G.R. No.

166006 March 14, 2008

PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
FERTIPHIL CORPORATION, Respondent.

FACTS:
President Ferdinand Marcos, exercising his legislative powers, issued LOI No. 1465 which provided, among
others, for the imposition of a capital recovery component (CRC) on the domestic sale of all grades of fertilizers in
the Philippines.

Pursuant to the LOI, Fertiphil paid P10 for every bag of fertilizer it sold in the domestic market
After the 1986 Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the P10 levy. With the return of
democracy, Fertiphil demanded from PPI a refund of the amounts it paid under LOI No. 1465, but PPI refused to
accede to the demand
PPI insists that LOI No. 1465 is a valid exercise either of the police power or the power of taxation. It claims that
the LOI was implemented for the purpose of assuring the fertilizer supply and distribution in the country and for
benefiting a foundation created by law to hold in trust for millions of farmers their stock ownership in PPI.
Fertiphil counters that the LOI is unconstitutional because it was enacted to give benefit to a private company. The
levy was imposed to pay the corporate debt of PPI. Fertiphil also argues that, even if the LOI is enacted under the
police power, it is still unconstitutional because it did not promote the general welfare of the people or public
interest.
RTC held in favor of Fertiphil Corporation. The RTC invalidated the levy for violating the basic principle that taxes
can only be levied for public purpose.

CA affirmed the decision of RTC with modification. The CA ruled that the lis mota of the complaint for collection
was the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465. The question then is whether it was proper for the trial court to exercise
its power to judicially determine the constitutionality of the subject statute in the instant case.
As a rule, where the controversy can be settled on other grounds, the courts will not resolve the constitutionality
of a law. The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of
political departments are valid, absent a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary.
However, the courts are not precluded from exercising such power when the following requisites are obtaining in
a controversy before it: First, there must be before the court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial
review. Second, the question must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person challenging the validity of the act
must have standing to challenge. Fourth, the question of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest
opportunity; and lastly, the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case
The CA held that the present case was primarily instituted for collection and damages. It also reveals that the
instant action is founded on the claim that the levy imposed was an unlawful and unconstitutional special
assessment. The requisite that the constitutionality of the law in question be the very lis mota of the case is present,
making it proper for the trial court to rule on the constitutionality of LOI 1465.

ISSUE: (SC indicated this as the Issue)

The constitutionality of LOI 1465 cannot be collaterally attacked and be decreed via a default judgment in a case
filed for collection and damages where the issue of constitutionality is not the very lis mota of the case. Neither
can LOI 1465 be challenged by any person or entity which has no standing to do so.
(Whether or not the constitutionality of LOI can be collaterally attacked in a case filed for collection and damages
where the issue of constitutionality is not the very lis mota of the case [for our discussion])
RULING:
Fertiphil has locus standi because it suffered direct injury; doctrine of standing is a mere procedural technicality
which may be waived. Fertiphil suffered a direct injury from the enforcement of LOI No. 1465. It was required, and
it did pay, the ₱10 levy imposed for every bag of fertilizer sold on the domestic market.
Even assuming arguendo that there is no direct injury, The SC find that the liberal policy consistently adopted by
the Court on locus standi must apply. The issues raised by Fertiphil are of paramount public importance. It involves
not only the constitutionality of a tax law but, more importantly, the use of taxes for public purpose.
And as for the case of Lis Mota, the SC declared that RTC may resolve constitutional issues; the constitutional
issue was adequately raised in the complaint; it is the lis mota of the case.
While PPI insists that the RTC and the CA erred in ruling on the constitutionality of the LOI. It asserted that the
constitutionality of the LOI cannot be collaterally attacked in a complaint for collection. Alternatively, the resolution
of the constitutional issue is not necessary for a determination of the complaint for collection.

It is settled that the RTC has jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree or an
executive order. This is clear from Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
Judicial review of official acts on the ground of unconstitutionality may be sought or availed of through any of the
actions cognizable by courts of justice, not necessarily in a suit for declaratory relief. Such review may be had in
criminal actions
The constitutional issue, however, (a) must be properly raised and presented in the case, and (b) its resolution is
necessary to a determination of the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented.

The constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 is the very lis mota of the complaint for collection. Fertiphil filed the complaint
to compel PPI to refund the levies paid under the statute on the ground that the law imposing the levy is
unconstitutional. The thesis is that an unconstitutional law is void. It has no legal effect. Being void, Fertiphil had
no legal obligation to pay the levy. Necessarily, all levies duly paid pursuant to an unconstitutional law should be
refunded under the civil code principle against unjust enrichment. The refund is a mere consequence of the law
being declared unconstitutional. The RTC surely cannot order PPI to refund Fertiphil if it does not declare the LOI
unconstitutional. It is the unconstitutionality of the LOI which triggers the refund. The issue of constitutionality is
the very lis mota of the complaint with the RTC.
G.R. No. 163586 January 27, 2009

SHARON CASTRO, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. MERLIN DELORIA, as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Guimaras; the COA-
Region VI, represented by its Director; and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.

