Group 1 Psychological Incapacity
I. 1) Is the conclusion of the Court of
NARCISO S. NAVARRO, JR. v. CYNTHIA
CECILIO-NAVARROG.R. No. 162049
April 13, 2007
FACTS:
On January 8, 2003 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 65677,
reversing the Regional Trial Court’s
declaration of nullity of the marriage of
petitioner and respondent. Likewise
assailed is the Court of Appeals’
Resolution dated February 4, 2004
denying reconsideration. Narciso
Navarro, Jr. with the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 37, he sought the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to
respondent. Petitioner and respondent
were college sweethearts. At the time
they got married, both in civil and church
ceremonies, they were awaiting their first
child. Since petitioner was still a medical
student, while respondent was a student
of pharmacy, they lived with petitioner’s
parents, on whom they were financially
dependent. Eventually, their union bore
four children. He filed the petition for
nullification of their marriage when he
found out their eldest daughter had been
made pregnant by a man whom
respondent hired to follow him. She
concluded that respondent was also
psychologically incapacitated to perform
the marital obligations because she knew,
from the start, that her husband was
going to be a doctor, yet she did not give
him the support and understanding that
was expected of a doctor’s wife. For the
respondent’s part, respondent refused to
submit to the psychiatric examination
asked by the petitioner, but said she
would do so only when her defense
requires it. She averred that she had no
marital problems, not until petitioner had
an illicit affair with a certain Dr. Lucila
Posadas. Petitioner denied the affair.
Respondent narrated that early 1984, she
caught petitioner and Lucila inside the
Harana Motel in Sta. Mesa where a
confrontation ensued. After the incident,
petitioner seldom went home until he
permanently left his family sometime in
1986. On August 21, 1998, the trial court
held that petitioner and respondent were
both psychologically incapacitated to
perform their marital obligations. The
marriage between the parties is (sic)
dated June 2, 1973 is hereby declared null
and void.
ISSUES:
Appeals – that the lower court (RTC)
erred in finding the parties (petitioner
and respondent) both psychologically
incapacitated under Article 36 of The
Family Code – correct or not?
2) Is the conclusion of the Honorable
Court of Appeals – that the evidence failed
to show that the parties (petitioner and
respondent) were completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of
marriage – correct or not?
RULING:
1) The Honorable Court of Appeals is
correct, Article 36 of the Family
Code states that, a marriage
contracted by any party who, at
the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization.
Psychological incapacity required
by Art. 36must be characterized by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability.
Psychological incapacity should
refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly in cognitive of the
basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to
the marriage. These include the
obligations to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help
and support.2) The Honorable
Court of Appeals is correct,
petitioner failed to show that
grave and incurable incapacity, on
the part of both spouses, existed at
the time of the celebration of the
marriage. Their bickering and
arguments even before their
marriage and respondent’s
scandalous outbursts in public, at
most, show their immaturity, and
immaturity does not constitute
psychological incapacity. Thus so
far, both petitioner and
respondent have not shown proof
of a natal or supervening disabling
factor, an adverse integral element
in their personality structure that
effectively incapacitates them from
accepting and complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
Group 1 Psychological Incapacity
II.
BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner, vs.
WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent. G.R.
No. 136490, October 19, 2000
FACTS:
The two first met sometime in 1980 when
both of them were assigned at the
Malacanang Palace. Brenda is an escort of
Imee Marcos while Wilson is a
Presidential Guard of President
Ferdinand Marcos. They eventually
became sweethearts and were married
twice: on September 6, 1982 and May 8,
1983. Out of their marriage, five children
were born.
After the downfall of President Marcos,
Wilson left the military service in 1987
and then engaged in different business
ventures that did not however prosper.
As a wife, she always urged him to look
for work so that their children would see
him, instead of her, as the head of the
family and a good provider. Due to his
failure to engage in any gainful
employment, they would often quarrel
and as a consequence, he would hit and
beat her. He would even force her to have
sex with him despite her weariness. He
would also inflict physical harm on their
children for a slight mistake and was so
severe in the way he chastised them.
Thus, for several times during their
cohabitation, he would leave their house.
In 1992, they were already living
separately.
On October 16, 1994, they had a bitter
quarrel. As they were already living
separately, she did not want him to stay
in their house anymore. On that day,
when she saw him in their house, she was
so angry that she lambasted him. He then
turned violent, inflicting physical harm on
her and even on her mother who came to
her aid. The following day, October 17,
1994, she and their children left the house
and sought refuge in her sister’s house.
