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative
body."
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court
relating to constitutional issues that inevitably and inextricably come
up to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the
practice of law, define the conditions of such practice, or revoke the
license granted for the exercise of the legal profession.
The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a
previous case before the Court, entitled "Administrative Case No.
526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the
Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court
exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its
Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines,
promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there made the
unanimous pronouncement that it was
... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all
the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative
materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive
Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of
the Philippine Bar is 'perfectly constitutional and legally
unobjectionable'. ...
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer
must belong, as distinguished from bar associations organized by
individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary.
Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member
of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out
the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its
responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an
integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are
required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules
prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement
of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of
the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional
ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes
sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause
appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the
offending member. 2
The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by
overriding considerations of public interest and public welfare to
such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the
restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests and
personal convenience of individual lawyers. 3
Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing
the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally
sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important
profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a
privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer
owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren
in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in
one of the most important functions of the State — the
administration of justice — as an officer of the court. 4 The practice
of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege
must submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the
extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court
through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected with
a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the
police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No.
6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court to
effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as
it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the paramount police
power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of the
legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable
the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively." Hence,
the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the
integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on January
9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the
constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential
Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental
considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet
the demands of pressing public necessity.
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere
with and regulate personal liberty, property and occupations.
Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in
order to secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S.
vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus
populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To
this fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals
are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery,
but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because
then society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726).
It is an undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals
from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.
But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality
and validity of Bar integration in the Philippines is the explicit
unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section
5 (5) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which
reads:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro.
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law and
the integration of the Bar ...,
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the
Supreme Court may adopt rules of Court to effect the integration of
the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to
raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility more effectively.
Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the
enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely to the
language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme
Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of
law," it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional
declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases
regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession,
his practice of law and his exercise of the said profession, which
affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the
body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might
be established by the proper authorities for the common good, even
to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not
wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and
regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in
his concerns.
On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.
The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now
concisely deal with them seriatim.
1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is
without power to compel him to become a member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule
is unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of
freedom to associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To
compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not
violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which
he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when
he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is
to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but
unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a
member. 8
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone.
He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar
Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The
only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual
dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate
interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may
require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be
shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program —
the lawyers.9
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a
lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is
justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. 10
2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of
the Court Rule requiring payment of a membership fee is void. We
see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its
constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the
admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine
Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the
respondent acknowledges — from requiring members of a privileged
class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying
the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It
is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory
measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and
purposes of integration. 11
3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the
penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation of property
without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional
rights. Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of
its being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a
profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it clear
that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary
powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the
respondent's right to practise law before the courts of this country
should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if
the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize,
then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may
be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or
arbitrary. 12
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a
property right but a mere privilege, 13 and as such must bow to the
inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the
lawyer's public responsibilities.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of
Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their
regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably
recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the
authorities holding such are legion. 14
In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of
the Board of Bar Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding was
confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar
Integration Act of Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the
conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon
constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power which is inherent in
this court as a court — appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper
administration of justice ... the argument that this is an arbitrary
power which the court is arrogating to itself or accepting from the
legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. It has
limitations no less real because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant
task to sit in judgment upon a brother member of the Bar,
particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave
responsibility, to be assumed only with a determination to uphold
the Ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and to protect
the public from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the duty
is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or
prostituted. ..."

The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973

Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the power to
"Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission
to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec.
5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain
a member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the
Court.

We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court

139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the

Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is
hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the
Roll of Attorneys of the Court.

Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muñoz Palma,

Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING
EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES.
This is a request for exemption from payment of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dues filed by petitioner Atty.
Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.
In his letter,[1] dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought
exemption from payment of IBP dues in the amount of P12,035.00 as
alleged unpaid accountability for the years 1977-2005. He alleged
that after being admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became
part of the Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then
migrated to, and worked in, the USA in December 1986 until his
retirement in the year 2003. He maintained that he cannot be
assessed IBP dues for the years that he was working in the Philippine
Civil Service since the Civil Service law prohibits the practice of ones
profession while in government service, and neither can he be
assessed for the years when he was working in the USA.
On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for
comment.[2]
On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its
comment[3] stating inter alia: that membership in the IBP is not based
on the actual practice of law; that a lawyer continues to be included
in the Roll of Attorneys as long as he continues to be a member of
the IBP; that one of the obligations of a member is the payment of
annual dues as determined by the IBP Board of Governors and duly
approved by the Supreme Court as provided for in Sections 9 and 10,
Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court; that the validity of imposing dues
on the IBP members has been upheld as necessary to defray the cost
of an Integrated Bar Program; and that the policy of the IBP Board of
Governors of no exemption from payment of dues is but an
implementation of the Courts directives for all members of the IBP to
help in defraying the cost of integration of the bar. It maintained that
there is no rule allowing the exemption of payment of annual dues as
requested by respondent, that what is allowed is voluntary
termination and reinstatement of membership. It asserted that what
petitioner could have done was to inform the secretary of the IBP of
his intention to stay abroad, so that his membership in the IBP could
have been terminated, thus, his obligation to pay dues could have
been stopped. It also alleged that the IBP Board of Governors is in
the process of discussing proposals for the creation of an inactive
status for its members, which if approved by the Board of Governors
and by this Court, will exempt inactive IBP members from payment
of the annual dues.
In his reply[4] dated 22 February 2005, petitioner contends that
what he is questioning is the IBP Board of Governors Policy of
Non-Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues of
lawyers regardless of whether or not they are engaged in active or
inactive practice. He asseverates that the Policy of Non-Exemption in
the payment of annual membership dues suffers from constitutional
infirmities, such as equal protection clause and the due process
clause. He also posits that compulsory payment of the IBP annual
membership dues would indubitably be oppressive to him
considering that he has been in an inactive status and is without
income derived from his law practice. He adds that his removal from
nonpayment of annual membership dues would constitute
deprivation of property right without due process of law. Lastly, he
claims that non-practice of law by a lawyer-member in inactive status
is neither injurious to active law practitioners, to fellow lawyers in
inactive status, nor to the community where the inactive
lawyers-members reside.
Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is entitled
to exemption from payment of his dues during the time that he was
inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was in the Civil Service
from 1962-1986 and he was working abroad from 1986-2003?
We rule in the negative.
An Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar, to which every
lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar association organized
by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary.
Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member
of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his shares in carrying out
the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its
responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an
Integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are
required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules
prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement
of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of
the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional
ethics or professional responsibility, breach of which constitutes
sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause
appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the
offending member.[5]
The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official
unification of the entire lawyer population. This requires
membership and financial support of every attorney as condition sine
qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the
Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.[6]
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with
anyone. He is free to attend or not to attend the meetings of his
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he
chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the
payment of his annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to foster
the States legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional
legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession
in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the
regulatory program the lawyers.[7]
Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits
the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate
rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and in the
integration of the Philippine Bar[8] - which power required members
of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee
toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to
which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is, indeed,
imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for
carrying out the noble objectives and purposes of integration.
The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the
Integration of the Philippine Bar,[9] thus:
For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not
mean that the Court is attempting to levy a tax.
A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation,
while tax purpose of a tax is a revenue. If the judiciary has inherent
power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation,
it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be
possible to put on an integrated Bar program without means to
defray the expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily
carries with it the power to impose such exaction.
The only limitation upon the States power to regulate the privilege of
law is that the regulation does not impose an unconstitutional
burden. The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar
far outweighs the slight inconvenience to a member resulting from
his required payment of the annual dues.
Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of
membership in the IBP, of which no one is exempt. This means that
the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as
ones membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of
practice of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged in.
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption
from payment of membership dues. At most, as correctly observed
by the IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of the Integrated
Bar of his intention to stay abroad before he left. In such case, his
membership in the IBP could have been terminated and his
obligation to pay dues could have been discontinued.
As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the
IBP Board of Governors is in the process of discussing the situation of
members under inactive status and the nonpayment of their dues
during such inactivity. In the meantime, petitioner is duty bound to
comply with his obligation to pay membership dues to the IBP.
Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty
of removal would amount to a deprivation of property without due
process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.
This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty.
Marcial Edillon,[10] in this wise:
. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its
being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession,
we do not here pause to consider at length, as it [is] clear that under
the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers
granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondents
right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and
is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to
impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a
penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be
avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or
arbitrary.

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a

property right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the
inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the
lawyers public responsibilities.

As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in

the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions,[11] one of which is the
payment of membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them
entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such
drastic move.

WHEREFORE, petitioners request for exemption from

payment of IBP dues is DENIED. He is ordered to pay P12,035.00, the
amount assessed by the IBP as membership fees for the years
1977-2005, within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from
receipt of this decision, with a warning that failure to do so will merit
his suspension from the practice of law.

SO ORDERED.
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,
BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.
This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M.
Dacanay for leave to resume the practice of law.
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He
practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek
medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for
Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program.
His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in
May 2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his
Philippine citizenship.1 On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as
a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto,
Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends
to resume his law practice. There is a question, however, whether
petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the
Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004.
Thus, this petition.
In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant
cites Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the
Rules of Court:
SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar.
– Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a
citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good
moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce
before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral
character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude,
have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that,
by virtue of his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in 2006,
petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of the
disqualifications for membership in the bar. It recommends that he
be allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines,
conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind him of his
duties and responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.
We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant
with certain modifications.
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.2 It is so
delicately affected with public interest that it is both a power and a
duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in
order to protect and promote the public welfare.3
Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the
highest degree of morality, faithful observance of the rules of the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the
legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso
education requirement and payment of membership fees to the jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.16
membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the
privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of
conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which
naturalization as a citizen of another country but subsequently
the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his
reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all Philippine
professional privilege.4
citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not
to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA
Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides: 9225]."17Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of
another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine
citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although
SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any person heretofore duly
he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the
admitted as a member of the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in
Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.
accordance with the provisions of this Rule, and who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in
the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to
Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the
its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license
Philippine bar in accordance with the statutory requirements and
or permit to engage in such practice."18 Stated otherwise, before a
who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law.
lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can
resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the
Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of authority to do so, conditioned on:
Court mandates that an applicant for admission to the bar be a
citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues
moral character and a resident of the Philippines.5 He must also
in the IBP;
produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral
character and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude,
have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.6 (b) the payment of professional tax;
Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as (c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory
furnishing satisfactory proof of educational, moral and other continuing legal education; this is specially significant to refresh the
qualifications;7 passing the bar examinations;8 taking the lawyer’s applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and update him
oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving from the clerk of of legal developments and
court of this Court a certificate of the license to practice.10
(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him
The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in good of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the
standing ― is a continuing requirement. This means continued Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the
membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual membership Republic of the Philippines.
dues in the IBP;11 payment of the annual professional
tax;12 compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a
requirement;13 faithful observance of the rules and ethics of the legal
member of the Philippine bar.
profession and being continually subject to judicial disciplinary
control.14
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is
hereby GRANTED, subject to compliance with the conditions stated
Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino
above and submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar
citizenship still practice law in the Philippines? No.
Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a member of the
Philippine bar.
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the
Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases
SO ORDERED.
prescribed by law.15 Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for

IN RE: PETITION RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN
THE PHILIPPINES, EPIFANIO B. MUNESES, Petitioner,
On June 8, 2009, a petition was filed by Epifanio B. Muneses
(petitioner) with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) praying that
he be granted the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.
The petitioner alleged that he became a member of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on March 21, 1966; that he lost his
privilege to practice law when he became a citizen of the United
States of America (USA) on August 28, 1981; that on September 15,
2006, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition
Act of 2003" by taking his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen
before the Philippine Consulate General in Washington, D.C., USA;
that he intends to retire in the Philippines and if granted, to resume
the practice of law. Attached to the petition were several documents
in support of his petition, albeit mere photocopies thereof, to wit:
1. Oath of Allegiance dated September 15,
2006 before Consul General Domingo P.
Nolasco;
The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for 3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
admission to the bar and is, in fact, a continuing requirement for the Philippines;
practice of law. The loss thereof means termination of the
petitioner’s membership in the bar;ipso jure the privilege to engage
4. Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the
in the practice of law. Under R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who
Bureau of Immigration;
have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization
as citizens of a foreign country are deemed to have re-acquired their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the 5. Certificate of Good Standing issued by the
Republic.1 Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another IBP;
country and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A. No.
9225, remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar. However, as 6. Certification from the IBP indicating updated
stated in Dacanay, the right to resume the practice of law is not payments of annual membership dues;
automatic.2 R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who intends to
practice his profession in the Philippines must apply with the proper
authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice.3 7. Proof of payment of professional tax; and
It can not be overstressed that: 8. Certificate of compliance issued by the
MCLE Office.
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with
In compliance thereof, the petitioner submitted the following:
conditions.1âwphi1 It is so delicately affected
with public interest that it is both the power
and duty of the State (through this Court) to 1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;
control and regulate it in order to protect and
promote the public welfare.
2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness,

2. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine
Citizenship of same date;
3. Order for Re-Acquisition of Philippine
Citizenship also of same date;
4. Letter dated March 13, 2008 evidencing
payment of membership dues with the IBP;
5. Attendance Forms from the Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education (MCLE).
In Bar Matter No. 1678, dated December 17, 2007, the Court was
confronted with a similar petition filed by Benjamin M. Dacanay
(Dacanay) who requested leave to resume his practice of law after
availing the benefits of R.A. No. 9225. Dacanay was admitted to the
Philippine Bar in March 1960. In December 1998, he migrated to
Canada to seek medical attention for his ailments and eventually
became a Canadian citizen in May 2004. On July 14, 2006, Dacanay
re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 9225 after
taking his oath of allegiance before the Philippine Consulate General
in Toronto, Canada. He returned to the Philippines and intended to
resume his practice of law.
maintenance of the highest degree of morality,
faithful observance of the legal profession,
compliance with the mandatory continuing
legal education requirement and payment of
membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required
for membership in good standing in the bar
and for enjoying the privilege to practice law.
Any breach by a lawyer of any of these
conditions makes him unworthy of the trust
and confidence which the courts and clients
repose in him for the continued exercise of his
professional privilege.4
Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for
the practice of law, the OBC required the herein petitioner to submit
the original or certified true copies of the following documents in
relation to his petition:
1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine
Citizenship;
2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine
citizenship);
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
4. Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine Citizenship
issued by the Bureau of Immigration, in lieu of the IC;
5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City Chapter
attesting to his good moral character as well as his updated payment
of annual membership dues;
6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010;
7. Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd compliance
period; and
8. Certification dated December 5, 2008 of Atty. Gloria
Estenzo-Ramos, Coordinator, UC-MCLE Program, University of Cebu,
College of Law attesting to his compliance with the MCLE.
The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance,
particularly with the MCLE. After all the requirements were
satisfactorily complied with and finding that the petitioner has met
all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for
membership in the bar, the OBC recommended that the petitioner
be allowed to resume his practice of law.
Upon this favorable recommendation of the OBC, the Court adopts
the same and sees no bar to the petitioner's resumption to the
practice of law in the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Epifanio B. Muneses is
hereby GRANTED, subject to the condition that he shall re-take the
Lawyer's Oath on a date to be set by the Court and subject to the 
payment of appropriate fees.
Furthermore, the Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to draft the
necessary guidelines for the re-acquisition of the privilege to resume
the practice of law for the guidance of the Bench and Bar.
SO ORDERED.
SC allows ‘dual’ law practice
posted November 05, 2014 at 12:01 am by Rey E. Requejo
Filipino lawyers who became naturalized American citizen can again
practice law in the country upon acquiring dual citizenship, according
to the Supreme Court.
In an en banc resolution promulgated September 23, 2014, but
released only this week, the Supreme Court granted the petition of
Marcos Del Rosario to practice his legal profession in the country
after losing his Philippine citizenship by reason of naturalization as
US citizen.
“The Court resolved to allow petitioner Del Rosario to resume
practice of law in the Philippines, subject to the conditions that he
re-takes his lawyer’s oath on a date set by the Court,” the resolution
stated.
The high court also required petition to pay “the appropriate fees,
and (submit) the original or certified true copy of the proof of
payment of the professional tax for 2013.”
The SC cited Article XII, Section 14 of the Constitution, which
provides that “the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall
be limited to Filipino citizens, save in cases prescribed by law.”
Before moving to the US, Del Rosario passed the Philippine Bar
exams after finishing his law degree from the University of the
Philippine in 1995.
He then obtained his Master of Laws in International Business from
Fordham University in New York, NY, U.S.A in 2003 and was admitted
to practice law in the State of New York and the US District Courts for
the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York after becoming a
naturalized American citizen.
Del Rosario filed the petition in the SC, saying he wanted to continue
practicing law in the country.
 IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS MICHAEL A. After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medado’s prayer in acts as “neither willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken belief
MEDADO, Petitioner. the instant petition, subject to the payment of a fine and the and an honest error of judgment.”22cralaw virtualaw library
imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension from the practice of
law. We disagree.
We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys filed
by petitioner Michael A. Medado (Medado).
At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person
of Attorneys would be akin to imposing upon him the ultimate from the legal consequences of his acts23 as it negates malice or evil
Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the
penalty of disbarment, a penalty that we have reserved for the most motive,24 a mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification,
degree of Bachelor of Laws in 19791and passed the same year’s bar
serious ethical transgressions of members of the Bar. because everyone is presumed to know the law and its
examinations with a general weighted average of 82.7.2cralaw
consequences.25 Ignorantia facti excusat; ignorantia legis neminem
virtualaw library
In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted. excusat.
On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the Philippine
For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at
International Convention Center (PICC) together with the successful
character when he finally filed the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll first operated under an honest mistake of fact when he thought that
bar examinees.3 He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on
of Attorneys. We note that it was not a third party who called this what he had signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was
13 May 1980,4 but he failed to do so on his scheduled date, allegedly
Court’s attention to petitioner’s omission; rather, it was Medado already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that
because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of
himself who acknowledged his own lapse, albeit after the passage of what he had signed was merely an attendance record, he could no
Attorneys5 given by the Bar Office when he went home to his
more than 30 years. When asked by the Bar Confidant why it took longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that
province for a vacation.6cralaw virtualaw library
him this long to file the instant petition, Medado very candidly point, Medado should have known that he was not a full-fledged
replied:chanrobles virtua1aw 1ibrary member of the Philippine Bar because of his failure to sign in the Roll
Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files,
Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at of Attorneys, as it was the act of signing therein that would have
Medado found the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. It was then
the time, what can you say? Takot ka kung made him so.26 When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to
that he realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he
anong mangyayari sa ‘yo, you don’t know continue practicing law without taking the necessary steps to
had signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an
what’s gonna happen. At the same time, it’s a complete all the requirements for admission to the Bar, he willfully
attendance record.7cralaw virtualaw library
combination of apprehension and anxiety of engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
what’s gonna happen. And, finally it’s the right
By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He
thing to do. I have to come here … sign the roll Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by one’s
stated that he was mainly doing corporate and taxation work, and
and take the oath as necessary.16 assuming to be an attorney or officer of the court, and acting as such
that he was not actively involved in litigation practice. Thus, he
For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for without authority, may constitute indirect contempt of
operated “under the mistaken belief [that] since he ha[d] already
disqualification from the practice of law,17which is more than what court,27 which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.28 Such
taken the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent,
we can say of other individuals who were successfully admitted as a finding, however, is in the nature of criminal contempt29 and must
nor as crucial to his status as a lawyer”;8 and “the matter of signing in
members of the Philippine Bar. For this Court, this fact demonstrates be reached after the filing of charges and the conduct of
the Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion, and was
that petitioner strove to adhere to the strict requirements of the hearings.30 In this case, while it appears quite clearly that petitioner
subsequently forgotten.”9cralaw virtualaw library
ethics of the profession, and that he has prima facie shown that he committed indirect contempt of court by knowingly engaging in
possesses the character required to be a member of the Philippine unauthorized practice of law, we refrain from making any finding of
In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal
Bar. liability for indirect contempt, as no formal charge pertaining thereto
Education (MCLE) seminars, he was required to provide his roll
has been filed against him.
number in order for his MCLE compliances to be credited.10 Not
Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal
having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his
practitioner, having held various positions at the Laurel Law Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise
roll number.
Office,18 Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine National Oil transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
Company, and the Energy Development Corporation.19cralaw which provides:chanrobles virtua1aw 1ibrary
About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the
virtualaw library CANON 9 – A lawyer shall not, directly or
instant Petition, praying that he be allowed to sign in the Roll of
indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice
Attorneys.11cralaw virtualaw library
All these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a full-fledged of law.
member of the Philippine Bar. While the practice of law is not a right While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory
but a privilege,20 this Court will not unwarrantedly withhold this assisting in the unauthorized practice of law, the unauthorized
conference on the matter on 21 September 201212 and submitted a
privilege from individuals who have shown mental fitness and moral practice of law by the lawyer himself is subsumed under this
Report and Recommendation to this Court on 4 February 2013.13The
fiber to withstand the rigors of the profession. provision, because at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer’s duty to
OBC recommended that the instant petition be denied for
prevent the unauthorized practice of
petitioner’s gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of
That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates. As
merit.14 It explained that, based on his answers during the
from all liability for his years of inaction. aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to comport themselves
clarificatory conference, petitioner could offer no valid justification
in accordance with the ethical standards of the legal profession.
for his negligence in signing in the Roll of Attorneys.15cralaw
Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a
virtualaw library
period spanning more than 30 years, without having signed in the Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9
Roll of Attorneys.21 He justifies this behavior by characterizing his have warranted the penalty of suspension from the practice of
law.31 As Medado is not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we cannot suspend
him from the practice of law. However, we see it fit to impose upon
him a penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of this Resolution. For his
transgression of the prohibition against the unauthorized practice of
law, we likewise see it fit to fine him in the amount of P32,000.
During the one year period, petitioner is warned that he is not
allowed to engage in the practice of law, and is sternly warned that
doing any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in
the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is

hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Michael A. Medado is ALLOWED to sign
in the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after receipt of this Resolution.
Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of P32,000 for his
unauthorized practice of law. During the one year period, petitioner
is NOT ALLOWED to practice law, and is STERNLY WARNEDthat
doing any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in
the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar

Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the
Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

SO ORDERED.
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN L.
RANA, respondent.
The Case
Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess
the requisite moral integrity for membership in the legal profession.
Possession of moral integrity is of greater importance than
possession of legal learning. The practice of law is a privilege
bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar candidate who is morally
unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the bar examinations.
The Facts
Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those
who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass
oath-taking of successful bar examinees as members of the
Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre (complainant) filed
against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the
Bar. Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice of
law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave
misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of
the Bar during the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001 at the
Philippine International Convention Center. However, the Court
ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending
the resolution of the charge against him. Thus, respondent took the
lawyers oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of
Attorneys up to now.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of
law and grave misconduct. Complainant alleges that respondent,
while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the
May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election
Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further
alleges that respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May
2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of
Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading,
respondent represented himself as counsel for and in behalf of Vice
Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan, and signed the pleading as
counsel for George Bunan (Bunan).
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that
respondent is a municipal government employee, being a secretary
of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such,
respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any
court or administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation,
complainant accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice
mayoralty candidate George Bunan (Bunan) without the latter
engaging respondents services. Complainant claims that respondent
filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the
winning vice mayoralty candidate.
On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing
respondent to take the lawyers oath but disallowed him from signing
the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him. In
the same resolution, the Court required respondent to comment on
the complaint against him.
In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his
specific assistance to represent him before the MBEC. Respondent
claims that he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer
but as a person who knows the law. Respondent admits signing the
19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain votes
in the canvassing. He explains, however, that he did not sign the
pleading as a lawyer or represented himself as an attorney in the
pleading.
On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan,
respondent claims that he submitted his resignation on 11 May 2001
which was allegedly accepted on the same date. He submitted a copy
of the Certification of Receipt of Revocable Resignation dated 28
May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon Relox. Respondent further
claims that the complaint is politically motivated considering that
complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate
for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that the
complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and that he be allowed to
sign the Roll of Attorneys.
On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondents
Comment and refuted the claim of respondent that his appearance
before the MBEC was only to extend specific assistance to Bunan.
Complainant alleges that on 19 May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao
(Estipona-Hao) filed a petition for proclamation as the winning
candidate for mayor. Respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao
in this petition. When respondent appeared as counsel before the
MBEC, complainant questioned his appearance on two grounds: (1)
respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was an
employee of the government.
Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondents
Comment) reiterating his claim that the instant administrative case is
motivated mainly by political vendetta.
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of
the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation.
OBCs Report and Recommendation
The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the
MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The minutes
of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent actively participated
in the proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent
appeared in the MBEC proceedings even before he took the lawyers
oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC believes that respondents
misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a
member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that respondents
unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to the
practice of law. The OBC therefore recommends that respondent be
denied admission to the Philippine Bar.
On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to
cite a law which respondent allegedly violated when he appeared as
counsel for Bunan while he was a government employee.
Respondent resigned as secretary and his resignation was accepted.
Likewise, respondent was authorized by Bunan to represent him
before the MBEC.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that
respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus
does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.
Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However,
the records show that respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan
prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent took the lawyers oath. In
the pleading entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the
Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of
Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for
George Bunan. In the first paragraph of the same pleading
respondent stated that he was the (U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in
behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN. Bunan
himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had authorized Atty.
Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him before the MBEC and
similar bodies.
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also
retained respondent as her counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001,
Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been
authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party
and the candidate of the said party. Respondent himself wrote the
MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was entering his appearance as
counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the
REFORMA LM-PPC. On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel
for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before the MBEC praying for
the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for
mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers
oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice of law without
being a member of the Philippine Bar.
 In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,[1] the Court
elucidated that:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases
or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveyancing. In general,
all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law,incorporation services, assessment
and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a
judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a
creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and
conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done
involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal
effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics
supplied) x x x
In Cayetano v. Monsod,[2] the Court held that practice of law
means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application
of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To
engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually
performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice
law is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal
knowledge or skill.
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he
appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various
pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the
charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself
counsel knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar.
Having held himself out as counsel knowing that he had no authority
to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a
member of the Philippine Bar.[3]
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and
took the lawyers oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of
Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that
respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the
bar is not the only qualification to become an
attorney-at-law.[8] Respondent should know that two essential
requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely:
his lawyers oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in
the Roll of Attorneys.[9]
On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that
the law does not allow respondent to act as counsel for a private
client in any court or administrative body since respondent is the
secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the
Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts complained of as constituting
unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001
addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor and presiding officer of
the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated that he was resigning
effective upon your acceptance.[10] Vice-Mayor Relox accepted
respondents resignation effective 11 May 2001.[11] Thus, the
evidence does not support the charge that respondent acted as
counsel for a client while serving as secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation,
evidence shows that Bunan indeed authorized respondent to
represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies.
While there was no misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had
no authority to practice law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission
to the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right

but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with
special qualifications duly ascertained and certified.The exercise of
this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge,
educational attainment, and even public trust[4] since a lawyer is an
officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to
practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of
law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed
the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced
law without a license.[5]

The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably

strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,[6] a candidate passed the bar
examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of
Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for practicing law even
before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized practice of
law is liable for indirect contempt of court.[7]
RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATH
Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in
1993. The Court however deferred his oath-taking due to his
previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.
The criminal case which resulted in petitioner's conviction, arose
from the death of a neophyte during fraternity initiation rites
sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other accused
initially entered pleas of not guilty to homicide charges. The eight (8)
accused later withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment all
pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated
11 February 1993 imposing on each of the accused a sentence of
imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4) months :and one (1) day
to four (4) years.
On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's
application for probation.
On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report
dated 6 April 1994 submitted by the Probation Officer
recommending petitioner's discharge from probation.
On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be
allowed to take the lawyer's oath based on the order of his discharge
from probation.
On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice
Florentino P. Feliciano issued a resolution requiring petitioner Al C.
Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may now be
regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character
imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar.
In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no
less than fifteen (15) certifications/letters executed by among others
two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of
religious orders. Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a
scholarship foundation had been established in honor of Raul
Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts of the latter's
family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal case.
On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty. Gilbert Camaligan,
father of Raul, to comment on petitioner's prayer to be allowed to
take the lawyer's oath.
In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:
a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which
led to the death of his son was deliberate rather than accidental. The
offense therefore was not only homicide but murder since the
accused took advantage of the neophyte's helplessness implying
abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior strength and
treachery.
b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide only out of pity for the
mothers of the accused and a pregnant wife of one of the accused
who went to their house on Christmas day 1991 and Maundy
Thursday 1992, literally on their knees, crying and begging for
forgiveness and compassion. They also told him that the father of
one of the accused had died of a heart attack upon learning of his
son's involvement in the incident.
c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for
the death of his son. However, as a loving father who had lost a son
whom he had hoped would succeed him in his law practice, he still
feels the pain of an untimely demise and the stigma of the gruesome
manner of his death.
d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit
for admission to the bar. He therefore submits the matter to the
sound discretion of the Court.
The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess
the strict intellectual and moral qualifications required of lawyers
who are instruments in the effective and efficient administration of
justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not only to "weed out"
lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the
law but, also of equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking
the lawyer's oath, thereby further tarnishing the public image of
lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than
irreproachable.
The resolution of the issue before us required weighing and
reweighing of the reasons for allowing or disallowing petitioner's
admission to the practice of law. The senseless beatings inflicted
upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident absence of that moral
fitness required for admission to the bar since they were totally
irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled for.
In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:
. . . participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior,
[which] makes impossible a finding that the participant [herein
petitioner] was then possessed of good moral character.聽 1
In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is
prepared to consider 聽 de novo 聽 the question of whether
petitioner has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral
character referred to above.
Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the
sentiment of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan. The death of one's child is, for
a parent, a most traumatic experience. The suffering becomes even
more pronounced and profound in cases where the death is due to
causes other than natural or accidental but due to the reckless
imprudence of third parties. The feeling then becomes a struggle
between grief and anger directed at the cause of death.
Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court- manifesting his having
forgiven the accused is no less than praiseworthy and commendable.
It is exceptional for a parent, given the circumstances in this case, to
find room for forgiveness.
However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to
state if petitioner is now morally fit to be a lawyer.
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow
petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign the
Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following
admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court
recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On
the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout
Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to
atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give him
the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general
tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.
We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere
ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL
TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes
when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves
strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be
faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned.
The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the
assistance he has been giving to his community. As a lawyer he will
now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the
more unfortunate members of society.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby
ALLOWED to take the lawyer's oath on a date to be set by the Court,
to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legal
profession.
SO ORDERED.
B.M. No. 810 January 27, 1998
IN RE: PETITION TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH BY ARTHUR M.
CUEVAS, JR.
Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr., recently passed the 1996 Bar
Examinations 1. His oath-taking was held in abeyance in view of the
Court's resolution dated August 27, 1996 which permitted him to
take the Bar Examinations "subject to the condition that should (he)
pass the same, (he) shall not be allowed to take the lawyer's oath
pending approval of the Court . . ." due to his previous conviction for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide. The conviction stemmed
from petitioner's participation in the initiation rites of the LEX
TALIONIS FRATERNITAS, a fraternity in the SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF
LAW, sometime in September 1991, where Raul I. Camaligan, a
neophyte, died as a result of the personal violence inflicted upon him.
Thereafter, petitioner applied for and was granted probation. On
May 10, 1995, he was discharged from probation and his case
considered closed and terminated.
In this petition, received by the Court on May 5, 1997, petitioner
prays that "he be allowed to take his lawyer's oath at the Court's
most convenient time" 2 attaching thereto the Order dated May 16,
1995 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10 of Antique discharging
him from his probation, and certifications attesting to his righteous,
peaceful and law abiding character issued by: (a) the Mayor of the
Municipality of Hamtic, Antique; (b) the Officer-in-Charge of Hamtic
Police Station; (c) the Sangguniang Kabataan of Pob. III, Hamtic,
through its chairman and officers; (d) a member of the IBP Iloilo
Chapter; (e) the Parish Priest and Vicar General of St. Joseph
Cathedral, San Jose, Antique; and (f) the President of the Parish
Pastoral Council, Parish of Sta. Monica, Hamtic, Antique. On July 15,
1997, the Court, before acting on petitioner's application, resolved to
require Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan, father of the deceased hazing
victim Raul I. Camaligan, to comment thereon. In compliance with
the Court's directive, Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan filed his comment
which states as follows:
1 — He fully appreciates the benign concern given by this Hon. Court
in allowing him to comment to the pending petition of Arthur M.
Cuevas to take the lawyer's oath, and hereby expresses his genuine
gratitude to such gesture.
2 — He conforms completely to the observation of the Hon. Court in
its resolution dated March 19, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 712 that the
infliction of severe physical injuries which approximately led to the
death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan was deliberate (rather than
merely accidental or inadvertent) thus, indicating serious character
flaws on the part of those who inflicted such injuries. This is
consistent with his stand at the outset of the proceedings of the
criminal case against the petitioner and his co-defendants that they Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr.'s discharge from probation without
are liable not only for the crime of homicide but murder, since they any infraction of the attendant conditions therefor and the various
took advantage of the neophytes' helpless and defenseless condition certifications attesting to his righteous, peaceful and civic-oriented
when they were "beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray dog", character prove that he has taken decisive steps to purge himself of
suggesting the presence of abuse of confidence, taking advantage of his deficiency in moral character and atone for the unfortunate
superior strength and treachery (People vs. Gagoco, 58 Phil. 524). death of Raul I. Camaligan. The Court is prepared to give him the
benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of
the youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating. 5 Let it be
3 — He, however, has consented to the accused-students' plea of
stressed to herein petitioner that the lawyer's oath is not a mere
guilty to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting to the
formality recited for a few minutes in the glare of flashing cameras
homicide, including the petitioner, out of pity to their mothers and a
and before the presence of select witnesses. Petitioner is exhorted to
pregnant wife of the accused who went together at his house in
conduct himself beyond reproach at all times and to live strictly
Lucena City, literally kneeling, crying and begging for forgiveness for
according to his oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
their sons, on a Christmas day in 1991 and on Maundy Thursday in
And, to paraphrase Mr. Justice Padilla's comment in the sister case
1992, during which they reported that the father of one of the
of Re: Petition of Al Agrosino To Take Lawyer's Oath, Bar Matter No.
accused died of heart attack upon learning of his son's involvement
712, March 19, 1997, "[t]he Court sincerely hopes that" Mr. Cuevas,
in the case.
Jr., "will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his
community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render
4 — As a Christian, he has forgiven the petitioner and his legal and other services to the more unfortunate members of
co-defendants in the criminal case for the death of his son. But as a society" 6.
loving father, who lost a son in whom he has high hope to become a
good lawyer — to succeed him, he still feels the pain of his untimely
ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby resolved to allow petitioner Arthur
demise, and the stigma of the gruesome manner of taking his life.
M.. Cuevas, Jr., to take the lawyer's oath and to sign the Roll of
This he cannot forget.
Attorneys on a date to be set by the Court, subject to the payment of
appropriate fees. Let this resolution be attached to petitioner's
5 — He is not, right now, in a position to say whether petitioner, personal records in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
since then has become morally fit for admission to the noble
profession of the law. He politely submits this matter to the sound
SO ORDERED.
and judicious discretion of the Hon. Court. 3
At the outset, the Court shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert D.
Camaligan and commiserates with the untimely death of his son.
Nonetheless, Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan admits that "[h]e is not, right
now, in a position to say whether petitioner since then has become
morally fit . . ." and submits petitioner's plea to be admitted to the
noble profession of law to the sound and judicious discretion of the
Court.
The petition before the Court requires the balancing of the reasons
for disallowing or allowing petitioner's admission to the noble
profession of law. His deliberate participation in the senseless
beatings over a helpless neophyte which resulted to the latter's
untimely demise indicates absence of that moral fitness required for
admission to the bar. And as the practice of law is a privilege
extended only to the few who possess the high standards of
intellectual and moral qualifications the Court is duty bound to
prevent the entry of undeserving aspirants, as well as to exclude
those who have been admitted but have become a disgrace to the
profession. The Court, nonetheless, is willing to give petitioner a
chance in the same manner that it recently allowed Al Caparros
Argosino, petitioner's co-accused below, to take the lawyer's oath. 4
RE: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS
ATTY. DANILO DE GUZMAN, Petitioner,
This treats the Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion dated
November 10, 2008 filed by petitioner Danilo de Guzman. He prays
that this Honorable Court "in the exercise of equity and compassion,
grant petitioner’s plea for judicial clemency, and thereupon, order
his reinstatement as a member in good standing of the Philippine
Bar."1
To recall, on February 4, 2004, the Court promulgated a Resolution,
in B.M. No. 1222, the dispositive portion of which reads in part:
WHEREFORE, the Court, acting on the recommendations of the
Investigating Committee, hereby resolves to —
(1) DISBAR Atty. DANILO DE GUZMAN from the practice of law
effective upon his receipt of this RESOLUTION;
xxxx
The subject of the Resolution is the leakage of questions in
Mercantile Law during the 2003 Bar Examinations. Petitioner at that
time was employed as an assistant lawyer in the law firm of Balgos &
Perez, one of whose partners, Marcial Balgos, was the examiner for
Mercantile Law during the said bar examinations. The Court had
adopted the findings of the Investigating Committee, which
identified petitioner as the person who had downloaded the test
questions from the computer of Balgos and faxed them to other
persons.
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) has favorably recommended
the reinstatement of petitioner in the Philippine Bar. In a Report
dated January 6, 2009, the OBC rendered its assessment of the
petition, the relevant portions of which we quote hereunder:
Petitioner narrated that he had labored to become a lawyer to fulfill
his father’s childhood dream to become one. This task was not
particularly easy for him and his family but he willed to endure the
same in order to pay tribute to his parents.
Petitioner added that even at a very young age, he already imposed
upon himself the duty of rendering service to his fellowmen. At 19
years, he started his exposure to public service when he was elected
Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) of Barangay Tuktukan,
Taguig City. During this time, he initiated several projects benefiting
the youth in their barangay.
Thereafter, petitioner focused on his studies, taking up Bachelor of
Arts in Political Science and eventually pursuing Bachelor of Laws. In
his second year in law school, he was elected as the President of the
Student Council of the Institute of Law of the Far Eastern University
(FEU). Here, he spearheaded various activities including the conduct
of seminars for law students as well as the holding of bar operations
for bar examinees.
Despite his many extra-curricular activities as a youth and student
leader, petitioner still managed to excel in his studies. Thus, he was
conferred an Academic Excellence Award upon his graduation in
Bachelor of Laws.
Upon admission to the bar in April 1999, petitioner immediately
entered government service as a Legal Officer assigned at the
Sangguniang Bayan of Taguig. Simultaneously, he also rendered free
legal services to less fortunate residents of Taguig City who were
then in need of legal assistance.
In March 2000, petitioner was hired as one of the Associate Lawyers
at the Balgos and Perez Law Offices. It was during his stay with this
firm when his craft as a lawyer was polished and developed. Despite
having entered private practice, he continued to render free legal
services to his fellow Taguigeños.
Then in February 2004, by a sudden twist of fate, petitioner’s
flourishing career was cut short as he was stripped of his license to
practice law for his alleged involvement in the leakage in the 2003
Bar Examinations.
Devastated, petitioner then practically locked himself inside his
house to avoid the rather unavoidable consequences of his
disbarment.
On March 2004, however, petitioner was given a new lease in life
when he was taken as a consultant by the City Government of Taguig.
Later, he was designated as a member of the Secretariat of the
People’s Law Enforcement Board (PLEB). For the next five (5) years,
petitioner concentrated mainly on rendering public service.
Petitioner humbly acknowledged the damaging impact of his act
which unfortunately, compromised the integrity of the bar
examinations. As could be borne from the records of the
investigation, he cooperated fully in the investigation conducted and
took personal responsibility for his actions. Also, he has offered his
sincerest apologies to Atty. Balgos, to the Court as well as to all the
2003 bar examinees for the unforeseen and unintended effects of his
actions.
Petitioner averred that he has since learned from his mistakes and
has taken the said humbling experience to make him a better person.
Meanwhile, as part of his Petition, petitioner submitted the following
testimonials and endorsements of various individuals and entities all
attesting to his good moral character:
1) Resolution No. 101, Series of 2007, "Resolution Expressing Full
Support to Danilo G. De Guzman in his Application for Judicial
Clemency, Endorsing his Competence and Fitness to be Reinstated as
a Member of the Philippine Bar and for Other Purposes" dated 4
June 2007 of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, City of Taguig;
2) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang
Hukuman ang Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng
Southeast People’s Village Homeowners Association, Inc. (SEPHVOA)
kay Danilo G. De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng
Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa Kanyang
Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang
Abogado" dated 1 June 2007 of the Southeast People’s Village
Homeowners Association, Inc. (SEPHVOA), Ibayo-Tipas, City of
Taguig;
3) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang
Hukuman ang Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng
Samahang Residente ng Mauling Creek, Inc. (SAREMAC) kay G. Danilo
G. De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at
ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa Kanyang Kakayahan Upang
Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado" dated 1
June 2007 of the Samahang Residente ng Mauling Creek, Inc.
(SAREMAC), Lower Bicutan, City of Taguig;
4) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang
Hukuman ang Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng
Samahan ng mga Maralita (PULONG KENDI) Neighborhood
Association, Inc. (SAMANA) kay G. Danilo G. De Guzman sa Kanyang
Petisyong Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong
Pag-susulong sa Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang
mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado" dated 1 June 2007 of the
Samahan ng mga Maralita (PULONG KENDI) Neighborhood
Association, Inc. (SAMANA), Sta. Ana, City of Taguig;
5) "An Open Letter Attesting Personally to the Competence and
Fitness of Danilo G. De Guzman as to Warrant the Grant of Judicial
Clemency and his Reinstatement as Member of the Philippine Bar"
dated 8 June 2007 of Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino, Laogan,
Trespeses and Llantino Law Offices;
6) "Testimonial to the Moral and Spiritual Competence of Danilo G.
De Guzman to be Truly Deserving of Judicial Clemency and
Compassion" dated 5 July 2007 of Rev. Fr. Paul G. Balagtas, Parish
Priest, Archdiocesan Shrine of St. Anne;
7) "Testimonial Letter" dated 18 February 2008 of Atty. Loreto C. Ata,
President, Far Eastern University Law Alumni Association (FEULAA),
Far Eastern University (FEU);
8) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang
Hukuman ang Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng
Samahang Bisig Kamay sa Kaunlaran, Inc. (SABISKA) kay G. Danilo G.
De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at
ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa Kanyang Kakayahan Upang
Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado" dated 8
July 2008 of the Samahang Bisig Kamay sa Kaunlaran, Inc. (SABISKA);
9) Board Resolution No. 02, Series of 2008, "A Resolution Recognizing
the Contributions of Danilo G. De Guzman to the People’s Law
Enforcement Board (PLEB) – Taguig City, Attesting to his Utmost
Dedication and Commitment to the Call of Civic and Social Duty and
for Other Purposes" dated 11 July 2008 of the People’s Law
Enforcement Board (PLEB);
10) "A Personal Appeal for the Grant of Judicial Forgiveness and
Compassion in Favor of Danilo G. De Guzman" dated 14 July 2008 of
Atty. Edwin R. Sandoval, Professor, College of Law, San Sebastian
College – Recoletos;
11) "An Open Letter Personally Attesting to the Moral competence
and Fitness of Danilo G. De Guzman" dated 5 September 2008 of Mr.
Nixon F. Faderog, Deputy Grand [Kn]ight, Knights of Columbus and
President, General Parent-Teacher Association, Taguig National High
School, Lower Bicutan, Taguig City;
12) "Testimonial Letter" dated 5 September 2008 of Atty. Primitivo C.
Cruz, President, Taguig Lawyers League, Inc., Tuktukan, Taguig City;
13) "Testimonial Letter" dated 21 October 2008 of Judge Hilario L.
Laqui, Presiding Judge, Regional Trail Court (RTC), Branch 218,
Quezon City; and
14) "Testimonial Letter" dated 28 October 2008 of Justice Oscar M.
Herrera, former Justice, Court of Appeals and former Dean, Institute
of Law, Far Eastern University (FEU).
Citing the case of In Re: Carlos S. Basa, petitioner pleaded that he be
afforded the same kindness and compassion in order that, like Atty.
Basa, his promising future may not be perpetually foreclosed. In the
said case, the Court had the occasion to say:
Carlos S. Basa is a young man about 29 years of age, admitted to the
bars of California and the Philippine Islands. Recently, he was
charged in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila with the
crime of abduction with consent, was found guilty in a decision
rendered by the Honorable M.V. De Rosario, Judge of First Instance,
and was sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of two years,
eleven months and eleven days of prision correccional. On appeal,
this decision was affirmed in a judgment handed down by the second
division of the Supreme Court.
xxxx
When come next, as we must, to determine the exact action which
should be taken by the court, we do so regretfully and reluctantly.
On the one hand, the violation of the criminal law by the respondent
attorney cannot be lightly passed over. On the other hand, we are
willing to strain the limits of our compassion to the uttermost in
order that so promising a career may not be utterly ruined.
Petitioner promised to commit himself to be more circumspect in his
actions and solemnly pledged to exert all efforts to atone for his
misdeeds.
There may be a reasonable ground to consider the herein Petition.
In the case of Re: Petition of Al Argosino to Take the Lawyer’s Oath
(Bar Matter 712), which may be applied in the instant case, the Court
said:
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow
petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign the
Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following
admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer’s oath, the Court
recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On
the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout
Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts, to
atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give him
the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general
tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.
xxxx
Meanwhile, in the case of Rodolfo M. Bernardo vs. Atty. Ismael F.
Mejia (Administrative Case No. 2984), the Court [in] deciding
whether or not to reinstate Atty. Mejia to the practice of law stated:
The Court will take into consideration the applicant’s character and
standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the
charge/s for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the
disbarment and the time that has elapsed in between the
disbarment and the application for reinstatement.
Petitioner was barely thirty (30) years old and had only been in the
practice of law for five (5) years when he was disbarred from the
practice of law. It is of no doubt that petitioner had a promising
future ahead of him where it not for the decision of the Court
stripping off his license.
Petitioner is also of good moral repute, not only before but likewise,
after his disbarment, as attested to overwhelmingly by his
constituents, colleagues as well as people of known probity in the
community and society.
Way before the petitioner was even admitted to the bar, he had
already manifested his intense desire to render public service as
evidenced by his active involvement and participation in several
social and civic projects and activities. Likewise, even during and
after his disbarment, which could be perceived by some as a
debilitating circumstance, petitioner still managed to continue
extending his assistance to others in whatever means possible. This
only proves petitioner’s strength of character and positive moral
fiber.
However, still, it is of no question that petitioner’s act in copying the
examination questions from Atty. Balgos’ computer without the
latter’s knowledge and consent, and which questions later turned
out to be the bar examinations questions in Mercantile Law in the
2003 Bar Examinations, is not at all commendable. While we do
believe that petitioner sincerely did not intend to cause the damage
that his action ensued, still, he must be sanctioned for unduly
compromising the integrity of the bar examinations as well as of this
Court.
We are convinced, however, that petitioner has since reformed and
has sincerely reflected on his transgressions. Thus, in view of the
circumstances and likewise for humanitarian considerations, the
penalty of disbarment may now be commuted to suspension.
Considering the fact, however, that petitioner had already been
disbarred for more than five (5) years, the same may be considered
as proper service of said commuted penalty and thus, may now be
allowed to resume practice of law.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is respectfully
recommended that the instant Petition for Judicial Clemency and
Compassion dated 10 November 2008 of petitioner DANILO G. DE
GUZMAN be GRANTED. Petitioner’s disbarment is now commuted to
suspension, which suspension is considered as served in view of the
petitioner’s five (5) year disbarment. Hence, petitioner may now be
allowed to resume practice of law.
The recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant is well-taken
in part.1avvphi1.zw+ We deem petitioner worthy of clemency to the
extent of commuting his penalty to seven (7) years suspension from
the practice of law, inclusive of the five (5) years he has already positive impact on society at large since the unfortunate events of
served his disbarment. 2003.

Penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to
correct offenders.2 While the Court is ever mindful of its duty to
discipline its erring officers, it also knows how to show compassion
when the penalty imposed has already served its purpose.3
In cases where we have deigned to lift or commute the supreme
penalty of disbarment imposed on the lawyer, we have taken into
account the remorse of the disbarred lawyer4 and the conduct of his
public life during his years outside of the bar.5 For example, in
Valencia v. Antiniw, we held:
However, the record shows that the long period of respondent's
disbarment gave him the chance to purge himself of his misconduct,
to show his remorse and repentance, and to demonstrate his
willingness and capacity to live up once again to the exacting
standards of conduct demanded of every member of the bar and
officer of the court. During respondent's disbarment for more than
fifteen (15) years to date for his professional infraction, he has been
persistent in reiterating his apologies and pleas for reinstatement to
the practice of law and unrelenting in his efforts to show that he has
regained his worthiness to practice law, by his civic and humanitarian
activities and unblemished record as an elected public servant, as
attested to by numerous civic and professional organizations,
government institutions, public officials and members of the
judiciary.6
Petitioner’s subsequent track record in public service affords the
Court some hope that if he were to reacquire membership in the
Philippine bar, his achievements as a lawyer would redound to the
general good and more than mitigate the stain on his record.
Compassion to the petitioner is warranted. Nonetheless, we wish to
impart to him the following stern warning:
"Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to
uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in
the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them
underfoot and to ignore the very bands of society, argues recreancy
to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the
insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic."8
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Judicial
Clemency and Compassion is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The
disbarment of DANILO G. DE GUZMAN from the practice of law is
hereby COMMUTED to SEVEN (7) YEARS SUSPENSION FROM THE
PRACTICE OF LAW, reckoned from February 4, 2004.
SO ORDERED.

And in Bernardo v. Atty. Mejia,7 we noted:

Although the Court does not lightly take the bases for Mejia’s
disbarment, it also cannot close its eyes to the fact that Mejia is
already of advanced years. While the age of the petitioner and the
length of time during which he has endured the ignominy of
disbarment are not the sole measure in allowing a petition for
reinstatement, the Court takes cognizance of the rehabilitation of
Mejia. Since his disbarment in 1992, no other transgression has been
attributed to him, and he has shown remorse. Obviously, he has
learned his lesson from this experience, and his punishment has
lasted long enough. x x x

Petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated the remorse expected of