FACTS:
Sharon Castro, a Revenue Officer of BIR Buenavista, Guimaras, was charged before the Ombudsman with
Malversation of Public Funds. She was accused of misappropriating public funds worth P556,681.53 despite notice
and demand upon her account for the funds.
Castro filed a Motion to Quash, stating that the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction. She said that the Information
failed to allege her salary grade—a material fact in the crime charged. Citing Uy vs. Sandiganbayan, since she
had a salary grade of 27, her case should be within the jurisdiction of the RTC. She also added that the
prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman are limited to the cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
RTC denied the Motion to Quash, recognizing the authority of the Ombudsman in the case. RTC cited the
Resolution of Uy vs. Sandiganbayan in 2001 which reversed the original decision in Uy vs. Sanidganbayan 1999,
and expressly recognizing the prosecutorial and investigatory authority of the Ombudsman in cases cognizable by
the RTC.

ISSUE: (as stated by the Supreme Court)

W/N the Resolution of the Uy vs. Sandiganbayan case (2001) violates the constitutional provisions against ex-
post facto laws and the denial of due process.

RULING
The decision on Uy vs. Sandiganbayan in 1991 was that the Ombudsman’s prosecutorial powers were limited to
Sandiganbayan cases, while the Resolution on the same case in 2001 expressly held that the Ombudsman shall
have power on all criminal cases involving public officials.

Petitioner contends that the decision in 1991 should apply to her case, instead of the 2001 Resolution, because
the Ombudsman instituted the action against her in April 26, 2000. Hence, the Information filed against
Resolution 2001 is a judicial interpretation of the statute. As such, it constitutes part of the original law which is the
Ombudsman Act of 1989. Such interpretation does not create new law, but rather construes it to reveal the true
intent of the lawmakers. Therefore, the Resolution of the Court in Uy interpreting the Ombudsman Act is part of
the law dated December 7, 1989. “Where no law is invalidated nor doctrine abandoned, a judicial interpretation of
the law should be deemed incorporated at the moment of its legislation”. The Resolution in Uy set aside an
erroneous pubescent interpretation of the Ombudsman Act manifested in Uy vs. Sandiganbayan (1999).

Where a judicial interpretation declares a law unconstitutional or abandons a doctrinal interpretation of such law,
the Court, recognizing that acts may have been performed under the impression of the constitutionality of the law
or the validity of its interpretation, has consistently held that such operative fact cannot be undone by the mere
subsequent declaration of the nullity of the law or its interpretation; thus, the declaration can only have a
prospective application. But where no law is invalidated nor doctrine abandoned, a judicial interpretation of the law
should be deemed incorporated at the moment of its legislation.

In the present case, the March 20, 2001 Resolution in Uy made no declaration of unconstitutionality of any law nor
did it vacate a doctrine long held by the Court and relied upon by the public. Rather, it set aside an erroneous
pubescent interpretation of the Ombudsman Act as expressed in the August 9, 1999 Decision in the same case.
Its effect has therefore been held by the Court to reach back to validate investigatory and prosecutorial processes
conducted by the Ombudsman, such as the filing of the Information against petitioner.
G.R. No. 171101 July 5, 2011

HACIENDA LUISITA, INCORPORATED, Petitioner,

LUISITA INDUSTRIAL PARK CORPORATION and RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING
CORPORATION,Petitioners-in-Intervention,
vs.
PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL; SECRETARY NASSER PANGANDAMAN OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM; ALYANSA NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG BUKID NG HACIENDA
LUISITA, RENE GALANG, NOEL MALLARI, and JULIO SUNIGA1 and his SUPERVISORY GROUP OF THE
HACIENDA LUISITA, INC. and WINDSOR ANDAYA, Respondents.

FACTS:
On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI
and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the PARC revoking HLI’s Stock Distribution Plan (SDP)
and placing the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) of the government.
The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted that there are operative
facts that occurred in the interim and which the Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the
revocation of the SDP must, by application of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296
qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or
[choose actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to “immediately
schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or practical
implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the
ballot, signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed names.”

The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court decision.

ISSUE: (Daming issue dito. Ito lang relevant)

Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case?

HELD
YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.
The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case since, contrary to the
suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional laws but also applies to
decisions made by the President or the administrative agencies that have the force and effect of laws. Prior to the
nullification or recall of said decisions, they may have produced acts and consequences that must be respected.
It is on this score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted from
the implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. The majority stressed that the application
of the operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs because
not only were they allowed to retain the benefits and homelots they received under the stock distribution scheme,
they were also given the option to choose for themselves whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or
not.
G.R. No. 202242 April 16, 2013

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDICIALAND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR.,
Respondents.

FACTS:
The case is in relation to the process of selecting the nominees for the vacant seat of Supreme Court Chief Justice
following Renato Corona’s departure.

