1) Gatchalian vs. Collector of Internal Revenue P8,000.00.
The Court of First Instance rejected the claim of ownership advanced by
Plaintiffs purchased, in the ordinary course of business, from one of the duly
authorized agents of the National Charity Sweepstakes Office one ticket for the sum
of two pesos (P2), said ticket was registered in the name of Jose Gatchalian and
Company. The ticket won one of the third-prizes in the amount of P50,000. Jose
Gatchalian was required to file the corresponding income tax return covering the
prize won. Defendant-Collector made an assessment against Jose Gatchalian and Co.
requesting the payment of the sum of P1,499.94 to the deputy provincial treasurer
of Pulilan, Bulacan. Plaintiffs, however through counsel made a request for
exemption. It was denied.
Plaintiffs failed to pay the amount due, hence a warrant of distraint and levy was
issued. Plaintiffs paid under protest a part of the tax and penalties to avoid the
effects of the warrant. A request that the balance be paid by plaintiffs in installments
was made. This was granted on the condition that a bond be filed. Plaintiffs failed in
their installment payments. Hence a request for execution of the warrant of distraint
and levy was made. Plaintiffs paid under protest to avoid the execution. A claim for
refund of the sum of P1,863.44 was made by the plaintiffs, which was dismissed,
hence the appeal.
Issue:
1. Did Gatchalian and Company form a partnership and or merely a
community of property without a personality of its own?
2. Should Gatchalian and company pay the tsx collectively or should the
payment be prorated among them and paid individually?
Ruling:
1. According to the stipulation facts the plaintiffs organized a partnership of a civil
nature because each of them put up money to buy a sweepstakes ticket for the sole
purpose of dividing equally the prize which they may win, as they did in fact in the
amount of P50,000 (article 1665, Civil Code). The partnership was not only formed,
but upon the organization thereof and the winning of the prize, Jose Gatchalian
personally appeared in the office of the Philippines Charity Sweepstakes, in his
capacity as co-partner, as such collection the prize, the office issued the check for
P50,000 in favor of Jose Gatchalian and company, and the said partner, in the same
capacity, collected the said check. All these circumstances repel the idea that the
plaintiffs organized and formed a community of property only.
2. Having organized and constituted a partnership of a civil nature, the said entity
is the one bound to pay the income tax which the defendant collected under the
aforesaid section 10 (a) of Act No. 2833, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 3761.
There is no merit in plaintiff's contention that the tax should be prorated among
them and paid individually, resulting in their exemption from the tax.
2.) DIVERSIFIED CREDIT CORPORATION VERSUS ROSADO
FACTS: Lot No. 62-B of Bacolod Cadastre belong to the thirteen co-owners, including
Luz Jayme Rosado, who owns 1/13th part pro-indiviso. On May 11, 1964, Luz Jayme
Rosado, wife of Felipe Rosado (defendants), signed a Deed of Sale together with the
co-owners of the property to Diversified Credit Corporation (plaintiff). Felipe Rosado
had built a house on the lot sometime in 1957 without the whole property having
been previously partitioned among the thirteen (13) co-owners. Title of the property
has already been transferred to the plaintiff upon registration of the Deed of Sale in
June, 1964. Demand was made by the plaintiff upon the defendant Felipe Rosado
and his wife Luz Jayme Rosado but defendant refused to vacate the premises or to
remove his house thereon on the grounds that he had built on the lot in question a
conjugal house worth P8,000.00 which necessarily makes the lot on which it stands
subject to Article 158 of the Civil Code and on the point of view of equity that if the
house were demolished the defendant would suffer damage in the amount of
Rosado.
ISSUE: Whether by the construction of a house on the lot owned in common by the
Jaymes, and sold by them to the appellant corporation, the land in question or a
1/13th part of it became conjugal property.
RULING:NO. It is a basic principle in the law of co-ownership that no individual co-
owner can claim title to any definite portion of the land or thing owned in common
until the partition thereof. Prior to that time, all that the co-owner has is an ideal, or
abstract, quota or proportionate share in the entire thing owned in common by all
the co-owners. The principle is emphasized by the rulings of this Court. In Lopez vs.
Ilustre, 5 Phil. 567, it was held that while a co-owner has the right to freely sell and
dispose of his undivided interest, he has no right to sell a divided part of the real
estate owned in common.
Since the share of the wife, Luz Jayme, was at no time physically determined, it
cannot be validly claimed that the house constructed by her husband was built on
land belonging to her, and Article 158 of the Civil Code can not apply. Certainly, on
her 1/13 ideal or abstract undivided share, no house could be erected. Necessarily,
the claim of conversion of the wife's share from paraphernal to conjugal in character
as a result of the construction must be rejected for lack of factual or legal basis.
6)MARIANO VS. CA (PROPERTY)
FACTS: Decedent Francisco Gosiengfiao is the registered owner of a residential lot
located at Ugac Sur, Tuguegarao, Cagayan. The said land was mortgaged by the
decedent to the Rural Bank of Tuguegarao (designated as Mortgagee bank, for
brevity). On August 15, 1958, Francisco Gosiengfiao died intestate survived by his
heirs, namely: Third-Party Defendants: wife Antonia and Children Amparo, Carlos,
Severino and herein plaintiffs-appellants Grace, Emma, Ester, Francisco, Jr., Norma,
Lina (represented by daughter Pinky Rose), and Jacinto.
The loan being unpaid, the lot in dispute was foreclosed by the mortgagee bank and
in the foreclosure sale held, the same was awarded to the mortgagee bank as the
highest bidder. Before the redemption period expires, third-party defendant Amparo
Gosiengfiao-Ibarra redeemed the property by paying the amount of P1,347.89 and
the balance of P423.35 was paid to the mortgagee bank. Amparo Gosiengfiao then
sold the entire property to defendant Leonardo Mariano who subsequently
established residence on the lot subject of this controversy. Defendant Leonardo
Mariano sold the same property to his children Lazaro F. Mariano and Dionicia M.
Aquino.
Plaintiffs Grace Gosiengfiao, et al. upon learning of the above transaction filed a
complaint for "recovery of possession and legal redemption with damages" against
defendants Leonardo and Avelina Mariano. Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that
as co-heirs and co-owners of the lot in question, they have the right to recover their
respective shares in the same, and property as they did not sell the same, and the
right of redemption with regard to the shares of other co-owners sold to the
defendants.
Defendants in their answer alleged that the plaintiffs has (sic) no cause of action
against them as the money used to redeem lot in question was solely from the
personal funds of third-party defendant Amparo Gosiengfiao-Ibarra, who
consequently became the sole owner of the said property and thus validly sold the
entire property to the defendants, and the fact that defendants had already sold the
said property to the children, Lazaro Mariano and Dionicia M. Aquino.
The Regional Trial Court of Cagayan, Branch I, rendered a decision dated September
16, 1986, dismissing the complaint and stating that respondents have no right of
ownership or possession over the lot in question. The trial court further said that
when the subject property foreclosed and sold at public auction, the rights of the
heirs were reduced to a mere right of redemption. And when Amparo G. Ibarra
redeemed the lot from the Rural Bank on her own behalf and with her own money
she became the sole owner of the property. Respondents' having failed to redeem
the property from the bank or from Amparo G. Ibarra, lost whatever rights the might
have on the property. 5 subsisting relationship when they started living together.