him considering the gravity of his transgressions. Even more to his
favor, petitioner has redirected focus since his disbarment towards
public service, particularly with the People’s Law Enforcement Board.
The attestations submitted by his peers in the community and other
esteemed members of the legal profession, such as retired Court of
Appeals Associate Justice Oscar Herrera, Judge Hilario Laqui,
Professor Edwin Sandoval and Atty. Lorenzo Ata, and the
ecclesiastical community such as Rev. Fr. Paul Balagtas testify to his
RE: 1999 BAR EXAMINATIONS,
MARK ANTHONY A. PURISIMA, petitioner.
Petitioner was conditionally admitted to take the 1999 Bar
Examinations. Like many others he was directed "to submit the
required certification of completion of the pre-bar review course
within sixty (60) days from the last day of the examinations."
Petitioner passed the 1999 Examinations. But in a Resolution dated
13 April 2000 the Court disqualified him from becoming a member of
the Philippine Bar and declared his examinations null and void on
two (2) grounds: (a) Petitioner failed to submit the required
certificate of completion of the pre-bar review course under oath for
his conditional admission to the 1999 Bar Examinations; and (b) He
committed a serious act of dishonesty which rendered him unfit to
become a member of the Philippine Bar when he made it appear in
his Petition to Take the 1999 Bar Examinations that he took his
pre-bar review course at the Philippine Law School (PLS) when, as
certified by Acting Registrar Rasalie G. Kapauan, PLS had not offered
such course since 1967.
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the 13 April 2000
Resolution but his motion was denied.
On 29 October 2001, retired Regional Trial Court Judge Amante P.
Purisima, father of petitioner, filed a Petition to Reopen Bar Matter
986. However, the Court in its Resolution of 27 November 2001
"noted without action" the said petition and further resolved "that
no further pleadings will be entertained."
On 2 July 2002 petitioner filed a Motion for Due Process stating,
among others, his reasons why in his Petition to Take the 1999 Bar
Examinations it was stated that he was enrolled in and regularly
attending the pre-bar review course at the PLS and not at the
University of Santo Tomas (UST) where he in fact took the said
course as evidenced by the Certification dated 22 July 1999 of Dean
Amado L. Damayuga of the UST Faculty of Civil Law.
Petitioner claimed that the statement in paragraph 8 of his Petition
that "he x x x enrolled in and passed the regular fourth year (law)
review classes at the Phil. Law School x x x x" was a "self-evident
clerical error and a mere result of an oversight which is not
tantamount to a deliberate and willful declaration of a falsehood."
Petitioner explained that upon obtaining a "ready-made form" of the
Petition and affixing his signature on the space provided therefor, he
requested his schoolmate/friend Ms. Lilian A. Felipe to fill up the
form, have it notarized and then to file it for him with the Office of
the Bar Confidant (OBC). Being "consumed with his preparations for
the upcoming bar examinations," petitioner admitted that he did not
have the opportunity to check the veracity of the information
supplied by Ms. Felipe. Had he done this he could have readily seen
that Ms. Felipe had erroneously typed "Philippine Law School,"
instead of UST, on the space provided for the school where
petitioner attended his pre-bar review course.
Petitioner further averred that on 26 July 1999, a week after the
filing of the Petition to take the bar, he (thru Ms. Felipe) submitted
the Certification of Completion of the Pre-Bar Review as Annex "D"
of his Petition to prove that he actually enrolled and attended the
pre-bar review course in UST.
To corroborate his enrollment in UST, petitioner submitted (a) the
Official Receipt of his payment of tuition fee for the course; (b) his
identification card for the course; (c) car pass to the UST campus; (d)
individual affidavits of classmates in the pre-bar review course in UST
that petitioner was their classmate and that he attended the review
course; (e) separate affidavits of five (5) UST students/acquaintances
of petitioner that they saw him regularly attending the review
lectures; (f) affidavit of Professor Abelardo T. Domondon attesting to
the attendance of petitioner in his review classes and lectures in
Taxation and Bar Review Methods at the UST Faculty of Civil Law; (g)
affidavit of Ms. Gloria L. Fernandez, maintenance staff at the UST
Law Department that she knew petitioner very well as he was among
those who would arrive early and request her to open the reading
area and turn on the airconditioning before classes started; and, (h)
affidavit of Ms. Melicia Jane Parena, office clerk at the UST Faculty
Civil Law, that Dean Dimayuga issued the Certification dated 22 July
1999 to the effect that petitioner was officially enrolled in and had
completed the pre-bar review course in UST which started on 14
April 1999 and ended 24 September 1999.
Petitioner also explained that he did not submit the required
certification of completion of the pre-bar review course within sixty
(60) days from the last day of the examinations because he thought
that it was already unnecessary in view of the Certification of
Completion (Annex "D" of his Petition) issued by Dean Dimayuga
which not only attested to his enrollment in UST but also his
completion of the pre-bar review course.
In a letter dated 17 September 2002, addressed to Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., thru Senior Associate Justice Josue N. Bellosillo,
who took over as Chairman of the 1995 Committee on Bar
Examinations, retired Judge Purisima expressed his concern for his
son and stated that his son took the pre-bar review course in UST
and that he entry in his son’s Petition that he took it in PLS is a
"self-evident clerical error." He then poised the question that if there
was really a falsehood and forgery in paragraph 8 and Annex "D" of
the Petition, which would have been a fatal defect, why then was his
son issued permit to take the 1999 Bar examinations?
Pursuant to the Court Resolution of 1 October 2002, the OBC
conducted a summary hearing on 30 October 2002 during which the
Bar Confidant asked clarificatory questions from petitioner who
appeared together with his father, retired Judge Purisima, and Ms.
Lilian Felipe.
On 7 November 2002 the OBC submitted its Report and
Recommendation the pertinent portions of which are quoted
hereunder:
"Considering petitioner’s explanation fortified by unquestionably
genuine documents in support thereof, we respectfully submit that
petitioner should be given the benefit of the doubt.
The Resolution of the Court dated April 2, 2002, in Bar Matter 890,
may be cited. In the said case, Victor Rey T. Gingoyon was given the
benefit of the doubt and allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath.
In said case, Mr. Gingoyon stated in his Petition to take the 1998 Bar
that the charge of Grave Threats (Criminal Case No. 9693) against
him was still pending before the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities,
Mandaue City, Branch 3, when in fact, in the decision of MTC dated
April 8, 1998, he was already convicted. But the Court believed his
explanation that he had no actual knowledge of his conviction.
In allowing Mr. Gingoyon to take the Lawyer’s Oath, the Court stated,
thus:
‘It had been two (2) years past since he first filed the petition to take
the lawyer’s oath. Hopefully, this period of time of being deprived
the privilege had been long enough for him to do some
introspection.’
In his letter, petitioner’s father also pleaded that the three (3) years
denial of his son’s request for oath-taking should be enough penalty,
if there may be any wrong that his son may have unwittingly
committed.
It is submitted that the same kindness and compassion extended to
Mr. Gingoyon in Bar Matter 890 be given to petitioner. Three years
deprivation of the privilege to practice law may be considered an
ample penalty, not to mention that petitioner has not been
convicted of any crime.
As regards petitioner’s failure to submit within sixty days the
required certification of completion of the pre-bar review course, his
explanation that there was no need for him to submit another
certification because the July 22, 1999 Certification of Dean
Dimayuga certified not only his enrollment but also his completion of
the course, is impressed with truth.
Let it be also noted that, in the Resolution dated April 13, 2000, in
this Bar Matter 986, the Court declared DISQUALIFIED from the 1999
Bar examinations not only Purisima but also Josenio Marquez Reoma,
Ma. Salvacion Sucgang Revilla and Victor Estell Tesorero for their
failure to submit within sixty days from the last day of the
examinations the certification of completion of the pre-bar review
course. However, the Court, in its Resolution dated June 20, 2000,
acting on the separate motions for reconsideration of the Court
Resolution dated April 13, 2000 filed by Reoma and Revilla, both
were allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath.
In the case of Reoma, his explanation that his failure to submit the
required certification was due to his honest belief and assumption
that the UP College of Law, where he took his review course, had
filed the required certification together with other required
documents, was accepted.
In the case of Revilla, her claim that her failure to submit the
required certification within the 60-day period was due to her
erroneous impression that only the certification of enrollment and
attendance was arequired, was likewise accepted.
The Court also allowed Mr. Tesorero to take his oath, as he stated
that his f ailure to submit within the 60-day period was due to his
honest and mistaken belief that he had substantially complied with
the requirements for admission to the Bar Examinations because he
thought that the required certificate of compleltition of the pre-bar
review course is the same as the certificate of enrollment and
attendance in the said course.
The OBS respectfully submits that pertitioner’s explanation should
also be given credit just like his three co-examinees.
Let it be finally cited that in Bar Matter No. 832, in the Matter of
Admission to the Bar of Blas Antonio M. Tuliao, the Court also
favorably considered the report of the Committee on Legal Education
which recommended the admission to the Bar of Mr. Tuliao on
grounds of fairness, equal treatment and protection, considering that
his co-accused in a criminal case have been allowed to take the
lawyer’s oath. This Court stated, in its Resolution dated November 27,
2001, that there was no reason to accord a different treatment to Mr.
Tuliao, and that the dispensation of justice should be even-handed
and consistent."
The recommendation is well taken.
The foremost question to be resolved is whether petitioner did enrol
in and complete his pre-bar review course in UST as he herein avows.
The testimony of petitioner and Ms. Felipe during the 30 October
2002 hearing that the subject Certification of Dean Dimayuga was
duly submitted to the OBC a week after the filing of the Petition to November 2002, the prayer in Bar Matters Nos. 979 and 986 is
take the bar appears to be credible. It is supported by documentary granted and examinee MARK ANTHONY A. PURISIMA who passed the
evidence showing that petitioner actually enrolled and completed 1999 Bar Examinations is now allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath and
the required course in UST. be admitted to the Philippine Bar. He is further allowed to sign the
Roll of Attorneys upon payment of the required fees.
Granting that the Certification of Dean Dimayuga was defective as it
certified completion of the pre-bar review course which was still SO ORDERED.
on-going, this defect should not be attributed to petitioner
considering that he had no participation in the preparation thereof.
Whatever it is, the fact remains that there is such a certification
issued by the UST which appears to be genuine. This finding is
backed by the affidavit of Ms. Parena, office clerk at the UST Faculty
of Civil Law, that she was the one who released the Certification to
petitioner on 26 July 1999.
Indeed, it must be stressed that there is nothing on record which
impugns the authenticity of the subject Certification as well as that
of the other documentary evidence proferred by petitioner to
establish that he was duly enrolled and took the pre-bar review
course in UST, not in PLS. As to the argument that the Certification of
Dean Dimayuga did not include the "taking and completion" of the
pre-bar review course, the realities of our bar reviews render it
difficult to record the attendance religiously of the reviewees every
single day for several months.
Considering petitioner’s explanation, fortified by undisputedly
genuine documents, at the very least, petitioner should be given the
benefit of the doubt and be allowed to take his oath.
The Court is well aware of instances in the past when ,as a measure
of compassion and kindness, it has acted favorably on similar
petitions. In his letter petitioner’s father pleaded that "the denial of
permission for Mark to take his oath for about three (3) years now
should be enough penalty." It is time to move on.
At this juncture it may be well to note the Court’s growing concern
over the apparent laxity of law schools in the conduct of their
pre-bar review classes. Specifically, it has been observed that the
attendance of reviewees is not closely monitored, such that some
reviewees are able to comply with the requisite with minimal
attendance. Enrollment and completion of pre-bar review course is
an additional requirement under Rule 138 of the Rules of Court for
those who failed the bar examinations for three (3) or more times.
For the Court to insist on strict compliance may be literally asking for
the moon but it can be done. We just have to bear in mind that this
requirement is not an empty or idle ceremony; it is intended to
ensure the quality and preparedness of those applying for admission
to the bar.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, as recommended by the Office of
the Bar Confidant in its Report and Recommendation dated 7
GERARD A. MOSQUERA, petitioner, vs. HON. DELIA H.
PANGANIBAN, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 64, City of Makati, Metro Manila,
HON.FELICIDAD Y. NAVARRO-QUIAMBAO, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 65, City of
Makati, Metro Manila, and MARK F. JALANDONI, respondents.
This is a petition for review on certiorari of orders dated June
9, 1995 and July 19, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
(Branch 64) sustaining an order of the Metropolitan Trial Court
(Branch 65) for the reinstatement of the information for less serious
physical injuries against petitioner Gerard S. Mosquera, which the
MeTC had previously allowed to be withdrawn by the
prosecution. The reinstatement of the case was made on motion of
the offended party.
The prosecution in the MeTC arose out of a physical encounter
between petitioner and private respondent Mark E. Jalandoni within
the premises of the Ateneo Law School on June 21, 1993. Petitioner
is a graduate of the law school and a member of a fraternity in that
school. On the other hand, private respondent was then a third-year
student enrolled in the law school.There is considerable dispute how
the fight took place. Petitioners version was that he had gone to the
law school and happened to meet respondent Jalandoni. Because
Jalandoni had a previous altercation with another member of
petitioners fraternity, petitioner tried to talk to Jalandoni, but the
latter reacted belligerently and the two had a fight. On the other
hand, Jalandoni claimed that petitioner and members of petitioners
fraternity simply attacked him upon seeing him, for a remark which
they claimed he (Jalandoni) had made, which caused a female
student to cry. The female student was a friend of one of the
fraternity members.
Be that as it may, as a result of the scuffle, a criminal
complaint for frustrated homicide was filed by private respondent
against petitioner and five others, namely, Gavino R. Meneses, Jr.,
Ronald B. Almeida, Alfredo B. Lagamon, Jr., Walter S. Ong, and Jayme
A. Sy, Jr., before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal.
After the usual preliminary investigation, Second Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Herminio T. Ubana, Sr. recommended the filing
of an information for less serious physical injuries against petitioner,
Gavino R. Meneses, Jr., Ronald B. Almeida and Alfredo B. Lagamon, Jr.
and the dismissal of the charges against Walter S. Ong and Jayme Sy,
Jr. The recommendation was approved by Rizal Provincial Prosecutor
Mauro M. Castro on January 10, 1994.
Accordingly, an information for less serious physical injuries
was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila
on January 17, 1994 against petitioner and Gavino R. Meneses, Jr.,
Ronaldo B. Almeida and Alfredo B. Lagamon, Jr. The case, docketed
as Criminal Case No. 147366, was assigned to Branch 65 of the MeTC
and tried in accordance with the Rule on Summary Procedure. The
arraignment was set on July 29, 1994, at 8:30 A.M., but petitioner
filed a motion before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for the
reconsideration of the resolution finding probable cause against
him. As his motion was denied by the Provincial Prosecutor,
petitioner appealed to the Department of Justice which, on July 20,
1994, directed the Provincial Prosecutor to withdraw the
information.
Accordingly, Second Assistant Prosecutor Benjamin R. Bautista
filed a motion to withdraw the information in Criminal Case No.
147366. Private respondent in turn moved for reconsideration of the
resolution of the Department of Justice but his motion was denied.
In its order dated October 13, 1994,[1] the MeTC, presided
over by respondent Judge Felicidad Y. Navarro-Quiambao, granted
the motion of the prosecution and considered the information
against petitioner withdrawn. The MeTC stated in its order:
Considering the time limit given by the Court to said counsel in
the order dated August 15, 1994 within which to pursue the motion
for reconsideration [of DOJ Resolution No. 525, Series of 1994] and
without said counsel having informed this Court of the outcome of
the same,[2] it can safely be concluded that private counsel had lost
interest to further prosecute the case. Moreover, Atty. Valdez acting
as private counsel in the prosecution of the instant criminal case is
under the direct control and supervision of the Trial Fiscal, who by
virtue of the Department of Justice resolution was impliedly ordered
to desist from prosecuting the case for lack of probable cause. In
view thereof, the Court is of the opinion that the motion of the Trial
Fiscal should be accorded weight and significance, as it was premised
on the findings that the filing of the information in question has no
legal basis.
On motion of private respondent, however, the MeTC
reconsidered its order. In its order dated December 29, 1994, the
MeTC said:[3]
After carefully weighing the arguments of the parties in
support of their respective claims, the Court believes that the weight
of the evidence and the jurisprudence on the matter which is now
presented for resolution heavily leaned in favor of complainants
contention. As held in the cases recently decided by the Hon.
Supreme Court, once a case is filed in Court, the latter acquires
complete jurisdiction over the same without regard to technicalities
and personal beliefs.
That while there is merit in the accused Gerard A. Mosqueras
claim that the institution of a criminal action depends upon the
sound discretion of the Fiscal who may or may not file the complaint
or information, when in his opinion the evidence is insufficient to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the
same is true only when the case is not in Court yet because after the
case is already forwarded, raffled and assigned to a particular branch
the Public Prosecutor loses control over the case.
It required the parties to appear before it on January 20, 1995,
at 9:00 A.M.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was
denied.[4] In its order, dated April 24, 1995, the MeTC also set the
arraignment of petitioner and Meneses, Jr. on May 19, 1995.
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in
the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The case, docketed as Special Civil
Case No. 95-718, was assigned to Branch 65, presided over by
respondent Judge Delia H. Panganiban.
Initially the RTC issued a temporary restraining order but, on
June 9, 1995,[5] it denied petitioners application for preliminary
injunction. The RTC upheld the reinstatement of the information
against petitioner and the other accused. With its denial of injunction
the RTC considered the petition for certiorari and prohibition as
having been rendered moot and academic.Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration which the RTC denied in its order of July 19,
1995.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari and for an order:
a. Reversing the Orders dated 09 June 1995 and 19 July
1995 (cf. Annexes A and B) issued by respondent
Judge Panganiban;
b. Setting aside, as null and void, the Orders dated 29
December 1994 and 24 April 1995 (cf. Annexes R
and T) issued by respondent Judge Quiambao;
c. Making the preliminary injunction final;
d. Prohibiting respondent Judge Quiambao from trying
and hearing Criminal Case No. 147366; and
e. Declaring the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 147366
as final and executory in accordance with the Order
dated 13 October 1994 issued by respondent Judge
Quiambao.
Petitioners contention is that, because the direction and
control of criminal prosecutions are vested in the public prosecutor,
the motion for reconsideration of the order of October 13, 1994,
which the private prosecutor filed without the conformity by the
public prosecutor, was a nullity and did not prevent the order of
dismissal from becoming final. Consequently, the MeTC gravely
abused its discretion in afterward reinstating the information.
Undoubtedly private respondent, as complainant, has an
interest in the maintenance of the criminal prosecution. The right of
offended parties to appeal an order of the trial court which deprives
them of due process has always been recognized, the only limitation
being that they cannot appeal any adverse ruling if to do so would
place the accused in double jeopardy.[6]We recently had occasion to
reiterate this rule in Martinez v. Court of Appeals,[7] where, through
the Chief Justice, we held:
Under Section 2, Rule 122 of the 1988 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the right to appeal from a final judgment or order in a
criminal case is granted to any party, except when the accused is
placed thereby in double jeopardy.
In People v. Guido, [57 Phil. 52 (1932)] this Court ruled that the
word party must be understood to mean not only the government
and the accused, but also other persons who may be affected by the
judgment rendered in the criminal proceeding. Thus, the party
injured by the crime has been held to have the right to appeal from a
resolution of the court which is derogatory to his right to demand
civil liability arising from the offense. The right of the offended party
to file a special civil action of prohibition and certiorari from an
[interlocutory] order rendered in a criminal case was likewise
recognized in the cases of Paredes v. Gopengco [29 SCRA 688 (1969)]
and People v. Calo, Jr., [186 SCRA 620 (1990)] which held that
offended parties in criminal cases have sufficient interest and
personality as person(s) aggrieved to file the special civil action of
prohibition and certiorari under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 in line
with the underlying spirit of the liberal construction of the Rules of
Court in order to promote their object. . . .
Petitioner cites the following statement in Cabral v. Puno[8] in
support of his contention that private respondent has no personality
to file the motion in question:
While it is true that the offended party, Silvino San Diego,
through the private prosecutor, filed a motion for reconsideration
within the reglementary fifteen-day period, such move did not stop
the running of the period for appeal [from the order of dismissal of
the information]. He did not have the legal personality to appeal or
file the motion for reconsideration on his behalf.The prosecution in a
criminal case through the private prosecutor is under the direction
and control of the Fiscal, and only the motion for reconsideration or
appeal filed by the Fiscal could have interrupted the period for
appeal.
The case of Cabral, however, differs materially from this
case. In Cabral, the offended party had lost his right to intervene
because prior to the filing of the criminal case, he had instituted a
civil action arising from the same act subject of the criminal case. On
the other hand, in the case at bar, the right of private respondent to
intervene in the criminal prosecution is well nigh beyond question as
he had neither instituted a separate civil action nor reserved or
waived the right to do so.[9]
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that private respondent
has the legal personality to file the motion for reconsideration in the
trial court.
Beyond the personality of the private respondent to seek a
reconsideration of the order of dismissal of the MeTC, the central
issue in this case is whether in ordering the reinstatement of the
information, the MeTC acted with grave abuse of discretion.
The MeTC invoked its authority under Crespo v. Mogul[10] to
approve the withdrawal of informations after they have been filed in
court, thus:
[O]nce a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of
the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused
rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains
the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even
while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on
the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do
with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its
exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case
filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the
option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done
before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion
was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instruction of the Secretary
of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.
Petitioner argues that by its order of October 13, 1994, the
MeTC already exercised its authority under the Mogul doctrine to
grant or deny the public prosecutors motion to withdraw the
information and was thereafter precluded from changing its mind in
absence of a motion for reconsideration filed by the public
prosecutor.
This argument is untenable. The court could have denied the
public prosecutors motion for the withdrawal of the information
against petitioner, and there would have been no question of its
power to do so. If it could do that, so could it reconsider what it had
ordered. Every court has the power and indeed the duty to review
and amend or reverse its findings and conclusions when its attention
is timely called to any error or defect therein.[11] In this case, the
motion for reconsideration was timely filed by the private prosecutor
who, as already discussed, has the legal personality to do so.
Indeed, the MeTC must have realized that it had surrendered
its exclusive prerogative regarding the withdrawal of informations by
accepting public prosecutors say-so that the prosecution had no
basis to prosecute petitioner.[12] Its order of October 13, 1994 was
based mainly on its notion that the motion of the Trial Fiscal should
be accorded weight and significance as it was premised on the
findings [of the Department of Justice] that the filing of the
information in question has no legal basis.
This certainly was not the exercise of discretion. As we said
in Martinez, whether to approve or disapprove the stand taken by
the prosecution is not the exercise of discretion required in cases like
this [under the Mogul ruling] . . . What was imperatively required
was the trial judges own assessment of such evidence, it not being
sufficient for the valid and proper exercise of judicial discretion
merely to accept the prosecutions word for its supposed
insufficiency.[13]
Unfortunately, just as in allowing the withdrawal of the
information by the public prosecutor, the MeTC did not make an
independent evaluation of the evidence, neither did it do so in
granting the private prosecutors motion for reconsideration. In its
order dated December 29, 1994, the MeTC simply stated that it was
reinstating the case against petitioner because [a]fter carefully
weighing the arguments of the parties in support of their respective
claims, the Court believes that the weight of the evidence and the
jurisprudence on the matter which is now presented for resolution
heavily leaned in favor of complainants contention and that after a
case has already been forwarded, raffled, and assigned to a
particular branch, the Public Prosecutor loses control over the case.
The order contains no evaluation of the parties evidence for the
purpose of determining whether there was probable cause to
proceed against petitioner. The statement that the weight of
evidence . . . lean[s] heavily in favor of complainants [Jalandonis]
contention is nothing but the statement of a conclusion.
Nor could the MeTC rest its judgment solely on its authority
under the Mogul doctrine to have the last word on whether an
information should be withdrawn. The question in this case is not so
much whether the MeTC has the authority to grant or not to grant
the public prosecutors motion to withdraw the information it
does but whether in the exercise of that discretion or authority it
acted justly and fairly. In this case, the MeTC did not have good
reason stated in its order for the reinstatement of the information
against petitioner, just as it did not have good reason for granting the
withdrawal of the information.
The matter should therefore be remanded to the MeTC so
that it can make an independent evaluation of the evidence of the
prosecution and on that basis decide whether to grant or not to
grant the withdrawal of the information against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the orders dated June 9, 1995 and July 19, 1995
of the Regional Trial Court are REVERSED and the orders of October
13, 1994 and December 29, 1994 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 65 are SET ASIDE and the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Makati is ORDERED within ten (10) days from receipt of this decision
to RESOLVE the public prosecutors motion to withdraw the
information in Criminal Case No. 147366, stating in its order clearly
the reason or reasons for its resolution, after due consideration of
the evidence of the parties.
SO ORDERED.
Antonio Carpio: The man on the bench
'The most important qualification of a judge is independence, not
brilliance,' Justice Antonio Carpio had told a former associate, and
that explains his actuations in the Supreme Court
(Newsbreak wrote this profile on Supreme Court Associate Justice
Antonio T Carpio in a Dec 4, 2006 issue. We are republishing it now
as Carpio, being the most senior justice in the High Tribunal,
becomes acting chief justice, following the removal of Renato Corona.
A PDF version of the story as published on Newsbreak is embedded
below.)
MANILA, Philippines - “Let us not…delude ourselves into believing
that a new constitution would immediately eradicate the ills that
plague our country. Nor can we expect that tinkering with the
constitution will totally purge it of its defects and make this nation
great again…. One thing we cannot afford to overlook nor
downgrade is the importance of the human element. A basically
workable constitution or law can become defective in the hands of
enthroned rascals, as we are now experiencing,” wrote Antonio Tirol
Carpio.
No, this was not written recently but was penned by him when he
was a 20-year-old senior economics student of the Ateneo de Manila
University in 1969. Published in The Guidon, of which Carpio was
then editor in chief, the piece mirrored tumultuous times.
Before graduating in 1970, Carpio wrote in his last editorial about the
seeming inevitability of a revolution, given the pervasive and severe
inequity prevailing at the time. Yet he lamented the fragmentation of
revolutionary forces and their inability to overhaul the system. “A
revolution is something that cannot be left to accident. It has to be a
deliberate and organized action.”
NO TO REVOLUTION. Carpio during his younger days at the Ateneo
A son of the First Quarter Storm, the first months of 1970 that were
marked by massive student protests against Ferdinand Marcos’s rule,
Carpio would become Supreme Court (SC) justice 31 years later on
Oct 22, 2001, and at 52, be the youngest appointee at that by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
Today, he’s caught in the vortex of public opinion because of his
biting language in his ponencia on people’s initiative. But
Carpio—according to those who know him—is just being consistent.
His decision on Charter amendments via what appears to be a rushed
and personal-agenda-driven people’s initiative is not radically
different from his early views as a young student leader, they say.
The repressive Marcos years which he saw and experienced as a law
student at the University of the Philippines from 1970 to 1975
shaped and left a deep imprint on him. After all, Edgar Jopson and
Eman Lacaba, student activists during Carpio’s time, were among the
Ateneo batchmates whom he lost to the “revolution.”
At UP, radicalism was predominant among students who organized
and joined often violent demonstrations against the Marcos regime.
Although student organizations were not recognized then,
fraternities became an outlet of rage and violence, and Carpio, as
head of the Sigma Rho fraternity during his time, got caught in the
tides.
Dad's advice
Sigma Rhoans entangled with rival Alpha Phi Betans who, at the time,
were headed by Oscar Orbos, who would later become congressman
and then governor of Pangasinan. The ensuing rumble resulted in
casualties on both sides and, following command responsibility,
fraternity leaders Orbos and Carpio were suspended from law school
for a year. Orbos managed to have his suspension reduced to one
semester, however, and graduated on time in 1975.
Carpio, who was a year ahead of Orbos and was in third year when
the rumble erupted, ended up graduating in 1975 instead of 1974.
“This was part of the adventure of growing up,” says an Alpha Phi
Beta member who recalls events that happened at the time.
It was in UP, too, that Carpio was introduced by former beauty
queen and later activist Nelia Sancho to his future wife, Vietnamese
Ruth Nguyen, with whom he would have two children, now both
college graduates.
“It was useless to be a lawyer then,” Carpio told people he knew
before he was appointed to the SC, but he nevertheless pursued his
law studies “because his father wanted him to.” His father Bernardo
Carpio, who was former regional director of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue in Davao, wanted his youngest to be a lawyer like him.
When martial law was declared in 1972, Carpio was in his second
year in law school and like most law students, was reading the SC
decision on the case of “Javellana vs Executive Secretary,” of then
Alejandro Melchor. In that case, the High Court ruled that the 1973
Constitution drafted by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was
ratified in accordance with the 1935 Constitution.
What made the decision controversial at the time was the
declaration of martial law in the middle of the convention in 1972
and the absence of real debates on the draft Constitution that
Marcos wanted the people to ratify through a plebiscite.
“It was a decision issued under the gun of the martial law regime,”
Carpio is quoted by an associate as having previously said. It was
precisely the repression of the period that left an indelible mark on
the man who would become SC justice. It would also explain some of
the important decisions he penned as a member of the High Court.
The path to FVR
“Tony would philosophize the needs of society,” says PR consultant
Antonio Abaya, who recalls that the night before EDSA 1 broke, he,
along with Carpio, were supposed to meet with Jesuit priest Joaquin
Bernas who had access to Corazon Aquino, the widow of slain Sen.
Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino Jr. Already in private practice with the firm
he co-founded with partners F. Arthur “Pancho” Villaraza and Avelino
“Nonong” Cruz Jr., Carpio was ready to risk his firm and connect with
the mutinous Reform the Armed Forces Movement, says Abaya.
Years later, as the Aquino government remained vulnerable to coup
attempts—the most serious of which was the 1989 Makati
siege—Carpio joined the political fray as he got into the circle of Fidel
Ramos, whom he did not know personally although they were
neighbors in the posh Ayala Alabang subdivision. Abaya says it was
the late Teodoro Benigno Jr. who helped connect them directly with
Ramos.
Regular meetings in Alabang followed in mid-January 1990 for
purposes of analyzing the prevailing political situation. These
eventually gave birth to Ramos’s Alabang Group which was a merger
of his Rotarians’ group and his neighbors’ circle. That Carpio and
what was then the Carpio Villaraza & Cruz (CVC) law firm would play
a major role in the Ramos presidency and become ascendant in the
process is already widely known.
In the 1992 presidential elections which Ramos eventually won, the
three partners of the firm had different political leanings but
respected each other’s preferences. While Carpio was for Ramos,
Villaraza was batting for Eduardo “Danding” Cojuangco Jr., and Cruz
was for Jovito Salonga.
All three combined were a formidable team. While Villaraza was
“tactical,” Cruz was “strategic,” and Carpio, the most serious of the
three, was “more deliberate,” says Abaya. Carpio put his passion
behind whatever he targeted.
He took to sailing, hunting, and sharp shooting, believing that the
latter was the best protection he could possibly have.
What is not widely known is Carpio’s reason for leaving Ramos in
1996, four years after serving as his chief presidential legal counsel.
As legal counsel, he was instrumental in breaking up monopolies in
the telecommunications and shipping industries, the same
stranglehold which contributed to societal inequities, and which he
already saw as a college student.