Originally, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to create a separate, competent and
independent body to recommend nominees to the President. Thus, it conceived of a body representative of all the
stakeholders in the judicial appointment process and called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).
In particular, Paragraph 1 Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution states that “(1) A Judicial and Bar Council is
hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman,
the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private
sector.” In compliance therewith, Congress, from the moment of the creation of the JBC, designated one
representative from the Congress to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex officio members.
In 1994 however, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only seven (7) members,
an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC
– one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.
During the existence of the case, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr.
(respondents) simultaneously sat in JBC as representatives of the legislature.
It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.
The respondents claimed that when the JBC was established, the framers originally envisioned a unicameral
legislative body, thereby allocating “a representative of the National Assembly” to the JBC. The phrase, however,
was not modified to aptly jive with the change to bicameralism which was adopted by the Constitutional
Commission on July 21, 1986. The respondents also contend that if the Commissioners were made aware of the
consequence of having a bicameral legislature instead of a unicameral one, they would have made the
corresponding adjustment in the representation of Congress in the JBC; that if only one house of Congress gets
to be a member of JBC would deprive the other house of representation, defeating the principle of balance.
The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2) representatives of Congress to be members of the
JBC does not render JBC’s purpose of providing balance nugatory; that the presence of two (2) members from
Congress will most likely provide balance as against the other six (6) members who are undeniably presidential
appointees
Supreme Court held that it has the power of review the case herein as it is an object of concern, not just for a
nominee to a judicial post, but for all the citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of
legal blunders.

ISSUE:
Whether the practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are members of
Congress, defeats the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.
RULING (copy paste ko lang to online. Sorry)
No. The current practice of JBC in admitting two members of the Congress to perform the functions of the JBC is
violative of the 1987 Constitution. As such, it is unconstitutional.
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain,
and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a
well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As such, it can be clearly and unambiguously
discerned from Paragraph 1, Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution that in the phrase, “a representative
of Congress,” the use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is unequivocal and leaves
no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the Constitutional Commission had in
mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more
than one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain
terms, so provided.
Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally
susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the
company of words in which it is founded or with which it is associated. Every meaning to be given to each word or
phrase must be ascertained from the context of the body of the statute since a word or phrase in a statute is always
used in association with other words or phrases and its meaning may be modified or restricted by the latter.
Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word “Congress” used in Article VIII,
Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether
the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular
representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC
Considering that the language of the subject constitutional provision is plain and unambiguous, there is no need
to resort extrinsic aids such as records of the Constitutional Commission. Nevertheless, even if the Court should
proceed to look into the minds of the members of the Constitutional Commission, it is undeniable from the records
thereof that it was intended that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. The underlying reason leads
the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between two representatives of
Congress, or among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter.
With the respondents’ contention that each representative should be admitted from the Congress and House of
Representatives, the Supreme Court, after the perusal of the records of Constitutional Commission, held that
“Congress,” in the context of JBC representation, should be considered as one body. While it is true that there are
still differences between the two houses and that an inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the
realization of the legislative powers conferred to them by the Constitution, the same cannot be applied in the case
of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. No
mechanism is required between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening and nomination of
judicial officers. Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department.
The framers of Constitution, in creating JBC, hoped that the private sector and the three branches of government
would have an active role and equal voice in the selection of the members of the Judiciary. Therefore, to allow the
Legislature to have more quantitative influence in the JBC by having more than one voice speak, whether with
one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each, would “negate the principle of equality among the three branches of
government which is enshrined in the Constitution.”
It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. Thus,
any inclusion of another member, whether with one whole vote or half (1/2) of it, goes against that mandate.
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, providing Congress with an equal voice with other members of the
JBC in recommending appointees to the Judiciary is explicit. Any circumvention of the constitutional mandate
should not be countenanced for the Constitution is the supreme law of the land. The Constitution is the basic and
paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the
land, must defer. Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matter what the tides of time may be. It cannot
be simply made to sway and accommodate the call of situations and much more tailor itself to the whims and
caprices of the government and the people who run it.
Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions
are nonetheless valid. In the interest of fair play under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the
declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar Council IS
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only
one (1) member of Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section 8(1), Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution. This disposition is immediately executory.
G.R. Nos. 177857-58 January 24, 2012

PHILIPPINE COCONUT, PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC. (COCOFED), MANUEL V. DEL ROSARIO,

DOMINGO P. ESPINA, SALVADOR P. BALLARES, JOSELITO A. MORALEDA, PAZ M. YASON, VICENTE
A. CADIZ, CESARIA DE LUNA TITULAR, and RAYMUNDO C. DE VILLA, Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent,
WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, OSCAR F. SANTOS, SURIGAO DEL SUR FEDERATION OF AGRICULTURAL
COOPERATIVES (SUFAC) and MORO FARMERS ASSOCIATION OF ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR (MOFAZS),
represented by ROMEO C. ROYANDOYAN, Intervenors.

FACTS:
In 1971, RA 6260 was enacted, creating the Coconut Investment Company (CIC) to administer the Coconut
Investment Fund (CIF). The fund was to be sourved from a PhP0.55 levy on the sale of every 100 kg of copra.
Under the regime of Marcial Law, PD 276 and 582 were enacted creating more funds, specifically the CCSF
(Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund) and CIDF (Coconut Industry Development Fund)
PD 755 was enacted to provide credit facilities to coconut farmers.