The Court of Appeals in its questioned decision reversed and set aside the ruling of
the trial court and declared herein respondents as co-owners of the property in the
question. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: 1. whether or not a co-owner who redeems the whole property with her own
personal funds becomes the sole owner of said property and terminates the existing
state of co-ownership
RULING: 1. In the case at bar, it is undisputed and supported by records, that third-
party defendant Amparo G. Ibarra redeemed the property in dispute within the one
year redemption period. Her redemption of the property, even granting that the
money used was from her own personal funds did not make her the exclusive owner
of the mortgaged property owned in common but inured to the benefit of all co-
owners. It would have been otherwise if third-party defendant Amparo G. Ibarra
purchased the said property from the mortgagee bank (highest, bidder in the
foreclosure sale) after the redemption period had already expired and after the
mortgagee bank had consolidated it title in which case there would no longer be any
co-ownership to speak of . 6 The decision of the Court of Appeals is supported by a
long line of case law which states that a redemption by a co-owner within the period
prescribed by law inures to the benefit of all the other co-owners.
ISSUE: 2. whether or not the right of legal redemption was not timely exercised by
the private respondents, as the same must be done within the period of one month
from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.
RULING: 2. The records of the present petition, however, show no written notice of
the sale being given whatsoever to private respondents. in the interpretation of a
related provision (Article 1623 of the New Civil Code) this Court had stressed that
written notice is indispensable, actual knowledge of the sale acquired in some other
manners by the redemptioner, notwithstanding. He or she is still entitled to written
notice, as exacted by the code to remove all uncertainty as to the sale, its terms and
its validity, and to quiet and doubt that the alienation is not definitive. The law not
having provided for any alternative, the method of notifications remains exclusive,
though the Code does not prescribe any particular form of written notice nor any
distinctive method written notification of redemption. Premises considered,
respondents have not lost their right to redeem, for in the absence of a written
notification of the sale by the vendors, the 30-day period has not even begun to run.
9. Mallilin v. Castillo (PROPERTY)
Facts: Eustaquio Mallilin Jr. and Ma. Elvira Castillo were alleged to be both married
and with children but separated from their respective spouses and cohabited in 1979
while respective marriages still subsist. They established Superfreight Customs
Brokerage Corporation during their union of which petitioner was the President and
Chairman and respondent as Vice President and Treasurer. They likewise acquired
real and personal properties which were registered solely in respondent’s name. Due
to irreconcilable conflict, the couple separated in 1992. Petitioner then demanded
his share from respondent in the subject properties but the latter refused alleging
that said properties had been registered solely in her name. Furthermore,
respondent denied that she and petitioner lived as husband and wife because they
were still legally married at the time of cohabitation. Petitioner filed complaint for
partition of co-ownership shares while respondent filed a motion for summary
judgment. Trial court dismissed the former and granted the latter.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner can validly claim his share in the acquired
properties registered under the name of the respondent considering they both have
Ruling: It was error for the trial court to rule that, because the parties in this case
were not capacitated to marry each other at the time that they were alleged to have
been living together, they could not have owned properties in common. The Family
Code, in addition to providing that a co-ownership exists between a man and a
woman who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage,
likewise provides that, if the parties are incapacitated to marry each other,
properties acquired by them through their joint contribution of money, property or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their contributions
which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal. There is
thus co-ownership eventhough the couple are not capacitated to marry each other.
On the basis of this, he contends that an implied trust existed pursuant to Art. 1452
of the Civil Code which provides that "(I)f two or more persons agree to purchase
property and by common consent the legal title is taken in the name of one of them
for the benefit of all, a trust is created by force of law in favor of the others in
proportion to the interest of each." We do not think this is correct. The legal relation
of the parties is already specifically covered by Art. 148 of the Family Code under
which all the properties acquired by the parties out of their actual joint contributions
of money, property or industry shall constitute a co-ownership. Co-ownership is a
form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the other. 18 The provisions of Art.
1452 and Art. 1453 of the Civil Code, then are no longer material since a trust
relation already inheres in a co-ownership which is governed under Title III, Book II of
the Civil Code.
10. Aguilar v. CA
Petitioner Virgilio and respondent Senen were brothers who purchased a house and
lot for their father. At first, they agreed to have a 2/3 and 1/3 share in the co-
ownership of the said property but eventually decided to have equal shares over the
same. They further agreed that the deed of sale would be executed and the title
registered in the meantime in the name of Senen. When their father died, petitioner
demanded that respondent vacates the house and that the property be sold and
proceeds thereof divided among them. Refusal of respondent led petitioner to file an
action to compel the sale of the house and proceeds thereof divided 2/3 in his favor
and 1/3 to respondent, and that the latter also pay monthly rentals for the use of the
house after their father died. However, respondent counterclaims that the proceeds
should be divided equally and that being co-owner, he was entitled to the use and
enjoyment of the property. The trial court held that the property be sold and the
proceeds divided equally between the co-owners, and that plaintiff shall pay shall
pay the rentals.
Issue:
1. May respondent seek for the partition of the co-owned house and lot?
2. Is respondent obliged to pay the monthly rentals?
Ruling:
1. Yes. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership and that each co-
owner may demand at any time partition of the thing owned in common insofar as
his share is concerned. Whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the co-
owners cannot agree that it be allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the
others, it shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly distributed. This is resorted to
when the right to partition the property is invoked by any of the co-owners but
because of the nature of the property it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision
would prejudice the interests of the co-owners, and the co-owners are not in
agreement as to who among them shall be allotted or assigned the entire property
upon proper reimbursement of the co-owners.

2. No. Being a co-owner, respondent has the right to use the house and lot without
paying any compensation to petitioner, as he may use the property owned in
common so long as it is in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and
in a manner not injurious to the interest of the co-owners. Each co-owner of property
held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property. However, from the
time the trial court ordered respondent to vacate, he should pay rental for the use
and enjoyment of the other half of the property appertaining to petitioner.
13) PNB v. CA, 98 SCRA 207 - Izzy
Facts: When the husband died, the wife and heirs inherited the lot in question. ½
belonged to the wife, the other half belonged to the heirs. The wife mortgaged the
entire property in favor of PNB, however, this was not annotated in the day book of
the Register of Deeds but it was annotated in owner’s certificate of title No. 7683
only five years later. Meanwhile, the wife defaulted the fulfillment of her obligation
with the Manila Trading Company. So the said company levied upon her share in the
lot in question. Her interest in the lot in question was afterwards sold at public
auction, at which the Manila Trading Company was the highest bidder.
She also failed to settle her dues with PNB, so the latter sold the whole lot in a public
auction, where PNB was the highest bidder. PNB filed a petition for cancellation of
the present title, and for the issuance of a new title in its name.
Later, PNB sold the property to Felizardo Reyes where a new certificate of title was
issued in the latter’s name.
