BMCR 2018.09.

43 on the BMCR blog

Bryn Mawr Classical Review 2018.09.43

Matteo Zaccarini, The Lame Hegemony: Cimon of Athens and the

Failure of Panhellenism, ca. 478-450 BC. Storia antica,
5. Bologna: Bononia University
Press, 2017. Pp. 400. ISBN 9788869232411. €35,00 (pb).

Reviewed by Eyal Meyer, Hebrew University of Jerusalem

(eyalmeyer2@gmail.com)

The present monograph, which sprang from the author’s doctoral dissertation,
constitutes an interesting and well-written study that offers a revised
reconstruction of Athenian history spanning from 478 to 450 BC, also known
as the Cimonian period. This critical period in Greek history was marked by
the emergence of Athenian imperialism and by the political dominance of
Cimon son of Miltiades, one of Athens’ most accomplished generals.

This is a challenging period for historical research, primarily due to the

paucity of contemporary or even near-contemporary sources. In essence, the
fifth-century accounts for the first three decades following the aftermath of
Xerxes’ invasion consist of Thucydides’ aguishly terse Pentecontaetia, a few
passages in Herodotus, and a handful of variably fragmented Attic
inscriptions. These traditions are supplemented by the accounts of fourth-
century historians and orators and the detailed accounts of Diodorus and
Plutarch, who derived their information from fourth-century historians such
as Ephorus and Callisthenes, whose works are now lost.

Consequently, modern scholarship must confront a fundamental question: to

what extent can we rely on non-contemporary sources when seeking to
reconstruct the early history of the Delian League? Zaccarini justly applies a
critical approach when dealing with the later sources, and he successfully
demonstrates that the meagerness of fifth-century sources allowed the
historians of the fourth century and their successors, both ancient and
modern, to reshape and modify fifth-century traditions in the process of
appropriating the past into their own historical and cultural context.

Zaccarini begins by providing two preliminary chapters that provide a

succinct survey of the literary traditions concerned with Cimon’s genealogy,
his cultural background, and major traits ascribed to the Athenian general in
the ancient sources. The reminder of the monograph is divided into two parts
entitled (I) ‘Chronology and events’ and (II) ‘A historical interpretation’.

Part I deals with Athenian military operations occurring between 478 and 450
BC. While still under Spartan leadership, the Greek allies turned their
attention to the Hellespont region and Cyprus. Zaccarini argues, rightly in my
view, that these attacks, which occurred in the very same campaign season,
albeit seemingly aggressive, were in fact defensive in nature since their
objective was in all likelihood to hinder another crossing of Persian land
forces from Asia to Europe and to prevent the Persian navy from Cyprus as a
staging point for future operations in the Aegean.

Only after the Persian threat had been contained, and the Athenians snatched
the leadership from the Spartans, were the Greek allies able to storm and
retake the last Persian strongholds in the northern Aegean. These operations
are divided by Zaccarini into two phases: ‘The campaign for the northern
Aegean Sea’ (470s BC) and ‘The Thracian campaign’ (mid-460s BC). The
capture of Eion (476 BC), the earliest attestation of a military operation
commanded by Cimon, prefigured the ongoing Athenian involvement in the
northern Aegean theatre in the decades to come. However, as Zaccarini
points out, while Aeschines credits the fall of Eion to the collective effort of
the citizen-soldiers of the Athenian democracy, Plutarch’s account centers on
Cimon’s role in the operation. The discrepancies between the accounts of
Plutarch and Aeschines provide a case-study that demonstrates the impact of
the historical context of later tradition on the manner in which these authors
commemorated the events of the mid-470s BC.