 The Philippine Coconut Administration (PCA) is authorized to handle the funds

 The PCA were authorized to use the funds to acquire a bank and to deposit the portion of fund levies. They
purchased the First United Bank (FUB), later renamed UCPB, but reimbursed the money from the funds.
 The funds were for the benefit of coconut farmers. The funds were used to pay for the financial commitments
of farmers and provided them with free shares of the bank.
 The stock certificates for the farmers were in the name of the PCA but were supposed to be distributed to the
farmers who possessed COCOFUND receipts (PCA Administrative Order No. 1)
P.D. No. 961 codified the various laws relating to the development of coconut/palm oil industries.

Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. was one of the mediators of the PCA funds and it was discovered that he caused the
issuance of PD 1468 (Revised Coconut Industry Code) through collaboration with Marcos.
The Aquino Administration initiated the recovery of ill-gotten gains through the implementation of the following
executive orders:

 EO 1 – establishment of the Presidential Committee on Good Governance (PCGG)

 EO 2 – “Ill-gotten gains” included shares of stocks
 EO 14 – The Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction
The Sandiganbayan ordered the sequestration against stocks in banks owned by more than a million coconut
farmers and CIIF companies

ISSUE: (in relation to our topic)

Whether or not Sandiganbayan gravely abused its power of judicial review and wrongly encroached into the
exclusive domain of Congress when it declared certain provisions of the coconut levy laws and PCA administrative
issuances as unconstitutional.

HELD: (Medyo malabo yung gawa ko. Pero try to read the part on “The Court may pass upon the constitutionality
of P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468.” nung full text. Medj maikli lang yan)
NO. Sandiganbayan did not abuse its power of judicial review.
It is basic that courts will not delve into matters of constitutionality unless unavoidable, when the question of
constitutionality is the very lis mota of the case, meaning, that the case cannot be legally resolved unless the
constitutional issue raised is determined. This rule finds anchorage on the presumptive constitutionality of every
enactment. Withal, to justify the nullification of a statute, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution. A doubtful or speculative infringement would simply not suffice.
The present controversy cannot be resolved without going into the constitutionality of P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468
in particular
To reiterate, it is of crucial importance to determine the validity of P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 in light of the
constitutional proscription against the use of special funds save for the purpose it was established. Otherwise,
petitioners’ claim of legitimate private ownership over UCPB shares and indirectly over SMC shares held by
UCPB’s subsidiaries will have no leg to stand on, P.D. No. 755 being the only law authorizing the distribution of
the SMC and UCPB shares of stock to coconut farmers, and with the aforementioned provisions actually stating
and holding that the coco levy fund shall not be considered as a special – not even general – fund, but shall be
owned by the farmers in their private capacities.

The Supreme Court is convinced of the imperative need to pass upon the issues of constitutionality raised by
Plaintiff. The issue of constitutionality of the provisions of P.D. No. 755 and the laws related thereto goes to the
very core of Plaintiff’s causes of action and defenses thereto.
The Supreme Court is also mindful that lower courts are admonished to observe a becoming modesty in examining
constitutional questions, but that they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted,
subject only to review by the highest tribunal (Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court).

It is true that, as a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity. The
Honorable Supreme Court … has clearly stated that the general rule admits of exceptions, thus:

‘For courts will pass upon a constitutional question only when presented before it in bona fide cases for
determination, and the fact that the question has not been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow
it to be raised later…. It has been held that the determination of a constitutional question is necessary whenever
it is essential to the decision of the case … as where the right of a party is founded solely on a statute, the validity
of which is attacked.’
G.R. No. L-34915 June 24, 1983

CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch
XVIII; HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC., respondents.

FACTS:
An ordinance was promulgated in Quezon city which approved the regulation of establishment of private
cemeteries in the said city. According to the ordinance, 6% of the total area of the private memorial park shall be
set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of QC. Himlayang
Pilipino, Inc., a private memorial park, contends that the taking or confiscation of property restricts the use of
property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of
his property. It also contends that the taking is not a valid exercise of police power, since the properties taken in
the exercise of police power are destroyed and not for the benefit of the public.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the ordinance made by Quezon City is a valid taking of private property

RULING:
NO. The ordinance made by Quezon City is not a valid way of taking private property. The ordinance is actually a
taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the
municipal corporation instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery. State's exercise of the power of
expropriation requires payment of just compensation. Passing the ordinance without benefiting the owner of the
property with just compensation or due process, would amount to unjust taking of a real property. Since the
property that is needed to be taken will be used for the public's benefit, then the power of the state to expropriate
will come forward and not the police power of the state.
G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, Respondent.