Issue: whether Rosa Ver could, as she did in fact, m the entire Lot 9068 to petitioner
PNB
Ruling: By herself alone, Rosa could not. The trial court found and so held that Lot
9068 belonged to the conjugal partnership of the spouse lingo Bitanga and Rosa Ver.
Therefore, when Inigo died on September 25, 1936, his one-half share in said lot was
transmitted to his heirs (Article 777, New Civil Code; Article 657, old Civil Code) 5
and a co-ownership was established between them and Iñigo’s surviving spouse
Rosa Ver. Hence, on October 20, 1936, a little over a year after Iñigo’s death, Rosa
Ver, by herself alone, could not have validly mortgaged the whole of Lot 9068 to
PNB.
Under Article 2085, New Civil Code (Art. 1857, Old Civil Code), one of the essential
requisites to the contract of pledge and mortgage is that the pledgor or mortgagor
be the absolute owner of the thing pledged or mortgaged. And under Article 493,
New Civil Code (Art. 399, Old Civil Code), each co-owner shall have the full
ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may
therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation
or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shag be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Hence, We fully agree with the trial court and the respondent Court and affirm the
holding that “what the Philippine National Bank had acquired from Rosa Ver by virtue
of the mortgage was simply one-half (½) of the entire property, for this was all she
had in her power to convey — the other half being, as it still is, the lawful share of
the plaintiffs-appellees as inheritance from their father, Iñigo Bitanga. Nemo date
quod non habet — One cannot give what is not his.
Issue: Do the MTC and interveners have a superior right over the ½ share the MTC
had previously acquire?
Ruling: Yes. In the instant case, there is no showing that the Manila Trading
Company (MTC) had any knowledge or notice of the prior mortgage in favor of the
PNB, hence, it may be safely presumed that it (MTC) acquired the rights of Rosa Ver
and Guillermo Bitanga as an innocent purchaser for value and free from all
incumbrances. From the MTC, the aforesaid rights of Rosa and Guillermo passed to
Santiago Sambrano, and from the latter, to herein intervenors. There is no question,
therefore, as to intervenors' rights over the property, as against the PNB or its
transferee, Felizardo Reyes. The intervenors merely stepped into the shoes of MTC, a
prior purchaser in good faith, and thereby became entitled to an the defenses
available to said Company, including those arising from the acquisition of the
property in good faith and for value. (Granados vs. Monton, L-1698, April 8, 1950, 86
Phil. 42).
Issue: Is the mortgage in favor to PNB, the same not being recorded in the day book
of the Register of Deeds, effective?
Ruling: No. Upon the clear and explicit provisions of the Land Registration Act and
the jurisprudence on the indefeasibility of the Torrens title after the lapse of one year
as reiterated and emphasized in the unbroken line of authorities, We hold that the
respondent court committed no error in holding that “the lien by reason or on
account of the mortgage executed by Rosa Ver over the entire parcel on October 20,
1936, which was not annotated on the original certificate of title, could not have
attached to the land. Otherwise stated, the failure of the interested party to appear
during the registration proceeding and claim such interest in the land barred him
from thereafter having such interest annotated on the certificate of title.” Stated
otherwise, the failure of the petitioner bank to appear during the registration
proceedings and claim such interest in the land, and further to do so after more than
a year after the issuance of the decree of registration which rendered the title
undefeasible and free from any collateral attack by any person g title to or interest
in the land prior to registration proceedings, has resulted into the petitioner bank
being virtually deprived of its mortgage.
14) Clarin vs CA, G.R. L-30786 (1984)
Facts: Petitioner Clarin was the owner of a 10-hectare land, which was his share from
the other co-owners. Petitioner agreed to sell his land to private respondent Rulon at
a price of P2,500 subject to the condition that a downpayment of P1,000 was to be
made and then the balance of P1,500 was to be paid on a monthly installment basis
of P100. Private repsondent was able to pay the downpayment and P100 as the first
installment. However, petitioner returned the payments made by private respondent
alleging that while they had agreed to the sale of the land, it was still subject to the
condition that the contract would be realized only if his co-heirs will give their
consent to the sale of a portion of their common inheritance and that his co-heirs
refus
ed to give their consent, resulting the projected contract to be discontinued or not
be realized.
Issue: WON there was a legal impossibility on the part of petitioner to dispose a
portion of the community property.
Held: No. The contract of sale was perfected between the petitioner and the
respondent and that the sale did not depend on a condition that the petitioner’s co-
owners would have to agree to the sale. The reasons given by the petitioner cannot
operate against the validity of the contract in question. A contract is valid even
though one of the parties entered into it against his better judgment. (See Lagunzad
v. Vda. de Gonzales, 92 SCRA 476; citing Martinez v. Hongkong and Shanghai Bank,
15 Phil. 252).
Although as a co-owner, the petitioner cannot dispose of a specific portion of the
land, his share shall be bound by the effect of the sale as provided in Article 493 of
the Civil Code.
15) Pamplona v. Moreto, 96 SCRA 775 izzy
Facts: Flaviano and Maniega are married, and they have six children. They own lots
Nos. 1495, 4545, and 1496 with 781, 544 and 1,021 sq. meters respectively. Child A
died (1959) and left 7 heirs. Child B died (1938) leaving 1 heir. Child C died (1954)
leaving 4 heirs. Child D (1943) died leaving 1 heir. Child E died (1942) leaving 1 heir.
Monica died (1946). Without the consent of heirs of the deceased wife, and before
any liquidation of the conjugal partnership of Monica and Flaviano could be effected,
Flaviano executed in favor of Geminiano Pamplona, married to defendant Apolonia
Onte, the deed of absolute sale covering lot No. 1495 for P900.00. Houses were built
thereon and from 1956-1960, the same was enlarged. A corral for a piggery was also
constructed within the same lot, the subject of their agreement. It was found later
that the lot they occupied formed part of lot. 1496. Nevertheless, all of them thought
it was lot 1945. When Flaviano died intestate (1961) the heirs demanded that the
Pamplonas vacate the premises for Flaviano Had no right to sell the said portion for
it belongs to the conjugal partnership and the wife was already dead when the sale
was executed without the consent of the heirs.
Issue: What rule should apply in this case: rules on co-ownership or partnership?
Ruling: Co-ownership. There is no question that when the petitioners purchased the
property on July 30, 1952 from Flaviano Moreto for the price of P900.00, his wife
Monica Maniega had already been dead six years before, Monica having died on May
6, 1946. Hence, the conjugal partnership of the spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica
Maniega had already been dissolved. (Article 175, (1) New Civil Code; Article 1417,
Old Civil Code). The records show that the conjugal estate had not been inventoried,
liquidated, settled and divided by the heirs thereto in accordance with law. The
necessary proceedings for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership were not
instituted by the heirs either in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased
spouse pursuant to Act 3176 amending Section 685 of Act 190. Neither was there an
extra-judicial partition between the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased
spouse nor was an ordinary action for partition brought for the purpose. Accordingly,
the estate became the property of a community between the surviving husband,
Flaviano Moreto, and his children with the deceased Monica Maniega in the concept
of a co-ownership.