Furthermore, Zaccarini highlights the centrality of Athenian strategic and

commercial interests in the northern Aegean, interests which according to
Zaccarini were the main the impetus for the Athenian subjugation of the
islands of Scyros and Thasos as well as the Boeotian city of Carystus. One
should add that the traditions which brand the peoples of Scyros and Carystus
as medizers, whose purpose seems to be to legitimize Athens’ war against
Greek communities while the war against Persia was far from over, shed light
on Athenian conduct in the aftermath of the Persian Wars. We have reports
regarding numerous Greek cities and communities that sided with the Persian
enemy, but only a handful of them were targeted by the Athenians. Such a
policy suggests that the accusation of Medism was a mere pretext that the
Athenians exploited to further their position in the Aegean. All in all, Athens’
involvement in the northern Aegean allowed the Athenians to establish
themselves as the undisputed leaders of the war against the Persian Empire
and to safeguard their own interests in the region. Once Attica was secured,
the Athenians were able to launch ‘The Asian Campaign’, in which both
Greek and non-Greek cities and communities were attacked by Athens and its
allies. Zaccarini seeks to redeem the Athenian war against Naxos by arguing
that the Athenians were not exclusively motivated by their desire to protect
their hegemony but also by the strategic importance of the island to the war
against the Persians, which was located on the route to and from the western
coastline of Asia Minor. But the major operation in this phase was Cimon’s
campaign in Caria and Lycia, which climaxed in the decisive victory over
Persian land and sea forces at the Eurymedon River. It is difficult to accept
Zaccarini’s assertion that “the battle of the Eurymedon commanded a
longstanding prominence and celebration in the tradition thanks to it
undisputed importance, its sensational outcome, and its distance from the
Greek motherland” (p. 140). Athenian presence in the region was ephemeral,
while the absence of any attempt to retake Cyprus seems rather odd. The
contrast between the succinct account of Thucydides and the wealth of details
provided by Plutarch and Diodorus undercuts the notion that the victory at
the Eurymedon was as decisive as later traditions claim it to be. Therefore,
we cannot rule out the possibility that the memory of this battle, just like
many other fifth-century events Zaccarini discusses, was embellished and
enhanced over the centuries.

Regardless of the actual historical importance of the Eurymedon campaign, a

useful observation made by Zaccarini refers to two opposing perspectives
concerned with the manner in which the Greco-Persian war is envisioned in
the sources. According to Thucydides’ viewpoint, the war against Persia
came to an end following the Persian defeats at Plataea and Mycale. But
other sources, mainly Diodorus, cast the peace of Callias as the true end of
the conflict. These two historiographical frameworks promote two different
narratives of the war between Persia and Greece: the one centers on the
collective effort of the Greek allies to ward off a Persian invasion, while the
other centers on Athens and its leading role in the continuous struggle against
the Persian menace.

Next, Zaccarini connects the political downfall of Cimon to the souring

relations between Athens and Sparta, which occurred in the context of ‘The
Peloponnesian Campaign’. The infamous incident at Ithome (464 BC), in
which the Spartans dismissed the Athenian contingent sent to assist them in
suppressing a helot revolt, constituted the first formal disagreement between
Sparta and Athens since Xerxes’ retreat. Zaccarini argues, convincingly in
my view, that the account of Thucydides is suspect since it depicts the
Spartans as unjustly hostile toward the Athenians. Such a portrayal must have
been dominant in the context of the Peloponnesian War since it validates
Athens’ response to the Spartan insult while it enforces Thucydides’ claim
that the clash between Sparta and Athens was inevitable.

The following phase, entitled ‘the one war and the last years of Cimon’,
centers on Cimon’s return from exile and his death. Zaccarini maintains that
aggressive Corinthian expansionism was key in the eruption of hostilities
between Athens and the Peloponnesians. As for Cimon, Zaccarini notes that
Plutarch’s account of the battle of Tanagra and Cimon’s final days, which
may reflect a fourth-century perspective, highlights Cimon’s heroic features,
which in turn justifies his early recall from exile and debunks the accusation
of his pro-Spartan tendencies.