FACTS:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled “An
Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in
Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila” (the
Ordinance).” The ordinance sanctions any person or corporation who will allow the admission and charging of
room rates for less than 12 hours or the renting of rooms more than twice a day.
The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC), and Sta. Mesa Tourist and
Development Corporation (STDC), who own and operate several hotels and motels in Metro Manila, filed a motion
to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the ordinance will affect their
business interests as operators. The respondents, in turn, alleged that the ordinance is a legitimate exercise of
police power.
RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null and void as it “strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed
and jealously guarded by the Constitution.” Reference was made to the provisions of the Constitution encouraging
private enterprises and the incentive to needed investment, as well as the right to operate economic enterprises.
Finally, from the observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless be
consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour stay,

When elevated to CA, the respondents asserted that the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to
Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which confers on cities the power to regulate the establishment,
operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging
houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports. Also, they contended that under
Art III Sec 18 of Revised Manila Charter, they have the power to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and
proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace,
good order, comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants and to fix penalties for the
violation of ordinances.
Petitioners argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacy and freedom
of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is unreasonable and oppressive interference in their
business.
CA, in turn, reversed the decision of RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the ordinance. First, it held that the
ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the owners or
operators of establishments that admit individuals for short time stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of police
power is only constrained by having a lawful object obtained through a lawful method. The lawful objective of the
ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful method since the establishments
are still allowed to operate. Third, the adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its
constituents in general.
Hence, the petitioners appeared before the SC.

ISSUE:
Whether Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power of the State.
HELD:
No. Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered as a valid exercise of police power, and as such, it is
unconstitutional.
The facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of Manila v Laguio Jr ruling, but the 1967 decision
in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila. The common thread
that runs through those decisions and the case at bar goes beyond the singularity of the localities covered under
the respective ordinances. All three ordinances were enacted with a view of regulating public morals including
particular illicit activity in transient lodging establishments. This could be described as the middle case, wherein
there is no wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the services offered by these establishments have been
severely restricted. At its core, this is another case about the extent to which the State can intrude into and regulate
the lives of its citizens
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held that for
an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and
pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial
or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public
policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable. (Valid Ordinance Test)
The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate admissions
and renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police power as
conferred on local government units by the Local Government Code through such implements as the general
welfare clause.
Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and
its people. Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State.
The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit
sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the
ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their
achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution.
An ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of
lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the ordinance as a police power
measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment
of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation
must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under
the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be
permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into
private rights.
The behavior which the ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be diminished
simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug
dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement
of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal
intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the
ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged
in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect “wash rates” from their clientele by
charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments.
SC reiterated that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the
legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from
needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well¬-intentioned the ordinance may be, it is in effect an
arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The ordinance
needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their
patrons without sufficient justification. The ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than
twice a day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and the Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 203335 February 11, 2014

JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ROWENA S. DISINI, LIANNE IVY P. MEDINA, JANETTE TORAL and
ERNESTO SONIDO, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
TECHNOLOGY OFFICE, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE and THE DIRECTOR OF THE
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Respondents.

Summary:
The Supreme Court declared Sections 4(c)(3), 12, and 19 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 as
unconstitutional. It held that Section 4(c)(3) violated the right to freedom of expression by prohibiting the electronic
transmission of unsolicited commercial communications. It found Section 12 in violation of the right to privacy
because it lacked sufficient specificity and definiteness in collecting real-time computer data. It struck down
Section 19 of the Act for giving the government the authority to restrict or block access to computer data without
any judicial warrant.

FACTS:
These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of Republic Act (RA) 10175, the Cybercrime
Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional and void.
The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace. The cyberspace is a boon to the need
of a current generation for greater information and facility of communication. But all is not well with the system
since it could not filter out a number of persons of ill will who would want to use cyberspace technology for mischiefs
and crimes. One of them can, for instance, avail himself of the system to unjustly ruin the reputation of another or
bully the latter by posting defamatory statements against him that people can read.
And because linking with the internet opens up a user to communication from others, the ill-motivated can use the
cyberspace for committing theft by hacking into or surreptitiously accessing his bank account or credit card or
defrauding him through false representations.
The wicked can use the cyberspace, too, for illicit trafficking in sex or for exposing to pornography guileless children
who have access to the internet.
For these reasons, the government has a legitimate right to regulate the use of cyberspace and contain and punish
wrongdoings. The government certainly has the duty and the right to prevent these tomfooleries from happening
and punish their perpetrators, hence the Cybercrime Prevention Act.
But petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace activities
violate certain of their constitutional rights.
Pending hearing and adjudication of the issues presented in these cases, on February 5, 2013, the Court extended
the original 120-day temporary restraining order (TRO) that it earlier issued on October 9, 2012, enjoining
respondent government agencies from implementing the cybercrime law until further orders.

