CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY between free expression and the integrity of the system

of administering justice.
THE LAWYER AND SOCIETY
Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the
court, is also a Special Prosecutor who owes duties of
Canon 1 Promote and Respect Law and Legal
fidelity and respect to the Republic and to the Supreme
Process;
Court as the embodiment and the repository of the judicial
CANON1: A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION,
power in the government of the Republic. The
OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT
responsibility of Gonzalez to uphold the dignity and
FOR LAW OF AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
authority of the Supreme Court and not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice is heavier than
Zaldivar v. Gonzales, 166 SCRA 316 (1988)
that of a private practicing lawyer.
166 SCRA 316 – Legal Ethics – Contemptuous Language
– Duty of a Lawyer Gonzalez is also entitled to criticize the rulings of the court
but his criticisms must be bona fide. In the case at bar,
Zaldivar was the governor of Antique. He was charged
his statements, particularly the one where he alleged that
before the Sandiganbayan for violations of the Anti-Graft
members of the Supreme Court approached him, are of
and Corrupt Practices Act. Gonzales was the then
no relation to the Zaldivar case.
Tanodbayan who was investigating the case. Zaldivar
then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari, The Supreme Court suspended Gonzalez indefinitely from
Prohibition and Mandamus assailing the authority of the the practice of law.
Tanodbayan to investigate graft cases under the 1987
Constitution. The Supreme Court, acting on the petition
issued a Cease and Desist Order against Gonzalez Laquindamum v. Quintana, AC No. 7036, June 29,
directing him to temporarily restrain from investigating 2009;
and filing informations against Zaldivar. FACTS:

Gonzales however proceeded with the investigation and Complainant:

he filed criminal informations against Zaldivar. Gonzalez  An administrative case was filed by Judge
even had a newspaper interview where he proudly claims Laquindanum of the Regional Trial Court of
that he scored one on the Supreme Court; that the Midsayap, Cotabato against Atty Quintana,
Supreme Court’s issuance of the TRO is a manifestation requesting that proper disciplinary action should
theta the “rich and influential persons get favorable be imposed on the latter for the following
actions from the Supreme Court, [while] it is difficult for reasons:
an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due (1) he performed notarial functions in
course”. Midsayap Cotabato, which is beyond
the territorial jurisdiction of the
Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt against
commissioning court that issued his
Gonzalez. The Supreme Court then ordered Gonzalez to
notarial commission which is within
explain his side. Gonzalez stated that the statements in
Cotabato City and the Province of
the newspapers were true; that he was only exercising his
Maguindanao only;
freedom of speech; that he is entitled to criticize the
o AM No. 03-8-02-SC states
rulings of the Court, to point out where he feels the Court
that executive judges are
may have lapsed into error. He also said, even attaching
required to closely monitor
notes, that not less than six justices of the Supreme Court
the activities of notaries
have approached him to ask him to “go slow” on Zaldivar
public within the territorial
and to not embarrass the Supreme Court.
bounds of their jurisdiction
ISSUE: Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt. and to see to it that notaries
public shall not extend
HELD: Yes. The statements made by respondent
notarial functions beyond the
Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call for the
limits of their authority.
exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme
o Evidences: Notarized the
Court. His statements necessarily imply that the justices
Affidavit of Loss ATM Card
of the Supreme Court betrayed their oath of office. Such
and Affidavit of Loss of
statements constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for
Driver’s License in Midsayap,
the Supreme Court. Such statements very clearly debase
Cotabato
and degrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court,
o Respondent alleged that he
the entire system of administration of justice in the
was singled out by Judge
country.
Laquindanum when he filed
Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free for notarial commission
speech. What Gonzalez seems unaware of is that freedom before the RTC in Midsayap,
of speech and of expression, like all constitutional Cotabato as he was
freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression humiliated (I.e. disseminated
needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated information) and was asked
with the requirements of equally important public for much more requirements
interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the (i.e. payment to be a
maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of member of the IBP of
the administration of justice. There is no antinomy Kidapawan City) compared
to other lawyers; thus, he
 withdrew his petition and
chose to be affiliated with
the IBP of Cotabato City.
o Complainant alleged that she
did not act upon such
petition because he failed to
pay his IBP dues which is a
requirement.
(2) he performed notarial acts with an
expired commission;
o Atty Quintana continued to
notarize documents in 2006
and 2007 even if his
commission as notary public
within Cotabato City and the
Province of Maguindanao
expired in December 31,
2005.
(3) he let his wife do notarial acts in his
absence;
o Atty Quintana alleged that
those documents notarized
by his wife within Midsayap,
Cotabato was an
entrapment operation by
Judge Laquindanum,
knowing that his wife was
not a lawyer.
(4) he notarized a document wherein
one of the signatories therein
already passed away that time.
o Evidence: Deed of Donation
notarized by Atty Quintana
in 2004 when the donor’s
wife, which was one of the
signatories, died in 2003.
Respondent:
(1) He maintained that he did not act outside
the province of Cotabato since Midsayap,
Cotabato, where he practices his legal
profession and subscribes documents, is part
of the province of Cotabato
(2) Atty. Quintana alleged that he filed a petition
for notarial commission before Branch 18,
Regional Trial Court, Midsayap, Cotabato.
However, the same was not acted upon by
Judge Laquindanum for three weeks
(3) He also denied the he authorized his wife to
notarize documents. According to him, he
slapped his wife and told her to stop doing it
as it would ruin his profession|.
(4) Atty. Quintana lamented that he was singled
out by Judge Laquindanum, because the
latter immediately issued notarial
commissions to other lawyers without asking
for so many requirements|||
(5) Atty. Quintana asked for forgiveness for
what he had done and promised not to
repeat the same. He also asked that he be
given another chance and not be divested
of his privilege to notarize, as it was the
only bread and butter of his family.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Atty Quintana, being a lawyer in
good standing, has the right to practice his
profession including notarial acts in the entire
Philippines?