The community property of the marriage, at the dissolution of this bond by the
death of one of the spouses, ceases to belong to the legal partnership and becomes
the property of a community, by operation of law, between the surviving spouse and
the heirs of the deceased spouse, or the exclusive property of the widower or the
widow, it he or she be the heir of the deceased spouse. Every co-owner shall have
full ownership of his part and in the fruits and benefits derived therefrom, and he
therefore may alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in
its enjoyment, unless personal rights are in question. (Marigsa vs. Macabuntoc, 17
Phil. 107)
Issue: Did the sale of Flaviano to the Pamplonas, even without consent from the
heirs, result to a partial partition?
Ruling: Yes because the heirs are estopped from questioning the sale.
We reject respondent Court’s ruling that the sale was valid as to one-half and invalid
as to the other half for the very simple reason that Flaviano Moreto, the vendor, had
the legal right to more than 781 sq. meters of the communal estate, a title which he
could dispose, alienate in favor of the vendees-petitioners. The title may be pro-
indiviso or inchoate but the moment the co-owner as vendor pointed out its location
and even indicated the boundaries over which the fences were to be erectd without
objection, protest or complaint by the other co-owners, on the contrary they
acquiesced and tolerated such alienation, occupation and possession, We rule that a
factual partition or termination of the co-ownership, although partial, was created,
and barred not only the vendor, Flaviano Moreto, but also his heirs, the private
respondents herein from asserting as against the vendees-petitioners any right or
title in derogation of the deed of sale executed by said vendor Flaiano Moreto.
Equity commands that the private respondents, the successors of both the deceased
spouses, Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega be not allowed to impugn the sale
executed by Flaviano Moreto who indisputably received the consideration of P900.00
and which he, including his children, benefitted from the same. Moreover, as the
heirs of both Monica Maniega and Flaviano Moreto, private respondents are duty-
bound to comply with the provisions of Articles 1458 and 1495, Civil Code, which is
the obligation of the vendor of the property of delivering and transfering the
ownership of the whole property sold, which is transmitted on his death to his heirs,
the herein private respondents. The articles cited provide, thus:
18.) Oliveros vs Lopez
Facts: Lorenzo Lopez owned Lot 4685 of the Cadastral survey of Villasis, Pangasinan
with an area of 69,687 square meters. Lorenzo Lopez died, leaving said property to
his wife, Tomasa Ramos and six (6) children. From that time on, the heirs of Lorenzo
Lopez did not initiate any moves to legally partition the property. More than twenty-
one years later, or on February 11, 1953, Tomasa Ramos and her eldest son,
Candido Lopez, executed a deed of absolute sale of the undivided portion of their
interests over Lot 4685, in favor of Melecio Oliveras. On the same day another deed
of absolute sale in favor of Pedro Oliveras Each of the documents bear the
thumbmarks of Tomasa and Candido. More than thirteen years later, the counsel of
the Oliveras brothers wrote the heirs of Lorenzo Lopez reminding them of the
Oliverases' demands to partition the property so that they could acquire their
respective titles thereto without resorting to court action, and that, should they fail
to respond, he would be forced to file a case in court. 8 Apparently, the Lopezes did
not answer said letter Oliveras brothers and their wives filed a complaint for
partition and damages 9 in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. The Oliverases
stated in their complaint that possession of the disputed properties was delivered to
them with the knowledge and consent of the defendants; that they had been paying
the real estate taxes thereon; that prior to the sale, said properties were offered to
the other co-owners for sale but they refused to buy them.
As special and affirmative defenses, the defendants contended that the deeds of
sale were null and void and hence, unenforceable against them; that the complaint
did not state a cause of action and that the cause or causes of action if any, had
prescribed.
Issue: Whether or not the two deeds of absolute sale were null and void considering
that the land subject thereof had not yet been partitioned.
Ruling: In a long line of decisions, this Court has held that before the partition of a
land or thing held in common, no individual co-owner can claim title to any definite
portion thereof. All that the co-owner has is an Ideal or abstract quota or
proportionate share in the entire land or thing. However, the duration of the juridical
condition of co-ownership is not limitless. Under Article 494 and 1083 of the Civil
Code, co-ownership of an estate should not exceed the period of twenty (20) years.
And, under the former article, any agreement to keep a thing or property undivided
should be for a ten-year period only. Where the parties stipulate a definite period of
in division which exceeds the maximum allowed by law, said stipulation shall be void
only as to the period beyond such maximum. Although the Civil Code is silent as to
the effect of the in division of a property for more than twenty years, it would be
contrary to public policy to sanction co- ownership beyond the period set by the law.
Otherwise, the 20-year limitation expressly mandated by the Civil Code would be
rendered meaningless.
In the instant case, the heirs of Lorenzo Lopez maintained the co-ownership for more
than twenty years. We hold that when Candido and his mother (who died before the
filing of the complaint for partition) sold definite portions of Lot 4685, they validly
exercised dominion over them because, by operation of law, the co-ownership had
ceased. The filing of the complaint for partition by the Oliverases who, as vendees,
are legally considered as subrogated to the rights of Candido over portions of Lot
4685 in their possession, 16 merely served to put a stamp of formality on Candido's
otherwise accomplished act of terminating the co-ownership.
19) Tuason v. Tuason, 88 Phil.428 – Co-Ownership
Facts: Siblings Angela, Nieves, Antonio held a parcel of land in common, each
owning an undivided 1/3 portion. Nieves sold her share to Gregorio Araneta Inc., a
domestic corporation, and a new Certificate of Title was issued in lieu of the old title
covering the same property. The three co-owners agreed to have the whole parcel
subdivided into small lots and then sold, the proceeds of the sale to be later divided
among them. The three co-owners agreed to improve the property by filling it and
constructing roads and curbs on the same and then subdivide it into small lots for
sale. Araneta Inc. was to finance the whole development and subdivision. It also is
given full power and authority to sign for and in behalf of all the said co-owners of
said property all contracts of sale and deeds of sale of the lots into which this
property might be subdivided. No co-owner of the property shall sell, alienate or
dispose of his ownership, interest or participation therein without first giving
preference to the other co-owners to purchase and acquire the same. Before, during
and after the execution of this contract, Atty. J. Antonio Araneta was acting as the
attorney-in-fact and lawyer of the two co-owners, Angela and Antonio. At the same
time he was a member of the Board of Director of the third co-owner, Araneta, Inc.
Angela revoked the powers conferred on her attorney-in-fact and lawyer, J. Antonio
Araneta and notified Araneta, Inc. she had decided to rescind said contract and she
asked that the property held in common be partitioned. Angela filed a complaint
asking the court to order the partition of the property in question and that she be
given 1/3 of the same including rents collected during the time that the same
including rents collected during the time that Araneta Inc., administered said
property. The trial court dismissed the complaint and because the property is valued
at more than P50,000, the appeal came directly to the SC.