ISSUE:
1. The petitioners contend that Section 4(a)(1) fails to meet the strict scrutiny standard required of laws that
interfere with the fundamental rights of the people. Is Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access unconstitutional?
2. Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers from overbreadth in that, while is seeks to discourage data
interference, it intrudes into the area of protected speech and expression, creating a chilling and deterrent
effect on these guaranteed freedoms.
3. Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or cyber-squatting violates the equal protection clause in that, not being
narrowly tailored, it will cause a user using his real name to suffer the same fate as those who use aliases or
take the name of another in satire, parody, or any other literary device.
4. Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates the constitutional rights to due process and to privacy and
correspondence, and transgresses the freedom of the press.
5. Petitioners claim that cybersex violates the freedom of expression clause of the Constitution.
6. Petitioners are wary that a person who merely doodles on paper and imagines a sexual abuse of a 16-year
old is not criminally liable for producing child pornography but one who formulates the idea on his laptop would
be.
7. Is Section 4(c)(3) unconstitutional for penalizing the transmission of unsolicited commercial communications?
8. Petitioners dispute the constitutionality of both the penal code provisions on libel as well as Section4(c)(4) of
the Cybercrime Prevention Act on cyberlibel.
9. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 5 that renders criminally liable any person who wilfully abets
or aids in the commission or attempts to commit any of the offenses enumerated as cybercrimes. It suffers
from overbreadth, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on protected expression.
10. Is Section 6 on the penalty of one degree higher constitutional?
11. Is Section 7 on the prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and RA 10175 constitutional?
12. Is Section 8 valid and constitutional?
13. Is Section 12 on Real-Time collection of traffic data valid and constitutional?
14. Is Section 13 on preservation of computer data valid and constitutional?
15. Is Section 14 on disclosure of computer data valid and constitutional?
16. Is Section 15 on search, seizure and examination of computer data valid and constitutional?
17. Is Section 17 on destruction of computer data valid and constitutional?
18. Is Section 19 on restricting or blocking access to computer data valid and constitutional?
19. Is Section 20 on obstruction of justice valid and constitutional?
20. Is Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC) valid and constitutional?
21. Is Section 26(a) on CICC’s power and functions valid and constitutional?