(2) Whether or not Atty Quintana can perform
notarial acts with an expired commission?
(3) Whether or not Atty Quintana can pass the
blame to his wife for her unauthorized practice of
law- notarizing documents?
(4) Whether or not Atty Quintana can notarize
documents despite one of the signatories being
dead?
RULING:
OBC ruling
In its Report and Recommendation, the OBC
recommended that Atty. Quintana be disqualified from
being appointed as a notary public for two (2) years;
and that if his notarial commission still exists, the same
should be revoked for two (2) years. The OBC found the
defenses and arguments raised by Atty. Quintana to be
without merit,
(1) NO- Although lawyers in good standing are
allowed to engage in the practice of law in the
Philippines, not every lawyer even in good
standing can perform notarial functions without
having been commissioned as notary public as
provided for under Section 11 of the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice. And it is also based on the
discretion of the commissioning court whether
lawyer should be issued notarial practice or not.
 Section 11 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
states that:
Jurisdiction and Term A
person commissioned as
notary public may perform
notarial acts in any place
within the territorial
jurisdiction of the
commissioning court for a
period of two (2) years
commencing the first day of
January of the year in which
the commissioning court is
made, unless earlier revoked
[or] the notary public has
resigned under these Rules
and the Rules of Court.
 Aside from violating Section 11
of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Pratice, this also partakes of
malpractice of law and
falsification as stated in Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which talks about
the lawyers oath which
unconditionally requires lawyers
not to do or declare any
falsehood.
 Thus, respondent may perform
his notarial acts only within the
territorial jurisdiction of the
commissioning court of Cotabato
 City and the Province of
Maguindanao and not in
Midsayap or Kabacan which is
part of Cotabato Province located
in North Cotabato or anywhere
beyond.
(2) NO- Notarizing documents with an expired
commission is a violation of the lawyers oath to
obey the laws, more specifically, the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice. Since the public is deceived
into believing that he has been duly
commissioned, it also amounts to indulging in
deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer's oath
proscribes as stated in the Code of Professional
responsibility Rule 1.01.
(3) NO- Respondent cannot take refuge in claiming
that he did not authorize his wife to notarize
thus it was his wife's act. A person who is
commissioned as a notary public must not only
take full responsibility for all the entries in his
notarial register , but also take personally
accountability for the activities in his office and
acts of his personnel including his wife who is his
secretary.
 Respondent therefore is guilty of violating Canon
9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which requires lawyers not to directly or
indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of
law.
 In the case of Lingan v. Calubaquib et al., Adm.
Case No. 5377, June 15, 2006 the Court held,
thus: A notary public is personally
accountable for all entries in his notarial
register; He cannot relieve himself of this
responsibility by passing the buck to their
(sic) secretaries
(4) NO- Sec. 2, (b), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice provides, thus: A person
shall not perform a notarial act if the
person involved as signatory to the
instrument or document (1) is not in the
notarys presence personally at the time of
the notarization; and (2) is not personally
known to the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined
by these Rules.
 In failing to determine the presence and
qualifications of the affiants, respondent only
shows his gross negligence and ignorance of the
provisions of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
The Supreme Court adopts the findings with adjustments
to the penalty
 Atty. Quintana fell short of his obligation under Canon
7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession
 Although Atty Quintana relies on his notarial
commission as his sole source of income, this will not
lessen the penalty. It should be reminded that a notarial
commission should not be treated as money-making but
a privilege to perform duties to protect public interest
such that only those qualified may act as such since
notarizing converts a private document into a public one
admissible in evidence without further proof of
authenticity.
 Atty Nestor Q. Quintana is being revoked and
disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public
for a period of two (2) years. He is also suspended from
the practice of law for six (6) months.
No Unlawful, Dishonest, Immoral, Deceitful
Conduct - Rule 1.01; Rules of Court
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 138, S21;
Section 21. Authority of attorney to appear. — an
attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to
represent any cause in which he appears, and no written
power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear
in court for his client, but the presiding judge may, on
motion of either party and on reasonable grounds therefor
being shown, require any attorney who assumes the right
to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority
under which he appears, and to disclose, whenever
pertinent to any issue, the name of the person who
employed him, and may thereupon make such order as
justice requires. An attorneys wilfully appear in court for
a person without being employed, unless by leave of the
court, may be punished for contempt as an officer of the
court who has misbehaved in his official transactions.
Ui v. Bonifacio, 333 SCRA 38 (2000);
Facts: A complaint for disbarment was filed by the
complainant, Leslie Ui against respondent Atty. Iris
Bonifacio before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
IBP on the grounds of immorality, for carrying on an illicit
relationship with the complainant’s husband, Carlos Ui. It
is respondent’s contention that her relationship with
Carlos Ui is not illicit because they were married abroad
and that after June 1998 when respondent discovered
Carlos Ui’s true civil status, she cut off all her ties with
him.
Issue: Did the respondent conduct herself in an immoral
manner for which she deserves to be barred from the
practice of law?
Held: NO. The practice of law is a privilege. A bar
candidate does not have the right to enjoy the practice of
the legal profession simply by passing the bar
examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked,
subject to the mandate of due process, once a lawyer
violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics. If good
moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar,
then the continued possession of good moral character is
also requisite for retaining membership in the legal
profession.
Membership in the bar may be terminated when a
lawyer ceases to have good moral character. A lawyer
may be disbarred for “grossly immoral conduct or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude”. A member of the bar should have moral
integrity in addition to professional probity.