Sometime in August 1995, she together
with her two sisters and driver, went to
him at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to
look for their missing child, Niko. Upon
seeing them, he got mad. After knowing
the reason for their unexpected presence,
he ran after them with a samurai and
even [beat] her driver.
Brenda filed a case for the nullity of the
marriage for psychological incapacity.
The RTC declared the marriage null and
void under Art. 36 which was however
reversed by CA.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the totality of the
evidence presented in the present
case enough to sustain a finding that
respondent was psychologically
incapacitated.
2. Whether or not personal medical or
psychological examination of the
respondent by a physician is a
requirement for a declaration of
psychological incapacity.
HELD:
1. The ruling is negative. Although the
Court is sufficiently convinced that
respondent failed to provide material
support to the family and may have
resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, the totality of his acts
does not lead to a conclusion of
psychological incapacity on his part.
There is absolutely no showing that
his “defects” were already present at
the inception of the marriage or that
they are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can
be attributed to the fact that he had
lost his job and was not gainfully
employed for a period of more than
six years. It was during this period
that he became intermittently drunk,
failed to give material and moral
support, and even left the family
home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness
was traced only to said period and not
to the inception of the marriage.
Equally important, there is no
evidence showing that his condition is
incurable, especially now that he is
gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
2. Psychological incapacity, as a ground
for declaring the nullity of a marriage,
may be established by the totality of
evidence presented. There is no
requirement, however, that the
respondent should be examined by a
physician or a psychologist as a
conditio sine qua non for such
declaration.
In Republic v. CA and Molina, the
guidelines governing the application
and the interpretation of
psychological incapacity, referred to
in Article 36 of the Family Code,
incorporate the three basic
requirements mandated by the Court
in Santos v. Court of Appeals:
“psychological incapacity must be
characterized by gravity; juridical
antecedence; and incurability.” The
guidelines do not require that a
Group 1 Psychological Incapacity
physician examine the person to be
declared psychologically
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause
may be “medically or clinically
identified.” What is important is the
presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the party’s
psychological condition. For indeed, if
the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual
medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.
III.
Republic of the Phil. Vs. Cabantug-
Baguio (Gr. No. 171042)
FACTS:
From the Decision of the Court of Appeals
which affirmed that of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu, Branch 24 nullifying the
marriage of respondent, Lynnette
Cabantug-Baguio (Lynnette), to Martini
Dico Baguio (Martini), the Republic
through the Office of the Solicitor General
filed the present petition for review.
Lynnette and Martini contracted marriage
on August 12, 1997. Less than three years
later, Lynnette filed before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City a complaint
for declaration of nullity of marriage,
docketed as Civil Case No. CEB 25700, on
the ground of Martinis psychological
incapacity to comply with the essential
marital duties and obligations under
Articles 68-70 of the Family Code.
Lynnette and Martini, a seaman working
overseas, became pen pals in 1995. On
August 12, 1997, Martini, then 32, and
Lynnette, then 34, contracted marriage,
following which they moved to the house
of Lynnette’s parents, Martini, however,
stayed there only on weekends, and
during weekdays he stayed with his
parents. While Lynnette suggested that
the two of them stay in the house of
Martinis parents, Martini disagreed,
claiming that there were many already
living with his parents. Lynnette noticed
that every time she conversed with
Martini, he always mentioned his mother
and his family, and she soon realized that
he was a mama’s boy.
On the insistence of his mother, Martinis
monetary allotment was shared equally
between her and Lynnette.
In 1999, Lynette had not heard from
Martini and stopped receiving her share
of the allotment. On investigation,
Lynnette learned that Martini declared in
his employment records that he was
single and named his mother as principal
allottee.
In the Psychological Evaluation Report,
Dr. Gerong concluded:
Defendant shows immature personality
disorder, dependency patterns, and self-
centered motives. These are the core
personality dysfunctions noted and have
been exaggeratedly expressed in the
defendant, which are detrimental to the
familial well-being. The defendant is
psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential obligations in marriage
and family.
ISSSUE:
Whether or not the petition filed by the
Office of the Solicitor General to review
the decision of the Court of Appeals on
the nullification of marriage of the
respondent on the ground of
psychological incapacity be granted.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
The decision of the Court of Appeals
dated January 13, 2005 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. CEB 25700 of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch
24, is DISMISSED.