RULING: (Copy pasted online. Although nag add ako sa ‘I think’ necessary sa discussion)
1. No. The strict scrutiny standard, an American constitutional construct, is useful in determining the
constitutionality of laws that tend to target a class of things or persons. According to this standard, a legislative
classification that impermissibly interferes with the exercise of fundamental right or operates to the peculiar
class disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional. The Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1)
that calls for the application of the strict scrutiny standard since no fundamental freedom, like speech, is
involved in punishing what is essentially a condemnable act – accessing the computer system of another
without right. It is a universally condemnable act.
2. Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state regulation,
may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of
protected speech. Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on these freedoms at all. It simply punishes what
essentially is a form of vandalism, the act of wilfully destroying without right the things that belong to others, in
this case their computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message. Such act has no connection
to guaranteed freedoms. Ergo, there is no freedom to destroy other people’s computer systems and private
documents. All penal laws, like the cybercrime law, have of course an inherent chilling effect, an in terrorem
effect, or the fear of possible prosecution that hangs on the heads of citizens who are minded to step beyond
the boundaries of what is proper. But to prevent the State from legislating criminal laws because they instil
such kind of fear is to render the state powerless in addressing and penalizing socially harmful conduct.
3. No, the challenge to the constitutionality of Section 4(a)(6) is baseless. The law is reasonable in penalizing the
act of acquiring the domain name in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive others who are
not ill-motivated of the rightful opportunity of registering the same. It is the evil purpose for which one uses the
name that the law condemns.
4. No. In assessing the challenge that the State has impermissibly intruded into these zones of privacy, a court
must determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that
expectation has been violated by unreasonable government intrusion. The law punishes those who acquire or
use identifying information without right, implicitly to cause damage. Petitioners fail to show how government
effort to curb computer-related identity theft violates the right to privacy and correspondence as well as the
right to due process. There is no fundamental right to acquire another’s personal right. The Court has defined
intent to gain as an internal act which can be established through overt acts of the offender, and it may be
presumed from the furtive taking of useful property pertaining to another, unless special circumstances reveal
a different intent on the part of the perpetrator. As such, the press, whether in the quest of news reporting or
 social investigation, has nothing to fear since a special circumstance is present to negate intent to gain which
is required by this Section.
5. The Court will not declare Section 4(c)(1) unconstitutional where it stands a construction that makes it apply
only to persons engaged in the business of maintaining, controlling, or operating, directly or indirectly, the
lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity with the aid of a computer system as Congress has
intended.
6. The constitutionality of Section 4(c)(3) is not successfully challenged. The law makes the penalty higher by
one degree when the crime is committed in cyberspace. But no one can complain since the intensity or duration
of penalty is a legislative prerogative and there is a rational basis for such higher penalty.
7. Yes, because to prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his emails,
even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech is a separate category of speech
which us not accorded the same level of protection as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of
expression but is nonetheless entitled to protection. The State cannot rob him of this right without violating the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Thus, unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of
expression.
8. Since the penal code and implicitly, the cybercrime law, mainly target libel against private persons, the Court
recognizes that these laws imply a stricter standard of malice to convict the author of a defamatory statement
where the offended party is a public figure. The elements of libel are: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act
or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d)
existence of malice.There is actual malice or malice in fact when the offender makes the defamatory statement
with the knowledge that it is false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. The reckless
disregard standard used here required a high degree of awareness of probable falsity. There must be sufficient
evidence to permit the conclusion that the accused in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the
statement he published. Gross or even extreme negligence is not sufficient to establish actual malice. The
defense of absence of actual malice, even when the statement turns out to be false, is available where the
offended party is a public official or a public figure. But, where the offended party is a private individual, the
prosecution need not prove the presence of actual malice. For his defense, the accused must show that he
has a justifiable reason for the defamatory statement even if it was in fact true.
9. A governmental purpose, which seeks to regulate the use of cyberspace communication technology to protect
a person’s reputation and peace of mind, cannot adopt means that will unnecessarily and broadly sweep,
invading the area of protected freedoms. If such means are adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of what
sinister predicaments await internet users will suppress otherwise robust discussion of public issues.
Democracy will be threatened and with it, all liberties. Penal laws should provide reasonably clear guidelines
for law enforcement officials and triers of facts to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. The terms
“aiding or abetting” constitute broad sweep that generates chilling effect on those who express themselves
through cyberspace posts, comments, and other messages. Hence, Section 5 of the cybercrime law that
punishes “aiding or abetting” libel on the cyberspace is a nullity.
10. Yes, because there exists a substantial distinction between crimes committed through the use of information
and communication technology and similar crimes committed using other means. In using the technology in
question, the offender often evades identification and is able to reach far more victims or cause greater harm.
11. The Court resolves to leave the determination of the correct application of Section 7 that authorizes
prosecution of the offender under both the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act 10175 to actual cases, with
the exception of the crimes of:
 Online libel as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(4) of Republic Act 10175 and
Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes a violation of the proscription against double jeopardy;
as well as
 Child pornography committed online as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(2) of
Republic Act 10175 and Republic Act 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 also constitutes a
violation of the same proscription, and, in respect to these, is void and unconstitutional.
12. Valid and constitutional, because the matter of fixing penalties for the commission of crimes is as a rule a
legislative prerogative.
13. Void and unconstitutional, because Section 12 does not permit law enforcement authorities to look into the
contents of the messages and uncover the identities of the sender and the recipient. Thus, the authority that
Section 12 gives law enforcement agencies is too sweeping and lacks restraint.
14. Valid and constitutional, because the user ought to have kept a copy of that data when it crossed his computer
if he was so minded. There was no undue deprivation of property since the data that service providers preserve
on orders of law enforcement authorities are not made accessible to users by reasons of the issuance of such
orders.
15. Valid and constitutional, because what Section 14 envisions is merely the enforcement of a duly issued court
warrant. Disclosure can be made only after judicial intervention.
The process envisioned in Section 14 is being likened to the issuance of a subpoena. Petitioners’ objection is that
the issuance of subpoenas is a judicial function. But it is well-settled that the power to issue subpoenas is not
exclusively a judicial function. Executive agencies have the power to issue subpoena as an adjunct of their
investigatory powers.
16. Valid and constitutional, because Section 15 merely enumerates the duties of law enforcement authorities that
would ensure proper collection, preservation, and use of computer system or data that have been seized by
virtue of a court warrant.
Section 15 merely enumerates the duties of law enforcement authorities that would ensure the proper collection,
preservation, and use of computer system or data that have been seized by virtue of a court warrant. The exercise
of these duties do not pose any threat on the rights of the person from whom they were taken. Section 15 does
not appear to supersede existing search and seizure rules but merely supplements them.
17. Valid and constitutional, because it is unclear that the user has a demandable right to require the service
provider to have that copy of data saved indefinitely for him in its storage system.
18. Void and unconstitutional, because Section 19 not only precludes any judicial intervention but it also disregards
jurisprudential guidelines established to determine the validity of restrictions on speech.
19. Valid and constitutional insofar as it applies to the provisions of Chapter IV which are not struck down by the
Court.
20. and 21. Valid and constitutional, because cybercrime law is complete in itself when it directed the CICC to
formulate and implement a national cybersecurity plan. The law gave sufficient standards for the CICC to
follow when it provided a definition of cybersecurity.
G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and Employment, and TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, as
Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, respondents.

FACTS:
Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI), a firm “engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino
workers, male and female, for overseas placement,” challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order
No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of “GUIDELINES
GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND
HOUSEHOLD WORKERS”.

Specifically, the measure is assailed for “discrimination against males or females” that it “does not apply to all
Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills”, that it is violative of the right to travel.

The Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the POEA invokes the
police power of the Philippine State.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the D.O. No.1 in the nature of a police power measure is constitutional.

HELD:

Yes. The concept of police power is it is the authority of the State to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.” It may be consists of (1) an imposition of
restraint upon liberty or property, and (2) in order to foster the common good.
It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. Significantly, the Bill of Rights itself does not purport to be
an absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties “Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted
license to act according to one’s will.” It is subject to the far more overriding demands and requirements of the
greater number.
As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina
workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers, are compelling
motives for urgent Government action. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon
to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government’s efforts.
Petition is dismissed.
G.R. No. 198860 July 23, 2012

ABRAHAM RIMANDO, Petitioner,

vs.
NAGUILIAN EMISSION TESTING CENTER, INC., represented by its President, ROSEMARIE LLARENAS
and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.