Circumstances existed which should have aroused
respondent’s suspicion that something was amiss in her
relationship with Ui, and moved her to ask probing
questions. Respondent was imprudent in managing her
personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her
relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what
respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be
considered as an immoral. For immorality connotes
conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of
society and to opinion of good and respectable member
of the community. Moreover, for such conduct to warrant
disciplinary action, the same must be grossly immoral,
that is it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a
high degree.
A member of the Bar and officer of the court is
not only required to refrain from adulterous
relationships . . . but must also so behave himself as to
avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he
is flouting those moral standards.
Respondents act of immediately distancing herself from
Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil status belies just
that alleged moral indifference and proves that she had
no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral
standard of the legal profession.
Figueroa v. Barranco, 276 SCRA 445 (1997);
Facts:
Simeon Barranco, petitioner, was a bar exam passer.
However, before he could take his oath, Patricia Figueroa,
respondent, petitioned that respondent be denied
admission. Her complaint was that respondent and she
had been sweethearts, a child of them was born out of
wedlock, and that respondent did not fulfill his repeated
promises to marry. Furthermore, respondent married and
settled with another woman. Complainant further claimed
that respondent forced complainant into sexual relations
with him.
Issue:
Are the charges set against the respondent enough to
disbar him from taking the lawyer’s oath?
Ruling:
No, the charges required to constitute a disbarment not
only be immoral, but grossly immoral. In the case at
hand, the allegation on respondent merely suggest a
doubtful moral character. Furthermore, complainant
continued to see respondent for a while, even after giving
birth to the child, thus suggesting that the sexual relations
were consensual and not forced.
Guevarra v. Eala, 529 SCRA 1 (2007);
Facts:
Wife of petitioner, Irene Moje was having an illicit affair
with the respondent. After leaving the conjugal home,
petitioner found out that Irene and respondent was living
together in a residential house few blocks away from the
church they were married. Few months thereafter, Irene
gave birth to a baby girl and wrote the name of the
respondent as the father in the certificate of live birth.
Petitioner filed a petition for annulment of marriage to
Irene and a criminal complaint for adultery against
respondent and Irene.
Petitioner also filed a complaint for disbarment before the
IBP-CBD on the ground of gross immoral conduct and
unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath which was
dismissed by the IBP Board of Governors due to lack of
merit.
Hence, the petition of complaint before the Supreme
Court.
Issue:
Would an illicit affair between a married lawyer and a
married woman constitute gross immoral conduct?
Ruling:
Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his
wife or without the benefit of marriage should be
characterized as 'grossly immoral conduct' depends on
the surrounding circumstances." The case at bar involves
a relationship between a married lawyer and a married
woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the
affair was carried out discreetly.
Sexual relations outside marriage is considered
disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate
disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows
protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.
(Vitug v. Rongcal)
Respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with a
married woman, a grossly immoral conduct and indicative
of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of
his profession. This detestable behavior renders him
regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor
and privileges which his license confers upon him. (Tucay
v. Atty. Tucay)
Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took
before admission to practice law.
Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV
(The Family) of the Constitution reading: Section 2.
Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State.
In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No.
209), which echoes this constitutional provision, obligates
the husband and the wife "to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help
and support."
Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes a
lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same
Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any
"conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law."

WHEREFORE, Petition is GRANTED. Respondent, Atty.
Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly
immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office, and
violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Vitug v. Roncal, 501 SCRA 166 (2006)
FACTS: Catherine Joie P. Vitug sought the service of
respondent Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal who was
introduced to her by her former classmate. Complainant
asked Atty. Rongcal to represent her in the support case
she was going to file against her former lover, Arnulfo
Aquino. Soon after, herein complainant and respondent
started having sexual relationship with each other.
According to Vitug, respondent also gave her sweet
inducements such as the promise of a job, financial
security for her daughter, and his services as counsel for
the prospective claim for support against Aquino.
On 9 February 2001, respondent allegedly convinced
complainant to sign an Affidavit of Disclaimer which the
latter signed without reading the said affidavit. On 14
February 2001, respondent allegedly advised complainant
that Aquino gave him P150,000.00 cash and P58,000.00
in two (2) postdated checks to answer for the medical
expenses of her daughter. Instead of turning them over
to her, respondent handed her his personal check in the
amount of P150,000.00 and promised to give her the
balance of P58,000.00 soon thereafter. However,
sometime in April or May 2001, respondent informed her
that he could not give her the said amount because he
used it for his political campaign as he was then running
for the position of Provincial Board Member of the 2nd
District of Pampanga
Complainant argues that respondent's acts constitute a
violation of his oath as a lawyer. She filed an
administrative case against Rongcal which was referred to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. It was then
recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for six (6) months and that he be ordered
to return to complainant the amount of P58,000.00 within
two months. The same was approved by the IBP Board of
Governors. Respondent then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration with Motion to Set Case for Clarificatory
Questioning with the IBP and a Motion to Reopen/Remand
Case for Clarificatory Questioning with the Supreme
Court.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not respondent be disbarred for
immorality
(2) Whether or not respondent’s act of preparing and
notarizing the Affidavit, a document disadvantageous to
his client, is a violation of the Code.
HELD:
(1) NO. One of the conditions prior to admission to the
bar is that an applicant must possess good moral
character. Said requirement persists as a continuing
condition for the enjoyment of the privilege of law
practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the
revocation of such privilege. The Court has held that to
justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of
must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. A grossly
immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful
as to be reprehensible to a high degree. On sexual relation
and on respondent’s subsequent marriage, by his own
admission, respondent is obviously guilty of immorality in
violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code which states that a
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct. The Court find credence in
respondent's assertion that it was impossible for her not
to have known of his subsisting marriage, complainant’s
allegations of deceit were not established by clear
preponderant evidence required in disbarment cases.