Note: (9) This contract shall remain in full force and effect during all the time that it
may be necessary for the PARTY OF THE SECOND PART to fully sell the said property
in small and subdivided lots and to fully collect the purchase prices due thereon; it
being understood and agreed that said lots may be rented while there are no
purchasers thereof;
(11) The PARTY OF THE SECOND PART (meaning Araneta Inc.) is hereby given full
power and authority to sign for and in behalf of all the said co-owners of said
property all contracts of sale and deeds of sale of the lots into which this property
might be subdivided; the powers herein vested to the PARTY OF THE SECOND PART
may, under its own responsibility and risk, delegate any of its powers under this
contract to any of its officers, employees or to third persons;
(15) No co-owner of the property subject-matter of this contract shall sell, alienate
or dispose of his ownership, interest or participation therein without first giving
preference to the other co-owners to purchase and acquire the same under the
same terms and conditions as those offered by any other prospective purchaser.
Should none of the co-owners of the property subject-matter of this contract
exercise the said preference to acquire or purchase the same, then such sale to a
third party shall be made subject to all the conditions, terms, and dispositions of this
contract; provided, the PARTIES OF THE FIRST PART (meaning Angela and Antonio)
shall be bound by this contract as long as the PARTY OF THE SECOND PART, namely,
the GREGORIO ARANETA, INC. is controlled by the members of the Araneta family,
who are stockholders of the said corporation at the time of the signing of this
contract and/or their lawful heirs
Issue: The main contention of the appellant is that the contract should be declared
null and void because its terms, particularly paragraphs 9, 11 and 15 violate the
provisions of Art. 400 of the Civil Code.
Note: ART. 400. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain a party to the community.
Each may, at any time, demand the partition of the thing held in common.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a specified length of
time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This period may be a new agreement.
Ruling: We agree with the trial court that the provisions of Art. 400 of the Civil Code
are not applicable. The contract has for its purpose and object, the dissolution of the
co-ownership and of the community by selling the parcel held in common and
dividing the proceeds of the sale among the co-owners. The obligation imposed in
the contract to preserve the co-ownership until all the lots shall have been sold, is a
mere incident to the main object of dissolving the co-owners. The Court finds no
valid ground for the partition insisted upon the appellant. We find from the evidence
as was done by the trial court that of the 64,928.6 sq. m. which is the total area of
the parcel held in common, only 1,600 sq. m. or 2.5 per cent of the entire area
remained unsold at the time of the trial in the year 1947, while the great bulk of
97.5 per cent had already been sold. As well observed by the court below, the
partnership is in the process of being dissolved and is about to be dissolved, and
even assuming that Art. 400 of the Civil Code were applicable, under which the
parties by agreement may agree to keep the thing undivided for a period not
exceeding 10 years, there should be no fear that the remaining 1,600 sq. m. could
not be disposed of within the four years left of the ten-years period fixed by Art. 400.
20) RAMIREZ VS RAMIREZ
FACTS: Plaintiff, Jose Maria Ramirez, brought this action against defendants, who are
collectively called Manuel Uy and Sons Inc, for the partition of a parcel of land which
is the estate of the late Jose Vivencio Ramirez and is likewise situated at the
Northwestern corner of Escolta street and Plaza Sta. Cruz, Manila. The land in
dispute belongs pro indiviso to both parties, one-sixth (1/6) to the plaintiff and five-
sixths (5/6) to the defendants. Manuel Uy & Sons and Butte (judicial administrator,
the Bank of the Philippine Islands) agreed to have the land partitioned. The other
defendants objected to the physical partition of the property in question, upon the
theory that said partition is "materially and legally" impossible and "would work
great harm and prejudice to the co-owners. Both the plaintiffs and the defendant
were not able to come up with an agreement in partitioning the land. The court then
referred the issue
to the three commissioners. The Court rendered a decision declaring that plaintiff is
entitled to the segregation of his share, and directing that the property be
partitioned in accordance with the plan submitted by commissioner Valencia.
Issue: Is the appellant correct that, instead of making the aforementioned
segregation, plaintiff's share should be sold to them citing Article 495 of the Civil
Code?
ART 495 Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding article, the co-owners
cannot demand a physical division of the thing owned in common, when to do so
would render it unserviceable for the use for which it is intended. But the co-
ownership may be terminated in accordance with article 498.
RULING: No. They apparently assume that the alleged "inestimable damage" to be
suffered by the property, if plaintiff's share were segregated, is equivalent to
rendering it "unserviceable for the use for which it is intended." Independently of the
fact that the minor premise of this syllogism — the alleged "inestimable damage" —
has not been established, the conclusion drawn by appellants does not follow
necessarily. There is nothing to show that, after segregating plaintiff's share, the
buildings left on the remaining 1,301.34 square meters, representing defendants'
share, would be unserviceable, either for commercial or for residential purposes. On
the contrary, it seems obvious that plaintiff would not insist upon the partition
prayed for, if his share 4 were unserviceable for either particularly the commercial
purpose.
22) CARBONELL v. CA
FACTS: On January 27, 1955, respondent Jose Poncio executed a private
memorandum of sale of his parcel of land with improvements situated in San Juan,
Rizal in favor of petitioner Rosario Carbonell who knew that the said property was at
that time subject to a mortgage in favor of the Republic Savings Bank (RSB) for the
sum of P1,500.00. Four days later, Poncio, in another private memorandum, bound
himself to sell the same property for an improved price to one Emma Infante for the
sum of P2,357.52, with the latter still assuming the existing mortgage debt in favor
of the RSB in the amount of P1,177.48. Thus, in February 2, Poncio executed a
formal registerable deed of sale in her (Infante's) favor. So, when the first buyer
Carbonell saw the seller Poncio a few days afterwards, bringing the formal deed of
sale for the latter's signature and the balance of the agreed cash payment, she was
told that he could no longer proceed with formalizing the contract with her
(Carbonell) because he had already formalized a sales contract in favor of Infante. To
protect her legal rights as the first buyer, Carbonell registered on February 8, 1955
with the Register of Deeds her adverse claim as first buyer entitled to the property.
Meanwhile, Infante, the second buyer, was able to register the sale in her favor only
on February 12, 1955, so that the transfer certificate of title issued in her name
carried the duly annotated adverse claim of Carbonell as the first buyer. The trial
court declared the claim of the second buyer Infante to be superior to that of the
first buyer Carbonell, a decision which the Court of Appeals reversed. Upon motion
for reconsideration, however, Court of Appeals annulled and set aside its first
decision and affirmed the trial court’s decision.
ISSUE: Who has the superior right over the subject property?
RULING: The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s decision and declared
the first buyer Carbonell to have the superior right over the subject property, relying
on Article 1544 of the Civil Code. Unlike the first and third paragraphs of said Article
1544, which accord preference to the one who first takes possession in good faith of
personal or real property, the second paragraph directs that ownership of
immovable property should be recognized in favor of one "who in good faith first
recorded" his right. Under the first and third paragraphs, good faith must
characterize the prior possession, while under the second paragraph, good faith
must characterize the act of anterior registration.