The term psychological incapacity to be a
ground for the nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a
party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
one is about to assume. As all people may
have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or
isolated characteristics associated with
certain personality disorders, there is
hardly a doubt that the intendment of the
law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most
serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. From
Lynnettes deposition, however, it is
gathered that Martinis failure to establish
a common life with her stems from his
refusal, not incapacity, to do so. It is
downright incapacity, not refusal or
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will,[47]
which renders a marriage void on the
ground of psychological incapacity.
IV.
SUAZO vs. SUAZO G.R NO. 164493
Group 1 Psychological Incapacity
FACTS:
Jocelyn and Angelito were married when
they were 16 years old. They lived with
Angelito’s parent. Jocelyn took odd jobs
while Angelito refused to work and was
most of the time drunk. Jocelyn urged him
to find work but this often resulted to
violent quarrels. A year after their
marriage, Jocelyn left Angelito. 10 years
later, she filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage under Art. 36. A
testified on the alleged physical beating
she received. The expert witness
corroborated parts of Jocelyn’s testimony.
Both her psychological report and
testimony concluded that Angelito was
psychologically incapacited. However,
Angelito was not personally examined by
the expert witness. The RTC annulled the
marriage but the CA reversed it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is basis to nullify
Jocelyn’s marriage with Angelito under
Art. 36.
HELD:
Jocelyn’s evidence is insufficient to
establish Angelito’s psychological
incapacity. The psychologist evaluated
Angelito’s psychological condition only in
an indirect manner – she derived all her
conclusions from information coming
from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause
cannot of course be doubted.The
psychlologist, using meager information
coming from a directly interested party,
could not have secured a adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila
complete personality profile and could
not have conclusively formed an objective
opinion or diagnosis of Angelito’s
psychological condition. While the report
or evaluation may be conclusive with
respect to Jocelyn’s psychological
condition, this is not true for Angelito’s.
The methodology employed simply
cannot satisfy the required depth and
comprehensiveness
of examination required to evaluate a
party alleged to be suffering from a
psychological disorder. Both the
psychologist’s report and testimony
simply provided a general description of
Angelito’s purported anti-social
personality disorder, supported by the
characterization of this disorder as
chronic, grave and incurable. The
psychologist was conspicuously silent,
however, on the bases for her conclusion
or the particulars that gave rise to the
characterization she gave. Jurisprudence
holds that there must be evidence
showing a link, medical or the like,
between the acts
that manifest psychological incapacity
and the psychological disorder itself.
Jocelyn’s testimony regarding
the habitual drunkenness, gambling and
refusal to find a job, while indicative of
psychological incapacity, do not, by
themselves, show psychological
incapacity. All these simply indicate
difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to
perform marital obligations.
V.
PILAPIL vs. IBAY-SOMERA, 174 SCRA
653, 30 June 1989
FACTS:
Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was
married in Germany to private
respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a
German national. They have a child who
was born on April 20, 1980 and named
Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Private
respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling
initiated a divorce proceeding against
petitioner in Germany on January
1983.The divorce decree was
promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the
ground of failure of marriage of the
spouses. The custody of the child was
granted to the petitioner.
Six months after the divorce was granted
private respondent filed 2 complaints for
alleging that while still married to Imelda,
latter “had an affair with William Chia as
early as 1982 and another man named
Jesus Chua sometime in 1983”.
ISSUE:
Whether a person could still be
prosecuted of bigamy after a divorce
decree was already issued?
HELD:
The law specifically provides that in
prosecution for adultery and
concubinage, the person who can legally
file the complaint should be the offended
spouse and nobody else. Though in this
case, it appeared that private respondent
is the offended spouse, the latter obtained
a valid divorce in his country and said
divorce and its legal effects may be
recognized in the Philippines.
Group 1 Psychological Incapacity
In the same consideration and rationale,
private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner and has no legal
standing to commence the adultery case
under the imposture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
VI.
ROEHR vs. RODRIGUEZ, G.R. No.
142820, 20 June 2003
FACTS:
Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German
citizen, married private respondent
Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on
December 11, 1980 in Germany. Their
marriage was subsequently ratified on
February 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros
Oriental. Out of their union were born
Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine.
Carmen filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage before the Makati RTC.
Meanwhile, Wolfgang obtained a decree
of divorce from Germany. The decree
provides that the parental custody of the
children should be vested to Wolfgang.