MAN ON THE BENCH. Carpio went against Fidel Ramos, his former
boss, in his ponencia on the PEA-Amari deal, which the High Court
voided in 2003
Against PIRMA
Early talk about constitutional amendments and the possibility of
extending the term of Ramos did not sit well with Carpio because he
thought it was not in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution.
And it put him at loggerheads with its proponents. It marked a key
policy difference between him and his boss who did nothing to stop
those lobbying for it.
It was after Carpio’s departure that the People’s Initiative for Reform,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA) was given an aggressive push by
then Budget Secretary Salvador Enriquez Jr. and spouses Alberto and
Carmen Pedrosa, with the backing of then National Security Adviser
Jose T. Almonte. The efforts came to naught when brought to the SC,
however.
Publicist and Ramos media consultant Ed Malay describes Carpio as
having enjoyed the confidence of the former President. “Hindi
political, tahimik. He would not even exchange banter…. He did not
smoke. He would attend meetings and stay for a while; he rarely
attended political meetings.”
Malay says that despite the association with Ramos, Carpio showed
his independence from his former boss. One of his first decisions as
associate justice involved the Public Estates Authority-Amari Coastal
Bay Development Corp. deal, which the High Court voided in 2003.
Written by Carpio, the decision upheld the Constitution which
prohibits the sale of public lands to private corporations. The deal
was first negotiated under Ramos’s term and renegotiated under the
administration of Joseph Estrada. “Akala ko ba kakampi natin (I
thought he was with us),” Ramos is quoted as saying after the SC
released its decision.
“The most important qualification of a judge is independence, not
brilliance,” Carpio had told a former associate, and that explains his
actuations in the SC.
Out of the box
Before he joined government as Ramos’s chief legal counsel,
Carpio—perhaps taking after his mother Sol Tirol who was, at one
time, superintendent of the Department of Education—became a
professorial lecturer at the UP College of Law from 1983 to 1992.
Notwithstanding his one-year suspension, Carpio graduated cum
laude and valedictorian in 1975, and placed sixth in the Bar that
same year.
He went into private practice before forming the firm in 1980 with
Villaraza and Cruz. While the three went their separate ways after
law school (the three are Sigma Rhoans), they promised to keep in
touch and get together when anyone felt he had gained sufficient
wingspan. It was Carpio who called Villaraza to tell him it was
perhaps time to come together.
They struggled to build a steady client base as they sought to create
a niche for a firm that they hoped would outlive them. While he was
the managing partner of the firm, Carpio took pains to travel to
Diliman to teach credit transactions and negotiable instruments, two
subjects in law. As professor, he was known for his clarity of thinking
and easily recruited to the firm the best and the brightest among his
students.
To Lani Gomez Somera, one of Carpio’s former students who joined
him in the firm and later in Malacañang, Carpio is a bit standoffish
and is not inclined to smile. Her boss is even-tempered and the
closest he got to losing his cool was when he “took off his glasses and
put them on the table,” she recalls.
A known techie, the associate justice introduced his former firm to
computers as early as the 1980s when these were not yet widely
used. Believing that technology is both equalizing and liberating, he
pushed for an e-library for the judiciary, the “first Web-based
searchable electronic library in the Philippine government.”
“He is solution-oriented and likes to think out of the box. He is not
predisposed to a linear way of thinking; he likes branching out,”
Somera, who has since left the firm, adds. In discussions of cases, he
would always push with his characteristic, “And?” In the aftermath of
the SC ruling on people’s initiative, there was an abundance of loose
talk about the firm being behind the Carpio-penned decision and
supposed differences between Carpio and Villaraza over Executive
Order 464, which prevented Cabinet officials from appearing before
a congressional investigation. Despite seeming evidence to the
contrary—given the resignation of Cruz as defense secretary and the
firm’s other lawyers in government following suit—Villaraza declared
that the firm remains supportive of the Arroyo administration.
If there is anything that the three partners have in common, it is
political astuteness. How tactics, strategy, and deliberation will come
into play bears close watching. For Carpio however, his place is
secure for a good 13 more years—unless politicians in Congress try
to impeach him. - Rappler.com/First published in Newsbreak in
December 2006
.R. No. 110280 October 12, 1993
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS and DR.
OLIVIA C. CAOILI in her capacity as Secretary of the
Board, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ELSIE LIGOT-TELAN in her capacity as Presiding Judge of
Branch 87, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and RAMON P.
In an effort to make the University of the Philippines (U.P.) truly the
university of the people, the U.P. administration conceptualized and
implemented the socialized scheme of tuition fee payments through
the Socialized Tuition Fee and Assistance Program (STFAP), popularly
known as the "Iskolar ng Bayan" program. Spawned by the public
clamor to overcome what was perceived as the sharpening elitist
profile of the U.P studentry, the STFAP aspired to expand the
coverage of government educational subsidies so as to include the
deserving in the lower rungs of the socio-economic ladder.
After broad consultations with the various university constituencies
by U.P. President Jose V. Abueva, the U.P. Board of Regents issued
on April 28, 1988 a Resolution establishing the STFAP. A year later, it
was granted official recognition when the Congress of the Philippines
allocated a portion of the National Budget for the implementation of
the program.
In the interest of democratizing admission to the State University, all
students are entitled to apply for STFAP benefits which include
reduction in fees, living and book subsidies and student
assistantships which give undergraduate students the opportunity to
earn P12.00 per hour by working for the University.
Applicants are required to accomplish a questionnaire where, among
others, they state the amount and source of the annual income of
the family, their real and personal properties and special
circumstances from which the University may evaluate their financial
status and need on the basis of which they are categorized into
brackets. At the end the application form, the student applicant, as
well as his parent, signs a sworn statement, as follows:
Statement of the Student
I hereby certify, upon my honor, that all the data and information
which I have furnished are accurate and complete. I understand that
any willful misinformation and/or withholding of information will
automatically disqualify me from receiving any financial assistance or
subsidy, and may serve as ground for my expulsion from the
University. Furthermore, is such misinformation and/or withholding
of information on my part is discovered after I have been awarded
tuition scholarship or any form of financial assistance, I will be
required to reimburse all financial benefits plus the legal rate of
interest prevailing at the time of the reimbursement without
prejudice to the filing of charges against me. (Emphasis supplied for
emphasis)
Moreover, I understand that the University may send a fact-finding
team to visit my home/residence to verify the veracity of the
information provided in this application and I will give my utmost
cooperation in this regard. I also understand that my refusal to
cooperate with the fact-finding team may mean suspension of
withdrawal of STFAP benefits and privileges.
———————
Student's Signature
Statement of the Applicant's Parent or Guardian
I hereby certify to the truthfulness and completeness of the
information which my son/daughter/dependent has furnished in this
application together with all the documents attached. I further
recognize that in signing this application form, I share with my
son/daughter/dependent the responsibility for the truthfulness and
completeness of the information supplied herein. (Emphasis supplied
for emphasis)
Moreover, I understand that the University may send a fact-finding
team to visit my home/residence to verify the information provided
in this application and I will give my utmost cooperation in this
regard. I also understand that my refusal to cooperate with the
fact-finding team may mean suspension or withdrawal of STFAP
benefits and privileges of my son/daughter/dependent.
—————————————————
Parent's/Legal Guardian's/Spouse's Signature1
From the early stages of its implementation, measures were adopted
to safeguard the integrity of the program. One such precautionary
measure was the inclusion as one of the punishable acts under
Section 2 (a) of the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and
Discipline of the University the deliberate falsification or
suppression/withholding of any material information required in the
application form.
To further insure the integrity of the program, a random sampling
scheme of verification of data indicated in a student's application
form is undertaken. Among those who applied for STFAP benefits for
School Year 1989-90 was Ramon P. Nadal, a student enrolled in the
College of Law.
On March 14, 1991, a team composed of Arsenio L. Dona and Jose
Carlo Manalo conducted a home investigation at the residence of
Nadal at 31 Twinpeaks Drive, Blue Ridge, Quezon City.
Ms. Cristeta Packing, Nadal's aunt, was interviewed and the team
submitted a home visit report. Consolacion Urbino, Scholarship
Affairs Officer II, found discrepancies between the report and Nadal's
application form. Forthwith, she and Bella M. Villanueva, head of the
Office of Scholarships and Student Services, presented the matter to
the Diliman Committee on Scholarships and Financial Assistance.2
In compliance with the said Committee's directive, Bella Villanueva
wrote Nadal informing him that the investigation showed that he had
failed to declare, not only the fact that he had been maintaining a
1977 Corolla car which was owned by his brother but also the
income of his mother who was supporting his brothers Antonio and
Federico. Nadal was likewise informed that the Diliman Committee
had reclassified him to Bracket 9 (from Bracket 4), retroactive to June
1989, unless he could submit "proofs to the contrary." Nadal was
required "to pay back the equivalent amount of full school fees" with
"interest based on current commercial rates." Failure to settle his
account would mean the suspension of his registration privileges and
the withholding of clearance and transcript of records. He was also
warned that his case might be referred to the Student Disciplinary
Tribunal for further investigation.3
On July 12, 1991, Nadal issued a certification stating, among other
things, that his mother migrated to the United States in 1981 but
because her residency status had not yet been legalized, she had not
been able to find a "stable, regular, well-paying employment." He
also stated that his mother, jointly with his brother Virgilio, was
shouldering the expenses of the college education of his two younger
brothers.4
Noting further discrepancies between Nadal's application form and
the certification, the U.P. charged Nadal before the Student
Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) on August 23, 1991 with the following:
That respondent RAMON P. NADAL (UP Student No. 83-11640), a
student of the College of Law, UP System, Diliman, Quezon City, and
STFAP (ISKOLAR NG BAYAN) recipient (Bracket 4 for SY 1989-1990;
Bracket 5 for SY 1990-1991) in his applications for STFAP (ISKOLAR
NG BAYAN) benefits which he filed for schoolyear 1989-1990, and
schoolyear 1990-1991, with the Office of Scholarship and Student
Services (formerly Scholarship and Financial Assistance Service)
voluntarily and willfully withheld and did not declare the following:
(a) That he has and maintains a car (Toyota Corolla, Model 1977);
and
(b) The income of his mother (Natividad Packing Nadal) in the U.S.A.,
in support of the studies of his brothers Antonio and Federico,
which acts of willfully withholding information is tantamount to acts
of dishonesty in relation to his studies, in violation of paragraph (a),
Section 2, of the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and
Discipline, as amended. (Approved by the B.O.R. at its 876th meeting
on 02 September 1976, amended at the 923rd B.O.R. meeting on 31
January 1980, and further amended at its 1017th B.O.R. meeting on
08 December 1988).5
On October 27, 1992, after hearing, the SDT6 rendered a decision in
SDT Case No. 91-026 exculpating Nadal of the charge of deliberately
withholding in his STFAP application form information that he was
maintaining a Toyota Corolla car, but finding him guilty of "wilfully
and deliberately withholding information about the income of his
mother, who is living abroad, in support of the studies of his brothers
Antonio and Federico, 7 which is tantamount to acts of dishonesty in
relation to his studies in violation of paragraph [a], Section 2 of the
Rules [now covered by paragraph (i), Section 2 of the Rules, as
amended 25 June 1992]." As such, the SDT imposed upon Nadal the
penalty of expulsion from the University and required him to
reimburse all STFAP benefits he had received but if he does not
voluntarily make reimbursement, it shall be "effected by the
University thru outside legal action."8
The SDT decision was thereafter automatically elevated to the
Executive Committee of U.P. Diliman for review pursuant to Sec. 20
of the U.P. Rules on Student Conduct and Discipline. On November
26, 1992, the Executive Committee, voting 13:4, affirmed the
decision of the SDT; whereupon, Nadal appealed to the Board of
Regents (BOR). The appeal was included in the agenda of the BOR
meeting on January 25, 1993.9
On January 18, 1993, upon her assumption to the Chairmanship of
the Senate Committee on Education, thereby making her
automatically a member of the BOR, Senator Leticia Ramos-Shahani
wrote the BOR a letter expressing her view that, after a close review
of Nadal s case by her legal staff, "it is only fair and just to find Mr.
Nadal's appeal meritorious and his arguments worthy of belief.
Consequently, he should be allowed to graduate and take the bar
examinations this year." 10
At its January 25, 1993 meeting, the BOR affirmed the decision of the
SDT but because "the Board was willing to grant a degree of
compassion to the appellant in view of the alleged status and
predicament of the mother as an immigrant 'TNT' in the United
States," the penalty was modified "from Expulsion to One Year-
Suspension, effective immediately, plus reimbursement of all
benefits received from the STFAP, with legal interest." The BOR also
decided against giving Nadal, a certification of good moral
character. 11
Nadal forthwith filed a motion for reconsideration of the BOR
decision, allegedly against the advice of his counsel. 12The motion
was placed on the agenda of the February 25, 1993 meeting of the
BOR. A day before said date, Senator Shahani wrote the BOR another
letter requesting that deliberation on Nadal's case be deferred until
such time as she could attend a BOR meeting.
On March 15, 1993, the U.P. filed an opposition to Nadal's motion for
reconsideration. Thereafter, the BOR held a special meeting to
accommodate the request of Regent Shahani with Nadal's case as
the sole item on its agenda. Again, Nadal's motion for
reconsideration was included in the March 23, 1993 agenda but in
view of the absence of Senator Shahani, the decision thereon was
deferred.
At the special meeting of the BOR on March 28, 1993 at the Board
Room of the Manila Polo Club in Forbes Park, Makati, Regent
Antonio T. Carpio raised the "material importance" of verifying the
truth of Nadal's claim that earlier, he was a beneficiary of a
scholarship and financial aid from the Ateneo de Manila University
(AdeMU). Learning that the "certification issued by the AdeMU that
it had not given Nadal financial aid while he was a student there was
made through a telephone call," Regent Carpio declared that there
was as yet "no direct evidence in the records to substantiate the
charge." According to Carpio, if it should be disclosed that Nadal
Falsely stated that he received such financial aid, it would be a clear
case of gross and material misrepresentation that would even
warrant the penalty of expulsion. Hence, he cast a conditional vote
that would depend on the verification of Nadal's claim on the matter.
U.P. President and concurrently Regent Jose V. Abueva countered by
stating that "a decision should not be anchored solely on one piece
of information which he considered irrelevant, and which would
ignore the whole pattern of the respondent's dishonesty and
deception from 1989 which had been established in the investigation
and the reviews." He added that "the respondent's eligibility for his
AdeMU high school scholarship and financial assistance from 1979 to
1983 does not in any way establish that he is 'not guilty as charged'
before the SDT," since the formal charges against him do not include
withholding of information regarding scholarship grants received
from other schools.
At the said March 28, 1993 special meeting, the Board decided to go
into executive session where the following transpired:
The Chairman of the Board, together with the President, directed the
Secretary to reflect in the minutes of the meeting the following
decisions of the Board in executive session, with only the Board
members present.
A vote was held by secret ballot on whether Ramon P. Nadal was
guilty or not guilty as charged of willful withholding of information in
relation to his application for Socialized Tuition and Financial
Assistance Program (STFAP) benefits which he filed for Schoolyears
1989-1990 and 1990-1991 which is tantamount to act of dishonesty
in relation to his studies, in violation of paragraph (a), Section 2 of
the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline, as
amended.
The Chairman gave the following results of the Board action during
the Executive Session: four (4) voted guilty; three (3) voted not guilty;
and three (3) gave conditional votes, pending verification with Father
Raymond Holscher of Ateneo de Manila University of Ramon P.
Nadal's statement in his STFAP application that he was granted
scholarship while he was in high school. Should Ateneo confirm that
Nadal had not received financial assistance, then the conditional
votes would be considered as guilty, and if otherwise, then not guilty.
The Chairman requested the President to make the verification as
soon as possible the next day. In answer to a query, the Chairman
clarified that once the information was received from Ateneo, there
would be no need for another meeting to validate the decision.
The President reiterated his objections to the casting of conditional
votes.
The Chairman himself did not vote. 13
In the morning of March 29, 1993, the AdeMU issued a certification
to the effect that Nadal was indeed a recipient of a scholarship grant
from 1979 to 1983. That evening, the BOR met again at a special
meeting at the Westin Philippine Plaza Hotel. According to Regent
Carpio, in executive session, the BOR found Nadal "guilty" as the
members voted as follows: six members — guilty, three members —
not guilty, and three members abstained. 14Consequently, the BOR
imposed on Nadal the penalties of suspension for one (1) year
effective March 29, 1993, non-issuance of any certificate of good
moral character during the suspension and/or as long as Nadal has
not reimbursed the STFAP benefits he had received with 12%
interest per annum from march 30, 1993 and non-issuance of his
transcript of records until he has settled his financial obligations with
the university. 15
On March 30, 1993, Nadal wrote President Abueva a handwritten
letter stating that "after learning of the latest decision" of the BOR,
he had been "intensely concentrating on (his) job so that (he) can
earn enough to pay for (his) financial obligations to the University."
Alleging that he was "now letting nature take its course," Nadal
begged President Abueva not to issue any press release regarding
the case. 16
However, on April 22, 1993, Nadal filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction
and prayer for a temporary restraining order against President
Abueva, the BOR, Oscar M. Alfonso, Cesar A. Buenaventura, Armand
V. Fabella and Olivia C. Caoili. The petition prayed:
After trial on the merits, judgment be rendered as follows:
a. Making the preliminary injunction permanent;
b. Ordering respondents 'to uphold and implement their decision
rendered on 28 March 1993, exonerating petitioner from all the
charges against him, and accordingly dismissing SDT No. 91-026;