(2) NO. It was not unlawful for respondent to assist his
client in entering into a settlement with Aquino after
explaining all available options to her. The law encourages
the amicable settlement not only of pending cases but
also of disputes which might otherwise be filed in court.
Rule 1.04, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states that: A lawyer shall encourage his
clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will admit
of a fair settlement. As complainant voluntarily and
intelligently agreed to a settlement with Aquino, she
cannot later blame her counsel when she experiences a
change of heart. Suspicion, no matter how strong, is not
enough in the absence of contrary evidence, what will
prevail is the presumption that the respondent has
regularly performed his duty in accordance with his oath.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds Atty.
Diosdado M. Rongcal GUILTY of immorality and impose on
him a FINE of P15,000.00 with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be
dealt with more severely.
The charge of misappropriation of funds of the client is
REMANDED to the IBP for further investigation, report and
recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt of
this Decision.
No Counseling to Defy Law - Rule 1.02;
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in
the legal system.
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 416 SCRA 465 (2003);
Facts:
-Attorney Alan F. Paguia, as counsel for Estrada, averred
that the respondent justices have violated Rule 5.10 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct by attending the ‘EDSA 2
Rally’ and by authorizing the assumption of Vice-President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to the Presidency in violation of
the 1987 Constitution.
“Rule 5.10. A judge is entitled to entertain personal views
on political questions. But to avoid suspicion of political
partisanship, a judge shall not make political speeches,
contribute to party funds, publicly endorse candidates for
political office or participate in other partisan political
activities.”
-Also, petitioner contended that the justices have
prejudged a case that would assail the legality of the act
taken by President Arroyo. The subsequent decision of the
Court in Estrada v. Arroyo (353 SCRA 452 and 356 SCRA
108) is, petitioner states, a patent mockery of justice and
due process.
-According to Atty. Paguia, during the hearing of his
‘Mosyong Pangrekonsiderasyon’ on 11 June 2003, the
three justices of the Special Division of the
Sandiganbayan made manifest their bias and partiality
against his client.
-Thus, he averred, Presiding Justice Minita V. Chico-
Nazario supposedly employed foul and disrespectful
language when she blurted out, ‘Magmumukha naman
kaming gago,’ (Rollo, p. 13.) and Justice Teresita
Leonardo-De Castro characterized the motion as
insignificant even before the prosecution could file its
comments or opposition thereto, (Rollo, p. 12.) remarking
in open court that to grant Estrada’s motion would result
in chaos and disorder. (Ibid.) Prompted by the alleged
‘bias and partial attitude’ of the Sandiganbayan justices,
Attorney Paguia filed, on 14 July 2003, a motion for their
disqualification.
-The petitioner also asked the Court to include in its Joint
Resolution the TRUTH of the acts of Chief Justice Davide,
et al., last January 20, 2001 in:
‘a) going to EDSA 2;
‘b) authorizing the proclamation of Vice-President Arroyo
as President on the ground of ‘permanent disability’ even
without proof of compliance with the corresponding
constitutional conditions, e.g., written declaration by
either the President or majority of his cabinet; and
‘c) actually proclaiming Vice-President Arroyo on that
same ground of permanent disability.
-In a letter, dated 30 June 2003, addressed to Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., and Associate Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban, he has demanded, in a clearly
disguised form of forum shopping, for several advisory
opinions on matters pending before the Sandiganbayan.
-Subsequently, the court ruled that the instant petition
assailing the foregoing orders must be DISMISSED for
gross insufficiency in substance and for utter lack of merit.
The Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of
discretion, an indispensable requirement to warrant a
recourse to the extraordinary relief of petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure.
-In a resolution, dated 08 July 2003, the Court strongly
warned Attorney Alan Paguia, on pain of disciplinary
sanction, to desist from further making, directly or
indirectly, similar submissions to this Court or to its
Members.
-Unmindful of the well-meant admonition to him by the
Court, Attorney Paguia appears to persist on end. In fact,
on the 7th September 2003 issue of the Daily Tribune,
Atty. Paguia wrote to say -
“What is the legal effect of that violation of President
Estrada’s right to due process of law? It renders the
decision in Estrada vs. Arroyo unconstitutional and void.
The rudiments of fair play were not observed. There was
no fair play since it appears that when President Estrada
filed his petition, Chief Justice Davide and his fellow
justices had already committed to the other party - GMA
- with a judgment already made and waiting to be
formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the
charade of a formal hearing. After the justices had
authorized the proclamation of GMA as president, can
they be expected to voluntarily admit the
unconstitutionality of their own act?”
Issue: WON Atty. Paguia committed a violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Held:
-Criticism or comment made in good faith on the
correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness, of
a decision of the Court would be welcome for, if well-
founded, such reaction can enlighten the court and
contribute to the correction of an error if committed. (In
Re Sotto, 82 Phil 595.) However, Attorney Paguia has not
limited his discussions to the merits of his client’s case
within the judicial forum. Indeed, he has repeated his
assault on the Court in both broadcast and print media.
“Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
prohibits a member of the bar from making such public
statements on any pending case tending to arouse public
opinion for or against a party. By his acts, Attorney Paguia
may have stoked the fires of public dissension and posed
a potentially dangerous threat to the administration of
justice.”
-It should be clear that the phrase “partisan political
activities,” in its statutory context, relates to acts
designed to cause the success or the defeat of a particular
candidate or candidates who have filed certificates of
candidacy to a public office in an election. The taking of
an oath of office by any incoming President of the Republic
before the Chief Justice of the Philippines is a traditional
official function of the Highest Magistrate. The assailed
presence of other justices of the Court at such an event
could be no different from their appearance in such other
official functions as attending the Annual State of the
Nation Address by the President of the Philippines before
the Legislative Department.