Wolfgang filed a motion to dismiss the
nullity case as a divorce decree had
already been promulgated, which was
granted by respondent Judge Salonga.
Carmen filed a motion with a prayer that
the case should proceed for the purpose
of determining the issues of custody of
children and the distribution of the
properties between her and Wolfgang.
Judge Salonga partially set aside her
previous order for the purpose of tackling
the issues of support and custody of their
children.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the granting the motion to
dismiss the nullity case valid ; it is valid to
assume jurisdiction to tackle child
custody and support.
HELD:
A judge can order a partial
reconsideration of a case that has not yet
attained finality. The court can modify or
alter a judgment even after the same has
become executory whenever
circumstances transpire rendering its
decision unjust and inequitable. Where
certain facts and circumstances justifying
or requiring such modification or
alteration transpired after the judgment
has become final and executory and when
it becomes imperative in the higher
interest of justice or when supervening
events warrant it.
Divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in
other countries are recognized in our
jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof,
such as custody must still be determined
by our courts. Before our courts can give
the effect ofres judicata to a foreign
judgment, it must be shown that the
parties opposed to the judgment had been
given ample opportunity to do so. In the
present case, it cannot be said that private
respondent was given the opportunity to
challenge the judgment of the German
court. The trial court was correct in
setting the issue for hearing to determine
the issue of parental custody, care,
support and education mindful of the best
interests of the children.
VII.
DANILO A. AURELIO, petitoner, vs. VIDA
MA. CORAZON P. AURELIO, respondent.
G.R. No. 175367, June 6, 2011
FACTS:
Spouses Danilo A. Aurelio, petitioner, and
Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio, respondent,
were married on March 23, 1988. From
this marriage, they had two sons: Danilo
Miguel and Danilo Gabriel.
On May 2002, respondent filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage. Her petition stated that both
she and her husband are allegedly
psychologically incapacitated of
performing and complying with their
respective essential marriage obligations.
In addition, the respondent alleged that
both their state of psychological
incapacity was present prior and during
the marriage ceremony. Thus, respondent
calls upon the Article 36 of the Family
Code to declare her marriage null and
void.
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void, even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
The following are the allegations made by
the respondent on her Petition:
On the Petitioner
(1) The husband manifested the
incapacity by the lack of financial
support from him and the lack of
drive and incapacity to discern the
plight of his wife.
Group 1 Psychological Incapacity
(2) He exhibited consistent jealousy
and distrust towards his wife.
(3) His moods alternated between
hostile defiance and contrition.
(4) He refused to assist in the
maintenance of the family.
(5) He refused to foot the household
bills and provide for his family’s
needs.
(6) He exhibited arrogance.
(7) He was completely insensitive to
the feelings of his wife.
(8) He liked to humiliate and
embarrass his wife even in the
presence of their children.
On the Respondent
(1) Respondent, on the other hand, is
effusive and displays her feelings
openly and freely.
(2) Her feelings change very quickly
from joy to fury to misery to
despair, depending on her day-to-
day experiences.
(3) Her tolerance for boredom was
very low.
(4) She was emotionally immature;
she cannot stand frustration or
disappointment.
(5) She cannot delay to gratify her
needs.
(6) She gets upset when she cannot
get what she wants.
(7) Self-indulgence lifts her spirits
immensely.
The psychological make-up of the spouses
was evaluated by a psychologist, who
found that the incapacity of both spouses
is grave, incorrigible, and incurable.
Respondent was found to be suffering
from Histrionic Personality Disorder with
Narcissistic Features, while the petitioner
suffers from a passive aggressive
personality that renders him immature
and irresponsible to assume the normal
obligations of a husband.
On November 8, 2002, the petitioner filed
for a Motion to Dismiss the petition of the
respondent. Principally argued that the
petition failed to state a cause of action
and that it failed to meet the standards set
by the Court for the interpretation and
implementation of Article 36. On January
14, 2003, the RTC issued an Order
denying the petitioner’s Motion. The
Court of Appeals confirmed the RTC
Order.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage shall be
declared null and void?
HELD:
The petition was denied and renders the
marriage still null and void.
1. The Court found that the root
cause of psychological incapacity
was stated and alleged in the
complaint. The Court agreed that
the manifestation of respondent
that the family backgrounds of
both the petitioner and
respondent were discussed in the
complaint as the root causes of
their psychological capacity, which
was clinically identified by a
competent and expert
psychologist.