When Carbonell bought the lot from Poncio on January 27, 1955, she was the only
buyer thereof and the title of Poncio was still in his name solely encumbered by bank
mortgage duly annotated thereon. Carbonell was not aware - and she could not have
been aware - of any sale to Infante as there was no such sale to Infante then. Hence,
Carbonell's prior purchase of the land was made in good faith which did not cease
after Poncio told her on January 31, 1955 of his second sale of the same lot to
Infante. Carbonell wanted to meet Infante but the latter refused so to protect her
legal rights, Carbonell registered her adverse claim on February 8, 1955. Under the
circumstances, this recording of Carbonell’s adverse claim should be deemed to
have been done in good faith and should emphasize Infante's bad faith when the
latter registered her deed of sale 4 days later.
24) Sunset View Condominiums Corporation vs Campos
This is a consolidation of two cases having identical facts and raising same questions
of law to which in both cases, respondents admitted that they have not fuly paid the
purchase price of the respective units. In the first case, respondent Aguillar-Barnes
Realty(ABR), is indebted to the Spouses Emmanuel and Zenaida Aguillar was the
assignee of Solana, in the Sunset View Condominium Project and La Perla
Commercial(LPC) as the assignor. LPC then bought the said unit from the Tower
Builders, Inc. Thereafter, petitioner filed a collection of assessment levied against
the unit of ABR before the CFI of Pasay. The respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss
alleging thereto that there is no cause of action and the court lacks jurisdiction over
the subject matter. the MTD was granted and the judge ruled that the case should
be tried in the SEC. the MTD having been denied, petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari.
In the second case, petitioner Sunset View Condominium Corporation filed before
the CFI of Pasay a collection of overdue accounts on assessments and insurance
premiums and the interest thereon amounting to P6,168.06 against respondent Lim
Siu to whom was assigned ton July 11, 1977a unit called "algeria" of the Sunset View
Condominium Corporation. As a response, respondent filed a MTD alleging that the
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter considering that the dispute arises
from a intra-corporate relationship this jurisdiction is before the SEC. However, the
said MTD was denied. the respondent move for reconsideration but it was ikewise
denied.
Aggrieved, respondent appealed, hence, petitioner move to dismiss the aforesaid
appeal on the ground that the decision appealed from is interlocutory. However, this
was denied by the court. the court rendered it decision favoring respondent and
direct the parties to ventilate their case with the SEC. The petitioner to to reconsider
but it was denied. Hence, this petitioner on certiorari.
Issues:
1. Is a purchaser of a condominium unit in the condominium project managed by the
petitioner, who has not yet fully paid the purchase price thereof, automaticaly a
,stockholder of the petitioner Condominium Corporation?
2. Is it the regular court or the Securities & Exchange Commission that has jurisdiction
over cases for collection of assessments assessed by the Condominium Corporation
on condominium units the full purchase price of which has not been paid?
Ruling:
1. The share of stock appurtenant to the unit win be transferred accordingly to the
purchaser of the unit only upon full payment of the purchase price at which time he
will also become the owner of the unit. Consequently, even under the contract, it is
only the owner of a unit who is a shareholder of the Condominium Corporation.
Inasmuch as owners is conveyed only upon full payment of the purchase price, it
necessarily follows that a purchaser of a unit who has not paid the full purchase
price thereof is not The owner of the unit and consequently is not a shareholder of
the Condominium Corporation.
2. Inasmuch as the private respondents are not shareholders of the petitioner
condominium corporation, the instant case for collection cannot be a "controversy
arising out of intracorporate or partnership relations between and among
stockholders, members or associates; between any or all of them and the
corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members or
associates, respectively" which controversies are under the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Securities & Exchange Commission, pursuant to Section 5 (b) of
P.D. No. 902- A. The subject matters of the instant cases according to the allegations
of the complaints are under the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
25) RAMOS VERSUS DIRECTOR OF LANDS
FACTS: Restituto Romero y Ponce apparently gained possession of a considerable
tract of land located in the municipality of San Jose, Province of Nueva Ecija, in the
year 1882. He took advantage of the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, to obtain a
possessory information title to the land, registered as such on February 8, 1896.
Parcel No. 1, included within the limits of the possessory information title of Restituto
Romero, was sold in February, 1907, to Cornelio Ramos, the instant petitioner, and
his wife Ambrosia Salamanca. The petitioner has cultivated only about one fourth of
the entire tract.
Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title registered.
Opposition was entered by the Director of Lands on the ground that Ramos had not
acquired a good title from the Spanish government and by the Director of Forestry
on the ground that the first parcel was forest land. The trial court agreed with the
objectors and excluded parcel No. 1 from registration.
ISSUE: Is actual occupancy of a part of the land described in the instrument giving
color of title sufficient to give title to the entire tract of land?
RULING: YES. The doctrine of constructive possession indicates the answer. The
general rule is that the possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract under claim
of ownership of all is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in the
adverse possession of another. The claimant has color of title; he acted in good
faith; and he has had open, peaceable, and notorious possession of a portion of the
property, sufficient to apprise the community and the world that the land was for his
enjoyment. (See arts. 446, 448, Civil Code.) Possession in the eyes of the law does
not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it
can be said that he is in possession. Ramos and his predecessor in interest fulfilled
the requirements of the law on the supposition that he premises consisted of
agricultural public land.
27) Director vs. CA, 130 SCRA 9 izzy
Facts: This is a land registration case involving a large tract of land owned by Bruno
Cabauatan. applicants have not produced in evidence any composition title, the
basis of their application. It was allegedly burned during the war. Thus, the
boundaries of the land is not known. On March 1934, a portion of the land (25
hectares) was registered. This was co-owned by the heirs of Cabauatan. The heirs
possessed the rest of the land openly, peacefully, continuously and in the concept of
owner since the Spanish regime up to the present time. As for the rest of land being
claimed by the heirs, there were found to be claimants who have applied for a
homestead long before this application for registration. Notwithstanding the claims
of the homesteaders, the trial court granted the registration of the 128 hectare land
grounded on the doctrine of constructive possession.
Issue: Does the doctrine of constructive possession apply in this case?
Ruling: No. The trial court granted the application for registration of the six lots with
an area of 128 hectares, in addition to the often mentioned 25 hectares already
registered. It reasoned out that if Bruno’s heirs had possession of the said 25
hectares, they could be deemed to have “constructive possession” of the remaining
part of the land provided that the same is not in the adverse possession of another
person (Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175).
We hold that the rule on constructive possession does not apply to this case because
the major portion of the disputed 128 hectares has been in the adverse possession
of homesteaders and their heirs and is still part of the public domain until the
patents are issued.
34). Cordero v. Cabral
Facts: Based on the claims and counterclaims filed by both parties, it can be inferred
that Gregorio Ocampo bought a parcel of land, which the portion under litigation is
included, and took possession of the whole lot thereafter. In 1935, the adjoining
owner of the said property, Mr. Rodriguez and predecessor of defendant Victoria
Cabral, requested Mr. Ocampo to sell to him the said land. As there was already a
meeting of the mind and per request of Mr. Rodriquez and Mr. Cabral, Mr. Ocampo
allowed the latter to possess the said portion. However, the proposed sale never
materialized. The Cabral continued to be in possession until this present case arose.