-The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; but it will
not countenance any wrongdoing nor allow the erosion of
our people’s faith in the judicial system, let alone, by
those who have been privileged by it to practice law in the
Philippines.
-Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
mandates that the lawyer should observe and maintain
the respect due to the courts and judicial officers and,
indeed, should insist on similar conduct by others. In
liberally imputing sinister and devious motives and
questioning the impartiality, integrity, and authority of
the members of the Court, Atty. Paguia has only
succeeded in seeking to impede, obstruct and pervert the
dispensation of justice.
-The Court has already warned Atty. Paguia, on pain of
disciplinary sanction, to become mindful of his grave
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court.
Apparently, he has chosen not to at all take heed.
-WHEREFORE, Attorney Alan Paguia is hereby indefinitely
suspended from the practice of law, effective upon his
receipt hereof, for conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an
officer of the Court.

Not to Encourage Lawsuit or Proceedings - Rule
1.03;
Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or
interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any
man's cause.
De Ysasi v. NLRC, 231 SCRA 173 (1994);
Jon De Ysasi and Jon De Ysasi III are father and sons
respectively. The elder Ysasi owns a hacienda in Negros
Occidental. De Ysasi III is employed in the hacienda as
the farm administrator. In November 1982, De Ysasi III
underwent surgery and so he missed work. He was
confined and while he’s nursing from his infections he was
terminated, without due process, by his father. De Ysasi
III filed against his father for illegal dismissal before the
National Labor Relations Commission. His father invoked
that his son actually abandoned his work.
ISSUE: Whether or not De Ysasi III abandoned his work.
HELD: No. His absence from work does not constitute
abandonment. To constitute abandonment, there must be
a.) failure to report for work or absence without valid or
justifiable reason, and b.) a clear intention to sever the
employer-employee relationship, with the second element
as the more determinative factor and being manifested by
some overt acts. No such intent was proven in this case.
The Supreme Court, in making its decision, noted that the
lawyers for both camps failed to exert all reasonable
efforts to smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out of
court and especially in consideration of the direct and
immediate consanguineous ties between their clients
especially considering that the parties involved are father
and son. This case may have never reached the courts
had there been an earnest effort by the lawyers to have
both parties find an off court settlement but records show
that no such effort was made. The useful function of a
lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but to avoid it
whenever possible by advising settlement or withholding
suit. He is often called upon less for dramatic forensic
exploits than for wise counsel in every phase of life. He
should be a mediator for concord and a conciliator for
compromise, rather than a virtuoso of technicality in the
conduct of litigation.
Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
explicitly provides that “(a) lawyer shall encourage his
client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit
of a fair settlement.” Both counsel fell short of what was
expected of them, despite their avowed duties as officers
of the court. In the same manner, the labor arbiter who
handled this regrettable case has been less than faithful
to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code mandating that
a labor arbiter “shall exert all efforts towards the amicable
settlement of a labor dispute within his jurisdiction.” If he
ever did so, or at least entertained the thought, the
copious records of the proceedings in this controversy are
barren of any reflection of the same.
Encourage Client to Avoid Controversy - Rule 1.04;
Rule 1.04 - A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid,
end or settle a controversy if it will admit of a fair
settlement.
Catsaneda v. Ago, 65 SCRA 505 (1975);
NATURE
- Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals
FACTS
- 1955 – Castaneda and Henson filed a replevin suit
against Ago in the CFI of Manila to recover certain
machineries.
-1957 – judgment in favor of Castaneda and Henson
- 1961 – SC affirmed the judgment; trial court issued writ
of execution; Ago’s motion denied, levy was made on
Ago’s house and lots; sheriff advertised the sale, Ago
moved to stop the auction; CA dismissed the petition; SC
ffirmed dismissal
- Ago thrice attempted to obtain writ of preliminary
injunction to restrain sheriff from enforcing the writ of
execution; his motions were denied
- 1963 – sheriff sold the house and lots to Castaneda and
Henson; Ago failed to redeem
- 1964 – sheriff executed final deed of sale; CFI issued
writ of possession to the properties
- 1964 – Ago filed a complaint upon the judgment
rendered against him in the replevin suit saying it was his
personal obligation and that his wife ½ share in their
conjugal house could not legally be reached by the levy
made; CFI of QC issued writ of preliminary injunction
restraining Castaneda the Registed of Deeds and the
sheriff from registering the final deed of sale; the battle
on the matter of lifting and restoring the restraining order
continued
- 1966 – Agos filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
to enjoin sheriff from enforcing writ of possession; SC
dismissed it; Agos filed a similar petition with the CA
which also dismissed the
petition; Agos appealed to SC which dismissed the
petition
- Agos filed another petition for certiorari and prohibition
with the CA which gave due course to the petition and
granted preliminary injunction.
ISSUE
WON the Agos’ lawyer, encourage his clients to avoid
controversy
HELD
- No. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the
complaint for the annulment of the sheriff’s sale, justice
demands that the petitioners, long denied the fruits of
their victory in the replevin suit, must now enjoy them,
for, the respondents Agos abetted by their lawyer Atty.
Luison, have misused legal remedies and prostituted the
judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the judgment,
to the extended prejudice of the petitioners.
- Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant
and his exalted position as an officer of the court, Atty.
Luison has allowed himself to become an instigator of
controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a
mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, a
virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead
of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral
justice.
- A counsel’s assertiveness in espousing with candor and
honesty his client’s cause must be encouraged and is to
be commended; what the SC does not and cannot
countenance is a lawyer’s insistence despite the patent
futility of his client’s position.