2. The petition likewise alleged the
psychological incapacities of both
parties was of such a grave nature
as to bring about the disability to
assume the essential obligations of
marriage.
3. The Court found that the essential
marital obligations of living
together, observing mutual love,
respect, and fidelity, and rendering
mutual help and support were not
complied with and were alleged in
the petition.
VIII.
LEONILO ANTONIO, petitioner vs.
MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, respondent.
G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006
FACTS:
Leonilo Antonio and Marie Ivonne Reyes,
who were ten years apart in age, met in
August 1989 and got married within
barely a year before a minister of the
Gospel at the Manila City Hall and through
a subsequent church wedding at a church
in Pasig on December 6, 1990. Out of this
marriage, respondent bore a child on
1991 that unfortunately died five months
later.
On March 8, 1993, petitioner filed a
petition to have his marriage with
respondent declared null and void. The
petitioner cited Article 36 of the Family
Code for the nullity alleging that the
respondent was psychologically
incapacitated and that it existed at the
time of the marriage and still subsisted
afterwards.
Manifestations of the respondent’s
psychological incapacity was through her
persistent lying about herself, the people
around her, her occupation, income,
educational attainment and other event
or things, to wit:
Group 1 Psychological Incapacity
(1) She concealed the fact that she
previously gave birth to an
illegitimate son, and instead
introduced the boy to the
petitioner as the adopted child of
her family.
(2) She fabricated a story that her
brother-in-law, Edwin David,
attempted to rape and kill her,
when in fact, no such incident
occurred.
(3) She misrepresented herself as a
psychiatrist to her obstetrician,
and told some of her friends that
she graduated with a degree in
psychology, when she was neither.
(4) She claimed to be a singer or a
free-lance voice talent affiliated
with Blackgold Recording
Company; yet, not a single member
of her family ever witnessed her
alleged singing activities with the
group.
(5) She invented friends named Babes
Santos and Via Marquez, and
under those names, sent lengthy
letters to petitioner claiming to be
from Blackgold and touting her as
the number one moneymaker in
the commercial industry worth
two million Philippine Pesos.
(6) She represented herself as a
person of greater means; thus, she
altered her payslip to make it
appear she had higher income.
(7) She exhibited insecurities and
jealousy over the petitioner to the
extent of calling up his officemates
to monitor his whereabouts.
In support of his petition, petitioner
presented Dr. Dante Abcede, a Whether or not Antonio has established
psychiatrist, and Dr. Lopez, a clinical
psychologist, who stated that based on
their tests, the petitioner was essentially a
normal, introspective, shy, and
conservative person. Whereas, they
observed the respondent’s actions of
persistent and constant lying to petitioner
was abnormal and pathological. It
undermined the basic relationship that
should be based on love, trust, and
respect. Thus, it was concluded that the
respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to perform her essential
marital obligations.
In opposing the petition, the respondent
claims the following:
(1) She concealed her child by another
man from petitioner because she
was afraid of losing her husband.
(2) She told petitioner about David’s
attempt to rape and kill her
because surmised such intent from
David’s acts of touching her back
and ogling her from head to foot.
(3) She was actually a BS Banking and
Finance graduate and had been
teaching psychology for two years.
(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of
Aris de las Alas, an executive
producer of Channel 9. She was a
Blackgold recording artist
although she was not under
contract with the company and
reported after office hours. Also,
she claimed that the luncheon was
indeed held in her honor.
(5) Bea Marques Recto was a resident
of the United States while Babes
Santos was employed with
Saniwares.
(6) She admitted to calling the
officemate but to merely ask the
officemate a diplomatic matter if
she was the one asking for
chocolates from petitioner.
(7) She belied the allegation that she
spent lavishly as she supported
almost ten people from her
monthly budget of seven thousand
Philippine pesos.
The Trial Court gave credence to the
petitioner’s evidence and declared the
marriage null and void. The Court of
Appeals later reversed the Trial Court’s
decision. It held that the totality of
evidence presented was insufficient and
that the requirements in the 1997 Molina
case have not been satisfied.
ISSUE:
his cause of action for declaration of
nullity under Article 36 of the Family
Code and, generally, under the Molina
Guidelines.
HELD:
Yes. The petitioner, aside from his own
testimony, presented a psychiatrist and
clinical psychologists, both who were able
to attest the constant and persistent lying
of the respondent as well as her extreme
jealousy is abnormal and pathological.