Plaintiffs herein, heirs of Gregorio Ocampo, filed an action against respondents
Cabral et al. seeking the court to order the latter to vacate and surrender to them
Lot no. 5, and to deliver to them the fruits harvested on the subject lot. Defendants
claim to be the owner of the said portion of land and that they have been in actual
adverse, peaceful and continuous possession of said land for more than 50 years.
Issue:
1. Did defendants acquire ownership over the land through acquisitive prescription?
2. Did defendants possess the land in good faith as to make them liable for the
harvest produced on the land?
Ruling:
1. no. Possession of defendants is not as owner but only as a prospective owner. His
possession cannot therefore be termed adverse. Such possession cannot also be
termed continuous for 50 years because mr. Ocampo was in possession of the same
in 1934 before Mr. Rodriguez came to possession of the same, first, with the consent
and later by toleration of Mr. Ocampo.
2. The defendants, by their own admission, are in possession of the disputed land.
There is no evidence that they were possessors in bad faith. However, their good
faith ceased when they were served with summons to answer the complaint. As
possessors in bad faith from the service of the summons they shall reimburse the
fruits received and those which the legitimate possessor could have received
pursuant to art. 549 of the NCC.
39) Dizon v. Suntay – 47 scra 160IZZY
Suntay turned over a diamond ring to Clarita to be sold by the latter for the former.
However, it was instead pledged in the pawnshop owned by Dizon.
Issue: Can Suntay recover the ring without reimbursing Dizon?
Ruling: Yes. There is a fairly recent restatement of the force and effect of the
governing codal norm in De Gracia v. Court of Appeals. 4 Thus: “The controlling
provision is Article 559 of the Civil Code. It reads thus: ‘The possession of movable
property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has
lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from the
person in possession of the same. If the possessor of a movable lost of which the
owner has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale,
the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor.’
Respondent Angelina D. Guevara, having been unlawfully deprived of the diamond
ring in question, was entitled to recover it from petitioner Consuelo S. de Garcia who
was found in possession of the same. The only exception the law allows is when
there is acquisition in good faith of the possessor at a public sale, in which case the
owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price. As authoritatively
interpreted in Cruz v. Pahati, the right of the owner cannot be defeated even by
proof that there was good faith in the acquisition by the possessor. There is a
reiteration of this principle in Aznar v. Yapdiangco. Thus: ‘Suffice it to say in this
regard that the right of the owner to recover personal property acquired in good
faith by another, is based on his being dispossessed without his consent. The
common law principle that were one of two innocent persons must suffer by a fraud
perpetrated by another, the law imposes the loss upon the party who, by his
misplaced confidence, has enabled the fraud to be committed, cannot be applied in
a case which is covered by an express provision of the new Civil Code, specifically
Article 559. Between a common law principle and a statutory provision, the latter
must prevail in this jurisdiction.”"
47) La Vista Assn. v. CA, G.R. No. 95252, Sept. 5, 1997izzy
Facts: In between the properties of Ateneo and LA VISTA is a 15-meter wide road,
called Mangyan road. Each gave each other an easement for a right-of-way. Ateneo
informed LA VISTA that it was going to develop the property into a subdivision. LA
VISTA offered to buy the property but Ateneo refused and sold it in a public sale. In
the contract, Ateneo stipulated that right-of-way will be transferred to vendee and
that the vendor will retain such privilege subject to the condition that the vendor
shall help maintain the road. Solid Homes, Inc. was able to purchase said property.
LA VISTA cancelled the privilege to use the road granted in favor to Ateneo and put
up concrete posts and chains which blocked entry to Solid Homes' subdivision.
Issue: WON a voluntary easement exists in this case.
Ruling: Voluntary easement exists. The predecessors-in-interest of both LA VISTA
and Solid Homes, Inc., i.e., the Tuasons and the Philippine Building Corporation,
respectively, clearly established a contractual easement of right-of-way over
Mangyan Road. When the Philippine Building Corporation transferred its rights and
obligations to ATENEO the Tuasons expressly consented and agreed thereto.
Meanwhile, the Tuasons themselves developed their property into what is now
known as LA VISTA. On the other hand, ATENEO sold the hillside portions of its
property to Solid Homes, Inc., including the right over the easement of right-of-way.
In sum, when the easement in this case was established by contract, the parties
unequivocally made provisions for its observance by all who in the future might
succeed them in dominion.
Issue: Once there is a voluntary easement of a right-of-way is established, is the The
free ingress and egress along the subject road demandable?
Ruling: Yes. The free ingress and egress along Mangyan Road created by the
voluntary agreement between Ateneo and Solid Homes, Inc., is thus legally
demandable (Articles 619 and 625, New Civil Code) with the corresponding duty on
the servient estate not to obstruct the same so much so that —When the owner of
the servient tenement performs acts or constructs works impairing the use of the
servitude, the owner of the dominant tenement may ask for the destruction of such
works and the restoration of the things to their condition before the impairment was
committed, with indemnity for damages suffered (3 Sanchez Roman 609). An
injunction may also be obtained in order to restrain the owner of the servient
tenement from obstructing or impairing in any manner the lawful use of the
servitude (Resolme v. Lazo, 27 Phil. 416; 417; 418).“ (Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, by Tolentino, Volume 2, 1963
edition, page 320)
Issue: Is there such a thing as judicial easement?
Ruling: No. Resultantly, when the court says that an easement exists, it is not
creating one. For, even an injunction cannot be used to create one as there is no
such thing as a judicial easement. As in the instant case, the court merely declares
the existence of an easement created by the parties. Respondent court could not
have said it any better — de Baltazar and her son Nestor. Immediately behind is the Sta. Ana River. On either
It must be emphasized, however, that We are not constituting an easement along
Mangyan Road, but merely declaring the existence of one created by the manifest
will of the parties herein in recognition of autonomy of contracts (Articles 1306 and
619, New Civil Code; Tolentino, supra, page 308; Civil Code of the Philippines, by
Paras, Volume II, 1984 edition, page 549).
47) LA VISTA ASSOCIATION, INC vs. CA- Easement of Right of Way
Like any other contractual stipulation, a voluntary easement cannot be extinguished
except by voluntary recession of the contract establishing the servitude or
renunciation by the owner of the dominant lots.
FACTS:
The controversy in this case is regarding the right of way in Manyan road. The road
is a 15 meter wide road abutting Katipunan Avenue on the west, traverses the edges
of La Vista Subdivision on the north and of the Ateneo de Manila University and
Maryknoll College on the south. The said road was originally owned by the Tuasons
sold a portion of their land to Philippine Building Corporation. Included in such sale
was half or 7.5 meters width of the Mangyan road. The said corporation assigned its
rights, with the consent of the tuasons, to AdMU through a Deed of Assignment with
Assumption of Mortgage. Ateneo later on sold to Maryknoll the western portion of
the land. Tuason developed their land which is now known as La Vista. On January,
1976, Ateneo and La Vista acknowledged the voluntary easement or a Mutual right
of way wherein the parties would allow the other to use their half portion of the
Manyan road (La Vista to use AdMU’s 7.5 meters of the mangyan road and also the
other way around.) Ateneo auctioned off the property wherein Solid Homes Inc., the
developer of Loyola Grand Villas, was the highest bidder.