The second part of the monograph is thematic in nature. In it Zaccarini seeks

to evaluate the consistency of Athens’ grand strategy during Cimon’s period
of prominence. He argues that, since the safety of Attica was paramount, the
Athenians sought to acquire strategic depth by subjugating locations of
military and economic importance in the Aegean. Such an interpretation does
well to connect the Athenian operations in the northern Aegean, Asia Minor,
and mainland Greece, but fails to explain the Athenian intervention in Egypt
in the 460s. Operations in Asia Minor, Cyprus, and even Phoenicia can be
viewed as efforts to keep the Persians at bay, as Zaccarini deems Athenian
operations in the eastern Mediterranean to have been preemptive wars
conducted on an irregular basis. However, the considerable investment of
resources and manpower in the expedition to Egypt serves as an indication
that the Athenians aspired to something more. Several scholars have argued
that economic and commercial considerations drove the Athenians to assist
the Egyptian rebels against the Persians,1 which corresponds with Zaccarini’s
interpretation of Athens’ involvement in the northern Aegean. Regardless,
although we cannot determine with certainty the nature and character of the
Persian policy in the west, there is no substantial evidence for a Persian
intention to reassert the Great King’s authority in the Aegean. We may
assume that economic considerations were cardinal in Athens’ strategy, but
we should not forget that the official goal of the Delian League was to wage
war against the Persians. Persian passivity posed a real and immediate threat
to the legitimacy of the Delian League, and by extension to Athens’s lofty
position within this political framework. Therefore, furthering the war against
Persia, regardless of actual Persian intent or action, must have been a crucial
component in Athenian strategy and foreign policy.

In the next section, ‘The New tyrants’, Zaccarini underscores the limitations
of the bipolar division between pro-democratic and pro- oligarchic factions in
Athenian politics. He demonstrates that such a partition did not exist in the
fifth century BC, and suggests that Athenian politicians should be assessed
by the manner in which they used wealth, either public or private, to garner
political support. It is followed by a section entitled ‘Contemporary
Intellectuals’, which constitutes an essentially negative exercise aimed at
refuting the hypothesis that Cimon’s policies and public image benefited
from the support of several prominent intellectuals. Zaccarini maintains that,
while a close relationship between Cimon and these intellectuals remains
plausible, the assumption that they were active participants in his effort to
maintain his political prominence is an overstatement. Lastly, Zaccarini
argues against the notion that Cimon was the driving force behind various
contemporary public works in Athens, which is followed by a summary of
the themes pertaining to Cimon’s literary portrait and how it developed
throughout the centuries.

To summarize, this monograph is an excellent addition to the study of the

history of Cimonian Athens. Zaccarini’s study is very thorough and coherent,
and provides ample documentation of the ancient sources and the modern
treatments. Although the Athenian campaigns in the eastern Mediterranean
may receive less attention, this study supplements and completes Biondi’s
recent monograph on the Athenian Empire.2 To some extent, this study
constitutes a biography of Cimon, a most welcome contribution since, as far
as I know, the only modern biography of Cimon was published by Lombardo
in 1934.3 However, since this book also seeks to reassess Athenian policies
between 478 and 450, when Cimon’s role in certain episodes is not well
documented, the tendency to follow his career disrupts the flow of the
discussion. Nevertheless, despite the scarcity of evidence, which adds a tinge
of speculation to any debate regarding the first decades of the Delian League,
Zaccarini’s contribution provides a valuable reconstruction of Athenian
policies and strategy in this pivotal period in Greek history.

Notes:

1. Cf. R. Meiggs. The Athenian Empire (Oxford 1972), 95; M.

Dandamaev. A Political History of the Achaemenid Empire (Leiden 1989),
239; S. Ruzicka. Trouble in the West: Egypt and the Persian Empire, 525-
332 BC (Oxford 2012), 34.
2. E. Biondi. La politica imperialistica ateniese a metà del V secolo a.C.: il
contesto egizio-cipriota (Milano 2016).
3. G. Lombardo. Cimone: ricostruzione della biografia e discussioni
storiografiche (Rome 1934).