It is the duty of the counsel to advice his client on the
merit or lack of his case. If he finds his client’s cause as
defenseless, then he is his duty to advice the latter to
acquiesce and submit rather than traverse the
incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and
caprices of his client, and temper his client’s propensity to
litigate.
CANON 2: PROVIDE EFFICIENT AND CONVENIENT
LEGAL SERVICES
Not to Reject Oppressed or Defenseless - Rule 2.01;
Rule 138, S31;
Rule 2.01 - A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid
reasons, the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed.
Section 31. Attorneys for destitute litigants. — A court
may assign an attorney to render professional aid free of
charge to any party in a case, if upon investigation it
appears that the party is destitute and unable to employ
an attorney, and that the services of counsel are
necessary to secure the ends of justice and to protect the
rights of the party. It shall be the duty of the attorney so
assigned to render the required service, unless he is
excused therefrom by the court for sufficient cause
shown.
IBP Handbook, Guidelines Governing the
Establishment and Operation of Legal Aid Office,
Art.1, Sec. 1;
SECTION. 1. Public service. – Legal Aid is not a matter of
charity. It is a means for the correction of social
imbalances that may and often do lead to injustice, for
which reason it is a public responsibility of the Bar. The
spirit of public service should, therefore, underlie all
legal aid offices. The same should be so administered as
to give maximum possible assistance to indigent and
deserving members of the community in all cases,
matters and situations in which legal aid may be
necessary to forestall an injustice.
Bar Matter No. 2012 Proposed Rule on Mandatory
Legal Services for Practicing Lawyers, June 23,
2009;
SECTION 1. Title. - This Rule shall be known as "The
Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Service."
SECTION 2. Purpose. - This Rule seeks to enhance the
duty of lawyers to society as agents of social change and
to the courts as officers thereof by helping improve
access to justice by the less privileged members of
society and expedite the resolution of cases involving
them. Mandatory free legal service by members of the
bar and their active support thereof will aid the efficient
and effective administration of justice especially in cases
involving indigent and pauper litigants.
SECTION 3. Scope. - This Rule shall govern the
mandatory requirement for practicing lawyers to render
free legal aid services in all cases (whether, civil,
criminal or administrative) involving indigent and pauper
litigants where the assistance of a lawyer is needed. It
shall also govern the duty of other members of the legal
profession to support the legal aid program of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SECTION 4. Definition of Terms. - For purposes of
this Rule:
(a) Practicing lawyers are members of the
Philippine Bar who appear for and in behalf of
parties in courts of law and quasi-judicial
agencies, including but not limited to the
National Labor Relations Commission, National
Conciliation and Mediation Board, Department of
Labor and Employment Regional Offices,
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board and National Commission for Indigenous
Peoples. The term "practicing lawyers" shall
exclude:
(i) Government employees and
incumbent elective officials not allowed
by law to practice;
(ii) Lawyers who by law are not allowed
to appear in court;
(iii) Supervising lawyers of students
enrolled in law student practice in duly
accredited legal clinics of law schools and
lawyers of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and peoples’
organizations (POs) like the Free Legal
Assistance Group who by the nature of
their work already render free legal aid
to indigent and pauper litigants and
(iv) Lawyers not covered under
subparagraphs (i) to (iii) including those
who are employed in the private sector
but do not appear for and in behalf of
parties in courts of law and quasi-judicial
agencies.
(b) Indigent and pauper litigants are those
defined under Rule 141, Section 19 of the Rules
of Court and Algura v. The Local Government
Unit of the City of Naga (G.R. No.150135, 30
October 2006, 506 SCRA 81);
(c) Legal aid cases are those actions, disputes,
and controversies that are criminal, civil and
administrative in nature in whatever stage
wherein indigent and pauper litigants need legal
representation;
(d) Free legal aid services refer to appearance in
court or quasi-judicial body for and in behalf of
an indigent or pauper litigant and the
preparation of pleadings or motions. It shall also
cover assistance by a practicing lawyer to
indigent or poor litigants in court-annexed
mediation and in other modes of alternative
dispute resolution (ADR). Services rendered
when a practicing lawyer is appointed counsel de
oficio shall also be considered as free legal aid
 services and credited as compliance under this
Rule;
(e) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) is the
official national organization of lawyers in the
country;
(f) National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) is
the committee of the IBP which is specifically
tasked with handling legal aid cases;
(g) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) is the
committee of the IBP which is specifically tasked
with disciplining members of the Bar;
(h) IBP Chapters are those chapters of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines located in the
different geographical areas of the country as
defined in Rule 139-A and
(i) Clerk of Court is the Clerk of Court of the
court where the practicing lawyer rendered free
legal aid services. In the case of quasi-judicial
bodies, it refers to an officer holding an
equivalent or similar position.
The term shall also include an officer holding a
similar position in agencies exercising quasi-
judicial functions, or a responsible officer of an
accredited PO or NGO, or an accredited mediator
who conducted the court-annexed mediation
proceeding.
SECTION 5. Requirements. -
(a) Every practicing lawyer is required to render
a minimum of sixty (60) hours of free legal aid
services to indigent litigants in a year. Said 60
hours shall be spread within a period of twelve
(12) months, with a minimum of five (5) hours
of free legal aid services each month. However,
where it is necessary for the practicing lawyer to
render legal aid service for more than five (5)
hours in one month, the excess hours may be
credited to the said lawyer for the succeeding
periods.
For this purpose, a practicing lawyer shall
coordinate with the Clerk of Court for cases
where he may render free legal aid service. He
may also coordinate with the IBP Legal Aid
Chairperson of the IBP Chapter to inquire about
cases where he may render free legal aid
service. In this connection, the IBP Legal Aid
Chairperson of the IBP Chapter shall regularly
and actively coordinate with the Clerk of Court.