ADMU transferred not only the property, but also the right to negotiate the
easement on the road. However, La Vista did not want to recognize the easement
thus they block the road using 6 cylindrical concrete and some guards over the
entrance of the road blocking the entrance of the residents of Loyola Grand Villas.
Solid Homes Inc. filed for injunction and La vista in turn filed a third party complaint
against AdMU. Some of the arguments of the petitioner were that Loyola residents
had adequate outlet to a public highway using other roads and also that AdMU has
not yet finalized the negotiation of the easement.
ISSUES: Whether or not there is an easement of right of way?
RULING: YES. There was a voluntary easement of right of way which was
acknowledged on January 1976 by the Tuasons and Admu (the easement was
established by PBC and the Tuasons but I don’t think I can find the details regarding
it in the case… I just saw the one regarding “acknowledgement” between admu and
the Tuasons.) Being such, the 4 requisites for a compulsory easement need not be
met. And like any other contractual stipulation, the same cannot be extinguished
except by voluntary recession of the contract establishing the servitude or
renunciation by the owner of the dominant lots. In the case at bar, all the
predecessors-in-interest of both parties recognized the existence of such easement
and there was no agreement yet to revoke the same. The free ingress and egress
along Mangyan Road created by the voluntary agreement is thus demandable. The
Court also emphasized that they are not creating an easement but merely declaring
one (there no such thing as a judicial easement)
48) VDA. DE BELTAZAR v. CA
FACTS: Panganiban is the owner of a parcel of residential land located at Sta. Ines,
Bulacan. Immediately to the front of said land is another land owned by Loreto Vda.
side are Lots owned by Calimon and Legaspi. Braulio Street, a provincial road, runs
along the frontage of the Lots of Calimon, Loreto and Legaspi. Panganiban then filed
a complaint against the Baltazars for the establishment of a permanent and
perpetual easement of right of way for him to have access to the provincial road. In
their answer, petitioners opposed the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction arguing that there exists two other rights of way adjacent to private
respondent's property. They likewise argue that private respondent had abandoned
the alleged right of way. It was discovered that Panganiban was allowed access
through Legaspi and Calimon’s property when Baltazar closed his property.
 ISSUE: 1.Can an easement of right of way be granted to a person who has two other
existing passageways adjacent to his property which he is using in going to and from
his property? and can this easement of right of way be established through the
alleged continuous use thereof?
RULING: For respondent Panganiban to claim a compulsory easement of right of
way, he must, therefore, first establish the existence of the following requisites: 1.
the property is surrounded by estate of others and there is no adequate outlet to a
public highway, 2. it must be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient
estate and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant
estate to a public highway may be the shortest, 3. there must be payment of the
proper indemnity, and 4. the isolation should not be due to the proprietor’s own
acts.
The first requisite has been established by the court a quo. Panganiban's property is
indeed surrounded by immovables on three sides and a river on the fourth.
For the second requisite, the Court of Appeals is correct when it ordered the remand
of this case to the lower court for the purpose of fixing the proper indemnity. With
the third requisite, Panganiban was likewise able to establish that the isolation of his
property was not due to his own act for he merely bought the lot which was formerly
part of the Baltazars' Lot, from petitioner Nestor predecessors-in-interest. The Lot
which respondents have been using as a right of way, has been "existing,
recognized, acknowledged, tolerated and used by the appellant as a right of way for
30 years during the lifetime of petitioner's grandfather, Fidel and his father..." It was
also established that the right of way was "closed and obstructed by the petitioners
when they closed the gate and placed plants across the gate of the Lot of Loreto
when petitioners constructed their present residence." As regards the fourth
requirement, both parties agreed that the passage claimed by respondent as his
right of way, compared to the other passageways, is the shortest distance from
respondent's lot to Braulio Street.
Petitioners could not have been inconvenienced by the passageway because the
same is separate and distinct from the gate used by them to enter their lot and
residence. Such being the case, we conclude that respondent is entitled to claim a
compulsory easement of right of way over petitioners' Lot.
Issue: Does Article 541 apply to a division of property by succession?
Ruling: Affirmative. Let us now consider Article 541 more closely in its application to the
easement of light and view and to the easement not to build higher (altius non tollendi).
These two easements necessarily go together because an easement of light and view
requires that the owner of the servient estate shall not build to a height that will obstruct
the window. They are, as it were, the two sides of the same coin. While an easement of
light and view is positive, that of altius non tollendi is negative. "It refers to those
negative easements which are the result and consequence of others that are positive,
such as the easement not to build higher, or not to construct, which is indispensable to
the easement of light."
It will thus be seen that under article 541 the existence of the apparent sign in the
instance case, to wit, the four windows under consideration, had for all legal purposes
the same character and effect as a title of acquisition of the easement of light and view
by the respondents upon the death of the original owner, Maria Florentino. Upon the
establishment of that easement of light and view, the con-comitant and concurrent
easement of altius non tollendi was also constituted, the heir of the camarin and its lot,
Maria Encarnacion Florention, not having objected to the existence of the windows. The
theory of article 541, of making the existence of the apparent sign equivalent to a title,
when nothing to the contrary is said or done by the two owners, is sound and correct,
because as it happens in this case, there is an implied contract between them that the
easements in question should be constituted.
NOTE:
 First, as to the modes of establishing and acquiring easements. According
to Article 536, easements are established by law or by will of th owners.
Acquisition of easements is first by title or its equivalent and secondly by
prescription.
 In the Sentence of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain dated November 7, 1911,
it was held that under article 541 of the Civil Code, the visible and
permanent sign of an easement "is the title that characterizes its
existence" ("es el titulo caracteristico de su existencia.")

51) Amor vs Florentino

It appears that over 50 years ago, Maria Florentino owned a house and a camarin or
warehouse in Vigan, Ilocos Sur. The house had and still has, on the north side, three
windows on the upper story, and a fourth one on the ground floor. Through these
windows the house receives light and air from the lot where the camarin stands. On
September 6, 1885, Maria Florentino made a will, devising the house and the land on
which it is situated to Gabriel Florentino, one of the respondents herein, and to Jose
Florentino, father of the other respondents. In said will, the testatrix also devised the
warehouse and the lot where it is situated to Maria Encarnacion Florentino. Upon the
death of the testatrix in 1892, nothing was said or done by the devisees in regard to the
windows in question. On July 14, 1911, Maria Encarnacion Florentino sold her lot and the
warehouse thereon to the petitioner, Severo Amor, the deed of sale stating that the
vendor had inherited the property from her aunt, Maria Florentino. In January, 1938,
petitioner destroyed the old warehouse and started to build instead a two-story house.
On March 1st of that year, respondents filed an action to prohibit petitioner herein from
building higher than the original structure and from executing any work which would
shut off the light and air that had for many years been received through the four
windows referred to. The Court of First Instance found on the 15th of the same month
that the construction of the new house had almost been completed, so the court denied
the writ of preliminary injunction.