c. Ordering respondents jointly and severally to pay petitioner
litigation expenses of at least P150,000.00.
Other just and equitable reliefs are likewise prayed for. 17
The motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and the
writ of preliminary injunction was immediately set for hearing. At the
May 10, 1993 hearing, the lower court declared that the only issue to
be resolved was "whether or not the respondents in Civil Case No.
93-15665 violated (Nadal's) right to due process when it rendered a
decision finding Nadal guilty of the charges against him" during the
March 29, 1993 meeting. After the respondents had presented their
first witness, Dr. Olivia C. Caoili, the lower court asked respondents'
counsel whether they were amenable to maintaining the status quo.
Said counsel replied in the negative, asserting the University's
prerogative to discipline students found guilty of violating its rules of
discipline.18
On the same day, the lower court 19 issued the following Order:
The parties were heard on their respective positions on the incident
(application for preliminary injunction and prayer for temporary
restraining order and opposition thereto). For lack of material time
set this for continuation on May 17 and 18, 1993 both at 2:30 p.m.
In the meantime, in order that the proceedings of this case may not
be rendered moot and academic, the respondents herein, namely:
Jose V. Abueva, President of the University of the Philippines and
Vice-Chairman of the U.P. Board of Regents, Oscar M. Alfonso, Cesar
A. Buenaventura and Armand V. Fabella, members of the U.P. Board
of Regents, Olivia C. Caoili, the officers, agents, representatives, and
all persons acting in their behalf, are hereby temporarily restrained
from implementing their decision rendered on March 29, 1993 in
Administrative SDT Case No. 91-026 entitled University of the
Philippines vs. Ramon P. Nadal, as reflected in the Minutes of the
1062nd meeting of the Board of Regents, U.P. held at the Romblon
Room, Westin Phil. Plaza, Manila, until further order from this Court.
SO ORDERED.
Thereafter, Nadal presented as witnesses Regents Emerenciana Y.
Arcellana, Ariel P. Tanangonan, Leticia R. Shahani and Antonio T.
Carpio. The University, on the other hand, presented Dr. Olivia Caoili
and Nadal himself as a hostile witness. On May 29, 1993, the lower
court issued the following Order:
The petitioner complains that he was not afforded due process when,
after the Board Meeting on SDT Case No. 91-026 on March 28, 1993
that resulted in a decision of "NOT GUILTY" in his favor, the Chairman
of the U.P. Board of Regents, without notice to the herein petitioner,
called another meeting the following day to deliberate on his (the
Chairman's) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, which this time
resulted in a decision of "GUILTY." While he main issue of violation of
due process raised in the petition pends trial and resolution, the
petitioner prays for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
prohibiting the respondents from further proceeding with SDT Case
No. 21-026 and from suspending the petitioner for one year.
It is a basic requirement in the issuance of the preliminary injunctive
writ that there must be a right to be protected. As the issue in the
case at bar is due process in the March 29 Board meeting, there is,
indeed, a right to be protected for, in administrative proceedings, a
respondent's right to due process exists not only at the early stages
but also at the final stage thereof.
With the circulation to the members of the Board of Regents, as well
as to other UP personnel, of the Minutes of the March 29, 1993
meeting, even after this case had already been filed, the Court is
convinced that there now exists a threat to the petitioner
(respondent in SDT Case No, 91-026) that the decision of the Board
of Regents finally finding him guilty of willfully withholding
information material to his application for Socialized Tuition and
Financial Assistance Program (STFAP) benefits, will be implemented
at any time, especially during the enrollment period, and this
implementation would work injustice to the petitioner as it would
delay him in finishing his course, and, consequently, in getting a
decent and good paying job. The injury thus caused would be
irreparable.
"Damages are irreparable within the meaning of the rule where
there is no standard by which their amount can be measured with
reasonable accuracy. Where the damage is susceptible of
mathematical computation, it is not irreparable." (Social Security
Commission v. Bayona, et al., G.R. No. L-13555, May 30, 1962).
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, and so as not to render moot the
issues in the instant proceedings, let a writ of preliminary injunction
be issued restraining the respondents, their officers, agent(s),
representatives, and all persons acting in their behalf, from further
proceeding with SDT Case No. 91-026, and from suspending
petitioner, upon the latter's filing a bond in the amount of P3,000.00.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 20
Dispensing with the filing of a motion for reconsideration, the
petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition
with prayer for the issuance of an injunction or temporary restraining
order, raising the following issues: whether or not Nadal was denied
due process in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against
him, and, whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused her
discretion in issuing the May 29, 1993 writ of preliminary injunction
thereby preventing the BOR from implementing the suspension
penalty it had imposed on Nadal.
Before proceeding with the discussion of the merits of the instant
petition, we shall confront a threshold issue raised by private
respondent, namely, that Dr. Caoili, not having been authorized by
the Board of Regents as a collegial body to file the instant petition,
and Dr. Abueva, who verified the petition, not being the "Board of
Regents" nor "the University of the Philippines," they are not real
parties in interest who should file the same. 21
A real party in interest is one "who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
'Interest' within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an
interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished
from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental
interest."22Undoubtedly, the U.P. Board of Regents has an interest to
protect inasmuch as what is in issue here is its power to impose
disciplinary action against a student who violated the Rules and
Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline by withholding
information in connection with his application for STFAP benefits,
which information, if disclosed, would have sufficed to disqualify him
from receiving the financial assistance he sought. Such dishonesty, if
left unpunished, would have the effect of subverting a commendable
program into which the University officials had devoted much time
and expended precious resources, from the conceptualization to the
implementation stage, to rationalize the socialized scheme of tuition
fee payments in order that more students may benefit from the
public funds allocated to the State University.
Having specifically named Drs. Abueva and Caoili as respondents in
the petition for mandamus that he filed below, Nadal is now
estopped from questioning their personality to file the instant
petition.23 Moreover, under Sec. 7 of the U.P. Charter (Act 1870) and
Sec. 11 of the University Code "all process" against the BOR shall be
served on "the president or secretary thereof'." It is in accordance
with these legal provisions that Dr. Caoili is named as a petitioner.
Necessarily, Dr. Abueva, the University President and member of the
BOR, has to verify the petition. It is not mandatory, however, that
each and every member of the BOR be named petitioners. As the
Court has time and again held, an action may be entertained,
notwithstanding the failure to include an indispensable party where
it appears that the naming of the party would be but a formality. 24
No longer novel, as this is not a case of first impression, is the issue
on the right of an academic institution to refuse admission to a
student arising from the imposition upon him of an administrative
disciplinary sanction. In our recent decision in Ateneo de Manila
University v. Hon. Ignacio M. Capulong,25 wherein certain law
students were dismissed for hazing resulting in the death of another,
we held that the matter of admission of students is within the ambit
of academic freedom and therefore, beyond the province of the
courts to decide. Certain fundamental principles bear stressing.
One of the arguments of Nadal in his petition for mandamus below
was that he was denied due process. To clarify, the so-called lack of
due process referred only to the March 29, 1993 meeting of the BOR.
As stated by respondent's counsel: "What was conceded by
undersigned counsel was that Nadal was afforded due process from
the start of the administrative proceeding up to the meeting of the
Board of Regents on March 28, 1993."26
With respect to the March 29, 1993 meeting, respondent considers
the same as "unquestionably void for lack of due process" inasmuch
as he was not sent a notice of said meeting. Counsel cites the ruling
in Non v. Dames II 27 that imposition of sanctions on students
requires "observance of procedural due process," 28 the phrase
obviously referring to the sending of notice of the meeting.
Attention is drawn to the disparate factual environments obtaining
in Non v. Dames II and in the instant case. In the former case, the
students were refused admission for having led or participated in
student mass actions against the school, thereby posing a collision
between constitutionally cherished rights — freedom of expression
and academic freedom. In the case at bar, Nadal was suspended for
having breached the University's disciplinary rules. In the Non case,
the Court ruled that the students were not afforded due process for
even the refusal to re-enroll them appeared to have been a mere
afterthought on part of the school administrators. Here, Nadal does
not dispute the fact that his right to due process was held inviolate
until the BOR decided to meet on March 29, 1993 with his case as
the sole item on the agenda.
In any event it is gross error to equate due process in the instant case
with the sending of notice of the March 29, 1993 BOR meeting to
respondent. University rules do not require the attendance in BOR
meetings of individuals whose cases are included as items on the
agenda of the Board. This is not exclusive of students whose
disciplinary cases have been appealed to the Board of Regents as the
final review body. At no time did respondent complain of lack of
notice given to him to attend any of the regular and special BOR
meetings where his case was up for deliberation. He would make an
exception of the March 29, 1993 meeting for it was "supposed to
reconsider the decision made on March 28, 1993 exonerating
respondent Nadal from all administrative charges against him." 29
Regent Antonio T. Carpio, in his testimony before the lower court on
May 25, 1993 admitted that there was no final verdict at the March
28, 1993 meeting in view of the conditional votes resulting from his
assertion that he was "not morally convinced that there was
sufficient evidence to make a finding of guilty against Nadal because
there was no direct evidence that his mother received income from
the United States and this income was sent to the Philippines to
support the studies of the children." 30 Two regents shared the view
of Regent Carpio, with the following result: four voted guilty, three,
not guilty, and three cast conditional votes. The BOR agreed that,
upon the suggestion of Regent Carpio, they would still verify from
the AdeMU about Nadal's alleged scholarship as a student in said
institution. Consequently, no definitive decision was arrived at by the
BOR on March 28, 1993, Much less was a verdict of exoneration
handed down as averred by respondent.
Regent Carpio testified, with respect to the March 29, 1993 meeting
where all twelve members of the BOR were present, that all of them
participated in the voting held to reconsider the previous day's
decision. He stated "I remember Regent Arcellana questioning the
voting again on the ground that there was already a final decision,
but there was a vote taken on whether a motion for reconsideration
can be decided by the board, and a majority of the board ruled that
the matter can be reconsidered again upon motion of the
chairman." 31
At said meeting, six (6) regents voted to find respondent guilty, three
(3) voted that he was not guilty and three (3) abstained. As succinctly
announced by Regent Carpio, the final decision was that which was
rendered on March 29, 1993 as "no other decision was made by the
Board with respect to the same issue." 32
Counsel for Nadal charged before the lower court that his client was
"not given due process in the March 29 meeting because the ground
upon which he was again convicted was not the same as the original
charge."33Obviously, he was referring to the basis of the conditional
votes on March 28, i.e., whether or not Nadal was telling the truth
when he claimed that he received a scholarship grant from the
AdeMU. However, Regent Carpio himself testified that the charge
considered was "exactly the same charge" of withholding
information on the income of Nadal's mother. 34 It should be stressed
that the reason why Regent Carpio requested a verification of
Nadal's claim that he was a scholar at the AdeMU was that Regent
Carpio was not "morally convinced" yet as to the guilt of Nadal. In
other words, he sought additional insights into the character of
Nadal through the information that would be obtained from the
AdeMU.
In this regard, we find such information to be irrelevant and a mere
superfluity. In his July, 12, 1991 certification aforementioned, Nadal
admitted, although inconsistently, that his mother was a "TNT" who
could not find a "stable, regular, well-paying employment" but that
she was supporting the education of his brothers with the help of
another son. To our mind, this constitutes sufficient admission that
Nadal withheld information on the income, however measly and
irregular, of his mother. Unlike in criminal cases which require proof
beyond reasonable doubt as basis for a judgment, in administrative
or quasi-judicial proceedings, only substantial evidence is required,
that which means more than a mere scintilla or relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,
even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine
otherwise. 35 In light of the foregoing circumstances, we find that
Nadal has been sufficiently proven to have violated his undertaking
to divulge all information needed when he applied for the benefits of
the STFAP.
Let it not be forgotten that respondent aspires to join the ranks of
the professionals who would uphold truth at all costs so that justice
may prevail. The sentinels who stand guard at the portals leading to
the hallowed Temples of Justice cannot be overzealous in admitting
only those who are intellectually and morally fit. In those who exhibit
duplicity in their student days, one spots the shady character who is
bound to sow the seeds of chicanery in the practice of his profession.
Having reached his senior year, respondent is presumably aware that
the bedrock axiom, Canon I, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states: "A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Further on,
Canon 7, Rule 7.01 provides: "A lawyer shall be answerable for
knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material fact in
connection with his application for admission to the bar." (Emphasis
supplied for emphasis)
Surely, it is not too early to warn entrants to the noble profession of
law that honesty and integrity are requirements no less weighty than
hurdling the Bar examinations. This is the reason why a certification
of good moral character is one of the documents that must be
submitted in applying to take said examination. In fact, a charge of
immoral or deceitful conduct on the part of an applicant, when
proved, is a ground for disqualifying him.
To revert to the instant case, inasmuch as it has been shown
sufficiently that respondent has committed an act of dishonesty in
withholding vital information in connection with his application for
STFAP benefits, all in blatant violation of the Rules and Regulations
on Student Conduct and Discipline of petitioner University, the
latter's inherent power and authority to impose disciplinary sanction
may be invoked and rightfully exercised.
As a Bohemian proverb puts it: "A school without discipline is like a
mill without water." Insofar as the water turns the mill, so does the
school's disciplinary power assure its right to survive and continue
operating. In more relevant terms, through its power to impose
disciplinary sanctions, an educational institution is able to exercise its
academic freedom which is, in the case at bar, the right to suspend
and refuse admission to a student who has subverted its authority in
the implementation of the critically important STFAP.
At the risk of being repetitious, the matter of admission to a
University is encompassed by the right of academic freedom.
In Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of
Theology 36 the Court stated that a school or college which is
possessed of the right of academic freedom "decides for itself its
aims and objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from
outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding
public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of
autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students." Elucidating,
in Ateneo de Manila University v. Hon. Ignacio M. Capulong, 37 the
Court further expounded:
Since Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, we have consistently
upheld the salutary proposition that admission to an institution of
higher learning is discretionary upon a school, the same being a
privilege on the part of the student rather than a right. While under
the Education Act of 1982, students have a right "to freely choose
their field of study, subject to existing curricula and to continue their
course therein up to graduation," such right is subject, as all rights
are, to the established academic and disciplinary standards laid down
by the academic institution.
For private schools have the right to establish reasonable rules and
regulations for the admission, discipline and promotion of students.
This right . . . extends as well to parents . . . as parents are under a
social and moral (if not legal) obligation, individually and collectively,
to assist and cooperate with the schools.
Such rules are "incident to the very object of incorporation and
indispensable to the successful management of the college. The rules
may include those governing student discipline." Going a step further,
the establishment of rules governing university-student relations,
particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded
as vital, if not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the
institution, but to its very survival.
disciplinary sanction upon an erring student of an institution of
higher learning.
From the foregoing arguments, it is clear that the lower court should
have restrained itself from assuming jurisdiction over the petition
filed by Nadal. Mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases, a
showing of a clear and certain right on the part of the petitioner
being required. 38 It is of no avail against an official or government
agency whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or judgment. 39
Hence, by issuing the writ of preliminary injunction, the lower court
dared to tread upon legally forbidden grounds. For, by virtue of the
writ, the University's exercise of academic freedom was peremptorily
curtailed. Moreover, the door was flung wide open for Nadal to do
exactly what the decision of the BOR prohibited him from doing and
that is, to violate the suspension order by enrolling for the first
semester of 1993-1994. It must have been with consternation that
the University officials helplessly watching him complete his
academic requirements for taking the Bar. 40 In the event that he be
allowed to continue with his studies he would, in effect render moot
and academic the disciplinary sanction of suspension legally imposed
upon him by the BOR's final decision of March 29, 1993. What is to
prevent other aspirants for STFAP scholarships from misleading the
University authorities by misrepresenting certain facts or as in
instant case, withholding vital information and stating downright
falsehoods, in their application forms with impunity? Not only would
this undermine the authority of the U.P. to discipline its students
who violated the rules and regulations of the institution but, more
importantly, subvert the very concept and lofty intent to give
financial assistance to poor but deserving students through the
STFAP which, incidentally, has not ceased refining and modifying it's
operations.