The practicing lawyer shall report compliance
with the requirement within ten (10) days of the
last month of each quarter of the year.
(b) A practicing lawyer shall be required to
secure and obtain a certificate from the Clerk of
Court attesting to the number of hours spent
rendering free legal aid services in a case.
The certificate shall contain the following
information:
(i) The case or cases where the legal aid
service was rendered, the party or
parties in the said case(s) for whom the
service was rendered, the docket
number of the said case(s) and the
date(s) the service was rendered.
(ii) The number of hours actually spent
attending a hearing or conducting trial
on a particular case in the court or
quasi-judicial body.
(iii) The number of hours actually spent
attending mediation, conciliation or any
other mode of ADR on a particular case.
(iv) A motion (except a motion for
extension of time to file a pleading or for
postponement of hearing or conference)
or pleading filed on a particular case
shall be considered as one (1) hour of
service.
The Clerk of Court shall issue the
certificate in triplicate, one (1) copy to
be retained by the practicing lawyer, one
(1) copy to be retained by the Clerk of
Court and one (1) copy to be attached to
the lawyer's compliance report.
(c) Said compliance report shall be submitted to
the Legal Aid Chairperson of the IBP Chapter
within the court’s jurisdiction. The Legal Aid
Chairperson shall then be tasked with
immediately verifying the contents of the
certificate with the issuing Clerk of Court by
comparing the copy of the certificate attached to
the compliance report with the copy retained by
the Clerk of Court.
(d) The IBP Chapter shall, after verification,
issue a compliance certificate to the concerned
lawyer. The IBP Chapter shall also submit the
compliance reports to the IBP’s NCLA for
recording and documentation. The submission
shall be made within forty-five (45) days after
the mandatory submission of compliance reports
by the practicing lawyers.
(e) Practicing lawyers shall indicate in all
pleadings filed before the courts or quasi-judicial
bodies the number and date of issue of their
certificate of compliance for the immediately
preceding compliance period. Failure to disclose
the required information would cause the
dismissal of the case and the expunction of the
pleadings from the records.
 (f) Before the end of a particular year, lawyers
covered by the category under Section 4(a)(i)
and (ii), shall fill up a form prepared by the
NCLA which states that, during that year, they
are employed with the government or incumbent
elective officials not allowed by law to practice or
lawyers who by law are not allowed to appear in
court.
The form shall be sworn to and submitted to the
IBP Chapter or IBP National Office together with
the payment of an annual contribution of Two
Thousand Pesos (P2,000). Said contribution shall
accrue to a special fund of the IBP for the
support of its legal aid program.
(g) Before the end of a particular year, lawyers
covered by the category under Section 4(a)(iii)
shall secure a certification from the director of
the legal clinic or of the concerned NGO or PO to
the effect that, during that year, they have
served as supervising lawyers in a legal clinic or
actively participated in the NGO’s or PO’s free
legal aid activities. The certification shall be
submitted to the IBP Chapter or IBP National
Office.
(h) Before the end of a particular year, lawyers
covered by the category under Section 4(a)(iv)
shall fill up a form prepared by the NCLA which
states that, during that year, they are neither
practicing lawyers nor covered by Section
(4)(a)(i) to (iii). The form shall be sworn to and
submitted to the IBP Chapter or IBP National
Office together with the payment of an annual
contribution of Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000) by
way of support for the efforts of practicing
lawyers who render mandatory free legal aid
services. Said contribution shall accrue to a
special fund of the IBP for the support of its legal
aid program.
(i) Failure to pay the annual contribution shall
subject the lawyer to a penalty of Two Thousand
Pesos (P2,000) for that year which amount shall
also accrue to the special fund for the legal aid
program of the IBP.
SECTION 6. NCLA. -
(a) The NCLA shall coordinate with the various
legal aid committees of the IBP local chapters for
the proper handling and accounting of legal aid
cases which practicing lawyers can represent.
(b) The NCLA shall monitor the activities of the
Chapter of the Legal Aid Office with respect to
the coordination with Clerks of Court on legal aid
cases and the collation of certificates submitted
by practicing lawyers.
(c) The NCLA shall act as the national repository
of records in compliance with this Rule.
(d) The NCLA shall prepare the following forms:
certificate to be issued by the Clerk of Court and
forms mentioned in Section 5(e) and (g).
(e) The NCLA shall hold in trust, manage and
utilize the contributions and penalties that will be
paid by lawyers pursuant to this Rule to
effectively carry out the provisions of this Rule.
For this purpose, it shall annually submit an
accounting to the IBP Board of Governors.
The accounting shall be included by the IBP in its
report to the Supreme Court in connection with
its request for the release of the subsidy for its
legal aid program.
SECTION 7. Penalties. -
(a) At the end of every calendar year, any
practicing lawyer who fails to meet the minimum
prescribed 60 hours of legal aid service each
year shall be required by the IBP, through the
NCLA, to explain why he was unable to render
the minimum prescribed number of hours. If no
explanation has been given or if the NCLA finds
the explanation unsatisfactory, the NCLA shall
make a report and recommendation to the IBP
Board of Governors that the erring lawyer be
declared a member of the IBP who is not in good
standing. Upon approval of the NCLA’s
recommendation, the IBP Board of Governors
shall declare the erring lawyer as a member not
in good standing. Notice thereof shall be
furnished the erring lawyer and the IBP Chapter
which submitted the lawyer’s compliance report
or the IBP Chapter where the lawyer is
registered, in case he did not submit a
compliance report. The notice to the lawyer shall
include a directive to pay Four Thousand Pesos
(P4,000) penalty which shall accrue to the
special fund for the legal aid program of the IBP.