FACTS

Naguilian Emission Testing Center, Inc., represented by its President, Rosemarie Llarenas (respondent) filed a
petition of mandamus against Abraham P. Rimando (petitioner), Mayor of Naguilian, La Union at the time that the
case was filed. The petition of mandamus was filed to compel the Rimando to issue a business permit in favor of
Naguilian Emission Testing Center, Inc.

The respondent claimed that its business is being conducted on a parcel of land which formerly belonged to the
national government but later on certified by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) as
an alienable and disposable land of the public domain. The respondent had operated its business of emission
testing on the land from 2005 to 2007. On January 18, 2008, the respondent filed an application for the renewal
of its business permit and paid the corresponding fees therefor.

The petitioner, however, refused to issue a business permit unless and until the respondent executes a contract
of lease with the Municipality of Naguilian. The parties did not reach an agreement as regards the stipulations in
the proposed agreement, hence the petition for mandamus.

On May 26, 2009, the RTC denied the petition for lack of merit based on the ratiocinations that:

(a) the Municipality of Naguilian is the declared owner of the subject parcel of land by virtue of Tax
Declaration No. 002-01197;

(b) under Section 6A.01 of the Revenue Code of the Municipality of Naguilian, the municipality has the
right to require the petitioner to sign a contract of lease because its business operation is being conducted
on a real property owned by the municipality; and

(c) a mayor’s duty to issue business permits is discretionary in nature which may not be enforced by a
mandamus writ.

On appeal, the CA held that the appeal was dismissible on the ground of mootness considering that the period for
which the business period was being sought had already lapsed. Nonetheless, the CA proceeded to resolve the
issues involved in the appeal for academic purposes.

The CA disagreed with the RTC and found that the factual milieu of the case justifies the issuance of a writ of
mandamus. The CA reasoned that the tax declaration in the name of the municipality was insufficient basis to
require the execution of a contract of lease as a condition sine qua non (meaning essential) for the renewal of a
business permit. The CA further observed that Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 2007-81, upon which the
municipality anchored its imposition of rental fees, was void because it failed to comply with the requirements of
the Local Government Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.

The CA held that the petitioner may not be held liable for damages since his action or inaction, for that matter, was
done in the performance of official duties that are legally protected by the presumption of good faith. The CA
likewise stressed that the civil action filed against the petitioner had already become moot and academic upon the
expiration of his term as the mayor of Naguilian, La Union.

Despite the case being moot, the CA rendered judgment reversing the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Rimando, as his capacity as mayor, may be compelled by mandamus to release a business permit
in favor of petitioners.
RULING:

We agree with the CA that the petition for mandamus has already become moot and academic owing to the
expiration of the period intended to be covered by the business permit.

An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy so that a
determination thereof would be without practical use and value or in the nature of things, cannot be enforced. In
such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which the applicant would be entitled to and which would be
negated by the dismissal of the petition. As a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on
ground of mootness.

The objective of the petition for mandamus to compel the petitioner to grant a business permit in favor of
respondent corporation for the period 2008 to 2009 has already been superseded by the passage of time and the
expiration of the petitioner’s term as mayor. Verily then, the issue as to whether or not the petitioner, in his capacity
as mayor, may be compelled by a writ of mandamus to release the respondent’s business permit ceased to present
a justiciable controversy such that any ruling thereon would serve no practical value. Should the writ be issued,
the petitioner can no longer abide thereby; also, the effectivity date of the business permit no longer subsists.

While the CA is not precluded from proceeding to resolve the otherwise moot appeal of the respondent, we find
that the decretal portion of its decision was erroneously couched.

The CA’s conclusions on the issue of ownership over the subject land and the invalidity of Sangguniang Bayan
Resolution No. 2007-81, aside from being unsubstantiated by convincing evidence, can no longer be practically
utilized in favor of the petitioner. Thus, the overriding and decisive factor in the final disposition of the appeal was
its mootness and the CA should have dismissed the same along with the petition for mandamus that spawned it.

More importantly, a mayor cannot be compelled by mandamus to issue a business permit since the exercise of
the same is a delegated police power hence, discretionary in nature. This was the pronouncement of this Court in
Roble Arrastre, Inc. v. Hon. Villaflor where a determination was made on the nature of the power of a mayor to
grant business permits under the Local Government Code, viz:

Central to the resolution of the case at bar is a reading of Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code of
1991, which provides, thus:

SEC. 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation.

(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the
municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the municipal mayor shall:

xxxx

3) Initiate and maximize the generation of resources and revenues, and apply the same to the
implementation of development plans, program objectives and priorities as provided for under Section 18
of this Code, particularly those resources and revenues programmed for agro-industrial development and
country-wide growth and progress, and relative thereto, shall:

xxxx

(iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon
which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance.

Indeed, as correctly ruled by the RTC, the petition for mandamus filed by the respondent is incompetent to compel
the exercise of a mayor’s discretionary duty to issue business permits.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated March 30, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 112152 is hereby SET ASIDE. The Decision dated May 26, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La
Union is REINSTATED.