It also satisfied the Molina Guidelines:
1. That Antonio has sufficiently
overcome his burden in proving
the psychological incapacity of his
wife.
2. The root cause of the respondent’s
illness has been medically and
clinically identified by competent
experts.
Group 1 Psychological Incapacity
3. That the made-up letters were
made before the marriage and thus
the existence of the illness was
even before the celebration of the
marriage.
4. The respondent’s psychological
incapacity was considered grave.
5. That her being a pathological liar
inhibits and makes her unable to
commit to her marital obligations.
6. The respondent’s case was
considered incurable even after
the petitioner tried to reconcile
with her. Her behavior remained
unchanged.
IX.
MORIGO vs PEOPLE, G.R. No. 145226, 6
February 2004
FACTS:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete
were boardmates for 4 years, after which
they lost contact with each other. They
reconnected again in 1984 and became
sweethearts when Lucia was in Singapore
until she went to Canada in 1986.
They got married in Aug.1990, the
following month Lucia went back to
Canada leaving Lucio behind. Lucia filed
for divorce in Canada which was granted
by the court to take effect on Feb 17,
1992. On Oct. 4, 1992, Lucio Morigo
married Maria Jececha Lumbago.
September 21, 1993, Lucio filed a
complaint for judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage with Lucia, on the
ground that no marriage ceremony
actually took place. Lucio was charged
with Bigamy in information filed by the
City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran City, with
the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.
Lucio filed a petition for certiorari seeking
a reversal of his conviction. He should not
be faulted for relying in good faith upon
the divorce decree of the Ontario court.
The OSG counters that petitioner’s
contention that he was in good faith in
relying on the divorce decree is negated
by his act of filing a petition for a judicial
declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Lucia.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner committed
bigamy and if so, whether his defense of
good faith is valid.
HELD:
The elements of bigamy are: (1) the
offender has been legally married; (2) the
first marriage has not been legally
dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse has not been
judicially declared presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage;
and (4) the subsequent marriage would
have been valid had it not been for the
existence of the first.
The trial court held that the marriage of
Lucio and Lucia is void ab initio, in
accordance with the Family Code. What
transpired was a mere signing of the
marriage contract by the two, without the
presence of a solemnizing officer.
The first element of bigamy as a crime
requires that the accused must have been
legally married. But in this case, legally
speaking, the petitioner was never
married to Lucia Barrete.
Petitioner has not committed bigamy. His
defense of good faith or lack of criminal
intent is now moot and academic.
X.
DEDEL vs. CA, G.R. No. 151867, 29
January 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner David B. Dedel married
respondent Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel
wedding on May 20, 1967. The union
produced four children. The conjugal
partnership, nonetheless, acquired
neither property nor debt.
Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible
and immature wife and mother and had
extra-marital affairs with several men.
Sharon once underwent treatment with a
clinical psychologist but it did not stop
Sharon in her illicit affairs where she even
had two children out of wedlock.
Sharon returned to petitioner bringing
along her two children. Petitioner
accepted her back and even considered
the two illegitimate children as his own.
December 9, 1995, Sharon abandoned
petitioner to join Ibrahim in Jordan with
their two children.
Petitioner filed a petition seeking the
declaration of nullity of his marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity.
Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was
suffering from Anti-Social Personality
Disorder exhibited by her blatant display
of infidelity and had no capacity for
remorse. Her repeated acts of infidelity
and abandonment of her family are
indications of Anti-Social Personality
Disorder amounting to psychological
incapacity to perform the essential
obligations of marriage.
ISSUES:
Does the totality of the evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding
Group 1 Psychological Incapacity

that respondent is psychologically

incapacitated?
Does the aberrant sexual behavior of
respondent adverted to by petitioner fall
within the term “psychological
incapacity?”
HELD:
Respondent’s sexual infidelity can hardly
qualify as being mentally or psychically ill
to such an extent that she could not have
known the obligations she was assuming.
Neither could her emotional immaturity,
irresponsibility and abandonment
constitute psychological incapacity. It
must be shown that these acts are
manifestations of a disordered
personality which make respondent
completely unable to discharge the
essential marital obligations. The
manifestations presented refers only to
grounds for legal separation, not for
declaring a marriage void.
The grief, frustration and even
desperation of petitioner in his present
situation cannot be denied. While
sympathy is warranted in the petitioner’s
marital predicament, the law must be
applied no matter how harsh it may be.