(b) The "not in good standing" declaration shall
be effective for a period of three (3) months
from the receipt of the erring lawyer of the
notice from the IBP Board of Governors. During
the said period, the lawyer cannot appear in
court or any quasi-judicial body as counsel.
Provided, however, that the "not in good
standing" status shall subsist even after the
lapse of the three-month period until and unless
the penalty shall have been paid.
(c) Any lawyer who fails to comply with his
duties under this Rule for at least three (3)
consecutive years shall be the subject of
disciplinary proceedings to be instituted motu
proprio by the CBD. The said proceedings shall
afford the erring lawyer due process in
accordance with the rules of the CBD and Rule
139-B of the Rules of Court. If found
administratively liable, the penalty of suspension
in the practice of law for one (1) year shall be
imposed upon him.
 (d) Any lawyer who falsifies a certificate or any
form required to be submitted under this Rule or
any contents thereof shall be administratively
charged with falsification and dishonesty and
shall be subject to disciplinary action by the
CBD. This is without prejudice to the filing of
criminal charges against the lawyer.
(e) The falsification of a certificate or any
contents thereof by any Clerk of Court or by any
Chairperson of the Legal Aid Committee of the
IBP local chapter where the case is pending or
by the Director of a legal clinic or responsible
officer of an NGO or PO shall be a ground for an
administrative case against the said Clerk of
Court or Chairperson. This is without prejudice
to the filing of the criminal and administrative
charges against the malfeasor.
SECTION 8. Credit for Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education (MCLE). - A lawyer who renders mandatory
legal aid service for the required number of hours in a
year for the three year-period covered by a compliance
period under the Rules on MCLE shall be credited the
following: two (2) credit units for legal ethics, two (2)
credit units for trial and pretrial skills, two (2) credit
units for alternative dispute resolution, four (4) credit
units for legal writing and oral advocacy, four (4) credit
units for substantive and procedural laws and
jurisprudence and six (6) credit units for such subjects
as may be prescribed by the MCLE Committee under
Section 2(9), Rule 2 of the Rules on MCLE.
A lawyer who renders mandatory legal aid service for
the required number of hours in a year for at least two
consecutive years within the three year-period covered
by a compliance period under the Rules on MCLE shall be
credited the following: one (1) credit unit for legal
ethics, one (1) credit unit for trial and pretrial skills, one
(1) credit unit for alternative dispute resolution, two (2)
credit units for legal writing and oral advocacy, two (2)
credit units for substantive and procedural laws and
jurisprudence and three (3) credit units for such subjects
as may be prescribed by the MCLE Committee under
Section 2(g), Rule 2 of the Rules on MCLE.
SECTION 9. Implementing Rules. - The IBP, through
the NCLA, is hereby given authority to recommend
implementing regulations in determining who are
"practicing lawyers," what constitute "legal aid cases"
and what administrative procedures and financial
safeguards which may be necessary and proper in the
implementation of this rule may be prescribed. It shall
coordinate with the various legal chapters in the crafting
of the proposed implementing regulations and, upon
approval by the IBP Board of Governors, the said
implementing regulations shall be transmitted to the
Supreme Court for final approval.
SECTION 10. Effectivity. - This Rule and its
implementing rules shall take effect on July 1,2009 after
they have been published in two (2) newspapers of
general circulation.
Ledesma v. Climaco, 57 SCRA 473 (1974);
Facts:
Petitioner Ledesma was assigned as counsel de parte for
an accused in a case pending in the sala of the respondent
judge. On October 13, 1964, Ledesma was appointed
Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Negros
Occidental. He commenced discharging his duties, and
filed a motion to withdraw from his position as counsel de
parte. The respondent Judge denied him and also
appointed him as counsel de oficio for the two defendants.
On November 6, Ledesma filed a motion to be allowed to
withdraw as counsel de oficio, because the Comelec
requires full time service which could prevent him from
handling adequately the defense. Judge denied the
motion. So Ledesma instituted this certiorari proceeding.
Issue:
Whether or not the order of the respondent judged in
denying the motion of the petitioner is a grave abuse of
discretion?
Holding:
No, Ledesma's withdrawal would be an act showing his
lack of fidelity to the duty rqeuired of the legal profession.
He ought to have known that membership in the bar is
burdened with conditions. The legal profession is
dedicated to the ideal of service, and is not a mere trade.
A lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio to
aid in the performance of the administration of justice.
The fact that such services are rendered without pay
should not diminish the lawyer's zeal.
Ratio:
“The only attorneys who cannot practice law by reason of
their office are Judges, or other officials or employees of
the superior courts or the office of the solicitor
General (Section 32 Rule 127 of the Rules of Court
[Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court]. The lawyer involved not being among them,
remained as counsel of record since he did not file a
motion to withdraw as defendant-appellant’s counsel after
his appointment as Register of Deeds. Nor was
substitution of attorney asked either by him or by the new
counsel for the defendant-appellant (People vs.
Williams CA G.R. Nos. 00375-76, February 28,
1963)
To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the
case of an indigent defendant, a lawyer may be required
to act as counsel de officio (People v. Daban) Moreover,
The right of an accused in a criminal case to be
represented by counsel is a constitutional right of the
highest importance, and there can be no fair hearing with
due process of law unless he is fully informed of his rights
in this regard and given opportunity to enjoy them
(People vs. Holgado, L-2809, March 22, 1950)
The trial court in a criminal case has authority
to provide the accused with a counsel de officio for such
action as it may deem fit to safeguard the rights of the
accused (Provincial Fiscal of Rizal vs. Judge Muñoz
Palma, L-15325, August 31, 1930)