Within memory of the current generation is the eruption of militancy

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the lower court is
in the academic groves as collectively, the students demanded and
hereby ordered to DISMISS the petition for mandamus.
plucked for themselves from the panoply of academic freedom their
own rights encapsulized under the rubric of "right to education"
forgetting that, in Hohfeldian terms, they have a concomitant duty, SO ORDERED.
that is, their duty to learn under the rules laid down by the school.
(Emphasis supplied.)

On the second issue presented for adjudication, the Court finds that
the lower court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writ of
preliminary injunction of May 29, 1993. The issuance of the said writ
was based on the lower court's finding that the implementation of
the disciplinary sanction of suspension on Nadal "would work
injustice to the petitioner as it would delay him in finishing his course,
and consequently, in getting a decent and good paying job." Sadly,
such a ruling considers only the situation of Nadal without taking into
account the circumstances clearly of his own making, which led him
into such a predicament. More importantly, it has completely
disregarded the overriding issue of academic freedom which
provides more than ample justification for the imposition of a
 DAVID YU KIMTENG, MARY L. YU, WINNIE L. YU, VIVIAN L. YU,
ROSA GAN, LILIAN CHUA WOO YUKIMTENG, SANTOS YU, MARCELO
YU, AND SIN CHIAO YU LIM, Petitioners, v. ATTY. WALTER T. YOUNG,
ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR., ATTY. JOVITO GAMBOL, AND ATTY.
DAN REYNALD R. MAGAT, PRACTICING LAW UNDER THE FIRM
NAME, YOUNG REVILLA GAMBOL & MAGAT, AND JUDGE OFELIA L.
CALO, PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 211 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, MANDALUYONG CITY, Respondents.
A disbarred lawyer's name cannot be part of a firm's name. A lawyer
who appears under a firm name that contains a disbarred lawyer's
name commits indirect contempt of court.
Through this Petition,1 petitioners ask that law firm, Young Revilla
Gambol & Magat, and Judge Ofelia L. Calo (Judge Calo), be cited in
contempt of court under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.2 Anastacio
Revilla, Jr. (Revilla) was disbarred on December 2009 in an En Banc
Resolution of this court in A.C. No. 7054 entitled Que v. Atty. Revilla,
Jr.3
David Yu Kimteng, Mary L. Yu, Winnie L. Yu, Vivian L. Yu, Rosa Gan,
Lilian Chua Woo Yukimteng, Santos Yu, Marcelo Yu, and Sin Chiao Yu
Lim are the majority stockholders of Ruby Industrial Corporation.4
In Majority Stockholders of Ruby Industrial Corporation v. Lim, et
al.,5 this court ordered the liquidation of Ruby Industrial Corporation
and transferred the case to the appropriate Regional Trial Court
branch to supervise the liquidation.6
The liquidation was raffled to Branch 211 of the Regional Trial Court
in Mandaluyong City,7 presided by Judge Calo.8
Walter T. Young (Atty. Young), Jovito Gambol (Atty. Gambol), and
Dan Reynald Magat (Atty. Magat) are lawyers practicing under the
firm, Young Revilla Gambol & Magat.9 They entered their appearance
in the liquidation proceedings as counsels for the liquidator.10
An Opposition11 was filed against the appearance of Young Revilla
Gambol & Magat on the ground that Revilla was already disbarred in
2009.12
Young Revilla Gambol & Magat filed a Reply to the Opposition
13
stating that the firm opted to retain Revilla's name in the firm name
even after he had been disbarred, with the retention serving as an
act of charity.14
Judge Calo overruled the opposition to the appearance of Young
Revilla Gambol & Magat and stated that Atty. Young could still
appear for the liquidator as long as his appearance was under the
Young Law Firm and not under Young Revilla Gambol &
Magat.15 Young Law Firm does not exist.
Thus, petitioners David Yu Kimteng, Mary L. Yu, Winnie L. Yu, Vivian L.
Yu, Rosa Gan, Lilian Chua Woo Yukimteng, Santos Yu, Marcelo Yu,
and Sin Chiao Yu Lim filed this Petition under Rule 71 to cite
respondents Atty. Walter T. Young, Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr., Atty.
Jovito Gambol, Atty. Dan Reynald R. Magat, and Judge Ofelia L. Calo
in contempt.
This court required respondents to comment on the
Petition.16 Respondent law firm Young Revilla Gambol & Magat filed
its Comment17 on April 14, 2014, while respondent Atty. Gambol filed
a separate Comment.18
On April 16, 2014, petitioners filed a Motion for Leave to File
Consolidated Reply.19 This was granted in the Resolution20 dated
June 18, 2014. In the same Resolution, this court denied petitioners'
Motion to Consider Case Submitted without Comment from [Judge
Calo]21 and ordered the parties to await Judge Calo's comment.22
Counsel for petitioners subsequently filed a
Manifestation,23 informing this court that they have yet to receive a
copy of Judge Calo's Comment.24 No Comment was filed by Judge
Calo.
Petitioners cite San Luis v. Pineda25 and United States v. Ney, et
al.26 to support their argument that the use of a disbarred lawyer's
name in the firm name is tantamount to contempt of court.27
Private Respondents Atty. Young and Atty. Magat counter that they
maintained Revilla's name in the firm name for sentimental
reasons.28
Atty. Young and Atty. Magat explained that they did not intend to
deceive the public29 and that in any case, the retention of Revilla's
name "does not give added value to the [law firm] nor does it
enhance the standing of the member lawyers thereof."30
They further argue that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The non-deletion of [Anastacio E. Revilla's]
name in the Young Law Firm's name is no more
misleading than including the names of dead
or retired partners in a law firm's name. It is
more for sentimental reasons. It is a fraternal
expression to a former brother in the
profession that the Private Respondents fully
understand, his [referring to Revilla] principled
albeit quixotic
advocacy.31ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Private respondents point out that the Balgos Law Firm is derailing
the liquidation of Ruby Industrial Corporation by filing this Petition
for contempt because the Balgos Law Firm resents that its nominee
was not elected as liquidator.32 Private respondents add that
petitioners have continuously blocked Ruby Industrial Corporation's
unsecured creditors from obtaining relief, as shown by the number
of times that Ruby Industrial Corporation's cases have reached this
court.33
Private respondents also raise the issue of forum shopping in their
Comment because petitioners allegedly filed a disbarment Complaint
against them before the Commission on Bar Discipline, Integrated
Bar of the Philippines. One of the grounds for disbarment cited by
petitioners was the use of Revilla's name in their firm name.34
Private respondent Atty. Gambol filed a separate
Comment,35 arguing that from the time Revilla was disbarred, he no
longer practiced law.36
Private respondent Atty. Gambol stated that he passed the 1990 Bar
Examination but took his oath in July 2006.37 He is a junior member
of the Young Revilla Magat & Gambol law firm and "has no power
and/or authority [to decide] who should be removed from the firm's
name[.]"38
Private respondent Atty. Gambol argues that in all the cases he
handled after Re villa's disbarment, he omitted Re villa's name from
the firm name in the pleadings that he signed. Such deletion was
through his own initiative.39
Petitioners filed their Reply,40 with petitioners addressing
respondents' allegations that they remained silent on the disbarment
case they had filed by citing Rule 139-B, Section 18 of the Rules of
Court,41which provides that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Rule 139-B. Disbarment and Discipline of
Attorneys
....
Section 18. Confidentiality. — Proceedings
against attorneys shall be private and
confidential. However, the final order of the
Supreme Court shall be published like its
decisions in other
cases.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Petitioners argue that liability for contempt is separate from
disciplinary action; hence, no forum shopping was committed.42
Petitioners did not address private respondents' allegations
regarding the delay in the liquidation of Ruby Industrial Corporation.
The issues in this case are:
First, whether private respondents Atty. Walter T. Young, Atty. Jovito
Gambol, and Atty. Dan Reynald R. Magat are in contempt of court
when they continued to use respondent Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr.'s
name in their firm name even after his disbarment;cralawlawlibrary
Second, whether private respondents Atty. Walter T. Young, Atty.
Jovito Gambol, and Atty. Dan Reynald R. Magat are in contempt of
court for deliberately allowing a disbarred lawyer to engage in the
practice of law;cralawlawlibrary
Third, whether private respondent Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. is in
contempt of court for continuing to practice law even after
disbarment;cralawlawlibrary
Fourth, whether public respondent Judge Ofelia L. Calo is in
contempt of court when she held that respondent Atty. Walter T.
Young can appear in court as long as it is under the Young Law Firm,
which is a non-existent firm; and
Lastly, whether the filing of this Petition despite the pendency of a
disbarment complaint before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
constitutes forum shopping.
II
Rule 71, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after
charge and hearing.— After charge in writing
has been filed, and an opportunity given to the
respondent to comment thereon within such
period as may be fixed by the court and to be
heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of
any of the following acts may be punished for
indirect contempt:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the
performance of his official duties or in his
official transactions;cralawlawlibrary
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful
writ, process, order, or judgment of a court,
including the act of a person who, after being
dispossessed or ejected from any real property
by the judgment or process of any court of
competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or
induces another to enter into or upon such
real property, for the purpose of executing acts
of ownership or possession, or in any manner
disturbs the possession given to the person
adjudged to be entitled
thereto;cralawlawlibrary
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference
with the processes or proceedings of a court
not constituting direct contempt under section
1 of this Rule;cralawlawlibrary
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or
indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of
a court, and acting as such without authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly
served;cralawlawlibrary
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a
person or property in the custody of an officer
by virtue of an order or process of a court held
by him. (Emphasis
supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
This court has defined contempt of court
as:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
a willful disregard or disobedience of a public
authority. In its broad sense, contempt is a
disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or
orders of a legislative or judicial body or an
interruption of its proceedings by disorderly
behavior or insolent language in its presence
or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings
or to impair the respect due to such a body. In
its restricted and more usual sense, contempt
comprehends a despising of the authority,
justice, or dignity of a court. The
phrase contempt of court is generic,
embracing within its legal signification a
variety of different acts.43 (Emphasis in the
original, citations
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In this case, respondents committed acts that are considered indirect
contempt under Section 3 of Rule 71. In addition, respondents
disregarded the Code of Professional Responsibility when they
retained the name of respondent Revilla in their firm name.
Canon 3, Rule 3.02 states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Rule 3.02. In the choice of a firm name, no
false, misleading or assumed name shall be
used. The continued use of the name of a
deceased partner is permissible provided that
the firm indicates in all its communications
that said partner is
deceased.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Respondents argue that the use of respondent Revilla's name is "no
more misleading than including the names of dead or retired
partners in a law firm's name."44
III
Maintaining a disbarred lawyer's name in the firm name is different
from using a deceased partner's name in the firm name. Canon 3,
Rule 3.02 allows the use of a deceased partner's name as long as
there is an indication that the partner is deceased. This ensures that
the public is not misled. On the other hand, the retention of a
disbarred lawyer's name in the firm name may mislead the public
into believing that the lawyer is still authorized to practice law.
The use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name was the issue
in the consolidated cases Petition for Authority to Continue Use of
the Firm Name "Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo"
and In the matter of the Petition for Authority to Continue Use of the
Firm Name "Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta &
Reyes."45 Petitioners prayed that they be allowed to continue
including Atty. Alexander Sycip's and Atty. Herminio Ozaeta's names
in their firm names.46 This court denied the petitions, explaining that
there is a possibility of deception in the use of a deceased partner's
name.47 Also, Article 1815 of the Civil Code48 shows that the partners
in a partnership should be "living persons who can be subjected to
liability."49 Further, the use of a deceased partner's name is not a
custom in the Philippines.50 On the contrary, the local custom shows
that the firm name usually identifies the senior members or partners
of a law firm.51 Justice Aquino dissented, stating
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I am of the opinion that the petition may be
granted with the condition that it be indicated
in the letterheads of the two firms (as the case
may be) that Alexander Sycip, former Justice
Ozaeta and Herminio Ozaeta are dead or the
period when they served as partners should be
stated therein.
Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in
continuing the use of the names of their
deceased founders is to retain the clients who
had customarily sought the legal services of
Attorneys Sycip and Ozaeta and to benefit
from the goodwill attached to the names of
those respected and esteemed law
practitioners. That is a legitimate motivation.
The retention of their names is not illegal per
se. That practice was followed before the war
by the law firm of James Ross.
Notwithstanding the death of Judge Ross, the
founder of the law firm of Ross, Lawrence,
Selph and Carrascoso, his name was retained
in the firm name with an indication of the year
when he died. No one complained that the
retention of the name of Judge Ross in the firm
name was illegal or
unethical.52ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The use of a deceased partner's name in a law firm's name was
allowed upon the effectivity of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, with the requirement that "the firm indicates in all its
communications that said partner is deceased."53
On the other hand, this court has ruled that the use of the name of a
person who is not authorized to practice law constitutes contempt of
court.
In San Luis v. Pineda, this court has held that "[n]eedless to say, [the]
practice of law by one who is disbarred constitutes contempt of
court."54United States v. Ney, et al. involved J. Garcia Bosque who
was denied admission to the bar because he chose to remain a
Spanish subject during the cession of the Philippines under the
Treaty of Paris.55 Bosque entered into an arrangement with Ney, a
practicing attorney, and established "Ney & Bosque."56 Bosque did
not personally appear in courts but the papers of their office were
signed "Ney and Bosque-C.W. Ney, Abogado."57 The matter was
referred to the then Attorney-General, and contempt proceedings
were instituted.58 At that time, Section 232 of the Code of Civil
Procedure defined contempt of court as:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful
writ, process, order, judgment, or command of
a court, or injunction granted by a court or
judge;cralawlawlibrary
2. Misbehavior of an officer of the court in the
performance of his official duties or in his
official
transactions.59ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
This court found that Atty. Ney was in contempt of court and held
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Under the second subdivision of [Section 232],
Bosque is obviously not answerable, inasmuch
as he was not an officer of the court. On the
other hand, under this subdivision, the
defendant Ney, as an admitted attorney, is
liable if his conduct amounted to misbehavior.
We are of the opinion that it did. In the offense
of Bosque in holding himself out as a general
practitioner Ney participated, and for the
improper signature of the pleadings he was
chiefly and personally
responsible.60ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Cambaliza v. Atty. Cristal-Tenorio,61 Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio
used a letterhead indicating that Felicisimo Tenorio, Jr. was a senior
partner in the Cristal-Tenorio Law Office when, in fact, he was not a
lawyer.62 This court held that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A lawyer who allows a non-member of the Bar
to misrepresent himself as a lawyer and to
practice law is guilty of violating Canon 9 and
Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which read as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Canon 9 — A lawyer
shall not directly or
indirectly assist in the
unauthorized practice of
law.
Rule 9.01 — A lawyer
shall not delegate to any
unqualified person the
performance of any task
which by law may only
be performed by a
member of the Bar in
good
standing.ChanRoblesVirt
ualawlibrary
The term "practice of law" implies customarily
or habitually holding oneself out to the public
as a lawyer for compensation as a source of
livelihood or in consideration of his services.
Holding one's self out as a lawyer may be
shown by acts indicative of that purpose like
identifying oneself as attorney, appearing in
court in representation of a client, or
associating oneself as a partner of a law office
for the general practice of law. Such acts
constitute unauthorized practice of law.
The lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very
least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice
of law is founded on public interest and policy.
Public policy requires that the practice of law
be limited to those individuals found duly
qualified in education and character. The
permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an
individual and limited privilege subject to
withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper
standards of moral and professional conduct.
The purpose is to protect the public, the court,
the client, and the bar from the incompetence
or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice
law and not subject to the disciplinary control
of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see
that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons
and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to
permit his professional services or his name to
be used in aid of, or to make possible the
unauthorized practice of law by, any agency,
personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a
misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary
action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized
practice of law.63 (Citations
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
From the time respondent Revilla was disbarred in 2009, it appears
that no efforts were exerted to remove his name from the firm name.
Thus, respondents Atty. Young and Atty. Magat are held liable for
contempt of court.
Rule 71, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides for
the imposable penalties for indirect
contempt:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 7. Punishment for indirect contempt.—If
the respondent is adjudged guilty of indirect
contempt committed against a Regional Trial
Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank,
he may be punished by a fine not exceeding
thirty thousand pesos or imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) months, or both. If he is
adjudged guilty of contempt committed
against a lower court, he may be punished by a
fine not exceeding five thousand pesos or
imprisonment not exceeding one (1) month, or
both. If the contempt consists in the violation
of a writ of injunction, temporary restraining
order or status quoorder, he may also be
ordered to make complete restitution to the
party injured by such violation of the property
involved or such amount as may be alleged
and proved.
The writ of execution, as in ordinary civil
actions, shall issue for the enforcement of a
judgment imposing a fine unless the court
otherwise provides. (Emphasis
supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In view of Rule 71, Section 7, a fine of P30,000.00 each is imposed on
respondents Atty. Young and Atty. Magat.
IV
Respondent Atty. Gambol filed a separate Comment, explaining that
he dropped respondent Re villa's name from the firm name in the
pleadings that he filed in several courts. Respondent Atty. Gambol's
explanation is supported by the allegations in the Comment filed by
respondents Atty. Young and Atty. Magat
stating:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In fact, when co-Private Respondent Gambol,
initially cowed perhaps, by the same
intimidation worked upon him by the
Complainants' counsel in another case, asked
permission to delete [Anastacio E. Revilla's]
name in the Young Law Firm's name in the
pleadings that he (i.e. Private Respondent
Gambol) would subsequently file, Respondent
Young allowed him to do
so.64ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
This court recognizes respondent Atty. Gambol's effort to avoid
misleading the public by removing respondent Revilla's name in the
pleadings he filed. Thus, the Complaint against him is dismissed.
Petitioners included Revilla as a respondent, but they did not serve
copies of the Petition and subsequent pleadings upon him.
Respondent Revilla also did not receive a copy of this court's
Resolution requiring respondents to comment. Thus, this court shall
refrain from ruling upon respondent Revilla's liability.
V
With regard to respondent Judge Calo, petitioners pray that she be
cited in contempt for allowing respondent Atty. Young's appearance
as long as it was under the Young Law Firm. A photocopy of the
Order65 was attached to the Petition. A portion of Judge Calo's Order
states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
 Although this court grants the appearance of
Atty. Walter Young for the Liquidator, his
appearance however shall be allowed only if in
the name of the Young Law Firm, managed by
the said counsel, and not under the name of
the Law Firm of Young Revilla Gambol and
Magat. This is to avoid any misconception that
a disbarred lawyer, Revilla, continues to
practice law.66ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Petitioners argue that respondent Judge Calo's Order is an indirect
violation of "the proscription against the participation of ... disbarred
lawyer[s]"67 in court. Further, the Young Law Firm does not exist.68
Respondent Judge Calo was required to file a Comment on the
Resolution69 dated February 24, 2014, but she did not comply.
From petitioners' allegations, it appears that respondent Judge Calo
committed an error in judgment when she allowed respondent Atty.
Young's appearance under the Young Law Firm. However, this
Petition to cite respondent Judge Calo in contempt is not the proper
remedy. Maylas, Jr. v. Judge Sese70discussed the remedies available
to litigants as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[T]he law provides ample judicial remedies
against errors or irregularities being
committed by a Trial Court in the exercise of its
jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against
errors or irregularities which may be regarded
as normal in nature (i.e., error in appreciation
or admission of evidence, or in construction or
application of procedural or substantive law or
legal principle) include a motion for
reconsideration (or after rendition of a
judgment or final order, a motion for new trial),
and appeal. The extraordinary remedies
against error or irregularities which may be
deemed extraordinary in character (i.e.,
whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise of
power or neglect of duty, etc.) are inter alia
the special civil actions of certiorari ,
prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for
inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as
the case may be.
Now, the established doctrine and policy is
that disciplinary proceedings and criminal
actions against Judges are not complementary
or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these
judicial remedies, whether ordinary or
extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion of
these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of
judgment in the corresponding action or
proceeding, are prerequisites for the taking of
other measures against the persons of the
judges concerned, whether of civil,
administrative, or criminal nature. It is only
after the available judicial remedies have been
exhausted and the appellate tribunals have
spoken with finality, that the door to an
inquiry into his criminal, civil or administrative
liability may be said to have opened, or
closed.71 (Citation
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Whether petitioners availed themselves of judicial remedies was not
stated in their Petition. Nevertheless, this court cannot ignore the
possible effect of respondent Judge Calo's Order. Thus, the
Complaint against respondent Judge Calo shall be re-docketed as an
administrative matter. Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SECTION 11. . . . The Supreme Court en bane
shall have the power to discipline judges of
lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote
of a majority of the Members who actually
took part in the deliberations on the issues in
the case and voted
thereon.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Also, Rule 4, Section 3(a) of the Internal Rules of the Supreme
Court72 provides that the administrative functions of this court
include "disciplinary and administrative matters involving justices,
judges, and court personnel[.]"
VI
As to the allegation of forum shopping, petitioners do not deny that
they filed a Complaint for disbarment. They argue, however, that
they did not mention the disbarment proceedings against
respondents in view of Rule 139-B, Section 18 of the Rules of Court,
which states that disbarment proceedings are private and
confidential.73 In addition, a Petition for contempt under Rule 71 and
a Complaint for disbarment are different from each other.
The filing of a Complaint for disbarment before the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the filing of this Petition for contempt under Rule
71 do not constitute forum shopping. Forum shopping has been
defined as:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
when a party repetitively avails of several
judicial remedies in different courts,
simultaneously or successively, all substantially
founded on the same transactions and the
same essential facts and circumstances, and all
raising substantially the same issues either
pending in or already resolved adversely by
some other
court.74ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The elements of forum shopping are:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties
as represent the same interests in both
actions;cralawlawlibrary
(b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed
for, the relief being founded on the same facts;
and
(c) the identity of the two preceding particulars,
such that any judgment rendered in the other
action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action
under
consideration.75ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
This court has explained that disbarment proceedings are sui generis,
and are not akin to civil or criminal cases.76 A disbarment proceeding
"is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its
undesirable members in order to protect the public and the
courts."77
Also, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines' findings are
recommendatory, and the power to sanction erring members of the
bar lies with this court.78
As discussed by this court in Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan:79
The disciplinary authority of the Court over
members of the Bar is broader [than] the
power to punish for contempt. Contempt of
court may be committed both by lawyers and
non-lawyers, both in and out of court.
Frequently, where the contemnor is a lawyer,
the contumacious conduct also constitutes
professional misconduct which calls into play
the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court.
Where the respondent is a lawyer, however,
the Supreme Court's disciplinary authority over
lawyers may come into play whether or not
the misconduct with which the respondent is
charged also constitutes contempt of court.
The power to punish for contempt of court
does not exhaust the scope of disciplinary
authority of the Court over lawyers. The
disciplinary authority of the Court over
members of the Bar is but corollary to the
Court's exclusive power of admission to the
Bar. A lawyers [sic] is not merely a professional
but also an officer of the court and as such, he
is called upon to share in the task and
responsibility of dispensing justice and
resolving disputes in society. Any act on his
part which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or
impede and degrade the administration of
justice constitutes both professional
misconduct calling for the exercise of
disciplinary action against him and
contumacious conduct warranting application
of the contempt power.80 (Citations
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, respondents Atty. Walter T. Young and Atty. Dan
Reynald R. Magat are found in contempt of court for using a
disbarred lawyer's name in their firm name and are meted a fine of
P30,000.00 each.

The Complaint against Atty. Jovito Gambol is DISMISSED. This is

without prejudice to any disciplinary liabilities of respondents Atty.
Walter T. Young, Atty. Dan Reynald R. Magat, and Judge Ofelia L. Calo.

The counsels are ordered to make the necessary amendments in

relation to the use of the disbarred lawyer's name including changes
in their signage, notice of appearances, stationeries, and like material
within a period of five (5) days from receipt.

The Complaint against respondent Judge Ofelia L. Calo is also

ordered re-docketed as an administrative matter.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar

Confidant, to be appended to private respondents' personal records
as attorneys, to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and to the
Office of the Court Administrator for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
PATRICK A. CARONAN, Complainant, v. RICHARD A. CARONAN A.K.A.
"ATTY. PATRICK A. CARONAN," Respondent.
PER CURIAM:
For the Court's resolution is the Complaint-Affidavit1 filed by
complainant Patrick A. Caronan (complainant), before the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), against respondent "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan,"
whose real name is allegedly Richard A. Caronan (respondent), for
purportedly assuming complainant's identity and falsely representing
that the former has the required educational qualifications to take
the Bar Examinations and be admitted to the practice of law.
The Facts
Complainant and respondent are siblings born to Porferio2 R.
Caronan, Jr. and Norma A. Caronan. Respondent is the older of the
two, having been born on February 7, 1975, while complainant was
born on August 5, 1976.3 Both of them completed their secondary
education at the Makati High School where complainant graduated
in 19934 and respondent in 1991.5 Upon his graduation, complainant
enrolled at the University of Makati where he obtained a degree in
Business Administration in 1997.6 He started working thereafter as a
Sales Associate for Philippine Seven Corporation (PSC), the operator
of 7-11 Convenience Stores.7 In 2001, he married Myrna G. Tagpis
with whom he has two (2) daughters.8Through the years,
complainant rose from the ranks until, in 2009, he was promoted as
a Store Manager of the 7-11 Store in Muntinlupa.9chanrobleslaw
Meanwhile, upon graduating from high school, respondent enrolled
at the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila (PLM), where he stayed
for one (1) year before transferring to the Philippine Military
Academy (PMA) in 1992.10 In 1993, he was discharged from the PMA
and focused on helping their father in the family's car rental business.
In 1997, he moved to Nueva Vizcaya with his wife, Rosana, and their
three (3) children.11 Since then, respondent never went back to
school to earn a college degree.12chanrobleslaw
In 1999, during a visit to his family in Metro Manila, respondent told
complainant that the former had enrolled in a law school in Nueva
Vizcaya.13 Subsequently, in 2004, their mother informed complainant
that respondent passed the Bar Examinations and that he used
complainant's name and college records from the University of
Makati to enroll at St. Mary's University's College of Law in
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya and take the Bar
Examinations.14 Complainant brushed these aside as he did not
anticipate any adverse consequences to him.15chanrobleslaw
In 2006, complainant was able to confirm respondent's use of his
name and identity when he saw the name "Patrick A. Caronan" on
the Certificate of Admission to the Bar displayed at the latter's office
in Taguig City.16 Nevertheless, complainant did not confront
respondent about it since he was pre-occupied with his job and had a
family to support.17chanrobleslaw
Sometime in May 2009, however, after his promotion as Store
Manager, complainant was ordered to report to the head office of
PSC in Mandaluyong City where, upon arrival, he was informed that
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) was requesting his
presence at its office in Taft Avenue, Manila, in relation to an
investigation involving respondent who, at that point, was using the
najne "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan."18 Accordingly, on May 18, 2009,
complainant appeared before the Anti-Fraud and Computer Crimes
Division of the NBI where he was interviewed and asked to identify
documents including: (1) his and respondent's high school records; (2)
his transcript of records from the University of Makati; (3) Land
Transportation Office's records showing his and respondent's driver's
licenses; (4) records from St. Mary's University showing that
complainant's transcript of records from the University of Makati and
his Birth Certificate were submitted to St. Mary's University's College
of Law; and (5) Alumni Book of St. Mary's University showing
respondent's photograph under the name "Patrick A.
Caronan."19 Complainant later learned that the reason why he was
invited by the NBI was because of respondent's involvement in a case
for qualified theft and estafa filed by Mr. Joseph G. Agtarap (Agtarap),
who was one of the principal sponsors at respondent's
wedding.20chanrobleslaw
Realizing that respondent had been using his name to perpetrate
crimes and commit unlawful activities, complainant took it upon
himself to inform other people that he is the real "Patrick A.
Caronan" and that respondent's real name is Richard A.
Caronan.21 However, problems relating to respondent's use of the
name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" continued to hound him. In July
2013, PSC received a letter from Quasha Ancheta Pena & Nolasco
Law Offices requesting that they be furnished with complainant's
contact details or, in the alternative, schedule a meeting with him to
discuss certain matters concerning respondent.22 On the other hand,
a fellow church-member had also told him that respondent who,
using the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan," almost victimized his
(church-member's) relatives.23 Complainant also received a phone
call from a certain Mrs. Loyda L. Reyes (Reyes), who narrated how
respondent tricked her into believing that he was authorized to sell a
parcel of land in Taguig City when in fact, he was not.24 Further, he
learned that respondent was arrested for gun-running activities,
illegal possession of explosives, and violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang (BP) 22.25cralawredchanrobleslaw
Due to the controversies involving respondent's use of the name
"Patrick A. Caronan," complainant developed a fear for his own
safety and security.26 He also became the subject of conversations
among his colleagues, which eventually forced him to resign from his
job at PSC.27 Hence, complainant filed the present
Complaint-Affidavit to stop respondent's alleged use of the former's
name and identity, and illegal practice of law.28chanrobleslaw
In his Answer,29 respondent denied all the allegations against him
arid invoked res judicata as a defense. He maintained that his
identity can no longer be raised as an issue as it had already been
resolved in CBD Case No. 09-2362 where the IBP Board of Governors
dismissed30 the administrative case31 filed by Agtarap against him,
and which case had already been declared closed and terminated by
this Court in A.C. No. 10074.32 Moreover, according to him,
complainant is being used by Reyes and her spouse, Brigadier
General Joselito M. Reyes, to humiliate, disgrace, malign, discredit,
and harass him because he filed several administrative and criminal
complaints against them before the Ombudsman.33chanrobleslaw
On March 9, 2015, the IBP-CBD conducted the scheduled mandatory
conference where both parties failed to appear.34 Instead,
respondent moved to reset the same on April 20, 2015.35 On such
date, however, both parties again failed to appear, thereby
prompting the IBP-CBD to issue an Order36 directing them to file their
respective position papers. However, neither of the parties
submitted any.37chanrobleslaw
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
On June 15, 2015, IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose Villanueva
Cabrera (Investigating Commissioner) issued his Report and
Recommendation,38 finding respondent guilty of illegally and falsely
assuming complainant's name, identity, and academic records.39 He
observed that respondent failed to controvert all the allegations
against him and did not present any proof to prove his identity.40 On
the other hand, complainant presented clear and overwhelming
evidence that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan."41chanrobleslaw
Further, he noted that respondent admitted that he and complainant
are siblings when he disclosed upon his arrest on August 31, 2012
that: (a) his parents are Porferio Ramos Caronan and Norma Atillo;
and (b) he is married to Rosana Halili-Caronan.42 However, based on
the Marriage Certificate issued by the National Statistics Office (NSO),
"Patrick A. Caronan" is married to a certain "Myrna G. Tagpis," not to
Rosana Halili-Caronan.43chanrobleslaw
The Investigating Commissioner also drew attention to the fact
that .the photograph taken of respondent when he was arrested as
"Richard A. Caronan" on August 16, 2012 shows the same person as
the one in the photograph in the IBP records of "Atty. Patrick A.
Caronan."44 These, according to the Investigating Commissioner,
show that respondent indeed assumed complainant's identity to
study law and take the Bar Examinations.45 Since respondent falsely
assumed the name, identity, and academic records of complainant
and the real "Patrick A. Caronan" neither obtained the bachelor of
laws degree nor took the Bar Exams, the Investigating Commissioner
recommended that the name "Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of
Attorneys No. 49069 be dropped and stricken off the Roll of
Attorneys.46 He also recommended that respondent and the name
"Richard A. Caronan" be barred from being admitted as a member of
the Bar; and finally, for making a mockery of the judicial institution,
the IBP was directed to institute appropriate actions against
respondent.47chanrobleslaw
On June 30, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. Section 6. Pre-Law. - No applicant for lawyers.61 This is imperative in the nature of the office of a lawyer,
XXI-2015-607,48 adopting the Investigating Commissioner's admission to the bar examination shall be the trust relation which exists between him and his client, as well as
recommendation. admitted unless he presents a certificate that between him and the court.62chanrobleslaw
he has satisfied the Secretary of Education
The Issues Before the Court that, before he began the study of law, he had Finally, respondent made a mockery of the legal profession by
pursued and satisfactorily completed in an pretending to have the necessary qualifications to be a lawyer. He
The issues in this case are whether or not the IBP erred in ordering authorized and recognized university or also tarnished the image of lawyers with his alleged unscrupulous
that: (a) the name "Patrick A. Caronan" be stricken off the Roll of college, requiring for admission thereto the activities, which resulted in the filing of several criminal cases against
Attorneys; and (b) the name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred from completion of a four-year high school him. Certainly, respondent and his acts do not have a place in the
being admitted to the Bar. course, the course of study prescribed therein legal profession where one of the primary duties of its members is to
for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with uphold its integrity and dignity.63chanrobleslaw
any of the following subject as major or field of
The Court's Ruling
concentration: political science, logic, english, WHEREFORE, respondent Richard A. Caronan a.k.a. "Atty. Patrick A.
Spanish, history, and economics. (Emphases Caronan" (respondent) is found GUILTY of falsely assuming the name,
After a thorough evaluation of the records, the Court finds no cogent
supplied) identity, and academic records of complainant Patrick A. Caronan
reason to disturb the findings and recommendations of the IBP.
(complainant) to obtain a law degree and take the Bar Examinations.
In the case at hand, respondent never completed his college degree. Accordingly, without prejudice to the filing of appropriate civil
As correctly observed by the IBP, complainant has established by
While he enrolled at the PLM in 1991, he left a year later and and/or criminal cases, the Court hereby resolves that:
clear and overwhelming evidence that he is the real "Patrick A.
entered the PMA where he was discharged in 1993 without
Caronan" and that respondent, whose real name is Richard A.
graduating.56Clearly, respondent has not completed the requisite chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Caronan, merely assumed the latter's name, identity, and academic
pre-law degree. (1) the name "Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of
records to enroll at the St. Mary's University's College of Law, obtain
Attorneys No. 49069 is
a law degree, and take the Bar Examinations.
The Court does not discount the possibility that respondent may ordered DROPPEDand STRICKEN OFF the Roll
later on complete his college education and earn a law degree under of Attorneys;
As pointed out by the IBP, respondent admitted that he and
his real name. However, his false assumption of his brother's name,
complainant are siblings when he disclosed upon his arrest on August
identity, and educational records renders him unfit for admission to (2) respondent is PROHIBITED from engaging
31, 2012 that his parents are Porferio Ramos Caronan and Norma
the Bar. The practice of law, after all, is not a natural, absolute or in the practice of law or making any
Atillo.49Respondent himself also stated that he is married to Rosana
constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands representations as a lawyer;
Halili-Caronan.50 This diverges from the official NSO records showing
it.57 Rather, it is a privilege limited to citizens of good moral
that "Patrick A. Caronan" is married to Myrna G. Tagpis, not to
character.58 In In the Matter of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee (3) respondent is BARRED from being admitted
Rosana Halili-Caronan.51 Moreover, the photograph taken of
Haron S. Meling in the 2002 Bar Examinations and for Disciplinary as a member of the Philippine Bar in the future;
respondent when he was arrested as "Richard A. Caronan" on August
Action as Member of the Philippine Shari'a Bar, Atty. Froilan R.
16, 2012 shows the same person as the one in the photograph in the
Melendrez,59 the Court explained the essence of good moral (4) the Identification Cards issued by the
IBP records of "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan."52 Meanwhile, complainant
character: Integrated Bar of the Philippines to respondent
submitted numerous documents showing that he is the real "Patrick
under the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" and
A. Caronan," among which are: (a) his transcript of records from the
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
University of Makati bearing his photograph;53 (b) a copy of his high
Good moral character is what a person really is, Certificates issued in such name
school yearbook with his photograph and the name "Patrick A.
as distinguished from good reputation or from are CANCELLED and/or REVOKED;
Caronan" under it;54 and (c) NBI clearances obtained in 2010 and
the opinion generally entertained of him, the and cralawlawlibrary
2013.55chanrobleslaw
estimate in which . he is held by the public in
the place where he is known. Moral character (5) the Office of the Court Administrator is
To the Court's mind, the foregoing indubitably confirm that
is not a subjective term but one which ordered to CIRCULATE notices and POST in the
respondent falsely used complainant's name, identity, and school
corresponds to objective reality. The standard bulletin boards of all courts of the country a
records to gain admission to the Bar. Since complainant - the real
of personal and professional integrity is not photograph of respondent with his real name,
"Patrick A. Caronan" - never took the Bar Examinations, the IBP
satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a " Richard A. Caronan," with a warning that he
correctly recommended that the name "Patrick A. Caronan" be
person to escape the penalty of criminal is not a member of the Philippine Bar and a
stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
law. Good moral character includes at least statement of his false assumption of the name
common honesty.[60] (Emphasis supplied) and identity of "Patrick A. Caronan."
The IBP was also correct in ordering that respondent, whose real
name is "Richard A. Caronan," be barred from admission to the Bar.
Here, respondent exhibited his dishonesty and utter lack of moral Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Under Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, no applicant for
fitness to be a member of the Bar when he assumed the name, Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the
admission to the Bar Examination shall be admitted unless he had
identity, and school records of his own brother and dragged the Court Administrator.
pursued and satisfactorily completed a pre-law course, viz.:
latter into controversies which eventually caused him to fear for his
safety and to resign from PSC where he had been working for years. SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirt
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Good moral character is essential in those who would be
 INTERADENT ZAHNTECHNIK PHILIPPINES, INC., BERNARDINO G.
BANTEGUI, JR. AND SONIA J. GRANDEA, Petitioners, v. REBECCA F.
SIMBILLO, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails the January 4, 2013
Decision2 and May 24, 2013 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA G.R SP No. 120474, which set aside the March 24, 20114and
May 19, 20115 Resolutions of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC No. 12-003076-10. The NLRC
affirmed the October 29, 2010 Decision6 of the Labor Arbiter
declaring respondent Rebecca F. Simbillo's (Simbillo) dismissal by
petitioners Interadent Zahntechnik Philippines, Inc. (Interadent) and
its officers Bernardino G. Bantegui, Jr. (Bantegui) and Sonia J.
Grandea (Grandea), as President and Human Resource &
Organizational Development Manager, respectively, valid on the
ground of loss of trust and confidence.
Antecedent Facts
Simbillo worked at Interadent as a rank-and-file employee from May
2, 2004 up to March 2006. In April 2008, she was rehired by
Interadent as Accounting Manager. On April 16, 2010, she was
promoted to the position of Finance and Accounting Manager. She
was also Interadent’s Treasurer upon being elected by the Board of
Directors on March 31, 2010.
On July 23, 2010, Interadent sought a company-wide implementation
of the following security measures: body frisking and bag/personal
items inspection of all employees upon ingress and egress of office,
disconnection of all USB ports and prohibition of cellular phone
usage.7 The immediate implementation of these security procedures
was brought about by an alleged leakage of security information
uncovered by Interadent's external auditors.
On July 28, 2010, upon the directive of Bantegui, all network and
internet connections in Interadent's Accounting Department were
removed and disabled. Simbillo's electronic mail (email) account was
likewise suspended.8
On July 29, 2010, petitioners served Simbillo a Memorandum9(Notice
to Explain) requiring her to submit a written explanation and to
attend an administrative hearing on August 2, 2010, regarding a
message she posted on her Facebook account "referring to company
concerns with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and insulting
statements against a co-worker." In the Notice to Explain, Simbillo
was reminded that as Treasurer, as well as Finance and Accounting
Manager, he should observe the highest degree of confidentiality in
handling sensitive information. She was preventively suspended for
seven days effective July 29, 2010 to August 6, 2010.
On the following day, Simbillo, through counsel, wrote a
reply-letter10 arguing that she was already constructively dismissed
even prior to her receipt of the Notice to Explain considering the
discriminatory acts committed by petitioners starting July 23, 2010
when certain security procedures were directed exclusively and
solely against her. Simbillo claimed that the Notice to Explain was
defective and was only used to disguise the intent to dismiss her;
hence there was no need for her to submit an answer or attend the
hearing. Simbillo further asserted that she committed no violation of
any rule or law relative to the message she posted on her personal
and private Facebook account that would justify any disciplinary
action.
In a letter11 dated August 6, 2010, petitioners extended Simbillo's
suspension up to August 25, 2010 in view of her failure to submit a
written explanation and to attend the scheduled hearing. In a
reply-letter12 dated August 9, 2010, Simbillo reiterated her claim of
constructive dismissal and that there was no need for her to answer
and attend the hearing.
On August 9, 2010, Simbillo filed with the Labor Arbiter a
Complaint13 for constructive illegal dismissal, non-payment of service
incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, illegal suspension, claims for
moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against
petitioners.
On August 24, 2010, petitioners issued a Second Notice14 informing
Simbillo of her termination from service effective August 25, 2010 on
the ground of loss of trust and confidence. Petitioners found Simbillo
to have disclosed sensitive and confidential information when she
posted on her Facebook account on July 15, 2010, the
following: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sana maisip din nila na ang kompanya
kailangan ng mga taong di tulad nila,
nagtatrabaho at di puro #$,*% ang
pinaggagagawa, na kapag super demotivated
na yung tao nayun baka iwan narin nya ang
kawawang kumpanya na pinagpepyestahan ng
mga b_i_r_. Wala na ngang credibility wala
pang conscience, portraying so respectable
and so religious pa. Hay naku talaga,
nakakasuka, puro nalang animus lucrandi ang
laman ng isip.15
Parties' Respective Positions
Simbillo asserted that her dismissal was without just cause or
compliance with procedural due process since the alleged loss of
trust and confidence was based on self-serving allegations and mere
speculation. She averred that the Facebook entry cannot support the
charge of breach of trust since it did not mention Interadent or any
of its personnel. She maintained that the message actually pertained
to a friend's predicament in another company. She explained that
the term "ng mga b_i_r_" in the Facebook message was short for
“bwitre" and certainly did not refer to the BIR. She claimed that the
sentiments that she expressed did not refer to herself or her work.
She denied having been penalized for a past infraction which
involved disclosure of confidential information.
Petitioners, for their part, denied Simbillo's claim of constructive
dismissal for absence of proof. They asserted that the security
measures were implemented company-wide without favoring or
discriminating against anyone.
Moreover, Simbillo was terminated for a valid and just cause and
with compliance with procedural due process. As a managerial and
confidential employee of Interadent, the highest degree of
professionalism and confidentiality was expected of Simbillo and the
presence of the basis for the loss of the trust and confidence reposed
upon her has warranted her dismissal. Petitioners posited that
Simbillo's Facebook message implying that the BIR is "feasting on"
the company was derogatory because it compromised the company's
reputation, making it vulnerable to ridicule and suspicion particularly
in its dealings with government agencies. Such act violated the
company's Code of Conduct as well as the Code of Ethics for
Professional Accountants. Furthermore, Simbillo's second infraction
of divulging sensitive and confidential financial information has
merited the penalty of termination.
Petitioners maintained that they observed due process by serving
Simbillo both the Notice to Explain and the Second Notice of
Termination. Simbillo was afforded the opportunity to answer but
instead waived her chance to do so by opting not to submit an
answer and attend the hearing.
Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
In a Decision16 dated October 29, 2010, the Labor Arbiter ruled that
Simbillo was not constructively dismissed because she failed to prove
her claim of discrimination. The security measures were
implemented as part of management prerogative to preserve the
integrity of Interadent's network system and encompassed all
employees as gleaned from a poster17 Simbillo herself submitted.
The Labor Arbiter sustained Simbillo's preventive suspension since
her continued presence during investigation posed an imminent
threat to the company's confidential information and records.
The Labor Arbiter also ruled that Simbillo was validly dismissed. He
held that there was no need for an actual leakage of confidential
information for Simbillo to be held accountable; her mere laxity and
carelessness in posting a statement on her Facebook account that
exposed the company to ridicule already rendered her unworthy of
the trust and confidence reposed on her. The dispositive portion of
the Decision reads: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we uphold
the legality of the dismissal of complainant No
pronouncement as to costs.18
Ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission
In a Resolution19 dated March 24, 2011, the NLRC affirmed the ruling
of the Labor Arbiter that Simbillo was not constructively dismissed
but was validly dismissed for loss of trust and confidence. The NLRC
held that the Facebook entry was "indeed alarming" as it
compromised Interadent's reputation and was sufficient basis for the
finding of willful breach of trust. It also ruled that Simbillo was not
denied due process and that she was the one who did not avail
herself of the opportunity to explain her side. The dispositive portion
of the NLRC ruling reads as follows: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal
is hereby DISMISSED, and the appealed
decision AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.20
Simbillo filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was, however,
denied in the NLRC Resolution21 dated May 19, 2011.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Aggrieved, Simbillo filed a Petition for Certiorari22 before the CA
ascribing upon the NLRC grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or in excess of jurisdiction in upholding the legality of her dismissal.
The CA, in a Decision23 dated January 4, 2013, found merit in
Simbillo's Petition. It ruled that to constitute a valid cause for
dismissal, the breach of trust should be willful and intentional, which
petitioners failed to prove in this case. It rejected petitioners'
allegation that Simbillo divulged confidential company information. It
noted that the Facebook entry did not contain any corporate record
or confidential information but was merely "a vague expression of
feelings or opinion towards a person or entity, which was not even
identified with certainty."24 It pointed out that the term "b_i_r_" in
the entry cannot be construed as the acronym “B.I.R." or the Bureau
of Internal Revenue. Finding no willful breach of trust, the CA held
that Simbillo's dismissal was illegal and ordered the payment of her
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement due to strained relations of
the parties plus backwages. The dispositive portion of the CA
Decision reads: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the instant petition of GRANTED.
The Resolutions dated March 24, 2011 and
May 19, 2011 of the National Labor Relations
Commission, are hereby SET ASIDE. Finding
private respondent InteraDent Zahntechnik
Philippines, Inc. to have dismissed petitioner
Rebecca Simbillo without valid or just cause,
InteraDent is hereby ordered to pay her a
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, of one
(1) month salary for every year of service plus
full backwages, inclusive of allowances and
other benefits or their monetary equivalent
from the time her compensation was withheld
until finality of this decision.
SO ORDERED.25cralawred
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied by the
CA in its Resolution26 dated May 24, 2013.
Hence, petitioners filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari27 and a
Motion for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction28 to restrain the implementation of the CA
Decision and Resolution.
Issues
Petitioners raise the question on whether the CA may reverse the
factual declarations of both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that
there was substantial evidence of willful and intentional breach of
trust. According to petitioners, the CA has no power to revisit the
findings of fact of the NLRC by making the following erroneous
interpretations in its Decision: a) that the Facebook entry "does not
contain any corporate record or confidential information;" b) that
the entry is "[a]t worst, x x x a vague expression of feelings or opinion
towards a person or entity, which was not even identified with
certainty;"29 and (c) that the term "b_i_r_" "does not, in any way,
represent the acronym 'B.I.R.' or Bureau of Internal Revenue."30 In
essence, they insist that, on account of such Facebook post, Simbillo
has failed to observe the degree of cautiousness expected of a
manager like herself and therefore may be dismissed on the ground
of loss of trust and confidence.
Our Ruling
The Petition lacks merit.
As a rule, factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies such as the NLRC
are generally accorded not only respect but also finality because of
the special knowledge and expertise gained by these agencies from
handling matters under their specialized jurisdiction.31 However,
well-settled is the rule that for want of substantial basis, in fact or in
law, these factual findings cannot be given the stamp of finality and
conclusiveness normally accorded to it.32 Hence, the CA can review
the factual findings or legal conclusions of the NLRC and "is not
proscribed from 'examining evidence anew to determine whether
the factual findings of the NLRC are supported by the evidence
presented and the conclusions derived therefrom accurately
ascertained'."33 In the exercise of its power to review decisions of the
NLRC, the CA can make its own factual determination when it finds
that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in overlooking or
disregarding the evidence which are material to the controversy.34 In
the instant case, the Court agrees with the CA that the conclusions
arrived at by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are manifestly
erroneous because the evidence does not support their findings.
As a managerial employee, the existence of a basis for believing that
Simbillo has breached the trust of petitioners justifies her
dismissal.35 However, to be a valid ground, loss of trust and
confidence must be based on willful breach of trust, that is, done
intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as
distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly,
or inadvertently.36
It bears emphasizing that the right of an
employer to dismiss its employees on the
ground of loss of trust and confidence must
not be exercised arbitrarily. For loss of trust
and confidence to be a va1id ground for
dismissal, it must be substantial and founded
on clearly established facts. Loss of confidence
must not be used as a subterfuge for causes
which are improper, illegal or unjustified; it
must be genuine, not a mere afterthought, to
justify earlier action taken in bad faith.
Because of its subjective nature, this Court has
been very scrutinizing in cases of dismissal
based on loss of trust and confidence because
the same can easily be concocted by an
abusive employer. x x 37
In this case, the act alleged to have caused the loss of trust and
confidence of petitioners in Simbillo was her Facebook post which
supposedly suggests that Interadent was being "feasted on" by the
BIR and also contains insulting statements against a co-worker and
hence has compromised the reputation of the company. According
to petitioners, there was disclosure of confidential information that
gives the impression that Interadent is under investigation by the BIR
for irregular transactions. However, we agree with the CA's
observation that the Facebook entry did not contain any corporate
record or any confidential information. Otherwise stated, there was
really no actual leakage of information. No company information or
corporate record was divulged by Simbillo.
Simbillo's failure to substantiate her claim that the Facebook entry SO ORDERED.
was posted for a friend who consulted her on a predicament she has
with her company and that the term "b_i_r_" represents ''bwitre"
will not weaken her case against petitioners. It must be emphasized
at this point that in illegal dismissal cases, the burden of proof is
upon the employer to show that the employee's dismissal was for a
valid cause.38''The employer's case succeeds or fails on the strength
of its evidence and not on the weakness of that adduced by the
employee, in keeping with the principle that the scales of justice
should be tilted in favor of the latter in case of doubt in the evidence
presented by them."39 The Facebook entry did not mention any
specific name of employer/company/ government agency or person.
Contrary to petitioners' insistence, the intended subject matter was
not clearly identifiable. As acknowledged by petitioners themselves,
Simbillo's Facebook account contained a list of her former and
present employers. If anything, the entry would merely merit some
suspicion on the part of Interadent being the present employer, but
it would be far-fetched to conclude that Interadent may be involved
in anomalous transactions with the BIR. Clearly, petitioners' theory
was based on mere speculations.

If at all, Simbillo can only be said to have acted "carelessly,

thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently'' in making such a
comment on Facebook; however, such would not amount to loss of
trust and confidence as to justify the termination of her employment.
When the breach of trust or loss of confidence conjectured upon is
not borne by clearly established facts, as in this case, such dismissal
on the ground of loss of trust and confidence cannot be upheld.

Petitioners' contention that Simbillo's second offense of divulging

confidential company information merits her termination deserves
scant consideration. Other than self-serving allegations of petitioners,
there was no concrete proof that Simbillo had a past infraction
involving disclosure of confidential information of the company. If
indeed Simbillo has been found guilty for not being trustworthy due
to an incident that happened in July 2009 as alleged by petitioners,
she should not have been promoted to a higher position as Finance
and Accounting Manager in April 2010 and elected as Treasurer in
March 2010. Moreover, she was given salary and merit increases for
the period covering June 2009-May 2010,40 which is an indication of
her high performance rating.

All told, we find no reversible error on the CA in finding that Simbillo

was illegally dismissed. The allegation of loss of trust and confidence
was not supported by substantial evidence, hence, we find Simbillo's
dismissal unjustified. A lighter penalty would have sufficed for
Simbillo's laxity and carelessness. As this Court has held, termination
of employment is a drastic measure reserved for the most serious of
offenses.41

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The January 4, 2013 Decision

and May 24, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 120474 are AFFIRMED.